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Civil Action2016

POON LOI TAK the Administrator of the late POON NUEN Deceased v. POON LOI CHEUNG DESMOND

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  • CACV32/2023POON LOI TAK the Administrator of the late POON NUEN Deceased v. POON LOI CHEUNG DESMOND
  • HCMP1174/2025POON LOI CHEUNG DESMOND v. POON LOI TAK

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[2023] HKCFI 2516-EN-2023-09-29

POON LOI TAK, the Administrator of the late POON NUEN, deceased v. POON LOI CHEUNG DESMOND

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HCA 3348/2016

[2023] HKCFI 2516

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO. 3348 OF 2016

____________________

BETWEEN  
 POON LOI TAK (潘來德) the Administrator of the late POON NUEN (潘暖) deceased Plaintiff
 and  
 POON LOI CHEUNG DESMOND (潘來祥) Defendant

____________________

Before: Mr Recorder Richard Khaw SC in Chambers (by paper disposal)
Date of Defendant’s Written Submissions: 9 May 2023
Date of Plaintiff’s Written Submissions: 14 June 2023
Date of Defendant’s Written Reply Submissions:28 June 2023
Date of Decision:29 September 2023

____________________

DECISION

____________________

1.  By summons dated 3 April 2023 (“theStay Summons”), the Defendant applies for (a) a stay of execution of paragraphs 1 and 3 of the Judgment, by which I ordered that the Defendant shall repay a sum of HK$14,248,000 withdrawn by him from the Premier Account and that there be an account of the Sale Proceeds received by the Defendant, pending determination of the appeal (“theStay Application”); and (b) an interim stay pending the final determination of the Stay Application.

2.  The Defendant filed his 5th, 6th and 7th Affirmations in support of the Stay Application.  The Plaintiff filed his 17th Affirmation in opposition.  By summons dated 9 May 2023, the Defendant also seeks leave to file his 8th Affirmation to clarify a factual inaccuracy in his 5th Affirmation.  Noting that the application is neither controversial nor opposed, I grant leave for the Defendant to so file.

Principles governing grant or refusal of stay of execution pending appeal

3.  The principles governing stay of execution are trite and summarised in Star Play Development Ltd v Bess Fashion Management CoLtd [2007] 5 HKC 84. In essence:

(1)  In order to justify a stay of execution, an applicant has to demonstrate that good reasons exist.

(2)  The existence of merely an arguable appeal (that is, one with reasonable prospects of success) cannot by itself amount to a sufficient reason for a stay.  It is the minimum requirement before a court would even begin to consider the application.

(3)  In other words, if the court is not convinced that there exist arguable grounds of appeal, no stay will be granted however exceptional the circumstances may otherwise be justifying a stay of execution.

(4)  On the contrary, the existence of a strong appeal or a strong likelihood of success will usually by itself enable a stay to be granted because this would constitute a good reason for a stay.

(5)  In cases where the court is faced with simply the existence of an arguable appeal, it becomes necessary for the applicant to provide additional reasons as to why a stay is justified.

(6)  Commonly, this is done by demonstrating that without a stay the appeal would be rendered nugatory, for example, because of an appreciable risk that the respondent to the appeal would not be able to repay in the event of a successful appeal against a money judgment, or because the failure to grant a stay would have a serious deleterious effect on the applicant.

(7)  In considering an application for a stay pending appeal, it would be impractical and even undesirable for the court to go deeply into the merits or strengths of the appeal, although the court must still form a preliminary view of these aspects.

4.  For the purpose of forming a preliminary view on the merits of the appeal, I note that the Defendant’s appeal against the Judgment concerns essentially issues of fact.  In this regard, I remind myself of the relevant principles on the Court of Appeal’s reluctance to disturb the findings of fact made by the court below.  As stated by the Court of Appeal in Yu Man Fung Alice v Chiau Sing Chi Stephen[2021] HKCA 1456 at §§33-34:

“33. … Palpable errors, whether of law or of fact, must be identified, and they must be sufficiently material to undermine the conclusions of the trial judge. In the absence of material errors, an appeal court will interfere with the findings of fact made by a trial judge only if it is satisfied that his decision cannot reasonably be explained or justified. What matters is whether the decision is one that no reasonable judge could have reached. That the judges in the appeal court may have reached a different conclusion is not a ground for intervention.

34.  The principles for appellate intervention apply also to inferences of fact drawn from primary facts (unless the finding is based purely on inferences or otherwise has nothing to do with the witnesses’ demeanour or the trial judge’s having received the evidence at first hand), and findings of mixed fact and law, or an issue on which the judge had to come to a judgmental conclusion after taking a number of factors into account.  The correct approach in reviewing such a conclusion is to treat the judge’s decision with utmost respect, and refrain from interference unless satisfied that it proceeded upon some erroneous principle or was plainly wrong.  It is similar to an appeal against an exercise of discretion.”

The appeal is not arguable with reasonable prospects of success

5.  As stated in Judgment §§32-33 and 43, the overriding issue in this action centres upon Father’s intention.  If a gift is claimed, the onus is on the alleged donee (i.e. the Defendant in this case) to prove such gift.  Given that the alleged gift was made by a person who is now deceased, the Court “must approach the claim with some caution and a true sense of enquiry”.  The Defendant does not appear to dispute this approach.

6.  The Defendant, in the written submissions made on his behalf, has highlighted three key grounds of appeal for the purposes of his present application for stay of execution.  However, in my view, none of the grounds is arguable with reasonable prospects of success.

7.  First, the Defendant contends that the Court erred in rejecting his evidence as being “irrelevant”. This is a mischaracterisation of this part of the Judgment and is incorrect.  Rather than simply rejecting his evidence as being “irrelevant”, the Court has provided an analysis as to why his evidence is not credible and thus should not be accepted (Judgment §§50-55).  Specifically:

(1)  The two alleged conversations with Father have never been included in any of the Defendant’s three witness statements but emerged for the first time at trial during cross-examination.  No proper explanation has been given by the Defendant in this regard.  Whilst the Defendant now seeks to heavily rely on them as “Father’s express indication of his donative intent”, there remains no explanation as to why he did not include them in any of his witness statements in the first place.  The Court is plainly entitled to take into account such glaring failure in assessing the credibility of his evidence.

(2)  In any event, the alleged “dinner-time conversation” with Father at most only referred to “some monies” without any details as to e.g. the amount, the alleged manner of gifting and whether it was related to the credit balance in any of Father’s bank accounts.  It does not take the Defendant’s case any further when it “does not provide any concrete information which can help establish Father’s intention to gift [him] the credit balance of the Savings Account”: Judgment §§50-52. In any event, this was not the sole reason for not accepting his evidence.

(3)  The Court also explained in Judgment §54 as to why it found his another (also belatedly) alleged conversation with Father when they stepped outside the Bank to be most artificial and self-serving.    The Defendant’s ex post facto justification that his alleged question to Father (on what would happen to him if he took Father’s monies) “stemmed from [his] subjective concern of whether Father would have sufficient funds for his personal use after making the gift” is a bare assertion and has not been borne out by evidence.

(4)  As the Defendant’s evidence fails to demonstrate any clear intention on Father’s part to gift the credit balance to the Defendant, nor did Father ever indicate that he would no longer use any of the monies in the account, it is rather disingenuous for the Defendant to speak of any “respect” for Father by “allowing” him to continue to operate the account: see Judgment §55.

(5)  As further pointed out in Judgment §82, whilst the authorities cited by the Defendant establish that a gift of a standing credit balance in a bank account controlled and managed by the donor is, a matter of law, capable of being the subject of a gift, they do not go so far as to establish that the donor’s entitlement to withdraw monies from the account is irrelevant on the question of donative intent.  In other words, depending on the circumstances of the case, weight may be attached to the fact that the donor was able to make withdrawals from the account as and when he saw fit.  Ultimately, the question boils down to Father’s intention.

8.  Secondly, the Defendant contends that the Court failed to take into account evidence which supports Father’s alleged intention to gift the credit balance of the Premier Account to the Defendant.  Such contentions likewise have no merits:

(1)  The Defendant’s alleged “express statements made by Father that [the Defendant] was free to use the monies in the Account in July/August 2014, in December 2014, and in around May and September 2015” are not credible for the reasons provided in Judgment §§87-91 and 98(3).

(2)  As pointed out in Judgment §§77-78, 82 and 85-86, the Court also took into account the events which occurred after the two joint accounts were created, before coming to the conclusion that none of such events would alter its views on Father’s intention.  As a matter of fact, such events further reinforce the Court’s views.

(3)  Insofar as the Defendant relies on the withdrawals made during Father’s lifetime, the Court also addressed in Judgment §98 as to why they do not help establish the Defendant’s case.

(4)  There are no real answers to the various fundamental problems identified by the Court in Judgment §59 regarding the Defendant’s evidence on Father’s alleged intention or wish to gift the credit balance of the Premier Account to him.

9.  Thirdly, the Defendant contends that the Court failed to consider properly or at all Father’s distinct courses of conduct in holding bank accounts with authorised signatories on the one hand and joint account holders on the other.  This is again bereft of merit:

(1)  The argument has already been analysed and addressed in Judgment §76.  Insofar as the Defendant maintains that Father “had full knowledge of the difference between an additional signatory and a joint account holder”, it is nothing but his bare assertion.

(2)  The fact that it was the Defendant (rather than Father) who put forward the suggestion of opening a joint account (Judgment §59(5)) also militates against, rather than supports, the assertion that Father was consciously aware of the distinct courses of conduct and intended to make a gift to the Defendant by opening a joint account.

(3)  Further, it is unhelpful for the Defendant to only refer to Judgment §46 on the Court’s observation of what Father would appear to prefer, without appreciating the findings in Judgment §99 that after Mother’s death, Father might have needed some sense of security or peace of mind such that his bank accounts would not be left unattended in case his health condition did not allow him to operate them anymore.

10.  For the foregoing reasons, I am of the view that the Defendant’s appeal is not arguable with reasonable prospects of success.  On this basis alone, the Stay Application shall be dismissed.

No good reasons justifying a stay

11.  If I was wrong in the above analysis, I would wish to add that in any event, I am not satisfied that there are good reasons justifying a stay, or that the appeal would be rendered nugatory in the absence of a stay.

12.  The Plaintiff, being a successful party, is entitled to the fruits of his litigation and to enforce the Judgment.  Further, the long-established practice is where an appeal is against a monetary judgment, a stay will only be granted if the appellant can satisfy the court that if the judgment sum is paid, there is no reasonable prospect of recovering it in the event of the appeal succeeding: China Citic Bank International Ltd v Durrant Simon Partrick Michael (CACV 127/2014, 21 July 2014) at §27 per Chu JA (as Chu VP then was).  The Defendant has failed to show that this is the case.

13.  The Defendant contends that the levying of execution would result in financial ruin for himself, as he does not have sufficient liquid assets and would be forced to sell his landed properties and liquidate his shareholding.  Good evidence is required to support such allegation: Star Play (supra) at §9(3).  I am of the view that no good or concrete evidence was adduced by the Defendant to support the contention.  The mere fact that he might be required to sell some of his properties in order to satisfy the judgment debt is by no means a sufficient reason for a stay.  The Defendant has failed to provide any evidence on whether he could or has taken any steps to raise funds elsewhere.  Neither is there any evidence as to why the Defendant could not live with any other members of his family or why he could not continue his business (which on the one hand was alleged to be his main source of income but on the other hand was, according to his own evidence, running at a loss over the past few years) by renting another workshop or office if he had to sell any of his residential or commercial properties.

14.  Having taken all the circumstances into account, I am not satisfied that an absence of a stay would render the appeal nugatory or would otherwise have a serious deleterious effect on the Defendant even on the assumption (albeit my ruling above) that his intended appeal has a reasonable prospect of success.

Disposition

15.  In view of the reasons stated above, I order that the Defendant’s Stay Summons be dismissed with costs.

16.  The Plaintiff has lodged a statement of costs.  The amount claimed is reasonable and I am of the view that the full sum shall be allowed.  Hence, the Plaintiff’s costs are summarily assessed at HK$65,636 to be paid by the Defendant within 14 days.

17.  I make no order as to costs in respect of the Defendant’s summons dated 9 May 2023 for leave to file his 8th Affirmation. 

 (Richard Khaw SC)
 Recorder of the High Court

  

Written Submissions by Mr Jacky Suen of P.C. Woo & Co., for the Plaintiff

Written Submissions and Reply Submissions by Ms Esther Mak, instructed by Patrick Chu, Conti Wong Lawyers LLP, for the Defendant

  

[2023] HKCFI 2093-EN-2023-08-11

POON LOI TAK the Administrator of the late POON NUEN Deceased v. POON LOI CHEUNG DESMOND

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HCA 3348/2016

[2023] HKCFI 2093

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO. 3348 OF 2016

________________

BETWEEN

POON LOI TAK (潘來德) the Administrator of the late POON NUEN (潘暖) deceasedPlaintiff
and
POON LOI CHEUNG DESMOND (潘來祥)Defendant

________________

Before:Mr Recorder Richard Khaw SC in Chambers (by paper disposal)
Date of Plaintiff’s Written Submissions:8 March 2023
Date of Defendant’s Written Submissions:22 March 2023
Date of Decision:11 August 2023

________________

DECISION

________________

1.  On 9 January 2023, judgment (“the Judgment”) was handed down in respect of this action. By summons dated 26 January 2023 (the “Summons”), the Plaintiff applies to vary the orders nisi made at §§124-125 of the Judgment as follows:-

(1) The Defendant do pay the Plaintiff interest on the whole or part of any sum of money (excluding interest) awarded to the Plaintiff, being the sale proceeds of HK$33,000,000, at a rate not exceeding 10% above judgment rate from 22 November 2017 until full payment;

(2) The Defendant do pay the Plaintiff costs of this action on an indemnity basis from 22 November 2017 with certificate for two counsel;

(3) The Defendant do pay the Plaintiff interest on costs at a rate not exceeding 10% above judgment rate until full payment.

2.  In support of the above application, the Plaintiff relies on a sanctioned offer dated 24 October 2017, and Order 22, rule 24 of the Rules of the High Court (Cap. 4A) which provides as follows:-

“24. Costs and other consequences where plaintiff does better than he proposed in his sanctioned offer

(1) This rule applies where –

(a) A defendant is held liable for more than the proposals contained in a plaintiff’s sanctioned offer; or

(b) The judgment against a defendant is more advantageous to the plaintiff than the proposals contained in a plaintiff’s sanctioned offer.

(2) The Court may order interest on the whole or part of any sum of money (excluding interest) awarded to the plaintiff at a rate not exceeding 10% above judgment rate for some or all of the period after the latest date on which the defendant could have accepted the offer without requiring the leave of the Court.

(3) The Court may also order that the plaintiff is entitled to –

(a) His costs on the indemnity basis after the latest date on which the defendant could have accepted the offer without requiring the leave of the Court; and

(b) Interest on those costs at a rate not exceeding 10% above judgment rate.

(4) Where this rule applies, the Court shall make the orders referred to in paragraphs (2) and (3) unless it considers it unjust to do so.

(5) In considering whether it would be unjust to make the orders referred to in paragraphs (2) and (3), the Court shall take into account all the circumstances of the case including –

(a) The terms of any sanctioned offer;

(b) The stage in the proceedings at which any sanctioned offer was made;

(c) The information available to the parties at the time when the sanctioned offer was made; and

(d) The conduct of the parties with regard to the giving or refusing to give information for the purposes of enabling the offer to be made or evaluated.

(6) The power of the Court under this rule is in addition to any other power it may have to award interest.”

