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XS 對 LB

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[2021] HKFC 5-EN-2021-01-14

XS v. LB

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FCMC 11635 / 2016

[2021] HKFC 5

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

MATRIMONIAL CAUSES

NUMBER 11635 OF 2016

----------------------------

BETWEEN  
 XSPetitioner

and

 LBRespondent

----------------------------

Coram :Before His Honour Judge K K PANG in Chambers (Disposal on papers)
Date of Petitioner Wife’s Submissions :19 November 2020
Date of Respondent Husband’s Submissions : 3 December 2020
Date of Petitioner Wife’s Reply : 10 December 2020
Date of Handing Down of this Ruling : 14 January 2021

------------------------------

RULING ON COSTS

------------------------------

1.  This is the hearing of the Petitioner Wife (‘W’)’s application for the costs of her Order 24 r.7A Summons dated 10 August 2020 (‘O.24 r.7A Summons’).

Background

2.  By an order dated 2 June 2020, it is ordered that H shall, within 49 days from the date of the order, provide to W for specific discovery the following documents/ information of H’s bank account no. 608-31xxxx-001 (the ‘said account’) and any other bank account with HSBC in his sole name and/or jointly with any other third parties from 1 January 2013: -

(a)  the account number(s);

(b)  whether the account(s) is in H’s sole name or jointly held with third parties;

(c)  if the account(s) is in joint name(s), name of the other account holder(s);

(d)  opening date and closing date (if appropriate);

(e)  bank statements of all such account(s) dated from 1 January 2013 to date (if the account(s) is now closed, dated from 1 January 2013 or 2 years prior to date of closure until date of closure, whichever is the longer period).

3.  On 10 August 2020, W took out the O.24 r.7A Summons against HSBC for an order that:

A.    HSBC shall provide to W the following documents within 14 days: -

(1)  copy of bank statements of the said account dated from 1 January 2013 to date;

(2)  in respect of all other account(s) H has or has had with HSBC in his sole name and/or jointly with any other third parties:

a.     copy of bank statements of such bank accounts dated from 1 January 2013 to date;

b.     account opening from(s) of the relevant account(s) evidencing opening date and name(s) of other account holder(s), if any;

(3)  if any of the account(s) referred to in sub-paragraph (2) above is closed:

a.     copy of bank statements of such bank accounts dated from 1 January 2013 or 2 years prior to date of closure, whichever is the longer period;

b.     account closing form(s) or statement of the relevant accounts evidencing the closure;

B.     If any of the documents referred to in paragraph A above are no longer in the possession, custody or power of HSBC, HSBC do file an affidavit explaining when it parted with them and what has become of them within 14 days.

4.  Unsurprisingly, HSBC has taken a neutral stance in respect of the O.24 r.7A Summons. Neither does H contest the application for an order for discovery against HSBC, despite that he takes issue on the question of W’s costs.

7.     On 5 November 2020, by consent it is ordered in terms of W’s application for third discovery against HSBC and that H shall pay HSBC’s costs of the O.24 r.7A Summons, and the question of W’s costs is directed to be dealt with on the papers.

Legal principles

5.  The court has a wide discretion as to costs. The relevant provisions in the Rules of the High Court governing the exercise of discretion as to costs are O.62 r.3(2A) and O.62 r.5. The effect of O.62 r.3(2A) was as explained in Melvin Waxman & Another v Li Fei Yu & Another [2013] 6 HKC 424 that the ‘rule’ that costs normally follow the event is no longer the usual order in an interlocutory application but remains an option.

6.  The Court in exercising its discretion as to costs shall, to such extent, if any, as may be appropriate in the circumstances, take into account the underlying objectives set out in Order 1A rule 1 as well as the other matters set out under O.62 r.5(1). One of the underlying objectives is the discouragement of unnecessary or unmeritorious applications: Hong Kong Civil Procedure Vol 1 62/5/A.

