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Civil Action2017

TACHING PETROLEUM CO, LTD v. MEYER ALUMINIUM LTD

Related cases with same parties

  • CACV477/2020TACHING PETROLEUM CO, LTD v. MEYER ALUMINIUM LTD
  • CACV478/2020SHELL HONG KONG LTD v. MEYER ALUMINIUM LTD
  • CACV621/2020TACHING PETROLEUM CO, LTD v. MEYER ALUMINIUM LTD
  • CACV622/2020SHELL HONG KONG LTD v. MEYER ALUMINIUM LTD
  • CAMP158/2020TACHING PETROLEUM CO, LTD v. MEYER ALUMINIUM LTD
  • CAMP159/2020SHELL HONG KONG LTD v. MEYER ALUMINIUM LTD
  • CTA1/2018TACHING PETROLEUM CO LTD v. MEYER ALUMINIUM LTD
  • CTA2/2018SHELL HONG KONG LTD v. MEYER ALUMINIUM LTD
  • HCA1069/2018SHELL HONG KONG LTD v. MEYER ALUMINIUM LTD
  • HCA1716/2009MEYER ALUMINIUM LTD v. MOSTLY STRONG PRECISION METAL INTERNATIONAL LTD

Files (5)

[2021] HKCFI 3028-EN-2021-10-12

TACHING PETROLEUM CO, LTD v. MEYER ALUMINIUM LTD

HTML content

HCA 1929/2017 &
HCA 1069/2018

[2021] HKCFI 3028

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO 1929 OF 2017

____________

BETWEEN  
 TACHING PETROLEUM COMPANY, LIMITEDPlaintiff

and

 MEYER ALUMINIUM LIMITEDDefendant
____________

AND

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO 1069 OF 2018

____________

BETWEEN

 SHELL HONG KONG LIMITEDPlaintiff

and

 MEYER ALUMINIUM LIMITEDDefendant
____________
 (Heard Together) 

Before: Hon Au-Yeung J in Court

Dates of Hearing: 27-30 July, 2, 3 and 9 August 2021

Date of Judgment: 12 October 2021

_______________

J U D G M E N T

_______________

1.  This is a claim for payment for goods sold and delivered with a defence under competition law.

2.  Taching and Shell were both suppliers of industrial diesel to Meyer.  By these 2 actions, Taching and Shell respectively claim against Meyer for costs of industrial diesel sold and delivered in the sum of HK$4,435,150 and HK$2,287,811.45 respectively.

3.  There is no dispute about the sale and delivery.  Meyer’s sole defence is based on the allegation that Taching and Shell had contravened the First Conduct Rule by agreeing/engaging in a concerted practice to fix price or exchange of price information (“Alleged Contravention”).  Meyer contends that:

(1)     The “relevant agreement” pursuant to which Taching and Shell have respectively supplied the industrial diesel between 1 April and 5 June 2017 (in respect of Taching) and between 5 April and 4 July 2017 (in respect of Shell) were tainted with illegality and unenforceable against Meyer; and

(2)     Meyer is entitled to set off the damages it has suffered as a result of the Alleged Contravention to extinguish its liability to Taching and Shell for the outstanding price.

4.  Meyer’s pleaded case on the Alleged Contravention was evidenced by and/or inferred from 2 factors only:

(1)     There were 118 Pairs of corresponding Price Adjustment Notices issued by Taching and Shell respectively, between January 2011 and June 2017 (“Relevant Period”).  Those 118 pairs of List Price Adjustment Notices made the same adjustments to the List Price of industrial diesel.

(2)     The adjustments of List Price specified in the 118 Pairs of Price Adjustment Notices were not public information and the striking uniformity in such changes could not be explained by mere coincidence.

5.  Based on these 2 factors alone, Meyer claims that the only reasonable inference for the uniformity in the 118 Pairs of Price Adjustment Notices is that it was the result of anti-competitive collusion between Taching and Shell.

6.  The Alleged Contravention has been transferred to the Competition Tribunal pursuant to section 113(3) of the Competition Ordinance, Cap 619 (“the Ordinance”) for determination as a preliminary issue in CTA 1 and 2 of 2018.

7.  As these 2 High Court Actions were heard together with the 2 actions in the Competition Tribunal, I have directed all evidence to be taken under the High Court Actions in view of the unlimited jurisdiction of the High Court.  If evidence is taken under the Competition Tribunal, the parties could not, even by consent, confer jurisdiction on the Competition Tribunal to hear evidence that may be outside the scope of competition law.

Illegality defence

8.  For the reasons given in the judgment of today’s date in CTA 1 and 2 of 2018 concerning the same parties, the Competition Tribunal has found that there was no breach of the First Conduct Rule.

9.  The pleaded illegality defence has no independent existence from the breach of the First Conduct Rule and must fail.

10.  I would add two observations.  Firstly, unlike the EU and UK parallel legislation, the Ordinance does not contain any provision that renders an agreement in contravention of the First Conduct Rule automatically void. 

11.  Paragraph 1 of Schedule 3 to the Ordinance gives power to the Tribunal to make orders under section 94 which include an order in:

(g)     prohibiting a person from giving effect to an agreement;

(h)     requiring the parties to modify or terminate an agreement; or

(i)     declaring an agreement to be void or voidable.

12.  Whether it should be the CFI or the Tribunal which should deal with the question of illegality and how the Tribunal should exercise its discretion under section 94 shall be left to a more appropriate case in future.

13.  Secondly, on the question of illegality, Hong Kong is bound by the Court of Appeal decision in Arrow ECS Norway v M Yang Trading[2019] HKCA 176, Cheung JA which followed Tinsley v Milligan [1994] 1 AC 340.  Since then, in UK, there have been Supreme Court decisions which propound approaches different to Tinsley v Milligan, such as Patel v Mirza [2017] AC 467. Again, which approach to follow should be left to a more appropriate case in future.

Set-off

14.  In respect of the defence of set-off, in [2021] HKCA 294, §58, the Court of Appeal identified 3 sub-issues, ie (i) whether or not the defence of set-off has been impliedly abrogated by the Competition Ordinance; (ii) whether contravention of the First Conduct Rule can give rise to a cross claim by Meyer against Taching and Shell on the basis of common law principles concerning breach of statutory duty; and (iii) if that cross-claim is sustainable, whether the common law criteria for equitable set-off can be satisfied.

15.  The question of set-off does not arise in the present case in view of the Tribunal’s judgment.  Those 3 sub-issues are fact-sensitive.  It is more appropriate for them to be argued in an actual case with proper pleadings than for this Court to give an advisory opinion on a hypothetical situation of no relevance to the immediate parties.