3.  By the sanctioned offer dated 24 October 2017, the Plaintiff offered to settle the whole of his claims herein against the Defendant for HK$29 million, inclusive of all pre-judgment interest and taking into account any counterclaim by the Defendant (the “Sanctioned Offer”). It is common ground that it is a proper sanctioned offer, and the last day on which the Defendant could have accepted it without the leave of the Court was 21 November 2017 (the “Cut-Off Date”); but he did not accept it.

4.  In light of the order made by this Court in the Judgment, it is also not in dispute that the Plaintiff has done better than the Sanctioned Offer. I am of the view that the requirement of Order 22, rule 24(1) has been met.

5.  According to Order 22, rule 24(4), the Court shall then make the orders referred to in rule 24(2) and (3) unless it considers it unjust to do so. The Plaintiff submits that there are no unjust circumstances herein whereas the Defendant also does not contend, rightly so in my view, that it would be unjust to make the orders under rule 24(2) and (3).

6.  The Defendant does not oppose the Plaintiff’s application for costs of this action on an indemnity basis as from 22 November 2017. He asks that certificate for two counsel be granted only for the trial of the action on the basis that the pre-trial conduct of the case should not warrant the involvement of two junior counsel. However, I do not think that such a distinction is warranted in the present case. Given the nature of and the issues involved and also the fact that each party was represented by two counsel at trial, there is no particular reason why the involvement of two counsel in the pre-trial conduct of the case could not be justified.

7.  I now turn to the Plaintiff’s application for enhanced interest. First, it appears from the Summons that the Plaintiff is asking for a variation of the principal sum on which interest should accrue, from HK$14,248,000 as ordered by this Court at §124 of the Judgment (which consists of the withdrawals from the Premier Account between 12 May 2015 and 21 April 2016 as set out at §§24-25 of the Judgment) to HK$33 million (being the amount of the Sale Proceeds from the sale of the Shop in 2014 and subsequently deposited into the two Joint Accounts as referred to in, amongst others, §§88-90 of the Judgment). However, no explanation has been provided on behalf of the Plaintiff for such proposed variation. In any event, I do not think that such variation would be appropriate. Plainly, the order nisi on interest granted at §124 of the Judgment relates to the order granted at §123(2) of the Judgment that the Defendant shall repay the sum of HK$14,248,000 withdrawn by him from the Premier Account. Insofar as the Plaintiff intends to claim from the Defendant any sum(s) in relation to the Sale Proceeds and any interest arising therefrom, this should be dealt with during the process of the account and enquiry as ordered in the Judgment.

8.  In respect of when the interest regarding the aforesaid sum of HK$14,248,000 should accrue, I note from both parties’ submissions that they seem to be content that the starting date should be the date of the Writ, i.e. 20 December 2016. I will proceed on this agreed basis accordingly. The Plaintiff in his submissions further suggests “judgment rate” presumably for the calculation of interest from 20 December 2016 to 21 November 2017 (i.e. the Cut-off Date) but has not explained why such rate should be adopted in this regard. The Plaintiff has failed to establish any other basis to justify the departure from the well-established practice of using prime rate plus 1% as the pre-judgment interest from 20 December 2016 to 21 November 2017: see Lo Yuk Sui v Fubon Bank (Hong Kong) Ltd [2017] 2 HKLRD 477 at §§18-19 per Ng J.

9.  As to the rate of enhanced interest as from 22 November 2017 (i.e. the date following the Cut-Off Date), the Plaintiff in his written submissions seeks a heightened rate of 10% above judgment rate, which is the maximum sanction reserved for the worst kind of cases: see Qvist Henrik v Clatronic Far East Ltd [2020] 1 HKLRD 703 at §29 per Recorder Stewart Wong SC. An example in which the Court had so ordered is Wong Giles v Donowho Simon Christopher & Anor[2020] HKCFI 1053, where the plaintiff was found to be untruthful about the reasons for his installation of what he described in his witness statement as “a stereo system”, which turned out to be 14 speakers purposely installed to make life a misery for his neighbours. Noises and vibrations were created by the plaintiff for at least 16 hours every day for several years to punish and retaliate. Yet, in prosecuting his claim, he portrayed himself as a victim of the defendants’ violence and abuses. K Yeung J granted an enhanced rate of 10% above judgment rate considering that the plaintiff’s conduct was disgraceful and the way he prosecuted his claim constituted an affront to the court and should be deterred.

10.  In the present case, as pointed out in the Judgment including §§50-56, 57-60, 87-94, 112 and 119-120, I found the Defendant’s evidence unsatisfactory and unreliable. I have also identified various examples which demonstrate the inherent inconsistencies and issues regarding general credibility in the Defendant’s case. Counsel for the Plaintiff has also referred to various matters regarding the Defendant’s conduct of this litigation.

11.  However, the above matters in respect of the quality of the Defendant’s evidence and also his conduct are not uncommon in a case of this nature, particularly in the context of a hotly contested dispute within a family and they do not, in my view, constitute an affront to the Court and therefore should not fall within the worst kind of cases for which the maximum sanction is reserved. In view of the sanctioned offer and all relevant circumstances of this case, I find that an enhanced interest rate of 6% above the judgment rate would be proportionate and appropriate.

12.  The Plaintiff contends that the enhanced interest rate should also apply to post-judgment interest and the interest on costs as from 22 November 2017 (i.e. the date following the Cut-Off Date). However, I am of the view that post-judgment interest should run at the judgment rate in the present case: see Zief Incorporated v Tekchandani Ajai Mohan (trading as D’Ziner Collections (Hong Kong)) & Ors[2021] HKCFI 730 at §§38-44 per Recorder Eugene Fung SC. Further, I agree with the Defendant that it is more appropriate to order interest on costs from the date following the Cut-Off Date at half of the enhanced interest rate until judgment: see Golden Eagle International (Group) Lid v GR Investment Holdings Ltd [2010] 3 HKLRD 273 at §18 per Lam J (as Lam PJ then was)

13.  For the reasons set out above, I make an order that the orders nisi regarding interest and costs as contained in the Judgment be varied as follows:

(1) The Defendant shall pay interest on the sum of HK$14,248,000 at prime rate plus 1% per annum from 20 December 2016 (i.e. the date of the Writ) to 21 November 2017, and thereafter at the rate of 6% above judgment rate to the date of the Judgment;

(2) From the date of the Judgment to the date of payment, the Defendant shall pay interest on the sum of HK$14,248,000 (including interest accrued up to the date of the Judgment) at judgment rate;

(3) The Defendant do pay the Plaintiff’s costs of this action, to be taxed if not agreed, on a party and party basis for the period up to and including 21 November 2017, and thereafter on an indemnity basis, with certificate for two counsel;

(4) For the period from 22 November 2017 to the date of the Judgment, the Defendant shall pay interest on costs at half of the rate of 6% above judgment rate.

14.  In view of the above, the Plaintiff’s application by way of the Summons is allowed but only in part. I therefore make an order that the Plaintiff shall have 50% of the costs of this application, to be taxed on a party and party basis if not agreed.

 (Richard Khaw SC)
 Recorder of the High Court

Written Submissions by Mr Abel Lam, instructed by P. C. Woo & Co., for the Plaintiff

Written Submissions by Ms Sara Tong SC leading Ms Esther Mak, instructed by Patrick Chu, Conti Wong Lawyers LLP, for the Defendant

[2023] HKCFI 101-EN-2023-01-09

POON LOI TAK the Administrator of the late POON NUEN Deceased v. POON LOI CHEUNG DESMOND

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HCA 3348/2016

[2023] HKCFI 101

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO. 3348 OF 2016

________________

BETWEEN

 POON LOI TAK (潘來德) the Administrator of the late POON NUEN (潘暖) deceasedPlaintiff
 

and

 
 POON LOI CHEUNG DESMOND (潘來祥)Defendant

________________

Before: Mr Recorder Richard Khaw SC in Court

Dates of Hearing: 1-3, 6-10, 10-15 and 29 December 2021

Date of Judgment: 9 January 2023

________________

JUDGMENT

________________


A. INTRODUCTION

1.  These proceedings have arisen from a dispute over the beneficial ownership of the credit balances in two bank accounts held with the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation Limited (“HSBC”) in the joint names of the Defendant (who is one of the elder brothers of the Plaintiff) and also his late father, Mr Poon Nuen (“Father”) who died intestate in April 2016. The credit balances in such accounts included the proceeds of a shop owned by Father, which was sold in 2014, details of which will be set out below.

2.  After Father’s passing in April 2016, the Plaintiff (who was the administrator of Father’s estate) discovered that the Defendant had withdrawn funds from the two bank accounts both prior to and after Father’s death. The Plaintiff’s case is that Father was the sole beneficial owner of the bank accounts and the monies therein shall form part of Father’s estate. Hence, according to the Plaintiff, the Defendant was merely holding the bank accounts as Father’s agent or trustee. As alleged by the Plaintiff, the Defendant was in breach of trust or fiduciary duty by withdrawing the monies from the bank accounts without the consent or authorisation from Father or his estate. The Defendant’s position is that the credit balances in the two accounts were gifts made by Father to him and his primary case is that he “was at all material times the sole beneficial owner of the credit balance standing from time to time in [the two bank accounts]”.

B. BACKGROUND

B1. The family

3.  Father and his wife, Madam Wong Oi (“Mother”), were a traditional Chinese couple who worked hard to earn a living and support their family. In 1955, Father started the business of manufacturing and selling noodles in the name of Wing Woo Noodle Factory (“Wing Woo”) (永和粉麵廠) with the assistance of Mother. In about 1964, Father together with Mother’s uncle jointly purchased a property known as Ground Floor, 91 Belcher’s Street, Hong Kong which was used as a shop for the business (“the Shop”). In about 1967, Father became the sole legal and beneficial owner of the Shop.

4.  Mother was responsible for retail and wholesale operations of the Shop, while Father was responsible for bookkeeping and preparing the materials required for the manufacturing of noodles. The business of Wing Woo provided the main source of income to support the family before the children started to engage in gainful employment.

5.  Father and Mother gave birth to six children who, in descending order of seniority, are:

(1) Poon Kit Bing (“Kit Bing”), who is the only daughter and also the eldest child in the family, was employed by a stockbroker firm and engaged in stock trading. Although she and her family emigrated to Canada and subsequently the United States more than 30 years ago, she kept close contact with her parents through long-distance calls and visited her parents around once a year upon her return to Hong Kong. She always resided in her parent’s home during her stay in Hong Kong.

(2) Poon Loy Koon (“Loy Koon”) had worked full-time in the Shop and was familiar with the manufacturing process. In 1993, he succeeded the family business and was responsible for running it until the shop premises were rented out in around late 1995. Before Father’s death, he worked part-time at the company of the Defendant with a monthly salary which started at about HK$4,000 and was increased to HK$15,000 after the commencement of the present proceedings.

(3) The Defendant, Poon Loi Cheung, Desmond, born in 1958, assisted in the family business during his school years until 1977 when he started to work as an ornament apprentice. In 1979, he worked as a junior account clerk at a foreign investment company and as a goldsmith master in the jewellery processing and manufacturing industry at a U.S. jewellery company in Canada in late 1986.

He returned to Hong Kong in 1988 and continued working with the Hong Kong branch of the U.S. company to promote its business of mixed-alloy materials until 1991. In 1992, he started a new company, Sinocean Company Ltd (“Sinocean”), carrying on the business of casting and manufacturing jewellery. Sinocean was registered under the names of Loy Koon and his wife. In the same year, Artec Company Ltd (“Artec”) was set up in his wife’s name. It engaged in the business of selling Italian and German machinery equipment to produce metal alloys.

His business expansion continued in recent years. For instance, in 2011, he started a sole proprietorship in Hong Kong for manufacturing jewellery with a Japanese company. And in 2017, he set up Oriental Trade Express Limited with his partner to export machinery equipment to Thailand. He also owned a company called Far East (HK) Enterprises. 2 years before the COVID-19 pandemic outbreak, he set up another company to invest in a noodle business with his friends.

(4) The Plaintiff, Poon Loi Tak, was born in 1960. He completed university education and attained a Master’s degree in Industrial Engineering in the United States. Upon completing his studies, the Plaintiff was employed by Boeing Aircraft in the United States from 1986 for a few years, and in 1990, he started to work as a lecturer at City University of Hong Kong.

(5) Poon Loi Tat (“Loi Tat”), born in 1964, mostly operated his real estate business in the Mainland China. He visited his parents every 1-2 months and stayed with them for approximately one week upon each visit.

(6) Poon Loi Chuen (“Loi Chuen”), who moved out from Nan Hai Property (as defined below) after his marriage, and moved into Ki Lung Street Property (as defined below) in around 2000. He regularly visited his parents during the weekends.

B2. Properties owned by Father and Mother

6.  Prior to the death of Father and Mother, the following properties were purchased:-

(1) Flat Bl, 1st Floor, Namhung Mansion, No.5 Belcher's Street, Hong Kong (the "Namhung Property");

(2) Flat 01, 14th Floor, Nan Hai Mansion, No. 46-47 Praya Kennedy Town, Hong.Kong (the "Nan Hai Property");

(3) 4th Floor, No.220 Ki Lung Street, Kowloon, Hong Kong (the "KiLung Street Property");

(4) Ground Floor, 91 Belcher’s Street, Kennedy Town, Hong Kong (i.e. the Shop); and

(5) Flat B6, 17th Floor, New Fortune House, Nos.4-8 North Street, Hong Kong (“New Fortune House Property”).

7.  In relation to the above properties, whilst Mother was the legal and beneficial owner of the New Fortune House Property, the other four properties were registered in the sole name of Father.

8.  Father and Mother (during their lifetime) lived in Nan Hai Property. Father allowed his children, if they so wished, to live in the properties without payment of rent. Thus, the Plaintiff, Loy Koon and Loi Chuen resided in the aforementioned properties. Prior to his first purchase of a property in Pokfulam in 1994, the Defendant together with his family had also stayed at the New Fortune House Property. In around late 1995, Wing Woo ceased its business and the Shop was then leased out until its sale in 2014.

B3. Events after Mother’s death

9.  In around 2010 to 2011, Mother was sick and had to be hospitalised from time to time. In around March 2010, given Mother’s hospitalisation, Father was added as a signatory to Mother’s Hang Seng Bank Savings Account numbered 296-080526-001 so that he could operate Mother’s bank account. Mother died on 6 February 2011.

10.  After Mother’s death, on 23 February 2012, Father added the Plaintiff as a signatory to his Hang Seng Bank Account numbered 296-0-025597 (“Hang Seng Account”) such that the Plaintiff was authorised to operate the Hang Seng Account.

11.  According to the Plaintiff, since Father became a signatory to Mother’s bank account at the time when Mother was ill and required Father’s assistance to settle her general and medical expenses, Father realised the need to have assistance from a family member for the purpose of taking care of his finance should needs arise. The Plaintiff also refers to Father’s deteriorating health condition after Mother’s passing as a reason for Father to add the Plaintiff as a signatory. It is also the Plaintiff’s evidence that the Defendant once told Father that when one of the Defendant’s former classmates was in serious illness, his wife could not have access to his bank accounts and had to borrow money from the Defendant. The Plaintiff believes that this also caused Father to consider making arrangements for further operations of this bank accounts.

12.  All the siblings, except the Defendant, agreed that Father became quiet and lacked energy after Mother’s passing. There is a dispute on whether Father’s ill health affected his ability and I will further discuss this issue later. However, it appears from the evidence that Father’s health did deteriorate over time in that he was diagnosed with diabetes and hypertension in about 2008. It appears that he also had other health issues including blurred vision, memory loss, and retina degeneration, although the parties disagree on the severity of these conditions.

