FUNG TSUN TONG v. CHOU MAN LEUNG

HCLA 13/2016

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

LABOUR TRIBUNAL APPEAL NO 13 OF 2016

(ON APPEAL FROM LABOUR TRIBUNAL CLAIM NO LBTC 1800 OF 2015)

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JUDGMENT

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I. INTRODUCTION

1.  Fung Tsun Tong (“C”) was the claimant in LBTC1800/2015 and the defendant in LBTC3400/2015, and Chou Man Leung (“D2”) was the 2^nd defendant in LBTC1800/2015 and the claimant in LBTC3400/2015. LBTC1800/2015 and LBTC3400/2015 were tried and heard together at the Labour Tribunal (“Tribunal”).

2.  On 8 June 2015, C in LBTC1800/2015 claimed against A Link Network (H.K.) Limited (“D1”) and D2 for the sum of $69,083.41. On 29 June 2015, the Tribunal granted leave for C to withdraw his claim against D1. On 21 January 2016, C filed his amended claim to reduce the amount of his claim to $68,926.70 in line with his earnings records. D2 denied liability on the basis that C was not his employee. As to the issue of quantum, D2 did not dispute item (A) referred to in paragraph 5 below (“Item (A) Claim”), but put C to prove in respect of items (B)-(D) referred to in paragraph 5 below (“Items (B)-(D) Claims”).

3.  In LBTC3400/2015, D2 claimed against C for overpayment in the sum of $20,000. D2 commenced such claim in the Small Claims Tribunal as SCTC34562/2015. On 22 October 2015, the Small Claims Tribunal transferred such claim to the Tribunal, and it became LBTC3400/2015.

4.  On 21-22 and 25 January 2016, LBTC1800/2015 and LBTC3400/2015 were tried and heard by Deputy Presiding Officer Jocelyn Leung (“DPO”). C and D2 gave evidence. The DPO considered parts of their respective evidence unreasonable and unreliable, so she would not accept certain parts of their evidence, but she found on the available employment-related evidence that (a) they had an employer-employee relationship and (b) the quantum of C’s claim should be upheld. The DPO dismissed D2’s claim for overpayment.

5.  In the circumstances, the DPO granted the following Award/ Order (“DPO Order”):

“1. 裁決LBTC1800/2015案件之[C]之下列申索得直, [D2]須繳付[C]款項$68,926.70, 詳情如下表所列:

項目	金額
(A)欠薪	$18,500
(B)代通知金	$34,041.83
(C)有薪年假	$7,189.92
(D)有薪假期	$9,194.95
總數	$68,926.70

[D2]須按香港法例第57章《僱傭條例》第25A條支付[C]上述(A)項:欠薪的利息，利息須按法定利率由到期支付的日期起計算直至實際支付的日期止。[D2]另須按香港法例第25章《勞資審裁處條例》第39(3) 條的規定支付[C]上述(B)項:代通知金及(C)項:有薪年假及(D)項:有薪假期的利息，該利息則須由裁斷作出的日期起計算至實際支付的日期止。款項須即時繳付。

2. 裁決LBTC3400/2015案件之[C]之(A)項: Overpayment申索被撤銷。

3. [Tribunal] 案件LBTC1800/2015及LBTC3400/2015及小額錢債審裁處案件SCTC34562/15三案件之訟費合併裁決: [D2]須繳付$2,526.10予[C]。[D2]須按香港法例第25章《勞資審裁處條例》第39(3) 條的規定繳付[C]上述的利息，利息須由裁斷作出的日期起計算至實際支付的日期止。款項須即時繳付。”

6.  On 1 February 2016, D2 applied for review in respect of the DPO Order concerning LBTC1800/2015 but not LBTC3400/2015. On 7 April 2016, the DPO heard the review application. On 2 June 2016, the DPO dismissed D2’s review application. On 3 June 2016, the DPO granted the following Amended Award/Order (“DPO Review Order”):

“1. [D2]之覆核申請被撤銷, [DPO Order]仍然生效。

2. [D2]於05.02.2016存入[Tribunal]之款項$72,893.45[“Security”]可發放予[C] 。

3. 無訟費命令。”

7.  On 8 July 2016, the DPO handed down her written Reasons for Decision for LBTC1800/2015 and LBTC3400/2015 (“DPO Reasons”).

II.  PARTIES’ RESPECTIVE CASE

8.  Details of C’s and D2’s respective case were set out in the DPO Reasons and summarised in paragraphs 9-18 of the Leave Judgment referred to in paragraph 10 below, which I shall adopt but will not repeat here. I just set out a few salient facts to put the discussion below in context:

(a) On 14 June 2014, D2 (owner of several trucks) and C (retired policeman who previously worked as a cross-border truck driver for other companies) entered into an agreement that expressly provided inter alia:

(i) “商業型式出租車輛, 車牌號碼LB691由[C]自己經營”;

(ii) “公/強積金, 勞工保險, 稅項, 交通, 貨車安全, 貨車保養及通訊等, 由租車者[C]負責, 雙方明白責任自負”;

(iii) “註: 安全貨源雙方有權提供”;

(iv) “如果有意見不合, 租車人要即時交回貨車及各項證件, 貨車必須完整為準, 車主不負任何責任 ……”

(b) C started to work for D2 on 21 June 2014 under such agreement. The agreement was subsequently terminated by D2 on 18 March 2015 without notice or payment in lieu of notice.

(c) C’s claim in LBTC1800/2015 was for outstanding wages and other payments due to D2’s termination of the agreement without notice or payment in lieu of notice.

(d) D2’s defence to C’s claim in LBTC1800/2015 for the Items (A)‑(D) Claims was essentially (i) C was all along an independent contractor and there was no 1-month notice requirement under the agreement, and (ii) the agreement was terminated and C was summarily dismissed because (1) D2 provided C with 3 gas station discount cards (“Discount Cards”) but C did not use them as instructed, and (2) C used illegal fuel for refuelling the lorry (collectively, “Twin Issues”).

III.  DPO’s REASONS

9.  The DPO set out her detailed reasons for the DPO Order and DPO Review Order in the DPO Reasons, which I had summarised in paragraphs 19-32 and 33-42 of the Leave Judgment referred to in paragraph 10 below. I do not propose to repeat them here as it sufficed to point out the DPO found C was an employee of D2 and the length of notice to terminate the agreement between C and D2 under section 6(2)(a) of the Employment Ordinance Cap 57 (“EO”) was 1 month, so D2 (who terminated the agreement without notice or payment in lieu of notice) was liable to C for the Items (A)-(D) Claims.

IV.  APPEAL: BACKGROUND

10.  On 14 June 2016, D2 applied for leave to appeal against the DPO Order and DPO Review Order on point of law on various grounds. Such application was heard by this court on 21 July 2016. I handed down judgment on 9 February 2017 (“Leave Judgment”), and granted the following order (“Leave Order”):

“1. 許可[D2]按以下的上訴理由就關於LBTC1800/2015及LBTC3400/ 2015兩案, [DPO]於2016年1月25日所頒下[DPO Order]及於2016年6月2日撤銷[D2]之覆核申請[DPO Review Order]提出上訴:

(1) [DPO]在考慮一些與案有關及關鍵性(relevant and material)事宜的處理方式是不接納提呈的證據, 未有就該些事宜可能構成案中的客觀事實或證據執行其調查責任;

(2) 就[D2]有否提供[Discount Cards]給[C]及[C]有否使用非法燃油的裁斷, [DPO]未有就以下事宜執行其調查責任, 以協助她在相對可能性下作出有關[D2]有否提供[Discount Cards]給[C]的裁斷:

(i) 每車程的一般油費;

(ii) [Discount Cards]持有人可得的燃油優惠;

(iii) 每車程的隧道/道路收費;

(iv) 每車程的其他使費或道路收費; 及

(v) [DPO]未有考慮應否從她已掌握的證據決定及如何進行調查, 及/或在調查上述(2)(i)-(iv)項所提及的事宜後, 才考慮全盤證據而對事實及[C]有否員工財政風險加以推斷;

明顯地構成不公平, 而申索也無法得到公平及正確的裁決, 屬法律觀點上犯錯; 及

2. 頒下暫准訟費命令, [D2]的上訴許可申請的一半訟費歸於上訴訟案中。”

11.  In the Leave Judgment, I rejected various intended grounds of appeal put forward by D2 save and except for one ground which I discussed in paragraphs 71-73 therein as follows:

“71. 第六, 周大律師指稱, 梁審裁官認為馮及周二人的證供也有些不合理和不可信的地方, 但她就一些與案有關及關鍵性(relevant and material)事宜的處理方式是不接納提呈的證據而沒有嘗試進行查詢。周大律師指稱, 甚至馮及周之間有僱傭關係, 梁審裁官應積極查訊周作為僱主是否有權可無須給予通知或代通知金而終止與馮的僱傭合約。[1]周指稱馮從來沒有使用他提供的油卡折扣優惠, 所以他認為馮必然把非法燃油注入他的車輛, 因為馮作供指稱周從來沒有提供油卡給他使用,而他的工資為港幣2,400.00元至2,500.00元(單程)或港幣3,400.00元至3,500.00元(雙程), 該款項已包括油費及道路/隧道費。周大律師指稱, 就這方面只有3個可能性: (1)周提供了油卡而馮亦使用油卡享有折扣優惠、(2)周提供了油卡但馮沒有使用油卡, 或(3)周沒有提供或馮不知悉周已提供了油卡。周大律師認為可排除第(1)點, 因為這並非馮的案情。至於第(2)及第(3)點, 雖然周忘記了他向馮提供油卡的日期, 但梁審裁官應該查詢以下事宜以協助她在相對可能性下作出有關周有否提供油卡給馮的裁斷: (i)每車程的一般油費, (ii)油卡持有人可得的燃油優惠, (iii)每車程的隧道/道路收費, 及(iv)每車程的其他使費或道路收費。周大律師認為上述乃關鍵事宜, 因為馮作為貨車司機的成本及費用(costs and expenses)如果超逾其每程車資便不合常理及邏輯。周大律師指稱, 在沒有上述查訊的情況下, 當梁審裁官考慮周可否即時終止與馮的合約定然沒有考慮有關因素, 而梁審裁官收到周的覆核書面陳詞也沒有在覆核期間調查上述事宜。

72. 周大律師指稱, 周曾向審裁處提供他的其他貨車燃油費收據以顯示每車程在折扣優惠下的燃油費, 但梁審裁官沒有考慮該等文件, 亦沒有將該等文件列為周的證物。再者, 周大律師指稱, 梁審裁官沒有在其口頭判詞及該理由書顯示她曾想及這一點, 繼而考慮馮會否為了大化其車資而要求/使用有折扣優惠的油卡(尤其是他曾以貨車司機身份替其他運輸公司工作而很有機會知悉油卡優惠的存在)或馮因非法燃油較折扣優惠下的燃油更便宜而沒有使用油卡並將非法燃油注入車輛。周大律師認為, 梁審裁官只指出周未能提供證人及/或文件證據證明其指稱,而就上述關鍵性事宜亦未有履行其查訊責任。周大律師亦認為, 基於梁審裁官未有履行上述查訊責任, 她不可能得出結論, 馮沒有員工財政風險。

73. 本席細心考慮周大律師的陳述, 認為這方面可能具有爭辯的理據。至於馮可能把非法燃油注入車輛的說法, 這是周的主張, 所以周就此負上舉證責任。雖然周沒有提供目擊證人的證供, 而梁審裁官認為周這方面的證供含糊籠統, 但正如周大律師所述, 上述第71(i)-(iv)點所提及的事宜可能構成案中的客觀事實或證據以促使梁審裁官執行其調查責任, 而梁審裁官應否從她已掌握的證據決定及如何進行調查, 及/或應否在調查後才考慮全盤證據而對事實加以推斷(以決定周指稱已將油卡交給馮使用及/或馮有否使用非法燃油是否屬實), 本席認為這是可爭辯的上訴理由。”

12.  On 10 March 2017, D2 filed Notice of Originating Motion to appeal against the DPO Order and DPO Review Order on the ground of appeal that the DPO erred in law by failing to discharge her statutory duty to investigate, and such lack of investigation gave rise to injustice in that a fair and proper determination of the claim could not be attained:

(a) in considering matters which might be relevant and material, the DPO disregarded evidence which should have been admissible such that she failed to discharge her statutory duty to investigate by making proper enquiry/finding as to whether such matters or evidence might constitute an objective finding of fact;

(b) in determining whether D2 did provide the Discount Cards to C and whether C used illegal fuel, the DPO failed to discharge her statutory duty to investigate by making proper inquiry/finding in respect of the following matters to assist her in determining on the balance of probabilities whether D2 did provide the Discount Cards to C:

(i) fuel costs per trip;

(ii) discount available to the Discount Card holder;

(iii) tunnels and road tolls per trip;

(iv) other costs and expenses per trip; and

(c) in discharging her statutory duty to investigate, the DPO failed to consider whether/how she should discharge such duty, and/or whether she should consider the whole of the evidence, the facts of the case and C’s financial risk upon her investigation of items (b)(i)-(iv) above.

13.  By the Notice of Originating Motion, D2 sought the following reliefs:

(a) C’s claim in LBTC1800/2015 and D2’s claim in LBTC3400/ 2015 be remitted to the Tribunal for a new hearing before another presiding officer;

(b) all Security previously paid into court by D2 be reinstated;

(c) costs of the trial and review before the DPO be remitted to the re-trial presiding officer for determination;

(d) C to pay costs of the leave application and of the appeal to D2;

(e) alternatively, costs of the leave application and of the appeal be remitted to the re-trial presiding officer for determination.

14.  On 19 May 2017, D2 filed his Supplemental Notice of Originating Motion, setting out the following additional grounds of appeal:

(a) the DPO erred in law by failing to discharge her statutory duty to investigate when during the trial D2 tendered to the Tribunal gas station receipts collected from his other truck drivers (“D2 Receipts”), but the DPO did not give such material evidence any consideration at all during the trial on 21-22 January 2016 (“Trial”):[2]

(b) the DPO should have given due consideration to the D2 Receipts before concluding (i) whether C was an employee or independent contractor and (ii) whether summary dismissal of C was justified in the circumstances;

(c) further, the DPO should have made proper inquiry into the following matters per trip after having considered the information available in the D2 Receipts, ie (i) fuel costs, (ii) discount available to the Discount Card holder, (iii) tunnels and road tolls, (iv) parking fees, (v) maintenance/repair costs, (vi) food/beverage expenses, and (vii) other costs and expenses (collectively, “Costs/Expenses”);

(d) in the circumstances, the DPO’s lack of investigation gave rise to material injustice such that a fair and proper determination of the claim could not be attained.

