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Matrimonial Causes2017

H v. W

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  • CACC527/2003HKSAR v. W
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Files (13)

[2025] HKFC 64-EN-2025-03-31

KK, H v. PK, H

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FCMC 8332 / 2017

[2025] HKFC 64

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

MATRIMONIAL CAUSES

NUMBER 8332 OF 2017

------------------------------------

BETWEEN

 KK, HPetitioner
 and 
 PK, HRespondent

--------------------------------------

Coram : Deputy District Judge Robin Egerton in Chambers (Not Open to Public)
Application : 7 January 2025
Submissions : Petitioner 10 February 2025
 Respondent : 13 March 2025
Judgment : 31 March 2025

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J U D G M E N T
Decree Absolute
Paper disposal

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A.  Background

1.  On the 13 of December 2024 I delivered judgment (“the Judgment”) granting the Mother’s application to relocate to Singapore with A, a girl aged 9.

2.  By her summons of 19 December 2024 the Mother applied to vary the judgment removing her obligation to obtain a Mirror order in Singapore prior to the relocation.

3.  The Father opposed the application. The application came before the Court on the 7 January 2025; I granted the Mother’s application as set out in the judgment of the same day.

4.  On the 8 January 2025 the Husband sought leave to appeal the Judgment with a stay pending appeal. By the Judgment of 13 February 2025 I dismissed both applications.

5.  The history and the details of the case are set out in the Judgment; I do not propose to repeat them in this judgment.

B.  The application before the Court

6.  By her summons of 7 January 2025 the Mother applies for the Decree Nisi pronounced on the 8 January 2019 to be made absolute

C.  The Father’s position

7.  As set out in his 54 affirmation dated 10 February 2025 the Father asks the court to dismiss the Wife’s application for the decree nisi to be made absolute.

8.  It would appear to be the Father’s case that he wishes that “all matters be fully resolved before a decree absolute is granted”

D.  Analysis

9.  In the Judgment I considered the status of the ancillary relief proceedings and the question of a declaration under Section 18, I stated as follows:

Section 18, decree absolute

79. By reference to section 18(6) of the MPPO welfare “in relation to a child includes the custody and education of the child and financial provision for him”.

80. The custody of A is recorded in the order of 15 December 2017 whereby the Parents have the joint custody of A.

81. Following upon the previous orders and this judgment there are now orders as to A’s custody and care and control, in addition to which arrangements have been ordered as to her relocation, education and access.

82. I have carefully considered whether, by reason of the problematical financial provision, arising from the Father’s failure to comply with court’s order as to maintenance, the court can be satisfied as to the “arrangements for the welfare” of A.

83. In the context of the case generally and notwithstanding the ongoing litigation in relation to maintenance and the fact that ancillary relief between the Parents has yet to be determined I consider the arrangements for A “are the best that can be devised in the circumstances”.

84. In addition I consider and that it is in A’s best interests for her Parents’ unhappy marriage be formally brought to end thereby by allowing the relationship between her Mother and Mr. N to be appropriately formalised by marriage.

85. I therefore hereby pronounce a Section 18 declaration. It will then be for the Mother to apply for the decree nisi pronounced on the 8 January 2019 to be made absolute.”

10.  I do not consider that the Husband’s opposition to the Decree Absolute raises any new matter of substance that I had not considered at the time of the Judgment.

11.  I therefore grant the Mother’s application for the Decree Nisi to be made Absolute.

E.  Costs

12.  Having considered the matter as a whole within the context of these unhappy and protracted proceedings there shall be no order as to costs nisi, such order to be absolute 14 days from the date of this judgment.

  (R N Egerton)
Deputy District Judge

The Petitioner (Father) and Respondent (Mother) both appeared in person

[2025] HKFC 14-EN-2025-01-07

KK, H v. PK, H

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FCMC 8332 / 2017

[2025] HKFC 14

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

MATRIMONIAL CAUSES

NUMBER 8332 OF 2017

------------------------------------

BETWEEN

 KK, HPetitioner
  (Father)
 and 
 PK, HRespondent
  (Mother)

--------------------------------------

Coram : Deputy District Judge Robin Egerton in Chambers (Not Open to Public)
Date of Hearing: 7 January 2025
Date of Handing Down of Judgment: 7 January 2025

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J U D G M E N T

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A.  Background

1.  On the 13 December 2024 judgment (“the Judgment”) was delivered inter alia giving leave to the Mother to relocate with A to Singapore; certain prior conditions were required in particular for a mirror order (“the Mirror Order”) to be obtained from the appropriate court in Singapore prior to the physical relocation.

B.  The Mother’s position

2.  By her summons of the 19th of December 2024 (“the Summons”) the Mother seeks to be released from paragraphs 6 and 8 of the order of the 13th of December 2024 which relate to obtaining the Mirror Order in Singapore prior to the relocation.

3.  The Summons is supported by her 50th affirmation which highlights the following matters post Judgment :

i)  On 16 December 2024 by Whatsapp the Mother asked the Father if he would “consent to mirroring the order in Singapore urgently”.

ii)  The Father replied by Whatsapp on the same day as follows:

I am planning to appeal the judgment, therefore I will not agree to a mirror order until my appeal has been exhausted”

iii)  By email dated 17 December 2024 the Mother’s Singaporean lawyer advised the Mother that the estimate timeline will be 4 to 9 months for a “contested Application of Enforcement of Foreign Judgement” and 2 months if such application is uncontested.

4.  On the 17December 2024 the Mother wrote to the Court asking to be released from obtaining the Mirror Order prior to relocation.

5.  On the 18 December 2024 the Court directed that the Mother take out a Summons.

6.  In her 50th affirmation the Mother has offered the following undertakings :

i)  “to take all reasonable steps to pursue the mirroring process in the appropriate court in Singapore as soon as practicable, including continuing to work closely with Singapore lawyers upon relocation, if necessary.

ii)  “to continue to support the Petitioner’s defined access rights as stipulated in the order of 13 December 2024”

iii)  “to return to Hong Kong with “A” should the Court require our presence”

7.  In her oral submission the Mother stated as follows:

i)  She had obtained an extension to A’s Singaporean Visa until 20 January 2025

ii)  CIS had a place for A to start on 20 January 2025

iii)  She has given notice to her Hong Kong landlord to vacate her apartment by 14 January 2025

iv)  She was in discussion with her employer as to a delayed start date in Singapore

C.  The Father’s position

8.  Although the Father is now a litigant in person, as he was at the Trial, I note that on 18 December 2024 Messrs Withers filed a Notice to Act which was operative until the Father filed his Notice to Act in Person on 3 January 2025. By way of background Withers previously acted for the Father in May 2021 before the Court of Appeal.

9.  Whilst acting for the Father Messrs Withers wrote to the court on 18 December 2024:

“We have been instructed act for the Petitioner Husband in the captioned proceedings. We refer to the Respondent Wife’s letter to this Court of 17 December 2024.

We are currently considering and advising our client on a potential appeal and application for stay of execution against the Judgment of 13 December 2024. Moreover, the relatively “tight” timeline that the Respondent Wife refers to in her said letter were known to this Court when it made its decisions. There is nothing new.

In the premises and without litigating through legal correspondence, we humbly ask the Court to not entertain the Respondent wife’s requests when surely the proper procedure is for her to take out a Summons with a supporting Affidavit and parties are given proper opportunity to be heard.”

10.  In his oral submissions the father confirmed he intended to apply for leave to appeal and stay the Judgment and that such applications would be filed within the next two days.

D.  Analysis

11.  The purpose of the Mirror Order was to provide a platform for the Singaporean Court in relation to these proceedings and in particular the Father’s access to A in Singapore.

12.  In his written submissions the Father stated “The Father reminds the court that it was the Mother’s own suggestion to have a mirror order in Singapore”.

13.  I have reflected on the Judgment and in particular paragraph 89:

“The priority is “the bests interests” of A. Where I have concluded that there is to be a relocation I consider the practical focus is ensuring that A’s move from Hong Kong and her integration in Singapore is as smooth as possible and ,in particular ,her assimilation into her new school .

14.  Having considered the case as a whole, the application, evidence and submissions I have no reason to doubt the undertakings proffered by the Mother.

15.  In the circumstances to avoid further delay to the relocation and taking into account A’s best interests I will vary the order of 13 December 2024 to enable the Mother to relocate with A without obtaining the Mirror order prior to such relocation,

E.  Order

16.  Upon the Mother’s undertakings to the court:

i) “to take all reasonable steps to pursue the mirroring process in the appropriate court in Singapore as soon as practicable, including continuing to work closely with Singapore lawyers upon relocation.

ii) “to continue to support the Petitioner’s defined access rights as stipulated in the order of 13 December 2024”

iii) “to return to Hong Kong with “A” should the Court require her to do so”

17.  The order of the 13 December shall be varied to remove the Mother’s obligation to obtain the Mirror Order prior to relocating from Hong Kong to Singapore.

18.  The Mother be given leave to serve this order on the Immigration Department of the HKSAR.

F.  Costs

19.  There shall be no order as to costs, such nisi order shall become absolute 14 days from the date of this judgment.

  (R N Egerton)
Deputy District Judge

The Petitioner (Father) and Respondent (Mother) both appeared in person

[2024] HKFC 226-EN-2024-12-13

H v. W

HTML content

FCMC 8332 / 2017

[2024] HKFC 226

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

MATRIMONIAL CAUSES

NUMBER 8332 OF 2017

------------------------------------

BETWEEN

 H
(Father)
Petitioner

and

 W
(Mother)
Respondent

--------------------------------------

Coram :Deputy District Judge Robin Egerton in Chambers (Not Open to Public)
Date of Hearing :22, 23, 24, 29 and 30 October 2024
Final Submission of the Petitioner :19 November 2024
Final Submission of the Respondent :18 November 2024
Date of Handing Down of Judgment :13 December 2024

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J U D G M E N T
(Care and Control, Relocation & Decree Absolute)

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Introduction

1.  This Judgment relates to the appropriate arrangements of a 9 year old girl A, the parties (“the Parents”) are respectively her Father and Mother.

2.  The Parents married in February 2013, A was born in October 2015, the Father filed a divorce petition in June 2017 and a decree nisi was pronounced on 8 January 2019; a decree absolute has yet to be pronounced.

3.  By the order of 15 December 2017 the Parents have joint custody of A, with interim care and control to the Mother and interim defined access to the Father.

4.  It is an unfortunate feature of these proceedings that the Parents have been and remain locked in chronic litigation in relation to the appropriate arrangements for A, ancillary relief as between each other and the financial arrangements for A. I was told in the hearing that the Court of Appeal is currently considering the Father’s application for leave to appeal the Maintenance pending suit (“MPS”)/Interim maintenance Judgment dated 15 April 2024, leave having been refused by the Trial Judge on 5 July 2024.

5.  Arising from the judgments to date there are substantial costs orders against both parties which have yet to be taxed. The Father has failed to pay maintenance of @HK$800,000; the Father informed the Court that he considered he was owed a similar amount by the Mother by way of the cost orders in his favour. I further understand from the Mother’s written opening that she has filed a Judgment Summons in respect of outstanding maintenance payments.

6.  I do not propose refer to each and every application and judgment however there are specific judgments of particular relevance to the issues to be determined in this trial:

i) By the judgment of 10 November 2020 the Family Court gave leave for the Mother to relocate to Singapore with A.

ii) Such judgment, so far as relocation, was over turned by the Court of Appeal’s judgment of 24 May 2021.

iii) On 28 July 2023 the Family Court delivered a Fact Finding Ruling in respect of three incidents: “closet incident”, “hair removal incident” and “indecent assault”. It was the Mother’s case that these three incidents amounted to abuse of A whilst in the Father’s care. This was not accepted by the Family Court.

7.  As the focus of this judgment relates to the future arrangements for A, I consider it appropriate to set out the concluding remarks of the Court of Appeal’s judgment of 24 May 2021:

"99. We allow the Father’s appeal and paragraph 1 of the Relocation Summons is dismissed. We set aside the Relocation Order save for the Intervening Order. Having made these orders, we wish to make it clear that Mother is not debarred from making any new application for relocation in future when she is able to provide realistic and practical proposals well researched and investigated, including but not limited to her business investment and/or finances and proposed housing, and when A has had a chance to meet Mr N and his children and has established a comfortable relationship with them. But it is wrong in principle for her to proceed with an immature and uncertain relocation option involving the child simply because she needs to procure her immigration status through the child’s student visa as a springboard."

Overview of A and the Parents’ circumstances

8.  A aged 9 lives primarily with her Mother and attends an international school in Hong Kong. In accordance with the order of 28 July 2023 current term time access arrangements for the Father are :

i) Week 1 Thursday after school until Saturday 5pm

ii) Week 2 Saturday, 5pm until Monday morning before school.

Dinner access on Wednesday night

9.  The Father aged 42 resides in his own property in Hong Kong. He is self-employed with a monthly income of approximately HK$100,000; he is sometimes required to travel overseas for short business trips. Inter alia he pays for A’s annual school fees of @HK$190,000, annual health insurance premiums for A of HK$25,000 and for the Mother of HK$60,000.

10.  The Mother aged 44 resides in rented accommodation in Hong Kong. Her current monthly salary is approximately HK$70,000. Her employer has offered her employment in Singapore as a Human Resources Manager. The Mother has been in a committed relationship with Mr. N since the summer of 2019; they having known each other for approximately 17 Years. Mr. N resides in Singapore and is aged 54; he and the Mother were engaged on 12 November 2023 and plan to marry as soon as they are able to do so.

The Applications before the Court

11.  By his summons of 1 December 2023 the Father seeks an order that:

“The Order of Her Honour Judge Melloy of 15 December 2017, granting the Respondent interim care and control of the child of the family, namely “A”, a girl, born on XX October 2015, and interim defined access to the Petitioner be varied to the extent that care and control be granted to the Petitioner and defined access be granted to the Respondent.”

12.  In his written opening the Father supplemented the relief he sought as follows :

i) The Mother’s access be initially suspended for two months to enable him to rebuild his relationship with A without interference from the Mother

ii) In the first month A to have no contact with the Mother; in the second month remote contact every day

iii) Gradual access by the Mother to resume until a week on week off arrangement is reached but with the Father having sole care and control

iv) Holidays to be split

v) A to spend her birthday with both parents, alternating the first and second parts with each parent

vi) A to stay with each parent on their respective birthdays

13.  By her summons of 2 November 2023 the Mother seeks an order that:

“1. Leave be granted for the Decree Nisi pronounced on 8th January 2019 to be made Absolute;

2. Leave be granted to the Respondent to permanently remove the child of the family namely “A” , a girl born on XX October 2015 from the jurisdiction of Hong Kong to Singapore subject to the Respondent’s undertaking to mirror the access arrangements order in the Singapore Court;

3. Leave be granted to the Respondent to enrol A into a suitable international school in Singapore for the academic year 2024/2025;”

14.  In her written opening the Mother supplemented the relief she sought as follows :

i) On her undertaking to obtain a mirror order in Singapore the costs of obtaining such order be paid equally by the Parents

ii) Leave to enrol A in the X International School, (“XIS”) or N International School or D College in Singapore

iii) General leave to both the Father and Mother to travel with A on holidays while she is with them without requiring prior approval from the other parent or the court, subject to an undertaking to notify the other of such travel plan prior to the travel

iv) Leave for the decree nisi of divorce pronounced on 8 January 2019 to be made absolute.

The Relevant law

15.  In their written submissions the Parents helpfully referred to various authorities; I do not propose to refer to each authority, in addition I am mindful of other authorities which provide helpful guidance in determining cases of this nature, in particular how a court should take into account the wishes of a child.

Care and Control

16.  The general principles are set out in s.3 of the Guardianship of Minors Ordinance, Cap.13 (“the GMO”), which states that:

(1) In relation to the custody or upbringing of a minor, and in relation to the administration of any property belonging to or held in trust for a minor or the application of the income of any such property-

(a) in any proceedings before any court (whether or not a court as defined in section 2) the court –

(i) shall regard the best interests of the minor as the first and paramount consideration and in having such regard shall give due consideration to –

(A) the wishes of the minor if, having regard to the age and understanding of the minor and to the circumstances of the case, it is practicable to do so; and

(B)any material information including any report of the Director of Social Welfare available to the court at the hearing;”

17.  In YSYM and LHB[2020] HKCA 586 the Court of Appeal referred to the importance of a child’s wishes in the determination of the appropriate care arrangements :

“71. Rix LJ had this to say in Re R (Residence Order) [2010] 1 FLR 509 at §§57 and 58:

“[57] The importance of listening to a child once he or she has reached the age of 10 … has been stressed in the authorities. Thus in Re L (A Child) (Contact: Domestic Violence) [2001] Fam 260, [2001] 2 WLR 339, [2000] 2 FLR 334 at 271-271, 347 and 340 respectively, Dame Elizabeth Butler-Sloss P sitting in this court cited with approval Contract and Domestic Violence - T–e Experts' Court Report [2000] Fam Law 615 at 624 on the subject of a child’s wishes:

‘… while this needs to be assessed within the whole context of such wishes, the older the child the more seriously they should be viewed and the more insulting and discrediting to the child to have them ignored. As a rough rule we would see these as needing to be taken account of at any age; above 10 we see these as carrying considerable weight with 6-10 as an intermediate stage and at under 6 as often indistinguishable in many ways from the wishes of the main carer (assuming normal development). In domestic violence, where the child has memories of that violence we would see their wishes as warranting much more weight than in situations where no real reason for the child’s resistance appears to exist.’

See also Re D (Abduction: Rights of Custody) [2006] UKHL 51, [2007] 1 AC 619, [2006] 3 WLR 989, [2007] 1 FLR 961 per Baroness Hale at para [57]:

‘But there is now a growing understanding of the importance of listening to the children involved in children’s cases. It is the child, more than anyone else who will have to live with what the court decides.’”

Alienation

18.  In his opening submission the Father referred to :

i) Re S (Parental Alienation: Cult: Transfer of Parental Care)[2020] EWCA Civ 568, Lord Justice Peter Jackson judgment:

“8 ….For working purposes, the CAFCASS definition of alienation is sufficient:

“When a child’s resistance/ hostility towards one parent is not justified and is the result of psychological manipulation by the other parent.”

To that may be added that the manipulation of the child by the other parent need not be malicious or even deliberate. It is the process that matters, not the motive.

10. There exists a spectrum of severity in relation to alienation, and the remedy depends upon the assessment of all aspects of the child’s welfare.”

19.  In addition to the above paragraphs referred to by the Father the immediate preceding paragraph in the judgment is relevant :

“7. At the outset, it must be acknowledged that, whether a family is united or divided, it is not uncommon for there to be difficulties in a parent-child relationship that cannot fairly be laid at the door of the other parent. Children have their own feelings and needs and where their parents are polarised they are bound to feel the effects. Situations of this kind, where the concerned parent is being no more than properly supportive, must obviously be distinguished from those where an emotionally abusive process is taking place. For that reason, the value of early fact-finding has repeatedly been emphasised.”

Relocation

20.  The Mother referred to the Court of Appeal’s judgment in BA and BL (Child Relocation) [2019] 4 HKLRD 23

“4.14 In Hong Kong, the paramount consideration is whether the relocation is in the best interests of the child. Hence whether a relocation application is made by a primary carer or a non-primary carer does not give rise to any presumption in favour of or against the applicant. There may be myriad reasons why such a parent applies for the relocation of the child. Ultimately it is one of the factors to be considered in the overall assessment whether the relocation is in the best interests of the child and the weight to be attached to this factor depends on the facts of the case. The value of Payne is that it "identifies a number of factors which will or may be relevant in a relocation case, explains their importance to the welfare of the child, and suggests helpful disciplines to ensure that the proper matters are considered in reaching a decision but it does not dictate the outcome of a case", per Black LJ at [144] in K v K. In my view Payne is not to be jettisoned. The relevant factors provide a structured framework in which the appraisal is to be made holistically.”

21.  The Court of Appeal in its judgment in this case [2021] HKCA 733 also emphasised the Payne principles :

“32. The Payne guidance can be summarised as (1) Is the applicant’s proposal genuine and realistic in the sense that it is not motivated by some selfish desire to exclude the father from the child’s life? (2) Is the respondent’s opposition motivated by genuine concern for the future of the child’s welfare or is it driven by some ulterior motive? (3) What would be the impact on the applicant, either as the single parent or as a new spouse of a refusal of his/her realistic proposal? (4) The outcome of the appraisals in (2) and (3) must be considered in the overriding review of the child’s welfare [or in Hong Kong the child’s best interests] as the paramount consideration.”

Decree Absolute

22.  The relevant legislative provisions are Sections 18(1)(b) and (6) of the Matrimonial Proceedings and Property Ordinance which states as follows :

(1) The court shall not make absolute a decree of divorce or of nullity of marriage, or make a decree of judicial separation, unless the court, by order, has declared that it is satisfied –

…..

(b) that the only children who are or may be children of the family to whom this section applies are the children named in the order and that –

(i) arrangements for the welfare of every child so named have been made and are satisfactory or are the best that can be devised in the circumstances; or

(ii) it is impracticable for the party or parties appearing before the court to make any such arrangements”

….

(6) In this section welfare (福利),in relation to a child, includes the custody and education of the child and financial provision for him.”

The Reports

23.  The court was provided with a 313 page bundle containing 26 reports, many of which were not referred to at the trial.

24.  There are seven Social Welfare Reports spanning the period 23rd November 2017 to the 2nd October 2024 recommending care and control to the Mother.

25.  Included in the bundle were the reports of Dr. Jadis Blurton dated 27 November 2017 and 26 March 2018 and Ms Lora Lee dated 15 November 2019 and 3 July 2020.

26.  In her Relocation Judgment dated 10 November 2020 Her Honour Judge Melloy said:

“37. Dr Jadis Blurton and her team were the courts original Single Joint Expert (SJE). However, they were replaced after the father contacted them privately for advice and potentially placed them in a position of conflict. In order to present any difficulties going forward and at the trial, they were then replaced by Ms Lora Lee, who, over time, prepared a further two reports. Consequently, Dr Blurton was not called to give evidence at the trial and she was not cross examined on her reports, which are in any event now over 3 years old. However, I refer to them here, because the father has continued to rely on some of the comments made in those reports.”

and

“43. Thus I am left in a situation where although the reports have all provided valuable background information they have not really assisted me in coming to a conclusion. For the reasons set out above I do not intend to rely on either Ms Tong’s or Ms Lee’s reports in their entirety and I do not intend to put into effect the recommendations that they have made.”(Ms Tong was the Social Welfare Officer at the trial)

27.  In relation to Ms Lora Lee reports, in her Fact Finding ruling dated 28 July 2023 Deputy District Judge S. Allison stated :

“23. I note that there has been a finding made by the Hong Kong Psychological Society (“HKPS”) of “gross negligence and biased reporting on the Child Custody Evaluation” in relation to Ms Lee. The finding was reached following an investigation by the discipline board appointed by the council of the HKPS. In light of this finding, I have not replied on or taken in account the Lee Reports in reaching my decision.”

28.  The Father considers that the reports of Dr. Blurton and Ms. Lee are relevant and supportive of his firm belief that the Mother has “brain washed” A and is guilty of “parental alienation”.

29.  In this trial the court was assisted by the oral evidence of Ms Chan the Social Welfare Officer and Ms Ho a Clinical Psychologist both from the Social Welfare Department.

30.  Ms Chan filed two reports:

i) The first on the 16 November 2023 recommended:

“29. In light of the above, I would like to recommend that there shall be alternative weekly access pattern as follows:

(a) Week 1: The “Father” shall have direct access to the family child from Thursday after school until Saturday, 5:00p.m.;

(b) Week 2: The “Father” shall have direct access to the family child from on Saturday, 5:00p.m. until Monday morning before school; The Petitioner, shall have remote access through phone calls, Face Time, WhatsApp on Wednesdays to the family child and;

(c) The “Mother”, shall have brief remote access to family child during the Petitioner’s access time.

(d) Both the “Mother and Father” should have equal and shared access to all other holidays;

(e) Both the “Mother and Father” shall facilitate the access arrangement.”

ii) Her second Report dated 2 October 2024 recommended:

“39. Based on the above analysis, subject to Your Worhsip’s consideration, the ISWO would like to recommend that:

i. The “Father” and the “Mother”, be granted joint custody of the family child “A”;

ii. The “Mother” be granted the Care and Control of the family child, “A”;

iii. Family child, “A” be relocated and studied in Singapore;

iv. The “Father”, should be granted the following defined access after the relocation:

- The “Father” shall have daily remote access through phone calls, text message, video calls or any other means;

- The “Father” shall have weekend access not exceeding twice per month in Singapore;

- For Chinese New Year, Easter and Christmas and long school holidays to be shared on equal basis;

v. The details of the above access, including time and logistics shall be flexible and mutually-agreed upon by both parties and shall not interrupt the family child’s school schedule;

vi. Before the transition to Singapore, a weekly access schedule from Friday to Sunday, along with daily remote access, is suggested while Wednesday night dinner access shall be cancelled.”

31.  Ms Ho filed a Psychological Report on 2 April 2024 which stated that

“15. Based on the information gathered from interviews, clinical observation, and results of psychometric assessment, no significant behavioural or emotional disturbance in “A” as compared with children of her age was identified.”

32.  By the order of 28 June 2022 the Official Solicitor (“the OS”) was appointed to act on behalf of A and by the order of the 29 September 2022 “to keep track of the access arrangements”. The OS filed 7 Reports between 28 November 2022 and 2 October 2024; Ms Chui, as the OS, helpfully attended the trial.

The Oral Evidence (in order of the sequence of witnesses)

Ms. Chan

33.  The Social Worker Officer who had prepared the reports dated the 16 November 2023 and 2 October 2024 was cross examined by both Parents. Prior to such cross examination she informed the court that she had first been involved in this case in June 2023.

34.  The Mother’s cross examination was relatively succinct no doubt by reason of the fact that Ms. Chan supported her relocation plan.

35.  The focus of the Father’s cross examination related to difficulties with access, including with paternal grandparents, alienation, the coaching of A, difficulties with play therapy, counselling and disclosure of medical records.

36.  In the context of access and relocation I consider the following exchange between the Father and Ms. Chan of significant relevance:

“Q. Why do you believe the mother would suddenly comply with orders if she were relocated to Singapore when she has not complied with any of the orders over the last past three years? Well, she has not complied with orders over the last three

Court: Past, how many years?

Petitioner : Three years.

A. I will give my answer in two parts. Firstly, as to why the mother suddenly changed her attitude, I think throughout this entire process, especially…

Court : And please, Madam Interpreter, go slowly. This is an important answer. Throughout this process?