B4. Joint bank accounts of Father and the Defendant

13.  According to the Defendant, in around March 2012, Father told him over dinner that he wished to give some monies to him and asked him to go to HSBC Bank with him. On 20 March 2012, around one month after the Plaintiff was added as a signatory to Father’s Hang Seng Account, Father added the Defendant’s name to his HSBC Savings Account No. 008-8-068085 (“the Savings Account”) as a joint account holder. They signed a form titled “Personal Account Opening Form – Passbook Savings”, confirming their agreement. Clause 6 of that form provided that the bank, in the event of death of one of the joint account holders, shallo hold any credit balance of the Savings Account to the order of the survivor.

14.  The Defendant claimed that in around November 2013, Father said he wished to give him some monies to assist him in buying a property. However, the Defendant said that he was not in need of money, and instead proposed to take ¾ of the then balance of the Savings Account to invest in a high yield foreign currency account to generate return. For this purpose, on 25 November 2013, Father and the Defendant attended the HSBC Bank (Westwood Branch) to open the Premier Account No. 650-062631-888 (“the Premier Account”) in their joint names. In doing so, Father and the Defendant signed “the Integrated Account-Investment Services Application Form” which included a declaration that they agreed to be governed by the Integrated Account Terms and Conditions, which specifically authorised the bank, in the event of death of one of the joint account holders, to hold any credit balance of the Premier Account to the order of the survivor.

15.  On the same day, a sum of HK$1.6 million was transferred from the Savings Account to the Premier Account. The Defendant substantially used the said sum to invest in an Australian dollar fund Unit Trust.

16.  The relevant evidence on Father’s intention and the Defendant’s understanding of the same at the time when the Defendant’s name was added to the Savings Account and also when the Premier Account was opened in their joint names will be analysed below. The Defendant also relies on, amongst others, the fact that he was named as one of the joint account holders (as opposed to merely an additional signatory) and the provision of the Personal Account Opening Form referred to above in support of his case. The legal effects of these arrangements will be examined below.

B5. Sale of the Shop

17.  On 20 December 2012, Father executed a Power of Attorney (“POA”) authorising the Defendant to sell the Shop on Father’s behalf.

18.  The Shop was sold for HK$33 million (“the Sale Proceeds”), completion of which took place on 14 May 2014. Father instructed the Defendant to deposit the Sale Proceeds into their joint accounts (“the Joint Accounts”) without specifying whether he was referring to the Savings Account or the Premier Account.

19.  The Defendant then instructed Father’s solicitors to deposit a sum of $3,297,000 (i.e. about 10% of the Sale Proceeds) into the Savings Account on 4 March 2014. After completion, three cheques representing the net balance of the purchase price were issued in favour of Father. A cheque for HK$155,000 was deposited into the Savings Account whilst two substantial cheques totalling HK$29,521,265 were deposited into the Premier Account. The Defendant alleges that he was not allowed to deposit any sum more than HK$10 million into the Savings Account.

B6. Plaintiff’s evidence on Father’s acts prior to his death

20.  It should be mentioned that the Plaintiff’s evidence specifically refers to the following incident which seems to suggest Father’s concern over the preservation of his assets (or potential future mismanagement of his estate) shortly before his death. This is denied by the Defendant.

21.  In January 2016, Father handed over an envelope to the Plaintiff after dinner at Nan Hai Mansion and said:-

“雞皮紙袋內係我和媽的證件,第日辦遺產手續時會有用的,幫我帶回五福保管,唔好唔見,唔好講比其他人知。”

22.  The envelope contained, inter alia, a Chinese written note (the “Chinese Note”):-

“記著領死亡證,切勿亂交別人手上,否則任人(魚肉),切記切記,一切手續辦妥時,才死亡證交出,切記切記”

23.  In March 2016, Father handed over a shoebox to the Plaintiff after a dinner at Nan Hai Mansion and said:-

“呢啲係我匯豐的簿仔和銀行卡,我大部分錢都放在裡面,全部都是我的錢,等我用完用剩後,你就分了它啦,不要講給別人知,要小心保管,小心喎。”

B7. Discovery of the Defendant’s Withdrawals

24.  In July 2016, when the Plaintiff and other siblings were preparing for the application for the Letters of Administration of Father’s estate, Loy Koon telephoned Loy Tat to inform him of his visit with the Defendant to the HSBC Bank to transfer away HK$10 million from the Premier Account on the day of Father’s passing. It was further found that a substantial amount of money in the total sum of HK$14,248,000 had been transferred out of the Premier Account into the Defendant’s own HSBC bank account, before and after Father’s death. Also, it was found that in April 2016, the Defendant attempted to open Father’s safe deposit box in Chong Hing Bank, but was unsuccessful because he did not have the correct key. He was requested by the Home Affairs Department to explain the incident. The details of the Defendant’s withdrawals from the Premier Account during the period between 12 May 2015 and 8 April 2016 (i.e. prior to Father’s death) are summarised as follows:

Item No.DateAmount (HK$)
1.12/5/2015248,000.00
2.2/9/2015200,000.00
3.9/9/2015300,000.00
4.6/10/2015100,000.00
5.16/10/2015400,000.00
6.9/11/2015300,000.00
7.21/12/2015200,000.00
8.23/12/2015300,000.00
9.25/2/2016400,000.00
10.2/3/2016200,000.00
11.11/3/2016400,000.00
12.21/3/2016200,000.00
13.22/3/2016200,000.00
14.29/3/2016300,000.00
15.8/4/2016300,000.00

25.  On the exact day of and also the day after Father’s death, the Defendant made 2 additional withdrawals:

Item No.DateAmount (HK$)
16.20/4/201610,000,000.00
17.21/4/2016200,000.00
Total:10,200,000.00

26.  These discoveries led to extensive arguments within the family.

B8. The Action

27.  On 8 December 2016, the Plaintiff instructed his former solicitors to issue a letter of demand to the Defendant for the withdrawn amount from the Premier Account. On 20 December 2016, the Plaintiff commenced the present proceedings.

28.  The Plaintiff seeks, amongst others, a declaration that all the assets in both the Savings Account and the Premier Account are legally and beneficially owned by Father solely and absolutely and shall be vested into Father’s estate upon his death and also an order that the withdrawn monies in the total sum of HK$14,248,000 be returned to the Plaintiff (representing Father’s estate).

29.  The Defendant denies liability and his pleaded position in respect of each of the two bank accounts is as follows:-

(1) The Defendant was at all material times the sole beneficial owner of the [bank accounts].

(2) Alternatively, the Father and the Defendant were joint beneficial owners of the credit balanced from time to time in the [bank accounts].

(3) Further and/or in the further alternative, upon the Father’s death, the Defendant became the absolute sole beneficial owner of the credit balance in the [bank accounts] by survivorship.

30.  There is a debate on whether the Defendant is permitted to run the above alternative (and seemingly inconsistent) pleas and I will also address this below.

C. RELEVANT LEGAL PRINCIPLES

31.  In general, a legal co-ownership can be created by way of a joint account by virtue of a joint tenancy of the monies owed by the bank to the joint account holders, namely the chose in action arising from the credit balance in such account. Under joint tenancy, upon the death of one of the account holders, the legal title in the chose in action would vest in the remaining account holder.

32.  The beneficial ownership of the credit balance in a joint account is, however, a question of intention of the joint account holders. There seems to be no dispute between the parties that if there is evidence upon which the Court could ascertain the intention of the parties, utility of the presumptions available at law will be substantially restricted (Overseas Trust Bank Ltd v Lee See Ching John [1999] 3 HKC 197, 201F-G; HSBC Private Trustee (Hong Kong) Ltd v Ho Yuen Ping Dorothy (unrep., HCA 2717/2008, 20 June 2011) §38; Lee Yee Wan Eva v Lee Tak Gate Richard [2018] 3 HKLRD 191 §25). In fact, both parties have referred the Court to the evidence on the question of Father’s intention and asked for a finding on the same. Hence, the overriding issue in this action centres upon Father’s intention.

33.  In HSBC Private Trustee (Hong Kong) Ltd, Deputy High Court Judge Coleman SC (as he then was) summarised the following propositions on a joint account:-

(1) A presumption of resulting trust arises when the source of monies in a joint account came from only one holder of the joint account. But such presumption is readily displaceable by sufficient evidence of the actual intention of the parties at the time of the transaction: §40.

(2) If a gift is claimed, the onus is on the donee to prove it. Whilst corroboration is not required as a matter of law, where there is a claim that a gift was made by a person who is now deceased, the court must approach the claim with some caution and a true sense of enquiry: §41.

(3) The fact of being a signatory to a bank account does not, without more, prove beneficial ownership. The matter is to be decided on the facts and intentions of the deceased, on the evidence which established what he or she did or said in life: §43.

34.  Hence, in the present case, it is important to examine the intention of Father (now deceased) with care and caution. Moreover, the Court should only resort to evidential tools of presumptions when the evidence on intention is such that the Court is not capable of forming a view one way or another.

35.  Further, the presumption of resulting trust could be displaced by the counter-presumption of advancement where a transfer is made from a father to his son (see Lewin on Trusts, 20th ed., §10.95, Snell’s Equity, 34th ed., §25-003; and Lee Yee Wan Eva (supra), per Peter Ng J §§22-25). Whilst the Plaintiff has cited a Canadian case, i.e. Pecore v Pecore [2007] 1 SCR 795 §40, in contending that the presumption of advancement should be limited to transfers by parents to minor children, the application of such presumption does not seem to be so restricted in view of the authorities in Hong Kong (see Nanyang Commercial Bank v Personal Representative of Vanneee Nativivat [2013] 2 HKLRD 749 §§31-32).

36.  Nevertheless, as aforementioned, the presumptions are not of much value if the intention of the relevant parties can be ascertained from the evidence adduced.

D. THE DEFENDANT’S PRIMARY AND ALTERNATIVE PLEAS

37.  As mentioned above, the Defendant’s primary case is that he was at all material times the “sole beneficial owner” of the credit balance standing from time to time in both the Savings Account and the Premier Account. His “alternative” case is that Father and the Defendant were “joint beneficial owners” of the credit balance from time to time in the two bank accounts. In the “further alternative”, the Defendant contends that upon Father’s death, he became the “absolute sole beneficial owner” of the credit balance in the bank accounts by survivorship.

38.  As a matter of principle, the Defendant’s “further alternative case” is part and parcel of his “alternative” case because joint equitable ownership of the credit balance in a bank account carries with it a right of survivorship in that upon the death of one of the account holders, the entire beneficial interest will vest in the surviving account holder.

39.  The Plaintiff argues the Defendant’s pleas are inconsistent and he is required to elect which case he intends to rely on. Further, as contended by the Plaintiff, the Defendant, by relying on the alternative case of joint ownership, has “disavowed” his primary case.

40.  Whenever a party pleads an alternative case, it may be said that such plea shows signs of some uncertainty. However, the question as to whether a party has “reasonable grounds” (see O.18 r.12A of the Rules of the High Court, Cap 4A) to make an alternative plea must depend on the individual circumstances of each case. For example, if a party has no direct knowledge of certain factual events and/or the court’s final rulings of such events may lead to different conclusions, there is no reason why such party should not be allowed to contemplate different possible scenarios by making alternative, albeit inconsistent, pleas.

41.  In the present case, the overarching issue is Father’s intention. Although both parties have adduced evidence on this point, the Court could only infer his intention (assuming that it is not necessary to resort to legal presumptions) from the relevant circumstances, in the absence of any direct evidence from Father. Obviously, the Court’s ruling on Father’s intention could give rise to various possible scenarios and conclusions (including the Defendant’s primary and alternative cases). It could also be the case that the Defendant is simply not entitled to any interest in the two Joint Accounts at all. Hence, I am of the view that the Defendant should be allowed to run the two alternatives in his pleadings.

42.  It is noted that the Plaintiff also complains that the Defendant’s pleaded case principally relies on the fact that he and Father were joint account holders and also on the documents signed for such purposes without much reference to Father’s express wish to gift the credit balances to the Defendant. However, this is not an issue of pleadings but it goes to the general credibility of the Defendant’ case on the alleged gift, which will be discussed below.

E. FATHER’S INTENTION

E1. The approach to ascertaining Father’s intention

43.  As stated above, the Court should look at the relevant and admissible evidence of Father’s actual intention. However, if such evidence is non-existent, the Court would resort to presumptions. Further, according to the legal principles summarised above, if a gift is claimed, the onus is on the alleged donee (i.e. the Defendant in this case) to prove such gift. Given that the alleged gift was made by a person who is now deceased, the Court “must approach the claim with some caution and a true sense of enquiry”.

44.  In Overseas Trust Bank Ltd (supra), the Court of Appeal held that the only relevant evidence as to the intention of the donor was that “before or at or immediately after the time of the transaction”. In this regard, in Overseas Trust Bank Ltd, Shephard v Cartwright [1955] AC 431 was cited for the proposition that:[1]

“...evidence of the acts and declarations of the parties before or at or immediately after the time of the transaction, constituting part of that transaction, is admissible for or against the party doing the act or making the declaration; but that evidence of subsequent acts or declarations is admissible only against the party doing or making them.”

45.  However, as pointed out by Stock NPJ in Leung Wing Yi Asther v Kwok Yu Wah (2015) 18 HKCFAR 605 at §§55-56, the modern approach is less rigid. Evidence of earlier and later events are admissible as evidence of intention at the time of the transfers. Having said that, contemporaneous conduct is inherently more likely to be a reliable indicator of intention, to be given greater weight, than are words and conduct after the event, especially in the case of self-serving statements or conduct of the transferor, who may long after the transaction be regretting earlier generosity.

E2. Father’s personality and relationship with his children

46.  Both Father and Mother came from a humble background. Father came to Hong Kong at the age of 6 and did not manage to receive any formal education. However, Father and Mother both worked very hard in order to earn a living and support their family. Father was a frugal and conservative person and was careful with his money. There is no dispute that he treated financial matters seriously and cautiously and was not willing to take risks in his investments. He appeared to prefer to manage his finances independently and was not easily influenced by others.

47.  Father was a loving parent who cared for all his children. He tried his best to support his children at different stages. It is the evidence of the Plaintiff and Loy Tat that Father loved and treated his children fairly and equally.

48.  The Plaintiff has adduced evidence to the effect that the Defendant is an “opportunist and risk-taker”. The Plaintiff takes the view that the Defendant is not a trustworthy person as he was suspected of misappropriating the patented gold refining formula of his former employer engaged in gold and jewellery manufacturing and this, according to the Plaintiff, eventually caused the Defendant to have to give an undertaking not to carry on business in the same industry. There is also evidence from the Plaintiff that the Defendant was not close to the parents and he did not often visit his parents once he began to work. However, quite apart from the issue of beneficial ownership, the fact that Father allowed the Defendant to hold Joint Accounts with him and also that Father executed a Power of Attorney in his favour shows that they had a sound relationship and Father also trusted the Defendant.

49.  I am of the view Father has treated all his children (including the Defendant) fairly and maintained a good and harmonious relationship with all of them. I cannot find any particular incident(s) which could show that Father was particularly critical of or favourable to any of his children.

E3. Alleged express wish of Father regarding the two Joint Accounts

50.  In respect of the Savings Account, it is the Defendant’s pleaded case and also evidence (as stated in his witness statement) that “[i]n or around March 2012, Father told me that he wished to gift some monies to me and asked me to go to HSBC Bank with him”.

51.  No further details were provided by the Defendant as to (1) whether Father had ever talked about his intention to gift some monies to him prior to 20 March 2012 and if not, why Father suddenly raised the idea of gifting him “some monies”; (2) whether there was any discussion on the amount of “some monies” in that particular conversation or otherwise; and (3) in what form such gift would be made and whether it was related to the credit balance in any of Father’s bank accounts.