15.  In essence, D2 contended the DPO should have made proper enquiry into the Costs/Expenses before determining the Twin Issues.[3] Insofar as the grounds of appeal raised any financial consideration/risk for C, it went to the Twin Issues and not to the issue of whether or not there was an employer‑employee relationship as between C and D2 (“Employment Issue”) for leave had not been granted for D2 to appeal against the finding/conclusion that such employment relationship did exist (“Employment Finding”).

16.  D2’s appeal against the DPO Order and DPO Review Order (“Appeal”) came before me for hearing on 14 June 2017 (“Hearing”). Counsel for D2 and C were respectively Mr Chow and Ms Law.

V.  APPEAL: MISCELLANEOUS MATTERS

17.  Three matters were of note in relation to the Appeal. First, as explained in paragraph 15 above, this court by the Leave Judgment had not granted leave for D2 to appeal on the ground set out in paragraph 14(b)(i) above and/or against the Employment Finding. The then intended ground for which I granted leave to appeal was premised on Mr Chow’s then submission that “……, 甚至[C]及[D2]之間有僱傭關係[DPO]應積極查訊[D2]作為僱主是否有權可無須給予通知或代通知金而終止與[C]的僱傭合約 ……” (see paragraph 71 of the Leave Judgment and paragraph 11 above). In other words, in relation to paragraph 14(b) above, this court only granted leave to appeal on the ground in sub-paragraph (ii), ie the DPO should have given due consideration to the D2 Receipts before concluding whether summary dismissal of C was justified in the circumstances. As D2 could not appeal against the Employment Finding, the question/indicia of control and financial risk for the purpose of determining the Employment Issue (as explained in Poon Chau Nam v Yim Siu Cheung)[4] was irrelevant to the Appeal. For the purpose of the Appeal, the relevance of C’s financial risk was limited to what had been explained in paragraph 15 above.

18.  Perhaps in response to the mistaken ground of appeal in paragraph 14(b)(i) above, Ms Law in her written submissions made much play of the contention that C’s financial risk was never a live issue at the Trial for there was little dispute over most of the 11 or 14 factors/indicia (including the factor whether C had to bear financial risk) the DPO had considered in determining the Employment Issue. Ms Law submitted that C’s/D2’s statement and oral evidence suggested C did not have to bear financial risk (as noted in the DPO’s oral decisions and DPO Reasons), so it was unnecessary for the DPO to make extensive and detailed inquiry in respect of such question. It was said the main dispute on the Employment Issue was the question of control which, Ms Law submitted, the DPO did carefully canvass. Ms Law argued that to allow C to raise the question of financial risk on appeal would be tantamount to re‑opening an issue that had not been in dispute, which must be a matter of abuse of process and should not be allowed.

19.  In my view, such submissions reflected misunderstanding of the nature/scope of the Appeal. Since no leave was granted for appeal against the Employment Finding, the question of control and/or financial risk as factors/ indicia for determining the Employment Issue were irrelevant to the Appeal. The matter of C’s financial risk only pertained to the Twin Issues (see paragraph 15 above) which in turn would inform the debate on whether D2’s summary dismissal of C was justified. Indeed, at the Hearing, Ms Law no longer relied on paragraphs 8-11 of her written submissions on the subject. Hence, whether or not the DPO made careful/detailed enquiry on the question of control for the purpose of the Employment Issue was neither here nor there.

20.  Secondly, I did not grant leave for D2 to appeal against the DPO Order and DPO Review Order in respect of his claim for overpayment in LBTC3400/2015 (see paragraph 74-75 of the Leave Judgment). Indeed, such ground of appeal did not appear in the Notice of Originating Motion and Supplemental Notice of Originating Motion. So there was no basis for D2 to seek the relief in paragraph 13(a) above to have his claim in LBTC3400/2015 remitted to the Tribunal for a new hearing before another presiding officer.

21.  Thirdly, D2 asked for C’s claim in LBTC1800/2015 to be remitted to the Tribunal for a new hearing before another presiding officer should he succeed on the Appeal. In light of the true nature/scope of the Appeal which would not include any challenge against the Employment Finding, the relevant evidential foundation and factual findings by the DPO in this respect had not been disturbed, and likewise the awards in the DPO Order under the Items (A), (C) and (D) Claims as upheld by the DPO Review Order could not disturbed (see paragraphs 3 and 77 of the DPO Reasons). The outstanding matter on appeal was whether, notwithstanding the Employment Finding, D2 was entitled to summarily dismiss C without notice or payment in lieu of notice, and consequently whether C was entitled to the award for the Item (B) Claim in the DPO Order.

22.  In such circumstances, even if the Appeal were allowed by setting aside the DPO Order and DPO Review Order in respect of the award for the Item (B) Claim (ie payment in lieu of notice) in the sum of $34,041.83, and the Item (B) Claim were to be remitted to the Tribunal for re-trial, such re-trial on this limited issue must be made in the context or against the backdrop of the evidential foundations/findings in relation to the Employment Issue (including the Employment Finding). In such circumstances, it would be eminently suitable, or even necessary, for the Item (B) Claim (if the Appeal were allowed) to be remitted to the same DPO rather than to any other presiding officer for re-trial.

23.  Mr Chow submitted it would be better to let a new presiding officer re-consider the matter since witnesses’ credibility might be in issue. But D2’s wish for “fresh eyes” to look into the matter could not overcome the considerations in the above paragraph. In any event, if the Appeal were allowed, the DPO would have the benefit of the discussion in the Leave Judgment and this Judgment, and this court could, if it saw fit, give further guidance to the re-trial Tribunal. Section 35(1)(c) of the Labour Tribunal Ordinance Cap 25 (“LTO”) provides that “[on] an appeal for which it has granted leave under section 32, the Court of First Instance may - …… (c) remit the matter to the tribunal with such directions as it thinks fit, which may include a direction to the tribunal for a new hearing” (my emphasis).

VI.  LEGAL PRINCIPLES

24.  There is no dispute about the relevant legal principles. I shall rely on and adopt (but without repeating here) the principles set out in paragraphs 43-53 of the Leave Judgment. Ms Law further referred to James Manuel Ho & anor v Grand Pacific Vacation (Hong Kong) Limited,[5] which concerned an appeal against a decision of the Small Claims Tribunal. I have carefully considered such authority, but it appeared to reinforce and did not detract from the principles set out in the Leave Judgment.

VII.  DISCUSSION

25.  Mr Chow submitted the DPO erred in principle by adopting an adversarial approach to the Twin Issues, and found against D2 by simply disregarding his contentions which she viewed as being too vague (see paragraph 57 of the DPO Reasons) or by holding the burden of proof was not met since D2 failed to provide factual witnesses and/or documentary evidence on the subject (see paragraph 74 of the DPO Reasons).

26.  Mr Chow agreed the available evidence showed D2 could not remember or was vague as to when the Discount Cards were provided to C and how he instructed C to use such cards, but D2 was adamant he did provide C with 3 Discount Cards, and he argued there was objective circumstantial evidence before the DPO which were deserving of investigation by the DPO in exercise of her statutory duty and which in turn would enable inference to be drawn as to whether D2 did or did not provide the Discount Cards to C. Mr Chow argued the DPO should have assumed an active inquisitional role to make proper inquiry into relevant and material matters being the Costs/Expenses in paragraph 14(c) above.

27.  Mr Chow reminded it was common ground that C had to defray the Costs/Expenses out of what D2 paid him for each journey/trip. C claimed D2 paid him $2,400-$2,500 for single journey and $3,400-$3,500 for round trip (see paragraph 6 of the DPO Reasons). Mr Chow argued it would fly against commercial logic or common sense for C to work as truck driver for D2 if his Costs/Expenses substantially reduced his earnings per trip or even exceeded his earnings per trip such that he would not be able to achieve (a) reasonable living on his net earnings or (b) (as C alleged) monthly earnings of $34,041.83.[6] It was said proper inquiry/investigation of the Costs/Expenses (including fuel cost per trip with or without the benefit of discount under the Discount Cards) would reveal whether C’s net earnings per trip after deduction of the Costs/Expenses met the standard in (a) or (b) above. Mr Chow submitted this would amount to clear objective evidence that could inform the dispute of whether or not the Discount Cards had been provided, and in this respect fuel cost with or without discount might make a material difference.

28.  Mr Chow submitted the above was especially important when neither party adduced objective evidence on the issue:

(a) Although C denied D2 provided the Discount Cards to him, he did not provide any receipt from the gas stations he allegedly patronised (which he claimed were not the 3 gas stations that allegedly issued the 3 Discount Cards), and there was no evidence as to how much and how (eg by cash, credit card, etc) he paid the fuel cost. Indeed, C said he did not use any Discount Card, and D2 claimed “…… 周曾經問過兩間他持有油卡的油商, 即加德士及中石化, 但他沒有經過美孚, 得到的答案是馮並沒有在這兩間油商入油”.

(b) D2 could not say precisely when the Discount Cards were given to C or how he instructed C to use the Discount Cards (and he also did not adduce any eyewitness evidence or criminal record in relation to use of illegal fuel).

29.  Mr Chow submitted in view of the debate (known to the DPO) as to whether or not D2 provided the Discount Cards to C, without proper inquiry/investigation into the matters in paragraphs 26-27 above in the context explained in paragraph 28 above, the DPO had no basis to conclude in the DPO Reasons that (a) such debate was irrelevant and/or (b) D2 was not entitled to terminate the agreement and/or summarily dismiss C without notice or payment in lieu of notice. Mr Chow argued that proper inquiry/investigation of such matters would enlighten whether C could have made a reasonable living and/or earned $34,041.83/month if he had to pay the Costs/ Expenses on the basis of regular-priced fuel cost without any discount, and if the objective inference was that C could not have done so without using the Discount Cards to buy discounted fuel, it would inform the debate as to whether he used cheap illegal fuel in order to adjust down the Costs/Expenses to achieve reasonable living and/or claimed monthly earnings of $34,041.83. On such basis and quite irrespective of the employment relationship between C and D2, Mr Chow contended proper inquiry/investigation would have revealed quite objectively whether D2’s stance on the Twin Issues could be supported, which in turn would show whether summary dismissal of C was justified. It was said use of illegal fuel would have been an obvious reason for summary dismissal, but failure to use the Discount Cards provided to C for refuelling at specified gas stations also could not have been ignored as it must have been commercially obvious that these gas stations favoured D2 with discount on fuel cost due to the volume of business that came their way from D2’s fleet of lorries, and C’s failure to patronise these gas stations for refuelling would have jeopardised D2’s entitlement to substantial discount for the benefit of his other truck drivers.

30.  Mr Chow further submitted the DPO erred in law by failing to discharge her statutory duty to investigate during the Trial when she did not receive/consider material evidence tendered by D2 (ie the D2 Receipts[7] that D2 collected from his other truck drivers) as shown by D2’s evidence in the trial transcript of 21 January 2016:[8]

“問： 好嘞，咁你話佢係冇入到嗰啲油站油，入咗街邊油，咁樣你點知呀？

答： 要有飛㗎嘛，個個有飛吖嘛，嗰啲飛…

問： 唔係呀，你點知道佢入街邊油呀？

答： 架車呢，好大架，你有兩條街喥呢，你都望到架車，行到邊，係人都睇到㗎嘞。呢啲就係我伙記嘅油飛，入完油佢有張收條㗎嘛，咁佢冇可能去第二度入，點解呢，第二度冇個優惠，我每1升油就回5鈫，佢好叻㗎。

問： 我係問你呀，…

答： 佢好叻嘅。

問： 你聽住喇，你聽住個問題喇，人哋問你問題，你聽住人哋問你乜嘢，你答嗰樣嘢。

答： 唔。

問： 而家係問你呀，你話見- -話即係馮生入街道油，咁樣呢，你點知道佢係入街邊油呀，有冇人見到呀？

答: 我打電話呢間問過, 個車牌佢有電腦㗎嘛, 你幾時入嘅, 佢隻手指一㧻落去就知嘞, 呢架車有無入過佢㗎, 佢話無, 今時今日電腦呢, 就油站都有嘅, 幾個月內呢, 你講個車牌123, 咁佢話123無嚟入過油呀, 可以咁講, 你同佢熟呢, 佢肯同你¸ 話冇呀, 長期冇呀。” (my emphasis)

31.  Mr Chow argued that had the DPO considered the D2 Receipts (as she should have done) she would have been made aware that the discount offered by the Discount Cards was substantial. Mr Chow submitted that if the other truck drivers working for D2 also had gas station discount cards, it raised questions as to (a) whether C (who had admittedly worked as a truck driver for other companies in the past) should have heard of gas station discount cards, and (b) why C was not provided with the Discount Cards as he alleged. If C had heard of gas station discount cards and/or knew fellow truck drivers had gas station discount cards, it made little sense for D2 not to provide such Discount Cards to C or for C not to ask for them even if (as C alleged) D2 had not provided them. After all, C’s earnings per trip would have been swelled by the discount on fuel costs. Mr Chow submitted in such context the DPO should have investigated/clarified whether C’s alleged disassociation with and non-use of any Discount Card was due to the fact (i) C was not provided with any Discount Card as he alleged or (ii) despite instructions to use the Discount Card(s) as provided C did not do so but adopted other means to adjust down the Costs/Expenses such as by using illegal fuel as D2 alleged, which matters would be material for determining whether D2 was entitled to dismiss C without notice or payment in lieu of notice under section 9 of the EO. Mr Chow therefore submitted that even though “…… [D2]指[C]把非法燃油注入他的車輛, 但並無刑事紀錄支持有關說法, [D2]也沒有提供證人指曾目擊[C]這樣做 ……” (see paragraph 74 of the DPO Reasons), the lack of direct eyewitness evidence and/or criminal records would not have been a complete answer as there was available objective circumstantial evidence before the DPO to cause her to inquire/investigate whether C was given the Discount Cards that he failed to use, which if so found would lend weight to D2’s contention that C had used illegal fuel.

32.  On such basis, Mr Chow argued the DPO’s failure to (a) take relevant/material matters into account and (b) discharge her statutory duty to investigate gave rise to injustice such that fair/proper determination of the claim could not be attained. Further or alternatively, it was said the DPO erred in principle by failing to give adequate reasons or at all in her oral decisions and DPO Reasons to demonstrate she had considered these relevant/material matters.

