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Matrimonial Causes2017

LY v. FF

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[2018] HKFC 233-EN-2018-12-18

LY v. FF

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FCMC 161/2017

[2018] HKFC 233

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

MATRIMONIAL CAUSES NO. 161 OF 2017

-----------------

BETWEEN

 LYPetitioner
 and 
 FFRespondent

-----------------

Coram:His Honour Judge G. Own in Chambers (Not Open to Public)
Date of Hearing:13 September 2018
Date of Decision:18 December 2018

-------------------------

D E C I S I O N
(Further and Better Particulars)

-------------------------

Introduction

1.  On 29/12/2017, the Petitioner Wife (“W”) issued a Summons seeking leave to file and serve a 4th Questionnaire on the Respondent Husband’s financial disclosures by way of Form E, supplemental affirmations and answers to W’s 2nd questionnaire.  Attached to the Summons was a draft 4th Questionnaire containing 10 questions.  The Summons was scheduled for a call-over hearing on 26/2/2018.

2.  At the call-over hearing, as H agreed to provide answers only to questions 1, 2 and 9, leave was granted to W to file and serve her 4th Questionnaire limited to those agreed questions.  For those remaining questions 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 10, leave was granted to W to file supporting affirmation with consequential leave for H to file affirmation in opposition.  W has leave to file a further affirmation in reply.  Direction was granted for substantive argument over those outstanding questions with 1 day reserved.

3.  On 12/3/2018, W filed her 5th Affirmation in support of those remaining questions.

4.  On 23/4/2018, H filed her 4th Affirmation in opposition.

5.  On 7/5/2018, W filed her 6th Affirmation in reply.

6.  At the trial today, W’s lawyers confirmed not to pursue questions 5 and 6.  Thus the Court was only required to deal with questions 3, 4, 7, 8 and 10.

The applicable legal principles

7.  There is not much dispute over the applicable legal principles on discovery.  H’s Counsel in his written submissions referred this Court to Rule 77(4) of the Matrimonial Causes Rules, Cap.179A (“MCR”) and the following cases : FCP v. CJLY(FCMC No.6202/2012), YXY v. YYW(FCMP No.7/2013), K & L Gates v. NavinKumar Aggarwal(HCA No.1061/2011) and CLS v. LPKP [2018] 1 HKLRD786.

8.  Rule 77(4) of the Matrimonial Causes Rules, Cap.179A (“MCR”) reads as follows :-

“(4) Any party to an application for ancillary relief may by letter require any other party to give further information concerning any matter contained in any affidavit filed by or on behalf of that other party or any other relevant matter, or to furnish a list of relevant documents or to allow inspection of any such document, and may, in default of compliance by such other party, apply to the court for directions.”

9.  Order 24 Rule 7 of the Rules of the High Court (“RHC”) is applicable to matrimonial proceedings by virtue of Rule 3 of the MCR.  Given the fact that W is now pursuing for further and better particulars of answers already provided by H including production of documents, I will take into account the approach prevalently adopted in specific discovery applications in this Decision.

10.  The principles governing specific discovery have been summarised by Hon Ng J in the case of Jade’s Realm Ltd v.Director of Lands  (HCA No.1509/2012) dated 9 January 2015 as follows :-

“(1) There is no jurisdiction to make an order for specific discovery under RHC O.24 r.7 unless there is sufficient evidence or prima facie case that : (a) the documents or classes of documents exist which the other party has not disclosed; (b) the documents relate to a matter in issue in the action; and (c) the documents are in the possession, custody or power of the other party;

(2) Once it is established that those three prerequisites for jurisdiction do exist, the court has a discretion whether or not to order discovery.

(3) The Court will not make an order unless the discovery sought is necessary either for disposing fairly of the cause or matter or for saving costs.

(4) The Peruvian Guano test remains the test of relevance, A document is relevant if :

(i) it is reasonable to suppose that it contains information which may, not must, either directly or indirectly enable the party requiring the same either to advance his own case or to damage the case of his adversary; or

(ii) it is a document which may fairly lead the party to a train of inquiry which may have either of those two consequences.

(5)  For the purpose of discovery, the pleadings have to be looked at broadly.

(6)  The order must identify with precision the documents or categories of documents which are required to be disclosed, for otherwise the person giving the discovery may find himself in serious trouble for swearing to a false affidavit, even though doing his best to give an honest disclosure.

(7)  Notwithstanding the Peruvian Guano test, ‘fishing’ is not allowed, and discovery should not be oppressive.

(8)  The respondent may answer an application for specific discovery by an affidavit stating that he does not have the documents, and this will be conclusive at the interlocutory stage.”

11.  In the often cited case of B v. B (matrimonial proceedings: discovery) [1979] 1 All ER 801, Dunn J summarised the law on discovery in ancillary relief application at page 811 :

“I will conclude the part of my judgment by summarising my conclusions as to law.

(1)  A party to a suit must disclose all the documents in his possession, custody or power which are relevant to the matters in issue. The court has discretion whether or not to order him to make such disclosure, and also has discretion whether or not to order him to produce the documents for inspection by the other party or the court.

(2)  …………….

(3)  …………….

(4)  …………….

(5)  The discretion is a judicial discretion, and in exercising it the court will have regard to all the circumstances. The court will balance the relevance and importance of the documents and the hardship likely to be caused to the wife by the non-production against any prejudice to the Husband and third parties likely to be caused by production………..….. The court will not order production unless it is satisfied that production is necessary either for disposing fairly of the issues between the parties or for saving costs.”

12.  With these principles in mind, I will now consider W’s application.

The Wife’s Questions

13.  On question 3, W is seeking production of supporting documents of 2 separate sums of HK$6,000 withdrawn which H deposed was for payment of legal fees to Messrs. Yip, Tse and Tang and Messrs. Joseph Leung & Co. on 17/1/2017 and 18/1/2017 respectively.

14.  On question 4, W is seeking production of supporting documents for a sum of HK$6,000 withdrawn on 19/1/2017 which H deposed was for payment of electricity, water, internet, telephone and management fees.

15.  On question 7, W is seeking production of transaction records of H’s securities account no. 697-x-xxxx5000 with full transaction details for the period from 1/1/2016 to 31/3/2017.