7.  In my view, the parties’ central contentions are about: -

(i)     The merits of W’s application, particularly looking at them in light of the litigation conduct of the parties (Underlying objectives, O.62 r.5(1)(d) & (e)); 

(ii)    Who can be regarded as the successful party (O.62 r.5(1)(f)); and

(iii)   Any admissible offer to settle made by a party, which is drawn to the Court’s attention (O.62 r.5(1)(g))

8.  O.62 r.5(2) provides that conduct for this purpose includes (a) whether it was reasonable for a party to raise, pursue or contest a particular allegation or issue; (b) the manner in which a party has pursued or defended his case or a particular allegation or issue; (c) whether a claimant who has succeeded in his claim, in whole or in part, exaggerated his claim; and (d) conduct before, as well as during, the proceedings.

Merits of the O.24 r.7A Summons and Conduct of the parties

9.  W is very critical of H’s litigation conduct. W alleges that the issue of the O.24 r.7A Summons was necessitated by the following circumstances: -

(i)    H has failed to comply with the Order dated 2 June 2020;

(ii)   H has failed to supply the requested documents dated from January to June 2013;

(iii)  H has failed to draw HSBC’s attention to the Order dated 2 June 2020;

(iv)  H has failed to procure HSBC’s confirmation of whether he has or has had any other accounts.

10.  In view of W’s rebuke of H’s litigation conduct, it is pertinent to have a review of the chronology relating to the parties’ litigation conduct at the material time that is as follows: -

(i)      By a letter dated 9 June 2020 to HSBC, H’s solicitors (‘YL’) wrote for copy of documents/ information as required by the Order dated 2 June 2019.[1]

(ii)     By a reply letter dated 29 June 2020, HSBC said that it was processing H’s request.[2]

(iii)    By a letter dated 8 July 2020 to YL, W’s solicitors (‘HI’) wrote that H should procure HSBC’s confirmation of whether he has or has had any accounts other that the said account.[3]

(iv)    By a letter dated 14 July 2020 to YL, HSBC indicated that requested documents dated before June 2013 was ‘beyond the retention’.[4]

(v)     By a letter dated 21 July 2020, YL advised HI that the requested documents dated before June 2013 was beyond HSBC’s retention.[5]

(vi)    By a reply letter dated 24 July 2020, HI said that they have sent HSBC a letter dated 10 December 2019 for preservation of all documents in relation to the said account and any other account in H’s sole name or jointly with third parties and as such they could not understand why the requested documents dated before June 2013 were beyond retention.[6]

(vii)   On or about 31 July 2020, HI proposed that the parties should make a joint application under r.121(2), Cap 179A for a consent order for the disclosure of the relevant provisions of the Order dated 2 June 2020 to HSBC. YL did not pick up such proposal.

(viii)  On 10 August 2020, W issued the present application.

(ix)    By a letter dated 11 August 2020, HSBC replied to HI that it was not the bank’s intention to contest the O.24 r.7A Summons.[7]

(x)     By a letter dated 18 August 2020, HI informed YL that the bank did not contest the O.24 r.7A Summons and sought confirmation of H’s position.[8]

(xi)    By a letter dated 24 August 2020, YL replied that H disputed the costs of the O.24 r.7A Summons and proposed costs in the cause.[9]

(xii)   By a letter dated 3 September 2020, HI pursued W’s costs of the O.24 r.7A Summons.[10]

(xiii)  On 14 September 2020, YL wrote to the Court with copy to HI, reported the progress and proposed that the question of W’s costs was to be disposed on the papers.[11]

(xiv)  On 18 September 2020, HI wrote to that Court that they did not wish to trouble the Court with the parties’ negotiations and they were instructed to follow up on the negotiations.[12]

(xv)   On the same date, HI wrote a without prejudice save as to costs letter to YL and proposed W’s costs be in the cause while H would pay HSBC’s costs (Not in the bundle, annexed to W’s replying Submissions on de bene esse basis).