A. Especially these two years, which I followed up on this case, I observed that the mum was very progressive and tried to compromise with you and tried to work with you, and slowly developed an arrangement that you both were able to compromise on. The second part: the mother did not cease all access….”

The Mother

37.  The Mother gave her evidence succinctly reflecting her own perceptions and concerns.

Mr. N

38.  Mr. N was measured in his delivery. It is a matter of note that he and Father exchanged their respective questions and answers in a courteous and civilised manner.

39.  I found the following evidence arising from the Father’s cross examination of Mr. N illustrative generally and in particularly of how Mr. N’s considers his role in the event the Mother and A relocate to Singapore and live with him :

Question : Did you try to guide her or give her advice on how to facilitate access between me and “A”?

Answer: I have always been of the opinion that “A” should get fair time with you and with her. So, yes I have sometimes given some advice and I’m happy to do my part to ensure that it stays strong as a bond between you and her.”

and

Question: “I put it to you that if relocation order was granted to Singapore and “A” still continues the belief that I have done something this severe to her, she may see her being taken away from me as confirmation that this did happen, which will have lasting effects on her growing up. What are your views on this?”

Answer: “I disagree because the fact-finding happened a while back and since then she has been having access with you and she seems to be enjoying it as well in my opinion, so I wouldn’t connect the two.”

and

Question : ..“I assume you and the respondent are close, as you said. I would like to know what guidance you may have offered her during this period to help promote the father-child bond.”

Answer: “I’m a father to two daughters who have grown up to be very strong, independent and successful young girls. I do feel that children remember everything from their lives and it makes them into good individuals if they get the support that they need from their parents. I have always shared with the respondent that “A” is primarily both of your responsibility and your duty to ensure that you give her the best of whatever is possible. So I have advised many times that rather than make anything into a conflict, it would be probably better if you two speak with each other first and then decide how to let “A” be made aware of that topic.”

and

Question : How can you convince me and the court that you would be able to amicably work as a blended family while respecting my role and time with Aryana as her biological father?

……..

Answer : “I firstly am very clear that “A” is your child and “P”’s child, and you are her biological parents, and therefore, your love for her and her love for you is nothing that I would ever want to step in the middle of. I love “P” and have grown to really care for “A” over the last few years. And my job, if I could say, is to ensure that it’s a harmonious relationship for all four of us. And I’m happy to do my part in whichever capacity that you feel I could be of value, to ensure that everybody feels comfortable with the relationship. I had also requested the respondent earlier once, some – last year or whenever, to see if I could meet up with you because I feel, rather than “A” thinking that it is me versus you, I just want to be a helpful ally, rather than anything else, to both of you.”

The Father

40.  The Father gave his evidence succinctly reflecting his own perceptions and concerns.

Ms. Ho

41.  Ms. Ho spoke to her report. In terms of the consideration A’s maturity and therefore the weight to be placed of her views I found the following exchange between Ms Chui (the OS) and Ms. Ho significantly relevant :

Question: …. “How would you describe “A”’s level of maturity during your communication and assessment with her?”

Answer : “I think she is at least not less mature than children her age or even more mature than children her age. And I also think that she is a smart and sensitive child.”

Analysis

The Father’s application for care and control

42.  The Father is seeking a change in A’s care and control from the Mother to him.

43.  From his perspective he inter alia highlighted in his opening the following :

i) “2. Previous Social Investigation Reports indicated that the father shared a “close and harmonious” relationship with the child, and it was recommended that the parents transition to a 50:50 shared care arrangement when the child reached the age of 5 or 6.”

ii) “6. Things changed in January 2022, the Mother unilaterally cut off the Father’s access to the Child and made a series of serious allegations to justify her actions…”

iii) By the order of 6 July 2022 the Father’s access to A was supervised.

iv) Unsupervised access was not restored until the Fact Finding Judgment of 28 July 2023.

v) “13. The Child is not now able to exhibit the “warm and loving” relationship she had with her Father prior to the Mother’s denial of access.”….“This clearly indicates something has gone very wrong that warrants immediate actions to rectify the situation and in particular rebuilding the father-daughter relationship having considered the Child’s best interests.”

vi) “15. A recurring theme throughout these proceedings, including the initiation of various allegations, is the Mother’s apparent intention to exclude the Father from the child's life. The nature of these allegations appears to demonstrate a lack of consideration for the daughter's well-being, focusing instead on the Mother's objective to prevail in court and remove the daughter from the Father's life.”

44.  In his closing submission the Father stated :

“12. It is clear that the Mother’s tactics of alienation against the Father is escalating at every turn and it is well documented the result of such escalation since the original trial had taken place in 2020. The Father has lost valuable time with the daughter during her precious years’ time that cannot be taken back.”

45.  I recognise there have been difficulties in access and that in particular the circumstances that were canvassed in the Fact Finding Judgment were singularly unhelpful to effective access.

46.  In evaluating the Father’s criticism of the Mother, the reports and oral evidence of the Ms Ho and Ms. Chan have been helpful in assessing the current interaction and dynamic within the parent/child relationship and whether or not the Mother’s intention is “to exclude the Father from the child's life.”

47.  I note Ms Ho stated in her report (12 April 2024) as follows:

i) Father-daughter-interaction“§8 Natural and spontaneous pattern was observed in their interaction”…”No sign of fear or rejection was noted in their interaction”

ii) “§16 The reasons she disliked having access with “father” were his insufficient attention, play and activities arranged.”

48.  I note Ms. Chan stated as follows :

i) In her first report dated 16 November 2023

“22. In all Interviews, “A” clearly expressed her preference to live continuously with her mother. She has expressed a desire to maintain contact with her father, but preferred to spend time with him only at weekends.”

and

“26. During the present investigation, “A” demonstrated a positive attitude and willingness to maintain a connection with her father”

ii) In her second report dated 2 October 2024

“26. ..Having built rapport with the ISWO,”A” appeared open to sharing her thoughts and was expressive throughout the process. During all interviews, she demonstrated good communication skills, providing coherent responses and a cooperative attitude. Despite her young age, “A” clearly expressed her views on custody matters during interviews with the ISWO. She regarded her mother as the most important person in her life. Whenever she felt sad or unwell, she wished to stay with her mother. “A” expressed a strong desire to live with her mother continuously and relocate to Singapore, but she felt afraid to share her views with her father due to concerns about his potential anger. While “A” loved both parents, she often felt caught in the middle of their conflicts and found the frequent transitions between their households confusing. “A” noted that her mother, Madam H , consistently supported her relationship wither father. For example, her mother gave her a doll to enhance her sense of security during visits to her father’s house. However, “A” felt disappointed that her father did not allow her to bring gifts back to her mother’s home.”

49.  It is clear from the Reports lodged by the OS and the Social Welfare Officer that access has stabilised and improved since the order of 28 July 2023. In addition to which Ms. Chan gave evidence as to the Mother’s “progressive” approach to A’s arrangements.

50.  By reference to the GMO and case law the court has a duty to take into account, subject to age and understanding, the wishes and views of the child.

51.  A is 9 and is of an age and understanding where her wishes and views are relevant; from the reports I apprehend that she wishes to primarily live with her Mother and to have contact with her Father.

52.  In the circumstances having considered the evidence as a whole I conclude that it is not in A’s best interests for her care and control to be changed, I therefore dismiss the Father’s application for sole care and control dated the 1 December 2023; A’s sole care and control shall remain with the Mother.

Relocation

53.  As referred to above this is the Mother’s 2nd application (2 November 2023) to relocate with A to Singapore and is formulated on the basis that she retains A’s care and control.

54.  As I have concluded that it is in A’s best interests to remain in the Mother’s care and control I propose to primarily evaluate the Mother’s relocation application by reference to the Payne criteria.

(1) Is the Mother’s proposal genuine and realistic in the sense that it is not motivated by some selfish desire to exclude the father from the child’s life?

55.  The Mother’s plan encapsulates the following:

i) Employment in Singapore; her Employment Pass has been approved by the Singaporean Ministry of Manpower enabling her to reside and work in Singapore.

ii) A’s Dependent Pass has also been approved by the Singaporean Ministry of Manpower enabling her to reside and study in Singapore.

iii) For A to attend Grade 3 at XIS an international school in Singapore from 20 January 2025 for the second semester. For the 2024/2025 academic year the holidays are:

Mid-term holidays5 October to 20 October 2024
Christmas holidays14 December to 5 January 2025
Easter holidays29 March to 6 April 2025
Summer holidays@8 ½ weeks starting in June 2025

The Mother has already paid the application fee of S$1,000 (@HK$5,800) (S$1 = HK$5.8) and a confirmation fee of S$5,500 is payable for acceptance of placement to be settled within 7 days of acceptance. XIS requires the parents to sign a “XIS Joint Agreement” prior to a child’s enrolment. The annual tuition fees for Grade 3 for the academic year 2024/2025 are S$38,800 or S$19,400 per semester = annually @HK$225,040 or semester HK$112,520.

iv) To reside with A with Mr. N in his accommodation; A is familiar with such accommodation from her previous visits to Singapore

v) To marry Mr. N who resides in Singapore

vi) Care arrangements: the Mother will be working from home and intends to apply for her long standing domestic helper in Hong Kong to move to Singapore. The Mother has researched an appropriate pediatrician and dentist for A.

vii) A and the Father’s relationship: the Mother proposes the following access :

- Remote access: weekly video calls in the evening at 6PM during term time to facilitate regular contact with the Father and is open to any further suggestions.

- Term time access: the Father have reasonable access in Singapore, with monthly weekend visits, and would be open to any further suggestions.

- School holidays: long school holidays to continue to be split equally and alternated every year for each parent

viii) Finances: In her opening the Mother refers to the Father’s previous undertakings recorded in the order of the 24 October 2018 to be responsible for A’s education costs and ECA’s (up to HK$2,000 per month) and her medical and dental insurance.

“138. Upon relocation, the Mother proposes that the Father continues covering these expenses and a small portion of A’s general living expenses. With the relocation, the Father would no longer need to pay for the Mother’s interim maintenance and medical and dental insurance .The Mother suggests that the parties either agree on this arrangement or engage in mediation to reach a resolution. If the Father chooses not to participate, the Mother and “Mr. N” have given an undertaking covering all of “A’”s financial needs”

56.  Having considered the above I conclude that the Mother’s proposal is both genuine and realistic and is not motivated by an intention to exclude the Father from A’s life.

(2) Is the Father’s opposition motivated by genuine concern for the future of the child’s welfare or is it driven by some ulterior motive?

57.  I perceive the Father’s primary opposition to relocation is not Singapore or the actual arrangements relating to “A’s” care, accommodation and schooling but rather the physical separation which relocation entails and in particular his fear that once in Singapore the Mother will impede his relationship and access with A.

58.  The Father has also raised concerns as to the Mother’s employment in Singapore and the strength of the Mother’s relationship with Mr. N.

59.  It appears from the Father’s submissions and evidence that he remains “trapped” in his own opinions and has not sufficiently recognised and or acknowledged the comments of Ms. Ho , Ms. Chan and most importantly A. The Father remains focused on what he perceives to be his own best interests in his relationship with A rather than the wider and broader vision of what is in A’s best interests holistically. Not with standing such impression I do, however, consider that the Father’s opposition is motivated by his genuine concern for the future of the A’s welfare rather than some ulterior motive.

(3) What would be the impact on the applicant (Mother), either as the single parent or as a new spouse of a refusal of his/her realistic proposal?

60.  Having had to the opportunity to review the evolution of the litigation from the trial bundles, the written and oral evidence of Ms. Ho and Ms. Chan and the Parents’ evidence I consider that it would be detrimental to the Mother if her application for relocation is refused particular with regard to her emotional and financial stability. I say this also having in mind the fact that the financial arrangements in Hong Kong have been and are fraught with difficulties as evidenced by the Father’s failure to comply with MPS/Interim maintenance order.

(4) The outcome of the appraisals in (2) and (3) must be considered in the overriding review of the child’s welfare [or in Hong Kong the child’s best interests] as the paramount consideration.”

61.  I have in mind the Court of Appeal’s judgment of 24 May 2021 in which it considered the Father’s concerns as to the Mother’s alienation and or alienating conduct :

“93. As regards the remaining Ground 2(II), Father’s complaint was the Judge failed to consider adequately or at all the impact that the Mother’s possible alienating conduct will have on A once A is a further step removed from Father and her other attachment figures”

“98. It was thus the Judge’s clear finding that there was no parental alienation or alienating conduct and we do not see any basis for interfering with her finding in this regard. There is no merit in Ground 2(II)”

62.  Whilst reflecting on the Father’s current concerns and fear as to future access it is of significance that A is 9, an independent young person whose wishes are relevant for the court’s consideration.

63.  I have had the opportunity to consider the recent reports and hear the from Miss Ho and Miss Chan from whose evidence it is clear that A loves her Father and wishes to have an interactive relationship with him. In addition to which the Ms. Chan deposed to the Mother’s approach to access and supported the Mother’s relocation plan.

64.  A’s emotions and wishes are inconsistent with alienation and brainwashing. I therefore do not accept the Mother has alienated and or brainwashed A or that the Mother’s objective is to “remove the daughter from the Father's life.”

65.  I also bear in mind that the Mother has proffered an undertaking to obtain a Mirror Order in Singapore; for the avoidance of doubt a Singaporean Mirror Order is to be obtained prior to A’s departure from Hong Kong. I shall in addition require the Mother to file with this court her undertaking to return A to the jurisdiction of Hong Kong if called upon to do so.

66.  The Father has raised concerns as to what would happen if the Mother’s employment came to an end in Singapore. Whereas with a move to a new country and employment can be problematic; I do not consider this possibility as an overriding factor in considering the Mother’s plan to relocate with A.

67.  The Father also raised concerns as to the strength of the Mother’s relationship with Mr. N. The Father makes the point that the Mother’s intended marriage will be her third marriage, that they have not cohabited on a full time basis and that this is her second relationship with Mr. N. The Husband in his closing drew attention to the Mother’s oral evidence that in the event she is not allowed to relocate their relationship would end whereas Mr. N said it would continue. I do not consider this reflects “their readiness to be together” as suggested by the Father but rather understandable differences/ concerns by the Mother and Mr. N as to the future.

68.  A has met Mr. N on his visits to Hong Kong, twice in Singapore and on other occasions on overseas holidays. Mr. N has three children by his earlier marriage aged 28, 26 and 18; he is on good terms with their mother. The two elder children reside outside Singapore. His 18 year older daughter attends university in Singapore and on occasions returns to Mr. N’s home at the weekend.

69.  I note that Ms Chan in her report dated 2 October 2024 stated as follows :

“15 …Overall, the observation revealed a close, supportive and joyful relationship among “the Mother, Mr. N” and A”.

70.  With an overriding review of the A’s best interests as the paramount consideration I conclude that the Mother’s application to permanently relocate from Hong Kong to Singapore with A should be granted with the following arrangements as to access and finance.

Access arrangements

71.  I propose to follow the recommendations in Ms. Chan’s report dated 2 October 2024 :

i) The Father shall have daily remote access through phone calls, text messages, video calls or any other means;

ii) The Father shall have weekend access not exceeding twice per month in Singapore;

iii) Chinese New Year, Easter and Christmas and long school holidays to be shared on equal basis

Financial arrangements

72.  Understandably there is no financial application before the court in this trial although in their submissions the Parents have commented on financial arrangements and have made and canvassed proposals.

73.  The current situation I understand to be as follows:

i) The Parents attended an unsuccessful FDR on 3 and 4 January 2022, a PTR was then listed for 25 March 2022; this was vacated pending determination of child matters.

ii) By the order of 15 April 2024, the Father has been ordered to pay, in addition to his undertakings to pay for A’s school fees, ECA’s up to a maximum of HK$2,000 per month and her medical/dental insurance and medical/dental insurance for the Mother :

- Monthly MPS of HK$10,000 per month for the Mother

- Monthly interim maintenance of HK$39,000 for A.

iii) The Father’s application for leave to appeal such order was refused by the MPS trial Judge on 5 July 2024, the Father has sought leave to appeal from the Court of Appeal.

iv) The Mother has lodged an application for a Judgment Summons.

v) The Father states he is paying A’s annual school fees of @HK$190,000, A’s annual health insurance of HK$25,000 and the Mother’s annual health insurance of HK$60,000.

74.  As there is no application and no updated evidence before me it is not appropriate to substantively re-visit the current MPS order; in any event there are outstanding applications for leave to appeal and judgment summons proceedings in respect of such order.

75.  However in the light of the Mother’s proposal set out above I do consider it is reasonable and practical to release the Father from his undertaking to pay the Mother’s health insurance and to vary the MPS for the Mother to zero, such arrangement will take effect from 1 January 2025.

76.  I note that although schooling in Singapore is slightly more expensive than in Hong Kong and that the Father will have the additional expense of flights and accommodation in Singapore during access, he will no longer be responsible for monthly MPS to the Mother of HK$10,000 (HK$120,000 per annum) and the Mother’s health insurance of HK$60,000 per annum.

77.  I do so in the knowledge that court may adjust such financial arrangement in the event that after future consideration and with the relevant updated financial evidence before it, a backdated adjustment is deemed just and appropriate whether upwards or downwards.

78.  For the avoidance of doubt until varied and or successfully appealed the Father’s remaining obligations in the order of 15 April 2024 remain :

i) The Father’s undertaking to continue to pay A’s school fees, ECA’s (up to HK$2,000 per month) and A’s medical and dental insurance

ii) Interim child maintenance of HK$39,000 per month.

Section 18, decree absolute

79.  By reference to section 18(6) of the MPPO welfare “in relation to a child includes the custody and education of the child and financial provision for him”.

80.  The custody of A is recorded in the order of 15 December 2017 whereby the Parents have the joint custody of A.

81.  Following upon the previous orders and this judgment there are now orders as to A’s custody and care and control, in addition to which arrangements have been ordered as to her relocation, education and access.

82.  I have carefully considered whether, by reason of the problematical financial provision, arising from the Father’s failure to comply with court’s order as to maintenance , the court can be satisfied as to the “arrangements for the welfare” of A.

83.  In the context of the case generally and notwithstanding the ongoing litigation in relation to maintenance and the fact that ancillary relief between the Parents has yet to be determined I consider the arrangements for A “are the best that can be devised in the circumstances”.

84.  In addition I consider and that it is in A’s best interests for her Parents’ unhappy marriage be formally brought to end thereby by allowing the relationship between her Mother and Mr. N to be appropriately formalised by marriage.

85.  I therefore hereby pronounce a Section 18 declaration. It will then be for the Mother to apply for the decree nisi pronounced on the 8 January 2019 to be made absolute.

Timing for the relocation and transitional access and arrangements

86.  A’s Christmas break for her current school in Hong Kong starts on 19 December 2024.

87.  The Mother is expected to start her employment in Singapore on 2 January 2025.

88.  From the XIS material produced by the Mother Classes resume with orientation for new students on Monday 6 January 2025.

89.  The priority is “the bests interests” of A. Where I have concluded that there is to be a relocation I consider the practical focus is ensuring that A’s move from Hong Kong and her integration in Singapore is as smooth as possible and ,in particular ,her assimilation into her new school .

90.  I therefore consider that on the basis that the Mother has obtained the Mirror order the Mother and A’s date for relocation shall be Wednesday 1 January 2025.

91.  Between Thursday 19 December when A breaks up and the 1 January 2025 the Father shall have access as follows:

i) Friday 20 December from 5pm until 5pm on Thursday 26 December

ii) Saturday 28 December until 5pm on Monday 30 December

92.  The transitional access arrangements and the access arrangements in Singapore will take effect from 19 December 2024 and shall supersede all previous orders as to access.

Costs

93.  The approach to costs has been succinctly summarised by Madam Justice Chu in LCH and JMC[2019] HKCFI 251:

“10. It has been long recognised that in children matters, the general practice is that there be no order as to costs. In TPL and WYY, CACV 47/2014 and CACV 61/2014, unreported, 15.12.14, the Court of Appeal has set out the relevant principles that should be taken into account when considering if a cost order is appropriate in applications to do with children. As pointed out by the Court of Appeal, the approach that in applications to do with children, the usual order should be no order as to costs stems from the aspiration that in these applications, the court is seeking to find an arrangement which is best for the children, and that the rationale is that when a court considers custody and care and control of the children, the proceedings are inquisitorial rather than adversarial.”

94.  Having considered the circumstances of this case and particularly the nature of this trial which relates to the future arrangements of a child; I see no reason to depart from the usual order that there be no order as to costs including any associated reserved costs. Such order will be nisi and shall become absolute 14 days after the date of this judgment unless either Parent notifies the court that they wish to be heard on costs.

95.  The Official Solicitor has asked to be released from the proceedings; I grant such application to take effect 14 days after A’s relocation and physical departure from Hong Kong.

Orders flowing from this Judgment (“the Relocation Order”)

96.  The Father’s application dated the 1 December 2023 for care and control of A be dismissed.

97.  The Mother shall have the care and control of A.

98.  The Father’s transitional access between 19 December to 31 December 2024:

i) Friday 20 December from 5pm until 5pm on Thursday 26 December

ii) Saturday 28 December until 5pm on Monday 30 December.

99.  Access post relocation

i) The Father shall have daily remote access through telephone calls, text messages, video calls or any other means;

ii) The Father shall have weekend access not exceeding twice per month in Singapore;

iii) Chinese New Year, Easter and Christmas and long school holidays to be shared on an equal basis with and without the jurisdiction of Singapore.

100.  Upon filing her undertaking to this court to return A to the jurisdiction of Hong Kong if called upon to do so and upon the Mother obtaining a mirror order from the appropriate court in Singapore with regard to the terms of this order (“the Mirror Order”), the Mother do have leave to permanently remove “A” from the jurisdiction of Hong Kong to Singapore from 1 January 2025.

101.  The Mother do have leave to enroll A in the X International School in Singapore.

102.  Current travel restrictions relating to A shall be uplifted upon the Mother obtaining the Mirror Order; the Mother do serve a copy of the Relocation Order and the Mirror Order upon the Immigration Department of the HKSAR.

103.  General leave to both the Mother and Father to travel with A on holidays while she is with them without requiring prior approval from the other parent or the court, subject to the undertaking of both parents that they shall notify the other in writing 14 days prior to such travel.

104.  There be a Section 18 declaration.

105.  The OS be released 14 days after A’s physical relocation and arrival in Singapore.

106.  The financial arrangements shall be as referred to in paragraphs 75 and 78 above.

107.  There be liberty to apply on an urgent basis as to the implementation of this order.

108.  There shall be no order as to costs nisi, including any associated reserved costs; such order to be absolute 14 days from the date of this judgment.

Last but not least

109.  The Parents have each assisted the Court with their written material, their focused questions of the SWO and CP, and their courteous manner in court including the interaction with each other at the Trial.

110.  Bearing in mind the nature and history of the litigation this must have required considerably restraint and control by both Parents and is a significant illustration of the benefits of their measured and respectful interaction.

111.  In the context where it is clear that both Parents and A wish this chronic litigation to end they may wish to explore resolving the outstanding matter of ancillary relief and other practical matters through mediation, particular having in mind the statement of Ms. Ho the clinical psychologist:

“20. Last but not the least, “A” (and both of her parents) had explicitly expressed that she/they had been very tired of the prolonged legal procedures, investigations with various professionals, as well as changes and complexity of access arrangement, although these were caused by the persistent parental disputes to certain extent.”

 (R N Egerton)
 Deputy District Judge

The Petitioner (Father) and Respondent (Mother) both appeared in person

  

[2024] HKFC 135-EN-2024-07-05

H v. W

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FCMC 8332 / 2017

[2024] HKFC 135

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

MATRIMONIAL CAUSES

NUMBER 8332 OF 2017

----------------------------

BETWEEN  
 HPetitioner

and

 WRespondent

----------------------------

Coram : Deputy District Judge S. Allison in Chambers (By Paper disposal)
Date of Petitioner’s Written Submissions:10 May 2024
Date of Petitioner’s Written Submissions:27 May 2024
Date of Judgment:5 July 2024

_____________________________

J U D G M E N T
(Leave to appeal MPS order)

_____________________________

1.  The Petitioner seeks leave to appeal against my judgment on maintenance pending suit and interim maintenance (“MPS”) handed down on 15 April 2024 (“MPS judgment”). The Petitioner filed his Summons for leave on 10 May 2024.

2.  I shall refer to the parties as Husband and Wife.

Legal Principles

3.  Under section 63A(2) of the District Court Ordinance (Cap.336), no leave to appeal shall be granted unless the Court is satisfied that the intended appeal has reasonable prospect of success or that there is some other reason in the interests of justice that the appeal should be heard.

4.  The applicant for leave needs to show that he has an arguable case with reasonable chances of success on appeal.  A reasonable prospect of success means an appeal with prospects that are more than “fanciful” but which do not need to be shown to be “probable” (SMSE v KL [2009] 4 HKLRD 125; KNM v HTF, HCMP 288/2011).

5.  In S v C[2021] HKCA 1372 (unreported, CAMP 243/2021, 21 September 2021) Hon G Lam JA affirmed the proper approach to be taken by the appellate court in considering an appeal against an MPS order:

“[6] …it should be noted that the determination of an application for MPS is an exercise with a high discretionary content. The proper approach of the appellate court in an appeal from an order for MPS is well established by the authorities, as summarised by Judge A Tse in ALDL v FTFC[2020] HKFC 180 as follows:

“ 5. The granting of maintenance pending suit is a discretionary remedy. On appeal, the Court of Appeal will not exercise the discretion afresh. Instead, it will only interfere with the decision when the discretion was wrongly exercised, such as being contrary to the principle or the primary judge had wrongly taken into account irrelevant matters or ignored relevant matters [see MWY v HWM HCMP 120/2017, 16 May 2017; WW v LLN[2019] HKCA 1278 at §§ 15‑17.]

6. In CHWA v LNLAI [2019] HKCA 1017at § 3.1, the Court of Appeal, in refusing leave to appeal, stressed ‘the interim nature of [maintenance pending suit] which generally requires the Court to adopt a broad brush approach in deciding the amount to be awarded. It is also for a limited duration until the final resolution of the issue of financial relief of the parties. Inevitably there will be adjustment to the final order to be made in the event of overpayment or underpayment of [maintenance pending suit].’

7. The threshold for appealing against an order for maintenance pending suit is a high one.  The court is inclined to leave factual questions of expenses and income for determination at the ancillary relief hearing.  The Court of appeal also stated that appeals against maintenance pending suit orders are ‘rare’ and the ‘powers of interference [of an appeal court] are strictly limited’: K v K [2011] 1 HKC 66 at §§ 1, 3; Hewitt, Family Law and Practice in Hong Kong (3rd ed. 2018), § 6.076.”

