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Matrimonial Causes2016

CWYJ v. LTYE

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[2022] HKFC 65-EN-2022-04-12

CWYJ v. LTYE

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FCMC1135/2016

[2022] HKFC 65

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

MATRIMONIAL CAUSES

NUMBER 1135 of 2016

----------------------------

BETWEEN  
 CWYJPetitioner
 and 
 LTYERespondent

----------------------------

Coram:  Deputy District Judge M Lam in Chambers

Date of Trial :  22 - 24 June 2021

Date of Closing Submissions of the Petitioner :  2 July 2021

Date of Closing Submissions of the Respondent :  16 July 2021

Date of Judgment :  12 April 2022

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Judgment

(Variation of Maintenance)

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Application

1.  This is the Respondent’s application for downward variation of maintenance for his ex-wife by the Notice of Application for Variation dated 11 August 2020 as amended on 10 November 2020.

2.  This is indeed the Respondent’s second application for variation of maintenance. He filed two notices of application for variation respectively on 4 April 2018 and 2 May 2018 (“First Variation Application”). The trial took place in May 2019 (“First Variation Trial”). On 28 June 2019, this Court handed down the judgment (“First Variation Judgment”) dismissing his application. No appeal was lodged against the judgment.

3.  In this application, the Petitioner (ex-wife) and the Respondent (ex-husband) (collectively, the “Parties”) gave evidence in court. The Respondent’s father (“Father”), who had not given evidence at the First Variation Trial, testified for the Respondent at this trial.

Consent Order

4.  The Parties got married in Hong Kong on 5 October 2007 (“Marriage”). Two daughters (“Children”) (now aged 13 and 12) were born of the marriage. The Petitioner petitioned for divorce in January 2016. The decree absolute was granted on 17 March 2017.

5.  During mediation, the Parties reached a settlement agreement (“Settlement Agreement”) on the issue of custody as well as financial arrangements with the assistance of a mediator and their respective solicitors. The Settlement Agreement was reduced into the “Minutes of Consent Order” dated 26 July 2016 (“Minutes”).

6.  The Minutes was subsequently made a consent order by Deputy District Judge D. Cheung on 27 January 2017. The Order was amended on 9 July 2018 and re-amended on 1 August 2018 ("Consent Order").

7.  The Consent Order was granted upon a number of undertakings given by the Respondent. The undertakings and the terms of the Consent Order which are relevant to the present purpose are that : -

(1)  the parties are to share joint custody of the Children with care and control to the Mother.

(2)  the Respondent is to :

(i)   procure and secure the former matrimonial home (“Matrimonial Home”) for the sole use and occupation of the Petitioner and the Children rent free.

(ii) pay or procure payments to be made for almost all of the expenses relating to the Children and the Matrimonial Home.

(3)  solely for the Petitioner, the Respondent is to :

(a)   pay, under the undertaking of Recital O and paragraph 3 of the Consent Order, a lump sum of HKD4 million (“Lump Sum Payment”) by eight installments of HKD500,000 each payable every six months. The first installment is to be paid on 1 January 2017 (subject to pronouncement of the Decree Absolute) and the last one on 1 July 2020.

(b)   pay, under the undertaking of Recital M and paragraphs 2 (interim maintenance) and 5 of the Consent Order, periodical payment of HKD35,000 per month until the Petitioner’s death or remarriage, whichever is earlier (“Periodical Payments”) with the first payment to be made on 1 August 2016.

((3)(a) - (b) collectively, the “Spousal Payments”);

(c)   provide the family car (“Family Car”) or another vehicle of the name or higher value for the sole use of the Petitioner and pay for all costs of car maintenance until her death or remarriage, whichever is the earlier, under the undertaking of Recital N of the Consent Order (“Family Car Undertaking”).

8.  Notwithstanding that the Lump Sum Payment was termed as repayment of loan to the Petitioner, the Parties regard it as lump sum payment having the meaning of section 4 of the Matrimonial Proceedings and Property Ordinance, Cap. 192 (“MPPO”) as in the First Variation Application. Further, the Respondent’s confirmation of his understanding of the terms and legal effect of the Minutes with the benefit of proper legal advice and sufficient time for consideration before entering into the Settlement Agreement was recorded in the Minutes and further re-confirmed at trial.

Enforcement Proceedings

9.  After two initial payments of HKD10,000 each in August and September 2016, totaling HKD20,000 (“2016 Payment”), the Respondent had since made no payment for the Spousal Payments until after a prohibition order (“Prohibition Order”) was granted restraining him from leaving Hong Kong on 6 July 2020.

10.  Given her repeated requests for payment met with no success since the 2016 Payment, the Petitioner has commenced enforcement proceedings against the Respondent, including, issuing a number of judgment summonses, an attachment of income application (no order was made), a statutory demand (“Statutory Demand”) (issued on 17 August 2018 and was subsequently set aside). On the other hand, the Respondent took out the First Variation Application.

11.  In the First Variation Judgment, it was found, in essence, that :

(a)   the Respondent’s assets were on the increase whilst his liabilities were in decline;

(b)   he continued to enjoy a high standard of living;

(c)   two months after the First Variation Application was made, he elected to cease living with his parents (“Parents”) rent free and rented an apartment at a monthly rate of HKD25,000.

(d)   the Parents have been generously supportive of the Respondent throughout the years and it was highly likely that their financial support would continue.

(e)   the Petitioner’s assets and earnings have not materially increased after the Settlement Agreement.

12.  On 1 July 2019, two days after the First Variation Judgment, the Respondent relocated to Singapore. The hearings of the Petitioner’s judgment summonses were then restored.

13.  In April 2020, the Respondent returned to Hong Kong and got married with his current wife (“Wife”) in May 2020. On 6 July 2020, the Petitioner obtained the Prohibition Order, which was extended twice to 4 September 2020. The second extension was set aside on 8 October 2020.

14.  In August 2020, the Petitioner issued another judgment summons as well as a summons to recover payments outstanding for more than 12 months. During the period, the Respondent took out the present application.

Payment History

15.  Other than the 2016 Payment of HKD20,000, there was no payment at all for the Spousal Payments from the Settlement Agreement in July 2016 until after the Prohibition Order granted on 6 July 2020.

16.  On 16 July 2020, the Respondent submitted an application form for the release of the funds from his MPF accounts in Hong Kong. On 26 August 2020, a cheque for payment of his MPF funds in Hong Kong at HK$846,132.05 (“MPF Funds”) was sent to the Petitioner to cover part of the arrears due to her under the Consent Order, including, inter alia, the periodical payments for the period between 1 September 2019 and 1 August 2020.

17.  On 28 September 2020, a Consent Summons was filed into Court to discharge two of the judgment summonses with the MPF Funds, leaving the Lump Sum Payment of HK$3,989,647.95 unpaid.

18.  Thereafter, the Respondent has made a monthly payment of HKD5,000 to the Petitioner for settlement of part of the Lump Sum Payment through his employer. As of 28 April 2021, the Lump Sum Payment remained outstanding was HKD3,944,647.95.

19.  In January 2021, the Respondent paid HKD75,000 (the sum was said to be his annual wage supplement and in anticipation of his bonus) to the Petitioner in settlement of a costs order.

20.  In February 2021, the Petitioner transferred the ownership of the Family Car to herself at the request of the Respondent. Subsequently, the Respondent also asked for the Family Car Undertaking be discharged with the sum of HKD60,000 (“Insurance Refund”), which was received by the Petitioner from an insurance company as a result of his restructure of an insurance policy for the Children.

21.  Notwithstanding the Parties reported to have incurred general and personal expenses for the Children in their respective Form Es and affidavits, they admit in court that almost all of the expenses relating to the Children and the Matrimonial Home have all along been funded by the Parents save that the utilities expenses relating to the Matrimonial Home have been met by the Respondent.

Present Application

22.  By the notice of the present application, the Respondent applied for downward variations of the Spousal Payments to the extent that : -

(1)  the payment schedule of the Lump Sum Payment be varied to monthly installments of HKD5,000, commencing from 1 September 2020; the monthly installments be increased to HKD10,000 from January 2022 until the whole sum be fully paid;

(2)  the Periodical Payments be varied downwards to HKD1 per annum; and

(3)  the Family Car Undertaking be discharged.

23.  Shortly before the trial, the Respondent offered that he would be willing to give an undertaking (“Proposed Undertaking”) to apply any increase in his salary, discretionary bonus and inheritance from his parents, net of taxes, towards discharging the balance of the Lump Sum Payment providing that the Spousal Payments would be varied to the extent that : -

(1)   the Lump Sum Payment to be paid by monthly installments of :

(a)   HKD5,000 until September 2021;

(b)   HKD10,000 from October 2021 onwards; and

(c)   HKD17,500 from October 2022 onwards until the Lump Sum Payment is discharged in full.

(2)   the Periodical Payments be varied downwards from HKD35,000 to HKD1 per annum; and

(3)   the Family Car Undertaking be discharged.

24.  At trial, it was clarified for the Respondent that the Proposed Undertakings would only be given if the Respondent’s offer is accepted in full. In his Closing Submissions, the Respondent revised his offer (“Offer”) so that the monthly payment of HKD10,000 is to be started from September 2021.

Grounds of Application

25.  The Respondent says that the Offer is the most that he can realistically afford in his present financial circumstances, which have been changed materially for the following reasons :

(1)  the Father who controls the family’s finances is no longer willing to provide financial support to him, other than the support to the Children.

(2)  Since his relocation to Singapore, he has been suffering a reduction in income and an increment in living expenses.

(3)  the Petitioner, having her own business, investments and a steady boyfriend, is capable to maintain herself financially.

26.  He offers to increase the monthly payments of the Lump Sum Payment in two stages because his loan from the DXX bank for which he currently makes a monthly repayment of about HK$5,000 would be discharged by October 2021 and his loan from the BXX bank for which he currently makes a monthly repayment of about HK$7,500 would be discharged by October 2022 (collectively, “Two Loans”).

27.  The Petitioner resists this application. She complains the Respondent to have been in default of his obligation from day one and continues to be in default. She regards this application as a de-facto attempt to reduce the Lump Sum Payment and to get rid of the Periodical Payments. She denies any change in circumstances which justifies a variation of the Consent Order.

Legal Principles

28.  The power of the Court to vary a periodical payment order and the repayment schedule of a lump sum payment order is provided for by section 11(1) of the Matrimonial Proceedings and Property Ordinance, Cap. 192 (“MPPO”) .

29.  The power is to be exercised in accordance with section 11(7) of MPPO. The Court shall have regard to all the circumstances of the case, including any change in any of the matters to which the court was required to have regard when making the order to which the application relates.

30.  The legal principles governing variation of a consent order can be summarized as follows: -

(a)   The statutory power to vary is wide and the court is to consider all the circumstances of the case.

(b)   While the court is not required to proceed from the starting point of the original order but look at the matter afresh, the basis and intended effect of the original order are relevant factors to which the Court should pay regard and there should not be a radical departure from the approach taken by   the parties themselves when they had entered into an agreement embodied in a consent order. see AEM v VFM [2008] 3 HKLRD 36

(c)   The existence of a prior agreement was an important aspect which should be looked at having regard to the conduct of the two parties, both leading up to the agreement and subsequent thereto, and the Court should bear in mind that formal agreements, properly and fairly arrived at with competent legal advice, should be given effect to unless good and substantial grounds were shown for concluding that injustice would be done by holding the parties to the terms of the agreement.  see AEM v VFM

(d)   Absent unfair or unconscionable factors attaching to the circumstances in which the agreement came to be concluded and absent material and drastic unforeseen circumstances arising after the conclusion of the agreement such as to cause manifest prejudice to one of the parties, the courts will hold the parties to their bargain. The burden is on the party seeking to achieve a different term to show “good and substantial cause” why the agreement should not be respected. see L v C [2007] 3 HKLRD 819

(e)   The public policy of finality in litigation dictates that order, especially consent orders, providing for a clean break, should only be countenanced when the anticipated circumstances have changed very significantly, and/ or for cogent reasons rendering it unjust or impracticable to hold the payer to the original order. see CH v MEH [2012] 1 HKLRD 752

31.  Where the third party financial assistance is involved, the court has to look at the reality of the situation, taking into account not only what a party actually had, but what might reasonably be made available to him if a request for assistance were to be made. As to what might occur in the foreseeable future, past conduct was often a useful guide. see KEWS v NCHC (2013) 16 HKCFAR 1

32.  With these principles in mind, I now turn to consider the arguments between the parties.

Respondent’s Earnings and Earning Capacity

33.  The Respondent was born in 1971 and graduated from a reputable university in the US with a degree in Engineering. He came from a wealthy family. The Father is aged 81 who has been a practicing solicitor in Hong Kong for more than 50 years. He ran his own law firm until its closure. He is now a senior solicitor in a well-established law firm in Hong Kong. The Respondent’s mother (“Mother”) is 75 years old. She is the director and sole shareholder of a limited company in Hong Kong (“Company”). The Company holds a number of valuable landed properties, including the Matrimonial Home.

34.  Since the purchase of the Matrimonial Home in around 2009, the Respondent had lived there rent free with the Petitioner until he moved out in around November of 2015. Since then, he lived with the Parents in a different block of the same estate until around January 2018. From then on, he started to cohabit with his then girlfriend (the Wife) in a flat rented by him at a monthly rent of HK$25,000. He relocated to Singapore on 1 July 2019. The Wife joined him with her two dogs in November 2019. They got married in May 2020.

35.  The Respondent has been working in the corporate finance industry since the mid-90s. In around 2007, he became a Responsible Officer under the Securities and Futures Ordinance. During the Marriage, he worked as a Responsible Officer in various established companies. He also embarked on his own businesses. In or around 2011, he successfully closed a mergers and acquisitions deal jointly with a Mr Yeung (“Yeung”), who rewarded him with HKD2,850,000 (“Business Venture”). In or about 2014, he tried to start some side businesses in Indonesia with some business partners.

36.  According to the affidavits and the four Form Es filed by the Respondent respectively on 12 April 2016 (“2016 Form E”), 17 November 2017 (“2017 Form E”), 22 January 2019 (“2019 Form E”) and 3 March 2020 (“Last Form E”) in these divorce proceedings, his monthly incomes in the past few years can be roughly summarized as follows : -

(a)  from April 2013 to mid 2015 : businessman and employment with XX holding limited : around HKD120,000;

(b)  thereafter to around mid 2016 : businessman and employment with XX Capital Ltd (“Previous Employment”) : around HKD38,500 (at the time of Settlement Agreement);

(c)  thereafter to 30 June 2019, employment with XX Securities Ltd as Head of the Corporate Finance Department (“Last Employment”) : around HKD91,958.