16.  On question 8, W is seeking production of supporting documents in respect of purchases and redemption of financial products in his wealth management account no.601-x-xxx69-2 on 3/5/2016, 6/6/2016, 4/7/2016, 8/8/2016, 19/2/2017 and 23/1/2017.  W also sought for monthly account statements of H’s wealth management account no.601-x-32xxx-2 with Wing Lung Bank from 1/1/2016 to 31/3/2017 or until it was closed.

17.  On question 10, W is seeking production of H’s Staff Handbook or medical insurance plan or any other supporting documents in respect of the fringe benefits provided by H’s employer.

The Husband’s Contention

18.  First and foremost, H contended that those questions presently in issue are either repetitive or irrelevant and had been answered previously[1].

19.  H’s reply to question 3 was that he did not keep those receipts of payments to the 2 law firms whom he sought primary consultation. 

20.  H’s reply to question 4, similar to that of question 3, was that he did not keep those receipts for utilities payments.  He was only able to produce the management fees demand note but not others.  He would not be able to produce those receipts no matter how many times W insisted for them.  H opined that this was a waste of time and costs to delay the proceedings.

21.  H’s reply to question 7 was that he failed to see any relevance between the transaction records of his security account no.697-x-xxxx5000 with CITIC Bank and his financial situation.  He had already produced as exhibit “FF-3” in his earlier Affirmation dated 28/3/2017 the latest value of HK$205,200 in credit as at 27/2/2017.

22.  H’s reply to question 8 was that the investment account no.601-x-xxx69-2 had already been closed at the time of filing his Form E.  The amount which remained in credit in the investment account was remitted to another account no.601-xxx-xx21-5 which he had already produced records showing those remittances.

23.  H’s reply to question 10 was that the Staff Handbook is highly confidential and that he was not able to produce it even though W insisted for the production.  H believed the purpose behind was that W wanted to challenge his monthly medical expenses of HK$1,500.  He had already provided to W medical expenses which consisted of body check fee around RMB 6,000 a year and monthly clinic fee ranging HK$800 to HK$1,000 on average.

The Court’s Views

24.  I will start with the 3 pre-requisites under (i) relevance; (ii) existence and (iii) possession; and then followed by consideration as to whether disclosure was needed either for disposing fairly of the cause or matter in issue or for saving costs[2].

25.  I have also reminded myself of the underlying objectives of the Civil Justice Reform embodied in Order 1A, rule 1 of the Hong Kong Civil Procedure 2018 (“HKCP”).   

26.  Parties in litigation, including in matrimonial cases, are under a continuing duty of full and frank disclosure of documents and information, it is the Court’s discretion guided upon established principles as to the scope and extent of disclosure.  The burden always falls upon the party seeking disclosure to justify his or her application.

27.  W’s question 3 is unjustified both in terms of context and the amount involved.  Spending 2 separate sums of HK$6,000 each on legal fees to 2 different law firms on 2 consecutive days (17/1/2017 and 18/1/2017) for primary consultation fee is not unreasonable.  H was then represented by another law firm Messrs Yan lawyers by the filing of the Form 4 on 17/2/2017.  W’s divorce proceedings were commenced on 5/1/2017.  Apparently, those 2 sums were spent between the commencement of proceedings and the filing of the Form 4.  H to obtain separate legal advice seems sensible and credible even though eventually he decided to instruct the present law firm.  More importantly, the amount involved was not excessive.  It is neither costs effective nor proportionate for W to dwell upon the 2 sums totalling HK$12,000 at the present interlocutory stage.

28.  I find H had sufficiently answered W’s question 3 which will be conclusive at this interlocutory stage[3].

29.  W’s question 4 is also unjustified.  As correctly submitted by H’s Counsel in his written submissions[4], the evidence shows the monthly management fees were HK$2,249 which formed part of the monthly expenses of HK$6,000.  W is actually seeking documentary proof as to the balance of HK$3,751 (i.e. HK$6,000 – HK$2,249).  In my view, further discovery on such trivial sum is wholly disproportionate in the context of the family pool of assets which consists of a property in Hong Kong, though under H’s sole name, worth over HK$10 million which W was seeking financial reliefs.

30.  I find H had sufficiently answered W’s question 4 which will be conclusive at this interlocutory stage[5].

31.  W’s question 7 is justified.  Disclosure of the latest balance in an investment account is insufficient as it does not show how such latest balance came about.  H has disclosed his consolidated bank statements of his CITIC Bank account (which also shows the account no.697-x-xxxx5000) from February 2016 to January 2017[6] where the monthly balance remains more or less the same around HK$28,000 except for the months ending May at HK$43,081.05; from August to December 2016 and January 2017 which was around HK$26,940.

32.  H submitted that any securities transactions would be logged in the bank statements.  It was further submitted that unless there was any particular transaction that W thinks H had done to defeat her ancillary reliefs, there is no reason for H to disclose the transaction records[7]. 

33.  Transactions in and out within an investment account are important in that it does not merely show gains or losses, it is also indicia of one’s financial capability to invest.  It is noted that the account no.697-x-xxxx5000 was given the name of “NOW Account” in the consolidated statements.  It is unclear whether such “NOW Account” includes any portfolios other than stock investment.  Moreover, the discrepancies in balance; in particular, for the month ending May 2016 suggests that there might be some transactions undertaken. 

34.  Moreover, how would W be able to know any particular transaction that looks suspicious of H defeating her ancillary reliefs without having had sight of all the transaction records in the first place ?

35.  H’s submission of the case of CLS v. LPKP (supra) where it was said transaction records are “cheap to obtain but expensive to analyse”[8] does not assist H. Reason being that it was H’s case that there was no transactions or virtually none and if so, there would not be any costs issue for analysing the records.

36.  Having said, I find W’s question 7 justified on ground of relevance and existence.  H is readily able to obtain all the monthly records to show whether there are any transactions taken place for the period of time in question.  Thus, the ground of possession will be fulfilled even though H does not have the records on hand.  I am also satisfied that the transaction records sought for are needed for disposing fairly of the issue of ancillary reliefs.