Interest

16.  For pre-judgment interest, I award to Taching P+1% from the date of writ to date of judgment and thereafter at judgment rate until payment: Chow How Yeen Margaret v Wex Pharmaceuticals Inc [2018] 3 HKLRD 163, §§45 and 75, CA.

17.  The Shell-Meyer Agreement contained, amongst others, the following terms:

"1.     Payment of the purchase price … for each Delivery shall be due … as of the end of the month in which the relevant delivery took place.”

“Payment Date: The last day of the month following the month in which delivery took place, except that if the last day of such month is not a Business Day, then payment shall be made not later than the immediately preceding Business day.”

18.  The General Terms and Conditions at Section B of the Shell-Meyer Agreement further stated that:

“6.4 Buyer agrees that payments not received by Shell or still owing more than ten (10) days past the due date will bear interest of 2% per annum above the Prime Rate quoted by the Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation Limited from time to time, calculated on a daily basis.”

19.  Shell should be awarded pre-judgment interest in accordance with clause 6.4 and thereafter at judgment rate until payment.  I accept Shell’s computation of interest as per Annex 3 to its closing submission.

Costs

20.  Meyer survived the applications for summary judgment but failed in its competition defence.  Meyer’s illegality defence raises substantial arguments on law which turns out to be unnecessary in view of the Tribunal’s judgment. For the same reasons given in Section N of the Tribunal’s judgment, the same costs order shall apply.

Conclusion

21.  There being no defence to the claims, there shall be judgment against Meyer as follows:

(1)     Payment of HK$4,435,150 to Taching;

(2)     Payment of HK$2,287,811.45 to Shell;

(3)  On a nisi basis, there shall be payment of interest to Taching at the rate of prime+1% per annum from the date of writ to the date of judgment and thereafter at judgment rate until payment;

(4)     On a nisi basis, there be payment of interest to Shell at the rate of 2% per annum above the HSBC prime rate from the due date of payment to the date of judgment and thereafter at judgment rate until payment;

(5)     There be payment out of the sums in Court with accrued interest to Taching and Shell respectively in partial satisfaction of the judgment sums; and

(6)     On a nisi basis, Meyer do bear the costs of Taching and Shell, such costs in respect of the proceedings after close of pleadings in the Tribunal shall be on indemnity basis, to be taxed if not agreed, with certificates for 2 counsel.

22.  I extend my greatest gratitude to counsel for their enlightening arguments and their dedicated efforts in this case.

(Queeny Au-Yeung)
Judge of the Court of First Instance
High Court

Ms Catrina Lam and Ms Cherry Xu, instructed by Herbert Tsoi & Partners, for Taching, the Plaintiff in HCA 1929/2017

Ms Eva Sit, SC and Mr Joshua Chan, instructed by Clifford Chance, for Shell, the Plaintiff in HCA 1069/2018

Mr Kenneth K H Lee, Ms Nana Lui and Mr William Tse, instructed by Robertsons, for Meyer, the Defendant in both cases

[2021] HKCFI 1690-EN-2021-06-10

TACHING PETROLEUM CO, LTD v. MEYER ALUMINIUM LTD

HTML content

HCA 1929/2017 &
HCA 1069/2018

[2021] HKCFI 1690

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO 1929 OF 2017

____________

BETWEEN

 TACHING PETROLEUM COMPANY, LIMITEDPlaintiff
 and 
 MEYER ALUMINIUM LIMITEDDefendant

____________

AND

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO 1069 OF 2018

____________

BETWEEN

 SHELL HONG KONG LIMITEDPlaintiff
 and 
 MEYER ALUMINIUM LIMITEDDefendant

____________

(Heard Together)

Before:Hon Au-Yeung J in Chambers
Date of Hearing:8 June 2021
Date of Decision:8 June 2021
Date of Reasons for Decision:10 June 2021

_________________________________

REASONS FOR DECISION

_________________________________

Introduction

1.  This was the pre-trial review hearing.  The trial would commence in 7 weeks’ time on 27 July 2021 with 10 days reserved.

2.  Meyer applied for a split trial of liability and quantum.  After hearing submissions, I dismissed the application.  These are my reasons.

Background

3.  In its defence, Meyer sought to set off the unliquidated damages arising from the alleged anti-competitive conduct of Taching and Shell against the price of industrial diesel delivered to Meyer. 

4.  At the Competition Tribunal (“the Tribunal”), Meyer has sought to, amongst others, adduce expert evidence on loss and damages it suffered, but it was refused by the Tribunal.  Meyer appealed to the Court of Appeal.

5.  The Court of Appeal held that since only the allegation of contravention of the First Conduct Rule was transferred to the Tribunal for trial, Meyer had applied for expert evidence on loss and damages in the wrong forum (paragraphs 32-34 and 56 of the judgment dated 11 March 2021 [2021] HKCA 294.

6.  The Court of Appeal further expressed the view that there would be sub-issues arising from the defence of set-off:

“58. … the Tribunal has no jurisdiction in the present proceedings to address if set-off should be available in the context of the High Court actions. It is a matter for the Court of First Instance. As further elaborated below, the Court of First Instance has to consider the question of set-off by addressing these sub-issues:

(a) As there is no express provision for conferring private right other than follow-on action, whether a contravention of the conduct rule under the Ordinance can give rise to cross-claims by Meyer against Taching and Shell on the basis of common law principles concerning breach of statutory duty;

(b) Whether there is an implied abrogation by the Ordinance of the common law cause of action by way of cross-claim as a defence;

(c) If a cross-claim for contravention of the conduct rule is sustainable in law, whether the common law criteria for equitable set-off can be satisfied in accordance with the test in Geldof Metaalconstructie NV v Simon Carbes Ltd [2010] EWCV Civ 667; [2010] 4 All ER 847; and

(d) The damages suffered by Meyer as a result of such contravention and the quantum thereof.”

7.  Having given guidance as to the sub-issues above, the Court of Appeal refrained from dealing with those matters.  The Court of Appeal expressly stated that the application to file expert evidence on damages and split trial was a case management possibility for the Court of First Instance.

“66. In terms of the application to file expert evidence on damages and quantum, there is also another case management possibility. Assuming an application for expert evidence on damages and quantum is made in the Court of First Instance, it is open to the court to adjourn that application until the Tribunal made a determination of the allegations. Adoption of such option may entail the splitting of trials in the High Court actions. The court could still address sub-issues (a) to (c) and issues on illegality in the trials taking place at the same time of the trials in the Tribunal proceedings. If the Tribunal found against Meyer [on the contravention of the First Conduct Rule] or if the [Court of First Instance] ruled against Meyer on [the sub-issues in §58(a) to (c)] and the defence of illegality, judgments can be given in the High Court actions. On the other hand, in the event of determinations in favour of Meyer in the Tribunal and in the Court of First Instance (except on the issue of illegality), the court would have to hold the second part of the trials to consider the quantum of set-off.