[7] It is important to note that MPS is an interim measure, intended to be temporary, and subject to adjustments in the final orders to be made in the determination of ancillary relief.  Overall fairness can be achieved at that point by giving credit and set‑off if there is found to have been any overpayment or underpayment in the interim.  In other words, an order for MPS does not finally determine the rights and obligations of the parties, and since it involves simply the payment of money, its effects may in general be redressed by monetary relief at the end.  This explains why in relation to MPS the courts “take a broad view” of the parties’ finances rather than engage in any detailed investigation, adopt a “broad brush” approach, and seek to arrive at “rough and ready” conclusions (see Rayden and Jackson on Relationship Breakdown, Finances and Children at §11.78; HJFG v KCY [2012] 1 HKLRD 95, §§32-38).  Appeals should be rare and the parties should be encouraged instead to focus on, and bring about as early as practicable, the final resolution of their dispute.  As has been said in Wong Kar Gee Mimi v Severn Villa Ltd [2012] 1 HKLRD 887 at §30 (albeit not specifically with regard to MPS), even if the threshold of reasonable prospects is met, the court may nonetheless in its discretion refuse leave to appeal in the interests of procedural economy and proportionality.  For my part, I consider that leave to appeal from MPS orders should generally not be granted unless there is some special reason why the matter cannot or should not be left to the ancillary relief stage such as serious hardship caused by the order to a party.  I can see none here based on the admissible materials, and on this ground alone I would dismiss the application.” (emphasis added)

Background

6.  The history leading up to the MPS Judgment is set out at paragraphs 4 to 9 of the MPS Judgment.  I will adopt the abbreviations used in the MPS Judgment. 

7.   In brief, the MPS Judgment related to the Husband’s downward variation Summons dated 3 March 2023.  This Summons sought to vary the previous MPS Order dated 24 October 2018.  Pursuant to the MPS Order, the Husband was to pay the Wife $14,000 per month as maintenance pending suit plus interim maintenance of HK$38,500 for B, the only child of the family.  The MPS Order also included the Husband’s undertakings to continue to pay B’s school fees, B’s ECAs up to a maximum of HK$2,000 per month as well as the Wife’s and B’s medical / dental insurance.

8.   In his downward variation application, Husband wished to cease contributing 50% towards the Wife’s general expenses.  The Husband further wished to be discharged of his undertaking to pay the Wife’s medical and dental insurance and he also wanted the Wife to contribute towards half of B’s expenses.

9.   In the MPS Judgment, I made an order to vary MPS such that the Husband was to pay the Wife HK$10,000 per month for MPS, and HK$39,000 for B in interim maintenance.  The variation was backdated to 1 September 2023 being one month after the Wife had commenced working. The Husband’s undertakings to pay B’s school fees, ECAs capped at HK$2,000 per month as well as the costs of the Wife’s and B’s medical / dental insurance remained unchanged.

Grounds of Appeal

10.  I have gleaned from the Husband’s leave to appeal submissions that he advances the following grounds of appeal against the MPS Judgment, that I erred in:

(1)  taking into account and assuming that the Husband could continue to borrow funds to meet the MPS Judgment.

(2)  ordering the Husband to cover the Wife’s shortfall of HK$10,000 per month.  In addition, I erred in ordering that the Husband to continue to pay for the Wife’s dental / medical insurance. In doing so, I had failed to assess the Wife’s personal expenses, even when the Husband himself did not challenge the Wife’s personal expenses.

(3)  not taking into account the presence of alternative financial resources available to the Wife, and that the MPS Judgment placed upon the Husband the sole responsibility of addressing the Wife’s financial deficits and insurance costs.

(4)  not adequately assessing the reasonableness of certain general expenses claimed by the Wife.

Ground 1

11.  This ground lacks merit and has no reasonable chance of success.   

12.  The Husband submits firstly, that I had assumed because he was only making minimum payments on his credit cards that he could borrow further. 

13.  I accepted the Husband’s evidence regarding the repayment of his credit cards.  This was stated in paragraph 30 of the MPS Judgment,

“30. In terms of the Husband’s ability to borrow, it is apparent from the credit card statements that the Husband’s credit cards are no repaid in full every month. He has however, managed to negotiate with many of his creditors, changes in the repayment terms and interests due on his personal loans to the extent that the figures in Part 4.2 of the Husband’s Form E relating to “loan repayments” and “interest payments” are not actual monthly expenditure made by the Husband. The fact that many of the Husband’s loans are personal loans given by family or friends, with flexible repayment terms, leads me to believe that he does have the ability to borrow further to meet his maintenance obligations.”

14.  There was no subsequent conclusion drawn that because of the Husband could only make the minimum payments for the credit cards that he had the further ability to borrow. 

15.  Rather, it was the Husband’s own evidence at the MPS hearing regarding his other loans that lead me to conclude he had the ability to borrow to meet his maintenance obligations.  The Husband’s evidence was that he obtained loans from his company to meet the MPS obligations.  The Husband’s evidence was that these loans are categorised as “loans to directors” in the company’s audited accounts.  These loans are personal loan given by the company to the Husband as a director.  There was no evidence from the Husband at the MPS hearing that the company would no longer provide him with further loans to meet his ongoing maintenance payments.  As such, it was perfectly reasonable for me to conclude that the Husband does have a continuing ability to borrow to meet maintenance obligations. 

Grounds 2, 3 and 4

16.  I will consider these three Grounds together because they are concerned mostly with the reasonableness of the Wife’s expenses and why the Husband is expected to continue contributing towards the Wife’s expenses.

17.  The Husband disputes (i) the Wife’s rental expenses because he submits the Wife voluntarily upgraded but he was now being held responsible; (ii) the costs of the Wife’s utilities and (iii) that the Wife’s household expenses should be HK$1,000 as opposed to HK$3,000 in the MPS Judgment.  

18.  The Husband has raised the issue of the Wife’s rental costs on various occasions.  However, the Husband has failed to demonstrate in any way, that the Wife’s current rental amount for her and B is unreasonable or excessive.  As to the Husband’s submission that I should have “scrutinised more closely the definition of what is deemed reasonable” and “the threshold at which reasonable expenses necessitate verification”, it is clear the detailed investigation which the Husband is seeking goes against the principle of assessing MPS and interim maintenance on a broadbrush basis.

19.  The Husband submitted at the MPS hearing that he wished for the variation downwards to reflect a cessation of his 50% contribution towards the Wife’s general expenses.[1]  In light of the Husband’s stated position, it was reasonable for me on a broadbrush basis when analysing the reasonableness of the Wife’s expenses going forward to confine myself in the main to analysing the Wife’s general expenses. 

20.  This is particularly so, when I had taken into account the fact that the Wife had her own financial resources to meet her personal expenses and I had held that the Wife would be responsible for some of B’s personal expenses, amounting to HK$9,000 per month.[2]   Given the Wife’s income of HK$66,000, I found that the Wife’s contribution towards her own general expenses, personal expenses and B’s expenses to be fair and proportionate in the circumstances.  

21.  In assessing on a broadbrush basis what the reasonable amount of MPS and interim maintenance should be, I took into account not just that the Wife had financial resources, but also the difference in the parties’ earning capacities and that the Husband has significantly greater earning capacity than the Wife. [3]    

22.  Furthermore, in addition to his ability to borrow, I observed at paragraph 31 of the MPS Judgment, the Husband could make adjustments to his expenditure.  Therefore, it was well within the exercise of my discretion in the MPS Judgment to find that the Husband’s contribution towards the Wife’s general expenses of HK$10,000 to be fair and proportionate in the circumstances.

23.  Additionally, in respect of B’s expenses, he seeks to challenge (i) the amount of B’s school bus and general transport fees and asks for a HK$400 reduction in this item (ii) the sum of $2,500 per month for B’s clothing as excessive and (iii) HK$1,000 for the excess of medical and dental is disputed by the Husband.   

24.  There is nothing in the Husband’s leave application which shows that I have erred in the exercise of my discretion.  I stand by the calculations for B’s expense which is set out in paragraph 46 of the MPS Judgment.  I note that the MPS Judgment has varied B’s maintenance upwards by HK$500 since the time of the first MPS Order of 24 October 2018.   This variation is, therefore, not unreasonable given all of the circumstances of this case.

25.  As for upholding the Husband’s original undertaking to meet the Wife’s dental and medical insurance costs, it was the Husband’s evidence at the MPS hearing that he spends the sum of HK$10,400 every month for the Wife’s and B’s dental and medical insurance. I accepted the Wife’s evidence that her employment only provided the most basis of medical insurance, and that she could not afford to purchase her own medical insurance in the meantime.  Given that the payment of medical and dental insurance has always been provided by the Husband during the course of the marriage, and he continued to do so following the parties’ separation, it was reasonable for me to conclude on a broadbrush basis that the Husband should continue to pay for both the Wife’s and B’s medical and dental insurance on an ongoing interim basis.  The Husband is at liberty to dispute any overpayment on this item at the ancillary relief stage should he think it appropriate to do so.

26.  Accordingly, I am not satisfied that Grounds 2, 3 and 4 have a reasonable prospect of success.

Conclusion

27.  For the above reasons, I find that all the grounds of the Husband leave to appeal lack merit and have no reasonable ground of success.  There being no other reasons in the interest of justice that leave should be granted, I refuse to grant leave to appeal and dismiss his Summons for leave dated 10 May 2024 accordingly.

28.  Finally, I wish to note, that the Husband set out in his draft notice of appeal three complaints that firstly, I had pre-judged him due to his family’s wealth, secondly, that during the MPS hearing, I had suggested the Husband pay to the Wife more and thirdly, I had accused him several times of financially pressuring the Wife.  I totally reject these complaints / submissions by the Husband.  These matters were never raised or discussed during the MPS variation hearing before me and I find that the Husband’s submissions on these points to be unjustified.

Costs

29.  The cost of this leave to appeal application shall follow the event in the normal way. The Husband shall pay the Wife the costs of and arising out of his Leave to Appeal application.

 ( Sasha ALLISON )
 Deputy District Judge

  

The Petitioner (father) acting in person

The Respondent (mother) acting in person


[1] See paragraph 2 of the MPS Judgment

[2] See paragraphs 35 and 47 of the MPS Judgment respectively.

[3] See paragraphs 24 and 27 of the MPS Judgment. 

[2024] HKFC 122-EN-2024-06-04

H v. W

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FCMC 8332 / 2017

[2024] HKFC 122

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

MATRIMONIAL CAUSES

NUMBER 8332 OF 2017

----------------------------

BETWEEN  
 HPetitioner

and

 WRespondent

----------------------------

Coram : Deputy District Judge S. Allison in Chambers (By Paper disposal)
Date of Respondent’s Written Submissions: 29 January 2024 & 22 April 2024
Date of Petitioner’s Written Submissions:6 May 2024
Date of Judgment: 4 June 2024

_____________________________

RULING
(Leave to appeal on a varied costs order)

_____________________________

1.  On 4 January 2024 I handed down a Ruling varying the costs order nisi (“Cost Ruling”) made in the Judgment dated 28 July 2023 regarding the fact finding hearing which took place in May 2023.  The nisi order for costs was that there be “no order” as to costs i.e. that each party would bear their own costs of the proceedings.  The stated reason for this was that neither party had indicated that they wished to seek their costs, and it was a children’s matter. 

2.  The Father then applied to vary the costs order nisi with an order for costs in his favour, further seeking that his costs be taxed on an indemnity basis.  I granted the Father’s application to the extent that the order nisi was to be varied, in that the Mother was to pay the Father’s costs of and occasioned by the child related litigation and the Rent-A-Mum service.  However, I refused to permit the Father’s costs to be taxed on an indemnity basis and ordered that the Father’s costs were to be taxed on a party and party basis if not agreed.  The Cost Ruling also stipulated that the Father’s costs were only payable after the Mother received her ancillary relief award.

3.  On 29 January 2024, the Mother filed Submissions for Leave to Appeal against the Cost Ruling.  At the time, the Mother failed to file an Inter-partes Summons for Leave to Appeal or the Notic of Appeal.  The Court wrote to the parties on 15 April 2024 directing that unless the Mother filed her Summons for Leave to Appeal within 7 days, her application would be dismissed.  It was only then that the Mother filed her Inter-partes Summons and Notice for Appeal together with Skeleton Submissions on 22 April 2024.

Delay in filing Summons and Notice of Appeal by Mother

4.  Order 58 r 2(4)(b) Rules of the District Court, Cap. 336H stipulates that all applications for leave to appeal from a judgment, order or decision which is not interlocutory, must be made within 28 days after the making of the court order.

5.  The Cost Ruling of 4 January 2024 was a final order.  This meant that the Mother had 28 days to an application for Leave to Appeal against the Cost Ruling, that is, the Mother had to file her leave application on or before 1 February 2024.  By omitting the Summons and Notice to Appeal at the same time she filed her Submissions for leave on 29 January 2024 the Mother failed to comply with the correct procedure and time frame for making her leave application.

6.  Back in August 2018, New Arrangements for Application for Leave to Appeal in the Family Court (“New Arrangements”) was implemented to improve the case management practice for proceedings in the family court.  Both the Mother and the Father are aware of the procedure for leave to appeal applications because they have both previously filed leave application against various judgments / decisions made in these proceedings in accordance with the New Arrangements.

7.  Therefore, the Mother has no excuse for failure to adhere to the correct procedure to file her leave application, as set out in paragraph 2 of the New Arrangements.

8.  Furthermore, the Mother would have known per paragraph 4 of the New Arrangements that she was required file her Summons, draft grounds of appeal and where appropriate, an affidavit explaining the reasons for the delaying support of an extension of time.

9.  Paragraph 6 of the New Arrangements reminds applicants for leave that he or she may run the risk of having their application struck out and dismissed on the grounds of failure to prosecute the application with due diligence.  The Mother did not file an affirmation to explain the reasons for her delay of almost three months in filing her leave application properly or why she did not comply with the New Arrangement when she filed her written submissions back on 29 January 2024. 

10.  I would dismiss the Mother’s application on the grounds of her unexplained delay and non-compliance with the proper procedure in making her Leave to Appeal application. Nevertheless, given the background of this case and for the sake of completeness, I will deal with the merits of the leave application below.

Legal Principles

11.  Section 63A(2) of the District Court Ordinance provides that leave to appeal shall not be granted unless:

(1)  the intended appeal has a reasonable prospect of success; or

(2)  there is some other reason in the interests of justice that the appeal should be heard.

12.  The relevant test of whether an appeal has a reasonable prospect of success is whether the applicant for leave can show that he has an arguable case with reasonable chances of success on appeal.  A reasonable prospect of success therefore means an appeal with prospects that are more than “fanciful” but which do not need to be shown to be “probable”: SMSE v KL [2009] 4 HKLRD 125; KNM v HTF, HCMP 288/2011.

13.  On the exercise of judicial discretion on costs, I refer to the judgment of Lam JA in Poon Ching Man v Lam Hoi Pun [2016] 3 HKLRD 815, where His Lordship reiterates at §34 that a decision on costs given by the trial judge is highly discretionary and which the Court of Appeal would be very circumspect in intervening:

“34. This court has stressed repeatedly that costs is very much a matter of discretion for the trial judge and the Court of Appeal would be very circumspect in intervening with such a decision with high discretionary content: see Ho Shu Kwong v Chiang Chun Yuan [2002] 3 HKLRD 419; IO of King Yip Factory Building v Kwun Wah Flower and Plant Manufactory Ltd CACV 128 of 2003, 13 Nov 2003; Hung Fung Enterprises Holdings Ltd v Agricultural Bank of China [2012] 3 HKLRD 679; Bonnie Blair Ltd v Witmore Ltd HCMP 1546 of 2015, 7 Aug 2015; Chan Shun Kei v Hong Kong Construction (HK) Ltd CACV 192 of 2014, 7 March 2016. In the last case, the court said at §22:

‘22. It must be stated at the outset that this court should acknowledge that costs is very much a matter of discretion of the judge and we should be circumspect in interfering with the same.  The established approach is that this court will only interfere when it is satisfied that the decision of the judge is either wrong in principle or plainly wrong, see Ho Shu Kwong v Chiang Chun Yuan [2002] 3 HKLRD 419.  The rationale for this approach was explained by Woo JA (as he then was) in Ho Shu Kwong.  The trial judge is the best person to exercise the discretion on costs because he is most familiar with the conduct of the case at the trial and the impact of the success and failure on each issue canvassed before him.  In a way it is like an appeal against findings of fact.  As explained in numerous judgments (see e.g. China Gold Finance Ltd v CIL Holdings Ltd CACV 11 of 2015, 27 November 2015), an appellate court is institutionally disadvantaged from re-assessing a decision of this nature as if it is hearing the matter in the first instance. Thus, this court should examine whether a primary judge committed any palpable error in the exercise of the discretion on costs.  In the absence of such an error, the mere fact that the appellate judges might have exercised the discretion in a different manner is not a sufficient ground to warrant interference with the decision of the primary judge.”

14.  I had borne these guidelines and principles in mind in the Cost Ruling as I do now in considering the Mother’s leave application.  The goal for the Court was to consider what costs order would be fair and just in light of the circumstances. 

Grounds of Appeal

15.  The Mother has not set out specific grounds of appeal, and it appears that the Mother’s main contention is that there was a lack of sufficient justification in the Cost Ruling to impose a cost order (“Ground 1”).  In addition, the Mother contents that she was merely “diligently followed the court’s directives and procedures” relating to the fact finding hearing, and the Court did not provide her with guidance that the issues / incidents she raised did not warrant a fact finding hearing (“Ground 2”).  Finally, the Mother disputes that there should be no order for the Rent-A-Mum Service which was the how supervised access took place for a period of time (“Ground 3”).

Ground 1

16.  This ground is not reasonably arguable. The reasons for varying the cost order nisi were set out very clearly in the Cost Ruling, where I referred to the Judgment setting out the instances where the Mother did cross the line of what was acceptable litigation conduct in child related proceedings.

17.  For the sake of completeness, I set out again my findings in relation to the Mother’s litigation conduct that warranted a costs order to be made:

“13. In the Ruling, I made a number of findings which go to the Mother’s behaviour and conduct of the litigation. For example,

“[15] ….I found the father to be a credible witness.  It is clear that he is trying his best to maintain a healthy father-daughter relationship despite the difficulty he has faced to have access.  I accept that the Daughter genuinely loves and enjoys the time she has with the father and his extended family and I would encourage the mother to support this relationship fully.  On the other hand, I found the mother had a tendency to exaggerate and to place an irrational overreliance that the Daughter should be completely believed and that the Daughter is not capable of being untruthful.”

14.   The Mother has a duty to not simply accept whatever the Daughter said but to make a proper assessment.  In terms of the closet incident, the Mother did not enquire with the Father to find out more information after the first time she heard of it and yet the Mother reached the conclusion that the Daughter was scared and traumatised.  As to the gravity of this incident, I made the finding that:

“[30] I note that this incident is not of a serious nature which warranted being an issue for a fact finding hearing and it is my observation that the mother’s conduct regarding the closet incident to be unreasonable for four reasons:

(1) The mother’s suggestion that the Daughter was placed in the walk-in wardrobe on more than one occasion is made without any supporting evidence. In the Daughter’s interview with the CP she claimed to have only been placed in the walk-in wardrobe on only one occasion.

(2) The mother continued to exaggerate the Daughter’s initial claims about being locked in a closet even after been presented with photographs of the walk-in wardrobe exhibited in the father’s affirmation, and after Ms. Chen had investigated the father’s home in person.

(3) There is no evidence in support that the closet incident happened recently or frequently. In fact, the Daughter told Ms Chen and the police that the closet incident happened two years ago and only once.

(4) The mother has not provided any evidence that the Daughter was placed in any danger by being placed in a walk-in wardrobe or that she was being abused.” (emphasis added)

15.  The hair removal incident should have similarly not been pursued at a fact finding hearing, especially since the Father did not deny that the Daughter’s hair was removed (likely by the helper) when she was in his care during Christmas access in 2021 and he gave an undertaking at the earliest opportunity on 19 January 2022 that the pumice stone or “magic cream” would not be used on the Daughter.  The findings on the Mother’s litigation conduct regarding this issue in the Ruling were:

“[33] When the mother was cross-examined on why she did not bring to the father’s attention her concerns about the Daughter’s skin or the hair removal before speaking with the Social Welfare Officer or the paediatrician, the mother’s answer was that she wanted to ensure that she was following the correct procedure. I do not accept that this is a reasonable reaction nor does it explain the delay of three days before the mother brought the Daughter to see the doctor if the Daughter was in fact, suffering from pain as the mother claimed.

[34] I do not accept that a reasonable person would have called the Social Welfare Officer before seeking medical attention for a child in pain, particularly when the child is known to have sensitive skin. I find that the mother has exaggerated the pain suffered by the Daughter arising from the hair removal….

…

    [38] As for the “magic cream” neither the mother nor the father knew what the Daughter was referring to. However, the mother persisted in her claim that “magic cream” was used solely on the Daughter’s say so. No evidence was provided by the mother as to possible creams which the Daughter could have been referring to. I, therefore, reject that any “magic cream” or any cream was used to remove the Daughter’s hair on her arms.”

16.  As for the third and most serious of the three allegations, I had set out at paragraph 42(1) – 42(8) of the Ruling the reasons why the Mother did not meet the evidentiary threshold. The Mother’s lack of insight and perspective was noted at paragraph 48 of the Ruling:

    “[48] Although I accept that some of these concerns are genuinely held by the mother, she continues to believe them as 100% true, notwithstanding the fact that there is little, if any corroborating evidence to support what the Daughter has said in regard to the most serious allegation.  This seems to me a remarkable lack of insight or perspective.  In my experience, children do not always tell the truth or they make up stories for a variety of reasons.”

17.   The Court is of the view that the Mother did cross the line of what is and what was not acceptable litigation conduct in child related proceedings.  Considering that the Mother expressing at the fact finding her continuing intention to relocate to Singapore with the Daughter once the Decree Absolute was granted and that she had unilaterally suspended the Father’s in-person access with the Daughter from 6 January 2022 until it was resumed on a supervised basis gradually per the Order dated 7 July 2022[1], I concluded in the Ruling that

“[43] … Consequently, it is not difficult to see why the father claims that the mother brought the indecent assault allegation only after she could not obtain an injunction against him.”

18.  I made clear findings on the times when the Mother’s litigation conduct was beyond the band of what was reasonable.  The Mother has no reasonable prospect of succeeding on this ground.

Ground 2

19.  The Mother seeks to contend that since she did not make the application for a fact finding hearing, and thus, she is not to be blamed for the for the fact finding hearing taking place.  This ground is also not reasonably arguable.

20.  It is disingenuous for the Mother to assert that she was merely following the Court’s directives and to take no responsibility for raising these issues and incidents at the fact finding hearing.  The Mother was emphatic at the fact finding hearing that all three incidents amounted to abuse.  Given the Mother’s stance, it would have been impossible for there to be a trial on care and control without the fact finding hearing taking place prior.  

21.  The Mother’s argues that the Court did not provide any guidance on whether she should pursue her list of issues at the fact finding hearing, at the hearing on 27 September 2022.  With respect, the Court is not responsible for providing legal advice to parties, even those acting in person.  Both the Father and the Mother have had the benefit of legal representation from time to time throughout these highly acrimonious proceedings, and continue to have the financial resources to obtain legal representation.  It is encumbered upon the parties to obtain independent legal advice if they are unclear or have questions relating to the proceedings.

22.  I do not accept that the Mother was merely following the Court’s directives and she would have acted differently if she had been provided guidance.  The fact finding hearing arose because of her actions.  

23.  An example is the manner in which the Mother handled the Hair Removal Incident.  The Mother filed an injunction to prevent the Father and his family having access with the daughter on 13 January 2022 on the basis of the Hair Removal Incident.  The Father immediately provided his undertaking in Court at the return date of the Mother’s injunction on 19 January 2022 regarding the Hair Removal Incident.  As such, no injunction was granted against the Father and his family.  The next day, on 20 January 2022 the Mother filed her complaint with the Child Protection Services alleging that the Father had indecently assaulted the daughter.  The Mother refused to provide the Father in person access with the daughter until the Order of 7 July 2022, which granted the Father access on a supervised basis. 

24.  Despite the Father providing his undertaking regarding the Hair Removal Incident by agreeing to not remove the Daughter’s hair and accepting that that the Daughter’s hair was removed (likely by the helper) the Mother nevertheless thought it fit and appropriate to litigate this incident at the fact finding hearing.

25.  Even in the Mother’s submissions for this leave application, the Mother once again recites her case regarding the child’s allegations despite the determination that was made in the Fact Finding Judgment.  Given the Mother’s strong views on the incidents, I take the view that on balance it would have made no difference if the Court had provided any guidance to the Mother in pursuing the fact finding hearing.

Ground 3

26.  This Ground lacks merit and has no reasonable prospect of success.

27.  The Mother suspended the Father’s access from 6 January 2022 to 7 July 2022.  It is because of the allegations put forward by the Mother that the Father’s access was suspended.  Now that the Fact Finding Judgment has determined that the Mother’s allegations have not been made out, it consequently follows that there the Mother should be responsible for the Father’s reasonable costs incurred for access to be supervised.

28.  It is not correct as the Mother asserts that the Father insisted on appointing Rent-A-Mum in lieu of supervised access in the Social Welfare Department and he should bear the higher costs solely.  There were occasions when the Father’s access was supervised at centres provided by the Social Welfare Department and the Hong Kong Family Welfare Society (“the Centres”).  It was only if access took place outside the Centres, that the supervision services of Rent-A-Mum was required.  I accept the Father’s submission that supervised access in a room at the Centres would not be ideal, and it is perfectly reasonable for the Father to arrange more pleasant access time with the daughter outside the Centres. 

29.  On 29 September 2022, access was further revised so that the father could have Thursday dinner access supervised by his sister or brother-in-law, Tuesday access at the Centres and for 2 hours on Saturday with Rent-A-Mum, which was further revised by the Order of 5 December 2022 permitted a change of locations where access could take place and the people who could supervise access was expanded. 

30.  The Mother did not easily agree to the persons who could supervise access outside the Centres, and as such, I find it reasonable that the Mother has to bear the financial consequences of the supervised access charges by Rent-A-Mum.  

Conclusion

31.  I find that all the grounds of the Mother’s leave to appeal lack merit and have no reasonable ground of success.  I, therefore, dismiss her application accordingly.

Costs

32.  The cost of this application shall follow the event in the normal way. The Mother shall pay the Father the costs of and arising out of her Leave to Appeal application.