37.  W’s question 8 is also justified.  Paragraph 5.1 of the Form E requires disclosure of any change in assets for 36 months preceding the Form E.  H’s Form E was filed on 6/3/2017 and the prescribed preceding 36 months runs from 6/3/2014. At paragraph 5.1 of H’s Form E, it was written “N.A.”[9] H is short of compliance with the prescribed disclosure.

38.  As to H’s answer that he had disclosed the wealth management account had already been closed and the remaining balance had been transferred to another account no.601-xxx-xx21-5 on 19/1/2017 and 23/1/2017, I find this is plainly an insufficient if not evasive answer.  Under the Form E, there is no exemption from disclosure of any bank accounts even though they were closed at the time of the Form E. 

39.  It is noted that nowadays financial products can be purchased and redeemed anytime on line at the tip of fingers.  However, there would be records kept by the bank on the transactions even though it was not reproduced on paper subsequent to the transaction as in the old days. 

40.  Mere disclosure of having bought and sold financial products or commodities without specifying any of the details of each of the transactions fall short of full and frank disclosure.  I find H’s answers as to where the proceeds had gone to be insufficient. The missing details, in my view, are much more important than the results of the investments as it is also indicia of one’s financial capability to invest. The missing details are also needed for disposing fairly of the issue of ancillary reliefs. 

41.  Same as transaction records under question no.7, I also find those records of purchase and redemption of financial products under question no.8 are relevant and in existence.  If H does not possess them, he is readily able to obtain from the Bank.

42.  With respect, I do not agree with H’s Counsel’s submission that it is oppressive to H for W to insist those supporting documents and records[10].  The further submission that it is unknown what sort of documents W was seeking is misconceived.  The documents sought are simply those purchase and redemption records.  This does not require H to prove anything or to prove closing of account so submitted by H’s Counsel[11].

43.  As to the non- disclosure of the monthly statements of H’s wealth management account no.601-x-xxx69-2 with Wing Lung Bank, I find against H in that closure of such account does not exonerate his duty of disclosure under established principles of discovery or as required by the Form E.

44.  Hence, I find in favour of W on question no.8 in its entirety.  H is required to produce all the transaction records of the purchase and redemption of financial products and also the monthly statements of his wealth management account no.601-x-xxx69-2 with Wing Lung Bank so requested by W.

45.  As to question 10 for disclosure of H’s Staff Handbook, the whole purpose was for W to ascertain what fringe benefits was provided by H’s employer including but not limited to any medical insurance coverage.  I also noted H’s contention of his duty of confidentiality to his Employer against such disclosure.

46.  In my view, whether H was entitled to any medical insurance coverage from his Employer is an issue since he was claiming medical fees as an expenses item. Without such Staff Handbook, W would have to take H’s words for whatever it is worth.  I noted that H had not provided any evidence from his Employer as to the confidentiality of the Staff Handbook.  Had the Staff Handbook been a confidential document, it would be incumbent upon H to seek approval from his Employer for such disclosure or to the very least for disclosure limited to fringe benefits such as any medical insurance coverage.  Falling short of any such evidence, I find it unacceptable for H to simply say outright that the Staff Handbook was confidential and would not be produced.

47.  Hence, I find W’s question 10 justified.         

Conclusion

48.  Given careful consideration to all the above, I find in favour of W on questions 7, 8 and 10. I find against W on questions 3 and 4.

Costs

49.  Since W is only successful on 3 out of 5 questions to be raised against H, I find it fair and reasonable not to make any costs order in respect of this application; save and except W’s own costs to be taxed in accordance with Legal Aid Regulations.

Orders

50.  I now make the following Orders :-

(a)  Leave be granted for W (Petitioner) to raise questions 7, 8 and 10 set out in the draft 4th Questionnaire attached to the Summons dated 29/12/2017 as the 5th Questionnaire within 3 days from today (that is, on or before 21/12/2018);

(b)  H (Respondent) do file and serve his answers to W’s (Petitioner’s) 5th Questionnaire within 28 days thereafter (that is, on or before 18/1/2019);

(c)  No further Questionnaire be filed without leave of the Court;

(d)  There be no Order as to costs, including all costs reserved;

(e)  W’s (Petitioner’s) own costs be taxed in accordance with Legal Aid Regulations.

51.  This is a costs order nisi which would become absolute if no application is made by any party to vary the same within 14 days from today.

 (George Own)
 District Judge

Mr. Yu Chung Yin of Messrs. CLY Lawyers, Solicitors for the Petitioner

Mr. Austin Yiu instructed by Messrs. YAN Lawyers, Solicitors for the Respondent



[1]  See paragraph 4 of H’s Counsel’s submissions

[2]  See Jade’s Realm Ltd v.Director of Lands (HCA No.1509/2012)

[3]  See paragraph 11 of YXY v. YYW (FCMP 7/2013)

[4]  See paragraph 19 of H’s Counsel’s written submissions

[5]  See paragraph 11 of YXY v. YYW (FCMP 7/2013)

[6]  See pages 136 to 172 of Trial Bundle

[7]  See paragraph 30 of H’s Counsel’s written submissions

[8]  See paragraph 57 of the Judgment

[9]  See page 38 of the Trial Bundle

[10]  See paragraph 37 of H’s Counsel’s written submissions

[11]  See paragraph 37 of H’s Counsel’s written submissions

[2018] HKFC 13-EN-2018-01-31

LY v. FF

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FCMC 161/2017

[2018] HKFC 13

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

MATRIMONIAL CAUSES NO. 161 OF 2017

-----------------

BETWEEN  
 LYPetitioner

and

 FFRespondent

-------------------

Coram: His Honour Judge G. Own in Chambers (Not Open to Public)
Date of Hearing: 8 December 2017
Date of Decision: 31 January 2018

-------------------------

J U D G M E N T
(Maintenance Pending Suit)

-------------------------

Introduction

1.  The Petitioner is the Wife (“W”) and the Respondent is the Husband (“H”).

2.  In January 2017, W filed her petition for divorce relying on the fact of “Unreasonable Behaviour”.  Decree Nisi was granted on 25 July 2017.  Custody, care and control of the only child of the family, who is now 3 years old (“the Child”), was granted to W with reasonable access to H.

