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Civil Action2016

WAH SUN HONG LTD v. WONG LEE YUK PING AGNES

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[2019] HKCFI 993-EN-2019-03-15

WAH SUN HONG LTD v. WONG LEE YUK PING AGNES

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HCA 333/2016

[2019] HKCFI 993

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO 333 OF 2016

____________

BETWEEN
 WAH SUN HONG LIMITED
(華新行塑膠原料有限公司)
Plaintiff
and
 WONG LEE YUK PING AGNES
(黃李玉平)
Defendant

____________

Before: Hon Au-Yeung J in Chambers

Date of Hearing: 15 March 2019

Date of Decision: 15 March 2019

__________________

D E C I S I O N

__________________


1.  The plaintiff seeks an order for part of the costs of the interim preservation order to be borne by Cheng, Kwok & Chang, Certified Public Accountants (“CKC”). They say it was necessitated by the attitude of CKC as CKC had refused by correspondence to give an undertaking to preserve the documents.

2.  I note from the correspondence that the plaintiff had, through their solicitors, tried to elicit the necessary undertaking to preserve from CKC about over a year ago, the first letter relied on being 1 February 2018.  Apart from two holding replies, CKC never gave any concrete reply.  In view of the imminent expiry of the seven-year period for auditors to preserve documents, the plaintiff took out the present application for interim preservation order against CKC.

3.  CKC immediately responded.  They did not oppose what was sought in the summons but they opposed the application for costs against them.  Mr Chang of CKC frankly told this court that they had been advised by their lawyers not to reply to the correspondence from the plaintiff insofar as the interim preservation order was concerned.

4.  In my view, the starting point is that CKC is a non-party.  They are a firm of auditors with professional duties and accounting practices to follow.  Having heard the submissions, I have considered the following points.  If CKC had been willing to give an undertaking:

(1)   What undertaking should they give? The letter dated 1 February 2018 did not set out the schedule of documents to which the undertaking should apply. 

(2)   The letter dated 1 February 2018 even imposed an onerous duty on CKC to keep the letter confidential and not to tip off Mrs Wong by disclosing the contents of the letter or the demands made by the plaintiff on CKC. 

(3)   Even if CKC had reasonably agreed to preserve documents, I do not think they had a duty to preserve the documents beyond the seven‑year period required by usual accounting practice or the law.  In the premises, the plaintiff would still have to come to court in order to get a preservation order to cover the period after those seven years.  It was apparent that this trial would be fixed for some time in the period after expiry of those seven years for preserving documents by an auditor.

(4)   As pointed out by Mr Chang of CKC, the letter of 1 February 2018 indicated that the plaintiff would apply to court for discovery and preservation orders if CKC had not replied by 7 February 2018.  So CKC expected an application soon after that day, and it took over a year before the plaintiff came to court.

5.  This court appreciates the good sense of the plaintiff in trying to avoid court proceedings with a third party.  On the other hand, CKC could have responded sensibly with a letter to the other side, imposing conditions for undertakings and so forth.  It would have greatly saved the court’s time.

6.  However, taking all matters into account and looking at things in the round, I do not consider CKC, being a third party, as being so unreasonable as to expect a proper court order requiring it to disclose documents before giving the necessary undertaking.  As things turned out, soon after the plaintiff issued the present summons, CKC had agreed to an order being granted.  They had not stood in the way of the plaintiff’s application. 

7.  Taking all circumstances into account, I do not think it is appropriate for the court to make an order for CKC to bear any part of the costs of this application.  The costs will be as I have previously ordered: costs of compliance by CKC to be borne by the plaintiff in the first instance and all costs relating to this summons to be in the cause as between the plaintiff and the defendant.



 (Queeny Au-Yeung)
 Judge of the Court of First Instance
High Court

Mr Douglas Lam, SC, leading Mr Roger Phang, instructed by Henry Wai & Co, Solicitors LLP, for the plaintiff

Mr Yuen Wai Bun, of W L Yuen & Co, for the defendant

Mr Peter Chang, of Cheng, Kwok & Chang, appeared in person

110968-EN-2017-08-22

WAH SUN HONG LTD v. WONG LEE YUK PING AGNES

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HCA 333/2016

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO. 333 OF 2016

_____________

BETWEEN
 WAH SUN HONG LIMITEDPlaintiff
 (華新行塑膠原料有限公司) 
and
 WONG LEE YUK PING AGNESDefendant
 (黃李玉平) 

_____________

Before: Hon Lok J in Chambers
Date of Hearing: 19 January 2017
Date of Decision: 22 August 2017

___________________

DECISION

___________________

1.  This is an application by the Defendant to strike out the Plaintiff’s claim in this action.

BACKGROUND

2.  The Plaintiff’s case as now pleaded in the Amended Statement of Claim can be summarised as follows:

(i) The Plaintiff is a Hong Kong company, with the principal business of trading of plastic raw materials.

(ii) The Defendant was employed by the Plaintiff as the general manager from 2005 to 2015, and had been the person in charge of the Plaintiff’s business, operations, finance and accounts.  The Defendant was also a director of the Plaintiff from 2007 to 2015.

(iii) The Plaintiff claims against the Defendant for misappropriation of funds:

(a) On various dates between 23 March and 8 April 2011, the Defendant caused sums totalling $19,139,209 to be transferred from the Plaintiff’s bank account to a close associate of the Defendant named Mr Deng Ping (“Deng”).

(b) Such transfers were not made pursuant to and were not supported by any transaction between the Plaintiff and Deng or any bona fide transaction at all.

(iv) Of the $19,139,209 transferred to Deng, the Plaintiff has received various sums totalling $10,676,701 in partial repayment. Thus a principal sum of $8,462,508 remains outstanding.

(v) By reason of the said transfers, the Plaintiff also claims that the Defendant has breached her fiduciary duties, trust, duty of fidelity and good faith, and duty to exercise reasonable care, skill and diligence owed to the Plaintiff.

(vi) Further, by reason of the said transfers, the Plaintiff claims that the Defendant conspired with Deng to defraud the Plaintiff or injure its economic interests.

3.  In the Defence, the Defendant pleads that she was never responsible for the Plaintiff’s accounting, and she denies that she was the only person in charge of the Plaintiff’s business, operations or finance.  Rather, she worked closely with one Mr Willie Chieng (“Chieng”).

4.  The Defendant admits that between 23 March to 8 April 2011, sums totalling $19,139,209 were transferred from the Plaintiff to Deng.  However, she avers that:

(i) She did not cause such sums to be transferred from the Plaintiff’s bank account to Deng.

(ii) The Defendant and Chieng had private investment via Well Faith Asia Limited (“Well Faith”) to acquire 20% equity interest in a mining company owned by Deng.  The Defendant made a first payment of $7,000,000 to Deng on 18 March 2011.