33.  On the other hand, Ms Law made 3 points in opposition:

(a) the 7 items of Costs/Expenses were not relevant/material to C’s claim;

(b) the DPO did discharge her statutory duty to investigate;

(c) any lack of investigation by the DPO (which was denied) did not give rise to any injustice.

34.  In relation to the 1^st point in paragraph 33(a) above, Ms Law suggested the 7 items of Costs/Expenses were not relevant/material to C’s claim because the DPO, after having considered the evidence, concluded D2 failed to prove he provided the 3 Discount Cards to C or he required C to patronise 3 particular gas stations,[9] hence it was irrelevant/unnecessary for the DPO to make further inquiries as to whether such Discount Cards actually provided the cheapest fuel. Ms Law submitted that even if they did it, it would not have led to the conclusion that D2 had given such Discount Cards to C. Ms Law argued it was not that the DPO disbelieved the Discount Cards did provide the cheapest fuel; rather it was not an issue which the DPO had to determine.

35.  Ms Law further submitted the Costs/Expenses were also not relevant to whether C used illegal fuel because the DPO found D2 failed to prove he made specific refuelling requirement or C used illegal fuel on the basis there was no criminal record or eyewitness evidence that supported D2’s allegation (as evident from the DPO’s oral decisions and DPO Reasons). Ms Law submitted D2’s allegation that C used illegal fuel was based primarily on his case that he had provided the 3 Discount Cards to C, but D2 failed to prove such allegation.

36.  Ms Law went on to say there was nothing in D2’s criticism that the DPO failed to take into account the D2 Receipts (all subsequent to D2’s termination of C’s employment on 18 March 2015), which receipts at most showed the Discount Cards would provide cheaper fuel, but which were irrelevant to the Twin Issues that the DPO, who had given clear reasons for her findings (see paragraphs 34-35 above), had to determine.

37.  Ms Law further suggested the question of financial risk was in any event not a live issue at the Trial, so it would be unfair for D2 to attempt to re-open the issue in the Appeal. Ms Law submitted it was also never D2’s case at the Trial, whether in his statement or oral evidence, that (contrary to his primary case that there was no employment relationship between him and C) he was entitled to summarily dismiss C without notice or payment in lieu of notice because C used illegal fuel, and D2 only raised this as an alternative case for the first time in his written submissions for the review. Anyway, the DPO had given clear reasons for her finding that D2 failed to prove C used illegal fuel.

38.  By reason of the above matters, Ms Law submitted the 7 items of Costs/Expenses were neither relevant nor material such that the DPO was required to exercise her duty to investigate.

39.  I am not persuaded by Ms Law’s arguments. Whilst I have no quarrel that the DPO came to her conclusions for the reasons set out in paragraphs 34-35 above, the whole thrust of D2’s contention was that the DPO should have made inquiry/investigation into the Costs/Expenses before coming into her conclusions. This left Ms Law’s argument that these matters were not relevant. Such suggestion appeared to rest on (a) the contention that D2 failed to prove he provided the Discount Cards to C and (b) the belief that D2’s case on the 3 Discount Cards was merely to show whether they provided the cheapest fuel. In my view, such submissions reflected a misunderstanding of D2’s contentions. It appeared Ms Law’s understanding of D2’s argument was that if it was shown D2 gave the Discount Cards to C and the Discount Cards provided the cheapest fuel, then C must have used illegal fuel otherwise the Costs/Expenses per trip might have exceeded his earnings. But in fact D2’s complaint about the DPO’s failure to look into the Costs/ Expenses was to undermine the DPO’s conclusion that D2 failed to prove the Discount Cards were provided to C, and it was not D2’s case about the Discount Cards that they would provide the cheapest fuel.

40.  The DPO did not have to decide whether the Discount Cards provided the cheapest fuel, but in a situation where D2 and C took contradictory positions on the Twin Issues (which Ms Law accepted were relevant issues, and which in my view if properly investigated might show whether summary dismissal was justified) and without direct supporting/ countervailing evidence for their respective assertions, the Costs/Expenses might serve to provide objective circumstantial evidence which if taken into account might aid determination of the Twin Issues. It would not reflect commercial logic or common sense for an employee to work for net earnings that could not support a reasonable living or net earnings that he claimed he made, and inquiry into the Costs/Expenses per trip (with and without discount for fuel cost) as compared with the known gross payments by D2 to C per trip might be telling.

41.  Indeed, this could be illustrated by Ms Law’s own written submissions. Ms Law submitted the D2 Receipts showed that before discount the most expensive fuel was $2,263 per trip. This certainly did not exceed C’s earnings per trip at $2,400-$2,500 for single journey and $3,400-$3,500 per round trip. But for this example, even putting aside (apart from the fuel cost) other items of the Costs/Expenses, C would have been earning $137-$237 for single journey and $1,137-$1,237 for round trip if there was no discount for fuel cost. There was no evidence as to C’s number of single journeys and/or round trips per month, but it would be fair to consider there would be a mix of both types of journeys/trips. There was also no evidence as to how many days C worked in a month. On the basis of C’s net earnings after deducting fuel cost (without discount) and other Costs/Expenses (eg tunnel/road tolls, parking fees etc) on mixed single journeys and round trips even for all days in a month, it was still not easy to see how C could have made total net earnings of $34,041.83 per month. If proper inquiry had been made as to the Costs/ Expenses, it might have revealed whether the fuel discount would have been essential for making such net earnings per month, and since C denied he was provided any Discount Card and he did not refuel at the 3 particular gas stations that allegedly issued the Discount Cards, then depending on the result of the inquiry/investigation, it might have lent inferential weight to D2’s suggestion that C used alternative cheap fuel (ie illegal fuel) to sustain his net monthly earnings as found by the DPO.

42.  As regards Ms Law’s complaint that the matter of summary dismissal was not a live issue at the Trial but was raised by D2 as an alternative case for the review, it was evident from the DPO’s oral decisions and the DPO Reasons that the Twin Issues, which Ms Law accepted were relevant questions to be determined by the DPO, were already before the DPO at the Trial. Bearing in mind that under section 20(3) of the LTO the DPO was under a duty to “investigate any matter which [she] may consider relevant to the claim, whether or not it has been raised by a party” (my emphasis), it would have been incumbent upon the DPO upon making the Employment Finding to go on and consider whether D2’s summary termination of the agreement was justified, especially when the issues of compliance with D2’s instructions and/or use of illegal fuel had been raised.

43.  In all the circumstances, I am unable to accept the 7 items of Costs/Expenses were irrelevant/immaterial as Ms Law suggested.

44.  In relation to the 2^nd point in paragraph 33(b) above, Ms Law submitted that in any event the DPO did discharge her statutory duty to investigate when she determined the Twin Issues. She suggested that since C denied such allegations in his statement/oral evidence, it was for D2 to substantiate his contention. Ms Law submitted the DPO made extensive inquiry with D2 as to whether he provided the Discount Cards to C or told C to go to particular gas stations,[10] and the Trial transcript showed the DPO continued to follow up several times when D2 did not immediately answer whether he told C to use the 3 particular gas stations. After D2 answered in the affirmative, the DPO followed up by asking when he gave the Discount Cards to C and told C to go to 3 particular gas stations.[11] At first D2 could not say when, but after the DPO asked the question several times D2 vaguely answered he told C during the first 1-2 months of work but later said there was no need to teach C who was an experienced driver. The DPO then inquired as to how D2 told P,[12] and D2 said he told C to go to the 3 particular gas stations and the 3 Discount Cards were placed at the front of C’s truck where C could see. But when the DPO pressed again, D2 later stated  he could not remember how he had told C as it was a long time ago.[13] Ms Law submitted D2’s evidence in this regard was inconsistent and self‑contradictory.

45.  Ms Law further submitted the DPO also made extensive inquiry with D2 before determining whether C used illegal fuel.[14] Ms Law noted the DPO asked D2 several times how he knew C used illegal fuel, including whether anyone had seen C using the same, and D2 answered he had checked with the gas stations by telephone. The DPO pressed further by asking which gas stations D2 checked, and again asked whether anyone had seen C using illegal fuel.

46.  By making the above inquiry, Ms Law submitted the DPO had already discharged her statutory duty to investigate when determining the Twin Issues. Ms Law argued there was no duty on the part of the DPO to summons witnesses to fill the gaps in D2’s evidence, and any further inquiry might amount to the DPO taking over the role of an advocate for C in cross‑examining D2. Ms Law submitted that since the DPO’s oral decisions and DPO Reasons showed she had thoroughly considered the Twin Issues and gave clear reasons for her findings which were based upon assessment of witness’ credibility and weight of the evidence, this court should not intervene in such matters which were essentially for the DPO.

47.  Again, I am unable to agree with Ms Law’s submissions. Whilst I have no doubt the DPO had made some inquiry/investigation with the witnesses, ie C and D2, it was equally clear from the DPO’s oral decisions and DPO Reasons there was no investigation into the objective evidence as to C’s gross earnings and Costs/Expenses to test the vitality of C’s allegations as to his net monthly earnings, which would have provided an objective foil to evaluate the respective evidential allegations by C and D2 on the Twin Issues. In carrying out such investigation, there was no call for the DPO to subpoena witnesses to help D2 fill in any evidential gaps or to cross-examine D2 as an advocate for C. Rather, the exercise was to look for an objective basis to evaluate and assess the opposite assertions by C and D2 on the Twin Issues. I accept the allegation that C used illegal fuel was a serious one. Ms Law submitted it behoved D2 to adduce cogent/compelling evidence, but in my view, how to assess the evidence and what weight should be placed on the evidence must come after proper inquiry and investigation of relevant facts and matters. I find the objective factors/considerations advocated by Mr Chow begged for consideration, and they should have been attended to by the DPO.

48.  In all the circumstances, I am not persuaded the DPO had sufficiently discharged her duty to investigate. Since it was C’s own contention that D2 did not provide him with any Discount Card, if the DPO, after having considered the Costs/Expenses per journey/trip came to the conclusion it was not probable that C did not have access to cheaper fuel, there might have been objective basis to reasonably infer C had alternative cheap source of fuel (since he claimed not to have and/or not to have used the Discount Cards) which would have led to further inquiry and investigation as to whether illegal fuel might have been used.

49.  In relation to the 3^rd point in paragraph 33(c) above, Ms Law suggested any lack of investigation by the DPO did not give rise to injustice. However, in making such argument, Ms Law harked back to the Poon Chau Nam indicia for the Employment Issue, and suggested the DPO adopted the correct approach by examining all features of the relationship between C and D2 with focus on the main dispute over the question of control. Ms Law submitted that even if the Costs/Expenses were relevant to the disputed issues and the DPO made an error by failing to investigate into them, such failure would have little or no significant bearing on the Employment Finding, or to put it in another way, any finding that D2 did provide the Discount Cards to C would only have strengthened the DPO’s view that D2 had certain control over C who did not have to bear any financial risk (if this was a pertinent matter at all) which would have supported the Employment Finding. On such basis, Ms Law submitted that even if the DPO failed to discharge her statutory duty to investigate, such failure did not give rise to injustice and D2 would not benefit from a re-trial.

50.  But in fact there was no appeal against the Employment Finding. Rather the whole issue for the Appeal was whether D2 could summarily dismiss C without notice or payment in lieu of notice. On this simple basis, the contentions in the above paragraph premised on proper consideration of the indicia for the Employment Issue upon the approach advocated in Poon Chau Nam fell away.

VIII. CONCLUSION

51.  In all the circumstances, the DPO Order in respect of award for (a) the Item (B) Claim for payment in lieu of notice in the sum of $34,041.83 with interest thereon and (b) costs of LBTC 1800/2015 in relation to the claim/ award in (a) above be set aside. Likewise, the DPO Review Order that upheld the DPO Order in these respects is also set aside. The Item (B) Claim is remitted to the Tribunal before the same DPO for re-trial with further inquiry and investigation as aforesaid.

52.  D2 asked for all Security he previously paid into court by D2 in the sum of $72,893.45 (paid out to C pursuant to the DPO Review Order) be reinstated. But other than the sum of $34,041.83 awarded under the Item (B) Claim, Mr Chow did not identify for this court the amount of interest and/or amount of costs attributable to this head of claim out of the Security sum of $72,893.45 paid by D2. In the circumstances, I order that $34,041.83 out of the Security that was paid by D2 and paid out to C pursuant to the DPO Review Order be reinstated, and C do pay the same into the Tribunal within 21 days. I leave it to the DPO to decide whether to reinstate any further Security that would reflect interest and/or costs in respect of the Item (B) Claim.

53.  I further order that costs of the trial and review before the DPO in respect of the Item (B) Claim for payment in lieu of notice be remitted to the re-trial DPO for determination.

54.  As for costs of the Appeal, there is no reason why costs should not follow event. Ms Law suggested there should be no order as to costs by referring to Ali Shoukat v Hang Seng Bank Limited.[15] In that case, DHCJ To said as follows:

“21. Though costs is a matter of discretion for the court, appeals from decisions of the [Tribunal] involving an unrepresented party often raise difficult questions of costs. The Appellant is wholly successful and was utterly without fault. On the other hand, but for the Presiding Officer falling into error, the Claimant would have his claim dismissed without costs. Cases of this kind often attract great sympathy from the courts. An employee who files an employment claim, succeeds before the [Tribunal] or the Minor Employment Claims Adjudication Board (the “MECAB”), but loses on appeal will end up with the consequence of a costs order in the appeal which is far in excess of his claim. The same could happen to an employer of a very small business who losses an appeal by a legally aided employee. Their only hope under such circumstances is that the appellate court will tamper justice with mercy.

22. I think appeals from the [Tribunal] and the MECAB stands out from other civil litigation as a special class of their own. The purpose of the [Tribunal] and the MECAB is to provide a speedy, efficient and cheap means of adjudication of employment claims. Usually, the disputes are resolved with no order as to costs. If costs are awarded, they are not substantial as the parties are not legally represented. Litigants have a reasonable expectation that their disputes will be resolved on a low-costs basis both at first instance and on appeal. In my view, this benefit of low-cost employment dispute adjudication should be extended to appellate proceedings if in all the circumstances it is just to do so. However, it is impossible to set out the circumstances when it would be just to exercise the discretion of making no order as to costs as each case depends on facts of its own. I think the following considerations should usually be taken into account in the exercise of this discretion. The primary consideration is whether the unsuccessful party has been guilty of unmeritorious conduct in the litigation both at first instance and on appeal.Of secondary importance are whether the unsuccessful party is legally represented in the appeal, whether he is the appellant or the respondent and balance of hardship the order of costs may have to the parties.