3.  On 7 June 2017, W applied by way of summons for maintenance pending suit for herself and interim maintenance for the Child.  W’s ground of application was contained in her Affirmation filed on the same date (TB:96-114).  H filed his Affirmation in Opposition on 7 July 2017 (TB:131-143).  W’s Affirmation in reply was filed on 4 August 2017 (TB: 144-156).

4.  However, without leave of the Court, H chose to file a further Affirmation on 22 August 2017 (TB:162-171) purportedly in further reply to W’s Affirmation.  At the hearing on 26 September 2017, leave was granted by consent for H to adduce such further Affirmation as evidence for this hearing with consequential leave for W to file one further Affirmation within 28 days.  W filed her further Affirmation on 24 October 2017 (TB:178-194).

5.  W is now seeking a monthly periodical payment of HK$50,000 in total as maintenance pending suit for herself and interim maintenance for the Child.  W had neither stated in her Summons as to the respective apportionment of the amount claimed nor as to when it should commence.

Parties’ Open Proposals

6.  On the day of trial, W split the amount for herself and the Child.  W proposed monthly sums of HK$10,000 for herself and HK$26,000 for the Child, thus making a total of HK$36,000 a month as her Open Proposals.  H proposed HK$18,000 a month only for the Child without any proposals for W.

7.  With the sharp difference between the proposals, the trial started.

8.  At the conclusion of this trial and upon parties’ agreement, this Court granted an interim interim maintenance order against H pending this Judgment at the same amount of his open proposals, namely, HK$18,000 a month apportioned at HK$8,472 for W and the Child, with the balance of HK$9,528 as school fees for the Child.

Background

9.  The parties married in 2013.  At trial, both H and W was aged 33.  There is one child born out of the marriage in June 2014 who is now aged 3 and is attending whole day nursery close to W’s living place which is a rented unit since February 2017.

10.  W has been a housewife throughout the marriage until present.  She is a lawyer in the PRC and undisputedly still maintained her practising certificate there although she has not been practising after marriage.  The reason given for maintaining the practising certificate was that she has to keep her PRC state benefits ‘open’ such as social security insurance.  It is only for this reason that she wants to continue to pay the practising certificate fees.

11.  In April 2017, she started working as an insurance agent in AIA International Limited in Hong Kong.  For the months between April and September 2017, she was only able to earn commissions of HK$9,010.70 and HK$916.07 out of 2 insurance policies, one of which was actually purchased by herself, the other one by her relative. In late September 2017, she decided to resign for the fact that she would not be able to work after January 2018 when her dependant visa would expire. Further, she did not see any future to continue working as an insurance agent since she had not been successful in sales of insurance policies to earn sufficient income to meet her financial needs.

12.  In order to be able to stay in Hong Kong to look after the Child, W enrolled herself in a post graduate diploma in business programme which enabled her to be able to obtain a study visa for the time being.  The programme would last for 1 year and by then she would like to continue a master degree programme which would last for another 1 to 2 years.  After graduation, she planned to stay in Hong Kong based on the Immigration Arrangement for Non-local Graduates visa (“IANG Visa”) (TB: 185).

13.  H works as a Vice President in the Corporate Banking Department of a local bank in Hong Kong.  In his Affirmation, H deposed to having an income of around HK$50,000 with bonus which fluctuated quite a lot from time to time.  H deposed his average monthly income around HK$60,000 provided that he could go back to work without being disturbed by W.  Reason being that since 1st July 2017, H had to cease his work because W had attended his office causing all sorts of disturbances.  Undisputedly, at the time of this trial, H had resumed his work with the same employer and his remuneration package remain unchanged.

14.  There is a property in Taikoktsui, Kowloon, Hong Kong which used to be the former matrimonial home (“FMH”) registered under the sole name of H.  This property is “mortgage free” with a market value of around HK$11 million.  The monthly rental of an apartment similar to the FMH is around HK$28,500.  However, the FMH was left vacant until shortly before this trial when H moved back and stayed there.

W’s case

15.  W deposed in her Affirmation as to how she had been denied access to the FMH around January 2017.  Around early December 2016, H admitted to her of having an extra-marital affair and insisted for a divorce notwithstanding that by that time W was pregnant for about 3 months.  H insisted W to carry out abortion through a private hospital in Shenzhen, PRC.  W was unwilling to do so at the beginning but she gave in at the end.  W carried out the abortion as arranged by H in mid to late December 2016 in Shenzhen, PRC.

16.  Upon return to Hong Kong after the abortion around late December 2016/early January 2017, W found out all the locks to the FMH were changed by H.  Starting from then onwards, she was denied access to the FMH.  She was forced to stay in a hotel with the Child for a short period of time before she rented the apartment in Taikoktsui which she is now living with the Child at the rent of HK$19,300 a month.

17.  W in her supporting Affirmation (TB: 100-102) sets out her monthly expenses as follows :-

General ExpensesAmount
RentalHK$ 19,300
Utilities (Electricity, gas, telephone, water and internet) HK$    800
FoodHK$ 4,500
Household expensesHK$ 1,200
Total:
HK$ 25,800
  
Personal Expenses 
Meals out of homeHK$ 2,000
TransportHK$ 1,000
Clothing/Shoes   HK$ 1,500
Personal grooming (including haircut and cosmetics)  HK$ 500
HolidayHK$ 1,700
Medical/Dental HK$ 100
Insurance premia HK$ 300
Fees for social security and lawyer’s practising certificate HK$ 1,660
Total:     
HK$ 8,760
  
Child’s Expenses 
School Fees  HK$ 6,141
School books and stationery   HK$ 100
Medical/DentalHK$ 250
Entertainment/presents HK$ 800
HolidaysHK$ 1,500
Clothing/ShoesHK$ 1,000
Other TransportHK$ 400
Child minding fees HK$ 2,000
UniformHK$ 125
Total:     
HK$ 12,316

18.  W in her 3rd Affirmation repeated her monthly expenses with a revised school fee for the Child of HK$11,500 instead of HK$6,141 since the Child had started whole day nursery; an additional item of English tuition of HK$1,638 for the Child.  With these revision, the Child’s Expenses become HK$19,313 instead of HK$12,316.

H’s case

19.  H chose not to comment on W’s case as to the denial of access to the FMH claiming that it was irrelevant to the present application (TB: 132). H chose to explain why he himself did not stay in the FMH and also why the FMH was left vacant since their separation.