52.  However, under cross-examination, the Defendant referred to a conversation which took place in one dinner (with no specific date mentioned) where Father suddenly said that Mother had passed away for one year and he had not made a will yet; hence, he would wish to gift some monies to the Defendant. The Defendant, according to his evidence, did not respond to Father’s alleged wish. During cross-examination, the Defendant admitted that Father did not fully express his thoughts, but he understood (會意) and interpreted it to mean a gift. I agree with the Plaintiff that had such conversation actually taken place, the Defendant would not have omitted it from his witness statement. The Defendant’s explanation that he did not find it necessary to refer to the incident in his witness statement does not seem to have any meaningful substance. In any event, this additional piece of evidence (which emerged for the first time at trial) does not provide any concrete information which can help establish Father’s intention to gift the Defendant the credit balance of the Savings Account.

53.  The Defendant further said in his witness statement that “[o]n or about 20 March 2012, Father and I went to HSBC Bank (Westwood Branch) together, and Father suggested to add me as a joint account holder of the Savings Account, so that I could freely use the monies in the account whenever I wished.” The Defendant also referred to the bank staff’s explanation to the effect that “the credit balance of the Savings Account would go to the survivor of either of us on the death of one of us.” These events, according to the Defendant, showed a “common understanding, intention and/or agreement” that “Father had made a gift of the credit balance standing from time to time in the Savings Account”.

54.  However, it is also the Defendant’s evidence (which, again, was revealed for the first time at trial) that after adding the Defendant’s name to the Savings Account and when they stepped out of the Bank, the Defendant asked Father what would happen to him if he had taken Father’s monies. The Defendant claimed that Father said “when I decided to add your name to the account, the sums were intended to belong to you (預咗俾你)”. The Defendant said that he thus had the feeling (感覺) or there was a subtle understanding (默契) between the Defendant and Father that Father had gifted him the credit balance. I find this part of the Defendant’s evidence most artificial and self-serving for the following reasons:-

(1) Again, there is no proper explanation from the Defendant as to why this part of the evidence has never been included in any of his three witness statements.

(2) It is the Defendant’s evidence that in view of Father’s express wish and the bank staff’s explanation, he was given to understand that the credit balance was gifted to him. In that case, why did the Defendant still find it necessary to ask Father what would happen if he took monies from the account? This additional evidence of the Defendant also raises considerable doubts on whether the bank staff really provided any explanation to the Defendant and Father as alleged or at all.

(3) Further, the Defendant’s question to Father regarding what would happen if he took monies from the account (which is in my view, glaringly self-serving) does not sit comfortably with the Defendant’s own evidence that he was not in need of the monies in the Savings Account.

55.  Moreover, the Defendant’s evidence that “out of respect for Father, I allowed Father to keep the passbook for the Savings Account so that Father could continue to use the monies therein for his own expenses if he wished to do so” is rather baffling. As mentioned above, the Defendant’s evidence fails to demonstrate any clear intention on Father’s part to gift the credit balance to the Defendant. Neither did Father, even on the Defendant’s evidence, ever indicate that he would no longer use any of the monies in the account. In the circumstances, the Defendant’s allegation that he “allowed” Father to continue to operate the account is quite inconsistent with the so-called “respect” for Father because there is simply no reason why Father would require any permission or authorisation from the Defendant to make further use of the account after the Defendant’s name was added onto it.

56.  For the reasons stated above, I find that Father never expressed any wish or intention to gift the credit balance of the Savings Account to the Defendant.

57.  In relation to the Premier Account, the Defendant ‘s case is that in or around November 2013, Father said he wished to gift the Defendant some monies to him to assist him in buying a property because (1) Father noticed that the Defendant had not used any money in the Savings Account; and (2) the Plaintiff, Loy Koon and Loi Chuen could reside in their parents’ properties rent-free whereas the Defendant did not enjoy such benefit.

58.  However, the Defendant rejected Father’s offer. Instead, he told Father that “I was not really in need of money and I considered it was not the right time financially to purchase a property”. Instead, he proposed to take around ¾ of the then balance of the Savings Account, which was around HK$1.6 million at that time, to invest in a high yield foreign currency account (i.e. Unit Trust) to generate return. According to the Defendant, Father agreed with his proposal. It was on this basis that Father opened the Premier Account with the Defendant, and transferred HK$1.6 million from the Savings Account to the Premier Account. It is the Defendant’s evidence that they attended the same HSBC branch to open the Premier Account the following day and it was the Defendant’s suggestion that a joint account be opened “out of my respect to him despite it was his intention to give me the money”.

59.  The Defendant’s evidence in this respect also has the following fundamental problems:-

(1) The above evidence from the Defendant is only that Father wished to gift “some monies” to him but has never referred to Father’s wish to gift the credit balance of the Premier Account to the Defendant.

(2) As mentioned, when the Premier Account was opened, it was decided that a sum of HK$1.6 million was to be transferred from the Savings Account and deposited into the Premier Account for future investment purposes. There is no mention in the Defendant’s evidence that any additional monies would be deposited into the HSBC Premier Account at the time when it was opened or thereafter. Had it been Father’s intention to gift the credit balance to the Defendant by way of opening a new account (with a view to, according to the Defendant’s case, enabling the Defendant to purchase his own property), one would have expected Father to put in additional funds in the new account for the benefit of the Defendant. But this is not the case here.

(3) As submitted by the Plaintiff, it had been pleaded in the Defendant’s original Defence that in relation to the opening of the Premier Account, Father “wished to gift some monies from his own savings (approximately HK$1.6 million) to the Defendant”, but the Defendant deleted the reference to the monies being from Father’s own savings in his 4th version (i.e. the Re-Re-Re Amended Defence).

(4) Under cross-examination, the Defendant admitted that there was a mistake in timing regarding the original version of his pleaded case. He meant that Father wished to gift him HK$1.6 million before adding his name to the Savings Account. This further reinforces the lack of clarity and credibility in the Defendant’s evidence relating to the alleged express wish or intention of Father.

(5) The Defendant admits that it was his own suggestion (as opposed to Father’s suggestion) to name both him and Father as joint holders of the Premier Account. There is no reference in the Defendant’s evidence as to the way in which Father had ever proposed this additional account to be opened and operated.

(6) In fact, the Defendant’s allegation that he decided to open a joint Premier Account “out of respect” for Father is, once again, plainly self-serving, particularly when, as mentioned above, there is simply no evidence which could establish any nexus between Father’s alleged wish to gift some monies to the Defendant with the credit balance in the Premier Account.

(7) Finally, whilst the fact that a gift of a standing credit balance in a joint account which is fluctuating and potentially defeasible does not undermine a donative intent, if the claim for a gift includes a substantial sum (i.e. the sum of about HK$30 million being part of the Sale Proceeds of the Shop in 2014) which was not contemplated at the time when the alleged gift was made but was only subsequently deposited, it is important to have clear and cogent evidence which can prove that the gift was intended to cover all further deposits. In the present case, there is no sufficient evidence in support of such intention.

60.  Having regard to the above factors, I am of the view that Father did not express any intention or wish to gift the credit balance of the Premier Account to the Defendant.

E4. Other circumstantial evidence on Father’s intention

61.  Further to my previous rulings that Father did not express any intention or wish to gift the credit balances in the two Joint Accounts to the Defendant, I will now proceed to examine the other circumstantial evidence that the Defendant relies on.

62.  According to the Defendant, he was the child “who had a particularly close relationship with the Father before he passed away”. The Defendant highlighted a few examples in this regard:-

(1) Since Primary 1, the Defendant spent considerable time assisting Father in his business until Father’s retirement in 1992. The Defendant and Loy Koon were the only two siblings who knew and participated in the noodle manufacturing process. When Father wished to retire in around late 1992, he specifically wanted the Defendant to take over the business which represented his life’s work. It was only because the Defendant had, by then, already started his own business that he turned down Father’s suggestion. The Plaintiff and his witnesses had all acknowledged their limited involvement in the business in the past.

(2) Father entrusted the Defendant to deal with rental and tenancy matters of the Shop Premises since 1996 until its eventual sale in 2014. The Defendant was able to speak in detail about the administrative matters concerning the lease of the shop and the repair work which he had arranged to be carried out in the past without seeking reimbursement from Father.

(3) Father entrusted the Defendant in collecting the monthly rental income of the Ki Lung Street Property from 1980 to 1997, which was one of the main sources of Father’s income at the relevant time.

(4) In the 20 years prior to Father’s death, Father entrusted the filing of his tax return forms to the Defendant, save for one year where this was done by the Plaintiff because the Defendant was busy.

(5) Father and Mother discussed with the Defendant and accepted his suggestions in relation to their cemetery arrangements. It was the Defendant who arranged and paid for Father’s funeral expenses.

(6) Whenever the Defendant visited Father at the Nan Hai Property, Father would prepare a good meal for him, whereas Father would not do the same for his other children.

(7) When Father and Mother re-registered their marriage in 1983, Father asked the Defendant to be one of the witnesses to the solemnisation.

63.  On the other hand, the Plaintiff’s case is that the Defendant did not maintain a particularly close relationship with Father or Mother, whether in his childhood or after he began his working life. The Plaintiff contends that none of the incidents mentioned by the Defendant individually or cumulatively show a close and trusting relationship as alleged by the Defendant. The Plaintiff has highlighted the following incidents:-

(1) The Defendant did not help out in Father’s Shop as frequently as alleged. On the contrary, the Defendant spent most of his childhood with friends.

(2) The Defendant has not been able to provide any documentary evidence or receipts in support of his contention of having arranged for repair works for Father’s shop.

(3) In relation to the Ki Lung Street Property, the rent was paid by the tenant by way of mailing cheques to Father. The tenant had never failed to pay rent.

(4) It was the Plaintiff who had been filing the majority of Father’s tax returns.

(5) As to Father’s funeral expenses, contrary to the Defendant’s assertions on the stand, the Defendant did not pay for Father’s columbarium expenses. The truth is that on 24 September 2010, Father paid for both his and Mother’s columbarium expenses.

(6) Given Mother’s declining health and Father’s long-term health issues including diabetes, the elaborate meals alleged by the Defendant with Father are clearly an exaggeration.

(7) The Defendant’s signature on the parents’ marriage certificate does not correspond with the Defendant’s signatures in any other documents.

64.  The Plaintiff says that Father had a harmonious relationship with all his children and treated them equally and fairly. Although Father would financially support his children, he did not favour the Defendant over the others. Father had previously lent money to not only the Defendant but also other children. The Defendant has not been able to point to any particular incident (apart from the alleged gifts) where Father had expressed his affection for the Defendant specifically to the exclusion of his other children by making a significant monetary gift to the Defendant solely.

65.  In response, it is submitted on behalf of the Defendant that the other siblings (including the Plaintiff, Loi Chuen and Loy Koon) have been staying rent-free in properties owned by Father and Mother. By contrast, the Defendant did not have such benefit since he moved out from New Fortune House since 1993.

66.  It is not seriously disputed by the Defendant that Father maintained a harmonious relationship with all his children and supported them insofar as it was within his ability to do so. Under cross-examination, although the Plaintiff may have retracted from his previous position that the Defendant was relatively distant from Father, he maintained that Father was equally close to all of his children. The Defendant also accepts that the Plaintiff was entrusted by Father with handling some matters during his lifetime.

67.  In my view, none of the matters raised by the Defendant, whether individually or cumulatively, showed that Father had a particularly close and trusting relationship with the Defendant. Although the Defendant was entrusted by Father to handle various matters on his behalf, the same could also be said of the Plaintiff. Even on the Defendant’s own case, there was no incident which showed that Father particularly and strongly favoured the Defendant over his other children.

68.  Further, Father did not have the habit of making one-off individual monetary gifts. I accept the Plaintiff’s evidence that Father had insisted on Mother’s estate to remain undistributed until his own death. Although, on the Plaintiff’s case, Father contemplated a partial distribution of HK$2 million in early June 2014 of the sale proceeds of the Shop to each of his children, the sale of the Shop was an exceptional, one-off, event. In any event, the contemplated distribution proceeded on the basis of equal distribution amongst all his children.

69.  As to the argument that the Defendant did not enjoy rent-free accommodation since he moved out of New Fortune House in 1993, it is submitted on behalf of the Plaintiff that all children were allowed to reside in one of the residences owned by Father and Mother, and the Defendant was never an exception. It was the Defendant’s own choice to move out of New Fortune House and move into his newly purchased property of over 1,000 square feet in Pok Fu Lam. Thus, the “loss” of rent-free accommodation was not a “loss” as such for which Father would have wished to compensate the Defendant.

70.  I accept the Plaintiff’s argument that the above reasons provided by the Defendant for a gift of the credit balance in the Premier Account is invalid for the following reasons:-

(1) As mentioned above, it was the Defendant’s own choice to move out of New Fortune House. Since then, the Defendant did well in real estate trading and was able to afford a flat which housed his entire family. That being the case, Father would not have been concerned about the Defendant not having a “roof over his head” with his family.

(2) Not only the Defendant, but also Loi Tat and Kit Bing did not have the benefit from Father and Mother of an apartment which could house their families. On the Defendant’s case, Father’s gift of the credit balance to him would leave Loi Tat and Kit Bing unremedied. There is simply no reason why Father would have done so, particularly in light of my ruling that Father treated all his children fairly and equally.

71.  In the circumstances, I accept the Plaintiff’s submission that there are no good reasons why Father would have suddenly decided to gift the two Joint Accounts to the Defendant. The circumstantial evidence fails to demonstrate that Father would have intended to make such gifts only in favour of the Defendant to the exclusion of his other children.

E5. The Defendant’s alternative case

72.  As stated above, the beneficial ownership of the funds in a joint account boils down to the question of the intention of the joint account holders. In view of my ruling that Father did not have any intention to gift the credit balances in the two Joint Accounts to the Defendant upon consideration of the Defendant’s evidence regarding the alleged express wish of Father and other circumstantial evidence, the Defendant’s alternative case on joint beneficial ownership also cannot stand.

73.  The survivorship clause contained in the documents that Father and the Defendant were required to sign in respect of the Joint Accounts provided the following:-

“On the death of either, any or all of us, to hold any credit balance on the Account, and any securities, deeds, boxes and parcels and their contents, and property of any description held in the Account or otherwise in our joint names to the order of the survivor or (if more than one) the survivors of us or the personal representative(s) of the last survivor, without prejudice, however, to any rights the Bank may have in respect thereof arising out of any lien, mortgage, charge, pledge, set-off, counter-claim or otherwise whatsoever and we agree to indemnify the Bank in respect of any claim which may be made against the Bank as a result of the Bank’s complying with this request and authorisation.”

74.  It is well-established that a survivorship clause of this type is primarily a contractual arrangement between the bank and the joint account holders on how to deal with the money in the joint account. It does not declare the respective beneficial interests of the joint account holders. It is also not determinative of parties’ ownership of the money in the joint account. The parties’ intention overrides the survivorship clause (Kwok Siu Mui Diana, Administrator of the Estate of Leung Shui Lin, deceased v Kwok Siu Yee[2020] HKCFI 2663per B Chu J §§79-88).

75.  The Defendant has referred me to the decision of the High Court of Singapore in Lim Chen Yeow Kelvin v Goh Chin Peng [2008] SGHC 119 to demonstrate the importance of the survivorship clause in considering beneficial interest in a joint account. However, it should be pointed out that in Lim Chen Yeow Kelvin, the survivorship clause provided that in the event of the death of a joint account holder, the amount standing to the credit of the joint account shall be held “for the benefit and to the order of the survivor(s)” (emphasis added). It was held that “[t]hese [italicised] words ... constituted very strong evidence of what [the deceased]’s true intentions were, namely that … the defendant was to have the money beneficially if he survived her” (§80). Further, the court in that case found that there were other factors showing a strong intention of the deceased to make a gift.