23. If the unsuccessful party to an appeal has not put forward a claim or a defence in bad faith and has not misbehaved himself in the conduct of the litigation, the appellate court should be slow in ordering costs of the appeal against him. Bad faith in this context means putting forward a false, frivolous or vexatious claim or defence and giving false evidence which is disbelieved. On the other hand, if he misled the Presiding Officer and obtained a judgment in his favour which led to the appeal, there is no reason why he should not bear the consequence of costs, even if such costs far exceeds his claim or the value of the claim against him. He only has himself to blame for his misfortune. Generally, the discretion to make no order as to costs should lie in favour of the unsuccessful party who cannot afford legal representation. This is because if a party is legally represented on appeal, he knows of the consequence of costs and he no longer litigates with the expectation of low-costs adjudication. Likewise, the discretion should also be exercised in favour of the unrepresented respondent as he is a passive party to an appeal, provided that he has not been guilty of any unmeritorious conduct in the litigation.” (emphasis added)

55.  Here, C had the benefit of legal representation for the Appeal. Further, he was not a passive party in the Appeal. He had chosen to uphold the DPO Order and DPO Review Order on arguments that did not find favour with this court. In the circumstances, he must be taken to have been aware of the usual consequences of litigation and could not have expected “low-costs adjudication”. Having considered all the circumstances, I grant a costs order nisi that C shall pay D2 costs of and occasioned by the Appeal to be taxed if not agreed.

HCLA 13/2016

香港特別行政區

高等法院原訟法庭

勞資審裁處上訴2016 年第13號

(原本案件編號：勞資審裁處申索2015 年第1800號)

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判 決 書

I.序言

1.  LBTC1800/2015的申索人及LBTC3400/2015的被告人為馮進堂先生(下稱「馮」)，而LBTC1800/2015的第2被告人及LBTC3400/2015的申索人為周文良先生(下稱「周」)。LBTC1800/ 2015和LBTC3400/2015兩案於勞資審裁處(下稱「該審裁處」)一併審理。

2.  於2015 年6 月8 日，馮在LBTC1800/2015一案向第1被告人振通物流配送(香港)有限公司(下稱「振通」)和周申索共港幣69,083.41 元，包括(A)欠薪、(B)代通知金、(C)有薪年假及(D)有薪假期。於2015 年6 月29 日，該審裁處批准馮撤回對振通之所有申索。於2015 年7 月2 日，馮存檔修訂申索書，更改周的送達地址。於2016 年1 月21 日，馮存檔再修訂申索書，將其申索的數額減為港幣68,926.70 元，包括(A)欠薪(港幣18,500.00元)、(B)代通知金(港幣34,041.83 元)、(C)有薪年假(港幣7,189.92 元)及(D)有薪假期(港幣9,194.95 元) ，而相關計算是根據馮的薪金紀錄作出的。

3.  就LBTC1800/2015的責任問題，周否認他須支付馮所申索的項目，而該案的爭議點在於馮周二人是否存在僱傭關係。在數額上，周對(A) 申索項目的數額沒有爭議，但而就(B) 、(C) 及(D)申索項目，馮須證明他應得的數額。

4.  周在LBTC3400/2015一案向馮追討多付款項(overpayment)港幣20,000.00 元。其實，周於2015 年9 月7 日在小額錢債審裁處SCTC34562/2015一案提出此項申索。於2015 年10 月22 日的聆訊，小額錢債審裁處的審裁官依據第338章《小額錢債審裁處條例》(下稱「小額錢債條例」)第7條主動將該案轉移至該審裁處，之後與LBTC1800/2015一併審理。LBTC3400/2015一案的爭議點在於該審裁處就多付款項申索是否具有司法管轄權，以及周是否多付該港幣20,000.00 元予馮而馮尚未歸還。

5.  於2016 年1 月21丶22及25 日，LBTC1800/2015和LBTC3400/2015二案在該審裁處暫委審裁官梁小玲(下稱「梁審裁官」)席前進行審訊。馮和周親自作供，梁審裁官認為他們二人的證供都有不合理和不可信的地方，所以梁審裁官不會接納馮和周的部份證供, 但基於有關僱傭關係的證供之分析, 梁審裁官認為雙方存在僱傭關係。梁審裁官亦接納馮作供時確認的申索數額。至於周指稱多付港幣20,000.00元，梁審裁官認為該申索屬於第25章《勞資審裁處條例》(下稱「該條例」)附表所賦予的司法管轄權範圍以外，但甚至該審裁處對此項申索具有司法管轄權，周的申索也不能夠得直。因此，梁審裁官於2016 年1 月25 日判處馮勝訴，並頒下裁斷/命令如下(下稱「該裁決」):

(1) 馮在LBTC1800/2015一案的(A)欠薪(港幣18,500.00元)、(B)代通知金(港幣34,041.83 元)、(C)有薪年假(港幣7,189.92 元)及(D)有薪假期(港幣9,194.95 元) 申索得直，周須繳付予馮港幣68,926.70 元的款項，並須按第57章《僱傭條例》(下稱「僱傭條例」)第25A條支付馮上述(A) 項欠薪的利息，利息須按法定利率由到期支付的日期起計算直至實際支付的日期止，亦須按該條例第39(3) 條的規定支付馮上述(B) 項代通知金、(C) 項有薪年假及(D) 項有薪假期的利息，該利息則須由裁斷作出的日期起計算至實際支付的日期止，款項須即時繳付;

(2) 周在LBTC3400/2015一案的(A) 項多付(overpayment) 申索被撤銷;

(3) LBTC1800/2015丶LBTC3400/2015及SCTC34562/2015三案件之訟費合併裁決，即周須繳付港幣2,526.10 元予馮，而周須按該條例第39(3) 條的規定繳付馮上述的利息，利息須由裁斷作出的日期起計算至實際支付的日期止，款項須即時繳付。

6.  周認為該裁決不合理，因此於2016 年2 月1 日申請覆核該裁決。該覆核只涉及LBTC1800/2015一案，而不涉周申索港幣20,000.00元的LBTC3400/2015一案。於2016 年2 月5 日,周將該裁決及訟費款項港幣72,893.45 元存入該審裁處。於2016 年2 月12 日，梁審裁官頒下命令，周存入該審裁處的港幣72,893.45 元暫緩發放予馮，直至覆核時一併處理。於2016 年4 月7 日, 該覆核申請聆訊在梁審裁官席前進行。於2016 年6 月2 日, 梁審裁官撤銷周之覆核申請, 因此2016 年1 月25 日的裁斷/命令則仍然生效，而覆核聆訊無訟費命令 (下稱「該覆核裁決」) 。於同日, 梁審裁官亦指示周於2016 年2 月5 日存入該審裁處之款項港幣72,893.45元可發放予馮。

7.  於2016 年7 月8 日，梁審裁官頒下LBTC1800/2015及LBTC3400/2015的書面裁決理由書(下稱「該理由書」) 。

II. 周的上訴基礎及理由

8.  於2016 年6 月14 日，周於本案存檔「基於法律觀點而提出的上訴許可申請書」(下稱「該申請書」) , 並於該申請書指稱, 該裁決及該覆核裁決在法律觀點上犯錯:

(1) 第1上訴理由: 沒有證據 (lack of evidence) –

「1. The Tribunal had erroneously relied on evidence adduced by both parties after ruling that the evidence of both the Claimant and Defendant were unreasonable and untrustworthy and not accepted by the Tribunal.

2. The Tribunal had failed to observe the general principle that the Claimant, being the party bringing the lawsuit, has the burden of proving the elements on a balance of probability. It follows that the Tribunal erred in law in that there was insufficient evidence to support any employment relationship and the conclusion that the Defendant was the employer is perverse or irrational, or where there is no evidence to support the Decision or where the decision was made by reference to irrelevant factors or without regard to relevant factors.

3. Alternatively, the Tribunal had failed to discharge the statutory duty to investigate, in particular, upon receiving the Defendant’s evidence and further submissions in the determination of the review, which gave rise to injustice. 」

(2) 第2上訴理由: 誤用Poon Chau Nam (misapplication of Poon Chau Nam) –

「4. The Tribunal had misapplied Poon Chau Nam v Yim Siu Cheung (2007) HKCFAR 156 by erroneously restricting itself to the “eleven factors” and/or “fourteen factors” referred to throughout the Decision which were not even identified. The Tribunal erred in law by failing to examine all the features of relationship between the Claimant and the Defendant against the background of the indicia developed in case-law.

5. Alternatively, the tribunal had misapplied Poon Chau Nam by mechanically ran through items on a checklist, i.e., the “eleven factors” and/or the “fourteen factors”. The Tribunal erred in law by failing to make an informed, considered, qualitative appreciation of the whole picture.

6. Further or alternatively, the conclusion of the tribunal was based on inconsistent and/or two different list of factors, i.e., the “eleven factors” and the “fourteen factors”, which were used interchangeably in the Decision. The conclusion is therefore perverse and/or irrational. 」

(3) 第3上訴理由: 周立即解僱馮的權利(Defendant’s entitlement to summary dismissal of Claimant) –

「7. Further or alternatively, even if an employer-employee relationship existed between the Claimant and the Defendant, the Tribunal had failed to consider whether the Claimant had, in relation to his “employment”, (i) wilfully disobeyed a lawful and reasonable order of the Defendant, (ii) committed a misconduct by failing to duly and faithfully discharge of his duties; (iii) defrauded and/or committed theft by reason of his failure to return the HK$20,000.00 to the Defendant; and (iv) habitually neglected his duties, all of which would have entitled the Defendant to summarily terminate the “employment” of the Claimant without notice at common law.

8. Further or alternatively, the Tribunal had failed to investigate and/or give reasons as to why the Defendant was not entitled to summarily dismiss the Claimant in such circumstances. 」

(4) 第4上訴理由: 程式失當(procedural irregularity) –

「9. The Tribunal had failed to investigate into the basis of calculation of the Claimant’s claim in the sum of HK$68,926.70.

10. Alternatively, the Tribunal had failed to give reasons as to why the Claimant’s claim in the sum of HK$68,926.70 was proven on a balance of probability.

11. The Tribunal had failed to refer LBTC3400/2015 to the Small Claims Tribunal after deciding it had no jurisdiction to rule on the matter. 」

III. 雙方的案情

(1)馮的案情

9.  依據該理由書和馮的口供，馮在朋友介紹之下，由周進行面試，並由周聘請為中港貨車司機，駕駛周提供的貨車LB691，並由周出糧給馮，馮的工資以轉數計算(單程為港幣2,400.00元但後增至港幣2,500.00元，雙程為港幣3,400.00元但後增至港幣3,500.00元，而款項已經包括油費及道路/隧道費) ，雙方同意終止僱傭關係的通知期為1 個月。馮指稱他於2014 年6 月21 日至2015 年3 月18 日受僱於周，但於2015 年3 月18 日遭周解僱，周尚未付其2015 年3 月的工資。

10.  馮指稱雙方在簽署租車合約前曾經商討條款，周提及此工作性質為自僱，以租車形式進行。馮指租車合約是由周提供，該合約應該還有第1頁，馮本來將租車合約放在車上，但周將車輛取去驗車後租車合約便不見了。馮同意他要遵守租車合約中的條款及附有細則，譬如請假要1週前通知，辭職要1個 月通知。馮指稱他簽署租車合約時已經理解其僱員身份，但他並沒有要求簽署僱傭合約。他過往曾任警務人員和中港司機，亦曾與其他運輸公司簽過僱傭合約，並享有公司提供的有薪年假及假期、勞工保險及強積金。至於為何明知是僱員身分仍然簽署租車合約，馮說周為了自己的利益以這樣的方式聘用員工，而他為了工作便作出簽署。至於租車合約的內容，譬如其中註明「自己經營」、「安全貨源，雙方有權提供」，馮說周提供的工作性質就是這樣，如果不同意就不能夠開工，但馮從來也不用付租車費，雙方亦從沒有提過有租車費。

11.  馮指稱雙方存在僱傭關係，並在其補充口供詞和口頭證供就下述指標作供如下:

(1) 控制權：馮指稱他開工要準時，每週的更表由周安排，請假要提早1週作出申請，馮未試過以提供的車輛載其他貨品，每轉的轉數錢由周決定，油費及路費則由馮支付。馮駕駛的車輛停泊在馮自己安排的地方，即其舊屋外，馮持有車匙，周亦持有後備匙，如果車輛要修理或換呔換電池，要在周指示的特定車房進行，由馮簽單，周之後付款。如果有輕微的維修，馮會先行付款在國內維修，然後由周付回維修費。馮指並無特定在那一間油站入油，周亦沒有提供油卡。行車路線方面，如果空車返港，司機可以自行決定路線，但如果載貨的話，就要按指定路線行車，如果塞車要改行其他路線，要通知DHL公司及周。馮要填行車紀錄表，以便周及振通的會計計算轉數。車上安裝了香港、大陸執法機關及DHL的衛星導航儀器記錄行車路程。

(2) 自備工具：馮不用自備工具，車輛由周提供。

(3) 是否自聘工作所需幫工： 馮並無自聘幫工。

(4) 是否須負上財政的風險及其性質與程度：馮並無底薪，收入按工作的數量計算，每月薪金不同，但不用付任何財政上的風險。

(5) 是否可從管理中獲得利潤：馮的工作不涉管理，除了每月的運費中，沒有其他收入或利潤。

(6) 投資及管理的責任，其性質與程度：馮不須負任何投資及管理的責任。

(7) 是否被識別為商業組織的一分子：馮並無識別為商業組織的一分子。

(8) 保險和稅務責任： 馮沒有報稅，周也沒有為他報稅，雙方亦沒有供強積金。馮指周說過不會供強積金，但馮亦不知有否勞工保險。

(9) 營商： 馮並無營商。

(10) 個人對此關係的看法：雖然租車合約指馮是自己經營，但馮認為他是以僱員的身份為周工作。

(11) 行業或專業的傳統結構及慣例會否有所理解：馮指運輸行業多以口頭及書面方式與僱員訂立合約，合約中指雙方不存在僱傭關係，但此類協議不能夠超越僱傭條例，司機如果符合法庭指示所列的條件，司機應屬僱員身分。

12.  就周指他多付的港幣20,000.00元，馮指該筆款項已經在2014 年8 月的薪金裡面扣除。他否認曾入非法燃油，並指周說他欠周1缸油而涉及價值港幣2,000.00多元並無根據。