(xvi)  On 27 October 2020, YL wrote to HI and proposed that there be no order as to costs (Not in the bundle).

11.  W takes the position that it is inappropriate for YL to disclose HI’s without prejudice save as to costs letter dated 18 September 2020 at this stage, given it seeks to settle these costs proceedings but not the substance of the O.24 r.7A Summons, and that the said letter is only to be taken into account when the question of the costs of this costs application is to be dealt with. Despite W’s position to the contrary, upon a fair reading of the said letter dated 18 September 2020, it is clear that it is a proposal on the disposal of the substance of the O.24 r.7A Summons and accordingly I see no reason why the Court should not consider it. Yet, W’s said without prejudice save as to costs offer was not accepted.

12.  H rejects W’s criticism of litigation conduct. H resists liability to W’s costs of the O.24 r.7A Summons primarily on the ground that he should not be faulted for HSBC’s position that the requested documents dated from January to June 2013 were beyond retention, inasmuch as he has done all he can do in order to comply with the Order dated 2 June 2020. H stresses that he has promptly written to HSBC for the requested documents. W however remarks that: (1) W cannot understand the alleged unavailability of the requested documents dated from January to June 2013 given that she through solicitors has already made request for preservation of the same; (2) The copy of the requested documents dated from 19 June 2013 to 6 January 2013 were sent to HI on 18 August 2020. That is to say, they were late and were sent after the O.24 r.7A Summons was issued on 10 August 2020. To take up point (2) first, I take notice that no satisfactory explanation of the lateness was given. As to the question of the availability of the requested documents dated from January to June 2013, I consider that it is unfortunate that YL has not chased after HSBC for the requested documents dated from January to June 2013 after they have learnt that W has already made request for preservation. It seems that they have wrongly somehow taken HSBC’s position dated 14 July 2020 that the requested documents were beyond retention as the end. In view of W’s request for preservation, obviously it should not be. Against the above backdrop, I accept that it is reasonable for W to issue the O. 24 r.7A Summons.

13.  In regard of W’s complaint of that H has failed to draw HSBC’s attention to the Order dated 2 June 2020 or to procure the bank’s confirmation of whether he has or has had any accounts with the bank, I tend to accept that H is not obliged to do W’s requests for the same as they are not within the purview of the Order dated 2 June 2020.

Who can be regarded as the successful party

14.  It should be beyond dispute that W is the successful party in the O.24 r.7A Summons. 

Any admissible offer to settle made by a party

15.  I take the view that W should have taken up H’s proposal by the letter dated 14 September 2020 that the question of W’s costs be disposed on the papers. I take notice that HI has instructions to continue the negotiations but apparently the proposed disposal of the matter will not in any way prejudice any ongoing negotiations. Had W accepted such offer, the matter could have been dealt with by way of consent summons setting out the terms of the agreement already made between the parties together with the proposed directions for paper disposal on W’s costs, and the hearing dated 5 November 2020 could have been vacated and costs thereof could have been saved.

Disposal

16.  I remind myself of the provisions of O.62 r.3(2A) and O.62 r.5, which set out the factors which the court shall have regard in exercising its discretion as to costs. I place significance on the fact that W succeeds in the O.24 r.7A Summons. I caution myself of the need to consider the overall justice of the situation and examine all the factors and circumstance. I also place significance on my view that W should have taken up H’s proposal by the letter dated 14 September 2020 and the hearing dated 5 November 2020 could have been vacated and costs thereof could have been saved. Looking at the matters in the round, I regard it is reasonable and just to make the order that H shall pay W 60% of the costs of the O.24 r.7A Summons, including all reserved costs with certificate for counsel, to be taxed if not agreed.