76.  It is also submitted on behalf of the Defendant that Father was aware of the difference between an additional signatory to a bank account and an additional joint account holder and his knowledge of such difference lends weight to the allegation that Father intended to pass the beneficial interests in the bank accounts. I disagree for the following reasons:-

(1) The Defendant emphasises that the bank staff had explained the survivorship clause to him and Father. However, as discussed above, the survivorship clause for the Savings Account and the Premier Account did not actually address the question of beneficial ownership.

(2) Further, as mentioned above, had the bank staff explained the relevant terms and conditions to the effect that the bank accounts would beneficially belong to the Defendant, the Defendant would not have asked Father, after the Saving Account was opened, what would happen if he took monies from that account.

(3) As I will further explain below, one of the reasons (provided by the Defendant) why he decided to withdraw a sum of HK$10 million on the date of Father’s passing was that he feared that the account might be frozen by the bank in view of Father’s death. However, this is clearly at odds with the Defendant’s case that as a result of, amongst others, the bank staff’s explanation, he had the “understanding” that the credit balances in the bank accounts should belong to him.

(4) In the circumstances, if the Defendant, on his own case, was uncertain about his entitlements despite the alleged explanations from the bank staff, it is inconceivable that Father would have been aware of the difference between having an additional signatory to his own account and having a bank account with another person as joint account holders.

E6. Subsequent events

77.  I have also taken into account the events which occurred after the two joint accounts were created in order to consider if any of such events would have a bearing on the issue of intention. I come to the view that none of them would alter my views on Father’s intention. On the contrary, they further reinforce such views. I would like to summarise a few points.

78.  It is undisputed that Father was entitled to withdraw monies from the joint accounts without the Defendant’s prior approval. In fact, Father made regular withdrawals of HK$5,000 from the Savings Account through automated teller machines.

79.  The Defendant argues that Father’s control does not undermine his donative intent to make a gift by relying on the decision of Overseas Trust Bank Ltd (supra) at p.203G-I per Godfrey JA, p.209E-F per Mortimer VP.

80.  In Overseas Trust Bank Ltd, Godfrey JA expressed:

“It is perhaps an odd sort of ‘gift’ with which we are concerned here, a gift of moneys controlled and managed by the donor and (in lawyers’ language), liable to be revoked pro tanto by drawings made from the accounts by the donor for his own benefit during his lifetime. But these odd characteristics do not as a matter of law preclude the transaction being regarded as one in which the donee takes an immediate beneficial interest in the money.

In the words of Megarry J in InRe Figgis [1969] 1 Ch 123, at 149:

It may be that the correct analysis is that there is an immediate gift of a fluctuating and defeasible asset consisting of the chose in action for the time being constituting the balance in the bank account.

Megarry J thought the subject ‘worthy of academic disputation’ (loc cit). But I would adopt this analysis; hold that it applies to the transactions in dispute here; and allow the son’s appeal.”

81.  Similarly, Mortimer VP also highlighted the significance of the words of Megarry J in InRe Figgis (supra):

“I tum finally to the nature of the gift. The gift by the father — in Megarry J's words in Re Figgis [1969] 1 Ch 123 at 149 — was ‘an immediate gift of a fluctuating and defeasible asset consisting of the chose in action for the time being constituting the balance in the bank account’, is a strange legal animal indeed. However, even though it is a gift of something which may turn out to be nothing, it is recognised by the law, in spite of the difficulty in providing any wholly sound, legal analysis.”

82.  In my view, whilst the authorities cited by Ms Tong establish that a gift of a standing credit balance in a bank account controlled and managed by the donor is, a matter of law, capable of being the subject of a gift, they do not go so far as to establish that the donor’s entitlement to withdraw monies from the account is irrelevant on the question of donative intent. In other words, depending on the circumstances of the case, weight may be attached to the fact that the donor was able to make withdrawals from the account as and when he saw fit.

83.  As Overseas Trust Bank Ltd was heavily relied on by Ms Tong, I shall discuss that case in further detail. It was a case of three fixed deposit accounts in the name of the first defendant (the son) where the deceased (the father) retained control of the accounts and from time to time withdrew money from those accounts for his own purpose. Unlike the present case, the three accounts were not joint accounts but were accounts in the sole name of the son. At trial, the judge found that when the deceased made monetary gifts to members of his family, he would “without exception record the amount of the gift and the reasons for making [it]. Any acknowledgement from the recipient would also be faithfully recorded”.[2] In the absence of reference in the deceased’s diaries on the opening of the bank accounts or of the gifts and the son’s acknowledgment of the gifts, the judge held that the deceased never intended the monies in the accounts as gifts.

84.  The Court of Appeal allowed the son’s appeal on the basis that the judge erred in relying on primarily the absence of reference in the deceased’s diaries to infer that the deceased did not have a particular intention.[3] Having reviewed the evidence before the trial judge, the Court concluded that there was no relevant and admissible evidence before the judge on the basis of which he could displace the presumption of advancement in favour of the son.[4] It was also against such background that the Court of Appeal did not give much weight to the fact that the accounts were controlled by the father.

85.  In the present case, however, I have ruled on the basis of the available evidence that Father did not have any intention to gift the two bank accounts to the Defendant. The fact the Father was at liberty to withdraw monies from the accounts appears to be consistent with my findings.

86.  Further, I note that Father kept the ATM cards, passbooks and ATM passwords of both Joint Accounts securely with him at all times as an outward manifestation of ownership. He also continued to rely upon the Savings Accounts to settle some of his ongoing expenses and asked for the bank statements of the Premier Account to be sent to his address. The fact that the bank statements were mailed to Father’s address from June 2014 onwards, whether on Father’s own request or the Defendant’s initiative, shows Father’s care and concern about the value of the monies in the account. He wanted to retain more control over the credit balance and monitor the Defendant’s performance. All these factors do not support Father’s donative intent.

87.  The sale of the Shop took place in 2014, i.e. after the opening of the Premier Account. It is the Defendant’s case that in about late 2014, Father asked the Defendant how his business was going. When the Defendant told Father that his business was not doing too well, Father reiterated to the Defendant that he was free to use the monies in the Premier Account (including the proceeds of sale of the Shop Premises) as he desired and reminded him that the account belonged to him anyway. The Defendant also alleges that he then, by once again relying on the so-called “respect for the Father”, informed Father of the withdrawals he had made from the Premier Account between 12 May 2015 and 2 September 2015.

88.  At trial, the Defendant nevertheless testified that at the time of depositing the Sale Proceeds into the Premier Account, the Defendant did not know that Father had gifted the same to him. Instead, the Defendant’s evidence was that the conversation in December 2014 was the first time Father made known that the Account belonged to the Defendant. I find the Defendant’s evidence in this respect unsatisfactory for the following reasons.

89.  First, according to the Defendant’s case, at the time when the two Joint Accounts were created, it was Father’s intention to gift the credit balance “standing from time to time” in each account to the Defendant. Had this been true, the Defendant should have had little doubt that he had beneficial interest in the Sale Proceeds deposited into the two Joint Accounts. However, his testimony that he did not know if the Sale Proceeds were gifted to him is plainly contrary to his primary allegation.

90.  Second, as analysed above, the Defendant’s evidence on Father’s intention or wish at the time when the two Joint Accounts were created is rather obscure and self-contradictory. In fact, the Defendant admitted that Father did not express his thoughts clearly. In the circumstances, when the Sale Proceeds of such a substantial amount were deposited into the accounts, one would have expected at least some discussions between Father and the Defendant on how the monies should be managed. The Defendant’s evidence that Father in late 2014 (i.e. more than 6 months after completion) simply told him in rather general terms that “he was free to use the monies in the Premier Account (including the Sale Proceeds)” is rather unrealistic and incredible.

91.  Third, the Defendant’s case that he then informed Father of his previous withdrawals from the Premier Account and Father said “it would be fine to withdraw monies from the account” flatly contradicts his own case that he was all along entitled to use the monies in the account. The Defendant’s continuous use of the pretext “out of respect for Father” simply demonstrates his rather desperate attempt to justify the inconsistencies in his case.

92.  Another matter which needs to be examined is the Defendant’s withdrawal from the Premier Account on the day of Father’s death, i.e. 20 April 2016.

93.  The Defendant’s explanation is that the sum withdrawn was intended to be used to facilitate the purchase of the village house given that the provisional sale and purchase agreement (“the Provisional Agreement”) was initially arranged to be signed on 20 April 2016. He also alleges that there would be difficulty in getting a mortgage for the purchase of the village house and he also harboured fear (allegedly arising from what he heard from friend and classmates) that the Premier Account might be frozen as a result of Father’s death.

94.  I find the Defendant’s explanation unacceptable:-

(1) Although the Defendant and the vendor agreed on the sale and purchase on 18 April 2016, there is no explanation as to why the Provisional Agreement was scheduled to be signed only on 20 April 2016. In fact, there is no evidence showing that the Provisional Agreement was actually intended to be signed on 20 April 2016.

(2) Upon hearing Father’s passing, the first thing which the Defendant did was to transfer HK$10 million from the Premier Account to himself (before seeing Father’s body), which runs contrary to his allegation that on the day of Father’s death, his “mind was not on financial or administrative matters”.

(3) The Defendant agreed that he knew he could postpone the signing of the Provisional Agreement. In the circumstances, there was no reason why he had to rush to withdraw HK$10 million from the Premier Account.

(4) As discussed above, the Defendant’s evidence that he was worried about the account being frozen is against his own case of his understanding and/or knowledge of the alleged gift and also the effect of the survivorship clause as allegedly explained by the bank staff.

(5) The Defendant has never produced any evidence to show that he was not capable of paying for the purchase of the village house through his own resources such that he was in urgent need of the withdrawn sum.

95.  I also wish to comment on another incident which happened shortly after Father’s death. On 26 April 2016, i.e. 6 days after Father’s death, the Defendant attended Chong Hing Bank in attempt to open Father’s safe deposit box. He did so without the presence of any other siblings. Although the Defendant claimed that he had informed the Plaintiff before and after his visit to the bank, this was (1) denied by the Plaintiff and (2) was not mentioned in the Defendant’s statutory declaration to the Home Affairs Department explaining why he had attempted to open the safe deposit box. In any event, the Defendant failed to explain why he saw the need to “check out” the contents of the safe deposit box at that time. This, coupled with the withdrawal of HK$10 million immediately after he heard about Father’s passing, demonstrates that the Defendant was very eager to make his own attempt to take control of Father’s assets shortly after his passing.

96.  Further, as set out above, according to the Plaintiff’s evidence, in about January 2016 (i.e. about 3 months before Father’s death), Father handed over various items, including, an envelope, a handwritten note and also a shoebox to the Plaintiff and gave him a warning of caution of what he should do for the purpose of carrying out a proper administration of estate upon Father’s death. The Defendant denies such incident and also disputes the authenticity of the handwritten note.

97.  The above evidence, objectively viewed, appears to show Father’s concern as to whether the administration of his estate would be properly carried out; but it does not accuse any individual of any wrongdoing. Although the Plaintiff in his witness statement provided his somewhat subjective feeling by saying “I believe Father deliberately wrote the written note after his discovery of Desmond’s wrongful acts in order to remind me to be cautious of Desmond who would try to interrupt the administration of his Estate”, under cross-examination, the Plaintiff tried to retract this part of his evidence by saying that he “did not wish to speculate”. In the circumstances, I have decided not to attach any weight to this part of the Plaintiff’s evidence in assessing Father’s intention as I do not find it directly relevant to the issue. I have already considered all the other relevant evidence and materials in coming to my conclusion on Father’s intention.

98.  Finally, insofar as the Defendant relies on the withdrawals which were made during Father’s lifeline (which, as alleged by the Defendant, were not opposed by Father), I wish to highlight the following points:-

(1) The Defendant has made withdrawals from the Premier Account in the total sum of HK$4,048,000 during the period between May 2015 and April 2016.

(2) The Defendant has disclosed bank statements of the above account together with envelopes bearing Father’s handwritten scribbles to show that Father had read such statements with knowledge of the Defendant’s withdrawals but did not raise any queries. However, it should be noted that the Defendant’s disclosure is only limited to the bank statements issued between July and October 2015 and does not cover the other withdrawals made by the Defendant.

(3) As discussed above, I see no reason why the Defendant would have informed Father in late 2014 of his previous withdrawals thereby prompting Father to give the Defendant an alleged reassurance about his liberty to use the monies in the account if the Defendant all along understood that the account belonged to him beneficially.

(4) Even assuming that Father had read the bank statements during the period between July and October 2015 and did not object to any of the withdrawals, it does not help salvage the Defendant’s case on the question of Father’s intention which has been assessed above. To say the least, the absence of Father’s objection to various withdrawals for a particular period could mean that Father specifically allowed the Defendant to withdraw monies from the account for certain purposes. For example, on the Defendant’s own case, he chose to inform Father in late 2014 that his business was not doing well. If Father, given what he had heard from the Defendant, allowed him to take monies from the account to solve his financial difficulties at that time, this could not be taken as a factor in support of a gift.

(5) In any event, I note that the Defendant has never run the argument of waiver or acquiescence.

99.  Having made my rulings on Father’s intention, it is not necessary to resort to the legal presumptions. Further, in view of such rulings, whether Father decided to create the two Joint Accounts for administrative convenience is not of particular importance as there could be more than one reason for Father’s behaviour. As outlined above, there is a debate between the parties on Father’s health condition before the Defendant was made a joint account holder. The Defendant’s argument is that in view of Father’s condition at that time, he was not required to have an additional joint account holder simply to give him physical or administrative assistance in handling the accounts. However, I do not find this debate meaningful, given the fact that shortly after Mother’s death, Father immediately decided to have the Plaintiff designated as an additional signatory to the Hang Seng Bank account. This shows that Father might have needed at least some sense of security or peace of mind such that his bank accounts would not be left unattended in case his health condition did not allow him to operate them anymore. Further, I have already found that Father was not aware of the difference between adding a person as a signatory to a bank account and creating a joint bank account.

F. CREDIBILITY OF THE WITNESSES

F1. Witnesses of the Plaintiff

100.  The Plaintiff has tendered witness statements from himself, Kit Bing, Loi Tat and Loi Chuen. At the trial, he has only called three witnesses, namely Loi Tat, the Plaintiff himself and Loi Chuen.

101.  Kit Bing in her witness statement alleged that when she visited Father in around December 2013, she was told that he invested substantial sums in an Australian dollar fund upon the suggestion of the Defendant. In this connection, she said that Father regretted doing so and complained about it. However, since Kit Bing has chosen not to give evidence, the Defendant was not given the opportunity to cross-examine her. As a matter of fairness, I will not give any weight to Kit Bing’s evidence.

102.  In general, I find the evidence of the Plaintiff and his witnesses reliable and credible.

103.  Loi Tat gave his evidence on family matters including the personalities of the siblings, the relationships amongst them and their relationships with Father. He also testified on the deteriorating health condition of Father and the matters after his death.

104.  The Defendant launched its attack against Loi Tat that he did not have first-hand knowledge as extensively as he claimed to be, particularly in relation to Father’s health. In contrast, it was the Plaintiff and Kit Bing who had personal knowledge. Further, the Defendant pointed to some discrepancies between his oral testimony and his witness statement.

105.  In my view, the discrepancies between his oral evidence and his witness statement are immaterial, particularly when those discrepancies did not touch upon the core issues in this case. For example, the Defendant complained in his Closing Submissions that regarding Father’s retirement in 1992, Loi Tat testified that Mother asked the siblings one by one whether anyone of them would take over, whereas a contradictory account was given by Plaintiff and Loi Chuen that they never heard of it. Given the passage of time and that the nature of such events is not directly relevant to the main issues, I do not find that the credibility of Loi Tat is undermined.