67. We have not heard submissions on that option and these are again matters of case management of the High Court actions for the Court of First Instance.  It is therefore not right for Mr Lee [counsel for Meyer] to assume that the Tribunal would exercise the discretion in the same way as did the Court of First Instance.  This Court cannot speculate what would have been the outcome had there been no procedural mistake on the part of Meyer in issuing the expert evidence summons in the Tribunal instead of the Court of First Instance.”

8.  Meyer invited this Court to adopt the Court of Appeal’s “cost-effective and practical approach”, so that the question of quantum of set-off, including expert directions, could be hived off to the second part of the trial.  Taching and Shell opposed that application.

Legal principles for ordering a split trial

9.  The general rule is for all issues to be tried at the same time and the general rule will be departed from only if it would be just and convenient to do so.  The burden is on the party seeking a split trial to demonstrate why there are “exceptional circumstances” and “special grounds” to justify the departure: Ying Cheong Construction Co Ltd v Lam Woo & Co Ltd[2019] HKCFI 1654, at §3, Mimmie Chan J.

Analyses

10.  Firstly, Meyer had previously suggested a stay of the High Court actions pending resolution of the competition issue in the Tribunal.  That suggestion was not accepted by the Court.  Instead, the Court specifically directed that the trial of these 2 actions should be carried out at the same time as the competition proceedings in CTA 1 & 2/2018, before the same judge constituting the Tribunal.  (See decision dated 22 February 2019 [2019] HKCFI 515).  Meyer has not begun to show why it was just and convenient to depart from the general rule and this specific direction. 

11.  Secondly, Mr Lee submits that the only reason why the Tribunal refused to give leave to adduce expert evidence on loss and damage was due to Taching and Shell’s erroneous argument that the set-off defence was entirely bad. There was a change of circumstances since the Court of Appeal’s decision cited above.

12.  With respect, Mr Lee has forgotten that his stance at the 3rd CMC, if not earlier, was similar to Taching and Shell’s – that Meyer had no right of action without a determination of a contravention of a Conduct Rule (§7 of the decision dated 22 February 2019 [2019] HKCFI 515). At that time, Mr Lee considered that Meyer had to pay the amounts claimed even if the Tribunal were to rule in his favour on the competition issue, and resort to a follow-on action.  In any case, Taching and Shell’s stance on the set-off is yet to be adjudicated in the light of the Court of Appeal’s views on the sub-issues.

13.  However, even if there was a change of circumstances brought about by the Court of Appeal’s decision, the Court of Appeal has left the case management issue to this Court.  It was incumbent on Meyer to make a timely application to this Court for a split trial or for expert directions. 

14.  Thirdly, as a matter of case management,

(1) This was a late application made by submission, without a summons, 7 weeks before trial.  This was way beyond 6 December 2019, the deadline for taking out interlocutory applications laid down at the 3rd CMC.  Late interlocutory applications may be dismissed on the basis of delay alone: PD 5.2, §34.  Unless there are exceptional circumstances and there are good reasons for the delay, one should not expect the courts to grant any late applications taken out shortly before the pre-trial review; Waddington Limited v Chan Chun Hoo Thomas, HCA 3291/2003, 7 May 2013, at §53, DHCJ Lok (as he then was).  No exceptional circumstances were shown.

(2) If, as Mr Lee submits, the Court had no difficulty understanding that the loss and damage to Meyer was the higher price paid for the diesel, there was no reason why Meyer could not have applied for expert directions in order for the trial on quantum to proceed at the same time as the trial in July.  The Court of Appeal had given guidance orally on 5 January 2021 after hearing the appeal, and the written reasons were handed down on 11 March 2021.  And yet nothing has been done by Meyer since January until this pre-trial review to seek expert directions.

15.  Fourthly, as a matter of pleading, as early as 22 February 2019, this Court has observed that Meyer has pleaded nothing to set off against any sum to be awarded to Taching/Shell.  As the pleadings then stood, there was simply nothing left for the court to investigate on quantum after determination of the issue of liability.  The Court saw no basis for ordering a split trial.”  See §§7-8 of the decision dated 22 February 2019 [2019] HKCFI 515.

16.  For 2 years and 3 months since, the defence has never been amended to plead a case that would justify investigation on quantum.

17.  As rightly pointed out by Ms Lam (and Ms Xu) counsel for Taching:

(1) In a follow-on action, the statement of claim must set out with full particulars the loss and damage suffered under each head of loss and the respective amount of damages claimed as well as the aggregate amount claimed: CTPD 1, §99.  The defence must plead specifically with as full particulars as possible to each item of loss and damage allegedly suffered by the plaintiff under each head of loss and to the amount of damages claimed: CTPD 1, §103. I agree with Ms Lam that, by the same token, the same requirement applies where a defence of set off is premised on loss and damage caused by the plaintiff’s alleged anti-competitive conduct.  Meyer’s defence does not satisfy this requirement.

(2) The burden is on a defendant to particularize the amount of his set off or the manner in which the amount is to be computed. This is reinforced by the approach in a summary judgment application, where the Courts have held that a bare defence of set-off, without particulars, is insufficient to give rise to a triable issue: 浙江省鐵投國際貿易有限公司 v HK Zexin Resources Co Ltd, HCA 3243/2016, 16 October 2017, at §§21-24, DHCJ Alex Lee (as he then was); Legend Pacific Ltd v Ng Choi Chi, HCA 1320/2009, 11 August 2009, at §§15-16, Registrar Au-Yeung (as she then was).

(3) In the context of competition law, there can be different types of damages to compensate for being subject to a cartel overcharge, loss of profit, loss of opportunity or even exemplary damages. Various methods and models may be used to evaluate quantum, depending on the circumstances of each case: Brealey QC & George, Competition Litigation UK Practice and Procedure, 2nd ed, §§16.01-16.14.  It is all the more important for a claimant to at least identify the type of loss he has allegedly suffered.

18.  Fifthly, all 3 parties agreed that even if there was no trial on the quantum of loss and damages of Meyer, there would be no prejudice to Meyer, as it could have a follow-on action if the Tribunal were to rule in its favour. Even if Meyer has to pay the price for the diesel and costs to Taching and Shell now, any prejudice can be compensated for in money terms in the follow-on action.

Conclusion

19.  Meyer’s application for a split trial was late and against the specific direction for 4 sets of proceedings to be tried together.  There was no good reason for the delay in application.  As a matter of case management and pleading, it has not been shown that it would be just and convenient to hive off the quantum issue to a second part of the trial.  There would be no prejudice to Meyer anyway even if the trial were to proceed without dealing with the quantum of Meyer’s alleged loss and damage.  For all the reasons given, I therefore dismissed the application for a split trial.