(2)周的案情

13.  依據該理由書和周的口供，周與馮之間並無僱傭關係，馮是自僱人士，承辦周的運輸生意，雙方簽了租車合約，議定雙方以承辦方式合作。就馮的申索項目，周只同意欠薪的數額，但認為有關欠薪要與馮欠他的其他款項抵銷。周沒有爭議他在2015 年3 月終止雙方租車關係，他反對通知期為1個 月，他說租車合約裡面只訂明，要即時交回貨車和證件。

14.  至於租車合約，周指其內容是他和其他「夥計」(即其他司機但不包括馮)一齊議定的。周指他收到運輸費之後，大概會保留港幣1,000 元作為租車費，其他款項就付給馮，但馮不知道租車費是多少。周表示，租車合約只有1頁，馮指合約有兩頁的說法是謊話。再者，雙方在傾談協議時，周說過強積金是由馮自己負責。就商討時有否說過是外判、承辦或者自僱這些字眼，周說好像是有，也好像是沒有，但馮知道公司是這樣運作的。

15.  就雙方是否存在僱傭關係，周在其補充口供詞和口頭證供上就下述指標作供如下：

(1) 控制權：周說他對馮有控制權，因為是他「炒」馮的。周指更表不是由他編制，是由DHL和他的「夥計」編制，如果馮要請假要通知廣州DHL 24小時熱線以及他的「夥計」(即其他司機)。周很少與馮聯絡，工作期間只有幾次，但他無法提供確實的次數，以及除了驗車之外聯絡的原因，周說他記不起因何事聯絡馮。周並無理會馮泊車的地方，而車輛如果有大問題要去萬昌車房維修，由周付費，但換呔就去屯門一間呔房更換。周將3張油卡放在租給馮的車輛的車頭，周要求馮在這3間油站入油，但因為時間太久，周已記不起何時向馮說過這要求，只說是在租車開首的一、兩個 月，周作供時亦指也許是在見工時說過。周又指就此要求馮可以問其他司機，因為馮是熟手，所以這些入油的問題不用教他。而且，車上的衛星導航儀並不是由周安裝的。

(2) 自備工具：馮不用自備工具。

(3) 是否自聘工作所需幫工： 馮並無自聘幫工，周補充說他不容許司機請大陸的司機，即俗稱「騎師」做替工。

(4) 是否須負上財政的風險及其性質與程度、是否可從管理中獲得利潤及是否有投資及管理的責任，其性質與程度: 周的答案都是否定的。

(5) 是否被識別為商業組織的一分子：周在補充口供詞指「是」，在審訊作供時，周說馮只是收錢，就再無補充。

(6) 保險和稅務責任：周沒有為馮報稅，沒有供強積金，沒有購買勞工保險，但他有購買香港和國內的車輛第三者意外保險。

(7) 營商： 馮並無營商。

(8) 個人對此關係的看法：周指馮是外判。

(9) 行業或專業的傳統結構及慣例會否有所理解：周只是指大家要依合約行事，他又說中港運輸是沒落行業，他自己也不想再經營下去。

16.  就有關多付港幣20,000.00元的申索，周指他在2014 年6 月20 日分別以港幣5,000.00元現金及港幣5,000.00元銀行過數，以及在6 月30 日以港幣10,000.00元銀行過數，共付了港幣20,000.00元予馮，但馮並無歸還。至於該港幣20,000.00元是否在2014 年8 月出糧時已經扣除，周指他的紀錄顯示該「上月預支」的港幣20,000.00元是他在2014 年8 月9 日付給馮的，這並非扣款，而馮在該頁左邊的簽名證明馮是收取了港幣20,000.00元。周指他的紀錄無寫明扣回港幣20,000.00 元，這反映了該港幣20,000.00元是付予馮的。至於周為何在紀錄上沒有在該港幣20,000.00元旁寫上2014 年8 月9 日的日期(如其他在2014 年7 月19 日或者7 月31 日付給馮的款項一般)，而該港幣20,000.00 元又為何是從7 月的生意額港幣64,800.00元中扣去而非加上去，周重複其所指該港幣20,000.00元是2014 年8 月9 日預支予馮的說法，並認為馮要提供歸還了港幣20,000.00元的證據。

17.  周又指稱，馮把非法燃油注入他的車輛，周曾經問過兩間他持有油卡的油商(加德士及中石化)，得到的答案是馮並沒有在這兩間油商入油，但周沒有問過美孚。周又說很多人見到馮入非法燃油，亦指馮的口供已承認入非法燃油，但梁審裁官認為其中可見馮只是講述介紹這一份工給他的朋友的說法。

18.  周又指租車給馮時車中的油缸注滿油，但馮還車時沒有入滿油就還車，但梁審裁官留意到，周不同的口供詞及文件中註明計算升數有所不同。周指他交車給馮時油缸注滿400升油，但還車時油缸是空的，而要補回的升數有提及320升港幣2,080.00元，但文件中又見350升的紀錄。

IV. 梁審裁官的裁決

19.  梁審裁官在該理由書說明她考慮了雙方的證人供詞、證物文件、陳詞及證人作供時的內容和神態，並認為周和馮兩人的證供都有不少地方不合理和不可信。就馮方面，雖然他指在簽署租車合約時已認為自己是僱員身分，而他是為了這份工作才簽下租車合約，但馮曾經任警員，亦曾在其他運輸公司受僱為中港司機而經簽署僱傭合約和享有勞工福利，他指為了工作而明知雙方並非屬外判或承辦的關係仍然簽租車合約的說法實在令人難以信服。就周方面，他就多付港幣20,000.00元的說法與他提供的紀錄內容不符，而在編制更表和提供租車合約的問題上亦見周想將責任放在他的「夥計」身上，以減輕自己在控制權或者租車合約上的責任。梁審裁官亦認為，周在何時及怎樣指示馮用油卡或者他指控馮入非法燃油的證供也有含糊和籠統的地方。基於以上所述，梁審裁官不會接納馮及周在上述部份的證供。

20.  至於有關僱傭關係的證供分析，梁審裁官考慮Poon Chau Nam v Yim Siu Cheung一案[1]所闡述的原則。「[梁審裁官]會依照過往的判例中的指標去審視，並納入雙方關係的所有特徵，以整體印象來裁定雙方的關係是否屬於僱傭關係。而[梁審裁官]在按照過往的判例所歸納的一籃子僱傭關係的標籤加以考慮時，舉證責任在[馮]身上」。

21.  梁審裁官認為，就雙方是否存在僱傭關係的11個指標中，雙方在大部分的指標[2]上爭議不大，而雙方的答案都是否定的。除了第(8)項外，其餘指標均指向馮是僱員。就第(7) 項(是否識別為商業組織一份子)，周雖在補充口供詞指「是」，但他在審訊作供時並無具體說明，僅說馮只是收錢，而馮的證供是沒有被識別為商業組織一份子，因此梁審裁官認為此指標並無指向馮乃屬僱員。

22.  就較有爭議的第1項(控制權)上，梁審裁官考慮雙方的證供後裁斷認為：(1)雙方並無爭議馮的運輸工作由周提供丶周有權終止雙方關係及轉數錢由周決定, (2)有關馮工作期間是否要聯絡周方面，周作供指他與馮很少聯絡，但他無法提供確實次數及除驗車外的聯絡原因，周未能清晰說出他與馮在工作期間聯絡的情況，因此梁審裁官接納馮所說，運輸的時間、地點及轉數要依照周或透過他的代理人(即周指的「夥計」)指派，有更表可以依循，而周在作供中也承認更表是他的「夥計」和DHL公司編制的, (3) 梁審裁官接納馮所說，請假要提前1週作出，周也承認請假要通知DHL 24 小時熱線以及他的「夥計」, (4) 梁審裁官接納馮所說，載貨時的路線有所規定，如果改行其他路線，要通知DHL公司及周，馮要填寫行車紀錄表，以便周及振通計算轉數, (5) 雙方無爭議周對泊車的地點沒有特定要求，周備有後備車匙, (6) 雙方亦無爭議須要到特定的車行進行車輛修理, (7) 梁審裁官認為沒有確實證據支持周指稱他曾要求馮在3間油商入油的說法。因此，梁審裁官認為周對馮的工作安排有一定的控制權。

23.  就第10項(個人看法)上，梁審裁官理解周的抗辯理由是指馮已經簽署租車合約，同意用租車的方式經營，由於審裁官不接納馮指他在簽署租車合約時已認為自己是僱員的說法，因此在此指標上她以雙方認為馮是自僱的看法作考慮。此外，租車合約有條款指相關車輛LB691是「由[馮]自己經營，公/強積金、勞工保險、稅項、交通、貨車安全、貨車保養及通訊等，由租車者[馮]負責，雙方明白責任自負」、「安全貨源雙方有權提供」，合約內容是指向馮以自僱的方式經營運輸的業務。但是，梁審裁官不認同周所指，馮有付租車費給周，周說大家在分攤利潤下，他所收取的就是租車費，梁審裁官認為那是不合實情的說法，因為馮根本就不知道所謂租車費是多少錢。而且，就算馮同意租車合約的條款，這只能夠反映他在雙方達成協議時的看法，以及雙方就彼此關係有所協議。梁審裁官認為，這只不過是Poon Chau Nam一案以及上述多項指標中的一部分，梁審裁官要全盤地考慮各個指標，周不能夠以單一指標就否定雙方實質關係裡面所呈現的性質。

24.  就第(8) 項(保險及稅務上的問題)，梁審裁官認為雙方的協議為周不會供強積金、不會報稅和購買勞工保險，而且雙方簽署租車合約的目的就是為了免除稅務、強積金、勞工保險上的責任。就第(11)項(行業或專業的傳統結構及慣例)方面，梁審裁官認為雙方均未能就此提供清晰的證供以供考慮。

25.  綜合以上來說，梁審裁官認為從不需自備工具、沒有幫工，沒有財政、管理責任和風險，沒有營商等方面清晰可見，馮的工作具僱員的特徵。在控制權方面，雖然梁審裁官注意到馮在非載貨的時間駕駛及停泊車輛有自由度，租車合約也沒有禁止馮承接其他貨源，但在實際運輸工作上，周對馮有所控制。雖然馮簽署了租車合約，梁審裁官也不接納馮說他一直認為自己是僱員的說法，但以整體印象而言，馮不屬自僱及沒有經營自己的業務這一點，十分明顯。梁審裁官考慮了整盤因素及雙方的實質關係之下，認為雙方存在僱傭關係。

26.  至於多付港幣20,000.00元的申索，周指出如果馮申索得直，他可以多付款項作抵銷。首先，梁審裁官認為周申索多付款項港幣20,000,00元，該審裁處並無司法管轄權處理復原法下的申索。在律政司司長訴李錦志，[3]法庭指僱主討回多付的工資或津貼並不是有關違反僱傭合約的申索，而該申索屬於該條例附表所賦予的司法管轄權範圍以外。梁審裁官在該理由書指出，她曾經在提訊時要求周諮詢及考慮法律意見，是否可基於其他法律原則或者其他訴因，以致他多付款項的申索，符合該審裁處的司法管轄權，但周就此並無再作回覆或陳述。

27.  雖此，梁審裁官考慮到周除了以此作申索項目，也涉及是否可藉此抵銷馮的申索項目及數額，因此梁審裁官也聽取及考慮了周的申索。但梁審裁官認為,甚至該審裁處對周多付款項的申索有司法管轄權，該申索也不能夠得直。從周提供的紀錄可見，馮指多付的港幣20,000.00元已在2014 年8 月9 日周付他的款項中扣除，這與他提供的入數紀錄完全吻合的，而周指稱該港幣20,000.00元是在2014 年8 月9 日以現金方式付給馮的說法與他的紀錄內容不同，而且周說馮的簽名是港幣20,000.00 元簽收的說法完全不能在文件裡面反映出來。

28.  梁審裁官又質疑該港幣20,000.00元沒有註明是扣除的款項，但從紀錄可見，扣除的金額是從計算程式中港幣64,800.00元先減港幣20,000.00元，再減兩次港幣10,000.00元，這反映出那是一個扣除的數額。周又指馮沒有辦法提供歸還港幣20,000.00元的紀錄，但該港幣20,000.00元在2014 年8 月9 日被扣除這一點已經在紀錄中清楚反映出來。因此，梁審裁官撤銷周在LBTC3400/2015中多付款項的申索。

29.  另外，周指馮把非法燃油注入他的車輛，但並無刑事紀錄支援有關說法，周也沒有提供證人指曾目擊馮這樣做。周說馮沒有將油載滿油缸便歸還車輛，梁審裁官認為周並無確實證據，指雙方就入油和還車時須載滿油缸有所協議，而他所指的數量、計法以及金額有所不同，也沒有單據或入油記錄以支持交車和還車時的升數。因此，梁審裁官裁定周未能成功以此抵銷馮的申索。

30.  就馮申索項目中的代通知金，周指租車合約中提及，如果意見不合，租車人要即時交還貨車及各項證件，所以通知期不應該以1個 月計算。但梁審裁官認為，該份租車合約並非僱傭合約，所提及的也非終止僱傭關係的情況。

31.  梁審裁官對於馮就租車合約有第1頁，他不能夠詳細記得細則條款，但又能夠說出終止關係的通知期是1個 月，梁審裁官對此存疑而不接納馮所說的。因此，在沒有議定通知期的情況下，梁審裁官根據僱傭條例第6(2)(a)條，裁斷相關的通知期為1 個月。另外，梁審裁官認為並無任何證據顯示，馮曾放取有薪年假或有薪假期，周就有薪年假或有薪假期的抗辯是馮並非僱員，基於以上就僱傭關係的分析，馮為周的僱員，因此可分別根據僱傭條例第 41AA(1)-(2)及第41D條和第39及第40條，獲有薪年假及有薪假期薪酬。

32.  基於以上所說，梁審裁官判馮申索(A)至(D)項港幣68,926.70 元得直，周須即時繳付該數額及相關利息。至於申索(B)、(C) 及(D)項，馮作供時提及受僱期應由2014 年6 月21 日開始，他亦確認及同意依照再經修訂申索書中的數額申索，因此梁審裁官裁定他在這3項申索得直的數額就如再經修訂申索書所列，周須即時繳付該數額及相關利息。梁審裁官亦就LBTC1800/2015、LBTC3400/2015和SCTC34562/2015合併判給馮共港幣2,526.10 元的訟費，周須即時繳付該數額及相關利息。