106.  The Plaintiff is a key witness in this case, and he was extensively cross-examined on various matters. His evidence covered topics across, amongst other things, Father’s personality, family matters including the relationships between family members and the dispositions of the siblings, Father’s medical condition, Father’s financial affairs and matters after Father’s death.

107.  The Defendant contends that the Plaintiff’s evidence was unbelievable for the reasons that it was “one-sided and self-serving” and he was “unable to answer pertinent questions raised during [cross-examination] about inconsistencies in his own evidence”. The Defendant then gave some examples which will be summarised below:-

(1) The Plaintiff had altered his evidence in relation to the payment of rent for residing in Father’s and Mother’s properties.

(2) The Plaintiff had changed his evidence in respect of a HSBC account as to whether it was jointly held by Father and Mother or by Mother alone.

(3) Regarding the Plaintiff’s assertion that Father taught the siblings that “financial matters … should be made clear and be segregated even among family members”, the Plaintiff during cross-examination was unable to recite the words of Father but instead changed the Father’s wording when pressed.

(4) The Plaintiff claimed that Father would usually make long-distance calls to Kit Bing, but he could not give any further particulars of the content of those conversations.

(5) When the Plaintiff was asked whether Father used the Savings Account for his daily expenses, he replied that he only knew about the Hang Seng Account.

108.  However, having seen and heard the Plaintiff’s evidence, I am of the view that the Plaintiff’s oral testimony is straightforward and forthcoming. For example, he did not insist that the Defendant was not trusted by Father during cross-examination. Neither did he maintain at trial that Father was worried about the administration of his estate because of his concern over the Defendant.

109.  Regarding Loi Chuen’s evidence, in addition to family matters and the medical condition of Father, he also gave evidence on Father’s financial affairs and the sale of the Shop.

110.  I accept the Defendant’s complaint that there were some uncertainties and inaccuracies in the answers given by Loi Chuen during cross-examination. For example, in respect of matters relating to the sale of the Shop such as whether the Defendant persuaded Father to sell the Shop, Loi Chuen seemed to have some confusion about the chronology of the relevant events and the places where those events took place. When he was pressed on matters that he did not have first-hand knowledge, such as Father’s investment portfolio and which of the siblings accompanied Father to medical appointments, he said he was unclear about those matters.

111.  Nevertheless, apart from the above, Loi Chuen’s answers were mostly direct and not evasive. I find Loi Chuen’s testimony reliable.

F2. The Defendant

112.  As analysed above, I find the Defendant’s evidence, particularly in respect of his case on Father’s express intention to make a gift to him, obscure, self-contradictory and unreliable. There are also various inherent inconsistencies in his case which have already been discussed above. He also had the tendency of trying to tailor the facts in order to suit his needs.

113.  I wish to only mention another incident which raises further doubts on the Defendant’s credibility.

114.  As aforementioned, in 1986, the Defendant moved to Canada with his wife and worked in a U.S. based company engaged in gold and jewellery manufacturing for about two years. The Plaintiff alleges that, in around 1988, the Defendant was suspected of stealing a patented gold refining formula from the U.S. company and used it for his own profit and that the Defendant avoided criminal prosecution only after Father paid over HK$500,000 to the U.S. company pursuant to an out-of-court settlement. According to the Plaintiff, apart from the payment of the settlement sum, the Defendant had undertaken not to carry on business in the same industry. Nevertheless, as alleged by the Plaintiff, the Defendant disregarded the undertaking and started both Artec in his wife’s name and Sinocean in the names of his wife and Loy Koon to circumvent the undertaking and operate his new businesses in the same industry.

115.  On Day 7 of the trial, during cross-examination, the Defendant was questioned about the operation of his businesses and the following matters were revealed:-

(1) Sinocean, which engaged in the business of jewellery casting, was initially held in the names of his wife and Loy Koon. In 1994, the Defendant’s wife was replaced by Father as one of the directors and shareholders of Sinocean.

(2) Artec was held in the name of the Defendant’s wife. The Defendant initially claimed that Artec was only engaged in jewellery consultancy and the sale of jewellery-manufacturing machines. However, this was contradicted by his later evidence that his parents regularly made soup for him because a lot of smoke was created by gold-melting at Artec’s Kam Mou office. Thus, it appears that Artec was also in the business of jewellery manufacturing.

116.  During cross-examination, although the Defendant admitted having given an undertaking to his former employer, he was adamant that it had nothing to do with any suspected criminal conduct. He claimed that the undertaking was given two months after he left the U.S. company in order to facilitate a prospective acquisition of the U.S. company. However, he had no knowledge of the details of the prospective acquisition. The Defendant claimed that the undertaking given only restricted himself, but not his companies or associates, from dealing with the then existing clients of his former employer for a period of 1.5 years. Although the undertaking did not prohibit him from engaging in jewellery-manufacturing, he sought to explain that he chose to set up Sinocean in the names of his wife and Loy Koon to avoid suspicion in case he was thought to have breached the undertaking.

117.  In his Closing Submissions, the Plaintiff alleges that the Defendant interposed his wife, Loy Koon, and/or Father as owners of Sinocean and Artec so that he could continue to operate his jewellery-manufacturing business in the shadows in breach of the undertaking. The Plaintiff submits that the Defendant’s version of the undertaking that he had given was a complete fabrication for the following reasons:-

(1) The Defendant’s allegation that the alleged undertaking was only signed 2 months after he left the company runs against common sense and standard commercial practice.

(2) The Defendant’s own evidence was that the alleged acquirer initially required his services to be included as part of the acquisition. Notwithstanding this, the Defendant left the company without any undertaking. Instead, the Defendant was only invited to give an undertaking, allegedly for US$70,000, 2 months after he had left the company and started his own business. The circumstances in which the Defendant had allegedly given the undertaking was illogical and strange.

(3) The terms of the undertaking, as alleged by the Defendant, would have only covered the Defendant personally, but not his companies or agents. Any properly drafted undertaking would have restricted the use of companies as a way to circumvent the prohibition.

(4) Although the Defendant claimed that the proposed acquisition was eventually successful, according to the shareholder and director records of the Hong Kong branch of the U.S. Company, there was no change in shareholders or directors between 1988 and 1999. There was simply no acquisition whatsoever.

118.  In response to the Plaintiff’s allegations, the Defendant submits that they are irrelevant to the issues in the present case and was not raised in the Plaintiff’s pleaded case. In his Closing Submissions, the Defendant repeated the explanation that he had provided during cross-examination, i.e. although he had given an undertaking to the U.S. Company, it had nothing to do with any alleged criminal conduct on his part. As to Sinocean, it was set up in the way it was out of an abundance of caution to avoid unnecessary trouble both to himself and his clients.

119.  Although I accept that the above incidents are not directly relevant to the present dispute, the Defendant’s explanations demonstrate further problems in his credibility:-

(1) Although the issue of the Defendant’s alleged criminal case was mentioned in the Plaintiff’s witness statement, the Defendant refused to provide any explanation until he made his Further Supplemental Witness Statement. Even then, the Defendant was not forthcoming about his explanation. He did not reveal the name of his former employer, nor did he mention anything about the undertaking that, in cross-examination, he first claimed to have given.

(2) For the reasons canvassed above, the alleged terms of the undertaking simply defy commercial sense. Further, had the terms of the undertaking been as alleged by the Defendant, there would have been no good reason to interpose his wife, Loy Koon and Father as owners of Sinocean. This is especially so because, on the Defendant’s own evidence, Sinocean would have been able to obtain loans more easily if he himself were a director/shareholder. The Defendant’s explanation that he made arrangements for the abovementioned people to be owners of Sinocean “out of abundance of caution” is merely a convenient yet empty . Thus, I find that the Defendant failed to tell the truth in this regard.

(3) Hence, even if I accept the Defendant’s evidence regarding the terms of the undertaking that he had given (which I do not), the way in which Sinocean was set up, coupled with the type of business that it was engaged in, still calls for an explanation. Yet, throughout the proceedings, the Defendant was not forthcoming in his disclosure of information concerning Sinocean.

120.  Thus, I find that the Defendant’s overall credibility was further undermined by his response to the Plaintiff’s allegations regarding the alleged criminal investigation as discussed above.

G. CONCLUSION

121.  By reason of the above analysis, I am of the view that Father never intended to make an inter vivos gift of his beneficial interest in the Savings Account and/or the Premier Account (including the Sale Proceeds) to the Defendant.

122.  Accordingly, I consider that the evidence supports the finding on the balance of probabilities that the Defendant held the funds in the Joint Accounts on trust for Father. I also find that between 12 May 2015 and 21 April 2016, the Defendant wrongfully caused the money in the Premier Account (which was then in the total sum of HK$14,248,000) to be transferred to his own HSBC bank account, in breach of his duty as a trustee and without consent from Father and/or the Estate.

123.  In the circumstances, the Plaintiff’s claim succeeds and I enter judgment in favour of the Plaintiff. I hereby make the following order as sought by the Plaintiff:-

(1) A declaration that the balance standing in the Savings Account and the Premier Account as well as the Sale Proceeds therein shall vest into the Estate upon Father’s death on 20 April 2016.

(2) An order that the Defendant shall repay the sum of HK$14,248,000 withdrawn by him from the Premier Account.

(3) An order that an account and an inquiry shall be taken of all money withdrawn from the Savings Account and/or the Premier Account that came to the hands of the Defendant or received by any other person on behalf or account of the Defendant, without Father’s and/or the Plaintiff’s authorisation.

(4) An account of the Sale Proceeds received by the Defendant.

(5) Delivery up by the Defendant of all money (with interest thereon) and properties belonging to Father and/or the Estate upon taking such accounts and/or inquiries under paragraphs (3) and (4) above.

124.  I also make an order nisi that the Defendant shall pay interest on the sum of HK$14,248,000 at prime rate plus 1% from 20 April 2016 (i.e. the date of Father’s death) to the date of this Judgment and thereafter at judgment rate until payment.

125.  In addition, I make a costs order nisi that the Defendant do pay the Plaintiff the costs of this action, to be taxed if not agreed with certificate for two counsel.

126.  The above orders nisi shall become absolute unless an application to vary the same is made within the next 14 days.

 (Richard Khaw SC)
 Recorder of the High Court

Ms Elaine Liu and Mr Abel Lam, instructed by K. B. Chau & Co., for the Plaintiff

Ms Sara Tong and Ms Esther Mak, instructed by Patrick Chu, Conti Wong Lawyers LLP, for the Defendant



[1]   Overseas Trust Bank Ltd p.201H-202B

[2]   Overseas Trust Bank Ltd p.203A-B

[3]   Overseas Trust Bank Ltd p.204F-I and 205D

[4]   Overseas Trust Bank Ltd p.203F-G, p.206E and p.209G.

[2019] HKCFI 3003-EN-2019-12-19

POON LOI TAK the Administrator of the late POON NUEN Deceased v. POON LOI CHEUNG DESMOND

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HCA 3348/2016

[2019] HKCFI 3003

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO 3348 OF 2016

________________________

BETWEEN  
 POON LOI TAK (潘來德)Plaintiff
 the Administrator of 
 the late POON NUEN (潘暖) Deceased 

and

 POON LOI CHEUNG DESMOND (潘來祥)Defendant

________________________

Before:Hon Wilson Chan J in Chambers
Dates of Hearing:1 and 16 August 2019
Date of Judgment:19 December 2019

________________________

J U D G M E N T

________________________

A. Introduction

1.  This is the hearing of the application by the defendant pursuant to his summons dated 6 March 2019 (the “Summons”) for orders (inter alia) that certain paragraphs of the witness statements of the plaintiff (the “WP Paragraphs”)[1] and certain items of disclosure in the plaintiff’s List of Documents (the “WP Documents”)[2] be excluded/expunged on the ground that they are subject to without prejudice privilege and inadmissible. 

2.  This Action was commenced by the plaintiff by Writ issued on 20 December 2016.  The WP Paragraphs and the WP Documents relate to discussions and meetings between the defendant and his siblings (including the plaintiff) (the “Siblings”) in the few months immediately prior to the commencement of this action (ie in September to December 2016) which the defendant says were conducted with a view to settling the disputes between them without resort to litigation.  Such discussions/meetings include:

(1) Telephone conversations between the defendant and some of the Siblings between September and October 2016;

(2) A meeting held between some of the Siblings on 17 October 2016 (the “17 Oct Meeting”);

(3) A meeting held between some of the Siblings on 31 October 2016 (the “31 Oct Meeting”);

(4) WhatsApp messages between the Siblings in November/December 2016 and references to a draft agreement containing proposed settlement terms;

(5) A meeting held between some of the Siblings on 5 December 2016 (the “5 Dec Meeting”).

3.  The plaintiff seeks to rely on the above matters in support of his claims against the defendant.  In particular, without the knowledge or consent of the defendant, the plaintiff secretly recorded the conversations and discussions during the 17 Oct Meeting and the 31 Oct Meeting and now seek to rely on the recordings and transcripts of such meetings as evidence in this Action. 

4.  The following affirmations have been filed in relation to the Summons:

(1) the defendant’s 2nd Affirmation dated 6 March 2019 in support of the Summons (“Desmond Poon 2nd”);

(2) the 3rd Affirmation of the plaintiff(“Plaintiff 3rd”); the Affirmation of Poon Loi Tat (“Loi Tat’s Affirmation”); and the Affirmation of Poon Loi Chuen (“Loi Chuen’s Affirmation”), all filed on behalf of the plaintiff in opposition to the Summons; and 

(3) the defendant’s 3rd Affirmation in reply dated 21 May 2019 (“Desmond Poon 3rd”).

5.  The defendant submits that the discussions referred to in the WP Paragraphs and the WP Documents are quite plainly bona fide attempts to settle a dispute between the parties and subject to without prejudice privilege, and ought to be excluded/expunged. There is also no basis for the plaintiff to suggest that the defendant has “abused the privileged protection” so as to deprive him of such privilege.

B.     Relevant background

6.  This is a family dispute between siblings in respect of the estate of their deceased father, Poon Nuen (“Father”) who passed away on 20 April 2016.  There are six siblings in the family in order of seniority: Poon Kit Bing (“Kit Bing”), Poon Loy Koon (“Loy Koon”), the defendant, the plaintiff, Poon Loi Tat (“Loi Tat”) and Poon Loi Chuen (“Loi Chuen”).

7.  In this action, the plaintiff (in his capacity as administrator of Father) claims against the defendant in relation to (inter alia) the monies in two bank accounts which were, at the time of the death of Father, held in the joint names of the defendant and Father with the Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation Limited (“HSBC”), namely the Savings Account No 008-8-068085 (the “Savings Account”) and Premier Account No 650-062631-888 (the “Premier Account”). It is common ground that the assets in the Savings and Premier Account include the proceeds of the sale in the amount of HK$33 million of the shop premises situated at Ground Floor, 91 Belcher’s Street, Hong Kong, which was previously held in Father’s name (the “Sale Proceeds”).

8.  The plaintiff’s case is that the funds in the Savings Account and Premier Account, including the Sale Proceeds, were owned by Father solely and absolutely and should be vested in his estate upon his death.  The defendant’s position is that the Sale Proceeds were deposited into the Savings Account and the Premier Account with Father’s consent and Father gifted such monies to him.  It is the dispute and negotiations as between the Siblings in relation to such monies that form the subject matter of the WP Paragraphs and the WP Documents in the present application. 