 ( Sasha ALLISON )
 Deputy District Judge

  

The Petitioner (father) acting in person

The Respondent (mother) acting in person


[1] Paragraph 9, 10 – 11 of the Ruling

[2024] HKFC 76-EN-2024-04-15

H v. W

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FCMC 8332 / 2017

[2024] HKFC 76

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

MATRIMONIAL CAUSES

NUMBER 8332 OF 2017

_____________________

BETWEEN

 HPetitioner

and

 WRespondent

_____________________

Coram:  Deputy District Judge S. Allison in Chambers (Not Open to Public) 
Date of Hearing:  23 February 2024 
Date of Judgment:  15 April 2024 

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J U D G M E N T
(Maintenance pending suit/Interim maintenance)

------------------------------------------------------------

Introduction

1.  This is an application by the Husband of 3 March 2023 to vary downwards, the MPS Order dated 24 October 2018 (“the MPS Order). The MPS Order provided that the Husband was to pay the Wife $14,000 per month as maintenance pending suit and interim maintenance of $38,500 for the child of the family, (“B”).  In addition, the MPS Order recorded the Husband’s undertakings to pay for the daughter’s school fees, ECA up to $2,000 and medical and dental insurance for the Wife and B.   

2.  At the hearing, the Husband confirmed that he wished for the variation to reflect a cessation of his 50% contribution towards the Wife’s general expenses, and that the Wife should contribute towards half of B’s expenses.  Furthermore, the Husband wished to be discharged of his undertaking to pay for the Wife’s her medical and dental insurance since the Wife was now employed.

3.  For her part, the Wife confirmed at the hearing that it was her stance that the MPS Order should remained unchanged.

Background

4.  Since the MPS Order was made, the parties have made subsequent applications to vary the MPS Order.  The Wife applied for litigation funding by way of Summons on 17 October 2019 while the Husband applied to vary downwards the MPS Order on 16 December 2019.  These two applications were addressed in the Judgment handed down on 11 June 2020 (“2020 MPS Order”).  The 2020 MPS Order rejected the Wife’s application for litigation funding and denied the Husband’s application to vary the MPS Order downwards.

5.  Following the 2020 MPS Order, the Wife filed an application to vary the MPS Order upwards by way of Summons dated 31 August 2021.  This application has been adjourned sine die as a result of the Wife’s second application for leave to permanent remove B from Hong Kong to live in Singapore, which she filed in November 2023.  The Wife’s second application for permanent relocation has been fixed for trial to be heard in October 2024. 

6.  Shortly after the Wife’s application in August 2021 to vary maintenance upwards, the Husband filed his Summons to vary the MPS Order downwards on 18 October 2021, which was then adjourned. 

7.  This was followed by a Financial Dispute Resolution hearing on 3 January 2022, which was unsuccessful.

8.  The Wife then filed a Judgment Summons dated 2 November 2022 against the Husband for arrears in maintenance in the sum of HK$419,965.64, as it is the Wife’s case that the Husband stopped paying maintenance since October 2022.  

9.  The Husband consequently made the current application on 3 March 2023 to vary the MPS Order downwards.  Pursuant to the Order of 4 January 2024, the Husband’s summons of 18 October 2021 was fixed to be heard at this maintenance pending suit hearing.  Since it is necessary for the variation of a maintenance application to be heard separately and before the Judgment Summons, the Wife’s Judgment Summons has been further adjourned pending this application for variation (See C v H [2012] 3 HKLRD 351). 

10.  The MPS judgment of 2018 has already set out the background facts of the case, which I will not repeat.  What is pertinent is that the Husband is currently 41 years old and the Wife is 44 years old.  It was a short marriage; the parties married in February 2013, separated in January 2016 and B was born in October 2015, shortly before the parties’ separation.

11.  During the marriage, the husband worked in the finance sector prior to setting up his own investment business in 2016, while the Wife owned a recruitment business until it closed down in or around March 2018. At the time of the MPS Order, both parties were not in paid employment and received passive income from some gold investment.

12.  Since the making of the MPS Order and the 2020 MPS Order, both parties have secured paid employment.  At the time of the hearing, the Husband disclosed that his monthly income was approximately HK$105,067.25 consisting of a fixed salary from Payment Asia and a director’s fee from his investment business company. 

13.  Both the Husband and the Wife did not disclose a copy of their employment contracts as per the Form E disclosure requirements, and they were given a chance to do so within seven days of the hearing.  The employment contracts provided by both parties support their evidence regarding their monthly income.  The Husband’s employment contract stipulated that the Husband is entitled to a discretionary bonus, which according to the Husband is paid at the end of each financial year.  It was the Husband’s submission that since he only commenced work with Payment Asia in February 2023, he anticipated a modest bonus of between HK$5,000 – HK$10,000 in or around the end of March 2024.  There was a potential for a more generous bonus going forward if the Husband was able to bring in more long term businesses or projects. 

14.  The Wife was originally employed as temporary staff with her current employer from around 1 April 2023, and was then promoted to full time staff member effective from 1 August 2023.  The Wife’s base salary is HK$66,000 per month and there is no bonus element for the Wife provided for in her employment contract.

Legal principles

15.  The law on variation of maintenance pending suit and interim maintenance is well established. Section 3 Matrimonial Proceedings and Property Ordinance,Cap 192 (“MPPO”) states that the only governing principle is that the court shall make such order as it considers reasonable in all of the circumstances of the case. Consequently, applications such as these are approached on a broad-brush basis.

16.  Sections 11(1) MPPO, further grants the Court power to vary, discharge or suspend any maintenance order previously made:

“11. Variation, discharge, etc. of orders for financial provisions

(1)  Where the court has made an order to which this section applies, then, subject to the provisions of this section, the court shall have power to vary or discharge the order or to suspend any provision thereof temporarily and to revive the operation of any provision so suspended.”

17.  While Section 11(7) of the MPPO stipulates how the court should exercise this power:

“11(7)  In exercising the powers conferred by this section the court shall have regard to all the circumstances of the case, including any change in any of the matters to which the court was required to have regard when making the order to which the application relates and, where the party against whom that order was made has died, the changed circumstances resulting from his or her death.” (emphasis added)

18.  In the case of AEM v VFM [2008] 3 HKLRD 36 , Cheung JA explained the modern approach in dealing with an application for variation of maintenance at para 14 of the Judgment, in particular the following sub-paragraphs:

“3. The traditional approach to variation was not to re-fix afresh the amount of maintenance but to consider the amount of change in the actual means of the parties so that the new order should merely be increased or decreased roughly in proportion to the change in the means : Foster v.Foster[1964] 3 All ER 541, Jackson's Matrimonial Finance and Taxation 7th Ed. Ch. 3. 131.

4. The modern approach, as required by section 11(7), is for the Court to consider all the circumstances of the cases. The Court is not required to proceed from the starting point of the original order but look at the matter afresh: Flavell v. Flavell[1997] 1 FLR 353at 357B following Lewis v. Lewis[1977] 1 WLR 409and Garner v. Garner[1992] 1 FLR 573.

5. Any change in any of the matters to which the Court was required to consider when making the original order was one of the circumstances to be considered.

…

8. At the same time the basis and intended effect of the original order are relevantfactors to which the Court on variation should pay regard and there should not be a radical departure from the approach taken by the parties themselves when they had entered into an agreement embodied in a consent order: Boylan v. Boylan [1988] FLR 282.”

19.  Based on the established legal principles, the court is to approach the matter de novo, having regard to the current circumstances of the case as is reasonable, and to make an Order applying fairness as the yardstick.

20.  In HJFG v KCY [2012] 1 HKLRD 95, the Court of Appeal held inter alia that:

“(a) The sole criterion to be applied in determining the application is ‘reasonableness’, which is synonymous with ‘fairness’.

(b) A very important factor in determining fairness is the marital standard of living. That is not to say that the exercise is merely to replicate that standard.

(c) In every maintenance pending suit application there should be a specific maintenance pending suit budget which excludes capital or long-term expenditure, more aptly to be considered on a final hearing. That budget should be examined critically in every case to exclude forensic exaggeration.

(d) Where the affidavit or Form E disclosure by the payer is obviously deficient, the court should not hesitate to make robust assumptions about his ability to pay. The court is not confined to the mere say-so of the payer as to the extent of his income or resources.  In such a situation the court should err in favour of the payee.”

21.  Therefore, as this is an assessment of interim maintenance, the proper approach is on a broad brush basis of the immediate and reasonable requirements of the payee balanced against the ability of the payor. (see Hartmann JA in HJFG v KCY [2012] 1 HKLRD 95 at paragraph 38)

22.  In reaching a conclusion on the assessment of maintenance on a broad brush basis, the court is to take a broad and robust view of the payor’s means and does not need to accept or proceed on the payor’s assertions as to his or her means and inability to pay. Similarly, the Court may look to the assertions made by the payee and take a similar approach when looking at his or her means and alleged reasonable requirements.  The court should look to the reality of the situation, in so far as it can, in relation to the bare assertions made by either the husband or the wife.  Any over or underpayment for maintenance pending suit can be taken into account and corrected at the financial ancillary relief hearing.

The husband’s ability to pay

23.  The major argument of the Husband’s variation application is that believes the MPS Order to be excessive and based on misconceptions about his wealth.  In support of his application, the Husband relies on the fact that the Wife’s earning capacity has improved since the MPS Order, that he has lost out on three specific earning opportunities due to the Wife’s criminal allegations brought against the Husband, that there has been overpayment of several items within the MPS Order and that the Court is erroneously considered his family’s wealth to automatically equate to him being personally wealthy.

24.  Since the MPS Order, the Husband’s financial resources have altered somewhat.  In terms of his income, as per Part 3 of his Form E dated 18 January 2024 (“Husband’s Form E”), the Husband currently earns:

Income HK$ 
Payment Asia 60,000.00
Director’s Fee from his advisory company 45,067.35
Total 105,067.25 

25.  The Husband also included passive income from the gold fund investment of HK$97,125.00 (equivalent to US$12,500 per month) as part of his monthly income.  However, in reality, the Husband has not been paid in full from the gold fund investment since July 2019. At the hearing, the Husband further confirmed that since July 2019 he has only received partial payment for three or four months.  Accordingly, for the purposes of this MPS application, I do not propose to include the gold fund investment as a source of the Husband’s current income. Rather, I consider that the unpaid debt should be better described as a “debt due to the Husband” under Part 2.9 of the Form E, which has in fact been disclosed by the Husband in his Form E to amount to HK$4,856,250.

26.  The Husband expressed frustration that due to the Wife bringing criminal complaints against him to the police, that he missed out on three separate income generating opportunities which could have earned him a higher income.  Of the three opportunities, the Husband has been successful in securing one, which is his current employment, albeit I accept that the employment relationship commenced months later than it was originally anticipated.  The Husband’s evidence was that he was still working on one of these business opportunities but at the moment, he could only secure work on a deal by deal basis without any long term relationship guarantee.  I accept the Husband’s explanation that he had to disclose the criminal investigations by the police against him, in the midst of negotiations with the three potential businesses due to the potential reputational damage that would have arisen, if the Husband had hidden this information from the businesses.  The Husband submitted that his business reputation was very important to him and his decision to not harm his business reputation cannot be faulted.

27.  That said, it is evident that the Husband has a higher earning potential which will hopefully continue to flourish over time, and in any event, the Husband is earning more than the Wife at present.

28.  Turning then to the Husband’s current level of income, there is a significant shortfall between his earned income and monthly outgoings.  It is the Husband’s evidence that he has had to borrow money to meet these monthly outgoings, and that for this reason his liabilities have increased since the MPS Order.  There has not been any evidence to show with precision how much the Husband has borrowed specifically to meet his ongoing monthly expenses, but the nature of the Husband’s liabilities, many of them being personal loans, demonstrate that he does have the ability to borrow. 

29.  The Wife does not accept that the Husband’s income is only HK$105,067.25 each month, since according to her, the Husband’s lifestyle has remained unchanged despite the parties’ separation which, to her is a clear indicator that he has additional sources of funds.  One example that Wife provided was that the Husband could rent out his carpark space to rental income of approximately HK$4,500 per month.  This proposal however, ignores the fact that the Husband requires a parking space to park his car.  The Wife’s assertions as to the Husband’s income were entirely unsupported by any evidence which the court could directly rely upon or to draw an adverse inference against the Husband. 

30.  In terms of the Husband’s ability to borrow, it is apparent from the credit card statements that the Husband’s credit cards are no repaid in full every month.  He has however, managed to negotiate with many of his creditors, changes in the repayment terms and interests due on his personal loans to the extent that the figures in Part 4.2 of the Husband’s Form E relating to “loan repayments” and “interest payments” are not actual monthly expenditure made by the Husband.  The fact that many of the Husband’s loans are personal loans given by family or friends, with flexible repayment terms, leads me to believe that he does have the ability to borrow further to meet his maintenance obligations.

31.  I am further of the view that in addition to having the ability to borrow, the Husband can also make adjustment to his expenditure, such as remortgaging his property to reduce the monthly mortgage instalments.  Accordingly, I find that the Husband has the ability to meet the maintenance pending suit and interim maintenance payments set out in this judgment.

The wife’s financial resources

32.  Since the MPS Order, the Wife’s income has increased and is currently HK$66,000 per month.  The Wife expressed her concern that her current employment status is tenuous in the long term although her employment contract is an open ended one and not for a fixed term.

33.  In addition, the MPS Order provides her with a total of HK$52,500 per month.

34.  Like the Husband, the Wife’s investment in the gold fund was meant to provide a passive income.  According to the Wife’s Form E dated 18 January 2024, she was meant to receive HK$37,440 per month (equivalent to US$4,800 per month).  Like the Husband, the Wife has also not received any income from the gold fund albeit, the Wife ceased receiving this payment from October 2021 onwards.  This amount, therefore, will not be included in the calculation of the Wife’s current income but should be properly considered as a debt owed to the Wife.  Under Part 2.9, the Wife has calculated the sum of HK$1,594,018 due to her from the gold investment income.

35.  The Wife does have other financial resources available to her.  I have had regard to the parties’ respective evidence regarding the part settlement of the outstanding interest to the Wife from the gold investment fund.  The Wife explained at paragraphs 9 - 10 of her 14th Affirmation that she was due to receive the sum of US$50,000 in cash, by way of part settlement in or around April 2021.  According to the Wife, she was preparing for a hearing before the Court of Appeal Vand was unable to collect the cash on 28 April 2021.  This explanation is at odds with the contemporaneous text messages exchanged between the Wife and the Husband’s cousin, who is the responsible person for paying the parties from the gold investment fund on between 4 and 5 March 2021 and 4 May 2021.[1]  The delay and the lack of urgency by the Wife in collecting the US$50,000 in cash which she states is owed to her, leads me to believe that the Wife does have financial resources to draw upon to meet her expenses.

What are the wife’s reasonable needs?

36.  The Wife has set out her most up to date expenses at paragraph 20 of her 46th Affirmation dated 5 February 2024 as follows:

General

Item Amount (HK$)
Rent 31,000.00
Utilities (electricity, gas, rates, telephone and water) 8,800.00
Food 7,700.00
Household expenses 5,000.00
Domestic helper and related 6,300.00
 HK$58,800.00

Personal

Item Amount (HK$)
Meals out of home 5,500.00
Transport 3,000.00
Clothing / Shoes 6,000.00
Personal grooming (incl. haircut, facials, treatments, cosmetics, gym etc.) 4,400.00
Entertainment / presents 2,200.00
Holiday 6,500.00
Medical / Dental 1,000.00
Legal Fees 5,500.00
Tax 9,900.00
Insurance premia Paid by Petitioner
Contribution to parents Nil
Others (specify)
Mobile phone
Club expenses

331.50
Nil
  HK$44,331.50

B

Item Amount (HK$)
School fees Paid by Petitioner
Extra-Curricular Activities
(Petitioner pays up to HK$2,000 per month)
760.00
General transport 2,500.00
School books and stationery 1,300.00
Medical / Dental 1,000.00
Clothing, accessories and utensils 4,000.00
Toiletries 1,000.00
Meals out of home 2,000.00
Entertainment 3,000.00
Holidays 5,500.00
Insurance premia Paid by Petitioner
School bus fees 1,416.00
Birthday party gifts/ birthday party 1,000.00
   HK23,476.00
TOTAL
(excluding expenses those paid by the Petitioner 
HK$126,607.50

37.  The Wife submitted that she required the Husband to continue to meet the cost of her medical insurance because her employment only provided the most basic medical insurance plan, and she could not afford to purchase her own medical insurance.

38.  According to the Wife, her total expenses amount to approximately HK$126,607.50 per month.  Based on her income and MPS Order, the Wife’s shortfall every month between her income and declared expenses should be approximately HK$8,607.50.  The Wife submitted that her fiancé contributes towards her expenses when they are together and / or when they travel, which explained how she met her monthly shortfall without the need of incurring further liabilities.

Discussion

39.  Both parties are currently in paid employment which is the most significant change since the making of the MPS Order and the 2020 MPS Order.  Although the Wife is also now engaged to her boyfriend who resides in Singapore, I do not agree with the Husband’s suggestion that this should mean the Wife should rely on this financial resource instead of receiving maintenance pending suit.  Although I accept the Wife’s evidence that the fiancé does provide some financial assistance when they travel or are together, I do not think it is appropriate to attribute any contribution by the fiancé towards B’s expenses which remains the responsibility of both the Husband and the Wife. 

General expenses

40.  In so far as the Wife’s general expenses are concerned, I accept the Husband’s contention that the Wife’s utility expenses of HK$8,800 are on the high side and do not properly reflect the size of the Wife’s accommodation.  The Wife was given the opportunity to provide a breakdown of the utilities, and even then, she was only able to account for utility expenses up to HK$5,100 per month, which I accept is a more realistic amount. 

41.  When asked to explain her monthly household costs of HK$5,000, the Wife submitted that this included moving costs and furniture / fittings of new apartments since she had to move frequently.  MPS expenses are meant to cover “immediate and reasonable” requirements and not long term expenditure.  I would reduce household expenses to HK$3,000 per month. 

42.  In total then, I accept that the Wife has general expenses in the region of HK$53,100 per month.  As part of his application, the Husband seeks that he should no longer be responsible for half of the Wife’s general expenses, although he does not dispute responsibility for B’s share of the general household expenses which amounts to HK$26,550 per month. 

43.  Taking into account that the Wife’s current income of HK$66,000 per month and has her own financial resources, on a broadbrush basis, I believe that the Husband’s contribution towards the Wife’s share of general expenses can be reduced to HK$10,000 per month. The Wife signed her full time employment contract on 1 August 2023.  This reduction should be backdated to one month after this date, that is from 1 September 2023.  At the same time, the Husband is to continue meeting the costs of the Wife’s medical and dental insurance until further order.

44.  The Husband did not challenge the Wife’s personal expenses, since the Wife is wholly responsible for these expenses.

B’s expenses

45.  The Husband’s undertaking to pay for B’s school fees, ECA’s and her medical and dental insurance will continue.  The breakdown of these expenses are HK$15,933.33 for B’s school fees, HK$2,000 contribution towards B’s ECA and HK$10,400 per month for the Wife’s and B’s medical and dental insurance.  This is a total sum of HK$28,333.33 which the Husband has undertaken to pay over and above the MPS Order.  This does not include the expenses the Husband incurs himself, when B is in his care during access.

46.  The Husband complained that some of the remaining expenses are on the high side for an eight year old child, which I tend to agree.  I will allow B’s expenses as follows:

B

Item Amount (HK$)
School fees (Paid by Petitioner)
Extra-Curricular Activities
Petitioner pays up to HK$2,000 per month
760.00
General transport 2,500.00
School books and stationery 1,000.00
Medical / Dental 1,000.00
Clothing, accessories and utensils 2,500.00
Toiletries 1,000.00
Meals out of home 2,000.00
Entertainment 3,000.00*
Holidays 5,000.00*
School bus fees 1,416.00
Birthday party gifts / birthday party 1,000.00*
Total  HK$21,176

* Items the Wife is to pay

47.  Of the HK$21,176.00 each month, the Wife will be responsible for the entertainment, holidays and birthday party gifts / birthday party costs of B.  The Wife’s contribution towards these items for B is fair and proportion in the circumstances.

48.  This leaves a balance of HK$12,176 of B’s personal expenses which the Husband will be responsible for.  Adding B’s share of the Wife’s general expenses, this comes up to a total of HK$38,726 for B’s interim monthly maintenance.  I will round this up to a sum of HK$39,000 per month.

Conclusion

49.  In conclusion, I will make an order that the MPS Order be varied such that the Husband do pay the wife HK$10,000 per month, as maintenance pending suit plus HK$39,000 per month as interim maintenance for B. Both these payments will be backdated to 1 September 2023.  These payments will be in addition to the Husband’s continuing undertakings to pay for B’s school fees, ECA’s up to a maximum of HK$2,000 per month and her medical/dental insurance and the medical/dental insurance for the Wife.

Costs

50.  Since neither party has been wholly successful in respect of this application, I make an order nisi for no costs which will be made absolute upon 14 days.  

Order

51.  I make an order as follows:

UPON the Petitioner undertaking to continue to pay for B’s school fees, ECA’s (up to HK$2,000 per month) and for B’s and the Wife’s medical and dental insurance directly.

IT IS ORDERED THAT: 

1)  Paragraph 1 of the Order dated 24 October 2018 to be varied such that the Petitioner do pay to the Respondent by way of maintenance pending suit for herself in the sum of HK$10,000 per month and interim maintenance for the child of the family, in the sum of HK$39,000 per month.  The variation of Paragraph 1 of the Order dated 24 October 2018 to be backdated to 1 September 2023 until further Order.

2)  There shall be an order nisi to be made absolute in 14 days’ time that there be no order as to costs.

 ( Sasha ALLISON )
   Deputy District Judge

  

The Petitioner appeared in person

The Respondent appeared in person



[1] Exhibit KKH-46-4 of the Husband’s 46th Affirmation.

[2023] HKFC 258-EN-2024-01-04

H v. W

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FCMC 8332 / 2017

[2023] HKFC 258

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

MATRIMONIAL CAUSES

NUMBER 8332 OF 2017

----------------------------

BETWEEN  
 HPetitioner

and

 WRespondent

----------------------------

Coram : Deputy District Judge S. Allison in Chambers (Not Open to Public)
Date of Written Submissions:11 December 2023
Date of Judgment:4 January 2024

_____________________________

RULING
(Variation of order nisi on costs)

_____________________________

1.  The fact finding hearing took place in May 2023 over five days.  On 28 July 2023, I handed down the Ruling on the Respondent Mother’s application in respect of a fact finding hearing concerning three distinct and separate incidents which the Mother alleged took place when the Daughter was in the father’s care. 

2.  In the Ruling, I held that in respect of the first two incidents, although they had taken place they did not amount of abuse.  On the third and more serious incident, I held that the evidence provided by the Mother fell significantly short of establishing this allegation and dismissed the Mother’s claims. 

3.  This ruling on costs should be read in conjunction with the full Ruling and the findings made therein following the fact finding hearing. 

Issues

4.  In the Ruling, I held that since neither party had indicated that they wish to seek their costs, and since it was a children’s matter, a no costs order nisi was made.  The order nisi was to become absolute after 14 days.

5.  By way of his summons dated 10 August 2023, the Father seeks to vary the cost order nisi to one where the Mother pays his costs occasioned by the fact finding hearing, “on an indemnity basis, at an amount to be taxed if not agreed, including costs of the adjournment of the trial on care and control, the costs of Rent-A-Mum services, transport fee’s incurred when picking up the child and the Respondent not permitting access, costs in relation to the Respondent[’]s demand that dinner access is to be held outside in a public place and costs associated with the legal fees to defend the indecent assault allegation to [be] payable forthwith”.  The Mother argues that there should be no variation and that the no order on costs should remain.

Legal Principles

6.  The Court has very wide discretion on the issue of costs. Order 62 rule 3(2) of the Rules of the High Court (“RHC”) states as follows:

“If the Court in the exercise of its discretion sees fit to make any order as to the costs of or incidental toanyproceedings (other than interlocutory proceedings), the Court shall, subject to this Order, order the costs to follow the event, except when it appears to the Court that in the circumstances of the case some other order should be made as to the whole or any part of the costs.

7.  The Court in exercising its discretion as to costs shall, if appropriate in the circumstances take into account the conduct of the parties (See Order 62, rule 5(1) RHC).  When evaluating the parties’ conduct, Order 62 rule 5(2) RHC states,

(2)  For the purpose of paragraph (1)(e), the conduct of the parties include

(a)  whether it was reasonable for a party to raise, pursue or contest a particular allegation or issue;

(b)  the manner in which a party has pursued or defended his case or a particular allegation or issue;

(c)  whether a claimant who has succeeded in his claim, in whole or in part, exaggerated his claim; and

(d)  conduct before, as well as during, the proceedings”

8.  The discretion on costs in the family court, is much wider and the starting point that costs follow the event is more easily displaced than in other civil proceedings.[1]  In particular, the Court of Appeal in TPL v WYY (unreported, CACV 47 and 61/2014) stated that:

“General practice” - no order as to costs

14.1. One starts with the "proposition" or "general practice" (though not a "principle": see London Borough of Sutton v Davis (Costs) No.2 [1994] 2 FLR 569 at p570H) that in applications to do with children, the usual order should be no order as to costs.

14.2. This approach stems from the aspiration that in these applications the court is seeking to find an arrangement which is best for the children, so that the only "winner" is the children, and neither parent should be regarded as the "winner"/"loser", although they had mutually exclusive proposals regarding custody and care and control.

14.3. The rationale is that when a court considers custody and care and control of children, the proceedings are inquisitorial rather than adversarial. In the court's search for the best option available, it does not wish "the spectre of an order for costs to discourage those with a proper interest in the child from participating in the debate. Nor does it wish to reduce the chance of their co-operation around the future life of the child by casting one as the successful party entitled to his costs and another as the unsuccessful party obliged to pay them" (LB of Sutton v Davis (No.2) at pp570H -571C).

14.4. As the English court of appeal observed in R v R (Costs: Child Case) [1997] 2 FLR 95 at p97, there is a "possibility that in effect a costs order will add insult to the injury of having lost in the debate as to what is to happen to the child in the future; it is likely to exacerbate rather than to calm down the existing tensions; and this will not be in the best interests of the child".

14.5. Having said that, this general practice is not a rigid rule. In particular, the court must be careful that this approach to costs should not be abused e.g. in cases where one parent has more means at his disposal than the other who does not qualify for, or prefers not to use, legal aid. The practice should not provide the opportunity for one parent to wear the other down financially by means of multiple interlocutory skirmishes….

Exceptional circumstances

15.1. Accordingly the courts have said that this approach to costs does not apply in exceptional circumstances, such as where the conduct of one party has been reprehensible, or the party's stance has been beyond the band of what is reasonable (LB of Sutton v Davis (No.2) at p571B-C, following Havering LBC v S [1986] 1 FLR 489 and Gojkovic v Gojkovic (No. 2) [1992] Fam 40).