Costs of the costs application

17.  In view of my decisions in the above paragraphs, there be a costs order nisi that H shall pay W 60% of the costs of the costs application with certificate for counsel, to be taxed if not agreed. The costs order nisi becomes absolute 14 days after the order is made unless a party has applied to the Court for varying the order.

( K K PANG )
District Judge

Ms Theresa Chow instructed by Ho & Ip, solicitors for the Petitioner

Yan Lawyers, solicitors for the Respondent


[1] B/ 151-152

[2] B/ 37

[3] B/ 2

[4] B/ 153

[5] B/ 35-36

[6] B/ 40-41

[7] B/ 50

[8] B/ 53

[9] B/ 146

[10] B/ 147-148

[11] B/ 149-150

[12] B/ 158-159

[2020] HKFC 120-CH-2020-06-03

XS 對 LB

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FCMC 11635 / 2016

[2020] HKFC 120

香 港 特 別 行 政 區

區 域 法 院

婚姻訴訟案件編號 2016年第 11635 宗

 —————————— 
 XS呈請人

及

 LB答辯人
 —————————— 
主審法官:區域法院法官彭家光內庭聆訊(非公開)
審訊日期:2020年6月2日
判決日期 :2020年6月3日

-------------------------

判 案 書
(更改暫准命令)

-------------------------

背景

1.  在2017年2月21日,在父親缺席聆訊情況下,應代表呈請人(母親)出席的律師的申請,本席將一名家庭子女(兒子)的管養權、照顧和管束權,頒予母親,答辯人(父親)有合理探視權。在2017年3月23日,法庭頒下暫准離婚令。在2017年4月26日,母親發出傳票,要求更改兒子的姓氏。在2017年5月26日,父親發出傳票,要求兒子的管養權和包括留宿探視權。經過審訊後,在2018年5月4日,本席頒令︰-

(1)     撤消母親要求更改兒子姓氏的傳票;

(2)     撤消父親要求更改兒子的管養權的傳票;

(3)     父親有界定探視,安排詳情見於該判決;

(4)     社工提交就探視之進度報告。

2.  在2019年5月17日,社工提交就探視之進度報告。在2019年6月3日,父親發出傳票要求更改兒子的管養權為共同管養權,又要求法庭領令許可父親帶兒子見精神科醫生。在2019年12月18日,本席頒暫淮命令社工就父親的傳票申請提交兒子的管養權、照顧及管束和探視安排之報告。然而,母親拒絕與社工配合。在2020年1月14日, 母親發出傳票要求更改暫准命令為社工只須就兒子管養權而無須就探視安排作報告。這是有關母親2020年1月13日之申請的審訊。

3.  扼要來說,母親認為因為父親2019年6月3日之傳票申請只為要求更改管養權,所以社工並無需要就探視作報告。對此,本席並不同意。本席認為,若要考慮應否就管養權作出任何更改或調整,必須顧及兒子整體之福利事宜,所以也必涉及過去探視之情況及未來探視之安排。況且,按父親之說法,一直以來他的探視毫不順利,顯然地社工也須對男方所說作出調查。又母親對此應為十分之清楚。

頒令

4.  本席認為,母親上述的說法並不合理的,母親目前的傳票申請也毫無成功的機會。本席頒令撤銷母親2020年1月14日的傳票。本席在此指示訴訟雙方與社工合作,讓調查報告能儘快完成。

訟費

5.  經考慮到母親的傳票申請毫無成功的機會,本席認為母親應付父親本申請之訟費,連大律師證書。這是一個暫准命令,如雙方在判案書頒發後的14天內沒有任何申請,有關的暫准訟費命令將轉為絕對命令。

( 彭家光 )
區域法院法官

  

呈請人由何葉律師事務所轉聘周廷勵大律師代表出席審訊

答辯人由閆顯明律師事務所轉聘陳星南大律師代表出席審訊

[2019] HKFC 195-EN-2019-08-02

X, S v. L, B

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FCMC11635/2016

[2019]HKFC195

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

MATRIMONIAL CAUSE NUMBER 11635 OF 2016

----------------------------

BETWEEN  
 X, SPetitioner
and
 L, BRespondent

------------------------

Coram :  Before Deputy District Judge K.K. PANG (Disposal on papers)