C.     Relevant legal principles

C1.    Application of the without prejudice rule

9.  The without prejudice rule is a rule governing the admissibility of evidence, which applies to exclude all negotiations genuinely aimed at settlement, whether oral or in writing, from being given in evidence: Rush & Tompkins Ltd v Greater London Council [1989] AC 1280, 1299G- 1300B per Lord Griffiths.  The court has power to expunge/exclude evidence which is inadmissible by reason of without prejudice privilege.

10.  The rationale of the without prejudice rule, which is founded on public policy, is to encourage parties to negotiate and settle their disputes out of court: Muller v Lindsley and Mortimer [1996] 1 PNLR 74, 77 (CA)per Hoffmann LJ (as he then was). 

11.  Given that the encouragement of settlement is enshrined in the overriding objectives of the Rules of the High Court (see Order 1A, rule 1(e)), the rule is of fundamental importance in the administration of justice: see Thanki, The Law of Privilege 3rd Edition §§7.01, 7.02.

12.  The purpose of the without prejudice rule is to protect a litigant from being embarrassed by any admission made purely in an attempt to achieve a settlement: see Hong Kong Civil Procedure 2020 Vol 1, Practice Note 24/5/41. The public policy underlying the rule was explained by Oliver LJ (as he then was) in Cutts v Head [1984] Ch 290, 306 as follows:

“It is that parties should be encouraged so far as possible to settle their disputes without resort to litigation and should not be discouraged by the knowledge that anything that is said in the course of such negotiations (and that includes, of course, as much the failure to reply to an offer as an actual reply) may be used to their prejudice in the course of the proceedings. They should, as it was expressed by Clauson J. in Scott Paper Co. v. Drayton Paper Works Ltd. (1927) 44 R.P.C. 151, 156, be encouraged fully and frankly to put their cards on the table. ……The public policy justification, in truth, essentially rests on thedesirability of preventing statements or offers made in the course of negotiations for settlement being brought before the court of trial as admissions on the question of liability.” (emphasis added)

13.  The principles applicable to the determination as to what constitutes without prejudice privileged negotiations for settlement have been set out in Re Jinro (HK) International Ltd [2002] 4 HKC 90 (per Kwan J as she then was) at §13, as follows:

(1) A party claiming without prejudice privilege on communication would have to show that the communication was made: (i) at a time when there was an existing dispute between the parties; (ii) legal proceedings in relation to the dispute had commenced or were contemplated; (iii) the communication was made in a genuine attempt to further negotiations to settle the dispute; and (iv) the communication was made with the intention that, if negotiations failed, it could not be disclosed without the consent of the parties.

(2) Further, it was not necessary for a “without prejudice” stamp to be expressly applied to the negotiations if it was clear from the surrounding circumstances that the parties were genuinely seeking to compromise the dispute.

14.  As to the requirement set out at paragraph 13(1)(iv) above, Hoffmann LJ (as he then was) had this to say in Forster v Friedland (unreported) 1992 WL 1351421 at page 3:

“A party cannot bring within the rule statement which is not within its public policy merely by his stated or implied intention that it should be protected. Thus, whatever the parties may stipulate, the rule covers only those communications which are genuinely aimed at a settlement to avoid litigation. On the other hand, parties are free to make open offers or negotiate openly to settle their differences. The fact that a communication is aimed at settlement may be an indication - even a strong indication - of an intention that it should be without prejudice but the rule would not apply if the court concludes that the communication was in fact intended to be open.” (emphasis added)

15.  See also Cheddar Valley Engineering Ltd v Chaddlewood Homes Ltd [1992] 1 WLR 820, at 824 GH, referring to negotiations between parties for the settlement of litigation:

“… Even without any express reference to the words ‘without prejudice’ or ‘off the record’ or anything of that kind negotiations of this kind prima facie raise the presumption that the communications involved in those negotiations are conducted without prejudice.” (emphasis added)

16.  Whether a particular communication was indeed an attempt to resolve a dispute, is to be determined objectively (the subjective intention of the party in question being irrelevant) having regard to all the circumstances: Alan Ramsay Sales & Marketing Ltd v Typhoo Tea Ltd [2016] 4 WLR 59 at §23 per Flaux J.

17.  It does not matter that litigation has not begun: the relevant question (to be decided objectively) is whether the parties “contemplated or might reasonably have contemplated that litigation would follow if they could not agree”: Barneston v Axa Framlington Group Ltd [2007] 1 WLR 2443at §§32-34 per Auld LJ.

18.  Further, it is not necessary for the communication to contain a concession or offer of compromise: it is sufficient that it evinces a genuine desire to negotiate a settlement of an actual or potential dispute: Williams v Hull [2009] EWHC 2844 (Ch) §28 per Arnold LJ.  As Recorder Jat Sew Tong, SC stated in Re Estate of Joachim Thomas [2011] 5 HKLRD 538§32:   

“In my judgment, the application of the [without prejudice] rule cannot depend on whether an offer or proposal has or has not been made in the discussions. There may be many reasons why a concrete offer was not put forward at a particular meeting or meetings. Statements may be made in an initial meeting, or series of meetings, which may form the basis of further discussions. The parties may not have reached, or been able to reach, the stage when a concrete proposal or offer could be made. But the fact that the discussions do not lead to any concrete offer or proposal could not alter, retrospectively, the purpose of holding the meeting in the first place.” (emphasis added)

19.  Similarly, in Unilever Plc v Proctor & Gamble Co [2002] 1 WLR 2436, Robert Walker LJ made the following observation at 2443H-2444B:

“Without in any way underestimating the need for proper analysis of the rule, I have no doubt that busy practitioners are acting prudently in making the general working assumption that the rule, if not ‘sacred’ (Hoghton v. Hoghton (1852) 15 Beav. 278, 321), has a wide and compelling effect. That is particularly true where the ‘without prejudice’ communications in question consist not of letters or other written documents but ofwide-ranging unscripted discussions during a meeting which may have lasted several hours.

At a meeting of that sort the discussions between the parties’ representatives may contain a mixture of admissions and half-admissions against a party's interest, more or less confident assertions of a party’s case, offers, counter-offers, and statements (which might be characterised as threats or as thinking aloud) about future plans and possibilities.” (emphasis added)

20.  The fact that a party asserts his rights is also not incompatible with it being part of a negotiation with a view to settlement: Williams v Hull supra §37 per Arnold LJ.  For example, in Schering Corporation v Cipla Ltd [2005] FSR 25 a letter which asserted the strength of the party’s position but states that it did not wish to embark on a confrontation if there was an alternative solution was construed as an invitation to negotiate (at §21 per Laddie J).

21.  A useful illustration of the workings of the without prejudice rule and its public policy rationale can also be found in cases on “opening shots”, in which an initial proposal in negotiations before commencement of proceedings may be protected by the privilege.  The courts look to whether the communication can be intended and understood to promote negotiations, even if the offer was by definition only unilateral at that point in time and even where there had not been any response from the opposing party: see Thanki: The Law on Privilege 3rd Edn §7.15; South Shropshire District Council v Amos [1986] 1 WLR 1271, at 1276A-C, 1276D-E, 1277C. 

22.  The without prejudice rule applies to all communications which form part of the negotiations, whether they are themselves offers: Thanki: The Law on Privilege 3rd Edn §7.16; South Shropshire supra at pp.1277-1278 per Parker LJ.  It has also been made clear that the protection of the privilege is not limited to admissions.  A party will not be allowed to engage in an exercise of dissecting technical admissions from the overall body of without prejudice negotiations.  Instead, the discussions as a whole will be protected, as a general freedom to negotiate is part of the same package: Thanki: The Law on Privilege 3rd Edn §§7.17-7.22.  As Robert Walker LJ stated in Unilever Plc v Proctor & Gamble Co supra: –

“the protection of admissions against interest is the most important practical effect of the rule. But to dissect out identifiable admissions and withhold protection from the rest of without prejudice communications (except for a special reason) would not only create huge practical difficulties but would be contrary to the underlying objective of giving protection to the parties…to speak freely about all issues in the litigation both factual and legal when seeking compromise…Parties cannot speak freely at a without prejudice meeting if they must constantly monitor every sentence, with lawyers…sitting at their shoulders as minders” (emphasis added) (2448H-2449B).

C2.    Exceptions to the without prejudice rule

23.  In exceptional circumstances, evidence that would otherwise be protected by without prejudice privilege would be rendered admissible if the exclusion of the evidence would act as a cloak for perjury or other unambiguous impropriety.  This exception would be applied only to the clearest of cases so as not to impair the value of the without prejudice rule: see Re Jinro supra §18 per Kwan J (as she then was) where it was held:

“The exception of ‘unambiguous impropriety’ to pierce the veil of without prejudice privilege should only be applied in the ‘clearest casesof abuseof a privileged occasion’, otherwise ‘the value of the without prejudice rule would be seriously impaired if its protection could be removed by anything less than unambiguous impropriety’ (Unilever, supra at 2444; Forster v Friedland, supra.). As Simon Brown LJ stated in Fazil-Alizadeh v Nikbin, unreported, English Court of Appeal, 25 February 1993, ‘There are powerful policy reasons for admitting in evidence as exceptions to the without prejudice rule only the very clearest of cases. Unless this highly beneficial rule is most scrupulously and jealously protected, it will all too readily become eroded.’’ (emphasis added)

24.  Attempts to rely upon what was allegedly said (or not said) in without prejudice meetings or correspondence to show that what the other party had earlier pleaded or said on oath was perjured should not be permitted; otherwise, the protection offered by the without prejudice rule would be seriously undermined:Re Estate of Joachim Thomas supra per Recorder Jat Sew Tong, SC at §§28-29, 48-49.  See also Savings & Investments Bank Ltd (In Liq) v Fincken[2004] 1 WLR 667 §§59-61.

25.  In Berry Trade Ltd v Moussavi (No. 2) [2003] EWCA Civ 715 the claimants sought to rely on certain admissions alleged to have been made by one of the defendants, Mr Ghadimi, in the course of three without prejudice meetings and a telephone conversation.  Mr Ghadimi attended two of those meetings by himself, and one meeting with his solicitor.  It is said that in the course of these communications what Mr Ghadimi had said (or rather, had not said) was inconsistent with his pleaded case, so as to show that his pleaded case was dishonest.  The claimant therefore asserted that the case fell within the recognized “cloak for dishonesty” exception to the without prejudice rule.  At §53 of the Judgment, Peter Gibson LJ (giving the judgment of the court), said this:

“In our judgment this is simply not the sort of case where the court should be prepared to admit the evidence of without prejudice statements as falling within the exception from the without prejudice rule for unambiguous impropriety. The situation here is precisely what Robert Walker L.J. referred to in Unilever (at p. 2444A) when he talked of without prejudice communications which ‘consist not of letters or other written documents but of wide-ranging unscripted discussions during a meeting which may have lasted several hours.’ It seems to us quite wrong to select from many hours of without prejudice discussions what are said to be an admission here and an admission there in order to mount a claim that by his subsequent statements on oath the alleged maker of the admissions committed perjury. These were not even discussions at which, through tape-recording or the keeping of a detailed note, what was said and the context in which it was said could not be doubted. If the without prejudice rule can be breached in this case, we do not see why it cannot be breached in any case where an admission, inconsistent with some pleading or sworn assertion, is alleged to have been made. No litigant could be advised to enter into without prejudice discussions without a lawyer at his elbow or a prepared script approved by his lawyer. To allow such admissions in evidence flies in the face of the public policy justification for the without prejudice rule.” (emphasis added)

D.     Discussion

26.  The discussions and communications referred to in the WP Paragraphs and the WP Documents can be broadly separated into three periods: (i) telephone conversations before the 17 Oct Meeting; (ii) the 17 Oct Meeting and 31 Oct Meeting; (iii) events after the 31 Oct Meeting. 

27.  To understand the proper context of the events and communications between the Siblings in these three periods, the relevant background of events in around August to September 2016 must first be considered. 

D1.    Background – events in around August to September 2016

28.  It is common ground that, at a meeting between the plaintiff and the defendant on 15 August 2016, the plaintiff requested the defendant to return the Sale Proceeds in the Savings Account and the Premier Account to the plaintiff for distribution.  However, both parties knew that the Sale Proceeds in the Accounts were in the joint names of Father and the defendant and were held by the defendant upon Father’s death, which was reiterated by the defendant throughout the meeting as a clear indication of his position that he was entitled to the Sale Proceeds as the sole survivor.  By then, the parties were conscious that the manner of distribution of the Sale Proceeds was disputed, as shown by the plaintiff’s acknowledgment of the defendant’s “[hesitance]” to return the Sale Proceeds[3] and the failure of the parties to reach an agreement upon the end of the meeting.

29.  Thereafter, the plaintiff and the defendant had a meeting on 5 September 2016, the content and discussions in which has not been disputed in the plaintiff’s affirmation in reply.  At the meeting:

(1) The defendant emphasised that the Sale Proceeds had been deposited into the Savings Account and the Premium Account which were in the joint names of Father and himself, which made clear his view that he was entitled to such funds as the sole survivor. 

(2) The plaintiff, who produced an image of the Letter of Administration he obtained and expected the Sale Proceeds to be distributed between the Siblings, took a wholly different view.  No doubt he was well aware of the dispute between the parties. 

(3) The fact that court litigation was contemplated is further reflected in the plaintiff’s remarks about numerous cases of joint accounts ending up in court battle.  

30.  Further, there is clear evidence and admissions that, even prior to September 2016, the Siblings had raised the possibility of litigation if the dispute could not be resolved. 

(1) At the 31 Oct Meeting, Loi Tat noted that, two months prior to the October family meetings, Loi Chuen was “determined” to fight the matter out in court.  The defendant recounted one occasion in which Loi Chuen raised the possibility of court litigation, which Kit Bing confirmed and further added that “it was a long time ago”.  The defendant also recalled that he was advised by lawyers to settle the matter out of court.  

(2) Loy Koon also informed the defendant that he and the rest of the Siblings were concerned about the Sale Proceeds, inviting the defendant to resolve the matter to avoid any court battle amongst the Siblings.

31.  It is against the backdrop of these extant disagreements, as well as parties’ hope for possible negotiation to avoid litigation, that the nature of the following discussions and meetings must objectively considered. 

D2.    Period 1: Telephone conversations prior to the 17 Oct Meeting

32.  The relevant WP Paragraphs relating to the various telephone conversations which the defendant had with Loi Chuen, Kit Bing and Loi Tat prior to the 17 Oct Meeting, in which he put forward proposals for the settlement of the dispute are as follows:

(1) Loi Chuen WS §§36-41;

(2) Kit Bing WS §§36-39;

(3) Loi Tat WS §§36-40.

33.  On the defendant’s case, these telephone conversations took place after his meeting with the plaintiff on 5 September 2016 and before the 17 Oct Meeting.  Kit Bing, Loi Tat and Loi Chuen do not dispute the existence of such telephone conversations and/or meetings, but aver that they occurred at a slightly earlier point in time.  On Kit Bing’s case, these conversations were said to have taken place between August and September 2016; for Loi Tat, between July and August; for Loi Chuen, “a few months” before the October meetings.

34.  However, it should be pointed out that while Kit Bing states that the three conversations she had with the defendant took place between early August to September, her text message to the plaintiff on 10 October 2016 indicates that the conversations in fact took place in early September and early October, which is consistent with the defendant’s version of events. 

35.  I agree with the defendant’s submission that looking at the circumstances objectively, it is plain that the aforementioned telephone conversations are protected by without prejudice privilege for the following reasons. 

36.  First, I agree it is clear that there was at the time a dispute as regards the Sale Proceeds, and the parties contemplated or might reasonably have contemplated that litigation would follow if they could not agree: –

(1) In determining whether there is a bona fide dispute which the parties were seeking to settle, the court cannot be confined to the selective descriptions of the conversations in the witness statements of the parties, but must have regard to undisputed facts and circumstances existing at the time (as set out in section D1 above) to objectively ascertain whether the communications were of a privileged nature. 