15.2. However, in considering whether the exception applies in a particular case, the court should not be too quick to label a parent's conduct as "unreasonable". As Hale J (now Baroness Hale SCJ) observed in R v R at p98B,  

"The fair point is made that in children cases one must not confuse unreasonableness in relation to the child - because one might say that we are expected to be unreasonable in our attitudes to our children - and unreasonableness in the attitude to the litigation".…..” (emphasis added)

9.  The father is asking for his costs to be paid on an indemnity basis, although this is a child related matter.  It is very unusual for a court to make a costs order against a parent in a child related case on an indemnity basis.  The Father has not provided any legal authority in support of seeking costs on an indemnity basis, and from my own research, I am not able to locate any case authority in Hong Kong where the court has seen fit to make a costs order on an indemnity basis in a child related matter.[2]

10.  Notwithstanding this, the legal principles set out by HHJ Bebe Chu in LYE and CWW and HWL, (unreported, FCMC 14787/ 2002, 6 May 2005) on the correct approach to indemnity costs in a family case (albeit not child related) are helpful:

“LEGAL PRINCIPLES

3. According to Rule 3 of the Matrimonial Causes Rules, the Rules of the High Court (RHC) shall apply with the necessary modifications to the commencement of matrimonial proceedings in, and to the practice and procedure in matrimonial proceedings pending in the Court of First Instance or in the District Court.

4. Rule 91A of the Matrimonial Causes Rules provides that where the costs of an incidental to any matrimonial proceedings are directed to be taxed, R.H.C. Order 62 shall have effect in relation to the costs of proceedings in the Court of First Instance, and R.D.C. Order 62 shall have effect in relation to the costs of proceedings in the District Court.

5. Order 62 Rule 28(3) in both R.D.C. and in R.H.C. provides that the Court in awarding costs payable to one party by another may in any case in which it thinks fit to do so order or direct that the costs shall be taxed on the common fund basis or on the indemnity basis.

6. Any order for costs is in the discretion of the Court. (see Headnote of Re Engindata Ltd (No. 2) 1993 1 All ER 232).

7. Section 53 of District Court Ordinance Cap. 336 (equivalent to Section 52A of High Court Ordinance Cap. 4) provides that the Court shall have full power to determine by whom and to what extent the costs are to be paid. See also Hong Kong Civil Procedure, 62/2/5:-

“The Court of Appeal in Choy Yee Chun (The Representative of the state of Chan Pui Yiu) v. Bond Star Development Ltd [1997] H.K.L.R.D. 1327, CA reviewed the cases and summarised the law as follows. A taxation of the successful party’s costs on an indemnity basis could properly be ordered where the proceedings were scandalous or vexatious, or had been initiated or prosecuted maliciously, or for an ulterior motive, or in an oppressive manner. Any proceedings instituted or prosecuted in such circumstances as to constitute an affront to the court could properly be the subject of a direction for the taxation of the successful party’s cost on the indemnity basis. However, the circumstances in which an indemnity award might properly be made were not restricted to circumstances beyond the requirement that taxation on an indemnity basis must be “appropriate”. The principle for the award of an order of costs on an indemnity basis applied equally to those who not only instituted proceedings but who defended them. If a plaintiff had been forced to institute proceedings by the defendant whose conduct had been not only hostile in the normal litigious sense, but oppressive and with base ulterior motive, and if the pursuit of a defence constituted conduct which was part of an oppressive game plan, then invocation of the power to award costs on an indemnity basis might well be justified”.

8. I have been referred by the Petitioner’s solicitor, Mr. Ko, to the case of Re Tang Hong Yeun Andy HCB 19585 OF 2003 (at paragraph 18) quoting Choy Yee Chun (The Representative of the estate of Chan Pui Yiu) v Bond Star Development Ltd. [1997] H.K.L.R.D. 1327 CA, where it was held that the discretion was not to be fettered or circumscribed beyond the requirement that taxation on an indemnity basis must be “appropriate”. See also Hong Kong Civil Procedure, 62/App/12.

9. I have also been referred to the Judgment of the Court of Final Appeal in Town Planning Board v Society for Protection of the Harbour Limited FACV No. 14A of 2003, at paragraphs 12, 14, 15, 18 and 23 where the Court of Final Appeal has made the following comments:-

(a) The Court has a broad discretion to determine how costs shall be paid and whether indemnity costs should be ordered (paragraph 12).

(b) The succesful party should show, in order to obtain an order for costs on an indemnity basis, that the case has some “special or unusual feature” (paragraph 15).

(c) In relation to the award of costs generally, it has been accepted, as Chu J pointed out, that while

“the ground [upon which costs are awarded] must be connected with the case. This may extend to any matter relating to the litigation and the parties’ conduct in it, and also to the circumstances leading to the litigation, but no further”.

There is no reason why this statement does not apply with equal force to the exercise of the discretion to award indemnity costs (paragraph 18).

(d) Other factors, such as the reasonableness of the conduct of the parties, may need to be taken into account (paragraph 23).

11.  With these guidelines and principles, I now proceed to consider the Father’s application for variation of costs.  The ultimate goal for this Court is what costs order would be fair and just in light of the circumstances. 

Discussion

12.  Parents should not be discouraged from raising legitimate concerns about their children, however, there is a fine line which if a parent has crossed, will warrant a cost order against that parent.[3]

13.  In the Ruling, I made a number of findings which go to the Mother’s behaviour and conduct of the litigation.  For example,

“[15] ….I found the father to be a credible witness. It is clear that he is trying his best to maintain a healthy father-daughter relationship despite the difficulty he has faced to have access. I accept that the Daughter genuinely loves and enjoys the time she has with the father and his extended family and I would encourage the mother to support this relationship fully. On the other hand, I found the mother had a tendency to exaggerate and to place an irrational overreliance that the Daughter should be completely believed and that the Daughter is not capable of being untruthful.”

14.  The Mother has a duty to not simply accept whatever the Daughter said but to make a proper assessment.  In terms of the closet incident, the Mother did not enquire with the Father to find out more information after the first time she heard of it and yet the Mother reached the conclusion that the Daughter was scared and traumatised.  As to the gravity of this incident, I made the finding that:

“[30] I note that this incident is not of a serious nature which warranted being an issue for a fact finding hearing and it is my observation that the mother’s conduct regarding the closet incident to be unreasonable for four reasons:

(1) The mother’s suggestion that the Daughter was placed in the walk-in wardrobe on more than one occasion is made without any supporting evidence. In the Daughter’s interview with the CP she claimed to have only been placed in the walk-in wardrobe on only one occasion.

(2) The mother continued to exaggerate the Daughter’s initial claims about being locked in a closet even after been presented with photographs of the walk-in wardrobe exhibited in the father’s affirmation, and after Ms. Chen had investigated the father’s home in person.

(3) There is no evidence in support that the closet incident happened recently or frequently. In fact, the Daughter told Ms Chen and the police that the closet incident happened two years ago and only once.

(4) The mother has not provided any evidence that the Daughter was placed in any danger by being placed in a walk-in wardrobe or that she was being abused.” (emphasis added)

15.  The hair removal incident should have similarly not been pursued at a fact finding hearing, especially since the Father did not deny that the Daughter’s hair was removed (likely by the helper) when she was in his care during Christmas access in 2021 and he gave an undertaking at the earliest opportunity on 19 January 2022 that the pumice stone or “magic cream” would not be used on the Daughter.  The findings on the Mother’s litigation conduct regarding this issue in the Ruling were:

“[33] When the mother was cross-examined on why she did not bring to the father’s attention her concerns about the Daughter’s skin or the hair removal before speaking with the Social Welfare Officer or the paediatrician, the mother’s answer was that she wanted to ensure that she was following the correct procedure. I do not accept that this is a reasonable reaction nor does it explain the delay of three days before the mother brought the Daughter to see the doctor if the Daughter was in fact, suffering from pain as the mother claimed.

[34] I do not accept that a reasonable person would have called the Social Welfare Officer before seeking medical attention for a child in pain, particularly when the child is known to have sensitive skin. I find that the mother has exaggerated the pain suffered by the Daughter arising from the hair removal….

…

[38] As for the “magic cream” neither the mother nor the father knew what the Daughter was referring to. However, the mother persisted in her claim that “magic cream” was used solely on the Daughter’s say so. No evidence was provided by the mother as to possible creams which the Daughter could have been referring to. I, therefore, reject that any “magic cream” or any cream was used to remove the Daughter’s hair on her arms.”

16.  As for the third and most serious of the three allegations, I had set out at paragraph 42(1) – 42(8) of the Ruling the reasons why the Mother did not meet the evidentiary threshold.  The Mother’s lack of insight and perspective was noted at paragraph 48 of the Ruling:

“[48] Although I accept that some of these concerns are genuinely held by the mother, she continues to believe them as 100% true, notwithstanding the fact that there is little, if any corroborating evidence to support what the Daughter has said in regard to the most serious allegation. This seems to me a remarkable lack of insight or perspective. In my experience, children do not always tell the truth or they make up stories for a variety of reasons.”

17.  The Court is of the view that the Mother did cross the line of what is and what was not acceptable litigation conduct in child related proceedings.  Considering that the Mother expressing at the fact finding her continuing intention to relocate to Singapore with the Daughter once the Decree Absolute was granted and that she had unilaterally suspended the Father’s in-person access with the Daughter from 6 January 2022 until it was resumed on a supervised basis gradually per the Order dated 7 July 2022[4], I concluded in the Ruling that

“[43] … Consequently, it is not difficult to see why the father claims that the mother brought the indecent assault allegation only after she could not obtain an injunction against him.”

18.  I wish to remind the parties that “it seems to the court that it is extremely important that parents should not be able to hide behind the fact that the litigation is about their child/ren to excuse extreme litigation tactics and an overly aggressive approach”.[5]

19.  Bearing all of this in mind, I am still not persuaded that this is a case where it would be appropriate to award costs on an indemnity basis nor am I persuaded that the Husband is permitted to claim for the transport costs incurred when picking up the child when the Mother had not permitted access, or costs for dinner access held outside in a public place.  

20.  The order nisi shall therefore, be varied in that the Mother to be ordered to pay the father’s costs of and occasioned by the child related litigation and the Rent-A-Mum service. The costs shall be taxed on a party and party basis if not agreed.  This order is also subject to only being payable until after the Mother receives her ancillary relief award.

Costs

21.  The cost of this application shall follow the event in the normal way in that the Mother shall pay the Father the costs of and arising out of his application dated 10 August 2023 seeking to vary the order nisi that there be no order as to costs.

 ( Sasha ALLISON )
 Deputy District Judge

  

The Petitioner (father) acting in person

The Respondent (mother) acting in person


[1]TL v SN (unreported CACV 196/2009, 19 October 2010), per Kwan JA; Z v X & C (unreported CACV 166/2011, 8 March 2013) at paragraph 10.

[2] Note the judgment of DC v AZF (unreported, FCMC 13675/2015, 23 April 2021) was in respect of financial provision for the children.

[3] See paragraph 11 of the Husband’s case authority of LEYY v UKWK (unreported, FCMC 1393/2015, 28 May 2020)

[4] Paragraph 9, 10 – 11 of the Ruling

[5] YSG (YX) v LYAG (unreported, FCMC15288/2015, 9 April 2020) per Melloy, J at paragraph 15

[2023] HKFC 145-EN-2023-07-28

KHH v. PKH

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FCMC 8332 / 2017

[2023] HKFC 145

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

MATRIMONIAL CAUSES

NUMBER 8332 OF 2017

________________________

BETWEEN

 KHHPetitioner
 and 
 PKHRespondent

________________________

Coram: Deputy District Judge S. Allison in Chambers (Not Open to Public)
Dates of Hearing: 22 – 25 May and 29 May 2023
Date of Written Closing Submissions: 20 June 2023
Date of Judgment: 28 July 2023

________________________

RULING
(Fact Finding Hearing)

________________________

Introduction

1.  This was a fact finding hearing in respect of the only child of the family, a girl, born on xxOctober 2015 (“the Daughter”).  The Daughter was 7 years old at the time of the fact finding hearing.  There were three distinct and separate incidents which the Respondent mother alleged took place when the Daughter was in the father’s care. On the mother’s case, each of these three incidents, amount to abuse of the Daughter.  I refer to these incidents as the “closet incident”, “hair removal incident” and “indecent assault”, respectively.

2.  I will consider these incidents in turn and make a finding on each of them.  It is important to place these allegations in the context of the context of the parties’ marriage and litigation history, as it is evident that there is a high level of conflict and the parties were unable to communicate reasonably with each other, even when the Daughter’s welfare was at stake.

Background

3.  The parties married on 15 February 2013, and separated in or around January 2016.  Both parties are of Indian descent, with strong ties to Hong Kong.  The father spent most of his childhood in Bangkok, but returned to Hong Kong to work in an investment business after completing his studies overseas.  The mother was born and grew up in Hong Kong. She obtained a diploma in law, and worked as a legal executive before establishing her own legal recruitment business, which closed down in October 2018.  Since then, the mother has worked outside the home for a few months between September 2022 until March 2023.

4.  The Daughter was born shortly before the parties separated.  The father issued a divorce petition on 29 June 2017 and the decree nisi was granted on 8 January 2019.  Since then, the parties have been litigating in the family court almost constantly which is reflected in the number of contested applications and judgments handed down by the court in these proceedings.

5.  Focusing solely on the care arrangements Orders; the first court Order was made on 15 December 2017.  The Order granted joint custody of the Daughter to both parents, interim care and control to the mother and interim defined access to the father.  Following that Order, the father made two applications, the first one on 8 January 2019 seeking sole care and control and the second application in 17 June 2019, seeking shared care and control of the Daughter.

6.  In March 2020, the mother issued her application to relocate to Singapore with the Daughter.  On 10 November 2020, the mother was granted leave at first instance to relocate to Singapore and an interim access Order was made pending relocation (“Relocation & Interim Access Order”).  However, the father appealed against the Relocation Order which was subsequently overturned by the Court of Appeal on 24 May 2021.

7.  The Interim Access Order, provided that weekend access was to be alternated between the parents from Friday, 5:00 pm until Sunday, 5:00 pm.  In addition, the Daughter would be in the care of the father during the week for one night following his weekend access, and two nights of those weekends he did not have access.  In week one, midweek access was to take place from Wednesday after school until Thursday morning when the father would drop the Daughter at school.  In the second week, the two-night access commenced from after school on Tuesday until Thursday morning.  The father was to bring the Daughter to her scheduled weekend activities when she was in his care including religious classes held on Saturday morning.  This arrangement was to continue while the Daughter remained in Hong Kong before moving to Singapore.

8.  Following the Court of Appeal’s decision of May 2021, the father issued a summons on 28 June 2021 to address the long term care and control arrangements.  On 10 August 2021, the Court of Appeal refused the mother leave to appeal, and by 15 November 2021 the mother filed her application to vary the Interim Access Order.

9.  Most recently, on 17 March 2023, the mother applied for the pronouncement of the decree absolute which was refused by HHJ, T. Kwan on 9 May 2023 pending the determination of the Daughter’s care arrangments.  During the fact finding hearing, the mother expressed her continuing intention to relocate to Singapore with the Daughter when the decree absolute is pronounced.

Relevant dates

10.  The court has approached the mother’s allegations in a linear fashion to make sense of the manner each incident was raised.  Each allegation and incident is independent of the others.  The rejection of one allegation does not justify or follow that the court will move onto rejecting all the allegations.  However, at the same time, the court is permitted to draw upon its assessment of one allegation and the parties’ behaviour surrounding each incident, to an extent when considering the others.  In order to provide a sensible account of analysis the chronology of the relevant incidents and surrounding facts are set out here as follows:

10 September 2021 The mother raised the closet incident for the first time in her letter to the court
15 Nov 2021 The mother’s Summons to vary the father’s access downwards.
24 Nov 2021 There was a directions hearing. The court did not permit any changes to be made to the father’s access and a Children’s Dispute Resolution hearing was fixed on April 2022.
26 Dec 2021 – 3 Jan 2022 The Daughter enjoyed Christmas access with the father, during which time the hair removal incidents took place on 28 December and 31 December 2021.
3 Jan 2022 The Daughter returned to the mother’s care. The mother noticed that the Daughter had no hair on arms and legs.
4 Jan 2022 The Daughter returned to school after the Christmas break. The mother filed a complaint against the father with the Social Welfare department regarding the hair removal incident.
The Social welfare officer called the father to investigate whether he had used a pumice stone or “magic cream” / bleach or chemicals on the Daughter to remove the hair on her arms and legs. The father denied using magic cream/ bleach or chemicals on the Daughter.
5 Jan 2022 The Daughter had staying access with the father after attending school.
7 Jan 2022 The mother brought the Daughter to the paediatrician regarding the hair removal incident. Daughter was absent from school.
The mother canceled the father’s access.
8 Jan 2022 The mother filed police report against the father’s helper regarding the hair removal incident.
9 Jan 2022 The mother was allegedly told by the Daughter that the father indecently assaulted her. On the mother’s case, this is the second time she was informed of this by the Daughter, the first time being in or around 1 March 2020.
13 Jan 2022 The mother filed an injunction against the father, his family, servants etc restraining them from seeing the Daughter. The mother’s affirmation in support only mentioned the hair removal incident.
19 Jan 2022 The injunction was not granted by the court following the father undertaking not to use a pumice stone or “magic cream” on the Daughter.
20 Jan 2022 The mother reported indecent assault incident to the Child Protection Services.
21 March 2022 A multi-disciplinary case conference (“MDCC”)  is held regarding the hair removal incident. The MDCC concluded that the use of the pumice stone and “magic cream” was not a maltreatment case.
23 March 2022 The mother writes ex parte letter to the court regarding alleged indecent assault.
12 April 2022 The mother filed a police report regarding the indecent assault incident.
20 April 2022 The mother filed her affirmation regarding all three incidents, including the indecent assault for the first time.
21 April 2022 Children’s Dispute Resolution hearing
28 April 2022 The Daughter has a recorded video interview with the police regarding the indecent assault incident.
6 June 2022 A MDCC is held regarding the indecent assault incident. The MDCC report concluded that there was inconclusive evidence and found that this was not a case of child abuse.
28 June 2022 The Official Solicitor was appointed

11.  From 6 January 2022 the father had no in-person access with the Daughter.  The father’s access only resumed after several months following the Order dated 7 July 2022, on a supervised basis with gradual increments of time with the Daughter.  The father’s access was supervised at centres provided by the Social Welfare Department and the Hong Kong Family Welfare Society (“the Centres”)  or if access was outside the Centres, it was under the supervision of Rent-A-Mum.

12.  There was a further revised access order on 29 September 2022 that the father could have Thursday dinner access supervised by his sister or brother-in-law, Tuesday access at the Centres and for 2 hours on Saturday with Rent-A-Mum.  The next Order of 5 December 2022 permitted a change of locations where access could take place at the father’s sister’s house and the people who could supervise access was expanded.  This was the access Order in place at the tie of the fact finding trial.

Evidence at trial

13.  Both parents gave evidence at trial. Both parties maintained their evidence in the face of cross examination and stood by their account.  I have had regard for the broader interest each party has as to the outcome of this hearing, particularly the mother.

14.  There was also evidence given by one of the Social Welfare Officers involved in the case, Ms Chen and the Clinical Psychologist, Ms Wu (“CP”).  The father’s sister also attended trial on the last day to give evidence.

15.  I found the father to be a credible witness.  It is clear that he is trying his best to maintain a healthy father-daughter relationship despite the difficulty he has faced to have access.  I accept that the Daughter genuinely loves and enjoys the time she has with the father and his extended family and I would encourage the mother to support this relationship fully.  On the other hand, I found the mother had a tendency to exaggerate and to place an irrational overreliance that the Daughter should be completely believed and that the Daughter is not capable of being untruthful.

16.  The father’s sister was a credible witness although of her evidence had little probative value since she was not present during any of the incidents.  What is clear from the paternal aunt’s evidence is that the father has a supportive extended family who clearly loves the Daughter very much.

Expert Evidence and their reports

17.  Due to the length of time the parties have been in conflict regarding the care arrangements of the Daughter, there have been a total of five Social Investigation Reports.  Three reports were prepared between November 2017 and June 2020 before the case was taken up by Ms Chen who prepared two updated Social Investigation Reports and one memo until her departure from the Social Welfare Department in February 2023.  I am grateful for Ms Chen for attending trial to give evidence even though she was no longer working at the Social Welfare Department.  I found her to be an impartial and steady witness.  In particular, she remained unshaken in her observation that the Daughter behaved differently when she was with the mother and when she was with her father.

18.  The CP was appointed by Order of 5 December 2022 and she prepared a report on 16 March 2022.  At the time of making the report, the police were still investigating the hair removal incident and the alleged indecent assault.  Hence, the CP did not explore the details of these incidents in her assessment and declined to make any finding on whether the Daughter was subject to parental alienation the basis that the concept was controversial.  The CP preferred instead view the child’s experience and relationship with each parent through a multi-factor model.  

19.  The CP presented her evidence well at trial. I agree with the CP that the Daughter is caught in a loyalty conflict between her parents.  I also accept the CP conclusion at paragraph 38(a)  of her updated report that the Daughter’s stress is a result of the “incessant parental disputes”.  Despite the mother’s denials, I find that the daughter is aware of these proceedings.  The CP reported that the Daughter was cross with the father because he had made her mother upset and the parents are the key to freeing the Daughter from conflict.

20.  The mother’s affirmation evidence in September 2021 was that the Daughter had displayed symptoms of anxiety in the preceding weeks and she had been sharing about being locked in the father’s closet.  The mother questioned both the Ms Chen and CP as to the possible cause of the Daughter’s anxious behaviour.  The mother attempted to link the Daughter’s anxious behaviour to the Daughter’s reluctance or anxiety to meet with the father.  This hypothesis was rejected by Ms Chen on the basis that the Daughter could be anxious for a variety of reasons.  The CP gave similar evidence regarding the various causes of the Daughter’s anxiety. I accept both their evidence on this.

Additional export reports

21.  In addition to these SIR and the clinical psychologist, there were reports prepared by two single joint experts for the purposes of the relocation trial.  Both these experts were not called to give evidence at the fact finding hearing, nor were they involved in the investigation of the three incidents.  I have, therefore, placed no weight on the reports of the single joint experts.

22.  One of the single joint experts was Ms Lee who had prepared 2 reports and an addendum in relation to the mother’s relocation application (collectively referred to “Lee Reports”).  On 30 May 2022, the mother applied to have the Lee Reports expunged from the court files, the court system as well as the records held by Social Welfare Department.  HHJ T. Kwan provided on 29 September 2022 her extempore decision refusing the mother’s application.  However, on the second day of the trial, the mother sought to renew her application regarding the expurgation of the Lee Reports which was refused on the grounds it was improper to seek to reopen a matter that had already been decided.

23.  I note that there has been a finding made by the Hong Kong Psychological Society (“HKPS”)  of “gross negligence and biased reporting on the Child Custody Evaluation” in relation to Ms Lee.  The finding was reached following an investigation by the discipline board appointed by the council of the HKPS.  In light of this finding, I have not relied on or taken in account the Lee Reports in reaching my decision.

The law in Hong Kong

24.  The purpose of a fact finding hearing is set out at PDSL 10.1 §8, that “the Court shall, wherever practicable, make findings of fact as to the nature and degree of the domestic violence if any and its effect on the child, the parties and any other relevant third parties”.  In addition, the fact finding hearing is to assess whether on the balance of probabilities, if there is a real possibility of future risk to the chid, as this impacts the manner in which the court should exercise its discretion in making care arrangements for the protection of the child (see PDSL10.1 §10).

25.  The mother in this case bears the burden of proving that the three incidents happened as she has alleged and she has to provide compelling evidence in support of her case.  In LACHY v YC (unreported, FCJA 2057/2016, 21 November 2017), HHJ Melloy addressed the standard of proof which is to be met in a fact finding hearings relating to allegations of child abuse:

“The law

8. In the judgment of FCMC 12118 of 2010, Specific Issues, dated the 7 March 2014 I set out the law relating to matters such as this in some detail. I have therefore taken the liberty of repeating the relevant sections as set out below:

13. The Family Court does of course follow the civil standard of proof when determining issues of this nature. Thus the court has to decide on the balance of probabilities whether it is more likely than not that these incidences took place.

14. Counsel for the wife has very helpfully set out the up to date position on the law in his closing submission as follows:

The Burden and Standard of Proof of the Allegation

3 It is trite in our legal system that he who alleges bears the burden of proving his allegation. There is no exception in the present proceedings although family proceedings are regarded as quasi-inquisitorial. Therefore, it is accepted that W [the wife] bears the burden of proving the Allegation. [The same applies in this case].

4 The majority in the United Kingdom House of Lords in Re H & Other (Minors)  (Sexual Abuse: Standard of Proof) [1996] AC 563 held that the civil standard requiring proof on a balance of probabilities continues to apply where, in civil proceedings, an allegation is made of criminal (or similarly serious)  misconduct, but explained that such standard is to be applied flexibly, factoring in the inherently greater improbability of serious misconduct as compared with lesser forms of misconduct, therefore requiring the person bearing the burden of proving the allegation to prove it with evidence of a commensurate cogency.

5  This approach was adopted by the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal in Nina Kung v Wong Din Shin (2005)  8 HKCFAR 387 (see para. 181 of the judgment). Nevertheless, afterall, the civil standard shall still apply while this Court has to bear in mind the seriousness of the misconduct alleged, recognizing that it carries an inherent degree of improbability. (Court’s emphasis added)”

9.  In addition, the solicitors for the father provided further case law and analysis in their opening submission, which went to the general point concerning the standard of proof required in a case where serious allegations of misconduct are made in the context of civil proceedings as here. They said inter alia as follows:

4.  The law regarding the requisite standard of proof for serious criminal allegation alleged in civil cases was set out in the following cases.  In HKSAR v Lee Ming Tee, FACC 1 of 2003, Sir Anthony Mason NPJ cited at paragraph 71: In re H (Minors) [1996] AC 563 where Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead (with whom Lord Goff of Chieveley and Lord Mustill concurred)  said (at 586E)

“When assessing the probabilities the court will have in mind as a factor, to whatever extent is appropriate in the particular case, that the more serious the allegation the less likely it is that the event occurred and, hence, the stronger should be the evidence before the court concludes that the allegation is established on the balance of probability.”