Petitioner’s Statement of Costs :  11 July 2019

Respondent’s Statement of Objections : 19 July 2019

Date of Handing Down of this Ruling : 2 August 2019


------------------------------

Summary Assessment of costs

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1.  This is the summary assessment of the petitioner’s costs arose from the 1st Appointment hearing dated 10 July 2019 pursuant to the paragraphs (2) to (3) of the costs order made on the same day.  By her Statement of Costs dated 11 July 2019 and filed on 12 July 2019, the petitioner made a claim of totally $47,860, of which $25,000 belongs to 50% of fee for counsel’s attendance.  By his Statement of Objections dated 19 July 2019, the respondent argued that the reasonable sum is $9,095.64.  However, the respondent did not take issue on the hourly charging rate of the petitioner’s solicitors. 

3.  Looking at the matter in the round, I accept the respondent’s argument that the petitioner’s claim is excessive.  This is a 1st Appointment hearing.  There is no complicated issues of law or fact involved.  Additionally, as I already indicated during the said hearing, I believe that most of the preparation work already done by the petitioner’s solicitors can actually be reused at the adjourned 1st Appointment hearing dated 4 December 2019.  According to the court records, the hearing time of the 1st Appointment dated 10 July 2019 is approximately 30 minutes.  Giving a broad brush approach, and taking items A, B and C of the petitioner’s Statement of Costs dated 11 July 2019 together, I allow 2 hr of GC, i.e. $3,460, and 30 minutes of DH, i.e. $1,930, totally $5,390.  As regards counsel fee, I consider that the sum of $8,000 being 50% of the brief fee is reasonable.  On top of the above, I allow item E1, i.e. copying charges of $50, but I disallow item E2 for the absence of necessary details.

4.  In conclusion, it is ordered that the costs payable by the respondent to the petitioner pursuant to the paragraphs (2) and (3) of the costs order dated 10 July 2019 be summarily assessed at $13,440.



 ( K K PANG )
 Deputy District Judge

Messrs. Ho & Ip, solicitors for the petitioner

Messrs. Yan Lawyers, solicitors for the respondent

[2018] HKFC 124-CH-2018-08-02

XS 對 LB

HTML content

FCMC 11635/2016

[2018]HKFC124

香 港 特 別 行 政 區

區 域 法 院

婚姻訴訟案件編號2016年第11635宗

-----------------------------------

XS呈請人
及
 LB 

-----------------------------------

主審法官:區域法院暫委法官彭家光內庭聆訊(非公開)
聆訊日期:2018年8月2日
判決書頒發日期:2018年8月2日

-----------------------------------

判 案 書
(上訴許可申請)

-----------------------------------

1.  這是答辯人(以下稱為“父親”)以2018年5月31日的傳票,要求許可就法庭在2018年5月4日頒出的共同管養權命令提出上訴的聆訊。

2.  應訴訟雙方分別的傳票作出申請,在2018年5月4日,經呈請人(以下稱為“母親”)作出以下的承諾、確認和同意後︰-

(i)   在作出有關兒子管養權事宜的決定之前,會盡最大的努力預先通知父親,徵詢和積極地考慮父親的意見。

(ii)   兒子之通常居住於香港;

(iii)   兒子之居籍為香港;

(iv)   除非訴訟雙方同意或法庭許可,否則母親不能單方面改變兒子之通常居住地或居籍;

(v)   除非訴訟雙方同意或法庭許可,否則母親不能帶兒子永久離開香港,移民往其他地方居住。

本席頒令如下︰-

(1)   母親2017年4月16日的傳票撤銷;

(2)   父親2017年5月26日要求更改兒子的管養權命令的傳票撤銷;