(iii) Of the $8,000,000 transferred from the Plaintiff to Deng on 23 March 2011, the Defendant’s share was $6,045,000 whereas Chieng’s share was $1,955,000.  The Defendant therefore paid a sum of $6,045,000 into the Plaintiff’s bank account.

(iv) As to the $5,000,000 transferred from the Plaintiff to Deng on 30 March 2011, it was entirely Chieng’s share and it was he who made the transfer.

(v) Of the $6,139,209 transferred from the Plaintiff to Deng on 8 April 2011, the Defendant’s share was $3,094,209 whereas Chieng’s share was $3,045,000.  The Defendant paid two sums totalling $3,094, 209 into the Plaintiff’s bank account.

(vi) In other words, of the $19,139,209 transferred from the Plaintiff to Deng, the Defendant’s share was $9,139,209 and she has deposited the same into the Plaintiff’s account.  The remaining $10,000,000 was Chieng’s share.

5.  In support of her striking out application, the Defendant filed her 1st Affidavit on 24 September 2016.  In that 1st Affidavit:

(i) The Defendant has essentially repeated the averments in her Defence.

(ii) She has also produced copies of some transfer vouchers and ledgers of the Plaintiff, which according to her show that the transfers to Deng were made with the approval and knowledge of the Plaintiff.

(iii) However, she has given no particulars about the alleged investment between Chieng and her in the mining company.

6.  One Ms Judy Chieng filed her Affirmation on behalf of the Plaintiff in opposition on 17 October 2016.  According to her, she had discussed the matter with Chieng and Ms Maggie Mak (“Mak”), who is the Office Manager of the Plaintiff, before making her Affirmation.

7.  On 31 October 2016, the Defendant filed her 2nd Affidavit in reply, where she complains that Chieng and Mak have not put forth the true version of events.  She also disclosed for the first time the particulars of the alleged investment, including:

(i) The name of the mine (七拱) and the mining company allegedly owned by Deng, namely “陽山縣金保利礦業有限公司” (“Jinbaoli”).

(ii) The discussion between Chieng, Deng and herself.

(iii) The verbal agreements between the parties and the circumstances under which those agreements were reached.

(iv) The involvement of Well Faith, with the alleged minutes of a board meeting of Well Faith produced.

8.  About 2 weeks before the hearing, the Plaintiff made an application to file 2 respective Affirmations by Chieng and Mak.  In his Affirmation, Chieng positively denies any agreement to invest in Jinbaoli, with documentary evidence in support showing that neither Deng, Well Faith, the Defendant nor Chieng has had any interest in Jinbaoli.  He also explains the circumstances under which he initialled the transfer vouchers.  Mak, on the other hand, confirms the evidence given by Chieng and Ms Judy Chieng.

9.  One may argue that the Plaintiff could have asked Chieng and Mak to make their affirmations in opposition in the first round of exchange of affirmations.  However, one may also contend that the Defendant, knowing full well the claim of the Plaintiff as pleaded in the Amended Statement of Claim, could have supplied more particulars about the alleged investment in Jinbaoli in her first affirmation in support of the striking application.  In any event, I take the view that the Defendant did in her 2nd Affidavit reveal for the first time particulars about the alleged investment, and as a result the Plaintiff should be given an opportunity to file further evidence to deal with these new allegations.  In particular, the Plaintiff could only have produced the search records of Jinbaoli after the Defendant had identified the investment involved.  Further, a successful striking out application would bar the Plaintiff from pursuing its claim without a proper trial.  With such draconian effect, the Plaintiff should be given reasonable opportunity to substantiate its claim.  I therefore allowed the Plaintiff’s application for the filing of additional evidence.

MERITS OF THE STRIKING OUT APPLICATION

10.  According to the Defendant’s striking out summons, she is relying on all the grounds contained in O 18 r 19(1) for the striking out application.  However, I cannot see how the Defendant can possibly advance the argument that the action discloses no reasonable cause of action. It is trite law that, for such ground, the court will simply assume the facts as pleaded in the statement of claim to be proved and determine, on that basis, whether the pleading discloses a reasonable cause of action.  The Defendant’s complaint herein is not related to the pleading itself, but rather she is contending that the Plaintiff’s allegations cannot possibly be true.  This is not a proper basis for striking out the Plaintiff’s claim on the ground of disclosing no reasonable cause of action, and Mr Hingorani, counsel for the Defendant, quite sensibly does not pursue such ground in the hearing.

11.  According to Mr Hingorani, the Defendant advances her application primarily under r 19(1)(b), i.e. the Plaintiff’s claim is scandalous, frivolous and vexatious.

12.  The Defendant’s arguments can be summarised as follows:

(i) The Plaintiff or its subsidiary or related companies had commenced a number of actions against the Defendant.  It was not necessary for them to do so, as it would be possible for the allegations in different actions to be included in fewer actions.  The proliferation of actions would lead to oppression and victimisation thereby creating harassment to the Defendant.

(ii) If the Plaintiff’s case were to be believed, it would be nonsensical for certain payments to Deng and part-payments by the Defendant to have occurred on the same day.

(iii) The Defendant repeats her averments in her Defence.  In short, the transfers of the sums from the Plaintiff’s account were actually directed, authorised and approved by Chieng, who owned 50% in one Sweetsmile Company Limited which in turn owned 100% shareholding in the Plaintiff.

(iv) All the documents produced by the Defendant are “consistent” with her case:

(a) There are three transfer vouchers relating to the transfers to Deng: two were checked and signed by Chieng and the other one signed by the Plaintiff’s staff.

(b) It was marked in the transfer vouchers that sums totalling $10 million were paid to Deng on behalf of Chieng.

(c) The minutes of Well Faith show that a board meeting attended by Chieng was held on 20 April 2011, during which the board agreed to acquire 20% of the shares in Jinbaoli and that it would take loans from the Defendant and Chieng.

(v) The Plaintiff should not be allowed to plead a vague and unparticularized case of fraud against the Defendant.

13.  I will deal with these arguments in turn.

(i)   Harassment caused by proliferation of actions

14.  For the complaint relating to the harassment caused by proliferation of actions, there is simply no evidence to support such complaint.  In particular, the court is not informed as to the background of the other actions which involve different parties and possibly different claims.  Bare allegation is not sufficient to substantiate such kind of complaint and so there is no merit in such argument.

(ii)    Whether the Plaintiff’s case is bound to fail?

15.  Arguments mentioned in §§12 (ii) to (iv) above relate to the merits of the Plaintiff’s claim.  With a view to establish a case for striking out the Plaintiff’s claim on the ground that it is scandalous, frivolous or vexatious, the Defendant argues that the Plaintiff’s claim is bound to fail on the facts.

16.  I agree that there are some arguments in favour of the defence case, for example, it was odd for certain payments to Deng and part-payments by the Defendant to have occurred on the same day.  Yet there are still a lot of factual disputes which require the adjudication of the court.