37.  It is the Respondent’s case that he was forced to resign from his Last Employment as a result of the restructuring of the employer company, and, in April 2019, he entered into employment (“Current Employment”) with a subsidiary company of a publicly-listed group company on the Singapore Stock Exchange (“Group”) at the invitation of Yeung. Yeung is his good friend who was and still is the Group’s chief executive officer and executive director. He started the Current Employment in July 2019. In the Last Form E, his income was reported to be HKD69,600, (basic salary of HKD45,600 (SGD8,000) + double pay HKD3,800 + bonus 15,200 + traveling allowance HKD5,000). His basic salary was increased to HKD50,160 (SGD8,800) on 1 July 2020 and his bonus in 2020 was HKD30,780 (SGD5,400).

38.  As summarized above, all the evidence points to the fact that he has strong earning capacity. he has good educational and professional qualifications. He has profound knowledge and experience in corporate finance and business developments locally and globally. He succeeded in the Business Adventure earning a profit of HKD2,800,000. His sound educational and professional background warranted him promotions and decent incomes over the years.

39.  It is the Respondent’s case that he left Hong Kong for the Current Employment at the invitation of his old friend, Yeung, who offered to reward him with attractive remunerations, including, bonuses and stock options, depending on his performance and the performance of the Group. He trusts Yeung will look after his financial interests as Yeung did in the Business Venture. They had trust and confidence in each other when entering into the Current Employment, targeting at building up the manufacturing branch of the Group’s business with a new investment to be made in electric vehicles, aiming at planning the business for an IPO. Since he is familiar with corporate finance and business development in various countries, including Indonesia, he has been entrusted by Yeung with both business management and development with a view to the Respondent eventually becoming his Chief Financial Officer. He regards the Current Employment as a valuable opportunity to re-establish himself after his career setbacks and broken marriage.

40.  At present, the Respondent is the Chief Executive Officer of two subsidiary companies of the Group. He is also involved with the corporate finance and business development of the Group and the manufacturing arm of another subsidiary. He goes on business trips almost every week. Even though it is said that the progress of the intended IPO has been delayed, he was still rewarded with a 2.5% interest in a subsidiary company of the Group, 10% basic salary increment and bonuses in 2019 (including SGD20,000 which was applied to discharge his credit card debts) as well as in 2020.

41.  Since March 2020, the Respondent has been working as a project leader on a USD20 million deal for electric bikes. He reiterates that it is a breakthrough deal for the Group as his employer has emphasized that it was the most important line of their investments, and, he regards it as his chance to earn a good bonus and stock options. Since August 2020, his employer has embarked on other potential electric bike business negotiations. When he stayed in Hong Kong after May 2021, he still managed to identify a few good clients in Hong Kong to prove his value to the employer. He was valued by his employer, who urgently needed him to go to Indonesia to oversee the projects when he was in Hong Kong in 2020 and even postponed the project schedule for him.

42.  As stated above, the Respondent’s income rose from HKD38,500 in April 2016 (shortly before the Settlement Agreement) to HKD90,458 by January 2019 (before the First Variation Trial). He relocated to Singapore shortly after the hand down of the First Variation Judgment, earning an average monthly income of HK$HKD69,600. He received 10% increment of basic salary in 2020.

43.  Despite the Respondent seeks to argue that his current earnings are lower than his earnings from the Last Employment, it is indeed much more than his earnings at the time he entered into the Settlement Agreement. I opine that the decline in earnings compared to the Last Employment should be short-term. He has strong earning capacity and prosperous career prospects before him. The chance that he will be handsomely rewarded by his long-term friend and business partner as promised is high. It is highly likely that his monthly average income will far exceed HKD70,000 in the foreseeable future.

Respondent’s Assets and Liabilities

44.  The Respondent says that his current financial position is more or less the same as that stated in the Last Form E, broadly he has assets in the value of 378,798 (HKD13,798 cash in banks, HKD365,000 long-term debts owed by a previous business partner) plus a sum of HKD205,119 in the Central Provident Fund in Singapore. He has liabilities of HKD394,924 (excluding the Spousal Payments).

45.  It is my finding in the First Variation Trial that the Respondent’s assets increased from HKD1,365,001 to HKD1,600,178 before the First Variation Trial whilst his liabilities were in decline. With regard to his liabilities, the majority of them was reported to be the money owed to the Parents (other than the Spousal Payments). In the 2016 Form E, he logged HKD1 million loan owed to the Parents. In the 2017 Form E, his loans owed to the Parents were increased to HKD3 million due to their settlement of his credit card debts of HKD2 million (which were accumulated since the Marriage). In the 2019 Form E and the Last Form E, no money due to the Parents was reported.

46.  There is around HKD138,000 decrease in his assets and approximately HKD80,000 decrease in his liabilities between the last two Form Es. Majority of his liabilities were the Lump Sum payments owed to the Petitioner.

Respondent’s Expenditure

47.  In the Last Form E, the Respondent sets out his expenditure as follows:

(A) General Expenses 
ItemsAmount (HKD)      

(1) Rent$18,810    
(2) Utilities$2,000    
(3) Food$4,000    
(4) Household expenses$5,000    
(5) Insurance premia$1,619.9  
(6) Domestic helper$2,736    
(7) Supplies & medical expenses for dogs$5,500    

General expenses$39,665.9  

(B) Personal Expenses 
ItemsAmount      

(8) Meal out of home$4,000    
(9) Transport$3,000    
(10) Clothing/shoes$1,000    
(11) Personal grooming $300    
(12) Entertainment/presents$500    
(13) Holiday $3,000    
(14) Medical/dental$200    
(15) Tax$2,374.53
(16) Monthly repayment of BXX loan$7,481.33
(17) Monthly repayment of DXX loan$5,244    
(18) CRC club absent membership fee$300    

Personal expenses $27,399.86

(C) Children Expenses 
ItemAmount      

Children expenses$41,648    

Total monthly expenses$108,713.76

48.  At trial, the Respondent confessed that upon and after the Settlement Agreement, all of the children’s expenses were in fact met by the Parents and he only paid for the utilities for the Matrimonial Home in a monthly sum of around HK$2,396. He accordingly adjusted his monthly expenditure to HK$69,461.76 and reiterated that it exceeded his income. He contends that his relocation to Singapore in July 2019 with the Wife joining him together with her two dogs on 5 November 2019 has increased his living expenses which rendered him incapable of paying the Spousal Payments.

49.  I am not impressed. Such argument plainly ignores the financial resources and responsibilities of the Wife and unjustifiably puts the interests of the wife in the subsequent marriage ahead of the legal obligation to maintain his former wife. Indeed, there is compelling evidence to show that the Wife is financial resourceful.

50.  It is the Respondent’s evidence that the Wife was a Marketing Manager earning a decent income before her relocation to Singapore in November 2019. She has run an online business since then. From July 2020 onwards, she has been funding the litigation costs of these proceeding to the extent of close to HKD1 million. She determines to continue funding his legal costs in litigations against the Petitioner because she despises the Petitioner and is eager to frustrate her. He has no actual plan to repay the Wife, who has not asked for repayment from him. She also asked him not to ask for money from the Parents.

51.  In parallel to the Respondent’s evidence, the Father testified that the Wife, who “had a lot of money”, was resourceful to the extent that the Parents were no longer required to financially support the Respondent after she got married with the Respondent.

52.  Undoubtedly, their evidence mirrors each other that the Wife is a capable person of substantial financial means. It is unreasonable for the Respondent to bear the general living costs for her at the expenses of the Petitioner. The intention of taking care of the current wife should not take priority over the duty to maintain the ex-wife, still less of the legal obligations under a court order by consent. Accordingly, I take the view that there is no justification for the Respondent to bear the general expenses for the Wife. He should control his own general expenses that are commensurate with a middle-aged working man in Singapore.

53.  In assessing the expenditure of the Respondent, the high standard of living during the Marriage is of reference. It however has not granted him a licence to continue living luxuriously while defaulting on maintenance payments, leaving the Petitioner with no payment at all or a monthly sum of HKD5,000. Taking into account all the circumstances, including, the fact that the Respondent is well-educated experienced finance-management person, and, some of the alleged expenses are in lack of sufficient particulars or documentary evidence in support, I am of the view that the following general expenses should be adjusted downwards for a household of two adults living in Singapore and the Respondent’s Share should be reduced accordingly :

(a)   household expenses of HKD5,000 is unjustified and on the high side.

(b)   domestic helper: the Respondent testifies that he has no longer engaged domestic helper and does the household chores all by himself.

(c)   dog expenses : I share the view with Mr Lam, the Counsel for the Petitioner, that the expenses for 2 dogs of the Wife, HKD3,000 for dog supplies and HKD2,500 for dog medications and vet visits, are grossly excessive, and, should in any event not take priority over the maintenance of the Petitioner.

(d)   the other expenses are also excessive which warrant a downwards adjustment.

54.  Looking at the matter in the round and adopting a board-brush approach, I form the view that the Respondent’s own general expenses should not be more than HKD12,500.

55.  By the same token, the Respondent’s personal expenses should be reduced :

(a)   meals out of home: he says that he usually has lunch at the company canteen which costs him about SGD2-3 for each meal only. He routinely eats at home, rather than dining out, because the Wife is used to cook for him.

(b)   transport: he does not maintain a car in Singapore and his transportation expenses are on MRT or bus.

(c)   clothing, shoes, personal grooming: can be slightly adjusted downwards.

(d)   holidays: his holiday expenses are excessive. There is no justification for him to spend HKD3000 for holidays but paying nothing or HKD5,000 to the Petitioner for maintenance.

(e)   CRC membership fee: given his relocation to Singapore, the membership fee is not reasonably necessary.

(f)   Two Loans: were scheduled to be discharged by October 2021 and October 2022 respectively.

56.  Even taking into account of the repayments of the Two Loans (for reasons which I will elaborate further below), his personal expenses should be maintained at a monthly sum of not more than HKD13,000 plus the utilities expenses of the Matrimonial Home in the sum of around HKD2,500.

57.  The fact that the Respondent has grossly exaggerated his expenses is revealed by the letter of his solicitor dated 27 April 2021 in that his latest version of his expenses was stated. It was repeated in his closing submissions which is now set out as follows :

ItemsAmount (HKD)      

(1) rent$13,248    
(2) management fee$1,152    
(3) hiring of furniture and fixtures $4,032    
(4) income tax$3,531    
(5) mobile phone (Singapore)$300    
(6) mobile phone (Hong Kong)$700    
(7) internet (Singapore)$300    
(8) utilities (Singapore) $500    
(9) water charges (Singapore)$250    
(10) transportation$2,500    
(11) meals at work $400    
(12) meal outside$3,000    
(13) dog expenses$1,200    
(14) groceries$2,000    
(15) internet (Hong Kong)$836    
(16) utilities (Hong Kong)$500    
(17) water charges (Hong Kong)$150    
(18) gas charges (Hong Kong)$700    
(19) PCCW Land Line$200    
(20) repayment of BXX loan$7,500    
(21) repayment of DXX loan$5,243    

Total monthly expenses$48,242    
(inclusive of the Two Loans and the utilities expenses for the Matrimonial Home)

58.  The Respondent has offered no reasonable explanation to justify the substantial reduction of his alleged expenses in such a short period of time. His exaggerations of his expenses are obvious. It is noteworthy that he sub-let his rented apartment to his friend during his overseas trip.

59.  In my view, the Respondent should adjust his lifestyle and expenditure to meet his obligations to the Petitioner. It is unjust for him to spend generously on himself leaving nothing or HKD5,000 for the Petitioner. His total monthly expenses should not be more than HKD28,000(General expenses of HKD12,500 + personal expenses HKD13,000 plus the utilities expenses of the Matrimonial Home in the sum of around HKD2,500).

Respondent’s Spending

60.  In consideration of his reasonable expenses as aforesaid, the Respondent’s incomes, reportedly to be HKD78,500 in November 2017, HKD90,458 in April 2019, HKD69,600 in February 2020, are indeed more than sufficient to maintain a reasonable standard of living. His allegation that he has been incapable of paying the Spousal Payments to the Petitioner, settling his credit card liabilities, repaying the Two Loans, which were reported to be HKD317,696 in November 2017 and further accumulated to HKD433,931 in April 2019, and HKD394,924 in February 2020 is unjustified.

61.  Mr Lam complains that the Respondent has continued to spend lavishly instead of paying the Petitioner by referring to his credit card statements and bank statements, some involving the period between January 2019 and July 2020 and some covering the period from January 2019 to March 2021. Some of them were not available or produced at the First Variation Trial.

62.  The Petitioner blames the Respondent for extravagantly spending roughly HKD115,934 in November 2017, HKD281,750 in January 2019, HKD131,300 in April 2019, HKD118,775 in May 2019, HKD180,812 in June 2019, HKD108,713 in February 2020, HKD110,856 in April 2020, HKD86,309 in June 2020, HKD86,855 in July 2020 while not paying a cent to her from October 2016 to mid-July 2020 is a neglect of his duty under the Consent Order.

63.  On the evidence before me, his allegation that a sizable number of his spending was made for others do not sit comfortably with his constant high spending pattern. Other than those he has provided particulars or documentary evidence in support, his general explanations that the expenses have been or would be reimbursed by the Group, friends, the Wife are bare self-serving allegations which are far from convincing. It is illogical that he would be able to tell that those payments were made for other peoples yet he could not outline any basic information about those arrangements.

64.  I further seek support from his own evidence that he continued to enjoy a high standard of livings. From May to July 2019, he made three self-paid trips to Thailand, one self-paid trip to Singapore. In July 2019, he made a trip to Taiwan for celebrating his friend’s wedding anniversary. In September 2019, he enjoyed a 13-day pleasure trip to San Francisco to attend a function of a prestigious private club. In November 2019, he enjoyed another pleasure trip to Thailand for a friend’s wedding.

65.  According to the bank statements disclosed by him, he made payments of a sum of HKD16,559 for the CXX club membership fee in January 2019, of spending at the club at HKD8,640 in May 2019, at HKD5,077 in June 2019. He spent HKD2,000 for a charity dinner in October 2019, HKD4,000 for a dinner in San Francisco in November 2019, HKD3,300 for another private club in November 2019. He chose to stay in a prestigious hotel at tens of thousands after he got married with the Wife even though he has rented an apartment in Singapore.

66.  The Respondent’s credit card debts and bank loans are generally similar to his liabilities in 2019. He nevertheless gave no reasonable explanation as to why those debts were incurred and further accumulated over the years if he has been cutting down his own expenses and the payments made for others were reimbursed by them as he alleged. The expansive entries of personal expenses spanning the period and the running of the credit card debts and bank loans remain unjustified.