 (Queeny Au-Yeung)
 Judge of the Court of First Instance
 High Court

Ms Catrina Lam and Ms Cherry Xu, instructed by Herbert Tsoi & Partners, for Taching, the Plaintiff in HCA 1929/2017

Ms Eva Sit, SC, instructed by Clifford Chance, for Shell, the Plaintiff in HCA 1069/2018

Mr Kenneth K H Lee, Ms Nana Lui and Mr William Tse, instructed by Robertsons, for Meyer, the Defendant in both cases

  

[2019] HKCFI 515-EN-2019-02-22

TACHING PETROLEUM CO LTD v. MEYER ALUMINIUM LTD

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HCA 1929/2017 &
HCA 1069/2018

[2019] HKCFI 515

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO 1929 OF 2017

____________

BETWEEN  
 TACHING PETROLEUM COMPANY, LIMITEDPlaintiff

and

 MEYER ALUMINIUM LIMITEDDefendant

____________

AND

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO 1069 OF 2018

____________

BETWEEN

 SHELL HONG KONG LIMITEDPlaintiff

and

 MEYER ALUMINIUM LIMITEDDefendant
____________
 (Heard Together) 

Before: Hon Au-Yeung J in Chambers

Date of Hearing: 21 January 2019

Date of Decision: 22 February 2019

_____________

D E C I S I O N

_____________

Introduction

1.  These 2 cases were heard together with related competition proceedings. This decision should be read with the decision of the Competition Tribunal handed down on the same date in respect of CTA 1 and 2 of 2018 (“the Tribunal’s Decision”).

2.  Taching and Shell respectively sue Meyer for the costs of industrial diesel oil.  Meyer contends that there was breach of the First Conduct Rule in the Competition Ordinance, Cap 619 (“CO”) in that Taching and Shell colluded to fix the price or exchange price information. 

3.  Meyer now suggests that there be a stay of the High Court proceedings pending resolution of the competition issue in the Tribunal.  Taching is neutral.  Shell suggests that all issues on liability in both the High Court Actions be tried at the same time, separate from the issues on quantum.

Analyses

4.  The general rule is that all issues in a case are to be tried at the same time.  Departure from this rule would only be ordered if it is just and convenient to do so: Hong Kong Civil Procedure 2019, Vol 1, §33/4/9. This general rule applies notwithstanding competition issues are involved and are hived off to the Tribunal.

5.  The pleadings disclose that the only issue on liability in these High Court Actions that is not found in the CT Actions is the averment that “by reason of” the breach of the First Conduct Rule in the CO, the relevant agreement for supply of industrial diesel oil between Shell/Taching and Meyer “is tainted with illegality and unenforceable” against Meyer.  Meyer seeks to set off unpleaded damages against the liquidated sums claimed by Taching/Shell. 

6.  It is plain that the issues of illegality and unenforceability in the HC Actions have no independent existence from the competition defence in the Tribunal.  So all issues on liability must be tried together with the Tribunal proceedings.

7.  What then is left of the trial on quantum?  Meyer’s indication is that it has no right of action without a determination of a contravention of a Conduct Rule by virtue of section 110(1) CO.  Meyer has pleaded nothing to set off against any sum to be awarded to Taching/Shell.

8.  As a matter of law, I fail to see how a future cause of action can support a defence to a present claim.  As the pleadings now stand, there is simply nothing left for the court to investigate on quantum after determination of the issue of liability.  I see no basis for ordering a split trial. 

9.  I therefore order as follows:

(1) The trial of the High Court Actions should be carried out at the same time as the Competition Tribunal proceedings, before the same judge constituting the Tribunal.

(2) The Tribunal’s Decision on inspection of documents, specific discovery, filing of witness statements and case management conference shall apply to these 2 High Court Actions.

(3) The witness statements filed in the Competition Tribunal Proceedings shall stand as witness statements of the parties in these 2 High Court Actions.

(4) The filing of witness statements in these 2 High Court Actions is dispensed with.

(5) Half of the costs of this CMC on 21 January 2019 (excluding costs of the Confidentiality Summons and Redaction Summons in the CTA proceedings), including 30 minutes of the hearing time, shall be in the cause of these 2 High Court Actions.  Such costs are to be equally divided between the 2 High Court Actions.

(6) There shall be liberty to apply.

10.  I thank counsel for their assistance.

(Queeny Au-Yeung)
Judge of the Court of First Instance
High Court

 

Ms Catrina Lam and Ms Cherry Xu, instructed by Herbert Tsoi & Partners, for Taching, the plaintiff in HCA 1929/2017

Ms Eva Sit and Mr Joshua Chan, instructed by Clifford Chance, for Shell, the plaintiff in HCA 1069/2018

Mr Kenneth K H Lee and Ms Nana Lui, instructed by Robertsons, for Meyer, the defendant in both cases

[2018] HKCFI 2095-EN-2018-09-12

TACHING PETROLEUM CO, LTD v. MEYER ALUMINIUM LTD

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HCA 1929/2017
and HCA 1069/2018
(Heard Together)
[2018] HKCFI 2095

HCA 1929/2017

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO 1929 OF 2017

____________

BETWEEN
 TACHING PETROLEUM COMPANY, LIMITEDPlaintiff
and
 MEYER ALUMINIUM LIMITEDDefendant

____________

AND

HCA 1069/2018

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO 1069 OF 2018

____________

BETWEEN
 SHELL HONG KONG LIMITEDPlaintiff
and
 MEYER ALUMINIUM LIMITEDDefendant

____________

(Heard Together)


Before: Hon Au-Yeung J in Chambers
Date of Hearing: 7 September 2018
Date of Decision: 7 September 2018
Date of Reasons for Decision: 12 September 2018

_________________________________________

REASONS FOR DECISION

_________________________________________

1.  This decision should be read with the decision in CTA1/2018 handed down on the same date.

2.  HCA 1929/2017 (“the Taching Action”) was listed to be heard together with CTA1/2018.  Shell appeared as an intervener and had made representations as regards directions over HCA 1069/2018(“the Shell Action”). This was a hearing for directions, most of which had been agreed.  I only need to deal with the following matters briefly.

Transfer of proceedings

3.  It was confirmed that there was a common defence in both the Taching Action and the Shell Action, namely, that Taching and Shell had colluded in price fixing, in breach of the First Conduct Rule (“the Allegation”) under the Competition Ordinance, Cap 619 (“CO”).

4.  By consent of Shell and Meyer, I therefore gave leave for the transfer of the Allegation in the Shell Action to the Competition Tribunal (“the Tribunal”).