V.梁審裁官的覆核裁決

33.  至於周提出的覆核申請，梁審裁官考慮了周提交的書面陳詞作為其覆核理據，並就周提出3方面的論點作出分析及裁斷。

34.  首先，就僱傭關係而言，周指梁審裁官未有考慮他的理據和證供，周認為馮是自僱人士及他的外判商，並在其進一步書面陳詞指出雙方的合作條件及關係特徵。梁審裁官在該理由書表示已在審訊時反複考慮其中要點後才裁定雙方存有僱傭關係，但周未有在審訊裡面提及以下各點, 因此梁審裁官加以考慮:

(1)  周指稱他要求，如果馮不能接更便須在1週前通知他，以安排其他外判商，但此舉並非告假，馮不接單，毋須得到周許可。梁審裁官認為這說法與周在審訊時的證供略有不同，因周在審訊時指稱如果馮不上班便要通知DHL熱線及周的「夥計」；

(2)  周指稱馮並無向周提及聘請幫工的需要，周無權干涉馮是否需要請幫工。但梁審裁官認為此點亦與周在審訊中提及不容許大陸司機做替工一點略有不同；

(3)  周指稱為確保馮所接的生意獲得妥善處理，他表明不希望馮在外面另外接單，但周本人沒有辦法控制到馮是否在外接單。

35.  梁審裁官認為周的進一步書面陳詞提出上述數點與他在宣誓下作供的說法略有不同，但無損梁審裁官就雙方是否存在僱傭關係的分析，因為周在第(1)點確認了馮的證供指若不能開工是要通知周本人，第(2)點也確認馮沒有提及請幫工，而第(3)點顯示周甚至指他曾表明不希望馮在外面另外接單。梁審裁官認為，若再考慮這些要點，雙方指向僱傭關係更為明顯。

36.  梁審裁官認為周最強的一點是雙方簽了租車合約，而根據租車合約內容馮是外判商，而梁審裁官在判決時已經提及並解釋過其中的法律問題，雙方的合約或者雙方對於彼此關係的個人看法，只是法庭考慮雙方是否具有僱傭關係的其中一個指標，法庭是要考慮一籃子因素，去斷定他們的實質關係為何，此乃終審法院在Poon Chau Nam中所釐定的法律原則。此外，在梁金華訴馮玉清經營創匯運輸公司一案[4]中，法庭指出雙方就算有已經協定的看法，那只是法庭考慮雙方關係的其一個因素。若果雙方客觀上存在僱傭關係，明文的協定也不能淩駕實質關係。梁審裁官表示她依照案例並考慮了周的案情，但不能單單從馮周二人簽署了租車合約，以及馮知道自己是外判這兩點，忽略雙方實質關係中的一籃子指標而只依賴此兩點決定雙方是否存在僱傭關係。

37.  第二，就更表、油咭和多付港幣20,000.00元等問題，周在其進一步書面陳詞指梁審裁官錯誤理解他關於更表的證供，而更表應該是DHL提供的紀錄。但梁審裁官在審訊裁決時所提及編更表的情況，是基於周談及控制權的證供指不是由周指派馮工作而是馮自己去取更表，而有關更表的編制並非周自己編制而是由他的「夥計」及DHL編制。梁審裁官是基於周的證供，在控制權一環中作出考慮。

38.  至於油咭的情況，周的進一步書面陳詞亦再重複提到油站折扣卡的問題，並指梁審裁官在謄本中第52段的判決是錯誤的。就此，梁審裁官考慮了周的證供指，他不記得何時叫馮要用該3張油卡入油，他無法說出確實日期，而且他的證供又指，因為馮是熟手，他可以問其他司機有關入油的要求。梁審裁官認為，周的證供無法確實地支持他的案情，即已經將3張油卡交給馮生，要求馮要在這3 間油站入油的說法。

39.  至於多付港幣20,000.00元的申索，梁審裁官認為由於該覆核只涉及LBTC1800/2015一案而非LBTC3400/2015一案，因此港幣20,000.00元的問題只能作為周能否藉此抵銷馮在LBTC1800/2015一案中申索的金額。周的進一步書面陳詞指梁審裁官錯誤理解該港幣20,000.00元的性質，周指該港幣20,000.00元是2014 年6 月期間預支馮，又或者是在2014 年7 月多付了港幣19,660.00元，而並非在2014 年8 月預支的港幣20,000.00元。梁審裁官指出，就此港幣20,000.00元的源頭，可從周的紀錄見到他在2014 年6 月份預支該港幣20,000.00元予馮，而當月即2014 年6 月的生意額總數為港幣19,660.00元，而該港幣20,000.00元可從周的紀錄及周的進一步書面陳詞所見在2014 年8 月9 日已被扣回，而2014 年7 月的生意額為港幣64,800 元，其中一項「上月預支」，就是從港幣64,800.00元減了港幣20,000.00元。根據梁審裁官對於該文件的理解，她認為其中2014 年6 月預支的港幣20,000 元，已經就2014 年7 月生意額(即在2014 年8 月9 日)作出扣減，因此馮根本沒有保留港幣20,000 .00元。

40.  周在進一步書面陳詞提到，他不應將以上所說的港幣19,660.00元存入馮的戶口。首先，此說法並非周在審訊時的申索內容，但從其紀錄可見，該港幣19,660.00元是2014 年6 月份周付馮作為該月工作的報酬，而當時周已經預支了港幣20,000.00元給馮。就當時來說，馮尚欠周港幣20,000.00元，但該港幣20,000.00元已經在2014 年8 月9 日被扣除。周就2014 年6 月的款項，沒有即月從港幣19,660 元扣減港幣20,000.00元，而是先發放港幣19,660.00元，再在2014年7 月的報酬中扣減港幣20,000.00元，是周當時的做法。梁審裁官不接納其中涉及錯誤扣除的問題。

41.  周展示馮的口供詞, 其中提及「[佬]細就係車房入咗一缸油(本人不知該油來源)，後對本人講用完去油站入油，本人答佢好」，但從口供詞內容，梁審裁官都不能得出馮協議在周指定油店入油，或馮在還車時要將油注滿油缸。

42.  另外,周在陳詞中提及馮有不誠實或非法行為，即使馮是周的僱員，周也有權將馮解僱，有關情況就如其書面陳詞及進一步書面陳詞中所說。在此問題上，梁審裁官認為她已經一一處理了油卡，入油事件，或者港幣20,000.00元的問題，周在這些事件中未能成功舉證馮有不誠實和非法行為，若周指他可藉這些事件即時解僱馮，梁審裁官不接納他的說法。梁審裁官認為就周的覆核申請，他只是重複他在審訊的說法，梁審裁官經解釋及考慮後認為有關說法在法理上未能成立，因此撤銷周的覆核。馮並無就覆核提出訟費申請，梁審裁官頒令周的覆核申請無訟費命令，周存入法庭的裁決金額，發放予馮。

VI.法理原則

43.  該條例第32 (1) 條述明:「如任何一方不滿審裁處的裁斷、命令或裁定，而理由是該裁斷、命令或裁定─(a)在法律論點上有錯;或(b)超越審裁處的司法管轄權範圍，則可 ...... 向原訟法庭申請上訴許可，而原訟法庭可予批准」，而該條例第35 (2) 條述明:「原訟法庭對於其根據第32 條批予許可的上訴，可─(a)作出事實推論;及(b)就訟費及開支方面作出其認為適當的命令，但不可─(i)推翻或更改審裁處就事實問題作出的裁定;或(ii)收取其他證據」(重點加強)。

(1)上訴的性質

44.  法庭裁定基於法律論點成功上訴，上訴一方必須確立審裁官錯誤地應用法律原則，誤解了法規，作出了一個沒有任何合理的審裁處會作出的決定，或達到了一個沒有任何證據支持的不合理結論。在Chan Kwok Hung v Hotel Panorama Company Limited 一案,[5] 高等法院原訟法庭法官朱芬齡(當時官階)指出，“[the] threshold onus of the applicant is to show that the intended appeal is arguable”(申請人負上責任須顯示其擬提出的上訴具可爭辯的理據)。

45.  於Vermeerbergen Peter Alfred v Swisstribe Limited一案,[6] 本席亦指出:

「10. ...... Whilst an appeal against a determination by the Labour Tribunal is on point of law, leave to appeal will also be granted if the determination was made without regard to relevant factors, was made without evidence, or there was failure to discharge the statutory duty to investigate and such failure has given rise to injustice, in that a fair and proper determination of the claim cannot be attained. 」[7]

(2)事實裁斷

46.  申請人如欲推翻該審裁處就事實所作的裁定，這是法律所不容許的，法庭不能純粹因對事實的觀點與原審審裁官不同而推翻對事實的裁定。關於事實的裁定，除非是偏離正軌或毫不理性、或沒有證據支持、或考慮了無關的因素、或沒有考慮有關的因素，方可被推翻。馮皓嵐訴威達製品有限公司一案[8]採納終審法院於Kwong Mile Services Ltd v Commissioner of Inland Revenue一案[9]所述的原則，並在第39 段述明如下:

「處理上訴的法庭不能純粹因對事實的觀點與原審審裁官不同而推翻對事實的裁定。若處理上訴的法庭另有唯一合理及真實的結論，則它有責任取代原審判決。被上訴的裁斷若是偏離正軌或毫不理性地就事實裁斷或推論、或沒有證據支持、或考慮了無關痛癢的因素、或沒有考慮相關的因素，則可被推翻。如果被上訴的裁斷無法被支持，則處理上訴的法庭會推論該審裁者誤解或忽略相關證據或在法律上錯誤引導自己，而無需辨別一個明確的法律謬誤。」

(3)調查責任

47.  該條例第20條述明: 「(1) 申索的聆訊，須不拘形式進行。(2) 審裁官可傳召證人，下令交出文件、紀錄、帳簿或其他證物，並向任何一方或證人提出其認為適當的問題。(3) 審裁官如認為任何事宜與申索有關，則不論該事宜曾否由任何一方提出，亦須予以調查。」

48.  在Chan Suk Bing, Angie v Harbour Phoenix Limited & anor一案,[10] 高等法院原訟法庭暫委法官陳振鴻(當時官階)述明該審裁處在法例下負上調查責任的相關法理原則如下:

「Section 20 of the Ordinance provides that hearings at the tribunal shall be conducted on an informal manner. This is mainly due to the prohibition against legal representation in the tribunal. This in turn, brought about s 20(3) which provides that ‘the Presiding Officer shall investigate any matter which he may consider relevant to the claim, whether or not it has been raised by a party’. ...... Presiding Officers should not allow themselves to derogate from this statutory duty under any circumstances, if a fair and just disposition of the claim is to be ensured. The requirements of justice in a judicial system such as the tribunal is such that, the Presiding Officers are required to assume an active inquisitorial role in the proceedings ......」

49.  在Chan Yat San v Future Luck (296) Ltd一案,[11] 其中的爭議點乃X是D的僱員或是自僱的獨立𠄘包商。D的唯一董事及股東L於2012 年10 月昏迷並接受腦神經外科手術。該審裁處駁回L妻再次申請押後聆訊, 但由於L仍然昏迷而無其他人可代表D, 審裁官認為D放棄了提呈證據的權利, 便在D缺席下作出事實裁斷而判D敗訴。高等法院原訟法庭法官陳美蘭述明如下:

「9. The key issue for determination by the Tribunal is whether the claimant was an employee of the defendant, or an independent and self-employed contractor providing services for the defendant. On this important issue, there are factual matters which are in dispute between the claimant and the defendant. ......

14. Further, the inquisitorial role of the Presiding Officer under s.20 of the Ordinance involves the duty to investigate relevant matters. Incidental to its performance of such a role and its duty to ensure a fair trial, in cases where there are disputes on facts and the credibility of witnesses is essential to the Presiding Officer’s determination, the Presiding Officer has the duty to raise with a party matters that require its clarification or elaboration, on which the Presiding Officer has queries and which may be determined against the party. This is in order to give the party an opportunity to deal with these matters and to all evidence on such matters.

15. In deciding on the relevant and important issue of the defendant’s control over the claimant’s work, the Presiding Officer had not given to the defendant the opportunity to call its witnesses to give evidence on this key issue, to test the claimant’s case by reference to the evidence of Lau and of the drivers who had given statements for the defendant, and to cross-examine the claimant on his assertions with regard to his choice of work given to him by the defendant.」

50.  但是審裁官的調查責任不是一項絕對的責任。審裁官並非申索人或被告人的律師, 他不可能在審訊前對申索人或被告人的案情有深入理解及知悉存在的證據, 案中亦要有恰當的客觀事實或證據才能促使審裁官執行其調查責任, 而審裁官有酎情權決定是否及如何進行調查。陳暫委法官(當時官階)在Chan Suk Bing, Angie一案續說如下:[12]

「...... I accept ...... such a statutory duty [to investigate] is not an absolute one in the sense that the presiding officers do have a “discretion” in the matter. They are only bound to investigate matters they “may consider relevant”. ......

It is obvious that not every failure to investigate a relevant matter will give rise to an appeal for a failure to discharge a statutory duty. The relevant matter forming the subject matter of the complaint must not only be relevant, but be of such a nature that the lack of investigation will give rise to injustice in that a fair and proper determination of the claim cannot be attained. All the circumstances of the case as well as all other findings of fact must be given all due regard before such a complaint can be upheld. Further, not only is the total absence of investigation a ground for complaint, totally inadequate or useless investigation which amount to no investigation at all will also suffice. It is, however, never sufficient for the appellate court to conclude that it would have preferred to approach the matter differently, or that there is a better way to investigate the claim. It is not open to the appellate court to prefer its own views to that of the presiding officers as to the manner of investigation. To suffice, it must be a clear and obvious case that the inadequacy of the investigation will render an ordinary reasonable man on the tram to Shaukiwan to conclude that injustice has resulted in that a fair and proper determination of the claim cannot be attained.

...... The insufficiency of evidence to support a finding, or the inconsistency of a finding with the evidence, are matters that the appellate court can properly take into account to determine whether there has been a failure to conduct any or any adequate investigation of material facts relevant to such a finding. But that is as far as the relevance of these matters go in relation to the failure to discharge the statutory duty. They do not per se prove a failure to discharge the statutory duty. ......

...... There may well very well be an innocent answer to each and every one of the above disputed facts. The learned Presiding Officer may still come to the same conclusion after all due and proper investigation have been carried out. But where the learned Presiding Officer falls into error, is to accept without any query or question or any investigation at all ......

...... To discharge such a duty, it is encumbered upon the learned Presiding Officer to be actively involved in the inquiry and the search for facts and explanations. That is what an inquisitorial system is all about after all. ......