67.  For reasons set out above, the Respondent should not have run at a deficit which went towards his credit card debts and the Two Loans, rolling over from month to month. It was his choice to spend unreasonably and not to discharge the credit card liabilities in full. Such liabilities are not valid reason for extinguishing or substantially reducing his payment obligations under the Consent Order.

Parents’ Assistance

68.  In looking at the reality of the Respondent’s finances, this Court should take into account not only what he has, but also what might reasonably be made available to him if a request for assistance were to be made.

69.  In the First Variation Judgment, I found that the Parents had been supportive of the costly lifestyle of the Respondent before the divorce, and, continued to financially support him after the Parties’ separation. Not only providing the Matrimonial Home as well as funding almost everything (living and education expenses, service of a live-in domestic helper) for the Children are in effect discharging a substantial part of the Respondent’s obligations under the Consent Order, the Parents did so even more generously as they had done previously by paying off the credit card debts (mostly for over-spending) for the Respondent to the extent of HKD2 million as well as paying for the pleasure trip to Thailand for the Parties and the Children in the month of August 2017.

70.  Coupled with the fact that the Respondent undertook to procure and secure the Matrimonial Home for the Petitioner to reside under the Consent Order, which could not be done without the assistance of the Parents, who owned the Matrimonial Home through a company, there was compelling evidence that the Respondent had intended to and actually looked to the Parents for financial support, and, the chance of continuous assistance in the foreseeable future remained high.

71.  In his opening submissions, the Respondent seeks to argue that in light of the new developments since the First Variation Trial, the question of the financial assistance by the Parents should be revisited. He relies on the following incidents for proof of the Father’s adamant insistence on not paying a cent to the Petitioner after the First Variation Trial :

(a)   Having been informed of the First Variation Judgment in or shortly after June 2019, the Father expressed sternly that he had no obligation to make payment for the Petitioner and would not pay a cent for her use.

(b)   in or about late 2019, the Father repeated his stance when he found out that the Petitioner’s boy friend (“Friend”) had been staying over at the Matrimonial Home.

(c)   on 17 July 2020, the Father reiterated his position when the Respondent asked for his financial assistance to discharge the Prohibition Order.

72.  Both the Respondent and the Father gave evidence on how the relationship between the Father and the Petitioner increasingly worsened as time went on. Even though the Petitioner seeks to argue that some of the incidents they relied on happened long time ago and their accounts of most of those incidents are inaccurate, her own evidence tends to show that her relationship with the Parents was not good when divorced and further deteriorated after the First Variation Trial which is evidenced by the following events : -

(a)   Notwithstanding the Petitioner’s efforts in prosecuting various enforcement proceedings against the Respondent for payments of the Spousal Payments throughout the years, and, inviting the Father to monitor the Respondent’s compliance of the Consent Order, the Father did not accede to her request, instead, he was the driving force of the Respondent in defending and delaying her enforcement proceedings, including the application for setting aside of the Statutory Demand.

(b)   After her issuance of the Statutory Demand against the Respondent, the Parents ceased to reimburse her for the living and education expenses. Since then, the Mother has only supplied limited groceries and food for the household and directly paid the education fees for the Children.

(c)   She confirms that she did not consult the Father about the Friend staying over at the Matrimonial Home in and after 2018.

(d)   On or around 18 August 2020, there was a hot dispute between the Parents and the Respondent on one camp and the Petitioner on the other at the Parents’ residence, in that the Petitioner was accused of assaulting the Father whereas the Petitioner explained that she just lightly patted the Father’s back to make her way during her argument with the Respondent. No matter who was to be blamed for initiating and / or aggravating the dispute. The conflict between the two camps was so serious which entailed intervention of the police.

73.  In Court, the Father did not hide his dislike of the Petitioner. He was heated and responded spontaneously without pausing for thought during cross-examination. In gist, his evidence can be summarized as follows : -

(a)  The Parents love the Respondent deeply. The Respondent is his only son and the eldest son of the paternal family. He will financially support the Respondent forever.

(b)  He cares much about his own reputation as well as the Respondent’s reputation. He will never allow the Respondent to become bankrupt or to lose his job. He is ready, willing and able to pay millions to settle the debts of the Respondent so as to save his son from imprisonment or bankruptcy. That was why he settled the credit card debts to the tune of HKD2 million for the Respondent in 2017. He would pay for the debts for the Respondent because he did not want the Respondent dislike him.

(c)  He is, however, not willing to settle the Spousal Payments for the Respondent for various reasons : -

(i)  he harbours a grievance against the Petitioner for her being “up to something”. He considers the Settlement Agreement which was embodied in the Consent Order was agreed between the Parties deliberately without his involvement or knowledge. He was taken by surprise when being informed of it, in particular, the loan owed by the Respondent to the Petitioner was increased from HKD3,000,000 to HKD4,000,000 therein. He did not agree to it. He emphasizes that it is a maintenance agreement between the couples and he strictly has no payment obligation under it.

(ii)  He reiterates that as the Consent Order is a maintenance order, which is different from credit card debt, the Respondent’s payment obligation can be varied according to the Respondent’s ability to pay and the Petitioner is not entitled to look to him for maintenance payments.

(iii)  He supported the Respondent in the First Variation Application as well as the application for setting aside of the Statutory Demand from his wisdom. He applauds the Judge in the High Court proceedings to set aside the Statutory Demand for correctly held that the Spousal Payments were in the nature of maintenance orders which were variable and not provable debts in bankruptcy.

(iv)  He was dismay for the filing of an anonymous complaint against the Respondent with the SFC accusing the Respondent of being in debt of HKD4 million. He surmised the complainant was the Petitioner, who aimed at disqualifying the Respondent from being a Responsible Officer.

(d)  Under cross-examination, he disclosed his hidden agenda in keeping the Parties in ongoing litigation for the Spousal Payments, for fear that once the Lump Sum Payment was paid, the Petitioner would leave with the Children and remarry. He loves the Children and therefore would rather have the litigations between the Parties continued to secure the Children’s residence at the Matrimonial Home.

(e)  Throughout the years and not until the Respondent married the Wife in May 2020, the Parents had unceasingly given money to the Respondent despite the father-and-son relationship turned sour after the Respondent married the Petitioner, whom he has always considered to have coveted his money. He only stopped giving money to the Respondent because the Wife was a capable person who had a lot of money and accordingly the Parents’ financial assistance was no longer necessary.

(f)  He is, in any event, ready and willing to continue financially support the Respondent because the Respondent is his only son and he loves him. Both he and the Mother spoil him. It has never been a problem to give the Respondent HKD10,000 - 20,000 whenever he asks for. He is prepared to give him even more money so long as the payments are for food, meals, daily life and building up image. He will financially support the Respondent without limit except payments for the Petitioner. He has never asked the Respondent for repayments and will not do so in future.

(g)  he has put the family fortune under the Mother, who has been allowed to give money to the Respondent without his prior approval. She would produce bank statements for his review on expenditures made. He would ignore the withdrawals involving insignificant amounts but make enquiries about the purposes of payments to the Respondent over tens of thousands. He confessed that at times he had commented about her making substantial payments to the Respondent, he however conceded to those payments. He has never asked the Respondent for repayment. He knows she spoil the Respondent.

(h)  Under cross-examination, he further testified that the Respondent had asked for and the Mother continued to give money to the Respondent throughout the years and even up to the present date notwithstanding the Respondent got married with the Wife, he consented to such arrangements because the Parents loved the Respondent, and, as a father, he was obliged to pay his son money. Even when the Respondent was kept in Hong Kong in 2020, the Mother acceded to his requests for money for meals, gifts for the Children and daily expenses.

74.  The Father’s evidence aforesaid attracted no serious challenges from the Petitioner. Having considered the evidence of the Parties and the Father individually and the combined effect of all of their evidence, it is clear to me that the Father has initially and subjectively surmised the Consent Order as an arrangement between the Parties to lay hands on his money. He has always considered the Petitioner to have coveted his money. The issuing of the Statutory Demand has turned his relationship with the Petitioner from bad to worse for he considered it placed the Respondent at risk of being bankrupted and losing the position as a Responsible Officer. He, rightly or wrongly, regarded the issuance of the Statutory Demand and the anonymous complaint to the SFC as the Petitioner’s plan to ruin the Respondent’s career, and subjectively attributed the Respondent’s change of career from a Responsible Officer in Hong Kong to a lower-paying job in Singapore, to the Petitioner. He is saddened that his only son left the Parents to relocate to Singapore and blamed the Petitioner for all these, rightly or wrongly. No doubt his hidden agenda to keep the Petitioner living in the Matrimonial Home with the Children is another reason for his refusal to pay the Petitioner.

75.  I accept that the Father’s determination of keeping himself aloof of the Respondent’s payment obligation of the Spousal Payments under the Consent Order is genuine. The reality is the Father, instead of assisting the Respondent to make the Spousal Payments to the Petitioner, has decided to support the Respondent in defending the Petitioner’s enforcement proceedings as well as prosecuting the applications for variation of maintenance. His relationship with the Petitioner further deteriorated after the First Variation Trial. He has been adamant in not making any payment to the Petitioner for her own use and benefits.

76.  That said, I am not impressed by the Respondent’s another argument that the Parents’ financial assistance was the basis or fundamental assumption upon which the Parties entered into the Settlement Agreement, and, the fact that the Father has been adamant in refusing to pay a cent to the Petitioner has rendered the whole basis of the Respondent’s payment obligation obsolete.

77.  First, such argument appears to be premised on the wrong footing that the Parents’ assistance is the sole reason for the Respondent to enter into the Settlement Agreement. That was not the finding in the First Variation Trial. The reasons for the judgment should not be taken out of context.

78.  Second, the argument ignores the Respondent’s own evidence that the Settlement Agreement was agreed in the circumstances that :

(a)  he anticipated a substantial income increment in the foreseeable future, and, in reality, he enjoyed substantial income increment in subsequent years.

(b)  the common background fact that the Lump Sum Payment was agreed in the circumstances that it was to cover not less than the loan the Petitioner alleged the Respondent to have owed her. The position is marked with the fact that the Lump Sum Payment was termed as repayment of loans to the Petitioner in the Minutes and the Consent Order, and, the Parties’ respective first Form E filed before the Settlement Agreement, in that both of them reported that the Respondent owed HKD3,000,000 to the Petitioner. It is also echoed by the Father’s evidence that he discovered, to his dismay, that the lump sum maintenance was fixed at HKD4,000,000 which was more than the loan owed by the Respondent to the Petitioner in the sum of HKD3,000,000.

79.  Third, in a variation application (not a set aside application), all the relevant circumstances should be taken into account including, inter alia, the parties’ earnings and earning capacities. The payer’s personal reason for entering into a consent order cannot be the only determining factor voiding the terms of a consent order.

80.  It is clear to me that the Parents’ unwillingness to make any payment for the Petitioner stemmed from their poor relationship with her, which will nevertheless not stop them from giving money to the Respondent for his own use and enjoyment as in the past. It is the Father’s repeated declarations in Court that while the Parents refused to make payment to the Petitioner for her own use and benefits, they would continue their support to their son everlastingly.

81.  The Parents’ support is flexible to suit the Respondent’s needs. They financially supported the costly lifestyle of the Parties and provided them with a decent apartment for residence during the Marriage. After the Parties’ separation, they continued to support the Respondent and did so even more generously by not only funding almost everything for the Children and the household but also paid off the debts for him to the extent of HKD2 million in one go. They continued giving monies to the Respondent throughout the years, even after he relocated to Singapore and got married with the Wife.

82.  As can be seen from the Respondent’s own evidence and his bank statements, solely for the period between February and September 2019, the money he received from the Mother ranging from a couple of thousands to tens of thousands, including:

DateAlleged by the RespondentAmount(HKD)

13.2.2019loan from the Mother70,000
19.3.2019(ditto)8,569
14.5.2019(ditto)78,700
1.6.2019(ditto)13,360
17.6.2019 money from Mother to pay for medicine24,000
17.6.2019loan from the Mother40,000
24.6.2019cheque from the Mother3,580
2.7.2019(ditto)8,443
8.7.2019(ditto)3,600
18.7.2019(ditto)7,722
2.8.2019T/T from Mother for his rental deposit50,000
23.8.2019cheque from the Mother2,880
11.9.2019from the Mother for credit card payment 100,000

410,854

83.  Under cross-examination, the Respondent further gave evidence that the Parents had given him a sum of HKD100,000 for his wedding expenses. Solely in the month of June 2019, he got HKD80,940 from the Mother and paid a total of HKD180,812.52 for credit cards bills. He also said that when he moved to Singapore, he asked the Mother for money for residence and living and said that he would repay her upon his receipt of the refund of rental deposit in Hong Kong in November 2020. However, in November 2020, he told her that he needed to buy furniture and settle credit card debts and would only pay her HKD2,200. He then used his money for settling credit card debts and for the Wife’s use. He also applied the sale proceeds of his car of HKD140,000 for his own use and transferred HKD80,000 to the Wife for her relocation expenses and her dogs.

84.  Viewed in this light, there is clear evidence before me that over the years the Respondent has been used to turn to the Parents for money for his own use and benefits. Those payments, ranging between hundreds and millions, were for settling his credit card bills, his daily life, image-building, necessities, including but not limited to, residence, food, dining, gifts for the Children. The Parents have all along been generous to him and remained flexible in terms of the amount and timing. There has been an understanding and an established practice between the Parents and the Respondent that the Mother could freely give him money and the Father actually endorsed to such arrangements so long as those payments were not for the Petitioner. The Father would only make enquiries about the purposes of payments exceeding tens of thousands. Even so, the Father would not object if the Mother insisted and both of them would not ask for repayments from the Respondent.

85.  Regardless of the Respondent’s allegation that he has regarded those payments from the Parents as loans and he intended to repay them when he is able to do so, he has neither made any serious payments in the past nor has he put forward any schedule of repayments. Strictly his Form Es have brought discredit on him, in that he alleged that he owed money to the Parents at HKD1,000,000 on 1 April 2016; at HKD3,000,000 on 17 November 2017. There was no report of money owed to the Parents in the last two Form Es filed respectively on 15 April 2019 and 3 February 2020. During the period, no meaningful payments have been made. He did not include any of his alleged loans from the Mother in the liabilities section of his last two Form Es.

86.  In cross-examination, the Respondent admitted that he had never meaningfully repaid any of the alleged loans advanced by the Parents to him. The very small sums of money which he said to have repaid to the Mother were minimal as compared to the amounts of money he received from the Mother. Needless to say the Respondent’s evidence also runs counter to the Father’s evidence that the monies given to the Respondent were not loans. The Parents have never intended him to repay nor asked him for repayments.