17.  It is the Plaintiff’s case that:

(i) Chieng positively denies that he has reached any agreement with Deng or the Defendant to invest in any mining company including Jinbaoli, which is supported by the search records of Jinbaoli showing that none of Deng, the Defendant, Chieng or Well Faith is a shareholder of Jinbaoli.

(ii) As to the accounting entries and transfer vouchers, Mak confirms that they were prepared at the instructions of the Defendant.

(iii) Although Chieng initialled the first two transfer vouchers, he did not know that the transfers to Deng were for the purpose of the alleged investment in a mining company.  The Defendant assured Chieng that she had checked the vouchers and that the vouchers were in order. Further, the second voucher had been altered after Chieng initialled it. Before the alteration, it showed that the payment to Deng was made on the Defendant’s behalf, whereas after the alteration, it showed that payment was made on Chieng’s behalf.

(iv) Chieng confirms that he had not signed the purported minutes of Well Faith and the contents therein are false.

(v) Chieng could not have unilaterally permitted the Plaintiff to make the transfers to Deng for investment in a mining company without the approval of the Plaintiff’s other directors, particularly his father Mr Wilson Chieng.

18.  It is trite that the court should not conduct a mini trial at this stage and a claim should only be struck out in a clear and obvious case.  In my judgment, the evidence adduced by the Defendant is far from being sufficient for her to argue that the Plaintiff’s case is bound to fail.  The factual disputes can only be resolved at the trial after cross examination of the witnesses.

19.  I also accept the argument of Mr Lam SC, counsel for the Plaintiff, that even if the Defendant’s factual allegations were to be believed, the Plaintiff would still have an arguable case against the Defendant for breach of her duties owed to the Plaintiff.  On the Defendant’s own case, the investment in Jinbaoli was made by Chieng personally.  Assuming that the transfers to Deng were made with Chieng’s approval and knowledge, it does not mean that the Defendant has not breached her duties owed to the Plaintiff.  In particular, Chieng is neither the sole director nor the sole shareholder of the Plaintiff, and so Chieng’s approval is not equal to the Plaintiff’s approval. Hence, whether the Plaintiff has approved those transfers deserves serious investigation by the court at the trial.  If the court were to find that the transfers were indeed made without the Plaintiff’s approval, it is certainly arguable that the Defendant might have breached her duties to the Plaintiff.

20.  For these reasons, there is no basis for the Defendant to say that the Plaintiff’s claim is bound to fail.  The striking out application therefore cannot possibly succeed.

(iii)   Lack of particulars for the fraud claim

21.  The final complaint relates to the lack of particulars for the fraud claim, which is mainly formulated in §§11, 12 and 23 of the Amended Statement of Claim:

“11. Still further or in the alternative, during the said Period, the Defendant and Deng … … … wrongfully and with intent to injure the Plaintiff by unlawful means conspired and combined together to defraud the Plaintiff and to conceal such fraud and the proceeds of such fraud from the Plaintiff. (The Plaintiff also relies on, inter alia, the matters pleaded in Paragraph 23 below in support of the conspiracy between the Defendant and Deng.)

12. Pursuant to and in furtherance of the conspiracy pleaded in Paragraph 11 above, the Defendant and Deng carried out the following unlawful acts and means by which the Plaintiff was injured:

(1) The Defendant caused the said Transfers to Deng to be made by the Plaintiff on the dates set out in Schedule 1 hereto as pleaded in Paragraph 7 above, which were not supported by any transaction between the Plaintiff and Deng (and/or any of his companies) or any bona fide transaction at all and/or any commercial or other justification.

(2) Deng received the Sums transferred to Deng on the dates set out in Schedule 1 hereto knowing that the Sums transferred to Deng had been paid to him in breach of the Defendant’s fiduciary duties to the Plaintiff as it director and the Defendant’s duty of fidelity and good faith to the Plaintiff as its employee, since the said Transfers to Deng, as Deng well knew or ought to have known, were not supported by any transaction between the Plaintiff and Deng (and/or any of his companies) or any bona fide transaction at all and/or any commercial or other justification.

(3) The Defendant has concealed the wrongful and improper nature of the said Transfers to Deng by recording or causing the same to be recorded in the accounting records of the Plaintiff as ‘temporary receipt; or ‘temporary payment’.

… … …

23. Further, the Plaintiff will rely on the alleged private investments of the Defendant through Deng in support of the Plaintiff’s assertions that: -

(1) the Defendant and Deng were at the material times close associates;

(2) the said Transfers to Deng were made or caused to be made by the Defendant in conspiracy with Deng; and

(3) out of the Sums transferred to Deng, the Defendant had received secret benefits and/or profits without the knowledge and approval of the Plaintiff.”

22.  The Defendant raised the complaint relating to the lack of particulars for the fraud claim for the first time in the written submissions filed for the hearing of the striking out application, and so the Plaintiff would not have had the opportunity to deal such complaint in the opposing affirmations.  In any event, assuming that the Plaintiff’s factual allegations were to be accepted by the court, there is certainly a prima facie case that the Defendant had obtained money from the Plaintiff in a fraudulent manner.  If the Defendant thinks that insufficient particulars have been included in the pleading, the proper way is for her to ask for further and better particulars in support of such claim.  At this stage, the Plaintiff’s fraud claim is one capable of being pursued and so I refuse to strike out the fraud claim pleaded in the Amended Statement of Claim.

23.  For the above reasons, I dismiss the striking out application.  I also make a costs order nisi that the costs of the application, including the costs of the application for leave to adduce the Affirmations of Chieng and Mak, be to the Plaintiff in any event with certificate for 2 counsel, which shall be made absolute 14 days after the date of the handing down of this Decision.

  

  

 (David Lok)
Judge of the Court of First Instance
High Court

   

Mr Douglas Lam, SC and Mr Patrick Siu, instructed by Henry Wai & Co, for the Plaintiff

Mr Jeevan Hingorani and Mr Lawrence Cheung, instructed by W L Yuen & Co, for the Defendant

106834-EN-2016-11-16

WAH SUN HONG LTD v. WONG LEE YUK PING AGNES

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HCA 333/2016

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO 333 OF 2016

____________________

BETWEEN  
WAH SUN HONG LIMITED
(華新行塑膠原料有限公司)
Plaintiff
and 
WONG LEE YUK PING AGNES
(黃李玉平)
Defendant

____________________

Before: Mr Recorder Stewart Wong SC in Chambers
Date of Hearing: 2 November 2016
Date of Decision: 16 November 2016

____________________

D E C I S I O N

____________________

A. Introduction

1.  In this action, the plaintiff sues the defendant, who was a former director and general manager thereof.

2.  The plaintiff alleges that the defendant had caused three sums totalling HK$19,139,209 to be transferred from the plaintiff’s bank account to a person named Deng with whom the plaintiff had no transactions, and there were no commercial or other justifications for the said transfers.  After taking into account certain “repayments” by the defendant totalling HK$10,676,701, the net amount claimed is HK$8,462,508.  Alternatively, it claims various reliefs arising from the alleged breach of fiduciary duties, trust and the duty of fidelity and good faith owed by the defendant, and conspiracy between the defendant and Deng, by reason of the said transfers          .  