Whether the remainder of the High Court Actions should be consolidated, heard together or tried together with the proceedings at the Tribunal

5.  Having regard to the common defence, it was clearly appropriate to list both High Court Actions together to be heard with the 2 sets of proceedings in the Tribunal for case management purpose.  The question of trial of the remainder of the High Court Actions shall be revisited at the next CMC when the pleadings have closed.

Pleadings

6.  Meyer has admitted the delivery of diesel oil by Taching and Meyer. Insofar as the defence would rely on contravention of the First Conduct Rule, Meyer could state simply in its defence that it would rely on the pleadings filed in the Competition Tribunal.  The same shall apply to Taching and Shell’s replies.

Discovery

7.  The parties have agreed that all discoveries among them shall be disclosed to one another, subject to any confidentiality protocol approved by the Tribunal. 

8.  Parties have agreed that the requirement for general discovery in these 2 High Court Actions shall be dispensed with.  This costs-saving approach was most welcomed by the court, and was in line with the approach of the Tribunal.

9.  I have directed the parties to make discovery of directly relevant documents including all documents referred to in the pleadings without the need for a request from another party.  Discovery before the next CMC would aid the parties in giving realistic estimates of time for witness statements, application for specific discovery, directions for expert evidence, and time for mediation.

Summary

10.  I had therefore ordered at the hearing that:

(1)The Allegation in the Shell Action be transferred to the Tribunal;

(2)In line with the directions in the Tribunal, the balance of the High Court Actions shall be listed and heard together with the 2 sets of proceedings in the Tribunal for case management purpose until further order.  There shall be discovery of only directly relevant documents and all documents referred to in the pleadings.  All pleadings and discovery shall be served on one another among Taching, Shell and Meyer.

(3)The pleadings in the High Court Action shall incorporate those filed in the Tribunal by reference insofar as competition issues were concerned.

(4)General discovery shall be dispensed with. 

  

  

 (Queeny Au-Yeung)
 Judge of the Court of First Instance
High Court

Ms Catrina Lam and Ms Cherry Xu, instructed by Herbert Tsoi & Partners, for Taching, the Plaintiff in CTA 1/2018 and HCA 1929/2017

Mr Kenneth K H Lee and Ms Nana Lui, instructed by Robertsons,
for Meyer, the Defendant in all cases

Ms Eva Sit, instructed by Clifford Chance, for Shell, the Intended Intervener in CTA 1/2018 and the Plaintiff in HCA 1069/2018

 

[2018] HKCFI 1074-EN-2018-05-17

TACHING PETROLEUM CO LTD v. MEYER ALUMINIUM LTD

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HCA 1929/2017

[2018] HKCFI 1074

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO 1929 OF 2017

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BETWEEN
 TACHING PETROLEUM COMPANY, LIMITEDPlaintiff
and
 MEYER ALUMINIUM LIMITEDDefendant

____________

Before: Hon G Lam J in Chambers

Date of Hearing: 16 March 2018

Date of Judgment: 17 May 2018

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J U D G M E N T

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The context

1.  This is the plaintiff’s application for summary judgment.  The plaintiff’s claim is for the price of goods sold and delivered. There is no dispute about the sale or delivery or quantity or quality of the goods (being diesel oil).  The sole defence raised is based on alleged price collusion in breach of the Competition Ordinance (Cap 619) (“Ordinance”) by the plaintiff with Shell Hong Kong Limited (“Shell”).

2.  The plaintiff is a Hong Kong company carrying on business in Hong Kong as an authorised dealer for Sinopec (a major fuel oil supplier) and a seller of various types of industrial fuel and diesel oil and other petroleum products.

3.  The defendant is also a local company, and has been carrying on business in Hong Kong in the manufacture and sale of aluminium products.  A key input for the defendant’s business is diesel fuel for its machines.  The defendant began purchasing fuel oil from the plaintiff in the late 1970s.  From 1999 onwards they had entered into written oil supply agreements.  There were successively a total of 4 supply agreements between them covering the period from 1999 to June 2015. In the initial years, the product sold and purchased was called Industrial Diesel Oil, but from 2010 onwards it had been called Industrial Euro V Diesel though according to the defendant it remained essentially the same product. 

4.  Each agreement specified an estimated quantity of diesel to be ordered by the defendant per month, which the plaintiff undertook to supply within a reasonable time.  If the plaintiff failed to supply, the defendant was entitled to purchase similar product from the market and claim the price difference from the plaintiff.  The plaintiff agreed to deliver diesel to the defendant’s premises within 24 hours of an order, and to maintain two underground storage tanks together with dispensing pumps and accessories in good condition throughout the duration of the agreement at no cost to the defendant.  The plaintiff also agreed to provide, free of charge, technical advice relating to the use of the diesel supplied.

5.  Under these agreements, the net price paid by the defendant had always been arrived at by taking a fixed discount (per litre) (“Fixed Discount”) specified in the agreement off the official list price (“List Price”) determined by the plaintiff.  A specific List Price was mentioned in the agreements but it was subject to change by the plaintiff from time to time, whereas the Fixed Discount was fixed for the duration of the contract.  In the last written agreement, dated 26 July 2012, it was stipulated that the price of the diesel supplied would be determined by deducting a Fixed Discount ($7.8 per litre) off the plaintiff’s List Price of Sinopec Ultra Low Sulphur Diesel, valid on the date of delivery. 

6.  After that agreement expired in June 2015, the parties did not enter into a further written agreement.  Instead, the plaintiff continued to supply Sinopec diesel to the defendant upon orders placed by telephone, and the defendant continued to pay for the diesel supplied in accordance with the plaintiff’s invoices issued on the terms of the last written agreement, until April 2017. 

7.  The present action concerns the diesel ordered by the defendant and supplied by the plaintiff between 1 April and 5 June 2017, the price of which totalled $4,435,150 as charged by 35 invoices at net prices ranging from HK$6.05 to HK$6.30 per litre and which have remained unpaid. 

8.  As I mentioned earlier, there is no dispute the diesel was sold and delivered and that the invoices were issued in accordance with the terms of the last written agreement between the parties.  The defence raised is based on an allegation that the plaintiff had been colluding with Shell, the defendant’s other supplier of diesel, to move their prices together.  In particular, the defendant alleges:

(1)  Shell was the other supplier of industrial diesel to the defendant apart from the plaintiff.  Shell’s pricing structure for the sale of diesel to the defendant was also based on a List Price less a Fixed Discount.  Over the years since 1999, whenever Shell revised its List Price, the plaintiff would invariably follow suit with a matching adjustment to its List Price within 1 to 2 working days.  There have been 120 such adjustments since 2011.

(2)  Between 1999 and 2008, the List Price of Shell and the plaintiff were close to each other.  From 2008 onwards, the difference between them widened (so that, for example, as at January 2017, Shell’s List Price was under HK$14 per litre where the plaintiff’s was over HK$15 per litre).