87.  I should add that, in light of the Father’s strict evidence that the Parents have all along financially supported the Respondent and would continue to do so in future, there is no room for a meaningful argument on the impact of not listing the Mother as a witness in the present application as suggested by the Petitioner. Suffice it to say that I share the view with Ms Leung, the Counsel for the Respondent, that prior to the Opening Submissions for the Petitioner, the Petitioner has never disputed the Respondent’s case that the Father controlled the family’s finances. The Parties have all along given evidence along this line in their respective affidavits and in Court that they actually looked to the Father, and not the Mother, for provision of accommodation and financial support in the past. It is the Petitioner’s case that she took the initiative to approach the Father, not the Mother, to ensure the outstanding Spousal Payments under the Consent Order would be settled.

88.  In the Respondent’s 14th affidavit and the Updated Agreed Statement of Issues, he stated that it was the Father who controlled the family’s finances. The Petitioner did not challenge this point in her affidavit, nor did she do so at the direction hearing or the Pre-trial Review. There has never been any suggestion that the Mother had or would make secretive payments to the Respondent behind the Father’s back.

89.  In the premises, I am satisfied that the Father has all along been in control of the family’s finance. Lacking any concrete evidence to indicate any secretive payments made by the Mother to the Respondent behind the Father’s back, the suggestion of drawing an adverse inference against the Respondent for not listing the Mother as a witness is not substantiated.

Respondent’s other financial resources and liabilities

90.  The Respondent alleges that while he was struggling to make ends meet, the financial assistance from the Parents was limited, ending up with an accumulation of his credit card liabilities necessitating a monthly repayment of HKD13,000 for the Two Loans.

91.  Not only that such allegation does not sit well with the Father’s declaration of the Parents’ readiness to financially support him, it also contradicts to the Father’s evidence that the Parents’ financial assistance only ceased because the Wife was very rich. Such evidence was echoed by the Respondent’s own testimony that the Wife told him not to ask the Father for money after their marriage. It is noteworthy that under cross-examination, the Father further disclosed that the Mother in fact continued to give money to the Respondent to the present date.

92.  Moreover, as analyzed above, there is clear evidence to show that such bank loans and credit card liabilities should not have been incurred or accumulated in light of his decent incomes and reasonable expenses, not to mention his election of not discharging his bank liabilities in full but applying part of the sale proceeds of his car of HKD140,000 for his own use and transferred at least HKD80,000 to the Wife for her relocation expenses and her dogs, transferring HKD55,000 to the Wife for their over-budgeted wedding expenses, applying HKD50,000 advanced by the Mother on 2 August 2019 to pay for his rental deposit in Singapore (but also said to have applied the refund of his rented apartment in Hong Kong for the same purpose).

93.  In looking at the reality of the Respondent’s finances, I should take into account not only what he actually has, but also what might reasonably be made available to him if a request for assistance were to be made. I also remind myself that “judicious encouragement” if it meant a form of pressure on non-parties to add to the relevant spouse’s resources which, on the evidence they would not do or were unlikely to do, should be rejected. See KEWS v NCHC [2013] 2 HKLRD 314

94.  Taking into account all the relevant evidence before me, I come to the conclusion that the Parents and the Wife would come to the Respondent’s assistance for his living expenses, the credit card liabilities and the repayments of the Two Loans should he ask for. I accept that even though the Father, who is the person in charge of the finance of the Parents, has determined not to give any money directly to the Petitioner for her own use or settle the Spousal Payments for the Respondent, he is always prepared to give money to the Respondent for his own use and benefits. Solely in the period between February 2019 and September 2019, on the Respondent’s disclosed case, he received a total sum of HKD410,854 (HKD51,356 each month in average) from the Parents.

95.  Apparently the Wife is another strong financial resources for the Respondent. She has since July 2020 funded the legal costs of the present proceedings in the tune of HKD1 million and would continue to finance his legal costs for the purpose of defeating the Petitioner as explained by the Respondent. Despite such financial burdens, she still persuaded the Respondent to cease asking the Parents for money.

96.  I accept Mr Lam’s submissions that those are financial resources available to the Respondent when called upon. He has been able to utilize, on his own admitted case, at least HKD1.4 million which he decided to use to cover legal fees and personal expenses, as opposed to complying with his duty to repay the Petitioner in the past two years. He has neither made any meaningful repayments to the Parents or the Wife, nor has he indicated any concrete plan of repayment to them.

97.  Solely from 2019 onwards, the Respondent has been able to call upon the Wife to bring in funds of HKD1 million since July 2020, and at least from the Parents a total sum of HKD410,854 in the span of a few months in 2019 as well as HKD100,000 for the wedding expenses. In July 2020, he managed to pay out over HKD846,132 from his MPF savings in Hong Kong, not to mention HKD50,000 from refund of rental deposit. Solely on his own disclosed case, he has been able to gather over 2 million in funds within 2 years. Indisputably he had resources at hand in the past few years. The Father’s settlement of his credit card debts in the tune of HKD2,000,000 in July 2017 was not a single incident that the Parents came to his assistance when he asked for.

98.  In the premises, I could safely conclude that the chance of the Respondent receiving financial assistance from the Parents and the Wife in the foreseeable future is very high and such assistance is flexible in terms of amount and timing which could cover the Two Loans and the existing credit card liabilities as well as his personal expenses should he ask for.

99.  In any event, such bank loans and credit card liabilities should not take priority over the Respondent’s legal obligations to maintain the Petitioner. Moreover, given he has let the credit cards debts and the Two Loans roll over for years, there is no reason or urgency for such liabilities be discharged at the expenses of the Petitioner.

100.  Proper weight should also be attached to the Respondent’s promising career prospects which will likely entitle him to attractive remuneration including increments of salary, bonuses and share options, still less of his prospects of entitlement to the Parent’s estate in future as indicated by him. I opine that it is highly likely that he would be able to discharge his liabilities with his future earnings in the foreseeable future.

Respondent’s Business

101.  The Respondent also says that his businesses in Indonesia failed miserably, leaving him heavily in debt. Such allegation does not advance his case any further. According to the four Form Es he has filed since April 2016, the value of all of the shareholdings of his several companies were reported to be either insubstantial or valueless. Those businesses involved were stated to be in a state of failure, either be suspended or yet commenced. He has not put forward any solid evidence for proof of his actual loss, other than general allegations. Nor has he articulated his actual sales deals in hand which have subsequently aborted frustrating his ability to pay.

Petitioner’s Earnings and Earning Capacity

102.  The Petitioner was born in a humble family in 1971. She was educated up to Form 5 level. Prior to the Marriage, she worked as an inter-bank money market broker earning a monthly salary of HKD80,000 plus discretionary bonuses. Shortly after marriage, she resigned from her employment and became a full-time housewife as agreed between the parties.

103.  In or around 2015, disputes over the Respondent’s investment in overseas business and his extramarital affair arose. Subsequently, he moved out of the Matrimonial home. The Petitioner filed a petition for divorce in January 2016. With the referral of a friend in or around December 2016, she managed to find a job earning HKD45,000 plus allowance. She was however laid off in November 2017. Since then, she has remained unemployed.

104.  On or around 14 November 2017, the Petitioner borrowed HKD200,000 from a bank, and thereafter, from time to time, borrowed an approximate amount of loans from banks. She undertook wine classes and invested HKD300,000 for 10% shareholdings in a limited company, which ran a bar in Central, with nine partners (“Business”). The bar had its soft opening in or around October 2018. Its business has been unsuccessful so far.

105.  The Respondent contends that in view of the failure of the Business, the Petitioner should engage herself in gainful employment. There is however no suggestion of any job markets which suit her.

106.  Undoubtedly the Petitioner earned a decent income in the past. The reality is she has been unemployed since the Marriage except the short-lived employment which was arranged by her friend and lasted for less than one year. In consideration of her limited educational background, of her unemployment for more than a decade except the short-lived employment, of the fact that she is the primary carer of the two children and effectively, a single mother parenting alone after the Respondent’s relocation to Singapore, I am not impressed that her employability has in any way improved. Further, the Children should not be deprived of her full time care as they have enjoyed since their birth.

107.  Much reliance has been placed on the Petitioner’s securities trading to suggest that she has other undisclosed financial means. The Respondent challenges that on each occasion she borrowed monies from the bank, she in fact had cash and securities in her bank account:

date of loanloan amount over 24 monthsbank balance

27.4.2016$275,000$608,407
14.11.2017$200,000$972,732
2.5.2018$180,000$1,079,351
26.2.2019$175,000$579,322
17.1.2020$200,000$212,301

108.  The Respondent also refers to her testimony that she has not made any calculations of her profit or loss over the years to contend that her carefree behavior does not sit well with someone struggling financially.

109.  In my view, the Petitioner’s testimony should not be taken out of context. Under cross-examination, she explained that right from the breakdown of marriage, she applied for bank loan roughly annually notwithstanding that she kept hundreds of thousands dollars in bank. That was in view of her limited savings which could not last long, she accordingly tried to take advantage of the low lending interest rate to engage in securities tradings in the hope that they would generate some incomes for her. The purpose of those loans were not for immediate living expenses but for taking advantage of their low interest rates for securities trading, so as to provide herself with some financial securities in her dire circumstances. She however was not a professional expert in securities and could not be absolute sure that her investments must be profitable.

110.  Coupled with the Respondent’s refusal of payment under the Consent Order, she found it necessary to keep the loans rolling over year by year before her savings is exhausted. Due to the limited capital money, the incomes generated from the securities trading were limited. As a result, she has not made detailed calculations on the profit and loss of those trading strictly on a regular basis as suggested by Ms Leung, but on rough calculations at different times, overall, the profits were insignificant.

111.  The Petitioner’s evidence is in line with the decline of her securities trading in the recent years. The balance of the relevant account was reduced from many hundreds of thousands to less than three hundred thousand after February 2019. Such fact goes contrary to the suggestion that she has been making good profits from securities trading.

112.  Further, I am not persuaded that the Petitioner’s investment in the Business in which she had no experience at all, with high overheads, rather than to get a job, is a valid proof of the existence of her undisclosed assests.

113.  The Petitioner has accounted for the circumstances giving rise to her investments in the Business. She explained that in light of the Respondent’s non-payment of maintenance and her limited savings, she had strived hard to support herself. With the assistance of her friend, she managed to engage herself in gainful employment. She was however laid off shortly. She then took the chance to invest in the Business together with her friends so as to benefit from the low rent offered by one of the partners, who owned the premises where the bar located.

114.  I am impressed that the Petitioner’s evidence is consistent with the background facts and logical in the normal course of events. After the breakdown of marriage followed by the non-payment of maintenance by the Respondent, she felt insecure with her limited savings and struggled to generate income by engaging herself in gainful employment, obtaining loans for securities trading as well as investing in a bar business. Those loans and investments were limited in scope compared to the Spousal Payments. Obviously she has been eager to maintain herself over the years. Against her wishes, the employment was a short-lived one and the bar business was fruitless under the covid-19 pandemic.

115.  The Respondent’s another suggestion that the Petitioner has hidden part of her assets with her sister is dispelled in her live evidence that she was simply assisting her sister in making investments.

116.  Lack of any solid evidence to undermine her assertions or for proof of the existence of her other financial resources, the Respondent’s suggestion of the existence of any material undisclosed assets or financial means of the Petitioner must fail. I have no reason not to believe her evidence that the Respondent’s default of maintenance payments and her legal costs incurred in the enforcement proceedings have rendered her living off her own savings and investments.

Petitioner’s Assets and Liabilities

117.  According to the Petitioner’s last Form E filed on 21 September 2020, she has HKD45,960 cash in bank, her interest in securities at HKD62,700, personal items at HKD228,000, MPF at HKD244,504, and, liabilities at HKD395,200 (credit card debts at HKD20,200 plus bank loans at HKD375,000).

118.  The Respondent contends that as most of the Petitioner’s expenses are being met by other people, her monthly expenditure should be less than HKD5,000 and the Offer is more than reasonable for her. He seeks support from the following matters :

(a)   She lives at the Matrimonial Home rent free. All the education and living expenses of the Children are met by the Parents, who also provided food, groceries and household items for the Petitioner and the Children. The utilities are paid by the Respondent.

(b)   Her testimony that the Friend has paid for her holidays and meals with him, and, from time to time bought some groceries, food and household items for her. She could also seek his assistance in lending her some money for the legal fees and only repaid him after her receipt of the maintenance payments from the Respondent in July 2021.

(c)   In her letter dated 24 March 2021, she claimed her additional out-of-pocket expenses at an average of HKD3,521.42 per month for the period from August 2020 to February 2021, ranging between HKD603 and HKD5,314.

(d)   Her credit card statements reveal her spending pattern at a monthly average of HKD8,383 in the period between July 2020 and August 2020 (excluding the loan repayments for her securities trading). Other than a total sum of HKD1,369 was spent on groceries, clothing and personal care, the remaining sums were for dining and wine.

119.  On such basis, the Respondent accuses the Petitioner of grossly inflating her monthly expenses to HKD67,330 in her latest Form E dated 21 September 2020. In reply, the Petitioner explains that the expenditure stated in the Form E was based on her normal standard of living. In reality, she was forced to keep her expenditure to the minimum because of non-payment of the Respondent. She also explains that for some expenditure on dining and wine, her friends have later repaid her for their shares.

120.  I do not find the evidence lends any support to the Respondent’s argument. Plainly the evidence points to the fact that the Petitioner has tightened her belts to the extreme as compared to her luxurious standard of living during the Marriage due to the Respondent’s continuous non-compliance of the Consent Order. It is unjust to regard her present expenditure as her reasonable needs in the normal circumstances. To allow the Respondent’s argument would permit him to take advantage of his own wrong, leaving the blameless party to bear all the undesirable consequences flowing from his non-compliance of the court order. This cannot be right.

121.  Apparently the standard of living of the Petitioner has been deteriorating due to the Respondent’s default of payments over the years. There is no solid evidence to indicate the existence of any stable source of income for her. Occasional provision of holidays, some food or groceries by the Friend has not advanced her financial position any further. The facts that she has been engaging in securities trading and a fruitless business or that she has sometimes spent a few thousand dollars on wine or meals do not constitute good pointers of the existence of hidden assets.

Family Car

122.  In or around June 2019, the Respondent stopped maintaining the Family Car as required under the Consent Order. In September 2019, the Petitioner received the Insurance Refund of HKD60,000 from the insurance company without prior notice from him. She said that she had used it to cover the children and household expenses but the sum was not deducted from the amount owed by the Respondent.

123.  On the other hand, the Respondent requested to use such sum for discharging the Family Car Undertaking including the car maintenance expenses of HKD16,154 (“Car Payment”) paid by the Petitioner, leaving HKD43,846 for the Petitioner for future maintenance of the car. In February 2021, at the request of the Respondent, the Petitioner transferred the car to her own name under protest.