20.  H’s explanation was that since W had asserted that she would keep going to his place to hassle him, he decided to rent and live elsewhere after separation. The reason for not letting out the FMH was that he found out W had registered a Notice at the Land Registry, he was being told by the estate agent it would be very difficult to find a tenant willing to rent the FMH.

21.  H estimated the Child’s expenses to be approximately at HK$13,775 a month (excluding one third of the rent, namely the rent spent on the Child).   At paragraphs 15 to 17 of H’s 2nd Affirmation (TB: 134-135), H said :-

“15. When it comes to details of the expense listed out in paragraphs 13, 14, 16 and 17, (1) household expenses of HK$1,200 shall be removed since the Petitioner and her mother are both living in the rented unit and there is no need to pay for household; (2) school fees at the amount of HK$11,500 already include HK750 as the meal fee and HK$1,280 as the book and entertainment fee for the Child. It is proposed that entertainment/present expenses for the Child shall be reduced to HK$200 per month and holiday expenses shall be reduced to HK$1,000 per month; (3) since the Child is living and attending school in Hong Kong within walking distance of the rented unit, no transportation expenses shall be incurred on regular basis; and (4) since uniform fee is paid on monthly basis, the Child’s clothes/shoes expenses shall be reduced to HK$600 per month.  

16. Particularly, the HK$2,000 paid to the Petitioner’s mother listed in paragraph 19 overlaps with the child-minding fees as listed in paragraph 16. I crave leave to refer to the Petitioner’s answer to my questionnaire of her Form E (“Her Answer”), paragraph 14 of Her Answer explains that the Child-minding fees of HK$2,000 is the fees paid to the Petitioner’s mother, including the expenses for meals out of home and transport. Therefore, the expense of HK$2,000 shall be removed from the list of total monthly expenses claimed by the Petitioner. Further, the Petitioner’s mother is taking care of the Child for the ease of the Petitioner to go to work on full time basis and it is up to the Petitioner to make such arrangement to maximize the value of her professional qualification and career development. Therefore, any expenses incurred by the Petitioner’s mother shall be considered as part of the living expenses of the Petitioner instead of the Child and be removed from the Child’s expense.  

17. In addition, I do not agree with the Petitioner’s proposal in paragraph 18 of her Affirmation. The Child is attending a whole-day class at a reputable school and the school fee is HK$11,500 per month. Resources spent on education of the Child is considered sufficient and adequate under current financial condition. Spending additional HK$1,638 per month for English class would make the education excessive and unaffordable for me. Also, I fail to see the necessity for a 3-year child to have 3 classes   per week after a whole-day education at school.”  

22.  Thus, H proposed the Child’s expenses are as follows :-

ItemAmount (HK$) 
School fees (including meal fee and book and birthday party fee)         
11,500
School books and stationery
100
Medical/Dental   
250
Entertainment/presents  
200
Holidays
1,000
Clothing/Shoes
600
Uniform
    125    
Total :   
13,775

23.  H in his 3rd Affirmation said further :-

“12. Paragraphs 13 to 18 of the Petitioner’s 3rd Affirmation are denied. I crave leave to refer to the Paragraphs 14 to 18 and Paragraphs 24 to 26 of my 2nd Affirmation as reply. Just to reiterate, my travelling expenses include the expense of my travel to Beijing at least once or twice per year to meet my parents alone without the Petitioner and the Child. Hence the Petitioner or the Child’s travel expenses are not comparable with mine.

13. Further, there has never been the so-called “common intention” that the Child should travel 2-3 trips per year after he attains the age of 3 or the Child should go to the international school. Frankly speaking, in my opinion, thoses choices in respect of the Child are all flexible as long as the Child can have a happy childhood and those choices shall be practical and conditional upon the actual income of the parents and the status of the family at that time. I do not see the necessity to take the Child for long distance trip at the age of 3. The Child will be too young to bear the tiredness and discomfort of the long flight trip and the possibility of getting sick during the trip is considerable. Meanwhile, attending international school is a reasonable choice for the Child before separation and may still be a feasible option if I can go back to work without the Petitioner’s hassling and intrusion and if the Petitioner performs her Responsibility by starting a serious full-time job as soon as possible.”

The statutory provisions and applicable legal principles

24.  Section 3 of the Matrimonial Proceedings and Property Ordinance, Cap.192 (“MPPO”) provides the Court the discretionary power to make interim orders requiring one party to the marriage to make to the other periodical payments for his or her maintenance as the court thinks reasonable

having considered all the circumstances of the case (see HJFGv. KCY[1012] 1 HKLRD 95).  The overriding principle is one of ‘reasonableness’.

25.  It is useful to recite those paragraphs of Hartmann JA (as he then was) in the HJFGcase :-

“33. Jurisdiction to award maintenance pending suit to a spouse is statutory, being governed by the provisions of s.3 of the Matrimonial Proceedings and Property Ordinance, Cap.192. By that section the court is given a discretion to make an order requiring either party to the marriage to make to the other such periodical payments for his or her ‘maintenance’ as the court thinks ‘reasonable’, subject to the condition that the duration of any such order is limited to the period of what may broadly be called the divorce litigation.

34. By definition, therefore, maintenance pending suit is restricted to payments which constitute ‘maintenance’, which are reasonable in the circumstances and which will endure for no longer than it takes to determine the divorce litigation. ‘Maintenance’ is a broad concept.  I do not seek to define its exact meaning but it seems to me that it must be restricted to those payments necessary to meet the recurring costs of living at whatever standard of living is appropriate.  That being the case, no matter how great the wealth of the parties and how unevenly distributed that wealth may be at the time an application for interim maintenance is made, the court has no jurisdiction to make orders which for all practical purposes result in a form of pre-trial capital re-balancing.  In the present case, the judge recognised the long-established approach of looking to the “immediate and reasonable needs” of the wife and son.

35. As to the amount of maintenance pending suit that may be paid, the Ordinance provides only that it must be ‘reasonable’, that is having regard to the circumstances of the case, that it must be fair.

36. An important factor in determining fairness is a consideration of the marital standard of living.  In this regard, each case must be considered according to its own circumstances.  It is not simply to be assumed that great wealth equates to great extravagance.  Some married couples who enjoy great wealth spend with comparative modesty and with a discipline born of discretion, others enjoy consumption on a grand scale.