3.  In her Defence, the defendant says that she did not cause the sums to be transferred because she did not know how to operate the e‑banking facilities of the plaintiff’s bank account and she did not had in her possession the “bank key” for access to the facilities.  Rather, she and Mr Willie Chieng Wai Lam (“Chieng”), who at the material times owned 50% of the holding company of the plaintiff, and the person who had “the last and final say in all decisions relating to the Plaintiff, in running the business”, had a private investment together via a company called Well Faith Asia Limited (“Well Faith”) to acquire a 20% interest in a mining company owned by Deng.  As a result, various instalments were due to be paid to Deng.  She made a first payment to Deng directly in the sum of HK$7,000,000 on 18 March 2011 as directed by Well Faith.  Further instalments from her and Chieng were subsequently due.  Chieng decided to pay, and directed the payments of, such instalments using the e‑banking facilities of the plaintiff’s bank account.  As for her own share of the instalments, the defendant would deposit the same into the plaintiff’s bank account first and the total sum (comprising her share and Chieng’s) would then be paid out of the plaintiff’s bank account.  The pleaded details in the Defence are as follows:

The defendant’s shareCheing’s sharePayment out from the plaintiff’sbank account to Deng
HK$6,045,000,
deposited into the plaintiff’s bank account on 23 March 2011.
(In its Amended Statement of Claim, the plaintiff agrees to this payment in by the defendant.)
HK$1,955,000;
the defendant says Chieng told her that the plaintiff owed him HK$1,000,000 as commission and he would utilise the same for payment.
HK$8,000,000
(According to the Amended Statement of Claim, this sum was paid from the plaintiff’s bank account on 23 March 2011.)
  HK$5,000,000
(The defendant alleges this instalment was due from Chieng on 30 March 2011.)
HK$5,000,000
(According to the Amended Statement of Claim, this sum was paid from the plaintiff’s bank account on 30 March 2011.)
HK$1,456,209 and US$210,000 (total HK$3,094,209),
deposited into the plaintiff’s account on 8 April 2011.
(In its Amended Statement of Claim, the plaintiff agrees to this payment in by the defendant.)
HK$3,045,000 HK$6,139,209
(According to the Amended Statement of Claim, this sum was paid from the plaintiff’s bank account on 8 April 2011.)
TOTAL: HK$9,139,209 TOTAL: HK$10,000,000 TOTAL: HK$19,139,209

The above is summarised from §6 of the Defence.

4.  No reply to the Defence is filed.  ‌There is therefore an implied joinder of issues pleaded in the Defence.  ‌No positive case is being asserted by the plaintiff regarding the alleged investment in the mining company via Well Faith.

B.  The plaintiff’s request for particulars

5.  By a summons dated 24 June 2016, the plaintiff asks for an order that the defendant do file and serve further and better particulars of the Defence pursuant to a request “filed herein on 6th June 2016”.  The request comprises 18 pages, with 10 requests which contain a large number of sub‑requests. I include the request as an annex to this Decision.

6.  Mr Patrick Siu, appearing for the plaintiff, submits that the requests 1 to 4 are the “gist” of his application.  By those requests, the plaintiff seeks very detailed particulars regarding the alleged investment, with details about the terms of the investment, Well Faith, the mining company, and the payments being sought.

7.  Mr Siu says that such information is required so that the plaintiff can prepare its case, for example, what documents to look for which may be relevant to the alleged investment.

8.  The defendant has placed before an affidavit made by her in support of her application to strike out the action, and the affirmation of Chieng Tsai Wan Judy (“Ms Judy Chieng”), a director of the plaintiff, in opposition.  Even though the inclusion of these documents in the hearing bundle was initially objected to by the plaintiff, at the hearing both Mr Siu, and Mr Jeevan Hingorani, appearing for the defendant with Mr Lawrence Cheung, refer to §11(1) of the affirmation of Ms Judy Chieng which reads as follows:

“Firstly, I have been informed by Willie Chieng and verily believe as follows–

(a) Since around 2005, the Defendant had mentioned to Willie Chieng numerous investment opportunities and projects, and one of such projects included a mining company. Willie Chieng had only agreed to participate in some of them but did not participate in all of them. Based on the recollection of Willie Chieng, the mining company was not one of the investments which he had agreed to participate.”

9.  What Ms Judy Chieng says is, in my judgment, relevant to my consideration of the plaintiff’s case as to what it needs in terms of particulars so as to prepare its evidence.  It is the plaintiff’s own case that Chieng did not agree to or participate in any investment in any mining company with the defendant.  Its case is not that Chieng cannot remember whether he agreed to invest in any mining company, or that he had invested in one or more such companies but could not remember which one or ones so that he does not know what documents or evidence are relevant.  Its case is that he invested in no mining company.  If so, he has no evidence to prepare save to deny that he did agree, or authorised any payments from the plaintiff’s bank account for any such purpose, and I do not see how the particulars asked for are required for proper preparation of evidence.  And even if he is not sure whether he did invest and if so which one or ones, which in fact is not his case as appeared from Ms Judy Chieng’s evidence although this is not altogether clear from the pleadings, it appears to me that, for the plaintiff and Chieng to prepare evidence in response, all that is needed is the name of the mining company, and not minute details as requested such as details of the mining company like its registered office or principal places of business, or details of each payment.  The plaintiff (and Chieng) can then prepare evidence as to whether he did invest in that company and if so what were the terms and his acts in relation thereto.  The details the plaintiff asks for are in my judgment matters of evidence, and not particulars.

10.  Mr Hingorani has agreed to provide answers to requests 1.1(2), 1.1(3) and 1.2(1)(a), thereby giving details of the alleged investment in Well Faith and the name of the mining company.  In my judgment these particulars, together with those already pleaded in §6 of the Defence, are more than sufficient for the plaintiff to prepare its evidence for trial, and to prevent any surprise at the trial, as well as serving the other purposes of particulars as summarised by Deputy High Court Judge Marlene Ng in WillwinDevelopment(Asia)CoLtdvWeiXing (HCA 797/2012, 25 February 2013) at §26:

“There is also no dispute that the function of particulars is as follows: (a) to inform the other side of the nature of the case that he has to meet as distinguished from the mode in which the case is to be proved, (b) to prevent the other side from being taken by surprise at the trial, (c) to enable the other side to know with what evidence he ought to be prepared and to prepare for trial, (d) to limit the generality of the pleadings, the claim and the evidence, (e) to limit and define the issues to be tried, and as to which discovery is required, and (f) to tie the hands of the party so that he cannot without leave go into any matters not included (see Hong Kong Civil Procedure 2013 Vol.1 para.18/12/1 at p.394 and Aktieselskabet Dansk Skibsfinansiering v Wheelock Marden & Co Ltd & ors [1994] 2 HKC 264, 269 – 270, per Bokhary JA (as he then was )).”