Conclusion

124.  As elaborated above, it is my finding that the Petitioner’s life has not changed for the better but for the worse. She was not paid a single cent from October 2016 to mid-July 2020 and has never received full payments. After August 2018, she has not been paid or reimbursed any money she paid for household expenses, extra food and personal necessities for the Children. From July 2019, the Respondent ceased to maintain the Family Car. She has been living on her own savings. Her efforts in generating income from security transactions were not fruitful to the extent that could cover her reasonable expenditure. Her employment was short-lived while her business was a failure. She is still dating the same boyfriend, who pays for her only to the extent that concerns their romantic relationship, which are gratuitous and sporadic in nature and could not have improved her financial position any further.

125.  On the contrary, the Respondent is financially resourceful. He has strong earning capacity, earning handsome incomes throughout the years. The Parents and the Wife are wealthy people who have and would come to his assistance whenever he asks for save and except that they will not make payments to the Petitioner for her own use. He pocketed his income and the money given by the Parents for his own use save for the insignificant amounts paid to the Petitioner, namely the 2016 Payments and the payments made after the Prohibition Order.

126.  In the circumstances, it is unjust to allow the Respondent to continue his financially carefree lifestyle leaving the Petitioner to lead a frugal life. Further, I bear in mind that the Consent Order was made by the Parties voluntarily, with legal advice and assistance of mediator. The Respondent confirms that he has been properly advised of and fully understood the legal implication and effect of the Minutes upon entering into the Settlement Agreement in these two variation applications.

127.  Having carefully considered all the arguments, evidence and submissions of the Parties, I form the view that the Parents’ refusal to make any payments to the Petitioner for her own use and benefit is genuine. That being the case, the Respondent is still financially capable of honoring his commitments under the Consent Order with his financial resources. It is unjust for him to lead a financially carefree life at the expenses of the Petitioner.

128.  Taking into account all the relevant circumstances, it is reasonable for the Respondent to control his monthly expenditure to not more than HKD28,000 (inclusive of the utilities paid for the Matrimonial Home). The balance of his income should be applied to maintain the Petitioner. His bank loans, credit card liabilities and expenses which go beyond his reasonable expenditure should not take priority over his legal obligations under the Consent Order. In any event, it is open to him to look to his other financial resources, as the Parents, the Wife, his strong earning capacity and good prospects of receiving bonuses and increment of salary to settle such liabilities.

129.  Viewed in this light, given the Respondent’s income has to be shared with the Petitioner, both of their standards of living have to be adjusted downwards. A balance should be struck between the expenditure of a working father in Singapore and a full-time mother in Hong Kong. Further, in order to avoid further arguments on the maintenance expenses of the Family Car, a small sum should be included in the monthly periodical payment for the Petitioner so as to discharge the Family Car Undertaking, after taking into account of the Insurance Refund together with the Car Payment.

130.  In weighing all the relevant factors and doing a balancing exercise, I have come to the conclusion that it is fair, just and reasonable to order the Respondent to pay a monthly periodical payment of HKD10,000 to the Petitioner for maintenance payment and a monthly installment payment of HKD32,000 for the Lump Sum Payment. The relevant undertakings under the Consent Order will be discharged to the extent to give effect to such payments. This is subject to the condition that any payments made by the Respondent to the Petitioner for discharging the Lump Sum Payment and the Periodical Payments during the relevant period are to be offset against the payments.

Order

131.  I order that the Consent Order be varied to the extent that: -

(1)   the payment schedule with respect to the balance of the Lump Sum Payment as of 1 September 2020 under paragraph 3 of the Consent Order be varied to monthly installment of HKD32,000 with the first payment be back-dated to 1 September 2020 and thereafter on the 1st day of each succeeding month until the whole sum be fully discharged.

(2)   the monthly Periodical Payment of HKD35,000 under paragraph 5 be varied downwards to HKD10,000 per month commencing from 1 September 2020 and thereafter on the 1st day of each succeeding month until the Petitioner’s death or remarriage, whichever is earlier.

(3)   the Respondent’s Undertakings given under Recitals M and O be discharged retrospectively from 1 September 2020 to the extent as to give effect to the variations as set out in paragraphs (1) and (2) above.

(4)   Credit be given to any sums that the Respondent has paid to the Petitioner for settlement of the Periodical Payments and the Lump Sum Payment during the relevant period. The Respondent do pay the arrears or shortfalls of the periodical payments and the Lump Sum Payment under paragraphs (1) and (2) above within 28 days from the date hereof.

(5)   the Family Car Undertaking under Recital N be discharged retrospectively from 1 September 2020.

(6)   all payments shall be paid into the designated bank account of the Petitioner.

(7)   Penal notice be endorsed.

132.  For avoidance of doubt, save for the variations as set out in the preceding paragraph, the other terms and undertakings of the Consent Order do stand.

Costs

133.  Given the outcome of this application and having regard to all the relevant circumstances, I form the view that the Respondent’s unreasonable insistence on paying just a monthly sum of HKD5,000 (to be increased to HKD10,000) for discharging the Lump Sum Payment until shortly before this trial only then the Offer was put forward, which is still far less than the amount he can afford and is in effect riding of the periodical payments, the Petitioner virtually had no option but to defend the present application. Coupled with the fact that she has beaten the Respondent’s open offer by a significant amount, the Petitioner should be awarded costs of this application.

134.  I order that the Respondent do pay the Petitioner’s costs of this application, including all costs previously reserved, to be taxed if not agreed, with one certificate for counsel.

135.  The costs order nisi shall become absolute after 14 days from the date of this judgement unless application to vary the order nisi by Summons is filed within this 14-day period.

136.  I thank Counsel for their assistance.

  ( M LAM )
Deputy District Judge

Mr Benjamin Lam and Ms. Fontanne Chu, instructed by Messrs Chong & Yen, for the Petitioner

Ms Vivien Leung, instructed by Withers, for the Respondent

[2020] HKFC 182-EN-2020-09-04

CWYJ v. LTYE

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FCMC 1135 of 2016

[2020] HKFC 182

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

MATRIMONIAL CAUSES

NUMBER 1135 of 2016

----------------------------

BETWEEN

 CWYJPetitioner
and
 LTYERespondent

------------------------

Coram :Deputy District Judge M Lam in Chambers
Date of Hearing :1 September 2020
Date of Decision :4 September 2020

-----------------------

DECISION
(Prohibition Order- extension and discharge)

-----------------------

The Applications

1.  This is the substantive hearing of 3 Summonses : -

(a) the Respondent’s Summons (“Discharge Summons”) filed on 22 July 2020 for a discharge of the Prohibition Order granted against him on 6 July 2020 (“July Order”);

(b) the Petitioner’s Summons (“Extension Summons”) filed on 30 July 2020 for extension of the July Order; and

(c) the Petitioner’s Summons (“Second Extension Summons”) filed on 27 August 2020 for further extension of the July Order.

2.  By the Consent Order granted on 3 August 2020 (“Extended Order”), the July Order was extended until 5 September 2020 with the costs of the Discharge Summons and the Extension Summons be reserved. It is agreed by the Parties that the Extended Order was made without prejudice to the Respondent’s position that the July Order should be discharged.

Background

3.  The Parties were married in October 2007. Two children were born of the marriage. The first child was born in 2008 and the second one in 2010. The Petitioner (wife) petitioned for divorce in January 2016. The decree absolute was granted on 17 March 2017.

4.  During a mediation meeting, the parties reached a settlement on the issue of custody as well as financial arrangements with the assistance of their respective solicitors. The settlement was reduced into the “Minutes of Consent Order” dated 26 July 2016 which was subsequently made a consent order by the learned Deputy District Judge D. Cheung on 27 January 2017. The Order was re-amended on 30 July 2018 ("Consent Order").

5.  The Consent Order was granted upon a number of undertakings given by the Respondent (husband). The undertakings and the terms of the Consent Order which are relevant to the present purpose are the spousal payments for the Petitioner. The Respondent is required to pay to her : -

(a)periodical payment of HKD35,000 per month until her death or remarriage, whichever is earlier (“PP Payments”). The first payment to be made on 1 August 2016; and
(b)a sum of HKD4 million
(by 8 installments, HKD500,000 for each installment for every six months. The first installment to be made on 1 January 2017 and the last one on 1 July 2020). (“LS Payments”)

(Collectively , “Spousal Payments”)

Enforcement Proceedings

6.  After two initial payments of HKD10,000 each in August and September 2016, totaling HKD20,000 (“2016 Payment”), the Respondent had since fallen into arrears. The Petitioner issued a judgment summons on 17 August 2017 (“First JS Summons”) and another one on 15 August 2018 (“Second JS Summons”) seeking to recover the Spousal Payments in arrears and costs. The Respondent made two applications for variation of the Consent Order on 4 April 2018 and 2 May 2018 respectively (“First VOM Applications”). The First VOM Applications were dismissed after trial by this Court on 28 June 2019. On 1 July 2019, the Respondent relocated to Singapore.

7.  At the call-over hearing of the two judgment summonses on 14 January 2020, the learned Deputy District Judge D. To ordered the Respondent to personally attend the adjourned hearing scheduled for 28 July 2020 (“First JS Hearing”) with penal notice be endorsed on the Order.

8.  On 29 June 2020, the Respondent filed an affidavit (“R’s June Affidavit”) asserting that he would not attend the First JS Hearing for he would leave Hong Kong for Singapore at any time between 7 and 9 July 2020 and, if he does not present at the hearing, he understood fully that the court is entitled to make any decision based on the evidence produced by the Parties. He however has made no application for an adjournment of the said hearing nor application for leave to be excused from attending it.

9.  The said affidavit triggered the Petitioner’s application for a prohibition order leading to the grant of the July Order.

10.  No application had been made for discharge of the July Order until 7:44p.m. on 21 July 2020 when the copies of the Respondent’s Affidavits were faxed to the Duty Judge with another set of copies lodged with the court on 22 July 2020.

11.  On 22 July 2020, this Court was seized of the matter and scheduled the hearing of the Respondent’s application on the same day. The Respondent was directed to issue the Discharge Summons with the original affidavits be formally filed.

12.  At that hearing, this Court refused to immediately discharge the July Order with brief reasons given. Upon the Petitioner’s undertaking that her application for extension of the July Order would be made by way of inter-parte Summons no later than 4:00p.m. on 30 July 2020, this Court directed the Petitioner’s intended extension summons to be heard together with the Discharge Summons before this Court on a date to be fixed no later than 5 August 2020 with costs of that hearing be reserved.

13.  It is noteworthy that at the said hearing, the Respondent indicated that he was willing to : -

(a) pay over the balance in his MPF account (of about HK$840,000) to the Petitioner within 7 days of his receipt of it so as to discharge the arrears of the PP Payments in full with the remaining balance applied towards the LS Payments;

(b) if the Petitioner were to apply for an attachment of income order in Singapore to enforce the Consent Order, he would not oppose the same in principle, subject to provision of his reasonable living expenses.

14.  That said, this Court’s invitation to the Respondent to materialize the terms of his 2 suggestions at the hearing was declined. The Petitioner also complained the late notification of the application which left her with no sufficient time for preparing her objection. As of the date of the hearing, the amounts remained unpaid was more than HKD5.6 million.

15.  At the First JS Hearing on 28 July 2020, the Respondent offered to pay the Petitioner HKD839,585.58, representing his MPF payment, upon receipt of it, which was said to take place shortly. Upon the enquiry of the learned Judge, the First JS Summons and the Petitioner’s application for leave to issue another Judgment Summons dated 22 July 2020 (collectively, the “Disposed Applications”) were disposed of due to irregularity. The learned Judge gave directions for further conduct of the Second JS Summons as well as the parties’ respective intended applications. The hearing of the Second JS Summons was adjourned to 24 August 2020 (“Second JS Hearing”). The Respondent was ordered to personally attend the adjourned hearing.

16.  The Petitioner took out the Extension Summons on 30 July 2020. The hearing of it and the Discharge Summons were fixed to be heard on 4 August 2020.

17.  By the Extended Order, the July Order was extended for one month and the hearing scheduled for 4 August 2020 was vacated.

18.  On 11 August 2020, the Petitioner took out an inter-parte Summons (“Leave Summons”) seeking leave to commence enforcement proceedings to recover the Spousal Payments which were outstanding for more than 12 months, including the LS Payments and the PP Payments she had sought to recover under the Disposed Applications.

19.  On the same day, the Respondent took out a Summons for variation of the Consent Order (“Second VOM Application”) seeking an order that :-

(a) the payment schedule of the LS Payments be varied to monthly installments of HK$5,000 and from January 2022, HK$10,000;

(b) The PP Payments be varied to HK$1 per annum.

20.  On 21 August 2020, the Petitioner took out a Judgment Summons (“Third JS Summons”) seeking to recover the PP Payments for the period between September 2019 and August 2020.

21.  At the Second JS Hearing, the learned Judge gave directions for filing of evidence, and adjourned the hearing of the Second JS Summons, the Third JS Summons (collectively, “Two JS Summonses”), the Leave Summons and the Second VOM Application (the four applications collectively, “Four Applications”) to 9 November 2020 (“Third JS Hearing”). The Respondent was ordered to personally attend the Third JS Hearing. Penal notice was endorsed on the order.

Past Payments

22.  Before the grant of the July Order, the Respondent had only made the 2016 Payments totaling HK$20,000 for settlement of the Spousal Payments. Only after the grant of the July Order, he then applied for the release of his MPF payment and also made payment of a sum of HK$5,000 to the Petitioner.

23.  On 27 August 2020, a Consent Summons was filed into Court for the purpose of disposing the Two JS Summonses after the receipt of the Respondent’s MPF payment of HK$846,132.05 (“2020 Payment”) by the Petitioner. It was agreed that the 2020 Payment was to settle the outstanding PP Payments under the Two JS Summonses with the balance sum to be applied towards partial settlement of the LS Payments. However, given the terms of the Consent Summons and the amounts involved are inherently problematic, court requisition was raised for clarifications and rectifications.

The Legal Principles

24.  The applicable legal principles are not in disagreement which I should briefly state as follows.

25.  The jurisdiction of the Family Court to make an order prohibiting a person from leaving Hong Kong to facilitate the enforcement, securing or pursuance of a judgment against that person for the payment of a specified sum of money is derived from section 52E of the District Court Ordinance, Cap. 336.