37. The principles that have emerged over time to guide judges in matters of interim maintenance have been fashioned in the main to ensure fairness.  This is well illustrated in the judgment of Nicholas Mostyn, QC, sitting then as a deputy High Court judge, in TL v. ML and Others (Ancillary Relief :Claim against Assets of Extended Family) [2006] 1 FLR 1263, at 1289, in which, having looked at earlier authorities, he derived the following principles that speak specifically to fairness or are based on the need to ensure it.

  For present purposes, it is sufficient to cite the relevant principles without citing the judge’s reference to the source of those principles :

a. The sole criterion to be applied in determining the application is ‘reasonableness’, which is synonymous with ‘fairness’.

b. A very important factor in determining fairness is the marital standard of living.  This is not to say that the exercise is merely to replicate that standard.

c. In every maintenance pending suit application there should be a specific maintenance pending suit budget which excludes capital or long-term expenditure, more aptly to be considered on a final hearing.  That budget should be examined critically in every case to exclude forensic exaggeration.

d. Where the affidavit or form E disclosure by the payer is obviously deficient, the court should not hesitate to make robust assumptions about his ability to pay.  The court is not confined to the mere say-so of the payer as to the extent of his income or resources.  In such a situation, the court should err in favour of the payee.

38. Finally, it is to be noted that in applications for interim maintenance, when the amount to be paid is for a limited period only and not all of the evidence is necessarily before the court, it is not appropriate, nor indeed in most cases possible, for the court to conduct a detailed investigation into the finances of the parties.  While, in order to determine what is or is not reasonable, some analysis is always required, that analysis can be conducted on a ‘broad-brush’ basis.

26.  As for the matters which the court should consider in assessing an application for maintenance pending suit, Rayden and Jackson on Divorce and FamilyMatters, 18th Edition, said as follows:

“16.17 …..There is no hard and fast rule, and no fixed proportion: each case depends on its own facts. It has been said that the approach to maintenance pending suit should be empirical, and that ‘in the ordinary sort of case the district judges who deal with these applications will have to take a broad view of means on the one hand and income on the other and come to a ‘rough and ready’ conclusion, or take a ‘broad brush’ approach. The overriding consideration is the actual needs of the parties pending suit. Although the provisions of s 25 of the MCA 1973 are expressed to arise only when the court is deciding whether to exercise its powers under s 23, 24 or 24A, the court may nonetheless have regard to the criteria listed in s 25 on an application for maintenance pending suit.

16.18 In practice, as oral evidence is rarely given, it will be unusual for the court on an application for maintenance pending suit to be in a position to make findings of fact on issues in dispute sufficient, for example, to deal with conduct or allegations of non disclosure. However, if it is demonstrated that the paying party has not performed his duty to make full and frank disclosure of his financial resources, then the court can take a broad and robust view of his means, and it does not have to accept and proceed on the basis of the assertions of the paying party as to his means and an inability to pay. The court can look at the reality of the situation and take into account voluntary funding from third parties. Any under provision or over provision in the order for maintenance pending suit can always be corrected when the account comes to be taken at the substantive hearing when there every opportunity to do fairness by set-off…….”

27.  In the often cited unreported case of C v. F (FCMC No.1701 of 2000), my learned brother Judge Bruno Chan at paragraph 14 of the Judgment said, which I respectfully agree :

  “14. Although the sole statutory guideline in considering maintenance pending suit is that the award shall be “reasonable”, the Court will nevertheless bear in mind all the factors drawn to its attention relating to the marriage and the parties to it (my emphasis), and perhaps the 2 most outstanding matters in every case, as in this one, are the standard of living of the parties, and the ability of the husband to pay.”

28.  Thus, in all maintenance pending suit applications, the Court would not be expected to carry out any detailed and minute investigation of finances and expenditures since there would be no cross examination of the parties’ affirmation evidence to determine their credentials or to make any findings of fact on the information produced.  Nonetheless, the Court would adopt a so-called ‘broad brush’ approach on the information before it and determine whether it is ‘reasonable’ to grant such order and; if so, what the amount should be.

29.  With these principles in mind, I now consider W’s application.

30.  In addition, H’s Counsel invited me to also consider the case of LJ v. LWHH [2003] 3 HKC where it was held that earning capacity would also be considered in maintenance pending suit applications.

Discussion and Analysis

Marital Standard of Living

31.  During the marriage, the parties enjoyed a moderate standard of living.  H was the sole breadwinner supporting W and the Child.  W continued to be a housewife.

32.  The FMH is about 928 sq . ft with private clubhouse facilities.  There is no issue as to the market monthly rent of a similar unit was around HK$28,500 a month. 

33.  In my view, the standard of living of the parties during the marriage was slightly above average standard.

The Child’s Expenses

34.  Going through each of the Child’s expenses items, I allow the items claimed by W though with some adjustments on Holidays which I will assess at HK$1,000 and Clothing/Shoes assess at HK$600.  As to the transportation costs of HK$400 which H contended that the school is within walking distance from W’s living place, my view is that there is bound to be transportation costs on holidays even though the Child everyday goes to school and return home on foot.  Thus I allow this modest sum of HK$400 a month.  However, since it is W’s case that she has been looking after the Child full time as a housewife, I fail to see any reason why there will be a child minding fees of HK$2,000 which H should be held liable to pay.  Thus, the item of child minding fees would be removed.  H has not been able to show the additional English tuition class of HK$1,638 would not be in the best interests of the Child save and except for his alleged financial reasons.  There is also no evidence to show the Child could not cope with such tuition.  I will allow such item of expenses.

35.  Given the said adjustments, the Child’s reasonable amount of interim maintenance will be as follows :-

“Child’s Expenses  
School Fees HK$ 11,500 
English tuition class HK$ 1,638 
School books and stationery HK$ 100 
Medical/Dental HK$ 250 
Entertainment/presentsHK$ 800 
Holidays HK$ 1,000 
Clothing/Shoes HK$ 600 
Other Transport HK$ 400 
Child minding feesHK$ -- 
UniformHK$ 125 
Total:     
HK$ 16,413” 

[NB: Bold print denotes adjusted amount]

The General Expenses of W and the Child

36.  As to the General Expenses of HK$25,800, I am satisfied that the items listed therein and the amounts thereunder are necessities and reasonable in respect of which one third (1/3) should be attributable to the Child.  The remaining two thirds (2/3) would be attributable to W and her mother.  Thus, there will be an additional sum of HK$8,600 (that is, HK$25,800 x 1/3) added

to the Child’s expenses, making a total of HK$25,013 a month as the Child’s financial needs.