Presiding Officers are advised that if they have in fact, considered their duty under s 20(3) in relation to any matter and determined further investigation to be unnecessary, a clear and adequate record ought to be kept of such fact. In the absence of any record of such a consideration, the appellate court is left with no alternative but to draw the inevitable inference that the issue had not occurred to the Presiding Officer and that he had failed to consider the matter. Needless to say, a clear record of any investigation that had been carried out, must be kept as part of the record of the proceedings even if no useful evidence had been uncovered as a result thereof. This departure from the normal requirements in reasons for judgment is necessary in view of the unique statutory duty to investigate that a Presiding Officer has to discharge. To do justice to himself, it is encumbered upon the Presiding Officer to keep a clear record of the consideration and his determination thereof, in the same manner as he would with regard to other rulings on law and procedure.」(重點加強)

51.  於謝林及其他二十位訴陳德偉,[13] 高等法院原訟法庭法官陳振鴻亦解釋, 審裁官在聆訊中所須承擔的「查訊責任」並非絕對的，無選擇性的。陳法官認爲如證人的證供，是清澈明確，明顯可信，或無可爭議，則審裁官再加調查，只會做成浪費。如上訴人欲引用此點上訴理由，則審裁官所犯錯誤，必須是足以引致不公情況出現，方可成立。因此，所缺乏的調查須爲對判決有重大影響者，以致任何合理人士皆會對判決不安。陳法官就該條例第20條下審裁官所須承擔的調查責任提供下述的指引：

「(一) 審裁官所須承擔的調查責任，只限於“任何與申索有關事宜”。

(二) 此責任並非一絕對責任，審裁官只須就任何對判決或對事實的裁定有重大影響的事宜，作出適當合理的調查。

(三) 即審裁官並無責任對任何與有關事宜，不論其重要性，不論其是否有合理論據或基礎，毫無選擇地盲目地作出不必要的調查。

(四) “與申索有關事宜”，有輕重之分，性質之別，絕不可一概而論，持一論而放諸四海。有效事宜，爲對判決或事實的裁定“有重大影響”者，即其影響力，並非必須對判決或事實的裁定起決定性作用，但須爲重要的影響力，足可引致一個合理的審裁官對其判決或事實的裁定，産生合理疑慮，或認爲有必要再作考慮。但調查責任不能引伸至一些較輕微，或少於上述程度的事宜。

(五) “作出適當合理的調查”：同樣地，所須調查程度亦有深淺之別，形式之異。調查必須是適當而合理的調查，不可有任何偏見，不可有任何先入爲主之差。調查形式及程度，須視乎事宜本身的合理需要，不可一概而論。唯一絕對的準則，爲審裁官所持態度，必須中立持平，不可以任何一方代表律師爲己任。他的任務乃找出事實真相，而非以破壞證人的可信性爲目的。他只能在有合理的疑點時，對證人作出查訊性的盤問，深入的追問，以求真相。他絕不應在毫無合理的疑點時，對證人作出無理及無必要的盤問。審裁官能保持角色中立，不偏不倚，絕無庖代餘地，實至爲重要。」

52.  本席在Vermeerbergen Peter Alfred v Swisstribe Limited一案[14]引用高等法院原訟法庭法官林文瀚(當時官階)在Le Thi Bich Thuy Kitty v Sheraton International (Hong Kong) Ltd trading as Sheraton Hong Kong Hotel & Towers一案[15]所述的法理原則:

「19. Lam J (as he then was) in Le Thi Bich Thuy Kitty v Sheraton International (Hong Kong) Ltd trading as Sheraton Hong Kong Hotel & Towers explained that the manner of investigation is a matter of discretion to be exercised by the presiding officer in view of the facts of the case before him. Regard can be taken as to the issues in dispute, the incontrovertible evidence before the Tribunal, and the material placed before the Tribunal by the parties after inquiry by the presiding officer.[16] But the presiding officer is obliged to remain neutral and impartial in carrying out his duty to investigate and not play the role as advocate for one litigant.[17]

......

21. In applying the above principles, Lam J (as he then was) in LeThi Bich Thuy Kitty said:

“11. Hence, the duty to investigate cannot replace a party’s right to cross-examine witnesses called by others and to challenge the case of the others ......

12. The duty to investigate does not empower the Presiding Officer to compel a party to give evidence against his own wishes, thereby exposing him to cross-examination (as distinct from summoning a witness). However, the Presiding Officer does have a duty to invite a party to consider giving evidence on relevant matters when it is apparent that he could give relevant evidence on important issues in the case ......

13. If the Presiding Officer discerns that there are relevant matters which the parties have not explored, he is obliged to look into it and should invite the parties to comment and guide (and if necessary, direct) them to produce further evidence or documents ......

14. There is nothing wrong for a Presiding Officer to lead a witness through his evidence in chief or to adopt his witness statement as evidence in chief ......

15. The duty to investigate should not be confused with the power to summon witnesses. A Presiding Officer can still decide a case by reference to burden of proof and there is no duty on the part of the Presiding Officer to summon witnesses to fill the gaps in the evidence of a litigant, particularly when a Presiding Officer had already reminded a party of the significance of the evidence of a particular witness. A litigant should bear the primary responsibility in the preparation and procurement of evidence in support of his case. ......

16. However, if the Presiding Officer had not explained adequately the significance of the evidence of a witness, and a party had no reason to suspect that the other evidence adduced by him would be open to doubt if a witness is not called, the Presiding Officer should not solely rely on the failure to call such a witness to disbelieve the other evidence before the court. 」

(4)述明判決理由的責任

53.  在Vermeerbergen Peter Alfred一案,[18] 本席指出:

「27.  There is in general a requirement that a tribunal of fact must give adequate reasons for its decision. In Zhou Cui Hao v Ting Fung Yee, it was held that:[19]

“Generally speaking, a professional judge is under a duty to analyse in his judgment the material points in the evidence of the case and give reasons as to why he has reached a particular conclusion or decision. This is the only way to make people understand why their evidence is not accepted by the court and why they lose in a case. Only by this can justice be seen to be done. Furthermore, the losing party needs to be clear on whether there is any error in the reasons for the decision given by the court before he can decide whether to appeal or not, and, at a later stage, submit to the Court of Appeal his grounds of appeal in order to seek to set aside the original decision. A professional judge is under a duty to give adequate reasons for any decision which he has made. This is a principle of paramount importance in the common law system. ......”

28.  In Oriental Daily Publisher Ltd v Commissioner for Television and Entertainment Licensing Authority, Li CJ gave the following guidance on reasons to be given by the tribunal:[20]

“First, the reasons given should show that the tribunal has addressed the substantial issues before it and show why the tribunal has come to its decision. There may not be any need however to address every single issue. But the reasons should show that the issues that arise for serious consideration have been considered.

Secondly, ...... [in some] instances, the duty to give reasons could be discharged by describing the contents without much more. Apart from cases of this kind, a decision ...... would not normally be adequate [where such] statements would in effect assert conclusions and would not reveal why the tribunal has come to such conclusions.

Thirdly, the reasons may not require great elaboration and they may be brief. It is only when they are defective in substance that they should be considered inadequate. Ultimately, what are adequate reasons in the circumstances of a particular case have to be approached sensibly.”

As explained by the Court of Appeal in Re Profit Success Development Limited,[21] “[whether] adequate reasons have been given in a particular case is, in other words, a fact sensitive question”. 」

(5)僱員或獨立承包商

54.  終審法院在Poon Chau Nam提供指引,[22]現今法院處理某人是否僱員的問題的方法, 是按照僱傭關係的各個表徵來細看雙方關係的所有特徵, 目的是根據整體印象決定雙方是否存在著僱傭關係。法院要由所得的細節構想出一個印象, 而這是細緻入微而非機械式的做法。有關的表徵包括: 「僱主」所行使的控制程度; 提供服務的人是否自行預備所需器材; 該人是否自行聘用助手; 該人所承擔的財政風險的程度; 該人所負有的投資和管理責任的程度; 以及該人在何等範圍內有機會從妥善管理其工作中得到利益。終審法院常任法官李義於第166-167頁指出:

「17.  The other influential first instance decision is that of Cooke J in Market Investigations Ltd v Minister of Social Security ...... The passage ...... runs as follows:

... the fundamental test to be applied is this: “Is the person who has engaged himself to perform these services performing them as a person in business on his own account?” If the answer to that question is “yes,” then the contract is a contract for services. If the answer is “no,” then the contract is a contract of service. No exhaustive list has been compiled and perhaps no exhaustive list can be compiled of the considerations which are relevant in determining that question, nor can strict rules be laid down as to the relative weight which the various considerations should carry in particular cases. The most that can be said is that control will no doubt always have to be considered; although it can no longer be regarded as the sole determining factor; and that factors which may be of importance are such matters as whether the man performing the services provides his own equipment, whether he hires his own helpers, what degree of financial risk he takes, what degree of responsibility for investment and management he has, and whether and how far he has an opportunity of profiting from sound management in the performance of his task.[23]

18.  The modern approach to the question whether one person is another’s employee is therefore to examine all the features of their relationship against the background of the indicia developed in the abovementioned case-law with a view to deciding whether, as a matter of overall impression, the relationship is one of employment, bearing in mind the purpose for which the question is asked. It involves a nuanced and not a mechanical approach, ......」

(6)舉證責任

55.  一般而言, 民事訴訟的舉證責任(general persuasive burden of proof in civil cases)在於「the party who substantially asserts the affirmative of the issue」,而負上舉證責任的一方需在平衡相對可能性的標準下證明他的主張。Phipson on Evidence一書第18版第 162-163頁第6-7段指出:

「...... If, when all the evidence is adduced by all parties, the party who has this burden has not discharged it, the decision must be against him. ...... This rule is adopted principally because it is just that he who invokes the aid of the law should be the first to prove his case; and partly because, in the nature of things, a negative is more difficult to establish than an affirmative. The burden of proof ...... remaining unchanged throughout the trial ...... never shifting. In deciding which party asserts the affirmative, regard must be had to the substance of the issue and not merely to its grammatical form ...... The true meaning of the rule is that where a given allegation ...... forms an essential part of a party’s case, the proof of such allegation rests on him. ...... In all but the simplest cases, the burden of the issues will be divided, each party having one or more cast upon him. 」

56.  在LBTC1800/2015及LBTC3400/2015二案, 馮和周也有作供及提呈文件證據, 審裁官可從相關證據作出事實裁定,而實際來說,舉證責任的法理原則不外是指:

「...... the claimant (on whom the legal burden lies) has an evidential burden to adduce sufficient evidence to raise an issue as to the existence or otherwise of a fact in question whereupon the spotlight switches to the defendant to discharge his evidential burden of raising a prima facie innocent explanation, and if that is satisfied the claimant has to establish on proper standard of proof the defendant’s prima facie innocent explanation is to be rejected. If the defendant chooses to adduce some countervailing evidence such that the 2 sides’ versions are contradictory and mutually exclusive, the burden of proof is practically an assessment of the parties’ relative credibility and cogency of evidence/inferences. ......」[24]

VII. 討論/分析

57.  代表D2的周大律師陳述指稱, D2擬提出的上訴具可爭辯的理據, 因為梁審裁官犯了以下法律方面的錯誤: (1)未有就要緊事宜履行調查責任, (2)誤用Poon Chau Nam, (3)未有考慮D2可無須給予通知或代通知金而即時終止僱傭合約, 及(4)未有就其決定給予充份理由。

58.  首先,周大律師指稱,由於Poon Chau Nam並沒有窮舉表徵,所以梁審裁官在口頭判詞及該理由書中不停引用多項表徵或指標正顯示她採用對抗方式(adversarial approach)衡量評估案中證據,而梁審裁官所以重複提及11項(或14項)表徵或指標是因為周的日期為2015 年6 月24 日補充證人陳述書回答了這方面的問題,但梁審裁官只就這11項(或14項)表徵或指標作出裁決而沒有查訊其他可能與爭議點有關的事宜。

59.  周大律師亦指稱,梁審裁官採用機械式的做法而只考慮了周的日期為2015 年6 月24 日補充證人陳述書所提及關於11項(或14項)表徵或指標的事宜,而梁審裁官將其考慮點只局限於上述11項(或14項)表徵或指標的做法已顯示她沒有履行其查訊責任,因此她裁定馮是周的僱員是有悖常理及人情(perverse and irrational)的決定。

60.  本席不同意周大律師的說法。其實, Poon Chau Nam也沒有完全捨棄過往判例提及的表徵或指標, 終審法院常任法官李義採納了Cooke J在Market Investigations Ltd一案所例舉的多項重要指標, 更表示雖然「控制權」並非唯一的決定性指標, 它可說是必然考慮的表徵。雖此, 終審法院常任法官李義亦提醒,現今的方法是就一籃子的指標細節加以考慮並得出一個整體印象, 這是細緻入微而非機械式的做法(見上述第54段)。

61.  該理由書清晰顯示, 梁審裁官理解Poon Chau Nam的上述法理原則, 她「依照過往的判例中的指標去審視, 並納入雙方關係的所有特徵, 以整體印象來裁定雙方的關係是否屬於僱傭關係」(見上述第20段)。本席認為, 梁審裁官就各項相關的表徵或指標加以考慮並無不妥, 這是Poon Chau Nam所容許的, 而梁審裁官就馮周二人這方面的證供作出細緻的衡量及評估(見上述第21-24段) 。更重要的是, 梁審裁官亦遵照Poon Chau Nam的指引, 從細節開始, 「考慮了整盤因素及雙方的實質關係」而構想出一個整體印象(即雙方存在僱傭關係)(見上述第25段), 本席看不到梁審裁官的該裁決犯上周大律師所指稱的法律觀點錯誤。

62.  本席認為, 梁審裁官於該理由書就覆核的分析及裁決更清晰顯示梁審裁官沒有犯上指稱的法律觀點錯誤。梁審裁官不但重複考慮馮周二人雙方關係的特徵及相關指標, 她更進一步考慮了周提出的新事項, 並與審訊時的證供平衡比較(見上述第34-35段), 而更重要的是, 梁審裁官明確指出法庭是要考慮一籃子因素以斷定馮周二人的關係, 而不是只單看任何一個因素而忽略整體因素所示的實質關係(見上述第36段) 。本席認為, 梁審裁官正確引用Poon Chau Nam的法理原則, 而將有關法理原則應用於LBTC1800/2015的案情上也沒有犯錯, 梁審裁官並沒有將其考慮局限於上述多項表徵或指標而忽略了其調查責任。故此, 這並非可爭辯的上訴理據。