(2) The assertions in Loi Chuen’s Affirmation §7 and Loi Tat’s Affirmation §12 that there had been no disagreement between the Siblings is not only contradicted by the matters set out in section D1 above, but also inconsistent with their own accounts in their witness statements:

(a) In relation to the conversations between Loi Tat and the defendant:

(i) Loi Tat recalls that the defendant proposed an offer which he did not agree to at the time.

(ii) Loi Tat further recalls that the defendant stated that the matter had best not be resolved through litigation.[4]

(iii) Thus, even on Loi Tat’s own account, considered objectively, there was clearly a dispute between the Siblings on the Sale Proceeds and how they should be distributed. 

(b) As to the conversation between Loi Chuen and the defendant, Loi Chuen was clearly well aware of the dispute between the Siblings, as on his own evidence[5], during the telephone conversations:

(i) The defendant’s position was that he was solely entitled to the Sale Proceeds, while other Siblings took the view that they were entitled to a share under the law;

(ii) The defendant said that the Siblings would derive no benefit in litigating with him “我們與他打官司亦沒用”, whereas Loi Chuen replied by saying “官司沒有一定贏或一定輸的”.

37.  Second, these conversations evidence a bona fide attempt to settle the extant dispute: –

(1) There is no dispute that the defendant had put forward a proposed sum for distribution to each of Loi Chuen, Loi Tat and Kit Bing.  Given the defendant’s position is that he is solely entitled to the Sale Proceeds, his offer of a certain proportion of the Sale Proceeds to the Siblings is clearly a concession and a proposed compromise.  Objectively construed, this cannot be otherwise than to promote negotiations in order to resolve the dispute regarding the Sale Proceeds. 

(2) The fact that the offer was unilateral does not preclude the privilege from attaching: see “opening shot” cases in paragraph 21 above. 

(3) Likewise, even if the defendant had asserted the strength of his position, this is not inconsistent with a proposed settlement (see paragraphs 19 and 20 above).  It must be viewed against his offer to distribute a certain proportion to each of the Siblings, being a step taken in compromise to his position that he is solely entitled to Sale Proceeds.   

(4) In any event, the Siblings shared the defendant’s eagerness to settle the matter and mutual steps were taken to negotiate and reach a compromise:

(a) After the defendant had made the offer to Loi Tat over telephone, Loi Tat stated that he would accept the offer if he was paid in advance, and was further willing to sign a settlement agreement to promise that he would not be involved in any dispute amongst the siblings.

(b) In response to the defendant’s offer, Loi Chuen responded with a counter-proposal to press for more, stating that he had not received any wedding money from Father since he did not hold a banquet when he got married.  In an attempt to encourage Loi Chuen to accept the settlement, the defendant informed him that he would secretly give him a “Lai Shi” (red packet) if the dispute could be resolved.

38.  It is clear that the telephone conversations, viewed objectively in the context of all the circumstances existing at the time, were clearly intended to promote negotiations with a view to resolving the dispute between the parties in relation to the Sale Proceeds. 

D3.    Period 2: 17 Oct Meeting and 31 Oct Meeting

39.  The relevant WP Paragraphs relating to the 17 Oct Meeting and the 31 Oct Meeting during which the Siblings carried out discussions in an attempt to resolve their disputes are at:

(1) Plaintiff WS §§95(6), 117-118, 139, 173-176, 178-181, Annex 1-2;

(2) Kit Bing WS §40;

(3) Loi Tat WS §§50-56;

(4) Loi Chuen WS §§42-45.

The full transcripts and recordings of the two meetings were disclosed as items 15 to 18 of the plaintiff’s List of Documents.

40.  The context of such meetings can be seen from the contemporaneous records of communication between the Siblings at the time: see text message between Kit Bing and the plaintiff on 10 October 2016 which states as follows:

“我今個月二十七日回港,已同[潘來全]講由他約你們一起商量解決遺產的事……最好坐埋一起去解決,到時[潘來祥]不出席的話,我地五個都可以商量,希望你會出席,放下成見,我想[潘來冠]都可參與”.

41.  It is clear from Kit Bing’s aforesaid message that the meetings were arranged so that the Siblings could sit down together to attempt to resolve the dispute over Father’s estate and the distribution of the Sale Proceeds.  It was hoped that the Siblings could put aside their differences and extant prejudices for a negotiation to be carried out to resolve the disputes.  The Siblings’ agreement to the meetings being arranged and their attendance at the meeting evidences this common intention. 

42.  Against the above background, I agree that without prejudice privilege clearly attaches to the discussions carried out as between the Siblings during the two meetings. 

43.  First, it is common ground that there were “references to litigation” throughout the meetings: Plaintiff 3rd §§23, 30; Loi Tat’s Affirmation §18.  Irrespective of whether litigation had begun, parties clearly contemplated litigation could follow if the dispute was not resolved, which suffices for privilege to attach (see paragraph 17 above). Further, the amount at stake and the manner in which the negotiations were conducted are such that all parties were clearly aware of the potential for litigation if they could not resolve the dispute as to how the funds in the Premier and Savings Account are to be distributed.

44.  Second, the defendant responded with a proposed compromise by offering HK$18 million from the Premier and Savings Accounts for distribution between the Siblings in an attempt to settle the dispute.

45.  At the 17 Oct Meeting, parties clearly intended to reach a compromise, against the backcloth of potential litigation if they could not resolve the dispute between them:

(1) The parties expressly stated their aim to reach a compromise and characterised their meeting as one for negotiation.  In particular, the defendant observed that while there may be differences between the Siblings, they ought to negotiate openly then and there.  In response, Loi Tat suggested that it was in everyone’s interest for the matter to be resolved, and the plaintiff expressly agreed.

(2) In discussing the acceptability of the defendant’s proposal, the siblings noted that it would need further consideration, but again reiterated that it was highly undesirable for the family to go into litigation.

(3) Even though parties were not able to immediately agree, they were eager to proceed with the settlement and stated that they would take some time to consider the proposals.

46.  The 31 Oct Meeting was arranged as a continuation of the 17 Oct Meeting to discuss disputes over Father’s estate: see WhatsApp message from the plaintiff to the siblings.  At the 31 Oct Meeting: –

(1) Parties undertook discussions with a view to settling the matters between them. While there remained disagreements between the siblings, they raised and discussed possible concessions that could be made by each party with a view to reaching a compromise.

(2) Everyone (except the plaintiff) agreed in principle with the defendant’s offers.  Accordingly, the siblings proposed a deadline for all of them to consider the matter, with a view to executing a settlement agreement at a solicitors’ firm.  The plaintiff concurred and suggested finding a date and time for all the Siblings to attend the offices of a solicitors’ firm.

(3) The 31 Oct Meeting concluded by the Siblings agreeing to take time to think over the matters discussed, with Loi Tat who remarked that they are all family and should each take a step back for the betterment of the whole.

47.  Third, the plaintiff has no answer to the clear and shared purpose of the meetings to resolve the disputes as set out above: –

(1) The attempts by the plaintiff, Loi Chuen and Loi Tat to cherry pick certain extracts and suggest that the discussions were otherwise than for negotiations is futile.  It is clear from the authorities referred to at paragraphs 19, 20 and 22 above that a without prejudice meeting is bound to contain a mixture of statements of different natures, including confident assertions of a party’s case or statements which might in itself be characterised as threats.  The underlying rationale of the privilege is to give protection to the parties to speak freely, and it would be both impractical and unprincipled to dissect without prejudice communications.  The mere fact that more hostile language was used at some point in the meeting does not mean that the meeting ceases to be protected by without prejudice privilege.  The discussions as a whole will be protected, as a general freedom to negotiate is part of the same package: see Unilever Plc v Proctor & Gamble Co supra at p.2448H-2449B.

(2) Further, the nature of the meetings cannot be judged on the selective references and descriptions referred to by the plaintiff in the WP Paragraphs.  As the plaintiff himself acknowledges, he has “omitted lots of the other matters discussed during these meetings” which he deemed to be “not directly related to the issues”.  Rather, the purpose and nature of the two meetings must be assessed objectively, in light of the parties’ ongoing discussions relating to the dispute over the Sale Proceeds. 

(3) The fact that the defendant has not expressly stated that the meetings were without prejudice is immaterial in this case.  The court should look at the substance of the communications, which content clearly indicate a bona fide attempt to settle a dispute and ought to fall within scope of without prejudice privilege. 

48.  Further, the plaintiff’s repeated suggestions that he personally did not think there was room for negotiation or that he “definitely would not agree to” alternative arrangements does not go anywhere to suggest that the privilege cannot attach to the communications.

(1) The question, which is an objective one for the court to determine in view of all the relevant factual circumstances, is whether there was a bona fide attempt to negotiate.  The plaintiff’s assertion that he did not think there was room to negotiate is contradicted by both his agreement to attend the meeting and the statements he has made. 

(2) In any event, the plaintiff’s insistence on the alleged lack of an “express or implied agreement”, is fixated only on the implied agreement rationale of the privilege and wholly ignores the public policy rationale of encouraging parties to negotiate: see Muller v Lindsley and Mortimer supra at p.77B per Hoffmann LJ.  It would be contrary to public policy if parties could avoid the operation of the without prejudice rule simply by asserting the strength of their stance or otherwise suggesting that they were not amenable to persuasion or discussion, notwithstanding their participation at discussions clearly aimed at settlement. 

D4.    Events subsequent to the October meetings

49.  The events subsequent to the October meetings concern: (i) the Siblings’ discussions over WhatsApp following the October meetings; (ii) the draft agreement which the defendant sent to the Siblings containing proposals for the distribution of the Sale Proceeds (the “Draft Settlement Agreement”); (iii) the 5 Dec Meeting attended by all the Siblings (except the plaintiff) to discuss/execute the Draft Settlement Agreement.

50.  The relevant WP Paragraphs relating to the above events include:

(1) Plaintiff WS §§182-187, 189-192, Annexes 3-4;

(2) Kit Bing WS §41;

(3) Loi Tat WS §§57-59;

(4) Loi Chuen WS §§46-51.

51.  I agree the above matters are clearly protected by without prejudice privilege: –

(1) The plaintiff, on his own initiative, requested by WhatsApp message dated 30 November 2016 (the “30 Nov WhatsApp”) that the defendant provide a draft agreement for the Siblings to consider.  The plaintiff’s message referenced a document “that was to be signed” (“要簽的文件”) for the purpose of facilitating a smooth execution “that day” (“方便當天的交收手辦”).  He was clearly referring to a state of affairs which all siblings understood, namely the fruits of the negotiation of the October meetings and the Siblings’ plan (as set out in paragraph 46(2) above) to execute an agreement to resolve the dispute over the distribution of funds in the Premier and Savings Account.  The 30 Nov WhatsApp is a clear continuation of parties’ without prejudice discussions and is covered by the privilege. 

(2) In any event, in asking for the draft agreement to be circulated, the plaintiff objectively demonstrated his intention and understanding that the Siblings were aiming to reach a settlement on the distribution of funds. 

(3) Thereafter, the defendant provided the Draft Settlement Agreement containing the terms of the proposed settlement, reflecting the proposed distribution to each of the Siblings of the funds in the Premier and Savings Account.  A written settlement proposal (even if unaccepted) is by its very definition put forward to settle disputes and must be protected by without prejudice privilege. 

(4) Thereafter, the 5 Dec Meeting (attended by all the Siblings except the plaintiff) was held to discuss whether the terms of the Draft Settlement Agreement were acceptable. Discussions at this meeting were clearly a continuation of the negotiations for resolving the dispute and is clearly privileged.  The assertion by Loi Tat that he only attended the meeting on 5 December 2016 to “see what [the defendant] would do” and that he considered there to be “no room for negotiation” cannot change the privileged nature of the communications viewed objectively.   

E.     Unambiguous impropriety? – No abuse of privilege by the defendant

52.  Exclusion of without prejudice privilege, whether on the basis that it is being used as a cloak for perjury or other unambiguous impropriety, can only be applied in the clearest of cases (Re Jinro supra §18 per Kwan J (as she then was) – see paragraph 23 above).  Applying the well-settled legal principles set out in Section C2 above, I accept there is no basis whatsoever for the exclusion of privilege in the present case.

53.  The only ground upon which the plaintiff alleges that the defendant has abused his privilege is that the statements he made in the meetings and communications are in “stark contrast” with his contentions in the proceedings, such that the privilege is being used as a cloak for perjury, inconsistent statements, and/or other unambiguous impropriety.

54.  This is not a case where the plaintiff is even suggesting that there is any perjury on the part of the defendant.  Rather, the plaintiff’s complaint appears to be no more than that the defendant has taken inconsistent positions during the without prejudice discussions and in these proceedings, which is said to cast doubt on his credibility and the trial judge should be allowed to evaluate such inconsistency in adjudicating upon the claims in this Action.  I agree with the defendant’s submission that this comes nowhere close to showing that there was “unambiguous impropriety” to constitute an abuse of privilege.

55.  Arguments based on “inconsistent” positions taken by a party in without prejudice communications and in legal proceedings as a purported ground for exclusion of the rule were raised and rejected in Re Estate of Joachim Thomas supra as being contrary to Savings & Investment Bank v Finken supra at p.684C-G (§57) per Rix LJ, where it was held that it is not the mere inconsistency between an admission and a pleaded case or a stated position that loses the party the protection of privilege; it is the abuse of privilege that does so; and that “it is not an abuse to tell the truth, even where the truth is contrary to one’s case”.  Similarly, in Berry Trade Ltd v Moussavi supra at §53, Peter Gibson LJ held that this is not the sort of case where the court would be prepared to admit the evidence of without prejudice statements as falling within the exception from the without prejudice rule, and to admit such evidence flies in the face of the public justification for the rule itself. 

56.  Examples where the court has found an abuse of privilege so as to warrant exclusion of the without prejudice rule include cases where a defendant told a claimant that he would give perjured evidence or bribe other witnesses to do the same unless the claimants withdrew their claims: see Hollander: Documentary Evidence(13th edn) §20-28.   

57.  The plaintiff has not demonstrated that the defendant has engaged in any such conduct that may possibly be regarded as being an abuse of privilege, let alone a “clear” case of such abuse. 

F.     Conclusion and Disposition

58.  For the reasons stated above, I grant an order in terms of paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Summons.

59.  As to paragraph 3 of the Summons, I give the following directions: “Paragraph 3 of the Summons be adjourned to be heard before a Master on a date to be fixed in consultation with Counsel’s diaries not earlier than 28 days after the determination of paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Summons”.

60.  I further order that the costs of the Summons be paid by the plaintiff to the defendant, such costs are to be taxed if not agreed with a certificate for one counsel only.  I am of the preliminary view that the nature of the application do not necessitate the retaining of two counsel to conduct the same.

61.  The above order as to costs is nisi and shall become absolute in the absence of any application within 14 days to vary the same.

62.  Lastly, I express my gratitude to counsel on both sides for their helpful assistance in this matter.

(Wilson Chan)
Judge of the Court of First Instance
High Court

  

Ms Elaine Liu, instructed by Messrs Kevin Ng & Co, for the plaintiff

Ms Sara Tong and Ms Esther Mak, instructed by Messrs Edward Lau, Wong & Lou, for the defendant


[1] See Summons §1.

[2] See Summons §2; Items 15-20 of the plaintiff’s List of Documents filed on 27.11.2017.

[3] Plaintiff WS §167. 

[4] Loi Tat WS §38. 

[5] Loi Chuen WS §§38, 41.