26.  In Avco Financial Services (Asoa) Ltd v Topma Electronics Ltd & Ors [1999] 4 HKC193, it was held that it would not be appropriate to make a prohibition order unless prohibiting the judgment debtor from leaving Hong Kong is reasonably and properly conducive to the enforcement of the judgment. There must be some e FCMC1135A/2016 CWYJ v. LTYE

FCMC 1135 of 2016

[2020] HKFC 182

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

MATRIMONIAL CAUSES

NUMBER 1135 of 2016

----------------------------

BETWEEN

 CWYJPetitioner
and
 LTYERespondent

------------------------

Coram :Deputy District Judge M Lam in Chambers
Date of Hearing :1 September 2020
Date of Decision :4 September 2020

-----------------------

DECISION
(Prohibition Order- extension and discharge)

-----------------------

The Applications

1.  This is the substantive hearing of 3 Summonses : -

(a) the Respondent’s Summons (“Discharge Summons”) filed on 22 July 2020 for a discharge of the Prohibition Order granted against him on 6 July 2020 (“July Order”);

(b) the Petitioner’s Summons (“Extension Summons”) filed on 30 July 2020 for extension of the July Order; and

(c) the Petitioner’s Summons (“Second Extension Summons”) filed on 27 August 2020 for further extension of the July Order.

2.  By the Consent Order granted on 3 August 2020 (“Extended Order”), the July Order was extended until 5 September 2020 with the costs of the Discharge Summons and the Extension Summons be reserved. It is agreed by the Parties that the Extended Order was made without prejudice to the Respondent’s position that the July Order should be discharged.

Background

3.  The Parties were married in October 2007. Two children were born of the marriage. The first child was born in 2008 and the second one in 2010. The Petitioner (wife) petitioned for divorce in January 2016. The decree absolute was granted on 17 March 2017.

4.  During a mediation meeting, the parties reached a settlement on the issue of custody as well as financial arrangements with the assistance of their respective solicitors. The settlement was reduced into the “Minutes of Consent Order” dated 26 July 2016 which was subsequently made a consent order by the learned Deputy District Judge D. Cheung on 27 January 2017. The Order was re-amended on 30 July 2018 ("Consent Order").

5.  The Consent Order was granted upon a number of undertakings given by the Respondent (husband). The undertakings and the terms of the Consent Order which are relevant to the present purpose are the spousal payments for the Petitioner. The Respondent is required to pay to her : -

(a)periodical payment of HKD35,000 per month until her death or remarriage, whichever is earlier (“PP Payments”). The first payment to be made on 1 August 2016; and
(b)a sum of HKD4 million
(by 8 installments, HKD500,000 for each installment for every six months. The first installment to be made on 1 January 2017 and the last one on 1 July 2020). (“LS Payments”)

(Collectively , “Spousal Payments”)

Enforcement Proceedings

6.  After two initial payments of HKD10,000 each in August and September 2016, totaling HKD20,000 (“2016 Payment”), the Respondent had since fallen into arrears. The Petitioner issued a judgment summons on 17 August 2017 (“First JS Summons”) and another one on 15 August 2018 (“Second JS Summons”) seeking to recover the Spousal Payments in arrears and costs. The Respondent made two applications for variation of the Consent Order on 4 April 2018 and 2 May 2018 respectively (“First VOM Applications”). The First VOM Applications were dismissed after trial by this Court on 28 June 2019. On 1 July 2019, the Respondent relocated to Singapore.

7.  At the call-over hearing of the two judgment summonses on 14 January 2020, the learned Deputy District Judge D. To ordered the Respondent to personally attend the adjourned hearing scheduled for 28 July 2020 (“First JS Hearing”) with penal notice be endorsed on the Order.

8.  On 29 June 2020, the Respondent filed an affidavit (“R’s June Affidavit”) asserting that he would not attend the First JS Hearing for he would leave Hong Kong for Singapore at any time between 7 and 9 July 2020 and, if he does not present at the hearing, he understood fully that the court is entitled to make any decision based on the evidence produced by the Parties. He however has made no application for an adjournment of the said hearing nor application for leave to be excused from attending it.

9.  The said affidavit triggered the Petitioner’s application for a prohibition order leading to the grant of the July Order.

10.  No application had been made for discharge of the July Order until 7:44p.m. on 21 July 2020 when the copies of the Respondent’s Affidavits were faxed to the Duty Judge with another set of copies lodged with the court on 22 July 2020.

11.  On 22 July 2020, this Court was seized of the matter and scheduled the hearing of the Respondent’s application on the same day. The Respondent was directed to issue the Discharge Summons with the original affidavits be formally filed.

12.  At that hearing, this Court refused to immediately discharge the July Order with brief reasons given. Upon the Petitioner’s undertaking that her application for extension of the July Order would be made by way of inter-parte Summons no later than 4:00p.m. on 30 July 2020, this Court directed the Petitioner’s intended extension summons to be heard together with the Discharge Summons before this Court on a date to be fixed no later than 5 August 2020 with costs of that hearing be reserved.

13.  It is noteworthy that at the said hearing, the Respondent indicated that he was willing to : -

(a) pay over the balance in his MPF account (of about HK$840,000) to the Petitioner within 7 days of his receipt of it so as to discharge the arrears of the PP Payments in full with the remaining balance applied towards the LS Payments;

(b) if the Petitioner were to apply for an attachment of income order in Singapore to enforce the Consent Order, he would not oppose the same in principle, subject to provision of his reasonable living expenses.

14.  That said, this Court’s invitation to the Respondent to materialize the terms of his 2 suggestions at the hearing was declined. The Petitioner also complained the late notification of the application which left her with no sufficient time for preparing her objection. As of the date of the hearing, the amounts remained unpaid was more than HKD5.6 million.

15.  At the First JS Hearing on 28 July 2020, the Respondent offered to pay the Petitioner HKD839,585.58, representing his MPF payment, upon receipt of it, which was said to take place shortly. Upon the enquiry of the learned Judge, the First JS Summons and the Petitioner’s application for leave to issue another Judgment Summons dated 22 July 2020 (collectively, the “Disposed Applications”) were disposed of due to irregularity. The learned Judge gave directions for further conduct of the Second JS Summons as well as the parties’ respective intended applications. The hearing of the Second JS Summons was adjourned to 24 August 2020 (“Second JS Hearing”). The Respondent was ordered to personally attend the adjourned hearing.

16.  The Petitioner took out the Extension Summons on 30 July 2020. The hearing of it and the Discharge Summons were fixed to be heard on 4 August 2020.

17.  By the Extended Order, the July Order was extended for one month and the hearing scheduled for 4 August 2020 was vacated.

18.  On 11 August 2020, the Petitioner took out an inter-parte Summons (“Leave Summons”) seeking leave to commence enforcement proceedings to recover the Spousal Payments which were outstanding for more than 12 months, including the LS Payments and the PP Payments she had sought to recover under the Disposed Applications.

19.  On the same day, the Respondent took out a Summons for variation of the Consent Order (“Second VOM Application”) seeking an order that :-

(a) the payment schedule of the LS Payments be varied to monthly installments of HK$5,000 and from January 2022, HK$10,000;

(b) The PP Payments be varied to HK$1 per annum.

20.  On 21 August 2020, the Petitioner took out a Judgment Summons (“Third JS Summons”) seeking to recover the PP Payments for the period between September 2019 and August 2020.

21.  At the Second JS Hearing, the learned Judge gave directions for filing of evidence, and adjourned the hearing of the Second JS Summons, the Third JS Summons (collectively, “Two JS Summonses”), the Leave Summons and the Second VOM Application (the four applications collectively, “Four Applications”) to 9 November 2020 (“Third JS Hearing”). The Respondent was ordered to personally attend the Third JS Hearing. Penal notice was endorsed on the order.

Past Payments

22.  Before the grant of the July Order, the Respondent had only made the 2016 Payments totaling HK$20,000 for settlement of the Spousal Payments. Only after the grant of the July Order, he then applied for the release of his MPF payment and also made payment of a sum of HK$5,000 to the Petitioner.

23.  On 27 August 2020, a Consent Summons was filed into Court for the purpose of disposing the Two JS Summonses after the receipt of the Respondent’s MPF payment of HK$846,132.05 (“2020 Payment”) by the Petitioner. It was agreed that the 2020 Payment was to settle the outstanding PP Payments under the Two JS Summonses with the balance sum to be applied towards partial settlement of the LS Payments. However, given the terms of the Consent Summons and the amounts involved are inherently problematic, court requisition was raised for clarifications and rectifications.

The Legal Principles

24.  The applicable legal principles are not in disagreement which I should briefly state as follows.

25.  The jurisdiction of the Family Court to make an order prohibiting a person from leaving Hong Kong to facilitate the enforcement, securing or pursuance of a judgment against that person for the payment of a specified sum of money is derived from section 52E of the District Court Ordinance, Cap. 336.

26.  In Avco Financial Services (Asoa) Ltd v Topma Electronics Ltd & Ors [1999] 4 HKC193, it was held that it would not be appropriate to make a prohibition order unless prohibiting the judgment debtor from leaving Hong Kong is reasonably and properly conducive to the enforcement of the judgment. There must be some evidence that the enforcement of the judgment would be impeded in some significant way if no prohibition order were made.

27.  The grant of a prohibition order is a matter of the court’s discretion. In Questnet Ltd v Rinck unreported, HCA1475/2006 18 February 2008, Chu J (as she then was) approved of the approach taken in Yue Wah Chuk & Anor v McKeon Bredan Hugh unreported DCCJ7088/2003 24 August 2004 over the exercise of discretion where judgment for a sum certain has been obtained, by asking three questions : (1) whether there is a real likelihood that the judgment debtor will leave Hong Kong; (2) whether there is a real risk that he will not return for a substantial period of time; and (3) whether as a result of his absence enforcement of the judgment would be obstructed or delayed.

28.  With these principles in mind, I shall now consider the parties’ respective applications.

Question 1 & 2

29.  Regarding Questions 1 and 2 posed in the Questnet Ltd case, some reliance can be placed on the Respondent’s statutory declaration for the purpose of termination of his MPF Account and for release of his MPF benefit on 16 July 2020. His ground of application was permanent departure from Hong Kong : “depart from Hong Kong to reside elsewhere (Singapore) with no intention of returning for employment or to resettle in Hong Kong as a permanent resident.” and for long-term overseas employment.

30.  In parallel with his statuary declaration, the Respondent has expressly declared in his affidavits that he has relocated to Singapore permanently for work and will leave Hong Kong as soon as the prohibition order is discharged and he is granted permission to return to Singapore from the Singapore Government under the travel restriction policy for the purpose of reducing the risk of importing the COVID-19 virus.

31.  His declarations sit comfortably with the background facts for he has : -

(a) packed up and delivered up vacant possession of his rented property in HK.

(b) relocated to Singapore and has been working in a company there since 1 July 2019 allegedly earning a reduced monthly salary of SGD8,800 plus bonus (as compared to his remunerations in Hong Kong in the past).

(c) moved from Hong Kong to live in his rented apartment in Singapore with his wife and their 2 dogs.

(d) booked flights to fly back to Singapore together with his wife on 8 July 2020. Because of the July Order, he was barred from leaving.

(e) applied for residency in Singapore.

(f) filed the R’s June Affidavit.

32.  The combined effect of his declarations and conducts point to his unequivocal determination of leaving Hong Kong to stay in Singapore permanently for work since 1 July 2019. His determination is echoed by his express eagerness to leave Hong Kong as soon as the prohibition order is discharged and the permission to return to Singapore is granted.

33.  It is said for the Respondent that his parents, his 2 children, and some of his friends and business connections are in Hong Kong and he has the practice of returning to Hong Kong to meet them.

34.  However, not only that there is no indication of any concrete plan to return to Hong Kong in the foreseeable future, especially in light of his alleged employment commitments together with the travel restriction policy of Singapore, worse still, his intention to attend the judgment summons hearings is in serious doubt.

35.  At the time the Discharge Summons was issued, the Respondent was well aware that he was ordered to attend the First JS Hearing 6 days later and he needed permission to entry from the Singapore Government before he can return to Singapore and would be subject to 14-day quarantine. As indicated in the R’s June Affidavit, he simply ignored the Order of the Court for his personal attendance of the First JS Hearing and the penal notice.

36.  Coupled with the long history of his defaulting payment, with his conduct of not paying one single cent since September 2016 until after the July Order, with his allegation that he is now in debt and his expenditures far exceed his income, the Petitioner has valid basis to fear that he would not want to face the consequences of the enforcement proceedings and hence a real risk of him not returning to Hong Kong should he be allowed to leave.

37.  Undoubtedly he has been well aware of the serious nature of the judgment summons procedures as well as the consequences of being subject to detailed examination under oath under the judgment summons and/ or committal proceedings, through the advice of his legal team and the warnings of the Courts in the previous hearings.

38.  In the premises, I have solid reasons to believe that there is a real risk that he will leave Hong Kong for a substantial period of time. See DX v LN FCMC7870/ 2014 unreported 14 April 2016.

Question 3

39.  The Consent Order has remained in force. The Petitioner has solid grounds for seeking an order that the Respondent should remain in Hong Kong whilst the enforcement proceedings remain on foot : the Second JS Summons, the Third JS Summons, the Leave Summons .

40.  The Consent Summons has yet been approved and the Two JS Summonses remain undisposed of. It certainly has not discharged the Respondent from the payment obligation of more than HKD5,000,000 under the Consent Order.

41.  Suffice it to say for the present purpose, the Petitioner has been taking a number of steps to enforce the Consent Order since 17 August 2017, including 4 applications initiating judgment summons process and serving a statutory demand against the Respondent (which was ultimately set aside). She clearly has an arguable case under the Leave Summons. Indeed, directions have been given for filing of affidavit for substantive argument of it.

42.  According to the Respondent’s Form E filed on 13 March 2020 and his affidavits, he has no assets of substantial value in Hong Kong or elsewhere, but deficits and liabilities. It is also said that his parents, his father being a senior solicitor in a reputable law firm and his mother, in possession of several landed properties in Hong Kong, who had substantially financed his luxurious life in the past, have cut-off their financial support to him.

43.  That said, he has been able to meet his own needs and expenses throughout the years and to retain a well-established firm and legal team to represent him. In further consideration of his relocation to Singapore since July 2019, the examination process under the judgement summons appears to be a sensible means for the Petitioner to pursue so as to ascertain his financial resources with an aim of getting the fruit of the Consent Order. To achieve this aim, his personal attendance of the hearings of judgment summons is crucial. The hearing of the Four Applications was scheduled for 9 November 2020.

44.  As outlined above, I am satisfied that enforcement of the Consent Order will be obstructed or delayed in the absence of the Respondent.

Prejudice

45.  As to the complaint of not being able to return to Singapore for work, I have seriously considered the impact of the July Order on the Respondent but opine that it is not something that weighs materially in favour of a discharge of the July Order, having regard to all the circumstances of this case.