(3)  Notwithstanding these changes in the List Price and the widening gap between their List Prices, the net price Shell and the plaintiff charged the defendant (ie List Price less the Fixed Discount) remained almost exactly the same throughout the period from 1999 to 2017.

(4)  The List Prices and Fixed Discounts offered by the plaintiff and Shell to the defendant were not publicly available information.  The Fixed Discounts, in particular, were negotiated by the defendant with the plaintiff and Shell separately.

(5)  As explained further below, the net prices the plaintiff and Shell charged the defendant, while similar to each other, were far in excess of what other suppliers were charging in the market and what the plaintiff was charging other purchasers.

9.  Furthermore, the defendant alleges that there had been massive over‑pricing by the plaintiff (and by Shell) in the sale of diesel to the defendant especially since 2008.  This argument involved the following steps:

(1)  The defendant took the import price of diesel from Singapore as the plaintiff’s variable cost.  The plaintiff’s import price was assumed to be the average monthly import price published by the Hong Kong Government.

(2)  The difference between this average monthly import price for January 1999 and the average actual price the plaintiff charged the defendant in that month is taken to be the average premium charged by the plaintiff for that month, which was calculated to be HK$0.28 per litre.

(3)  The defendant asserted that a fair premium thereafter would be the average premium in January 1999 adjusted for inflation by reference to the movements of the Composite Consumer Price Index.

(4)  Adding this inflation-adjusted premium to the average monthly import price would produce what the defendant called the “Fair Market Price” for each month.

(5)  The defendant found that the actual price the plaintiff invoiced it for “was much higher than the [Fair Market Price], especially since 2008”.  Accordingly, the defendant says that the plaintiff had been overcharging it since 1999.  It is said that the cumulative amount overcharged since 1999 exceeded HK$50 million, and that the amount overcharged since 14 December 2015 alone (the date when the Ordinance fully came into effect) was approximately HK$11 million.

10.  The defendant contends that such collusion between the plaintiff and Shell from 14 December 2015 onwards constituted a breach of the “first conduct rule” in s 6(1) of the Ordinance, which provides:

“(1) An undertaking must not—

(a) make or give effect to an agreement;

(b) engage in a concerted practice; or

(c) as a member of an association of undertakings, make or give effect to a decision of the association,

if the object or effect of the agreement, concerted practice or decision is to prevent, restrict or distort competition in Hong Kong.”

11.  As a consequence, the defendant contends that (i) the contracts pursuant to which the plaintiff supplied diesel oil to the defendant and now seeks to recover the price therefor were tainted by illegality and unenforceable; and (ii) the plaintiff is liable to the defendant for damages being the amount overcharged by the plaintiff as a result of the collusion estimated in the amount of HK$10,985,585, on which the defendant relies by way of set‑off to extinguish its liability to the plaintiff for the outstanding price.

12.  Accordingly, the defendant contends it should be given leave to defend, that its defence should be transferred to the Competition Tribunal (“Tribunal”), and that the proceedings should be stayed pending investigation by the Competition Commission (“Commission”).

The issues

13.  Based on the parties’ arguments it seems to me the following issues arise on this application, which I deal with in turn below:

(1)  Does the defence raising contravention of the first conduct rule have to be transferred to the Tribunal?

(2)  Has the defendant raised triable issues in the allegation that there was a contravention by the plaintiff of the first conduct rule?

(3)  If so, has the defendant raised triable issues that the price of diesel sued for was thereby rendered irrecoverable on the ground of illegality?

(4)  Has the defendant raised triable issues that it may rely on equitable set‑off of its claim for damages for loss and damage suffered as a result of the alleged contravention?

(5)  Should the proceedings be stayed by this court pending the Commission’s investigation?

Transfer of proceedings

14.  S 113(1)–(3) of the Ordinance provides:

“(1) Subject to subsection (2), the Court of First Instance must transfer to the Tribunal so much of the proceedings before the Court that are within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal.

(2) Subsection (1) does not apply to any proceedings that —

(a) are within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal under section 142(1)(g); and

(b) the Court of First Instance considers should not, in the interests of justice, be transferred to the Tribunal.

(3) Without limiting subsection (1) but subject to section 115(2), if, in any proceedings before the Court of First Instance, a contravention, or involvement in a contravention, of a conduct rule is alleged as a defence, the Court must, in respect of the allegation, transfer to the Tribunal so much of those proceedings that are within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal.”

15.  S 113(3) should be read with s 142(1), which sets out the subject matter jurisdiction of the Tribunal and, in particular, s 142(1)(d), which provides that the Tribunal has jurisdiction to hear and determine “allegations of contraventions, or involvements in contraventions, of the conduct rules raised as a defence”.  Mr Leung who appeared for the plaintiff did not dispute it and I have little difficulty in accepting that s 113(3) is prima facie engaged in this case.

16.  Although s 113(3), using the word “must”, might suggest a transfer to the Tribunal is mandatory, it may be that there is scope for suggesting that the Court of First Instance (“CFI”) can examine the quality of the defence so that if it can be summarily seen to be of no substance with the result that it can be struck out or summary judgment can be entered, then no defence remains that calls for a transfer.

17.  Even if a transfer is mandatory irrespective of the quality of the defence alleged, the same result may in my view be reached via the alternative route of s 114(3), which provides:

“If the Court of First Instance transfers any proceedings to the Tribunal under section 113(3), the Tribunal may transfer back to the Court so much of those proceedings that the Tribunal considers should, in the interests of justice, be transferred back to the Court.”

18.  This power to transfer back is exercisable in the interests of justice.  Without in any way seeking to define the circumstances in which it might arise, it seems to me it is open to the Tribunal to exercise this power where the defence raised is so lacking in substance that it would be liable to be struck out or would not survive an application made by the plaintiff for summary judgment.

19.  Moreover, I see no reason why this power could not, in an appropriate case, be exercised immediately following a transfer to the Tribunal under s 113(3).  It would be a very cumbersome procedure indeed if, in such a case, the hearing in the CFI has to be adjourned while the defence is transferred to the Tribunal, for the Tribunal to be constituted and to convene on a date to be fixed only to transfer the defence back to the CFI for it to be dealt with and for judgment to be entered.

20.  All judges of the CFI appointed under s 6 of the High Court Ordinance (Cap 4) are ex officio members of the Tribunal: s 135 of the Ordinance, ie excluding recorders, deputy judges, judges appointed under s 11A(3)(a) of the High Court Ordinance, and justices of appeal sitting as additional judges of the CFI.  In an appropriate case, where (as in this case) the judge of the CFI dealing with the case is also a member of the Tribunal, there seems to be nothing to prevent the same judge, after transferring (mandatorily) part of the proceedings to the Tribunal, from himself constituting the Tribunal (at any rate with the consent of the President of the Tribunal under s 145(1) of the Ordinance) and immediately exercising the discretion to transfer that part back to the CFI.