11.  Apart from the particulars which Mr Hingorani has agreed to give, the particulars sought under requests 1 to 4 are in my judgment matters of evidence (some of which such as the name and shareholding of other shareholders of the mining company are of very peripheral, if any, relevance even at trial) rather than material fact or particulars thereof, and I do not see the justification for those requests.  I should add that but for the agreement of Mr Hingorani, for reasons stated above I would not have ordered the particulars asked for under requests 1.1(2), 1.1(3) and 1.2(1)(a).

12.  While I do accept of course that the issues in a case are defined by pleadings and not by witness statements, the necessity for particulars requested to inform the other side of the case it has to meet and what evidence to look for and to be prepared, and to prevent surprise, which are the functions relied upon to by Mr Siu, in a given situation must be viewed in the light of current practice of filing witness statements well before trial.  As Deputy High Court Judge Marlene Ng said in Willwin at §27, which I find to be apposite in the present case:

“In a nutshell, the purpose of FBP is to permit the parties to understand the case they have to meet at trial so as to remove the element of surprise. But the particularity of what is required from the pleader depends on the facts of each case. The modern approach is stated in McPhilemy v Times Newspapers Ltd & ors [1999] 3 All ER 775 as follows: the current practice of requiring witness statements, expert reports and so forth to be exchanged should reduce the need for FBP to clarify pleadings, and as long as the pleadings do convey the nature of the party’s case and state the material facts, they should not attract applications for FBP even though some details that are likely to come forth in discovery or witness statements are not disclosed.”

13.  As Mr Hingorani submits, the defendant can be expected to provide discovery and to file a witness statement to support her pleaded case, which would further prevent any surprise to the plaintiff at trial, and to assist its preparation.  I do not see any genuine difficulty by the plaintiff in understanding the nature of the case it has to meet from the current Defence.

14.  Mr Siu, referring to §11(1) of the affirmation of Ms Judy Chieng, argues that as Chieng says that he had agreed to other investments, the monies might have been paid for other projects so the plaintiff need to know the name of the mining company and the full terms of the investment.  Mr Siu says the defendant might have made a mistake about what the transferred sums were for.  ‌But, with respect, and as Mr Hingorani submits, the defendant has committed her case to investment in a mining company and her case is to be further nailed down to a specific named mining company.  Even if the sums were for another investment by the defendant and Chieng, the requests would not have assisted the plaintiff in identifying what was that other investment, if not for the mining company to be named (and which in fact had already been named in the affidavit of the defendant for the strike‑out application).  If the sums were indeed for another investment, that would not be named or identified by the particulars sought, while sufficient details have in the meantime been pleaded in relation to each of the transfers to Deng.

15.  I dismiss the plaintiff’s requests 1 to 4 (save for those Mr Hingorani agrees to give).  Mr Siu accepts that request 5 is a “recap” of requests 1 to 4 and they stand or fall together.  ‌In the premises, I dismiss request 5 as well.

16.  Under requests 6 and 7, the plaintiff refers to certain denials by the defendant in the Defence and asks what the defendant’s case is.  Of course, the Defence would have to be read as a whole and with common sense, and reading the Defence, in particular §6 thereof which I summarise at §3 above and to which the denials cross‑reference, in my judgment the defendant’s case relating to the subjects of denial (which the requests are asking about) is sufficiently clear. I dismiss requests 6 and 7.

17.  Request 8 relates to an averment in the Defence that entries in the plaintiff’s accounting records concerning sums alleged to be Chieng’s contributions were “done in accordance with the Plaintiff’s regular business practices as decided by Maggie Mak”.  Ms Mak was an accounting staff of the plaintiff.  ‌Request 8(1) asks what exactly were the business practices alleged, and the rest of request 8 asks very detailed questions about the business practices.

18.  In my judgment the alleged practices were sufficiently identified, as it is pleaded that the sums were recorded as “temporary receipt” and “temporary payments” because “it helped to designate which account each respective party would be assigned when Willie Chieng settled the balance due to the Plaintiff”.  Thus, how and why the sums were so recorded has been pleaded.  With respect, I fail to see the further information asks for would be material facts or particulars or is required to serve the purposes of particulars.  I dismiss request 8.

19.  Request 9 asks in effect for particulars of how the plaintiff  was supposed to be “well aware of the said Transfers to Deng” in that whether it was solely by virtue of the alleged involvement of Chieng that the plaintiff was fixed with notice or knowledge of the purchase of shares from Deng.  But the relevant averment in the Defence already pleads that it was “Because of Mr. Willie Chieng’s involvement in the Deng Share Purchase, the Plaintiff was aware” of the transfers.  The defendant has pleaded why she says the plaintiff was so aware.  ‌I simply do not understand the purpose of asking someone who expressly gives a reason for something, “Is that the only reason?”  Otherwise a question like that can be asked for almost every sentence in every pleading.  The simple point is that she has pleaded her case and as the Defence stands she cannot justify her case that the plaintiff had knowledge by reference to any other reason or basis.  I dismiss request 9.

20.  Request 10 relates to the defendant’s understanding that a commission of HK$1,000,000 was credited to Chieng in the “temporary account”.  This is not so much an allegation of the fact of entry but an allegation of the defendant’s understanding, which may or may not be correct, and the relevance of which I am not too sure in any event.  That must be a matter of evidence and not material facts or particulars.  And the plaintiff (and Chieng) certainly would be in a position to know whether the understanding is correct or not (which the defendant is not asserting as a fact).  I dismiss request 10.

C.  Disposition

21.  I dismiss the plaintiff’s summons save for requests 1.1(2), 1.1(3) and 1.2(1)(a), answers to which should be provided by the defendant within 14 days of the date of this decision.

22.  I also make an order nisi that the costs of the summons be paid by the plaintiff to the defendant.  If the plaintiff does not apply for a variation of the costs order nisi within 14 days of the date of this decision, the order will become absolute, and there will be a gross sum assessment of the costs by me and the defendant is to file and serve her bill of costs of the summons within 14 days of the date the costs order becomes absolute.  The plaintiff is to provide its submissions on the bill (if so desired) within 7 days of service and the defendant is to provide her submissions in reply (if so desired) within 7 days thereafter.

23.  I shall also indicate that I am not minded to give costs to the defendant for more than one counsel as this application does not justify that.  If the defendant wishes to ask for costs of both counsel appearing, then she should also include submissions in support when she submits her bill of costs, and the plaintiff is to give its answer to this (if so desired) when it provides its submissions on the bill generally.