46.  Truly the risk of losing employment can never be eliminated. A Mr YXXX, the XXXXXXXXXXXXX of the Respondent’s employer and a mutual friend of the Parties, has filed an affirmation stating that the Respondent, being the XXXXXXX, was required to return to Singapore and XXX for work and the company might consider replacing him if the situation required. I however could not lose sight of the fact that although the Respondent was aware of the July Order on 9 July 2020, he only sought to discharge it until 21 July 2020. He has maintained effective communication and flexibility with his employer resulting in the rescheduling of the projects which involved him as well as other constructive business developments after the July Order.

47.  The suggestion that he needs to return to work in order to make good his payment proposal under the Second VOM Application is negated by the fact that almost all of the Spousal Payments remained unpaid despite his stable employment with decent salary for the past few years.

48.  From the materials before this Court, it can be readily inferred that he will leave Hong Kong for a substantial period of time as soon as he could if the prohibition order were removed. He is the author of his destiny and the Petitioner should not be blamed for this.

Enforcement Alternatives

49.  Ms Leung seeks to argue that it is open to the Petitioner to enforce the Consent Order in Singapore. It is emphasized that an application for an attachment of income order is a good option as the Respondent is willing to undertake not to oppose the same, subject to an agreement that a reasonable sum be provided to him for his living expenses. That being the case, no concrete proposal or figures were suggested by him.

50.  As elaborated above, from the information gathered at this stage, it is not illogical or unreasonable for the Petitioner to persist on the examination procedures and intended committal proceedings in these proceeding. In view of the payment history and the past conducts of the Respondent, it is understandable that the Petitioner will be cautious about such general suggestion (without concrete plan) and be loath to be burdened with additional cost in commencing another set of proceedings in Singapore at this stage.

51.  I am not persuaded that the Petitioner is at fault for not putting forward any concrete plan of attachment of income for the Respondent to consider. While the parties have been constantly encouraged to settle their disputes through alternative dispute resolution routes, their mediation has met with no success lately. The Petitioner has the legal rights to enforce the Consent Order according to the civil procedures. Regrettably, the courts’ invitations for the Respondent to materialize the terms of the attachment of income suggestion and to explore feasible solutions as direct payments from his employer met with no success. It is difficult to see how the Petitioner will be able to design a feasible plan with the limited information disclosed by the Respondent and his past conduct in departing from his undertakings at this stage.

52.  So far, the Respondent has been silent on the suggestion of arranging personal guarantee or surety. This is an option open to him for they will not be spent if he does return for future hearings.

Material Non-disclosure

53.  As to the Respondent’s complaints about the Petitioner’s material non-disclosure and misrepresentation in her affirmation in support of the application for the July Order (“Supporting Affirmation”), the Respondent produced the affirmation of Mr YXXX to justify his criticism. The content of which is disputed by the Petitioner.

54.  I am slow to consider the Petitioner’s statement in the Supporting Affirmation that she had contacted Mr YXXX who indicated that there was no urgency for the Respondent to return to Singapore at that moment amounts to material non-disclosure or misrepresentation which warrants a discharge order. The fact in question is not one which should have been put in the scales, nor is it determinative. I do not think such information is necessary to enable this Court to properly exercise the discretion.

55.  It is a disclosed fact that the Respondent has been in employment with the group which Mr YXXX serves. Logically and in the normal course of event, an employee is duty bound to report to duty and to discharge the obligations imposed by his employer, some are urgent matters and some are less urgent ones. Risk of losing employment because of absence from duty is logically foreseeable.

56.  It is not an established practice to incumbent on an applicant for a prohibition order to approach the employer of the respondent for ascertaining the degree of urgency of his work or the likelihood of termination of employment. In reality, it is difficult for an applicant to approach a respondent’s employer or to assess the degree of urgency of his work or likelihood of dismissal as presented by the employer. It is a matter of degree and perception. Commonsense dictates that absence from duty for long without permission entails termination of employment. An applicant’s perception in this regard is immaterial.

57.  The fact that the Petitioner had a conversation with Mr YXXX, so happened to be a mutual friend of both parties, on the work situation of the Respondent does not render such matter material to the present application. Much emphasis has been placed by Mr Lam that such matter was not relied on upon the application of the July Order.

58.  Further, even if Mr YXXX’s affirmation is taken to the highest, which I do not so find, it does not lend any support to the Respondent’s argument. Mr YXXX said that in his telephone conversation with the Petitioner on 1 July 2020, he told her that he had not been notified by the Respondent of his obligation to attend the First JS Hearing, that they had not expected the COVID-19 lock down would go beyond June 2020 and thought it would make no difference if the Respondent was working home or in Hong Kong, that the Respondent was a XXXXXXX for the project in XXX and he needed to be there since the project was already delayed, that he could not force any of his staff members to take any action against their will but there would be consequences as it affects the company.

59.  Shortly thereafter, when the Petitioner whatsapps him to ask him for : -

“please write a company letter for me to state that [the Respondent] has not reported to his employer on his need to be in HK on 28Jul202 and that he is not absolutely necessary to go back to Singapore.

I know this request is a little out of the ordinary, but [the Respondent] has to produce evidence to support his application to skip/ postpone the court hearing. If what you said on our last conversation is true, then you are just stating the facts. Many thanks.”

60.  Mr YXXX chose not to reply to such message even though he now says that such message did not reflect the true contents of their conversation. He did neither complain to the Petitioner that her statement was untrue. Nor did he clarify what the true facts are.

61.  In the circumstances, the Petitioner was left with her view undisputed that the Respondent had not reported to his employer on his need to be in Hong Kong on 28 July 2020 and that he was not absolutely necessary to go back to Singapore. There is factual basis for her to perceive there was no urgency, bearing in mind that urgency is a matter of degree and interpretation. At any rates, her perception of no urgency has no material impact on the exercise of the Court’s discretion as commonsense dictates that absence from work for long entails dismissal. There is no room for argument on material non-disclosure, still less of misrepresentation.

62.  After all, in this case, the Respondent’s eagerness to return to Singapore to develop his career and the risk of losing employment is not something that weighs materially in favour of a discharge of the prohibition order, having regard to all the circumstances of this case. Even if, which I do not so find, the alleged material non-disclosure does exist, I would have re-granted a fresh prohibition order.

63.  I take the view that the July Order and the extension of it is needed to enforce the Consent Order, which is the subject of the series of judgment summonses and Leave Summons. The Respondent has been obliged to personally attend the hearings of those applications as ordered by the Court. The Petitioner clearly has valid grounds for seeking an extension order that the Respondent should remain in Hong Kong while the enforcement proceedings remain on foot.

Conclusion

64.  Having considered the Parties’ submissions, evidence and all the circumstances of this case, I order that : -

(1) the Discharge Summons be dismissed;

(2) the Second Extension Summons be allowed. The Prohibition Order dated 6 July 2020, extended on 3 August 2020, be further extended for one month from the date of its expiry.

Costs

65.  Taking into account all the circumstances of this case, I take the view that the general principle of costs follow the event should apply. I make an order nisi that the Respondent do pay the costs of the Discharge Summons, the Extension Summons and Second Extension Summons to the Petitioner, including all costs previously reserved, to be taxed if not agreed, with certificate for counsel.

66.  The above costs order nisi shall become absolute after 14 days from the date of this decision unless application to vary the order nisi by Summons is filed within this 14-day period.

 ( M LAM )
 Deputy District Judge

Mr Benjamin Lam, instructed by Messrs Pansy Leung Tang & Chau, for the Petitioner

Ms Vivien Leung, instructed by Withers, for the Respondent

[2019] HKFC 164-EN-2019-06-28

CWYJ v. LTYE

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FCMC 1135 of 2016

[2019] HKFC 164

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

MATRIMONIAL CAUSES

NUMBER 1135 of 2016

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BETWEEN  
 CWYJPetitioner

and

 LTYERespondent

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Coram:Deputy District Judge M Lam in Chambers
Date of Hearing:22-23, 28 May 2019
Date of Handing Down Decision :28 June 2019

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DECISION
(Variation of Maintenance)

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The application

1.  By two notices of application dated 4 April 2018 and 2 May 2018 respectively, the respondent seeks to vary the Consent Order granted by Deputy District Judge D Cheung on 27 January 2017. The said order was amended on 9 July 2018 and re-amended on 30 July 2018 (“Consent Order”).

2.  For ease of reference, I will refer to the petitioner and the respondent as wife and husband.

The Consent Order

3.  The parties were married in October 2007. Two children were born of the marriage. The first child was born in 2008 and the second one in 2010. The wife petitioned for divorce in January 2016. The decree absolute was granted on 17 March 2017.

4.  During a mediation meeting, the parties reached a settlement onthe issue of custody as well as financial arrangement with the assistance of their respective solicitors. The settlement was reduced into the “Minutes of Consent Order” dated 26 July 2016 (the “Minutes”) which was subsequently made an order of the court, the Consent Order.

5.  The Consent Order contained a number of undertakings given by the husband in addition to the terms of the order. The terms and undertakings which are relevant to the present application are that the parties were to share joint custody of the children with care and control to the wife, that the husband was to procure and secure the former matrimonial home for the sole use and occupation of the wife and the children rent free, that he was to pay or procure payments to be made for almost all of the expenses relating to the children and the former matrimonial home. As to the payments for the wife herself, he was required, under his undertakings as well as the terms of the Consent Order, to pay, : -

(a)     periodical payment of HKD35,000 per month until her death or remarriage, whichever is earlier (“PP Payment”). The first payment to be made on 1 August 2016; and

(b)     a sum of HKD4 million (“Lump Sum”)

(by 8 installments, HKD500,000 for each installment for every six months. The first installment to be made on 1 January 2017 and the last one on 1 July 2020). (“LS Payment”)

     (Collectively as “Maintenance Terms”)

6.  Notwithstanding that the LS Payment was worded as repayment of loan to the wife in the Consent Order, the parties take no issue on the nature of such payment and they regard it as lump sum payment having the meaning of section 4 of the Matrimonial Proceedings and Property Ordinance, Cap. 192 (“MPPO”).

7.  So far, the husband has only made two payments of HKD10,000 each in August and September 2016, a total of HKD20,000. The wife therefore took out a judgment summons on 17 August 2017. The husband thereafter made the present application.

8.  It is from the Maintenance Terms the husband now seeks to vary to the extent that : -

(a)     the PP Payment be varied to monthly payment of HKD1, commencing from the date of decree absolute; and

(b)     the LS Payment be varied from semi-annual installment of HKD500,000 to monthly installment of HKD5,000, commencing from the date of decree absolute.

The grounds of application

9.  The husband confirms unequivocally in Court that: -

(a)     he does not challenge the validity of the Minutes, the Consent Order or the liability to pay the Lump Sum.

(b)     He only seeks to vary the amount and frequency of the installment of the Lump Sum but not the Lump Sum itself.

(c)     his only ground of application is a change in circumstances of both parties after the divorce.

10.  The husband says that after the divorce, there has been material change in circumstances on both parties. The wife has changed from a full-time housewife to a business woman, having her own business and a steady boyfriend. She has increase in cash and stock investment, enjoying a high standard of lifestyle. On his part, even though his assets and earnings are on the increase and the liabilities are on the decline, he actually has no means to pay for the wife’s maintenance. The wife’s issuing of a statutory demand (“Statutory Demand”) against him for the outstanding maintenance payment in August 2018 has an adverse impact on him.

11.  The wife resists the application. She contends that the variation as sought will take the husband 800 months (66.6 years) to repay the Lump Sum and the monthly periodical payment of HKD1 is effectively no payment at all. She argues that the application is in effect a wholesale abandonment of the Consent Order which should not be allowed. She denies any change in circumstances which justifies a variation of the Consent Order as sought.

The law

12.  The power of the Court to vary a periodical payment order and the repayment schedule of a lump sum payment order is provided for by section 11(1) of MPPO : -

“(1) Where the court has made an order to which this section applies, then, subject to the provisions of this section, the court shall have power to vary or discharge the order or to suspend any provision thereof temporarily and to revive the operation of any provision so suspended.”

13.  The power is to be exercised in accordance with section 11(7) of MPPO: -

(7) In exercising the powers conferred by this section the court shall have regard to all the circumstances of the case, including any change in any of the matters to which the court was required to have regard when making the order to which the application relates and, where the party against whom that order was made has died, the changed circumstances resulting from his or her death.”

14.  The legal principles governing variation of a consent order can be summarized as follows: -

(a)     The statutory power to vary is wide and the court is to consider all the circumstances of the case.

(b)     while the court is not required to proceed from the starting point of the original order but look at the matter afresh, the basis and intended effect of the original order are relevant factors to which the Court should pay regard and there should not be a radical departure from the approach taken by the parties themselves when they had entered into an agreement embodied in a consent order. See AEM v VFM [2008] 3 HKLRD 36

(c)     the existence of a prior agreement was an important aspect which should be looked at having regard to the conduct of the two parties, both leading up to the agreement and subsequent thereto, and the Court should bear in mind that formal agreements, properly and fairly arrived at with competent legal advice, should be given effect to unless good and substantial grounds were shown for concluding that injustice would be done by holding the parties to the terms of the agreement. See AEM v VFM

(d)     The court must be astute to guard against unmeritorious applications for variation by litigants who seek to undo a settlement, or have second thoughts about settlements they have knowingly reached on their own volition. See HCCT v TYYC [2008] HKFLR 286

(e)     when parties who are sui juris freely enter upon a bargain for the division of matrimonial assets then, absent (a) unfair or unconscionable factors attaching to the circumstances in which that agreement came to be concluded and absent (b) material and drastic unforeseen circumstances arising after the conclusion of the agreement such as to cause manifest prejudice to one of the parties, the courts will hold the parties to their bargain. The burden is on the party seeking to achieve a different term to show “good and substantial cause” why the agreement should not be respected. See L v C [2007] 3 HKLRD 819

(f)     if an application consequent on an order is brought very soon after that order has been made, the Court, in normal circumstances, is likely to attach more weight to the earlier order than if it had been made some years previously. See HCCT v TYYC

(g)      disparity in value of assets distributed, unless it is evidence to support unconscionable circumstances, is not a matter that carries weight.  L v C

(h)     orders for lump sum payments by installments could not be readily or easily varied on change of circumstances. The public policy of finality in litigation, so that orders, and especially consent orders, providing for a clean break, are not set aside unless there is a compelling reason to do so. See CH v MEH [2012] 1 HKLRD 752

15.  With these principles in mind, I now turn to consider the arguments between the parties.

The husband

16.  The background of the parties can be briefly stated as follows. The husband was born in 1971 and graduated from University with a degree in Engineering. He has been working in the finance industry since the mid-90s. In around 2007, he became a responsible officer under the Securities and Futures Ordinance (Cap.571).