W’s Personal Expenses

37.  Now I will deal with W’s Personal Expenses. 

38.  There is not much contention by H as to W’s Personal Expenses save and except the main challenge against W was, being a qualified PRC lawyer and having a high earning capacity, that she did not utilise it by seeking employment either in Hong Kong or Mainland China.  Given the fact that W’s mother has been living with her and assisted her in taking care of the Child, there is no reason why W could not seek employment and have to seek financial support from him. 

39.  As for W’s expenses, I do not agree the fees for social security and keeping her PRC practising certificate to form part of the expenses which H should be liable for.  I will allow the items at the following adjusted amount :

“Personal Expenses  
Meals out of home HK$ 1,000 
Transport HK$ 1,000 
Clothing/ShoesHK$ 800 
Personal grooming (including haircut and cosmetics) HK$ 500 
HolidayHK$ 1,000 
Medical/Dental HK$ 100 
Insurance premia HK$ 300 
Fees for social security and lawyer’s practising certificateHK$ 0 
Total:     
HK$ 4,700” 

[NB: Bold print denotes adjusted amount]

40.  Same as in the Child’s Expenses, there will be added one third (1/3) of the General Expenses of HK$8,600 (HK$25,800 x 1/3) to W’s Personal Expenses, thus making a total of HK$13,300 a month as W’s financial needs.

W’s Earning Capacity

41.  Submission was made by H’s Counsel as to W’s earning capacity should be considered (see LJ v. LWHH [2003] 3 HKC 455).  It was W who chose to resign from her post of insurance agent and then stay unemployed to seek financial assistance from him.

42.  W in her 3rd Affirmation at paragraphs 8 to 12 (TB: 146-148) gave her reasons for not seeking employment.  First of all, she has been a housewife since mid 2012 and would not be easy for her to find full time employment after those idle years.  Secondly, as the sole custodian having care and control of the 3-year old child, she would like to take care of the child herself.  Her mother continued to stay with W was because of her abortion in December 2016 and tried to assist her during those difficult times with the failed marriage.  Moreover, her mother is already 62 years old with joint problem at her shoulder making her difficult to lift up her arms.  Her mother is not physically fit to take care of the Child on a full time basis.  Her mother also does not speak any Cantonese and does not know English at all making her unable to assist the Child academically.

43.  Furthermore, W was and at the time of trial is on a dependent visa with validity until January 2018.  Having enquired with the Immigration Department, she would not be able to renew such visa given the present state of affairs and there is no other way to apply other visa for her to stay in Hong Kong.  Eventually she enrolled on a post graduate diploma programme which enabled her to stay in Hong Kong to study and which also facilitated her to look after the Child.

44.  H in his 3rd Affirmation in reply (TB: 162-171) contended that W, with her legal qualifications and experience as a PRC lawyer, would be able to find decent job with a considerable income had she wanted to do so.  Having said, she would then be able to stay in Hong Kong on a working visa notwithstanding expiry of the dependent visa.  H then talked about himself also on a working visa with expiry in June 2018. 

45.  In my view, the case of LJ v. LWHH (supra) does not assist H.  Although it was held that there was no rule that the parties’ earning capacity could never be considered in an application for maintenance pending suit, the Court by nature of the application being maintenance pending suit, would not consider parties’ long term prospects or earning capacity in circumstances which were less obvious.

46.  At paragraphs 25 and 26 of the Judgment where it was said :

“25. However, in our view, what a judge should not do, at this stage, is to consider earning capacity in circumstances which are less obvious. In the present case, the wife has not worked for the past six to seven years, since she started living with the husband. She is a new immigrant and speaks no English. Her former employment was as a saleslady on the Mainland and she has no skills. With the present state of unemployment in Hong Kong, it is by no means clear that she can easily find suitable employment. 26. Accordingly, whilst we do not agree with the submission by counsel for the wife that the court should never take the parties’ earning capacity into account in an application for maintenance pending suit, we have to say that in this case, the deputy judge fell into error in taking it into account when there was no evidence that a suitable job was available for the wife and she had refused it. Different considerations would of course apply at an application for ancillary relief.”

47.  Thus, was there any circumstances or evidence in the present case which are not less obvious so that W’s earning capacity should be considered by this Court ?

48.  In my view, W is somehow akin to the wife in the LJ v. LWHH case as W had also stayed out of employment in the legal field for some 5 to 6 years.  She does not have any experience working in Hong Kong as a foreign lawyer.  There is no evidence before me as to the employment market in Hong Kong on the supply and demand of PRC lawyers (without any experience working in Hong Kong).  Thus I am unable to take H’s words as the truth nor any judicial notice that gainful employment suitable to W was around the market and it is just because W who refused to seek such employment.

49.  Having said, I believe W’s earning capacity could not be taken on board for consideration simply relying upon H’s bare assertion that W was able to make full use of her earning capacity to generate income.

50.  I find against H on his contention that W’s earning capacity should be considered in the present application for maintenance pending suit.

H’s financial ability to pay

51.  Before going through H’s income and expenses, it is worth to mention that the “mortgage-free” FMH (where H is the sole legal owner) which W was denied access after the abortion around December 2016 was left

vacant and unoccupied since separation until shortly before this trial when H moved back and resided there.

52.  During the period of separation, H rented a service apartment for himself allegedly because he wanted to avoid W’s hassling him if he stays at the FMH. 

53.  H in his Form E reported a monthly basic salary of HK$50,600 along with an average bonus of HK$30,000, thus making a total income of around HK$80,600 a month.   Although he had stopped from working for a few months during which he received no income, it is undisputed that at the time of this trial he had already resumed employment with the same employer and on the same terms.  Moreover, he had moved out from the service apartment he rented and returned to reside in the “mortgage-free” FMH.