21.  For this reason, where a contravention, or involvement in a contravention, of a conduct rule is alleged as a defence in a case in the CFI, it would in my view be conducive to effective case management if any application to strike out such defence or for summary judgment or for transfer to the Tribunal is listed either before the President of the Tribunal (as a CFI judge) or in consultation with the President.

22.  In the present case, since, as will be seen below, I find there are triable issues raised, s 113(3) requires that the allegation of contravention of the first conduct rule be transferred to the Competition Tribunal.

Alleged contravention of first conduct rule

23.  There is no dispute between the parties that, for the purposes of an application for summary judgment, competition law defences are not in a special category with a different set of rules.  The usual principles apply.  Where a defendant shows that he has a fair case for defence or reasonable grounds for setting up a defence, or even a fair probability that he has a bona fide defence, he ought to have an opportunity to defend the action.  The question is not whether the defendant’s assertions are to be believed but whether they are believable — a question to be answered not by taking those assertions in isolation but rather by taking them in the context of so much of the background as is either undisputed or beyond reasonable dispute; see UnicCompany v Centus Developments Limited [1988] HKC 643 and Ng Shou Chun v Hung Chun San [1994] 1 HKC 155, per Godfrey JA; Re Safe Rich Industries Ltd (unrep, CACV 81/1994, 3 November 1994), per Bokhary JA.

24.  I agree, however, that in this context there is a need for careful scrutiny of competition law defences.  In Intel Corp v Via Technologies Inc [2003] FSR 12, [2002] EWHC 1159 (Ch), at §90, where the claimant sued the defendant for patent infringement and applied for summary judgment, and the defendant alleged the claimant’s refusal to license the defendant on the terms that it sought was an abuse of a dominant position under UK and EU competition laws, Lawrence Collins J stated, in a passaged approved on appeal in [2002] EWCA Civ 1905, [2003] FSR 33, at §32:

“the ease with which a defence based on Article 81 or 82[1] may be generated on the basis of vague or imprecise allegations makes it necessary to scrutinise them with some care in order to avoid defences with no merit at all going to a lengthy trial with expert economic evidence”.

25.  With these principles in mind I turn to the defendant’s allegations in the present case.  As Mr Leung submitted on behalf of the plaintiff, the defendant has produced no direct evidence of collusion between the plaintiff and Shell.  All that it relies upon is circumstantial evidence, particularly parallelism in price movements which, Mr Leung submitted, fell short of constituting “a firm, precise and consistent body of evidence of prior concertation”: Re Wood Pulp Cartel: A. Ahlstrom Osakeyhtio v E. C. Commission [1993] 4 CMLR 407, at §70. I accept that parallel conduct cannot by itself be equated with concerted practice, but it may, depending on the circumstances, be evidence of such practice.  Recognising that it is commonplace for collusion to take place clandestinely, the law does not insist on direct evidence.  As the European Court of Justice stated in Case C‑407/08P Knauf Gips KG v European Commission, at §49:

“In most cases, the existence of an anti‑competitive practice or agreement must be inferred from a number of coincidences and indicia which, taken together, may, in the absence of another plausible explanation, constitute evidence of an infringement of the competition rules”.

26.  With reference to parallel conduct, in Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd v E. C. Commission [1972] ECR 619, the European Court of Justice stated (at §66):

“Although parallel behaviour may not by itself be identified with a concerted practice, it may however amount to strong evidence of such a practice if it leads to conditions of competition which do not correspond to the normal conditions of the market, having regard to the nature of the products, the size and number of the undertakings, and the volume of the said market.”

27.  Similarly, in the case relied upon by Mr Leung, Re Wood Pulp Cartel, supra, at §71, the European Court of Justice also stated:

“parallel conduct cannot be regarded as furnishing proof of concertation unless concertation constitutes the only plausible explanation for such conduct”.

28.  Based on the materials produced by the defendant, there seems to have been a general parallel trend between the net price charged to the defendant by the plaintiff and by Shell respectively.  The precise extent of parallelism, both as regards closeness of the prices and simultaneity of movements, remains to be examined and analysed in detail but this is not an exercise required for present purposes because Mr Leung accepted there were price similarities as alleged, and indeed stated they were “not merely a coincidence”, but contended that they were “a normal feature of the diesel market in Hong Kong”.

29.  The problem with that contention is that the plaintiff has chosen not to file any factual evidence from itself in response or to give any explanation of the matters relied upon by the defendant.  All that the plaintiff did in its reply affirmation was, in essence, to exhibit two public reports, namely, a consultants’ report commissioned by the Economic Development and Labour Bureau on behalf of the Competition Policy Advisory Group of the Hong Kong Government on the Auto‑fuel Retail Market (published in 2005) and the report of the Competition Commission on Hong Kong’s Auto‑fuel Market (published in 2017).  The plaintiff’s affirmation quoted extensively from these reports, citing their conclusions that no evidence had been found to support the allegation of collusion among oil companies in the Hong Kong auto‑fuel market.

30.  In his submissions, Mr Leung also merely referred to the two reports in submitting that simultaneous price movements are an almost universal feature of competitive homogeneous product markets.  On that basis it was submitted that parallel pricing between the plaintiff and Shell is not necessarily indicative of collusion between them and is therefore insufficient to raise any triable issue.

31.  With respect, this approach seems to me to be misconceived.  The two reports both dealt with the automobile fuel market while the subject matter of the present case is industrial diesel oil.  There is no suggestion or evidence that these products are the same or inter-substitutable. In Hong Kong, auto‑fuel is generally sold to consumers through full‑service petrol filling stations, while diesel was supplied to the defendant at its own premises by the plaintiff’s tanker trucks.  As Mr Leung accepted in oral argument, industrial diesel which is the subject matter of this action is a different product from auto‑fuel, and the two markets are different markets. 

32.  Significantly, on the defendant’s case, the List Price and the Fixed Discount were both not publicly available information.  The plaintiff has not filed any evidence to deny it.  Indeed, Mr Leung accepted that the Fixed Discount was the result of private negotiations between the plaintiff and the defendant.

33.  Furthermore, the defendant’s case is not that all suppliers of industrial diesel colluded in price across the board against all purchasers, but only that the plaintiff and Shell colluded against the defendant.  In essence, the defendant alleges that the plaintiff and Shell, the defendant’s only two suppliers, had got together and decided to increase their prices for diesel sold to the defendant over and above what other suppliers in Hong Kong were charging and over and above what the plaintiff and Shell were charging other purchasers. 