(3)   父親界定探視權安排如下︰(1)由即日開始,每三個星期一次日間探視,在星期日於本港境內進行,每次6小時。探視時間、地點、接送地點,由父母雙方或其代表律師協訂。(2)日間探視的安排,須於探視開始前72小時確定。如雙方因事未能進行日間探視,須於24小時前以其代表律師或其他通訊方式知會對方。(3)由即日起計3個月後,即由2018年6月起,在每個學校長假期,即農曆新年、復活節、暑假及聖誕假期期間,一次留宿探視,每次不少於三天兩夜在本港境內酒店進行。留宿探視的安排,須於探視開始前72小時確定。如雙方因事未能進行留宿探視,須於48小時前,經其代表律師或以其他通訊方式知會對方。(4)在執行上述探視安排,父母雙方要遵守下列事項︰(i) 在探視期間內,父親負照顧兒子的責任。(ii) 除雙方事前同意者外,探視期間,不應有第三者如親戚、朋友等參與探視當中。(iii) 為協調雙方的不信任態度,在日間探視期間,母親可安排不多於兩名人員,如家庭教師或傭人,在探視時在場陪伴兒子。(iv)在留宿探視期間,母親可安排兩名人員如家庭教師或傭人,在晚上可待於留宿探視房間的鄰房。有關租用房間的費用由父親支付。

(4)   訴訟雙方開立一個微信戶口,就兒子探視事宜作溝通。

(5)   訴訟雙方須出席由社工安排之親職課程。

(6)   社工在12個月後提交就探視安排之進度報告。

3.  在2018年5月31日,父親以傳票作出申請,要求許可就法庭在2018年5月4日頒出的共同管養權命令提出上訴。父親的申請的理據見於連同傳票提交的擬上訴通知書。此外,父親的法律代表也在提交的陳詞裡,就父親的上訴的理據作出討論。

4.  主要來說,就共同管養權的判決,可見於2018年5月4日的判案書第29至第44段。值得一題的是,本席是經小心考慮全部證供以後,而作出判決的。

5.  經小心考慮以後,就已有証據衡量,本席認為於上述判決是穩妥的,也符合家庭子女的最佳利益。

6.  在處理父親的上訴許可申請時,本席須考慮香港法例第366章《區域法院條例》第63A條的條文,有關法例的條例節錄如下︰- 

“(1) 根據第63條批予的上訴許可,可-

(a) 就在有關的判決、命令或決定中出現的某個爭論點而批予;及

(b) 在聆訊該許可申請的法官、聆案官或上訴法庭認為為使有關上訴得到公正、迅速及合乎經濟原則的處置而需要的條件的規限下批予。

(1) 聆訊有關上訴許可申請的法官、聆案官或上訴法庭除非信納-

(a) 有關上訴有合理機會得直;或

(b)有其他有利於秉行公正的理由,因而該上訴應進行聆訊,

否則不得批予上訴許可。

7.  經小心考慮以後,本席認為父親並沒有提出任何可行的上訴理由,他的上訴並無合理機會得直,本席也看不到任何有利於秉行公正的理由,應進行上訴聆訊。本席拒絕父親的上訴許可申請。

8.  父親的申請失敗。在一般情況下,失敗一方須支付對方的訟費。就已有証據衡量,本席並不察覺有任何理由,應以例外方法來處理本案。本席領令父親須付母親本申請的訟費,若雙方不能同意訟費的金額,將來由法庭評定。這是一個暫准命令,如雙方在本判決書頒發後的14天內沒有任何申請,有關的暫准訟費命令,將轉為絕對命令。

  

  

 ( 彭家光 )
 區域法院暫委法官

呈請人:由何葉律師事務所轉聘周廷勵大律師代表

答辯人:由閆顯明律師事務所轉聘姚子軒大律師代表

[2018] HKFC 68-CH-2018-05-04

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