63.  第二, 周大律師陳述指出,周在覆核前呈交的進一步書面陳詞,但梁審裁官在覆核時只問周有沒有進一步陳述而沒有查訊周在進一步書面陳詞所提及的事宜。由於梁審裁官理解周在進一步書面陳詞提及的事宜涉及審訊時未有提及的事項或就關鍵性事情提供進一步證據及/或解釋, 梁審裁官沒有就該等事宜執行查訊責任而犯了法律觀點上的錯誤。

64.  本席不同意周大律師的說法。從該理由書可見, 梁審裁官理解周就覆核的進一步書面陳詞提出審訊時未有提及的事宜, 並已就該等事宜加以考慮(見上述第34段) 。周大律師指稱, 梁審裁官沒有查訊該等事宜, 但其實梁審裁官以直接簡單方式處理這方面的事宜, 雖然她發現周在覆核提出的進一步事宜與周在審訊時的說法略有不同, 但梁審裁官是以周在覆核提出的進一步事宜為基礎作出考慮, 而她得出的結論是該些事宜無損她就馮周二人是否存在僱傭關係這方面的分析, 而她在該理由書清楚述明她得出上述結論的分析及原因, 亦認為若再考慮這些要點, 馮因雙方指向僱傭關係的相關證據比審訊時更為明顯(見上述第35段)。在這情況下, 本席看不到梁審裁官如何忽略了調查責任。正如上述, 雖然梁審裁官有責任執行調查, 但這責任不是一項絕對的責任, 而她有酎情權決定是否及如何進行調查證據。本席認為, 在上述的考慮基礎, 梁審裁官根本不需在這方面作進一步的調查。這並非可具爭辯性的上訴理據。

65.  第三,周大律師同意依據Poon Chau Nam的法理原則,租車合約的條文並非結論性因素(conclusive factor),但他指稱梁審裁官沒有考慮馮和周兩位都不是可信的證人,所以:

「...... the Presiding Officer should have considered what was agreed under the Agreement between the parties in the light of the general principles of burden of proof in civil cases where [馮] had the burden of proving that an employer-employee relationship existed between [馮] and [周], and since [馮] was an unreliable witness, there could be no solid evidence for the Presiding Officer to displace what was written on the face of the Agreement, even if viewed objectively without taking into account the intention of the parties.」

66.  本席亦不同意這說法。本席認為,上述指稱其實是誤解了梁審裁官就證據上的分析:

(1)  梁審裁官並無說馮周二人是完全不可信的證人, 或他們的證供是完全不可信的。梁審裁官在該理由書指出馮周二人的證供有些地方不合理和不可信, 而他不會接納他倆在該些地方的證供(見上述第5及第19段)。但除此之外, 梁審裁官分析了他倆就有關僱傭關係的證供而作出判決(見上述第19-25及第34-36段)。本席完全看不到梁審裁官如何忽略了馮周二人的證供當中有些不可信的地方。

(2)  周大律師認為周毋須證明馮是自僱人士, 反之, 應由馮證明他是受僱人士, 但既然他倆也是不可信的證人, 甚至從客觀的角度, 也沒有任何有力的證據可取替租車合約的內容。本席認為, 這陳述建基於馮周二人的證供完全不可靠及不可信, 但依據上述的分析這並不正確。而且, 有關梁審裁官不理解舉證責任的指摘亦對她不公平。梁審裁官在該理由書扼要地道出雙方的爭議點(見上述第3-4段), 而作為一位有經驗的暫委審裁官, 不時需要在案件中決定有沒有僱傭關係存在的事實, 她在該理由書清楚指出舉證責任在馮身上(見上述第20段), 本席認為她毋須在該理由書詳細寫下舉證責任的法理原則。本席細閱該理由書, 發覺梁審裁官沒有錯誤處理舉證責任。她亦正確引用Poon Chau Nam的案例, 並提及LBTC1800/2015的爭議點在於馮周二人是否存在僱傭關係, 明顯地知悉訴訟之重點。而且, 當梁審裁官檢視僱傭關係的指標準則及構想整體印象時, 她是採用客觀的標準。從梁審裁官就馮周二人所提供有關僱傭關係方面的證供證據的分析, 可知她平衡了各項準則, 亦引用了平衡相對可能性的舉證標準以作出事實裁斷, 本席認為梁審裁官在這方面沒有犯上法律觀點上的錯誤。

(3)  Leung Kam Wah (梁金華) v Fung Yuk Ching Yvonne(trading as Hong Kong Transportation Co (馮玉清經營創滙運輸公司)一案[25]已清楚解釋雙方在合約中的關係標籤是其中考慮因素,法庭應分析有關客觀事實從而裁定雙方是否有僱員僱主關係：「It is well settled that it is for the court and not the parties to evaluate the facts and determine their true legal relationship: Chan Kwok Kin v. Mok Kwan Hing & Another [1991] 1 HKLR 631, per Clough JA at p. 636A-B. Thus the parties’ own view, even agreement, as to the relationship is but one factor that the court takes into account」。Poon Chau Nam一案在第180頁亦提醒「...... [it] may be ...... that where the relationship is highly ambiguous, and it is not at all clear that the injured person is an employee, the parties’ express agreement as to the status of that person may be important. However, if there is objectively an employer- employee relationship, the compulsory statutory duty which the employer bears cannot be overridden by the express stipulation of the parties. ......」從上述第36段可見,梁審裁官考慮了雙方簽署合約的內容,亦引述梁金華一案的指引, 並考慮了客觀因素而裁定雙方的實質關係,本席認為梁審裁官在這方面沒有犯上法律觀點上的錯誤。

67.  第四,周大律師陳述指稱,就著控制權的指標或表徵,梁審裁官依賴了DHL的更表紀錄, 並認為周想將編制更表的責任放在他的「夥計」身上，以減輕自己在控制權上的責任,但梁審裁官沒有給周機會傳召其「夥計」就這重大課題作供,而梁審裁官在這方面的裁決是沒有證據支持的臆測。

68.  本席不同意周大律師的說法。馮指稱每週更表由周安排,請假要提早1週作出申請(見上述第11(1)段),但周指稱更表不是由他(而是由DHL和他的「夥計」)編制,如果馮要請假要通知廣州DHL 24小時熱線及他的「夥計」(即其他司機) (見上述第15(1)段)。從上述可見,雙方清楚知悉更表方面的爭議,亦有機會就這爭議點作供表述他們分別的立場主張。周大律師並沒有指稱周欲傳召證人而梁審裁官拒絕其申請,他只說梁審裁官沒有給周機會傳召其「課計」作供。但是, 梁審裁官的調查責任不是一項絕對的責任, 而正如林文瀚法官(當時官階)在Le Thi Bich Thuy Kitty一案所述,審裁官的調查責任與傳召證人的權力不能渾為一談,而審裁官沒有責任傳召證人以補救與訟一方在證供證據上的缺漏(見上述第52段)。再者,雖然梁審裁官認為周有關這方面的指稱是想推卸責任,但她考慮控制權的指標或表徵時,其實已考慮了周作供時承認更表是他的「夥計」和DHL公司編制之說(見上述第22(2)段), 而在整體證供及證據的衡量及分析下,這因素不足以支持周的主張。基於上述理由,本席認為周在這方面的指控並不是可爭辯的上訴理據。

69.  第五, 周大律師亦指稱,梁審裁官認為馮及周二人的證供有些不合理和不可信的地方,但她就一些與案有關及關鍵性(relevant and material)事宜的處理方式是不接納提呈的證據而沒有嘗試進行查訊。周大律師認為, 就馮的申索數額而言, 周對LBTC1800/2015(A)項申索(欠薪)的數額沒有爭議, 但就(B)、(C)及(D)項(代通知金、有薪年假及有薪假期)申索的數額, 梁審裁官採用對抗方式(adversarial approach)指稱周沒有提供運算方式或數額, 而只採納馮作供時確認的申索數額, 但沒有查訊該申索數額的基礎。周大律師指稱, 不爭的事實是馮並非收取日薪而是按車程轉數計算收入, 所以馮每月的收入會有波動。周大律師亦不滿梁審裁官沒有述明她接納馮所計算的賠償數額之原因。

70.  本席不同意上述的指稱。至於LBTC1800/2015的(B) 、(C)及(D)項(代通知金、有薪年假及有薪假期)申索的數額, 馮在申索書已詳細說明該些數額的運算方式, 而該運算方式是以平均月薪/日薪計算,梁審裁官亦在該理由書第2段指出「有關計算是根據馮的薪金紀錄作出」(見上述第2段)。正如林文瀚法官(當時官階)在Le Thi Bich Thuy Kitty一案所述,「[there] is nothing wrong for a Presiding Officer to lead a witness through his evidence in chief or to adopt his witness statement as evidence in chief」(見上述第52段)。本席亦認為, 梁審裁官在該判決書第 2及第75-77段已清楚述明其判決理由, 她認為租車合約未能反映馮周二人的僱傭關係, 所以她依賴僱傭條例有關通知期的條文, 亦採納馮根據其薪金紀錄作出並在庭上作供時確認的薪酬資料, 以計算代通知金數額。本席看不到馮採納依其薪金紀錄及僱傭條例而作出的申索數額有何不妥, 尤其是周的主要抗辯理據是他認為馮是自僱人士而非他的僱員。周並沒有任何或然的立場/主張, 例如若馮是他的僱員(雖然他不同意), 那麼馮按其僱傭關係而追索的項目數額如何運算。再者, 既然周全然不接受馮是僱員身份,亦沒有或然的立場/主張, 他當然就有薪假期的索償數額沒有正面的反駁,本席看不到梁審裁官依據僱傭條例有關有薪假期的條文及馮根據其薪金紀錄作出(而在庭上作供時確認)的薪酬資料計算有薪年假有何不妥, 亦不明白梁審裁官如何作進一步的查訊。這並非可爭辯的上訴理由。

71.  第六, 周大律師指稱,梁審裁官認為馮及周二人的證供也有些不合理和不可信的地方, 但她就一些與案有關及關鍵性(relevant and material)事宜的處理方式是不接納提呈的證據而沒有嘗試進行查詢。周大律師指稱, 甚至馮及周之間有僱傭關係,梁審裁官應積極查訊周作為僱主是否有權可無須給予通知或代通知金而終止與馮的僱傭合約。[26]周指稱馮從來沒有使用他提供的油卡折扣優惠, 所以他認為馮必然把非法燃油注入他的車輛, 因為馮作供指稱周從來沒有提供油卡給他使用,而他的工資為港幣2,400.00元至2,500.00元(單程)或港幣3,400.00元至3,500.00元(雙程), 該款項已包括油費及道路/隧道費。周大律師指稱,就這方面只有3個可能性: (1)周提供了油卡而馮亦使用油卡享有折扣優惠、(2)周提供了油卡但馮沒有使用油卡, 或(3)周沒有提供或馮不知悉周已提供了油卡。周大律師認為可排除第(1)點,因為這並非馮的案情。至於第(2)及第(3)點,雖然周忘記了他向馮提供油卡的日期,但梁審裁官應該查詢以下事宜以協助她在相對可能性下作出有關周有否提供油卡給馮的裁斷: (i)每車程的一般油費, (ii)油卡持有人可得的燃油優惠, (iii)每車程的隧道/道路收費, 及(iv)每車程的其他使費或道路收費。周大律師認為上述乃關鍵事宜,因為馮作為貨車司機的成本及費用(costs and expenses)如果超逾其每程車資便不合常理及邏輯。周大律師指稱,在沒有上述查訊的情況下,當梁審裁官考慮周可否即時終止與馮的合約定然沒有考慮有關因素,而梁審裁官收到周的覆核書面陳詞也沒有在覆核期間調查上述事宜。

72.  周大律師指稱,周曾向審裁處提供他的其他貨車燃油費收據以顯示每車程在折扣優惠下的燃油費, 但梁審裁官沒有考慮該等文件,亦沒有將該等文件列為周的證物。再者, 周大律師指稱,梁審裁官沒有在其口頭判詞及該理由書顯示她曾想及這一點, 繼而考慮馮會否為了大化其車資而要求/使用有折扣優惠的油卡(尤其是他曾以貨車司機身份替其他運輸公司工作而很有機會知悉油卡優惠的存在)或馮因非法燃油較折扣優惠下的燃油更便宜而沒有使用油卡並將非法燃油注入車輛。周大律師認為, 梁審裁官只指出周未能提供證人及/或文件證據證明其指稱,而就上述關鍵性事宜亦未有履行其查訊責任。周大律師亦認為,基於梁審裁官未有履行上述查訊責任,她不可能得出結論, 馮沒有員工財政風險。

73.  本席細心考慮周大律師的陳述,認為這方面可能具有爭辯的理據。至於馮可能把非法燃油注入車輛的說法, 這是周的主張, 所以周就此負上舉證責任。雖然周沒有提供目擊證人的證供, 而梁審裁官認為周這方面的證供含糊籠統, 但正如周大律師所述, 上述第71(i)-(iv)點所提及的事宜可能構成案中的客觀事實或證據以促使梁審裁官執行其調查責任, 而梁審裁官應否從她已掌握的證據決定及如何進行調查, 及/或應否在調查後才考慮全盤證據而對事實加以推斷(以決定周指稱已將油卡交給馮使用及/或馮有否使用非法燃油是否屬實), 本席認為這是可爭辯的上訴理由。

74.  第七,就周申索要求馮歸還周多付的港幣20,000 .00元,梁審裁官認為這是該審裁處司法管轄權以外的申索, 但梁審裁官仍然考慮該申索是否可抵銷馮的申索。周大律師陳述指稱, 依據上述第6點提及的上訴理由, 周具有可爭辯的理據可即時終止與馮的合約,梁審裁官在考慮「抵銷」時忽略了這一點。

75.  本席不同意這說法。作為任何「抵銷」項目,周也必須證明其多付港幣20,000 .00元的申索是有效的申索, 但從證據上(包括證人證供對比文件紀錄)的分析(見上述第26-28段及第39-40段), 周就這方面的申索根本站不住腳(而周大律師也沒有就這方面提出的反駁理由), 因此不能構成任何「抵銷」, 也不值得梁審裁官行使酌情權將LBTC3400/2015轉回小額錢債審裁處審理。這不是具有爭辯理由的上訴理據。

VIII. 總結

76.  基於上述原因，本席許可周按上述第71-72段所述的上訴理由就該裁決及該覆核裁決提出上訴。周須於頒下本判決書後14天內將中文正式命令的草擬文本送交法庭供本席批核, 而該草擬文本須述明上述獲批許可上訴的法律觀點。本席亦頒下暫准訟費命令，周的是次上訴許可申請的一半訟費歸於上訴訟案中。