34.  Mr Leung said it is incredible that the defendant, a substantial company and a sizeable consumer of industrial diesel, could have allowed itself to be ripped off for so many years in the way it alleges.  There is some force in the point but there is evidence that on 7 June 2017, 2 days after the last purchase by the defendant from the plaintiff, the plaintiff quoted a price of HK$3.80 per litre of industrial diesel, compared to HK$6.25 invoiced to the defendant on 5 June 2017. Other suppliers including Chevron, Brenntag, ExxonMobil, Tak Cheong Loong and Yick Fung Hong were all quoting prices in the range of HK$3–4 per litre in around June to October 2017.  It is true that there is as yet no evidence of the pricing of other suppliers prior to June 2017, but there was no dramatic drop in the import price around June 2017 and the plaintiff has not suggested there was a substantial drop in retail price across the market at that time. The evidence on its face therefore gives some support for the defendant’s allegation which portrays a different situation from that found in the auto‑fuel market. 

35.  Mr Hui, who appeared for the defendant, did not shrink from the fact that the premise of the defendant’s case is that, for many years, the plaintiff and Shell had got away with charging the defendant a price far above the rest of the market because the defendant had simply failed to “shop around”, perhaps because it was too trusting, lazy or gullible.  Mr Leung castigated this assertion as incredible given the defendant’s experience and knowledge of the fuel oil market.  He also submitted that the alleged collusion would be ineffective because there would be many other suppliers willing and ready to sell at lower prices, thus undercutting and counteracting the alleged limited collusive union.  This had given me pause, but in the end, on the evidence before me, I do not think this makes the defence cross the line from being intuitively improbable to being unbelievable, though I consider there is sufficient doubt raised to warrant imposing a condition for leave to defend.

36.  Further, while I have serious misgivings about the so‑called Fair Market Price calculated by the defendant (see §9 above), there is, on the present evidence, nothing to contradict the allegation that the plaintiff’s and Shell’s prices charged to the defendant, whilst matching each other closely, substantially exceeded both what other suppliers were charging and the plaintiff’s own quote subsequently obtained.  Mr Leung was not able to point to anything to suggest that this might be a normal feature of an oligopolistic market or a competitive market for homogeneous products.

37.  In the light of (i) the prima facie evidence of parallel pricing over a prolonged period between the plaintiff and Shell as against the defendant which substantially exceeded the prices charged by rest of the market, (ii) the (as yet) uncontradicted evidence that the List Price and Fixed Discount in the sales to the defendant were both confidential information, and (iii) the absence of any relevant evidence from the plaintiff to show that the defendant’s express or implied assertions of fact are beyond belief or to set out or explain what has happened, I have come to the view that the defendant’s case cannot summarily be dismissed as wholly without substance.  There are matters that warrant investigation in a trial.  Leave to defend should be given subject to a condition of payment into court.

Effect of contravention

38.  Mr Leung accepted that if the plaintiff and Shell did breach the first conduct rule as alleged, then the defendant arguably has an illegality defence.  It follows from the conclusion above (without any need for a decision) that there is a triable issue in relation to the illegality defence.  It is therefore unnecessary for me to discuss the arguments and authorities relied upon by Mr Hui in relation to illegality.

Set‑off

39.  Mr Hui further argued that if there was a contravention of the first conduct rule by the plaintiff, the defendant would be entitled to damages for the loss and damage it suffered as a result, which could be set off against the price claimed by the plaintiff.  In answer, Mr Leung submitted that the defendant can only claim damages by way of a follow‑on action under s 110 of the Ordinance if and when the CFI or the Tribunal has determined that the plaintiff contravened the first conduct rule and that, since no action or even investigation has been taken by the Competition Commission against the plaintiff, there is no basis for claiming any set‑off.

40.  The defence of set‑off is premised on a finding of contravention of the first conduct rule.  As such, in the circumstances of this case and for the purposes of the present application, it adds nothing to the illegality defence.  I have some doubt whether the defendant has a cause of action for damages under the Ordinance other than that enforceable by a follow‑on action conferred by s 110.  It is however unnecessary to deal with the defence of set‑off separately or with Mr Hui’s contention that s 94 permits a claim for damages to be raised by a private party, at any rate by way of set‑off. 

41.  I would only mention that it seems to me that a follow‑on action can be issued after a judicial finding of contravention has been made not only in the context of an enforcement action brought by the Commission, but also in the context of a defence in an action raising a contravention of a conduct rule.  This may be inferred from s 110(3)(b) which refers to a decision of the CFI under s 114(3), which in turn refers to s 113(3), which is concerned with a contravention of a conduct rule being raised as a defence.

Stay

42.  S 118(2) of the Ordinance empowers the CFI and the Tribunal to stay the proceedings before it pending the Commission’s investigation where the Court or the Tribunal has referred an alleged contravention or alleged involvement in a contravention of a conduct rule to the Commission for investigation.  Where a reference is made, the Commission has to consider whether to conduct an investigation: s 39(1)(c).

43.  The defendant has already made a complaint to the Commission in 2017.  There is no evidence on the views of the Commission or the steps that it is likely to take with regard to the complaint.  It is not known whether a formal investigation will be commenced. A reference to the Commission under s 118(1) is not to be lightly made.  Nor is it necessary in the circumstances of this case.  The evidence available before this court at this stage, whilst in my view sufficient to show triable issues, does not warrant a reference by this court to the Commission.  The power to stay under s 118(2) therefore does not arise.  Nor do I consider it appropriate under the general powers of the court to stay the action pending the Commission’s disposal of the defendant’s complaint.

Disposition

44.  For the reasons above, I would give leave for the defendant to defend the action on the condition of payment of HK$4.43 million into court within 28 days.  There will be an order nisi that the costs of and relating to the plaintiff’s summons filed on 28 September 2017 be in the cause. 

45.  Pursuant to s 113(3) of the Ordinance, the allegation of contravention of the first conduct rule will be transferred to the Competition Tribunal.  The provisions in Order 78A of the Rules of the High Court and Part 6 of the Competition Tribunal Rules (Cap 619D) will take effect accordingly, in conjunction with the general directions in §§109–114 of Practice Direction No 1 of the Tribunal.  I further direct that the remainder of the action is to be listed in the CFI for directions on the same day before the same judge who constitutes the Tribunal for the purpose of the directions hearing held pursuant to rule 99(1)(b) of the Competition Tribunal Rules.

 (Godfrey Lam)
 Judge of the Court of First Instance
High Court

Mr Richard Leung, instructed by Herbert Tsoi & Partners, for the Plaintiff

Mr John Hui and Mr Jonathan Chan, instructed by S.K. Lam, Alfred Chan &Co., for the Defendant



[1] Broadly the equivalent of the first and second conduct rules in the Competition Ordinance.