5.  In Ming Shiu Chung v Ming Shiu Sum, FACV 25 of 2005, Ribeiro PJ which was by cited Sir Anthony Mason NPJ in HKSAR v Lee Ming Tee, FACC 1 of 2003, that inferences of fraud or serious misconduct are “……not to be reached by conjecture nor …... on a mere balance of probabilities.”  They are “to be plainly established as a matter of inference from proved facts”

6.  In Nina Kung v Wang Din Shin, FACV 12 of 2004, Mr. Justice Chan stated that paragraph 185 that:

“……the court is invited to reach a conclusion of forgery as an inference to be drawn on the basis of circumstantial evidence, any such inference must be properly grounded in the primary facts found. The court guards against indulging in conjecture under the guise of drawing an inference where the primary evidence does not logically and reasonably justify the particular inference in question.”

10. With respect I agree. It is then accepted that the burden of proof lies with the mother and that given the seriousness of the allegations made, she has to prove to a very high standard indeed that what she alleges is in fact correct. In other words, she has to provide compelling evidence to support her case.”

The closet incident

26.  It was the mother’s case that the Daughter told her the father had put her in a closet, locked the door and turned out the lights.  The reason given by the Daughter for being placed in the closet was that she had told the father she missed her mother and wanted to go home to her mother.  As a result, the father punished the Daughter by placing her in the closet.  The mother was unaware of how frequent the Daughter was placed in the closet or how long the Daughter was in the closest for.  According to the mother, the Daughter started sharing this story, over the summer of 2021 which made the mother believe that the Daughter was scared and traumatised.  The Daughter continued to share this story with several other people.  It is not in dispute that at no time, when the mother first heard this story from the Daughter did the mother call or text the father to find out more information regarding the incident.

27.  It was the father’s evidence that he had used the walk-in wardrobe as a “time-out” or naughty corner for the Daughter, however, he denied having locked the door or turning off the light.  The father also denied having placed the Daughter in the walk-in wardrobe when she expressed her feelings about missing her mother.  The father’s case was that the Daughter was not as traumatised about the walk-in wardrobe, as the mother was making it out to be, since the Daughter would frequently choose to play inside the wardrobe with her dolls.

28.  The closet is mentioned in Ms Chen’s report dated 7 April 2022.  Ms Chen confirmed with the Daughter that the incident happened when the Daughter was four years old, although the Daughter only shared this information with the mother two years after the event.  The Daughter similarly shared with the police that the closet incident happened 2 years prior.  Ms Chen confirmed at trial that she had investigated the closet in the father’s home and found it to be a walk-in wardrobe, with doors.  The lock did not align and the walk-in wardrobe was not capable of being locked.  Ms Chen’s comment on the closet incident was that she did not think that the Daughter was scared of the closet but it was unclear if there was a specific incident which caused the Daughter to be frightened.  The CP’s evidence that the Daughter was likely to have been upset about the punishment rather than the closet itself.

29.  I accept the father’s evidence that he had previously placed the Daughter in the walk-in wardrobe as what he had believed to be an age appropriate punishment.  Having heard the advice from the Social Welfare Officer and the CP, he is now aware that this was not considered appropriate for a four year old.  In light of all of the evidence, I accept that the Daughter was likely to have been placed in the walk-in wardrobe on one occasion.  It is important that the father, having heard advice from the professionals has changed his behaviour and I accept his undertaking to not place the Daughter in the wardrobe as a form of punishment going forward.

30.  I note that this incident is not of a serious nature which warranted being an issue for a fact finding hearing and it is my observation that the mother’s conduct regarding the closet incident to be unreasonable for four reasons:

(1)  The mother’s suggestion that the Daughter was placed in the walk-in wardrobe on more than one occasion is made without any supporting evidence.  In the Daughter’s interview with the CP she claimed to have only been placed in the walk-in wardrobe on only one occasion.

(2)  The mother continued to exaggerate the Daughter’s initial claims about being locked in a closet even after been presented with photographs of the walk-in wardrobe exhibited in the father’s affirmation, and after Ms. Chen had investigated the father’s home in person.

(3)  There is no evidence in support that the closet incident happened recently or frequently.  In fact, the Daughter told Ms Chen and the police that the closet incident happened two years ago and only once.

(4)  The mother has not provided any evidence that the Daughter was placed in any danger by being placed in a walk-in wardrobe or that she was being abused.

Hair Removal Incident

31.  This incident was said to have taken place during the time the Daughter had staying access with the father over Christmas access in December 2021, on 28 December and 31 December.  The mother’s evidence was that she learned about the hair removal when the Daughter returned to her care on 4 January 2022.  She then contacted Ms Chen on the same day and brought the Daughter to see the paediatrician on 7 January 2022.  The paediatrician’s letter records that there was hair loss on the Daughter’s arms and legs, some new hair growth on the bald areas and four eczema patches over both legs.  The paediatrician’s letter does not mention that the child was in pain at the time of the appointment.  The letter also does not record that the daughter had open sores or scabs which was the mother’s evidence at trial. 

32.  The mother explained in her 20th Affirmation that “I did not bring this incident regarding the hair removal up with [the father] since I had limited information at that time about the stress it was causing [the Daughter] and did not want to get into a confrontation without fully assessing the situation”.

33.  When the mother was cross-examined on why she did not bring to the father’s attention her concerns about the Daughter’s skin or the hair removal before speaking with the Social Welfare Officer or the paediatrician, the mother’s answer was that she wanted to ensure that she was following the correct procedure.  I do not accept that this is a reasonable reaction nor does it explain the delay of three days before the mother brought the Daughter to see the doctor if the Daughter was in fact, suffering from pain as the mother claimed.

34.  I do not accept that a reasonable person would have called the Social Welfare Officer before seeking medical attention for a child in pain, particularly when the child is known to have sensitive skin.  I find that the mother has exaggerated the pain suffered by the Daughter arising from the hair removal.

35.  Both parents accept that the Daughter is a child with a predisposition to be hairy.  The mother accepted in cross examination evidence that she had previously hired a baby masseuse for the Daughter in an attempt to remove excess hair when the Daughter was just an infant.

36.  Although the father did not deny that the pumice stone was used to remove the Daughter’s body hair, his evidence regarding the hair removal incident was to try and blame the mother, claiming that it was the mother who first instructed him to use the pumice stone to remove the Daughter’s hair.  The mother denied ever using the pumice stone or giving instructions to the father to use such a device to remove the Daughter’s body hair.  The father claimed that the Daughter’s use of the pumice stone was always supervised by the helper or his mother via videocall or the Daughter used the pumice stone herself.  The father’s evidence was that he did not know that the Daughter’s hair on her arms had been removed nor did he know how many days the pumice stone was used on the Daughter.  He only came to know about the hair removal incident when he received the call from the Social Welfare Officer and when he had spoken with his helper regarding the incident.

37.  It is not acceptable for the father to try and shift the blame onto the mother, if fact, that is what she has instructed him to do.  I do not accept this as a reasonable excuse for the father’s behaviour.  It was the responsibility of the father to decide whether or not the use of the pumice stone was appropriate on the skin of a six year old, and whether it was likely to cause her pain or to inflame her skin bearing in mind that the Daughter had sensitive skin.

38.  As for the “magic cream” neither the mother nor the father knew what the Daughter was referring to.  However, the mother persisted in her claim that “magic cream” was used solely on the Daughter’s say so.  No evidence was provided by the mother as to possible creams which the Daughter could have been referring to.  I, therefore, reject that any “magic cream” or any cream was used to remove the Daughter’s hair on her arms.

39.  The father has not denied that the Daughter’s hair was removed when she was in his care during Christmas access in 2021, although is it likely to have been the helper who was responsible for this action.  Based on his own admission I find that the Daughter’s hair was removed in December 2021 but again, I find that it does not amount to abuse of the Daughter.  In any event, the father has provided an undertaking to not use the pumice stone again on the daughter and I accept that he will be more vigilant going forward.

Indecent assault incident

40.  This is the most serious of all three allegations.  I am mindful that notwithstanding this is a serious allegation, the standard of proof is unchanged and the burden is on the mother to provide compelling evidence in support of her case.

41.  The mother’s evidence as set out in her 20th Affirmation is that:

“45. On Sunday, 9th January 2022, in the evening at bedtime while [the Daughter] was lying down she had her hands inside her pyjamas, inside her underwear in the front. I asked her why she was doing this and she told me that her father does that to her. I asked her what she means and she said “He puts his hand inside my underwear and touches my bum when we are lying down.” After [the Daughter] shared this information with me I immediately informed my mother and domestic helper as I was in utter shock and disbelief. I asked [the Daughter] to repeat what she had told me and managed to record the conversation. There is now produced and shown to me marked “XX” a USB with the video recording of the conversation on 10th January 2022 at 12:18 AM. This was the second time I had heard of such an incident, the first was almost two years earlier. [The Daughter] had told me about such an incident on 1st March 2020. At that time I spoke with Dr. H on the telephone on 3rd March 2020 and asked her whether I could bring [the Daughter] in for an examination regarding the incident she shared with me. Dr. H recommended I contact the Child Protective Services or get specialised psychological advice and sent me the hotline number to contact for assistance. On 16th March 2020 at 9:50PM, [the Daughter] brought this matter up with me again while we were in bed. She passed urine while she was still awake and wet the bed. I was concerned as she had also wet her underwear two days prior, on 14th March 2020 in the afternoon. I messaged Dr. H to ask if it could be because of the medication she was on at the time for her cold or whether this could relate to the incident I had discussed with her 2 weeks prior, but Dr. H responded informing me medication should not cause incontinence…

The next day, on 17th March 2020 I proceed to contact the hotline for the Child Protective Services and shared the incident with an officer called Ms. Wincy who said that she would speak with her supervisor and called me back to let me know that I should take [the Daughter] to the government hospital for check up. [The Daughter] was 4 years old at the time and it was the only time she had mentioned anything like this to me. I wasn’t sure if it was an accident. I was asked to take her to the government hospital for a full body examination and Covid-19 had just started. I did not want her to have exposure to the virus as she was also unwell at the time. Furthermore, I was also apprehensive for [the Daughter’s] private body parts to be examined. I mentioned the incident to my lawyers at the time and they warned me that bringing up an incident like this, particularly when the father was already alleging parental alienation would significantly complicate the proceedings. [The Daughter] did not mention this incident to me since then in 2020 until out conversation on 9th January 2022.

46. On 14th January 2022, at around 2:30PM while [the Daughter] was playing with her dolls she spoke to me again about her father putting his hands in her underwear and touching her bum. She said it was ‘ouchy and itchy’.”  

42.  I have carefully considered the mother’s allegations relating to the indecent assault incident(s)  and I do not find them proven.  In my assessment, the evidence falls significantly short of establishing this allegation.  I have regarding this conclusion having regard to the following:

(1)  Inherent improbability of the March 2020 incident having taken place.  The Daughter’s told the mother for the first time in March 2020 that her bottom hurt immediately after having access with the father.  It was not in dispute that the Daughter suffered from chronic constipation from time to time.  At trial, the mother provided background information for the first time as to how she found out about the Daughter’s bottom in March 2020.  According to the mother, the Daughter was returning home from access with the father.  The mother and her extended family were celebrating the maternal grandmother’s birthday.  Prior to returning home, the Daughter had gone to the toilet.  Although the Daughter told the mother that the helper had cleaned her bum, she claimed that her bum hurt because of the father.  Although the mother was shocked with the revelation, she did not speak with the father or the Social Welfare Officer immediately at the time about it.  The mother’s inaction in March 2020 is the best indication that she did not consider that the father had indecently assaulted the Daughter then, and the Daughter’s existing constipation to be a perfectly reasonable explanation for the pain in the Daughter’s bottom in March 2020.

(2)  The mother’s evidence in court regarding what the Daughter told her on 1 March 2020 is starkly different and contradicts her affirmation evidence.  At trial the mother’s evidence was that the Daughter’s bum hurt and this was caused by the father.  This is very different from the mother’s affirmation which claimed that on 1 March 2020 the Daughter shared with her of the father placing her hand inside her underwear.

(3)  Furthermore, although the mother was given advice by the paediatrician on 3 March 2020 to speak with the Social Welfare Officer and a psychologist.  The mother only contacted the Children’s Protection Services on 17 March 2020.  The mother’s reasons for not investigating the matter further was Covid, the Daughter not feeling well and the lawyer’s advice.  The mother also shared with Ms Chen that she wanted to protect the Daughter from the small Indian community who would have gossiped.  Given the gravity of the possible abuse against the Daughter, these reasons led me to conclude that the mother did not take the Daughter’s comments in March 2020 seriously.

(4)  Subsequent to March 2020, as part of her relocation application, the mother agreed that the father could have general access to the Daughter when he came to Singapore, including access.  This proposal from the mother is clear indication that she did not believe that the father had acted inappropriately then.

(5)  The Daughter also continued to have staying access with the father until the mother’s unilateral cessation of access on 6 January 2022.

(6)  There is similarly an inherent improbability of an indecent assault taking place more recently.  Firstly, the Daughter’s was unable to identify the time or occasions when it happened.  Secondly, I prefer the evidence of the father and his sister regarding their sleeping arrangements, at the father’s house that the Daughter would chose to sleep with either the father or the aunt even if she had been placed in her own bed.  Thirdly, the Daughter recalled very specific details for the first time during the VRI, despite being unable to recall any details on the previous occasions when the Social Welfare Officer spoke with the Daughter.  These details are denied by the father.

(7)  I have placed no weight on the recording made by the mother on 10 January 2022.  It is self-serving material, although I am most concerned that the mother thought it is appropriate to have an important and intimate discussion with the six year old at midnight.  From the transcript of the recording, the Daughter is tired and wishes to go to bed but the mother continued speaking with the Daughter about the alleged incident in the presence of the maternal grandmother.

(8)  All in all, the obvious difficulty for the mother is that she has presented no corroborating evidence in support of her serious allegation.  In fact, the MDCC report of 6 June 2022 regarding the hair removal stated “the case nature was inconclusive while the risk of re-occurrence of child maltreatment was considered as low”.

43.  I accept the mother’s evidence that she was having cold feet about reporting the matter of the indecent assault immediately after 9 January 2022.  Nevertheless, it is unfortunate that the mother did not bring this to the attention of the court at the hearing on 19 January 2022 when she was seeking an injunction against the father.  However, I do not accept that she wished to speak with the father on 23 March 2022 before taking matters forward.  The mother demonstrated that she could not text the father over minor concerns such as the closet incident and the hair removal incident.  On balance it is highly unlikely, that for such a serious allegation, that the mother would then take steps to speak with the father.  Consequently, it is not difficult to see why the father claims that the mother brought the indecent assault allegation only after she could not obtain an injunction against him.

Discussion

44.  There is no doubt that both parents love the Daughter.  I accept there are high levels of distrust, especially from the mother towards the father.  I appreciate that the mother has said that both parents do not speak on the telephone but that does not excuse her behaviour or explain why she did not send the father a text message when she was concerned about what she had heard and seen.

45.  The mother seems to have little insight into the effect of the present conflict was having on the Daughter.  As mentioned above, the mother was aware that the Daughter was feeling anxious before September 2021.  Pursuant to the Order dated 10 November 2020, the Daughter was to be sent to the play therapist.  The father’s evidence that he had tried to arrange with the mother play therapist sessions for the Daughter on several occasions, but this was ignored by the mother.  I was particularly concerned despite the Court Order, the father’s request and her own observation that the mother did not bring the Daughter to seek any play therapy or counselling earlier.  The mother finally arranged for the Daughter to see the school counsellor in early September 2022.

46.  The mother’s reason that she did not obtain therapy for the Daughter because the Daughter’s anxiety was due to the parents’ disagreement, is not logical or reasonable.  It would have been far better for the Daughter to obtain therapeutic treatment as soon as possible about matters troubling her regardless of the cause.  In fact, the high parental conflict should have been a good enough reason for prioritising therapy for the Daughter.  I am of the view that if the mother genuinely wanted to address the Daughter’s anxiety, she would have taken steps to have the Daughter obtain treatment as soon as possible.  Instead, the mother’s delay in arranging the appropriate treatment of the Daughter is very concerning to me.

47.  I accept that the father has not abused the Daughter nor does he pose a risk to the Daughter’s welfare going forward.  I find that the closest incident and the hair removal incident to have occurred, but that these incidents are not of a serious nature to warrant a suspension of the Daughter’s access with the father or for access to be supervised.  I am satisfied with the undertaking given by the father regarding these two incidents.  The indecent assault is clearly the most serious allegation, and for the reasons set out above, I find that on the balance of probabilities it had not occurred.

48.  Although I accept that some of these concerns are genuinely held by the mother, she continues to believe them as 100% true, notwithstanding the fact that there is little, if any corroborating evidence to support what the Daughter has said in regard to the most serious allegation.  This seems to me a remarkable lack of insight or perspective.  In my experience, children do not always tell the truth or they make up stories for a variety of reasons.

49.  One example given by the father on Daughter’s ability of to be less than truthful or to have her own version of events, which are not founded in reality, related to how the Daughter ended on the school bus in October 2021.  The mother’s version was that the Daughter had snuck onto the school bus because the Daughter did not want to go to the father’s house.  According to the mother, this was the reason that the Daughter had shared with the mother as to why she was on the school bus.  In reality, the school had a miscommunication and the staff had mistakenly placed the Daughter on the school bus.  This was confirmed in an email from the school explaining to the father why the Daughter ended up on the school bus.  The mother also confirmed in cross-examination that the school had called her the day after to explain the situation.  However, at the fact finding hearing despite having read the email from the school and being told the reason by the school, the mother still accepted the Daughter’s version of sneaking onto the school bus instead of the mix up having arisen by the school’s mistake.

50.  The father complained that instead of correcting the Daughter’s false impression, the mother continues to reinforce it by leaving the Daughter notes to not sneak off onto the school bus.

51.  The father has expressed his concerns about the mother’s parental alienating behaviour with the Daughter.  The mother’s unilateral cessation of access and variation of the father’s access is at prima facie odds with her claim that she wishes for the father to continue in the Daughter’s life or that she has not engaged in alienating behaviour.  I mention this only in passing because this fact finding hearing is confined to the three incidents raised by the mother.  Any findings relating to whether the mother has alienated the Daughter from the father is outside the purview of this ruling.  I, therefore, make no comments on the same.

52.  It seems to me that if there is to be any improvement in the situation between the parents which has a direct impact on their parenting of the Daughter, both parties need to have some form of ongoing therapy in addition to co-parenting counselling/ therapy.  I will direct that both parties avail themselves of such therapy and counselling and to report back to the court with respect to that on the next occasion.

Interim access order

53.  In line with my findings above, there is no justification for supervised access to continue or that access only takes place in a public setting.  Furthermore, it is unreasonable for that access to the father be only once one mid-week dinner access and one weekend access limited to 3 hours, subject to the child’s schedule and activities, as the mother has proposed.

54.  Accordingly, the father’s access to the Daughter is to be resumed immediately without any supervision.  I have taken into account the evidence from the parties, Ms Chen, the CP as to the difficulties of Tuesday night access.  Although Ms Chen supports the resumption of access per the interim order of 10 November 2020, that order was made a long time ago when the Daughter was four years old and intended to be in place for a short period of time.

55.  In coming up with the following interim access schedule, I have borne in mind the benefits of a consistent routine, the fact that Daughter is attending full time school, and has various extra-curricular activities.  These factors are balanced against the importance of the Daughter maintaining a relationship with her father, and ensures that both parents have at least one full day on the weekend with the Daughter plus time during the school week in order to be involved with the Daughter’s homework and school life.  The schedule also cuts down the time the Daughter needs to switch between her two homes.  

56.  I, therefore, propose that there shall be alternating weekly access for the father as follows:

Week 1 Thursday after school until Saturday, 5:00pm.
Week 2 Saturday, 5:00pm until Monday morning before school.
Dinner access on Wednesday night

57.  In addition, the father is to arrange the pick-up and drop off of the Daughter at school respectively, as well as to bring the Daughter to any extra-curricular classes on Saturday morning including religious classes.

58.  This arrangement allows the mother to organise weekly activities for the Daughter on those days when the father does not have access. The mother is not to arrange any other activities on the weekend, when the Daughter is meant to be with the father, without the father’s prior written agreement. All other holiday access as per the order of 10 November 2020 to remain in place until further order.

59.  An updated SIR on the issue of access will be called for in three months’ time, as well as an updated CP report on the question of how the Daughter is coping with access. It will take some time for both parents and the Daughter to adjust to the interim arrangements, before deciding if it is necessary to come back to court.

Directions going forward

60.  Pursuant to PDSL10.1 paragraph 9, I have to consider whether or not this matter should proceed to a CDR hearing or whether this matter should proceed straight to trial. Given my Order that the parties attend co-coparenting counselling, and personal therapy, the parties are expected to use the CDR hearing to agree on the long term care arrangements relating to the Daughter.

61.  The Daughter clearly understands that missing access has the consequence of there being make up access. I, therefore, am of the view that this arrangement should continue because at this age, the Daughter should not be given the choice of whether or not she is to attend access. It is common sense that giving the seven year old child a choice of whether she should attend access, places her in the middle of the conflict and her wish to not disappoint either parent. I hope both parents can explain to the Daughter that missing access will cause more inconvenience and disturb her schedule and that of her parents.

62.  I hereby make the following Orders:

(1)  All previous orders regarding interim access shall be shall be varied to the effect that interim access to the father commencing on 3 August 2023, shall be as follows:

Week 1 Thursday after school until Saturday, 5:00 pm.
Week 2 Saturday, 5:00 pm until Monday morning before school.
Dinner access on Wednesday night

(2)  Both parents to attend co-parenting course as well as personal counselling or therapy. Certificate or proof of attendance to be provided by each party at the next hearing.

(3)  The Daughter do continue counselling with the school counsellor until otherwise recommended or further order of the court.

(4)  The issue of access only shall be adjourned to a CDR hearing fixed on 7 December 2023 at 9:30 am (with 3 hours reserved).

(5)  Both parties do personally attend the CDR hearing.

(6)  Both parties shall file an updated Form J in relation to access only, 28 days prior to the CDR hearing.

(7)  No further affirmations to be filed without leave of the court.

(8)  Both parties shall file short statement of proposal in relation to access only, 7 days before the CDR hearing.

(9)  An updated SIR on the issue of access only to be prepared and filed in English, 21 days before the CDR hearing.

(10)  The Official Solicitor do file and serve a short updated report on the issue of access only, 14 days before the CDR hearing. 

(11)  The Official Solicitor do attend the CDR hearing.

Costs

63.  Given that neither party has indicated that they wish to seek their costs, and since it is a children’s matter, I make a no costs order nisi to be made absolute in 14 days.

( Sasha ALLISON )
Deputy District Judge

The Petitioner (father)  acting in person

The Respondent (mother)  acting in person

Ms Melody Chui for the Official Solicitor’s Office

[2022] HKFC 212-EN-2022-09-29

H v. W

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FCMC 8332/2017

[2022] HKFC 212

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

MATRIMONIAL CAUSES NO. 8332 OF 2017

----------------------------

BETWEEN  
 HPetitioner

and

 WRespondent

----------------------------

Coram: Her Honour Judge Thelma Kwan in Chambers (not open to public)
Date of Hearing: 29 September 2022
Date of Judgment:29 September 2022

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J U D G M E N T
( Extempore Decision on Leave to Provide Documents to Third Party)

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A.  INTRODUCTION

1.  W says she found out from the child of the family on January 9th 2022 that H had previously touched her inappropriately in or around March 2020. A police report was filed about the same on 12 April 2022. 

2.  The Police has since started investigating the alleged incident. H has been arrested, cautioned, but not charged. The Police had scheduled an interview with H for August 2022, but that interview has been postponed pending the outcome of this hearing.

3.  This is H’s application for leave to provide copies of the following documents to the Police Department and the Department of Justice (“H’s Documents”), to assist their investigation:

3.1.  A Memo on Access Arrangement by Dr. JB dated 15 March 2018;

3.2.  The Social Welfare Reports dated 8 November 2019 and 22 June 2020, and the updated Social Welfare Report dated 7 April 2022;

3.3.  Ms. LL’s (“L”) psychological reports dated 15 November 2019 and 22 June 2020, as well as its addendum dated 24 July 2020;

3.4.  A Psychological Report prepared by the Social Welfare Department dated 16 March 2022;

3.5.  A transcript of the CDR hearing held on 21 April 2022 (“Transcript”); and

3.6.  H’s 26th Affirmation.

4.  W initially objected to leave being granted for each of these items, primarily because she was of the view that they would not assist the Police in its investigation, especially since (in her view) they have been cherry picked.

5.  However, after H disclosed in his 32nd Affirmation that the Police, in a letter dated 29 July 2022, says H’s Documents would be relevant to its investigation; W amended her position, agreeing to leave being granted for those documents, and also asking for leave to provide the Police Department and the Department of Justice the following additional documents: (“W’s Documents”), in order to give them a fuller picture:

5.1.  The Court’s transcript for the relocation trial (“Relocation Transcript”);

5.2.  HHJ Melloy’s Judgment for the Relocation Trial (“Relocation Judgment”);

5.3.  HKPS’ letter dated 26 April 2022, which states that L has prima facie breached a number of Codes of Professional Conduct (“HKPS Letter”); and

5.4.  W’s 31st Affirmation.

6.  I have decided to give this judgment on an ex-tempore basis, as there is urgency to the matter. The allegations against H are serious, and the Police understandably wants to proceed with its investigation expeditiously.

B.  LEGAL PRINCIPLES

7.  The Family Court has power to control access to documents within its custody. The exercise of this power is subject to a balancing exercise in terms of weighing the relevant conflicting interests and rights, bearing in mind the overall demands of justice: MRS. A by LPCR her next friend v The Executors of the Estate of A[2018] HKFC 196 §§8-10 per Deputy District Judge D. Cheung.

8.  In that regard, leave should be granted to a person to provide court documents to third parties to facilitate criminal investigations, unless there are good countervailing reasons not to: Secretary for Justice v FTCW at §§16, 114-116 per Lam VP (as he then was).

C.  DISCUSSION

C1.  H’s Documents

9.  As mentioned, W now agrees to H having leave to provide H’s Documents to the Police Department and the Department of Justice.  As such, I will give H leave accordingly, save that to avoid unnecessarily overwhelming the Police Department:

9.1.  For H’s 26th Affirmation, I will give leave for the affirmation but not for the exhibits thereto (“H’s Exhibits”);

9.2.  For the Transcript, I will only give leave for pages 22 to 44, which covers the discussion concerning the reported incident.

10.  If the Police Department asks for H’s Exhibits and a full copy of the Transcript, H can come back to this court and seek leave for them.

C2.  W’s Documents

11.  As mentioned, W asks to give the Police Department and the Department of Justice a full picture. On that basis, she asks for leave to provide them the Relocation Transcript, Relocation Judgment, HKPS Letter, and her 31st Affirmation.