54.  H’s reported Monthly Expenses in his Form E are as follows :-

General Expenses     Amount 
RentalHK$ 22,100 
Utilities (Electricity, gas, telephone, water and internet)HK$   3,000 
Management fees   HK$ 2,200 
FoodHK$ 5,000 
Household expenses   HK$ 2,000 
Total:HK$ 34,300 
   
Personal Expenses  
Meals out of home  HK$ 3,000 
TransportHK$ 1,500 
Clothing/ShoesHK$ 3,000 
Personal grooming (including haircut and cosmetics) HK$  300 
Entertainment/PresentsHK$ 2,000 
HolidayHK$ 3,000 
Medical/Dental   HK$ 1,500 
TaxHK$ 10,000 
Contribution to parents HK$ 10,000 
Contribution to other dependants   HK$ 5,000 
Others (Electrical appliances and house maintenance) HK$ 3,000 
Total:HK$ 42,300 
   
Child’s Expenses  
School FeesHK$ 9,100 
Medical/Dental HK$ 200 
Extra curricular activities   HK$ 500 
Clothing/Shoes   HK$ 500  
Lunch and pocket moneyHK$ 800 
UniformHK$ 200 
Total:     HK$ 11,300 

55.  Moreover, H in his Form E disclosed a number of bank accounts with CITIC Bank and Wing Lung Bank adding together with savings around HK$578,435 and stocks valued around HK$205,000.   H had 4 credit cards but only one of which had an outstanding balance of HK$49,180.63. 

56.  Going through each of the items listed H’s Form E as to General Expenses and Personal Expenses and assessing on a broad brush basis, I believe there are items which H had exaggerated.  There are items of contribution to parents of HK$10,000 and contribution to dependants of HK$5,000, totalling HK$15,000 which no Court would agree to rank priority to support the Child.  Hence, I adjusted and set out below the amount which this Court considers as reasonable for H’s General and Personal Expenses.  Those adjusted amount will be annotated in bold print.

“General ExpensesAmount 
Rental HK$ 0 
Utilities (Electricity, gas, telephone, water and internet) HK$ 2,000 
Management fees HK$ 2,200 
FoodHK$ 2,500 
Household expensesHK$ 1,000 
Total: HK$ 7,700 
   
Personal Expenses  
Meals out of home HK$ 3,000 
Transport HK$ 1,500 
Clothing/Shoes HK$ 1,000 
Personal grooming (including haircut and cosmetics) HK$ 300 
Entertainment/Presents HK$ 1,000 
Holiday HK$ 1,000 
Medical/Dental HK$ 800 
TaxHK$ 10,000 
Contribution to parents HK$ 2,000 
Contribution to other dependants HK$ 1,000 
Others (Electrical appliances and house maintenance)HK$ 1,000 
Total:HK$ 22,600 

57.  With the adjusted amounts, H’s General Expenses would be HK$7,700 and Personal Expenses would be HK$22,600, making a total of HK$30,300.  Thus, H would have a surplus of around HK$55,700 out of his average income of HK$86,000.  Given the fact that bonus are variable and not payable on a month to month basis, H would still have a surplus of HK$19,700 out of his basic salary income of HK$50,000 (HK$50,000 - HK$30,300 = HK$19,700) for paying interim maintenance to W and the Child.  Any deficit could have been made good from his bank savings without having to liquidate his investments.

58.  For these reasons, I consider and rule H has the ability to provide maintenance pending suit and interim maintenance for W and the Child.

How much should be paid by H towards W’s and the Child’s financial needs?

59.  “Maintenance” has been held to be a broad concept and generously interpreted.   The ultimate answer to all applications for maintenance pending suit, in my view, is one of ‘reasonableness’ considered objectively by the Court having regard to all the circumstances of the case in question and then exercise its discretion on a ‘broad brush’ basis.  Should there be any over-provision or under-provision, it can always be adjusted at the ancillary relief trial proper at a later stage.

60.  Given careful consideration to all the above, I rule the financial needs of W and the Child at present are HK$13,300 and HK$25,013 respectively a month.  For the sake of convenience, I will round up the Child’s amount to HK$25,000 (instead of HK$25,013).  The total amount to be paid by H would then be HK$38,300.  I decided it should commence on 1 February 2018 whereupon the interim interim maintenance Order of HK$18,000 dated 8 December 2018 would cease. 

61.  As W is legally aided, her maintenance pending suit would be subject to Legal Aid First Charge. 

Costs

62.  Given this Court’s decision and parties’ Open Proposals, I decided that H should pay W’s costs of this application together with all costs reserved, to be taxed if not agreed.  I will so order accordingly.

63.  I also order that W’s own costs be taxed in accordance with Legal Aid Regulations.

64.  This is a costs order nisi which will become absolute if no application to vary it is made within 14 days from the date of this Judgment.

Orders and Directions

65.  For all the above reasons, I now grant the following Orders :-

(a)  H (Respondent) shall pay to W (Petitioner) maintenance pending suit (subject to any Legal Aid First Charge) at the rate of HK$13,300 a month commencing 1 February 2018 and thereafter on or before the 1st day of each and every succeeding month until further order;

(b)  H (Respondent) shall pay to W (Petitioner) interim maintenance for the Child of the family at the rate of HK$25,000 a month commencing 1 February 2018 and thereafter on or before the 1st day of each and every succeeding month until further order;

(c)  H (Respondent) shall pay all costs of W’s (Petitioner’s) costs of this application as per the Summons dated 7 June 2017 including all costs reserved, to be taxed if not agreed;

(d)  W’s (Petitioner’s) own costs be taxed in accordance with Legal Aid Regulations.

66.  I also direct that a Penal Notice be endorsed.

67.  Personal Service of this Order on H (Respondent) be dispensed

   with and be effected upon H’s legal representatives.

68.  In the event H (Respondent) becomes unrepresented, there be

   personal service of this Order on H (Respondent).

69.  Last but not least, I wish to thank both parties’ legal representatives and Counsel for their assistance to this Court.

(George Own)
District Judge

  

Mr. Yu Chung Yin of Messrs. CLY Lawyers, Solicitors for the Petitioner

Mr. Austin Yiu instructed by Messrs. YAN Lawyers, Solicitors for the Respondent