17.  He came from a wealthy family. His parents (the “Parents”) are considered to be high net worth individuals. His father is a senior lawyer in a law firm in Hong Kong. His mother is the sole shareholder of a limited company in Hong Kong(“Company”). The Company holds a number of valuable landed properties in Hong Kong, including the former matrimonial home.

18.  Since the purchase of the former matrimonial home in around 2009, the parties had lived there rent free. In around 2015, the husband moved out from it and lived with his parents until around January 2018. From then on, he started to cohabit with his girlfriend in a flat rented by him.

19.  He has been holding some shares of several overseas companies before and after the breakdown of marriage. The business of those companies have either been suspended or yet been commenced. The parties take no issue on the value of those businesses.

The wife

20.  The wife was born in 1971. After marriage, she became a full-time housewife as agreed between the parties.

21.  In or around 2015, disputes over the husband’s investment in overseas business and the suspected extramarital affair of the husband arose. The wife filed a petition for divorce in January 2016. In or around December 2016, she managed to find employment with a Hong Kong company through a friend. She was laid off in November 2017. Since then, she has remained unemployed. She has all along been living with the children in the former matrimonial home.

The Minutes

22.  It is against these backgrounds that this Court is invited to consider whether there was a change in circumstances which justifies a variation of the Consent Order. I should start from the circumstances under which the Minutes was signed.

23.  The Minutes was stated to be for full and final settlement of all claims that the parties might have against each other. It was signed by both parties together with their legal representatives. Not only that his understanding of his legal rights and the legal effects of the Minutes was recorded in the Minutes, the husband admitted in Court that before signing the Minutes, he had received proper legal advice and well understood the terms and obligations under the Minutes.

24.  He confessed that he was in fact warned by his solicitor to give serious consideration to the monetary obligations under the Minutes and, in particular, to make sure he had sufficient means to discharge the payment obligations before he signed the Minutes. He nevertheless accepted and signed the Minutes despite his monthly salary was only around HKD38,500 by then. He said by that time he was emotional and in the hope that he would be able to generate some more income by closing some sales deals.

25.  On his confirmation of his understanding of the Minutes with the benefit of proper legal advice and sufficient time for consideration and acceptance of the Minutes, it is clear to me that he could not now seek support from his emotion and his hope at the time of his signing of the Minutes to justify his present application. Indeed, there is simply no evidence to suggest that by the time of the signing of the Minutes he had some actual sales deals which would have enabled him to meet the payment obligations under the Minutes have subsequently aborted that frustrated his ability to pay.

Change in circumstances of the husband

Earnings and earning capacity

26.  As revealed in the husband’s three Form E (“H’s Form E”) filed on 12 April 2016, 17 November 2017 and 22 January 2019 respectively and his admission in court, his earnings and assets were on the increase whereas his liabilities were on the decline. His salary rose from HKD38,500 in April 2016 to HKD90,458 by January 2019.

27.  I am not convinced that the issuing of the Statutory Demand constituted a material change in circumstances which justifies the present application. There is no solid evidence to show that the Statutory Demand has prevented the husband from continuing his current employment. The fact is that he only resigned in April 2019, many months after the issuing of the Statutory Demand. As expressed in his resignation letter which was verified by him in Court, his last working day would be 5 July 2019 and the reason of resignation was company restructure of the employer and departure of many senior managements.

28.  According to him, a few months before his resignation, he had already secured an employment in Singapore with a monthly salary of SGD7,000 (approximately HKD41,000). The new employment would commence in July 2019. In Court, he said that the remuneration package for the new employment had yet been finalized and he would have in addition to his salary of SGD7,000, commission and bonus.

29.  In any event, the basic salary of SGD7,000 is indeed higher than his earnings upon entering into the Minutes. Regardless of the issuing of the Statutory Demand, he managed to secure a job a few months before his resignation (said to be 6 months before this hearing). In cross-examination, he revealed his true motive of his plan to work in Singapore was in fact for better quality of life and retirement.

30.  In light of his employment arrangement aforesaid, it is difficult to see as to how the husband might end up in disqualification of responsible officer or bankruptcy because of the Statutory Demand would, in reality, cause significant adverse impact on him financially. In any event, for the reasons I would elaborate further below, the chance of disqualification of responsible officer or bankruptcy because of the Statutory Demand is flimsy. I should add that the husband’s reliance on the serving of the Statutory Demand as a ground of the present application is indeed putting the cart before the horse. He is in effect seeking to vary the Consent Order by reason of his non-compliance of the order. This is something the court would be slow to allow.

31.  He accepted in live evidence that there was in fact no substantial change in his earning capacity. He is a university graduate with over 25 years of working experience. The increment of his income in the past few years marked his earning capacity which could land him a well-paid job. I accept Mr. Lam’s submission that the wife should not be penalized by the husband’s own choice of life.

Assets and liabilities

32.  As accepted by the husband and demonstrated in his Form Es, his assets enjoyed a gradual increase over the past few years (from HKD1,365,001 to HKD1,600,178) whilst his liabilities were in decline.

33.  With regard to his liabilities, the majority of them were stated to be the LS Payment and the money owed to the Parents. In the 2016 Form E, the husband logged HKD1 million loan owed to the Parents. In the 2017 Form E, his loan owed to the Parents were increased to HKD3 million due to their payment for the husband’s credit card debt of HKD2 million in or around July/ August 2017. In the 2019 Form E, the HKD3 million owed to the Parents no longer existed as a liability. At any rate, there is no suggestion that the Parents have ever taken any serious steps to recover payment from him.

34.  As to the other debts, the husband admitted that most of them were incurred over the years of marriage which continues after divorce.

35.  In the premises, there has been no material change of circumstances in the aspect of the husband’s assets and liabilities which justifies the present application.

Standard of living

36.  The husband’s case is not premised on any compromise of standard of living on his part. In fact, the H’s Form E together with his credit card statements reveals, in reality, he has continued to enjoy a high standard of living over the years.

37.  He continues to enjoy the membership of three private clubs. For the period between October 2016 and November 2018, he made 33 overseas trips and only 15 of them were paid by his employer or clients. His credit card statements suggest that his overseas trip expenses were more than his reported expenses.

38.  As to his general and personal expenses as reported in his Form E, a substantial part of them were related to the children and the former matrimonial home. In court, both parties admitted that the expenses relating to the children were in fact funded by the Parents which should be removed from their respective Form E.

39.  Other than that, a sizable portion of the husband’s expenses were for dining, holiday, entertainment and car, and since January 2018, rental. Two months after the present application was made, the husband elected to cease living with his parents rent free and rented an apartment at the monthly rate of HK$25,000 with a deposit payment of HK$50,000. His election of moving out of his parents’ home and renting of a flat instead of paying off the long-standing debts owed to the wife cannot constitute a valid reason for the present application.

40.  For the reasons aforesaid, I do not find any change in circumstances of the husband which justifies the present application.

Financial support from H’s parents

41.  On the husband’s argument on his insufficient earnings for payment to the wife. I am not convinced. The evidence shows that the Parents have been supportive of the husband before the divorce, and since then, indeed all along, they have continued generously to support him.

42.  The agreed or unchallenged facts are : -

(a)     the Parents have provided the former matrimonial home for the parties and their children to reside since the purchase of it, in or around 2009.

(b)    during the marriage, the wife was full time housewife with no income. The parties did not have a habit of saving. They however enjoyed a high standard of living : fine dining, good food, wine, private club memberships and the wife was showered with luxurious gifts, jewelry, car, beauty treatments and overseas trips. Their expenditures have been constantly far beyond the husband’s earnings and their savings over the years. Their overspendings were met by the Parents from time to time.

(c)     after the divorce, the Parents have discharged most of the obligations under the Consent Order for the husband. They continue to provide the former matrimonial home for the wife and the children to live in as well as to fund almost all of the expenses of the children.

(d)    the Parents paid for the pleasure trip to Bangkok for the wife in August 2017.

(e)     the Parents paid off the husband’s credit card debts (mostly for his personal over-spending) to the tune of HKD2 million in or around July or August 2017.

43.  There is ample evidence pointing to one single fact that the Parents have always been generous to the husband and ready, willing and able to financially support him. They supported the costly lifestyle of the parties in the past. After the parties’ separation, they continued to support the husband and did so even more generously as they had done previously by not only funding almost everything for the 2 children but also paid off the debts for the husband to the extent of HKD2 million.

44.  The flexibility of the financial assistance is wide. Payments can be made on monthly basis (such as the children’s maintenance) or to the extent of millions (such as payment for the husband’s credit card debt).

45.  In the circumstances, there is compelling evidence to suggest that the financial support from the Parents will continue in the years to come. There is no reason why they would not financially support the husband in discharging his obligations under the Maintenance Terms if the husband is called upon to do so seriously. The indication that the father is unwilling to make any payment to the wife because of his poor relationship with her will unlikely stop him from financially support the husband in discharging his obligations, so as to save the husband from any serious consequences resulting from non-compliance with the Consent Order.

46.  I also accept the wife’s evidence that the continuous support of the parents was the reason why the husband was willing to accept the Minutes despite his limited earnings. The fact that the former matrimonial home was the Parents’ property and the payment obligations under the Minutes actually exceeded the husband’s earnings upon the signing of the Minutes do lend support to the wife’s argument.

47.  In looking at the reality of the husband’s finances, I should take into account not only what he actually has, but also what might reasonably be made available to him if a request for assistance were to be made. See KEWS v NCHC [2013] 2 HKLRD 314

48.  Having considered the extent of the financial assistance from his parents in the past and at present and the high likelihood of continuous assistance in the foreseeable future, the husband’s contention that he does not have sufficient means to comply with the Maintenance Terms does not stand.

Change in circumstances of the wife

49.  I now turn to consider the circumstances of the wife. The husband describes the wife’s present lifestyle as “luxurious” and is well better than her lifestyle during the marriage. I however am not persuaded that her financial situation has been improved to an extent that justifies a reduction of her maintenance payment.

Earnings and earning capacity

50.  The husband seeks to argue that the wife has changed from a full-time housewife to a business woman. His first argument rests on her employment in a Hong Kong company. The said employment was however a short-lived one which lasted for less than one year. She was employed through the introduction of a friend but was laid off shortly. In reality, she has been unemployed since the marriage except the said short-lived employment. Coupled with the fact that she has the care and control of the two children and is their primary carer, I am not impressed that her employability has in any way improved.

51.  The husband’s second argument is premised on the wife’s recent business adventure. The wife gave an account of placing HKD300,000 for her 10% shareholdings in a limited company which runs a bar in Central. The bar had its soft opening in or around October 2018 and obtained a liquor license in or around April 2019. The business is break-even and she has yet received any profit-sharing. The husband has not mounted any sustained challenge to such evidence.

52.  Absent any evidence showing any new source of solid income of the wife, I have no reason not to believe her evidence that the husband’s default of maintenance payment and her legal costs incurred in the enforcement proceedings have rendered her living off her own savings and investments.

Assets and liabilities

53.  On the fluctuation of the value of her investments and cash in hand as indicated in her Form E, filed on 29 April 2016, 20 November 2017 and 24 April 2019 (“Wife’s Form E”), I accept her explanation that it was due to the fluctuation of the face value of the securities which formed a considerable part of her investments. She explained that the acquisitions of most of those securities were funded by low-interest loans from banks and at some stage, the face value of those securities reached a high level. She however missed the best chance to sell them and ultimately sold them at less favorable prices with little profits, at the time when the stock market was stagnant because of the international trade dispute. Those profits were used for her personal expenses. Her explanation is not countered with any serious argument from the husband.

54.  In any event, as revealed in her Form E, her investment has never been a big venture that attracts life-changing income. It is disclosed that the lion share of her assets of around HKD5 million lies in the form of receivables from the husband under the Consent Order (the outstanding LS Payment of HKD4 million and the PP Payment of over HKD1 million).

55.  In the absence of any real challenge to the wife’s disclosure of incomes and assets, I find her assets and incomes are in no way more substantial than before divorce.

Standard of living

56.  I also do not find the wife’s standard of living after the divorce lends support to the husband’s application. On the husband’s own admission, during the marriage, both of the parties enjoyed a lifestyle which offered them with frequent dining out at fancy restaurants, overseas travel and purchase of luxury items for the wife. The evidence shows the wife has, after divorce, just enjoyed a lifestyle more or less as the same as that during the marriage, but not significantly better. The lifestyle was mainly supported by her boyfriend and friends by paying for her dining, parties, overseas trips as well as granting her small loans.

57.  There is no evidence to suggest that those generous offers will become a consistent or guaranteed source of funding for the wife’s lifestyle. Instead, it is the wife’s unchallenged evidence that she was treated to free dining and entertainment because of her friends’ kindness in offering her support in the transition and such support would not last for long. Further, the disputes between the wife and her boyfriend from time to time further cast doubt on his continuous support of the wife’s overseas trips and entertainment.

58.  For the valuable jewelries, a close study of the W’s Form W will find that there is only an addition of one diamond ring to the wife’s collection (purchase value of HK$60,000 and estimate value of HK$10,000) since the divorce. It was a gift from her boyfriend which could hardly give any impact on the present application.

59.  For the 2 wine fridges, the wife said that one of them was bought together with the husband during marriage and the other one was a used fridge which was bought at a big discount to keep the wine mostly purchased during marriage. That was to save the monthly storage charges. Her evidence was unchallenged.

60.  On the inquiry into the source of her legal fees, the wife answered that she herself had paid for all of them, making reference to her bank statements. In Court, the husband did not pursue this matter any further.

61.  In all, the wife’s assets and earnings have not materially increased since the Minutes. Nor has her lifestyle enhanced dramatically over the years.

62.  Time-wise, the default of payments was immediately after the signing of the Minutes. For the first and second payments the husband was required to pay under the undertakings of the Minutes, he only paid HKD10,000 each in August and September 2016. Since then, no further payment has been made. Absent any material change of circumstances, his default payment in part and in full since the first periodical payment raises doubt on his intention to discharge his payment obligation. His offer to negotiate other payment arrangement with the wife but insistence on the presence of the wife’s former solicitors raises further doubt on his intention to pay.

Conclusion

63.  Having considered all the evidence and submissions of both parties as well as all the circumstances in this case, I am not satisfied there is any valid grounds which justify a variation of the Consent Order. I order that the husband’s two applications be dismissed.

Costs

64.  Costs follow the event. I make an order nisi that the husband do pay the costs of the present application to the wife, including costs previously reserved, to be taxed if not agreed, with certificate for counsel.

65.  The above costs order nisi shall become absolute after 14 days from the date of this decision unless application to vary the order nisi by Summons is filed within this 14-day period.

( M LAM )
Deputy District Judge

  

Mr Benjamin Lam, instructed by Messrs Chong & Yen, for the Petitioner

The Respondent acting in person