12.  I agree with W’s submission in principle. With a view to not overwhelming the Police Department:

12.1.  I grant W leave for the Relocation Judgment. I will also additionally give the Parties leave for the Court of Appeal’s judgment on the relocation [2021] HKCA 733;

12.2.  I grant W leave for her 31st Affirmation, but not for the exhibits thereto;

12.3.  HKPS’ letter dated 26 April 2022 is not a Court document, and W can provide it to the Police Department and the Department of Justice without leave from this Court;

13.  In my view, the three sets of documents above documents are sufficient to give the Police Department and the Department of Justice a full picture. As such, I will not additionally grant W leave to provide them with the Relocation Trial’s Transcript.  On this latter point, I specifically do not wish to inundate the Police with the transcript of a 6 day trial.

14.  W has further asked that the Order made on 28 June 2022 be made available, I am not of the view that this is relevant, and will therefore not grant leave for this.

15.  If the Police asks for the Relocation Trial’s Transcript or the exhibits to W’s 31st Affirmation specifically, W can come back to this court and seek leave for them.

16.  The Police should also receive a copy of this Judgement.

D.  COSTS

17.  H asks for costs of his application, which has been successful.

18.  While W initially objected to H’s application, to be fair to her, the Police letter stating H’s Documents are relevant to its investigations was only made available to her after she filed her affirmation in opposition to the H’s Summons, and she has taken the first available opportunity to amend her position to a more reasonable ask.

19.  I therefore make no order as to cost for his application.

(Thelma Kwan)
District Judge

Petitioner: appeared in person  

Respondent: appeared in person  

[2022] HKFC 211-EN-2022-09-29

H v. W

HTML content

FCMC 8332/2017

[2022] HKFC 211

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

MATRIMONIAL CAUSES NO. 8332 OF 2017

----------------------------

BETWEEN  
 HPetitioner

and

 WRespondent

----------------------------

Coram: Her Honour Judge Thelma Kwan in Chambers (not open to public)
Date of Hearing: 29 September 2022
Date of Judgment:29 September 2022

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JUDGMENT
( Extempore Decision on Expunction of Documents)

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Introduction

1.  The current proceedings in this matter must be seen against the backdrop of the history of this case, which follow the W’s unsuccessful relocation application. After a 6 days trial in July 2020 (“Relocation Trial”), HHJ Melloy allowed W’s relocation application in her decision in November 2020, but this was overturned by the Court of Appeal in May 2021, the W’s leave to appeal to the CFA was refused in August 2021.  The proceedings were sent back to the District Court where the parties continue to engage in litigation over the care and access of the child of the family. 

2.  Oral submissions were delivered by both parties acting in person today.  I am giving this decision on an ex tempore basis with the intention that this case can move forward with the provision of information where appropriate.

3.  This is W’s Summons dated 30 May 2022 wherein she applies to have the following documents expunged/struck out: [§xx refers to paragraphs in this Summons]

a.  The Addendum prepared by Ms. LL (“L”) dated 24 July 2020 (“Addendum”): [§1] from the files of (i) the Court, (ii) the Court appointed Social Welfare Officers, (iii) any other units of the Social Welfare Department, and (iv) other persons appointed by the court;

b.  Any reference to the Addendum from the Parties’ Affirmations or other Court documents regarding the Children’s trial: [§2]

c.  The Social Investigation Report dated 7 April 2022 (“Social Investigation Report”) (prepared by Ms. CKL) and the Clinical Psychologist Report dated 16 March 2022 (“Clinical Psychologist Report”) (prepared by Ms. WST):[§3] from the files of (i) the Court, (ii) all units of the Social Welfare Department of Hong Kong; and (iii) any other person appointed by the Court;

d.  Any reference the Social Investigation Report and the Clinical Psychologist Report from the Parties’ Affirmations or other court documents regarding the Children’s trial: [§4];

e.  The reports prepared by L dated 15 November 2019 and 22 June 2020 (“L Reports”): [§5] from the files of (i) the Court, (ii) all units of the Social Welfare Department of Hong Kong; any (iii) other person appointed by the Court; and

f.  Any reference to L Reports from the Parties’ Affirmations, or other court documents relating to the Children’s trial [§6];

4.  W also applies for the following orders (“Orders”):

a.  The Addendum, Social Investigation Report, the Clinical Psychologist Report, and the L Reports not be referred to or shared with any expert or third parties in the proceedings or beyond: [§§7-9];

b.  New and updated social investigation and clinical psychologist reports be called for from a different officer of the Social Welfare Department and a different clinical psychologist: [§§10-11].

5.  The Summons can be broadly divided into three aspects: The Addendum, the L Reports and the Orders she sought in paragraph 4 above.

The Addendum

Expunction from Court

6.  L sent her “Addendum to the evaluation report dated June 22 2020” to HHJ Melloy on 24 July 2020 directly, this is one day after the Relocation trial was concluded.  In it, she opened with:

“I have reflected carefully on the criticism of the court, and on reflection, I have found that there are items in my report and during the hearing that were not expressed clearly. I would like to take this opportunity to clarify my statement and offer the final conclusions and recommendations.”

7.  In the oral submissions, W submits that this Addendum was not called for, made without leave, and add nothing to the previous reports made by L.  H argues that HHJ Melloy has not ruled on the admissibility of the Addendum at the time and even gave him leave to share the Addendum with Ms. CKL (SWO) and Ms. WST (CP) subsequently.

8.  The H’s arguments appeared to be premised on the Addendum being evidence before the Court, but the Addendum has not been admitted as evidence at any time of these proceedings:

a.  The Addendum was never and could not have been admitted as an expert report (and remains inadmissible as such), as it does not comply with O. 38 r. 37C Rules of the District Court(Cap. 336H);

b.  It is also not part of the parties’ evidence, as it is not an exhibit to either party’s affirmations.

9.  If it has been erroneously treated by anyone as evidence, it should not have been.  However, simply because the Addendum is not evidence does not mean it cannot be in the Court file.  A letter, and the Addendum as such, can exist in the Court file as a piece of correspondence.   

10.  In W’s Summons and written submissions, the basis of the application rests on an order made by HHJ Melloy on 29 July 2020 in response to the Addendum she received, where she noted:

“The Court did not ask Ms L for a further report and the trial is now concluded. In such circumstances, please note that the Court will not read the report or take it into account further. The parties are not to refer to this report in their submissions or generally.”

11.  However, it is my view that HHJ Melloy only meant that the Addendum could not be referred to “generally” in W’s relocation application. She could not have meant it could not be referred to in subsequent applications.  I also agree with the H’s argument that HHJ Melloy’s order on 29 July 2020 was made before the H’s appeal on relocation and could not be premised on the CA overturning her decision and that there is to be ongoing trial on the child’s care arrangement.  This interpretation is also clear from the fact that, at a direction hearing on 24 November 2021, HHJ Melloy allowed H to refer Ms. CKL (SWO) and Ms. WST (CP) to the Addendum.

12.  Accordingly, I find the basis of the W’s application to expunge the Addendum to be without merits, I will therefore not expunge the Addendum from the Court’s files, nor references to the Addendum in any Court Documents and the Parties’ Affirmations.

Expunction from other Files

13.  I will also not expunge the Addendum from the files of the Social Welfare Officers, other units of the Social Welfare Department, and any other persons appointed by the court.  Not only do I not have the jurisdiction to do so; also, simply because the Addendum is not evidence does not mean Government units and persons appointed cannot have a copy of it, as they often have access to court files for preparation of their reports.

Social Investigation Report/Clinical Psychologist Report

14.  W says the Social Investigation Report and the Clinical Psychologist Report and references to it should be expunged because the Government Clinical Psychologist had a copy of the Addendum; and the Social Welfare Officer might have been informed of the Addendum’s contents.

15.  Those are not good reasons for expunging those reports, nor references to them in the Court documents:

a.  Simply because the experts might have had copies of the Addendum when preparing their reports does not make the reports inadmissible;

b.  If W’s actual complaint is the reports are tainted or unreliable because they might have relied on the Addendum, that goes to the reports’ weight, not their admissibility;

c.  It is in any event premature to tell whether the reports are tainted or unreliable because they might have relied on the Addendum. That can only be determined after the relevant experts have been cross-examined, and submissions made on the weight to be attached. It is then a matter for the trial judge.

L Reports

16.  W says the L Reports should be expunged.

17.  L Reports were admitted as evidence at the Relocation trial and L was cross examined during that hearing.

18.  W has submitted that the L Reports had been “adjudicated upon”, this is an incorrect submission. The Relocation Trial was not to adjudicate on the reports, the latter were produced to assist the Court in determination of the issues before it.  The reports called for previously will continue to have value in providing background to the case. 

19.  W also says that L Reports should be expunged because she has made a complaint against L to the Hong Kong Psychological Society (“HKPS”) in around July 2021 (this was only after the abovementioned CA decision in May 2021), and HKPS has written to W on 26 April 2022, informing her of HKPS’s view that L has prima facie breached a number of Codes of Professional Conduct, and that the complaint merits a full investigation; and W therefore submits that L will “inevitably be found to be in breach of the Code of Conduct of Expert Witness Appendix E under RDC.”  I note that the W has not provided a copy of her complaint to HKPS to this Court.

20.  In my view, since no evidence has been put forward on the findings of HKPS’s full investigation; I cannot now decide on whether L Reports, or references to them in the Court documents, should be expunged.  Even if there is a result of the full investigation, decision to expunge the L Reports cannot be made without knowing the details of the findings of the investigation. 

Other Orders

21.  The Orders W seeks are sought on the premise that her expunction application is successful. As W’s expunction application is dismissed, I will not grant the Orders sought.

Conclusion and Cost

22.  For the reasons above given, I dismiss the W’s Summons in its entirety. In the premises, I will not grant W’s request for H to bear the costs of her Summons.

23.  As H has not asked for costs, I shall therefore make no order in this regard.

(Thelma Kwan)
District Judge

Petitioner: appeared in person

Respondent: appeared in person

[2020] HKFC 123-EN-2020-06-11

H v. W

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FCMC 8332/2017

[2020] HKFC 123

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

MATRIMONIAL CAUSES

NUMBER 8332 OF 2017

________________________

BETWEEN

 HPetitioner
 and 
 WRespondent

________________________

Coram:  Deputy District Judge Thelma KWAN in Chambers

Additional financial disclosures:  From Respondent 17 March 2020

From Petitioner 19 March 2020

Submissions from Respondent:  30 March 2020 and 6 April 2020

Submissions from Petitioner:  30 March 2020 and 6 April 2020

Date of Judgment:  11 June 2020

________________________

J U D G M E N T

(Litigation funding and variation of maintenance pending suit)

________________________


1.  This judgement is concerned with two applications:

a.  The Respondent wife’s application for litigation funding under her Summons dated 17 October 2019; and

b.  The Petitioner husband’s application for variation of a MPS Order made by HHJ Melloy on 24 October 2018 (the “MPS Order”) dated 16 December 2019.

2.  By an Order of the Court made on 4 March 2020, the applications were directed to be dealt with by way of paper disposal.  As these are standalone applications, they were transferred to me, sitting as a Deputy judge, so that it could be dealt with as expeditiously as possible.

Issues

3.  Under the wife’s application, the Court is to consider if and how much the husband should pay for litigation funding to the wife.

4.  The Court is also to consider whether the alleged change of circumstances of the husband warrant any variation to the MPS Order. 

The Background

5.  The previous MPS judgement had set out in part the parties’ background.  To recap the essentials, the parties are respectively aged 37 and 40, they were married in February 2013, the daughter of the family were born in October 2015, and the husband issued the divorce petition on 29 June 2017.

6.  Following the MPS Order, the husband is to pay the wife, $14,000 per month and interim maintenance of $38,500 for the child of the family, in addition to the undertakings to pay for the daughter’s school fees, ECA up to $2,000 and medical and dental insurance for the wife and daughter.

7.  It is recalled that the husband had a few sources of income at the time of the wife’s first MPS application:

a.  Salary from APC $95,000;

b.  Gold investment income US$2,000;

c.  Gold Fund Income $96,487.50; and

d.  Online business commission of approximately $40,000

8.  Even before the last MPS Hearing on 13 August 2018, the husband had resigned from his salaried position at APC whereupon his total monthly income was reduced by around $100,000; and claimed to be no longer receiving the US$2,000 from the gold investment income, it was noted that there were no reasons nor supporting documents given.

9.  Following the MPS Order, a number of events had taken place.

10.  He had sold his business interest in X Ventures to his father for US$201,973.99 in January 2019, although the wife claimed that the husband remains a principal in the business.

11.  He closed down his online business after consulting legal advice, so that income of $40,000 is no longer available to him.

12.  Husband claimed that due to IRS intervention, his income from the gold fund has stopped since July 2019.

13.  The husband’s payment under the MPS Order had lagged in August 2019, and then he stopped paying since October 2019.  He caught up with October and November payments when chased and only partially paid for December.  He then appeared to lag behind again in January and February 2020.

14.  The husband had filed a summons for joint care and control of the child in June 2019, and the wife filed a relocation summons in March 2020.

15.  Both parties supplied updated financial disclosures from August 2018 to January 2020 in March 2020.

The wife’s application

16.  The wife’s application for litigation funding is only with regard to the care and control hearing coming up, originally scheduled in May 2020 and subsequently re-fixed to July 2020.  The husband initially issued his summons for sole care and control then amended it to shared care and control, a 7 days trial has been set down with numerous witnesses including relatives and friends, domestic helpers, experts and social work officer.

17.  Both sides have complained about each other’s litigation conduct which have led to protracted proceedings and increased costs, these were elaborated at length in their affirmations, but will not be reiterated here.  Despite both parties had stated their wishes to resolve matters out of court, nothing has come out of these intentions and various proceedings are still on-going.

18.  Both parties have engaged legal representation, the costs that they had incurred were substantial and as of December 2019, amounted to more than $10M; with the husband spending 50% more than what the wife has spent.  This is an appalling drain on the family resources, and clearly would be money better used for the daughter; there was an incident in January 2020 when the husband allegedly could not come up with money to pay for her school.  The husband had since claimed that he could no longer afford his lawyers and have filed to act in person as of 17 December 2019.

19.  The wife’s legal representation has estimated the cost of the care and control hearing to be $1,924,000; and a further $4,101,000 going forward for a possible preliminary issues and ancillary relief hearing.  She had provided a detailed breakdown of the legal costs required.

20.  The husband filed his 14th Affirmation on 4 March 2020, this was supposed to be his reply to the wife’s affirmation in opposition to his variation summons.  However, his affirmation contained further responses with regard to the wife’s litigation funding summons, this is without leave and will be ignored for the purpose of this decision.

The husband’s application

21.  The husband’s application for variation of maintenance taken out on 16 December 2019 asked the Court to reduce his obligations under the MPS Order.  He did not propose a figure, except to ask for a variation to such amount as the Court sees fit.  It is worth noting that this has come about less than 14 months since the handing down of the MPS judgement.

22.  In addition to the abovementioned events which happened after the first MPS hearing in August 2018 to the time of the husband’s application, it is the husband’s contention that the wife has more assets than he does; and that he is no longer able to borrow any further sums.

23.  The husband complained about the amount of expenses the wife claimed and also that she had double counted some of them.  He was also very persistent in ensuring that the amounts he paid for the daughter indeed went to what it was claimed for.

The Law on Legal Costs Provision

24.  So far as the law on the funding of litigation costs is concerned, Currey v Currey [2006] EWCA Civ 1338 continues to be referred to in Hong Kong. This states inter alia that:

“the conditions for a ‘costs allowance’ are as follows:

(1) That the applicant spouse has no assets, or none that can reasonably be deployed (at para [19], [20]).

(2) That she can provide no security for borrowing, or none which can reasonably be offered (at paras [19], [20]).

(3) That she cannot reasonably obtain legal services by offering a charge on the outcome of the litigation (at para [20] and see Sears Tooth, per Wilson J).

(4)  That she cannot secure publicly funded legal help ‘at a level of expertise apt to the proceedings’ (at para [20])”

25.  At para [20], Wilson J further held “In my view, the initial, overarching enquiry should be into whether the applicant for a costs allowance could demonstrate that she cannot reasonably procure legal advice and representation by any other means.”

26.  The Court’s discretion is wide, and is also to consider the “subject matter of the proceedings”, and the “reasonableness of the applicant’s stance in the proceedings”. ([Para 21] refers)

The Analysis on the litigation funding application

The wife’s resources

27.  The wife admitted her entitlement to an income of $37,000 from her gold investment of $2.34M, although there has been problem with this payment since July 2019 due to some issues with IRS as aforementioned.  It does not appear to be in dispute between the parties, that there has been difficulty in securing this monthly sum, as the husband has the same source of income and he received $96,163.  Originally thought to be a bank account compliance issue, the wife had in January found out from the husband that the IRS is investigating the gold investment and that the funds are frozen; it is unclear when the investigation will be over, but the husband has indicated this should be lifted in due course. 

28.  The wife also has the use of a supplemental credit card which is capped at $20,000. This is settled by the husband, but the amount will be set off from the sum he pays to her.

29.  The husband insisted that the wife should return to work.  Apparently, the wife ran her own recruitment business during the marriage, but closed the business in around March 2018; she had indicated that she would return to work when the daughter enters primary school, She is now 4 years old, and will turn 5 in October 2020.

30.  Husband had also engaged a forensic accountant to do an analysis on the wife’s company finances and listed out a number of challenges.  This is not the forum to look into these numbers, which will need to be investigated in context, and given to the wife to respond.  The issues raised by the husband will therefore not have any bearing on this decision.

31.  The wife has been drawing on her business account, this account had around $2,141,000 in August 2018, from then to June 2019, she moved almost $1.7M to her personal account, no doubt to supplement her expenses which is understandable.  The MPS Order gave her only $14,000 from the husband for general expenses, she is expected to pay for her own personal expenses, and the entertainment and travel expenses of the daughter when she is with her.

32.  According to her 9th affirmation dated 6 February 2020, her most updated account statements showed she had the following assets:

a.  $1.686M in her personal account

b.  $1.439M in her business account

c.  $543,015 in her securities account

Her business account balance is erroneously reported, the February 2020 statement shows only a balance of $385,835.

33.  There should also be “gold investment” of $2.34M, as stated in her Form E dated September 2017. This should be the source of her monthly income.  It is difficult to expect her to draw on these funds as it is generating an income for her, and at the moment it is frozen under the IRS investigation.  But it would not be correct to say that she is without resources; or that it is impossible for her to convert this investment into some other form of investment with return.

34.  However, by a letter from her lawyers dated 6 April 2020, the wife has apparently transferred US$150,000 to Singapore to secure a 20% interest in a company she hopes to work in.  This amount was taken from the wife’s personal account and her business account. Her latest position in her bank accounts after this tallies HK$144,792 and $248,106 respectively.  I am assuming she still has the assets in her securities account.

35.  The Singapore company to which this capital sum has been transferred, is apparently owned by a man with whom the wife has a relationship and intends to marry after the divorce; this latter information was provided by a letter from the wife’s lawyers to the husband.  A letter from this Singapore company to the wife stated that the injection amount for the stake holding into the company is a “generous offer” only available up to 31 March 2020.

36.  I do not consider such removal of the wife’s capital amount to be appropriate during the course of the divorce.  This amount could have gone towards more than half of the litigation funding for the care and control hearing.  It is unfortunate that the wife has made such a move and at such timing; and on the basis that she does have assets she could have deployed, but chose not to, I will dismiss her application for litigation funding.

37.  For the sake of completeness, I am of the view that the wife has no assets which could be offered as security for borrowing; she is unable to obtain legal service by offering a charge against the outcome of the litigation, nor is she likely to be eligible for legal aid.

The Law on Variation of Maintenance

38.  The husband’s summons is based on Section 11 of the Matrimonial Proceedings and Property Ordinance, which reads as follows:

“(1) Where the court has made an order to which this section applies, then, subject to the provisions of this section, the court should have power to vary or discharge the order or to suspend any provision thereof temporarily and to revive the operation of any provision so suspended.”

…

“(7) In exercising the powers conferred by this section the court shall have regard to all the circumstances of the case, including any change in any of the matters to which the court was required to have regard when making the order to which the application relates …”

39.  In the case of AEM v VFM [2008] 3 HKLRD 36 , Cheung JA explained the modern approach in dealing with an application for variation of maintenance at para 14 of the Judgment, in particular the following sub-paragraphs:

“3. The traditional approach to variation was not to re-fix afresh the amount of maintenance but to consider the amount of change in the actual means of the parties so that the new order should merely be increased or decreased roughly in proportion to the change in the means : Foster v.Foster[1964] 3 All ER 541, Jackson's Matrimonial Finance and Taxation 7th Ed. Ch. 3. 131.

4. The modern approach, as required by section 11(7), is for the Court to consider all the circumstances of the cases. The Court is not required to proceed from the starting point of the original order but look at the matter afresh: Flavell v. Flavell[1997] 1 FLR 353at 357B following Lewis v. Lewis[1977] 1 WLR 409 and Garner v. Garner [1992] 1 FLR 573.

5. Any change in any of the matters to which the Court was required to consider when making the original order was one of the circumstances to be considered.

…

8. At the same time the basis and intended effect of the original order are relevantfactors to which the Court on variation should pay regard and there should not be a radical departure from the approach taken by the parties themselves when they had entered into an agreement embodied in a consent order: Boylan v. Boylan [1988] FLR 282.”

40.  The legal principles arising therefrom have been clearly established in case law. The court is to approach the matter de novo, having regard to the current circumstances of the case as is reasonable, and to make an Order applying fairness as the yardstick.

41.  Furthermore, as this is an assessment of interim maintenance, it is trite law that the proper approach is on a broad brush basis as set out by the Hong Kong case presided by Hartmann JA in HJFG v KCY [2012] 1 HKLRD 95:

“38. Finally, it is to be noted that in applications for interim maintenance, when the amount to be paid is for a limited period only and not all of the evidence is necessarily before the court, it is not appropriate, nor indeed in most cases possible, for the court to conduct a detailed investigation into the finances of the parties. While, in order to determine what is or is not reasonable, some analysis is always required, that analysis can be conducted on a 'broad brush' basis.”

The Analysis the Variation of maintenance

Wife’s current expenses

42.  The wife set out her current expenses in her 8th Affirmation, her general expenses were in line with what the court ordered under the MPS judgement. 

Item MPS Order W’s 8th Affirmation
Rent 29,000 28,000
Utilities 8,800 8,800
Food 7,700 7,700
Household Expenses 5,000 5,000
Insurance premier for Helper 100 5,600
Domestic Helper 5,500
TOTAL $56,100 $55,100

43.  Her personal expenses are irrelevant for the purpose of this variation application as the court did not rule that the husband had to pay for her personal expenses.  But comparing her current personal expenses to that which she declared for her first MPS application, she had reduced her spending, and is likely to be living below the standard of living enjoyed during her marriage.  This is an expected outcome when a family is separated into two households, even if resources have remained the same. 

44.  As for the daughter’s expenses, there is a marginal increase from $10,500 as assessed by the court, to $12,300 (not $20,300 as stated by the husband as the judge ruled that each party should be responsible for their own entertainment and holidays costs for the daughter).

Item MPS Order W’s 8th Affirmation
School Fees Paid by the Petitioner Paid by the Petitioner
ECA Paid by the Petitioner
(Up to HK$2,000)
Paid by the Petitioner
(Up to HK$2,000)
General Transport 2,000 3,000
School books and stationery 500 1,300
Medical / Dental   1,000 1,000
Clothing, accessories and utensils   4,000 4,000
Toiletries   1,000 1,000
Meals out of home   2,000 2,000
Entertainment*   3,000 3,000
Holidays*   5,000 5,000
TOTAL (not counting entertainment and holidays 10,500 12,300

45.  He challenged her expenses on rental, utilities, household and for the domestic helper.  I am of the view that these are misconceived; her expenses were assessed to be reasonable in the MPS judgement; even looking at this anew, I do not find these numbers to be so excessive to warrant a downward adjustment. 

46.  While the wife has submitted increased numbers for the daughter in her affirmation, she has explained the increased numbers for transport and for books and stationery.  I accept that as a growing child her expenses will no doubt increase, and the wife is not asking for any additional amounts. 

Husband ability to pay

47.  It appeared that the husband was making $250,000 in 2016, then $152,000 in 2017 and now $119,029 according to his affirmations filed under the present summons.

48.  A high-level review on the husband’s statements showed that he had been receiving a sum of US$12,250 since at least the beginning of the divorce, which appeared to have translated into a regular income of $96,163 from January 2019.  This seems to tally with his claim of income from a gold fund.  This amount appeared twice in the months of April and May 2019 and ceased in July 2019.  There is very little clarity on the source and details of this particular income.  The husband called it “gold fund income” and “income generated from unrefined gold trading business” in his January 2018 affirmation, “partnership income” in his answer to the first questionnaire, then “commission income” in his answer to the second and third questionnaire.  This income suffered the same fate as the wife’s income of HK$37,000, which appeared to be from the same source, and seemed to be caught in the same IRS investigation previously mentioned.  The wife claimed that her income of HK$37,000 is generated from a HK$2.34M in gold investment, it begs the question how much the husband has invested to generate this income.

49.  Husband claimed to be providing advisory services in mergers and acquisitions and that he had made two deals which brought in a total of US$35,000 / $274,400 in 2019, but no supporting evidence was given.

50.  Husband had approximately US$200,000 flowing through his personal account between October and December 2019, which was unexplained. 

51.  The husband claimed to have maxed out his ability to borrow but has not produced much evidence to this effect.  There is only an existing loan from HSBC, the repayment amount stated in his affirmation in opposition is $13,528.  To support his loan rejection allegation, he exhibited a Whatsapp messages on which he relied to say he could not borrow further.  It is my view that this so called “rejected loan application” does not come close to supporting his inability to borrow.  It is not clear with whom he was communicating in this conversation, there is no application form, there is no formal rejection letter, it is unclear what institution was involved, and the exchange was undated.  This is far from acceptable for a claim that he is not able to borrow further.

52.  He claimed to be $6.9M in debt owed under credit card, personal loan from HSBC and loans from friends, but provided no breakdown nor supporting information.  On the latter point, he produced 5 promissory notes:

Borrow date From Amount Due date
4 May 2018 BP $700,000 10 May 2019
4 May 2018 KCD US$100,000 10 May 2019
15 August 2018 JB US$150,000 14 August 2019
26 April 2019 KCD US$150,000 10 May 2020
1 Sept 2019 GD US$125,000 31 August 2020

53.  Of these loans, the following observations can be made:

a.  Repayment on three of these loan should have been due, but there is no evidence of repayment from his bank account;

b.  The loan in April 2019 was from one KCD, who was lending to the husband a second time without evidence of repayment of the previous debt;

c.  Husband claimed as expenses $19,979 being interest payment for personal loans, but there is no evidence of this;

I hold that these loans from friends may well be soft loans, and he has not yet exhausted all his sources of borrowing.