24.  A summons taken out by the defendant on 19 July 2016 seeking further and better particulars of the Amended Statement of Claim is also before me.  But the plaintiff has provided voluntary particulars and there is no need for me to, and I do not, make any order on the summons.  The parties also agree that there should be no order as to costs for this summons.  The amount of hearing time spent on this summons is minimal, and no skeleton is filed on it by the defendant, and I shall bear these in mind when I undertake the gross sum assessment of the costs to be paid to the defendant on the plaintiff’s summons.

25.  I thank counsel for their assistance.

 (Stewart Wong SC)
 Recorder of the High Court

Mr Patrick Siu, instructed by Henry Wai & Co, for the plaintiff

Mr Jeevan Hingorani and Mr Lawrence Cheung, instructed by W L Yuen & Co, for the defendant

    

Annex

__________________________________________________________________

REQUEST FOR FURTHER AND BETTER PARTICULARS

OF THE DEFENCE FILED HEREIN ON 6TH JUNE 2016

__________________________________________________________________

1.  Paragraph 6(4):-

In respect of the allegations that “Mr. Willie Chieng Wai Lam and the Defendant had private investment via a Hong Kong company, Well Faith Asia Limited, to acquire 20% interest in a mining company owned by Deng, pursuant to which the Defendant has made the first payment ofHK$7,000,000 to Deng by her personal cheques on 18thMarch, 2011 as directed by Well Faith Asia Limited.”, please state with all particularity:-

1.1  in relation to the alleged private investment of Mr. Willie Chieng Wai Lam (“Mr. Willie Chieng”) and the Defendant via Well Faith Asia Limited (“Well Faith”):-

(1) the alleged amount of the investment of each of:-

(a) Mr. Willie Chieng; and

(b) the Defendant

via Well Faith;

(2) the alleged percentage interest of each of:-

(a) Mr. Willie Chieng; and

(b) the Defendant

in such alleged investment via Well Faith; and

(3) if the total of the alleged percentage interests of Mr. Willie Chieng and the Defendant in such alleged investment via Well Faith is less than 100%:-

(a) the full name(s) of all other investor(s) in such alleged investment via Well Faith;

(b) the amount of the alleged investment of each of such other investor(s); and

(c) the alleged percentage interest of each of such other investor(s) in such alleged investment via Well Faith;

1.2  in relation to the 20% interest in a mining company owned by Deng allegedly acquired or to be acquired via Well Faith:-

(1) (a) the full name;

(b) the place of incorporation;

(c) the registered office;

(d) the principal place(s) of business;

(e) the authorized/registered share capital and paid up capital (both before the alleged acquisition of the 20% interest and immediately thereafter); and

(f) the directors, the shareholders and their respective shareholdings (both before the alleged acquisition of the 20% interest and immediately thereafter)

of the mining company owned by Deng (“the Mining Company”);

(2) the consideration for the alleged acquisition of the 20% interest in the Mining Company;

(3) whether the acquisition of the 20% interest in the Mining Company via Well Faith was by way of:-

(a) the transfer of existing shares in the Mining Company;

(b) the allotment of new shares in the Mining Company; or

(c) a combination of both (a) and (b),

and the number of shares transferred and/or allotted to the transferee and/or allottee (as the case may be) representing the 20% interest in the Mining Company;

(4) the full name(s) of the transferor(s) and transferee(s) and/or allottee(s) of the 20% interest in the Mining Company;

(5) the parties to the agreement for the acquisition of the 20% interest in the Mining Company;

(6) when the agreement for the acquisition of the 20% interest in the Mining Company was made;

(7) whether the agreement for the acquisition of the 20% interest in the Mining Company was made orally or in writing;

(8) if the agreement for the acquisition of the 20% interest in the Mining Company was made orally:-

(a) whether it was made at a meeting or over the telephone;

(b) between whom such agreement was made orally;

(c) if at a meeting:-

(i) the place of the meeting; and

(ii) in whose presence the agreement was made; and

(9) if the agreement for the acquisition of the 20% interest in the Mining Company was made in writing, the description, date and parties of the agreement in writing;

1.3  in relation to the alleged first payment of HK$7,000,000 to Deng by the Defendant’s personal cheques on 18th March 2011:-

(1) (a) the date;

(b) the amount;

(c) the drawer;

(d) the drawee bank;

(e) the payer; and

(f) the payee

of each of the Defendant’s personal cheques;

(2) whether such payment of HK$7,000,000 was a deposit or part payment or earnest money or otherwise in relation to the alleged acquisition of the 20% interest in the Mining Company from Deng; and

(3) whether such payment of HK$7,000.000 was for the transfer of existing shares in the Mining Company or the allotment of new shares in the Mining Company or otherwise;

1.4  in relation to the alleged direction by Well Faith for the first payment of HK$7,000,000 to Deng by the Defendant’s personal cheques on 18th March 2011:-

(1) when such alleged direction was given;

(2) by whom on behalf of Well Faith and to whom such alleged direction was given;

(3) whether such alleged direction was given orally or in writing;

(4) if such alleged direction was made orally:-

(a) whether it was made at a meeting or over the telephone;

(b) if at a meeting:-

(i) the place of the meeting; and

(ii) in whose presence such alleged direction was made; and

(5) if such alleged direction was made in writing, the description and date of the document or correspondence in which such alleged direction was made.

2.  Paragraph 6(5):-

In respect of the allegations that “Out of this HK$8,000,000, the Defendant’s share was HK$6,045,000 while Willie Chieng’s share was HK$1,955,000.  Mr. Willie Chieng requested that the entire sum of HK$8,000,000 be made in one lump sum to Deng and invited the Defendant to deposit her share to the Plaintiff’s account on the same date so that the whole sum can be transferred via the e-banking facility of the Plaintiff.  He told the Defendant that the Plaintiff had owed him HK$1,000,000 as commission due to him and he would utilize the same for payment. . . . .”, please state with all particularity:-

2.1  in relation to the alleged instalment payment of HK$8,000,000 due to be paid to Deng on 23rd March 2011:-

(1) all facts, matters and circumstances (including any agreement or contract) based on which the sum of HK$8,000,000 allegedly needed to be paid to Deng on 23rd March 2011;

(2) all facts, matters and circumstances based on which the sum of HK$8,000,000 allegedly due to be paid to Deng on 23rd March 2011 was calculated and determined;

(3) whether such payment of HK$8,000,000 was a deposit or part payment or earnest money or otherwise in relation to the alleged acquisition of the 20% interest in the Mining Company from Deng; and

(4) whether the purpose of such payment of HK$8,000.000 was for the transfer of existing shares in the Mining Company or the allotment of new shares in the Mining Company or otherwise;

2.2  in relation to the allegation that out of the sum of HK$8,000,000, the Defendant’s share was HK$6,045,000 while Willie Chieng’s share was HK$1,955,000:-

(1) all facts, matters and circumstances based on which the aforesaid alleged respective shares and amounts of payment of the Defendant and Willie Chieng were calculated and determined;

(2) when the aforesaid alleged respective shares of payment were agreed;

(3) between whom the aforesaid alleged respective shares of payment were agreed;

(4) whether the aforesaid alleged respective shares of payment were agreed orally or in writing;

(5) if agreed orally:-

(a) whether it was made at a meeting or over the telephone;

(b) if at a meeting:-

(i) the place of the meeting; and

(ii) in whose presence it was agreed; and

(6) if agreed in writing, the description and date of the agreement, contract, document and/or correspondence in which it was agreed;

2.3  in relation to the allegation that Mr. Willie Chieng requested that the entire sum of HK$8,000,000 be made in one lump sum to Deng and invited the Defendant to deposit her share to the Plaintiff’s account on the same date so that the whole sum can be transferred via the e-banking facility of the Plaintiff:-

(1) when such alleged request and invitation were made;

(2) whether such alleged request and invitation were made orally or in writing;

(3) if made orally:-

(a) whether it was made at a meeting or over the telephone;

(b) if at a meeting:-

(i) the place of the meeting; and

(ii) in whose presence it was made; and

(4) if made in writing, the description and date of the document and/or correspondence in which it was made;

2.4  in relation to the allegations that Mr. Willie Chieng told the Defendant that the Plaintiff had owed him HK$1,000,000 as commission due to him and he would utilize the same for payment:-

(1) when the Defendant was allegedly told by Mr. Willie Chieng of the same;

(2) whether the Defendant was allegedly told by Mr. Willie Chieng of the same orally or in writing;

(3) if told orally:-

(a) whether it was told at a meeting or over the telephone;

(b) if at a meeting:-

(i) the place of the meeting; and

(ii) in whose presence it was told;

(4) if told in writing, the description and date of the document and/or correspondence in which it was told;

(5) whether the alleged commission of HK$1,000,000 due and owing from the Plaintiff to Mr. Willie Chieng had been approved by the Defendant as a director of the Plaintiff;

(6) whether the alleged commission of HK$1,000,000 due and owing from the Plaintiff to Mr. Willie Chieng had been approved by any of the other directors of the Company as at March and April 2011, namely, (i) Chieng Sai Yung Wilson (錢世庸) (“Mr. Wilson Chieng”), (ii) Chieng Tsai Wan Judy (錢燦雲) (“Ms. Judy Chieng”) and (iii) Chieng Wai Ting Warton (錢蔚霆) (“Mr.Warton Chieng”); and

(7) if the answer to (6) above is yes, all facts, matters and circumstances based on which each of the other directors of the Plaintiff is alleged to have approved the alleged commission of HK$1,000,000.

3.  Paragraph 6(6):-

In respect of the allegations that “On 30th March 2011, another payment of HK$5,000,000.00 needed to be made to Deng.  Mr. Willie Chieng was responsible for paying the entirety of said HK$5,000,000.00 and again he decided to make said transfer using the Plaintiff's e-banking capabilities.”, please state with all particularity:-

3.1  in relation to the payment of HK$5,000,000.00 allegedly needed to be made to Deng on 30th March 2011:-

(1) all facts, matters and circumstances (including any agreement or contract) based on which the sum of HK$5,000,000.00 allegedly needed to be paid to Deng on 30th March 2011;

(2) all facts, matters and circumstances based on which the sum of HK$5,000,000.00 allegedly needed to be paid to Deng on 30th March 2011 was calculated and determined;

(3) whether such payment of HK$5,000,000.00 was a deposit or part payment or earnest money or otherwise in relation to the alleged acquisition of the 20% interest in the Mining Company from Deng; and

(4) whether the purpose of such payment of HK$5,000.000.00 was for the transfer of existing shares in the Mining Company or the allotment of new shares in the Mining Company or otherwise;

3.2  in relation to the allegation that Mr. Willie Chieng was responsible for paying the entirety of said HK$5,000,000.00:-

(1) all facts, matters and circumstances based on which the sum of HK$5,000,000.00 for which Mr. Willie Chieng was allegedly responsible in paying the entirety thereof was calculated and determined;

(2) when it was agreed that Mr. Willie Chieng was responsible for the payment of the sum of HK$5,000,000.00 that needed to be made to Deng on 30th March 2011;

(3) between whom it was agreed that Mr. Willie Chieng was responsible for the payment of the sum of HK$5,000,000.00 that needed to be made to Deng on 30th March 2011;

(4) whether such agreement was made orally or in writing;

(5) if made orally:-

(a) whether it was made at a meeting or over the telephone;

(b) if at a meeting:-

(i) the place of the meeting; and

(ii) in whose presence it was made; and

(6) if made in writing, the description and date of the agreement, contract, document and/or correspondence in which it was agreed.

4.  Paragraph 6(7):-

In respect of the allegations that “On 8th April 2011, another payment of HK$6,139,209.00 needed to be made to Deng.  Again, per the direction of Mr. Willie Chieng, the Plaintiff’s e-banking capabilities were used to transfer said funds.  The Defendant paid HK$3,094,209.00 as her share to the Plaintiff by depositing a sum of HK$1,456,209,00 into the Plaintiff's Hang Seng Bank account and a sum of USD210,000.00 to the Plaintiff’s foreign currency account No. 372-000018-203 which said sum was credited as payment of HK$1,638,000.00 by the Defendant to the Plaintiff.  Mr. Willie Chieng was supposed to contribute HK$3,045,000.00 as his share.”, please state with all particularity:-

4.1  in relation to the payment of HK$6,139,209.00 allegedly needed to be made to Deng on 8th April 2011:-

(1) all facts, matters and circumstances (including any agreement or contract) based on which the sum of HK$6,139,209.00 allegedly needed to be paid to Deng on 8th April 2011;

(2) all facts, matters and circumstances based on which the sum of HK$6,139,209.00 allegedly needed to be paid to Deng on 8th April 2011 was calculated and determined;

(3) whether such payment of HK$6,139,209.00 was a deposit or part payment or earnest money or otherwise in relation to the alleged acquisition of the 20% interest in the Mining Company from Deng; and

(4) whether such payment of HK$6,139,209.00 was for the transfer of existing shares in the Mining Company or the allotment of new shares in the Mining Company or otherwise;

4.2  in relation to the alleged direction of Mr. Willie Chieng to use the Plaintiff’s e-banking capabilities to transfer the funds:-

(1) to whom such direction was allegedly made;

(2) when such direction was allegedly made;

(3) whether such direction was allegedly made orally or in writing;

(4) if made orally:-

(a) whether it was made at a meeting or over the telephone;

(b) if at a meeting:-

(i) the place of the meeting; and

(ii) in whose presence it was made; and

(5) if made in writing, the description and date of the agreement, contract, document and/or correspondence in which it was agreed;

4.3  in relation to the allegations that the Defendant paid HK$3,094,209.00 as her share to the Plaintiff and Mr. Willie Chieng was supposed to contribute HK$3,045,000.00 as his share:-

(1) all facts, matters and circumstances based on which the aforesaid alleged respective shares and amounts of payment of the Defendant and Willie Chieng were calculated and determined;

(2) when the aforesaid alleged respective shares of payment were agreed;

(3) between whom the aforesaid alleged respective shares of payment were agreed;

(4) whether the aforesaid alleged respective shares of payment were agreed orally or in writing;

(5) if agreed orally:-

(a) whether it was made at a meeting or over the telephone;

(b) if at a meeting:-

(i) the place of the meeting; and

(ii) in whose presence it was agreed; and

(6) if agreed in writing, the description and date of the agreement, contract, document and/or correspondence in which it was agreed.