54.  From the husband’s affirmation, his expenses are as follows:

a.  General expenses: HK$78,490 inclusive of HK$52,432 for mortgage;

b.  Personal expenses: HK$335,529 inclusive of HK$52,500 interim maintenance and HK$219,114 for legal fees; and

c.  Child expenses: HK$13,120 inclusive of HK$9,240 for school fees

55.  Throughout the period from the last MPS hearing in August 2018 to his application herein, his apparent income was from his gold fund investments and his borrowings which he used to pay his legal fees of at least $3.2M (up to November 2019) and various expenses above.  It is unfortunate that paying his wife maintenance under the MPS Order is not considered a priority.  On his own admission, he was out of funds when he needed to pay for the corporate debenture of his daughter’s school, and he needed to scramble to borrow $140,000 from a friend in January 2020 to make the payment.

56.  The husband’s father passed away in September 2019, and he claimed to receive nothing except for approximately $378,519, and exhibited his father’s will dated June 2019 which gave everything to his mother and failing, to his only sister. As the only son, his name was not even mentioned in the Will.  The wife has responded to this with suspicion, and I do concede that this may warrant further investigation in due course. 

57.  I remain sceptical on the timing of the sale of his business to his father and closure of his businesses soon after the MPS Order, then followed by the cessation of the income payment from the gold investment where no evidence was proffered on the IRS investigation other than Whatsapp messages exchange.

58.  I conclude that the husband has more resources than what he claimed, and in particular, he has the ability to borrow further either from financial institutions, or from friends who were able to lend him money and did not demand repayment in accordance with the promissory note they signed. 

Conclusion

59.  In conclusion, I dismiss the wife’s application for litigation funding.

60.  I also rule that the maintenance payments under the MPS Order are not excessive, and the husband does have the ability to pay.  It follows that and the husband’s application to vary down the MPS Order is dismissed, and the previous MPS Order stands.

Costs

61.  As both applications have been dismissed, I made no Order as to cost for both cases.

Order

62.  Consequently, I shall make the following Orders:

a.  The Respondent’s Summons for litigation funding be dismissed;

b.  The Petitioner’s Summons for variation to the MPS Order made by HHJ Melloy on 24 October 2018 be dismissed;

c.  There be no Order as to costs for both Summons.

 (Thelma KWAN)
 Deputy District Court Judge

The Petitioner acted in person

Messrs Boase Cohen & Collins represented the Respondent

[2019] HKFC 12-EN-2019-01-14

H v. W

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FCMC 8332 / 2017

[2019] HKFC 12

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

MATRIMONIAL CAUSES

NUMBER 8332 OF 2017

____________________

BETWEEN
 HPetitioner
and
 WRespondent

____________________

Coram: Her Honour Judge Sharon D. Melloy in Chambers (Not Open to Public)

Date of Hearing: 10 January 2019

Date of Judgment: 14 January 2019

__________________________

J U D G M E N T

(Removal)

__________________________


Introduction

1.  This is an application by a Petitioner father for leave to remove the child of the family, a little girl B, born on the XX October 2015, out of the jurisdiction of Hong Kong in order to visit Marrakesh in Morocco so that she may attend a family wedding. The trip is scheduled to take place from the 6th – 12th March 2019. The application is resisted by the Respondent wife.

Background to the marriage

2.  By way of a short background reference can be made to the Maintenance Pending judgment of the 24 October 2018, where I said inter alia as follows:

 7.  The parties married on the 15 February 2013 and separated in or about January 2016. This was then, by anyone’s standard a very short marriage. As I have said B was born shortly before the parties’ separation in October 2015. The husband issued a divorce petition on the 29 June 2017 and although he has applied for the decree nisi it has yet to be granted. Unfortunately, the parties were unable to reach full agreement with respect to B and there is a Pre Trial Review scheduled for the 6 November 2018 in that regard.

 8.  The husband was originally in paid employment and has worked in the finance sector prior to setting up his own investment business in 2016. The wife for her part ran her own small recruitment business until it finally closed down earlier this year. She now says that she is a full time mother 

3.  The hope originally was that there might be a truncated trial on the practical arrangements for B, as full agreement appeared to have been reached in relation to most of the major issues and Scott Schedules were filed in that respect (see in particular the Joint Scott Schedule filed on the 2 January 2019). Unfortunately, that no longer appears to be the case and the father has since issued a summons seeking care and control of B, with reasonable access to the mother (see the summons dated the 7 January 2019). Thus a fully litigated trial, possibly lasting many days, now seems inevitable.      

The law in Hong Kong

4.  It is not disputed that the general principles concerning children govern this application and in particular section 3 of the Guardianship of Minors Ordinance, Cap. 13, which states that the court must have regard to what is in the best interests of B. It is generally accepted that a child has the right to see and to have a relationship with both of her parents. I also accept that generally speaking a trip overseas with a parent will be viewed by the court as being in the best interests of a child.

The issue

5.  There is then only one issue - should leave be given for the father to take B to Morocco in March 2019 in order that she might attend a family wedding?

Discussion

6.  The mother opposes the application. She says that B is too young (only three years old) to be taken aware from her caretaking parent (which on the mother’s case is herself) to go on her first long haul flight or flights, post separation. She says that this will be too much for the child, that she is likely to suffer from jet lag, to miss school without cause and that this could aggravate her chronic constipation. In a nut shell she says that it is not in her best interests to attend the wedding.

7.  Although I accept that some of these concerns are genuinely held by the mother it seems to me that it is important that B attend. She has been asked to be a flower girl and although the mother says that this is contrived, it seems to me that in any event it is important that B attend the wedding and that she have full exposure to the paternal side of her family. This is not a distant relative who is getting married, but the father’s first cousin. I have no doubt that had the parties still been together that they would have made this trip together. Although the wife is concerned about B making this trip without her, B has travelled with her father before and he will be accompanied on the trip by his sister for the first tranche of the trip and by his parents in addition for the second tranche. I accept that she will be properly cared for and that arrangements will be made for her to rest and sleep as necessary – even at inopportune times. I also tend to accept Ms Irving’s point that in such circumstances it is acceptable for B to miss a few days of school.

8.  The mother complains that the father has been high handed in his approach and that he had booked the tickets for the trip and made hotel reservations, in addition to informing the school of the same before leave had been granted. I think there is little in this. The father seems to have taken a view and would have been required to have cancelled any reservation pertaining to B, in the event that the application was not granted. Conversely he may have had difficulties reserving flights and hotel rooms etc had he left it too late.

9.  In such circumstances I shall make an order in terms of paragraph 1 of the summons dated the 31 October 2018. Given that this is a child related matter there shall be an order nisi to be made absolute in 14 days’ time that there be no order as to the costs of this summons to include all costs reserved.

 (Sharon D MELLOY)
 District Judge

Ms Francis Irving instructed by Withers for the Petitioner

Mrs Usha Casewell of Boase Bohen & Collins for the Respondent

[2018] HKFC 181-EN-2018-10-24

H v. W

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FCMC 8332 / 2017

[2018] HKFC 181

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

MATRIMONIAL CAUSES

NUMBER 8332 OF 2017

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BETWEEN
 H Petitioner
and
 WRespondent

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Coram: Her Honour Judge Sharon D. Melloy in Chambers (Not open to public)

Date of Hearing: 13 August 2018

Date of receipt of further documentation: 16 and 24 August and 4 September 2018

Date of Judgment: 24 October 2018

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J U D G M E N T
(Maintenance pending suit/Interim maintenance)

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Introduction

1.  This is an application by a Respondent wife for maintenance pending suit for herself pursuant to section 3 Matrimonial Proceedings and Property Ordinance Cap 192 (MPPO) and interim maintenance for child of the family, a little girl, B, who was born on the XX October 2015 and is now 3 years of age, pursuant to section 5 of the same ordinance.

The main issues

2.  In broad terms there is only one issue to be determined namely how much maintenance should the husband pay to the wife for herself and B on an interim basis.

3.  The wife seeks an order in the sum of HK$85,000 per month whereas the husband asks that an order be made that he pay for half of B’s reasonable expenses and that he also make whatever contribution towards the wife’s expenses that are similarly deemed reasonable in the circumstances.

4.  The husband also makes reference to the fact that the parties previously reached an agreement that he would pay maintenance pending suit/interim maintenance as follows:

a) HK$45,000 per month for both mother and child;

b) In addition he would undertake to pay for B’s school fees, Extracurricular Activities (ECA’s) and her medical/dental insurance together with the wife’s medical insurance directly,

c) he would make a one off payment of HK$60,000 as a contribution towards the wife’s moving costs   

d) and there would be no order as to costs.

5.  Unfortunately the wife ultimately decided that she was unable to accept this proposal and this offer no longer appears to be on the table. The husband is currently paying the wife HK$20,000 per month plus he continues to pay for B’s school fees and ECA’s.

6.  This case involves two people of Indian descent, neither of whom is currently in paid employment. The husband also comes from a well-known and wealthy family in Hong Kong. There are many subsidiary issues here, each of which could take some time to unravel and are likely to increase the parties’ legal costs very significantly if they are fully litigated. For example, it is the husband’s case that the parties entered into a binding pre nuptial agreement. This is categorically denied by the wife. There is also an issue concerning the purchase of the former matrimonial home and whether, inter alia, the deposit for its purchase was a gift or a loan from the husband’s father/uncle. This may have to be determined as a separate preliminary issue. In addition, there are significant concerns with respect to the husband’s disclosure to date and the extent to which he is financially supported by his family, if at all. In broad terms it is the wife’s case that she and the husband enjoyed an extremely high standard of living during the marriage and that the husband is now unilaterally attempting to reduce that standard of living. Not so says the husband, pointing instead to what he says is evidence of the wife’s reckless over spending.

Background 

7.  The parties married on the XX February 2013 and separated in or about January 2016. This was then, by anyone’s standard a very short marriage. As I have said B was born shortly before the parties’ separation in October 2015. The husband issued a divorce petition on the 29 June 2017 and although he has applied for the decree nisi it has yet to be granted. Unfortunately, the parties were unable to reach full agreement with respect to B and there is a Pre Trial Review scheduled for the 6 November 2018 in that regard.

8.  The husband was originally in paid employment and has worked in the finance sector prior to setting up his own investment business in 2016. The wife for her part ran her own small recruitment business until it finally closed down earlier this year. She now says that she is a full time mother. 

The law

Maintenance pending suit and interim maintenance

9.  The law is well known and not in dispute. Section 3 Matrimonial Proceedings and Property Ordinance Cap 192 states that the only governing principle is that the court shall make such order as it considers reasonable in all of the circumstances of the case. Consequently, applications such as these are approached on a broad-brush basis. A detailed examination of the parties’ means may be examined at a later date at a full ancillary relief hearing if there is no agreement in the meantime, when there is then every opportunity to achieve fairness by means of a set off. In other words, if there is any overpayment or underpayment that can normally be rectified at a final ancillary relief hearing. Applications for interim maintenance under section 5 of the same ordinance are approached in the same way. As Rayden points out

…what really matters is the immediate and reasonable requirements of the wife balanced against the ability of the husband to pay for them, assessed using a broad-brush approach. (See paragraph 16.17 of Rayden, 18th edition).

10.  Further

In practice, as oral evidence is rarely given, it will be unusual for the court on an application for maintenance pending suit to be in a position to make findings of fact on issues in dispute sufficient, for example, to deal with conduct or allegations of non disclosure.  However, if it is demonstrated that the paying party has not performed his duty to make full and frank disclosure of his financial resources, then the court can take a broad and robust view of his means, and it does not have to accept and proceed on the basis of the assertions of the paying party as to his means and an inability to pay.  The court can look at the reality of the situation …… Any under provision or over provision in the order for maintenance pending suit can always be corrected when the account comes to be taken at the substantive hearing when there are every opportunity to do fairness by set off ……” (See paragraphs 16.18 of Rayden, 18th edition).

11.  Likewise the court may look to the assertions made by the payee and take a similar approach when looking at her means and alleged reasonable requirements.  The court should look to the reality of the situation, in so far as it can, in relation to the bare assertions made by either the husband or the wife.

12.  Although I was not specifically referred to the following authority by either side it seems to me that the following section from Jackson’s Matrimonial Finance 9th edition (paragraph 3.92) may also be of some assistance:

“When a party applies for an order for maintenance pending suit or for periodical payments, it is not a complete answer to the claim for the potential payer to say: ‘I have no income and no assets’. In one case, a husband with a very small income (in three successive years it was £42, £69, £60) who asserted that he was ‘living on borrowed money and staving off a number of creditors while he [was] developing certain properties’, was nevertheless shown to have maintained by means of bank loans a consistent standard of living over a substantial period: the court in effect held that if he could borrow for himself he must likewise borrow for his wife. The principle was that he was able to touch resources from which payments could be made; he had the ability to obtain the necessary money, albeit bank loans, and it was assumed that his ventures were such as not only to justify the loans but also reasonably to contemplate their repayment in due course ….”

13.  Reference has also been made by each side to the Hong Kong Court of Appeal decision in HJFG v KCY [2012] 1 HKLRD 95 where it was held inter alia that:

“(a) The sole criterion to be applied in determining the application is ‘reasonableness’, which is synonymous with ‘fairness’.

(b) A very important factor in determining fairness is the marital standard of living. That is not to say that the exercise is merely to replicate that standard.

(c) In every maintenance pending suit application there should be a specific maintenance pending suit budget which excludes capital or long-term expenditure, more aptly to be considered on a final hearing. That budget should be examined critically in every case to exclude forensic exaggeration.

(d) Where the affidavit or Form E disclosure by the payer is obviously deficient, the court should not hesitate to make robust assumptions about his ability to pay.  The court is not confined to the mere say-so of the payer as to the extent of his income or resources.  In such a situation the court should err in favour of the payee.”

14.  Ms Rattigan for the wife has also referred me in particular to the Court of Final Appeal’s decision in KEWS v NCHC [2013] 2 HKLRD 314 and argues that the same principles should be applied to the present case. In her written submission she said as follows:

25. In the present case where the Petitioner comes from a very wealthy family and he has enjoyed access to that wealth and continues to do so the Court is entitled to make orders based on that reality.  In KEWS v NCHC [2013] 16 HKCFAR 1, the Court of Final Appeal stated:

“37. It goes without saying in the fact finding exercise, the Court must look at the reality of the situation and have regard to matters of substance and not just form.

In looking at reality, the Court can take into account not only what a party actually has, but also what might reasonably be made available to him or her if a request for assistance were to be made. In O’D v O’D [1976] Fam 83, which involved the Court taking into account the financial support given to the husband by his father, Omrod LJ said ‘In making his assessment the Court is concerned with the reality of the husband’s resources, using that word in a broad sense to include not only what he is shown to have, but also what could reasonably be made available to him’.

38. In addition to looking at what may occur in the foreseeable future, past conduct is often a useful guide: see SR v CR (Ancillary relief: Family Trusts) 2009 2 FLR 1083 at 109 (para. 27).”

Although I would accept that in the final analysis KEWS v NCHC may be of some relevance on final ancillary relief, it is hard to apply these same principles to a maintenance pending suit/interim maintenance application, which is by its very nature broad brush in approach and where there can be no findings of fact made in relation to some of the issues in dispute. Although I would of course accept that the court is charged with trying to ascertain the “reality of the situation” nonetheless.

The husband’s ability to pay 

15.  In this instance the husband maintains that he has limited financial resources and that he is finding it hard to make ends meet. In his affirmation of the 5 January 2018 he said as follows:

My Financial Position

38. In 2016, I had four sources of monthly income; a salary of HK$95,000 (later HK$100,000) per month, gold investment income of HK$15,500 (US$2,000), gold fund income of HK$96,487.50 (US$12,450) and online commission income of approximately HK$40,000.

39. In 2017, after I resigned form APC, my income was significantly reduced by HK$100,000 per month, to approximately HK$152,000.  Whilst my income decreased, my expenses did not.  As a result, I had no option but to put the family (including the Respondent) on a more controlled budget.  The breakdown of my current income as follows:

IncomeUSDHK$
Generated from unrefined gold trading business 12,450 96,487.50
Promissory Note into gold fund 2,000 15,642.26
Online Commission Income  40,000.00
Total  152,129.76

16.  It is the husband’s case that the second amount of approximately HK$15,000 per month has now gone and that his monthly income is now in the region of HK$137,000 per month. The difficulty however is that this is not entirely borne out by the evidence. As pointed out by Ms Rattigan the husband’s true financial position remains as “clear as mud” notwithstanding two rounds of questionnaires. This difficulty was compounded by the fact that the husband’s disclosure had seemingly stopped at June 2017 with no updated bank and credit card statements being produced prior to the hearing. The reasons for this were unclear and were, in my view, entirely unsupportable in any event. Updated statements were finally produced by both sides after the hearing.

17.  Ms Rattigan attempted to analyse the bank statements that had been produced by the husband for the period from July 2016 – June 2017, in a speaking note produced for the hearing. She identified for example one bank account where there is a significant movement of money both in terms of deposits and withdrawals. In total she says that over HK$14 million was deposited into this account in a 12-month period. In addition, there is reference to online business payments and what the husband has termed as “on line commission income”. It seems that a similar pattern of deposits and withdrawals can be found in the updated bank statements produced post hearing. The husband says that he earns HK$40,000 per month from “online commission income”, whereas Ms Rattigan says that the difference between income and withdrawals amounts to some HK$238,861 per month. Needless to say all of this will require significant and cogent explanation going forward. As things stand I do not accept that the husband’s income is necessarily as low as HK$137,000 per month as claimed. In addition, it seems to me that he does have the ability to borrow.

18.  On a brief review of the updated bank and credit card statements, it seems that the husband continues to enjoy a comfortable middle class lifestyle. I do not necessarily agree with the wife however, that there is any evidence here of a very very high standard of living. I will though expect that in time there will be a full analysis undertaken of the husband’s credit card expenditure etc. It seems that generally speaking all of the husband’s credit cards are paid off in full at the end of each month.

The wife’s financial resources     

19.  It is the husband’s case that the wife has more significant financial resources than himself, including cash savings in her own name and funds held in the name of her company. The wife for her part says that her income has recently reduced by approximately HK$30,000 per month, following the closing down of her business earlier in the year. Like the husband she has an investment in a gold fund which produces a passive income, in her case of HK$37, 440 per month. In addition, she receives the husband’s interim interim maintenance of HK$20,000 per month. But it is the wife’s case that she is in a precarious financial situation and that her savings are reducing at an alarming rate. Her most recent bank statements show cash savings of just over HK$1.6 million in her own name and cash held in her company account of just over HK$2 million, down from just over HK$2.9 million and HK$2.3 million respectively, in October 2017. Largely I accept that the wife’s position is not sustainable in the longer term.

What are the wife’s reasonable needs?

20.  The wife’s most updated schedule can be found in a letter from her solicitors to the solicitors for the husband dated the 8 August 2018 in which she sets out her most up to date expenses as follows:

General

Item Amount (HK$)
Rent 29,000.00
Utilities (electricity, gas, rates, telephone and water) 8,800.00
Food 7,700.00
Household expenses 10,000.00
Insurance premia for the helper 100.00
Domestic helper 5,500.00
  HK$61,100.00

Personal

Item Amount (HK$)
Meals out of home 8,300.00
Transport 3,920.00
Clothing / Shoes 21,700.00
Personal grooming (incl. haircut, facials, treatments, cosmetics, gym etc.) 10,000.00
Entertainment / presents 2,900.00
Holiday 12,500.00
Medical / Dental 1,500.00
Tax 855.00
Insurance premia
The Petitioner recently changed the insurer to Cigna and has not provide any details of the cost.
Unknown
(Paid by Petitioner)
Contribution to parents 10,000.00
Others (specify)
Mobile phone
Club expenses
800.00
4,300.00
  HK$76,775.00

B

Item Amount (HK$)
School fees (Tutor Time) 9,790.00
(Paid by Petitioner)
Extra-Curricular Activities
(Currently B only attends My Gym which costs HK$880.00 per month)
2,000.00
(Paid by Petitioner)
General transport 4,000.00
School books and stationery 840.00
Medical / Dental 1,000.00
Clothing, accessories and utensils 8,000.00
Toiletries 2,000.00
Meals out of home 2,000.00
Entertainment 3,000.00
Holidays 11,779.18
Insurance premia
The Petitioner recently changed the insurer to Cigna and has not provide any details of the cost.
Unknown
(Paid by Petitioner)
Shipping of B’s clothes from the US using Myus.com 600.00
Total HK$45,009.18
Total excluding expenses those paid by the Petitioner HK$33,219.18

21.  Although the wife’s total expenses amount to approximately HK$170,000 per month (without those items that the husband has agreed to pay for directly) she reiterated during the hearing that she is infact only seeking HK$85,000 per month – HK$51,500 for herself and the remainder for the child.

She also says that her up to date moving costs and expenses amounted to just under HK$230,000.

Discussion

22.  I should say at the outset that although in some cases it may be appropriate to split the costs for a child 50:50, that is generally where the parties are earning a similar amount or they have similar financial resources otherwise. Although the wife has some cash assets, she is not earning an income at present, save for the passive income from the gold investment. In contrast most of the husband’s assets are illiquid. Consequently, it seems to me that at this stage it would be more appropriate for the husband to be responsible for the majority of B’s expenses. This may alter over time.

23.  I should add that given that both parties are relatively young, (36 and 38 years old respectively) and that they each have an earning capacity; I will expect both parties to do whatever is necessary to maximize their earning capacity in the short to medium term.

General expenses

24.  In so far as the wife’s general expenses are concerned, it seems to me that most of these are reasonable and are in the same ball park as the husband’s schedule of general expenses. The only category that may be capable of some sort of reduction are the household expenses, which I will reduce to HK$5,000 per month. In total then I accept that the wife has general expenses in the region of HK$56,000 per month. Half of this sum will be attributable to B – at HK$28,000 per month. The husband will be responsible for HK$28,000 for B, being her share of the general expenses and for half of the wife’s share at HK$14,000 per month.

25.  In so far as the wife’s personal expenses are concerned, she shall be wholly responsible for these. Some seem very high in any event and are clearly capable of reduction. There has also been a lot of debate concerning the wife’s alleged financial support for her parents. It is a matter for the wife if she wishes to financially support them. I accept that the husband should not be expected to contribute towards this. Further the wife’s financial responsibility for herself and B must take precedence over any financial responsibility that she feels that she has towards her parents.

B’s expenses

26.  The husband has undertaken to pay for B’s school fees, ECA’s and her medical and dental insurance. I will hold him to those undertakings which shall be included in the preamble of the order. Some of the remaining expenses seem very much on the high side. I will allow as follows:

B

Item Amount (HK$)
School fees (Tutor Time) 9,790.00*
(Paid by Petitioner)
Extra-Curricular Activities
(Currently B only attends My Gym which costs HK$880.00 per month)
2,000.00*
(Paid by Petitioner)
General transport 2,000.00
School books and stationery 500.00
Medical / Dental 1,000.00
Clothing, accessories and utensils 4,000.00
Toiletries 1,000.00
Meals out of home 2,000.00
Entertainment 3,000.00*
Holidays 5,000.00*
Insurance premia
The Petitioner recently changed the insurer to Cigna and has not provide any details of the cost.
Unknown
(Paid by Petitioner)
Shipping of B’s clothes from the US using Myus.com 0
Total HK$18,500.00

Of the HK$18,500 per month, each side will be responsible for their own entertainment and holiday costs with B. The husband shall be responsible for the remainder of the expenses for B in the sum of HK$10,500 per month.

Standard living

27.  In allowing these sums I have recognised that when a marriage breaks down and the parties begin to live in two separate households it is not possible, generally speaking, to maintain the same standard of living as before. There has to be, by necessity, some form of adjustment. This case is no exception.    

Conclusion

28.  In conclusion then I will make an order that in total the husband do pay the wife HK$14,000 per month, as maintenance for herself plus HK$38,500 per month as maintenance for B plus he will undertake to continue to pay for B’s school fees, ECA’s up to a maximum of HK$2,000 per month and her medical/dental insurance and the medical insurance for the wife. It seems to me that the husband should be able to pay this sum and that the wife will be able to support herself in the immediate to short term by relying on this together with her small passive income and her other savings. Longer term however the wife will need to return to work in some capacity and as I have said the husband will also need to maximize his earning capacity.

Costs

29.  I have several concerns when it comes to the issue of costs. Firstly, I am concerned that the husband offered to pay the wife HK$45,000 per month, but then reduced that sum to HK$20,000 per month, leaving very little room for sensible compromise. In those circumstances the wife had little option but to proceed with her application. In such circumstances I shall make an order nisi to be made absolute in 14 days’ time that the husband do pay the wife’s costs of this restored application on a party and party basis to be taxed if not agreed.

Backdating

30.  In a similar vein it seems to me that the husband must have known that the wife would struggle to survive on HK$20,000 per month once she had moved into her own apartment. I accept that she had little option but to do so given the fact that the husband refused to move out of the former matrimonial home and that it was untenable for the pair to continue to live under the same room on a longer term basis. Although the wife had some savings this does not excuse the husband’s stance. Given that I will backdate this order to the month that the wife moved out of the former matrimonial home, credit to be given for any sums paid by the husband as maintenance.    

Order

31.  Consequently I shall make an order as follows:

UPON the Petitioner undertaking to continue to pay for B’s school fees, ECA’s (up to HK$2,000 per month) and for her medical and dental insurance together with the wife’s medical insurance directly.

IT IS ORDERED THAT: 

1) The Petitioner do pay maintenance pending suit to the Respondent for herself in the sum of HK$14,000 per month and interim maintenance to the Respondent for the child of the family, B, in the sum of HK$38,500 per month the first payment to be made on the 1st day of the month that the Respondent moved out of the former matrimonial home and thereafter to be paid on the 1st day of each succeeding month until further order.

2) The First Appointment hearing shall be adjourned to the 6 November 2018 at 9:30 am. Further directions may also be sought with respect to any other preliminary issues referred to in paragraph 6 above.

3) Both parties do personally attend that hearing.  

4) There shall be an order nisi to be made absolute in 14 days’ time that the Petitioner shall pay the Respondent’s costs of and occasioned by this restored application on a party and party basis to be taxed if not agreed. There shall be certificate for counsel.

 (Sharon D. MELLOY)
 District Judge

Mr Jeremy Chan instructed by Withers for the Petitioner

Ms Mairead Rattigan instructed by Boase Cohen & Collins for the Respondent