5.  Paragraph 6(8):-

In respect of the allegations that “Overall, a total of HK$10,000,000.00 of the said Transfers to Deng were made by and on behalf of Mr. Willie Chieng (per his decisions and directions) to satisfy his obligations under the Deng Share Purchase and thus have no legal bearing on the Defendant.”, please state with all particularity:-

(1) what exactly the alleged obligations of Mr. Willie Chieng under the Deng Share Purchase were;

(2) to whom Mr. Willie Chieng allegedly owed such obligations;

(3) the circumstances under which such alleged obligations of Mr. Willie Chieng arose;

(4) whether such alleged obligations arose pursuant to any agreement or contract;

(5) if such alleged obligations arose pursuant to any agreement or contract:-

(a) when such agreement or contract was entered into;

(b) the parties to such agreement or contract;

(c) whether such agreement or contract or was orally or in writing;

(d) if made orally:-

(i) whether it was made at a meeting or over the telephone;

(ii) if at a meeting:-

(I) the place of the meeting; and

(II) in whose presence it was agreed; and

(e) if agreed in writing, the description and date of the agreement, contract, document and/or correspondence in which it was agreed.

6.  Paragraph 7(2):-

In respect of the Defendant’s denial that “there were no commercial or other justifications for any of the said Transfers to Deng due to the reasons alleged in paragraph 6 hereinabove”, please state with all particularity:-

(1) whether it is the Defendant’s case that there were commercial or other justifications and/or benefits to the Plaintiff for using the bank account(s) of the Plaintiff to make the said Transfers to Deng, assuming that such payments were made for the purpose of the acquisition by the Defendant and Mr. Willie Chieng via Well Faith of the 20% interests in the Mining Company from Deng as alleged by the Defendant; and

(2) if yes, what the alleged commercial or other justifications and/or benefits to the Plaintiff were.

7.  Paragraph 8(1):-

In respect of the Defendant’s denial that “the said Transfers to Deng were caused to be made by the Defendant without the knowledge or approval of the Plaintiff”, please state with all particularity:-

(1) whether it is the Defendant’s case that:-

(a) she denies that the said Transfers to Deng were caused to be made by the Defendant but does not deny that they were made without the knowledge or approval of the Plaintiff;

(b) she does not deny that the said Transfers to Deng were caused to be made by the Defendant but denies that they were made without the knowledge or approval of the Plaintiff;

(c) she denies (i) that the said Transfers to Deng were caused to be made by the Defendant and (ii) that they were made without the knowledge or approval of the Plaintiff;

(2) if it is denied that the said Transfers to Deng were made without the knowledge or approval of the Plaintiff:-

(a) whether it is the Defendant’s case that the said Transfers to Deng were made with the knowledge or approval all of the directors of the Plaintiff at the material time (i.e. March to April 2011) other than the Defendant and Mr. Willie Chieng, namely, (i) Mr. Wilson Chieng, (ii) Ms. Judy Chieng and (iii) Mr. Warton Chieng;

(b) if the answer to (a) is no, which director(s) of the Plaintiff other than the Defendant and Mr. Willie Chieng is/are alleged to have knowledge or approved the said Transfers to Deng;

(c) in any event, whether each of (I) Mr. Wilson Chieng, (II) Ms. Judy Chieng and (III) Mr. Warton Chieng:-

(i) knew without approving; or

(ii) knew and approved

the said Transfers to Deng, and the facts, matters and circumstances relied upon by the Defendant in asserting that each of them had knowledge and/or approved the said Transfers to Deng (if and where applicable).

8.  Paragraph 8(2):-

In respect of the allegation that “Subject to discovery and the Defendant’s Requests for Further and Better Particulars, it was the understanding of the Defendant that only the part related to Willie Chieng’s contributions, i.e. HK$1,955,000, HK$5,000,000 and HK$3,045,000 respectively were recorded as “temporary receipt” or “temporary payment”.  They were recorded this way because it helped designate which account each respective entry would be assigned when Willie Chieng settled the balance due to the Plaintiff.  It was done in accordance with the Plaintiff’s regular business practices as decided by Maggie Mak.” (emphasis added), please state with all particularity:-

(1) what exactly the alleged regular business practices of the Plaintiff as decided by Maggie Mak were;

(2) when and under what process Maggie Mak allegedly decided such alleged regular business practices;

(3) whether the alleged regular business practices of the Plaintiff as decided by Maggie Mak were contained in or evidenced by any document or correspondence; if yes, the date and description of such document or correspondence;

(4) when the alleged regular business practices of the Plaintiff as decided by Maggie Mak came into effect and the period during which the same have remained in effect;

(5) all facts, matters and circumstances based on which it is alleged that Maggie Mak had the authority to decide the alleged regular business practices of the Plaintiff; and

(6) whether the alleged regular business practices of the Plaintiff as decided by Maggie Mak had been approved by the board of directors of the Company; if yes, the date of the meeting(s) and/or written resolutions of the board of directors of the Company allegedly approving the same.

9.  Paragraph 8(3):-

In respect of the allegation that “Because of Mr. Willie Chieng’s involvement in the Deng Share Purchase, the Plaintiff was well aware of the said Transfers to Deng.”, please state with all particularity:-

(1) whether it is the Defendant’s case that solely by virtue of the alleged involvement of Mr. Willie Chieng (who was not a shareholder and was only one of the five directors of the Plaintiff during the period when the said Transfers to Deng were made) in the Deng Share Purchase, the Plaintiff was fixed with notice or knowledge of the Deng Share Purchase; and

(2) if no, all other facts, matters and circumstances relied upon by the Defendant in alleging that the Plaintiff was well aware of the said Transfers to Deng.

10.  Paragraph 12(3):-

In respect of the allegation that “Subject to discovery and the Defendant's Requests for Further and Better Particulars, it is the understanding of the Defendant that an amount of HK$1,000,000 being commission to Mr. Willie Chieng was credited to the ‘temporary account’ as part repayment of Willie Chieng’s share of the transfer.”, please state with all particularity:-

(1) all facts, matters and circumstances in support of the alleged understanding of the Defendant an amount of HK$1,000,000 being commission to Mr. Willie Chieng was credited to the ‘temporary account’ as part repayment of Willie Chieng’s share of the transfer.

Dated the 15th day of June 2016.

 HENRY WAI & CO.
 Solicitors for the Plaintiff