HK CourtDB
HomeDirectoryMCP
Hong Kong CourtDB
Back to directory
Civil Action2017

CANTON PLUS ENTERPRISE LTD AND ANOTHER v. TONG ZHENJUN AND OTHERS

Related cases with same parties

  • CAMP150/2021CANTON PLUS ENTERPRISE LTD AND ANOTHER v. TONG ZHENJUN AND OTHERS
  • HCMP1244/2015JOINT AND SEVERAL RECEIVERS OF PACIFIC BULK SHIPPING LTD v. TONG ZHENJUN AND OTHERS

Files (7)

[2022] HKCFI 2256-EN-2022-07-22

CANTON PLUS ENTERPRISE LTD AND ANOTHER v. TONG ZHENJUN AND OTHERS

HTML content

HCA 227/2017
HCA 1026/2020 &
HCA 2132/2020

[2022] HKCFI 2256

HCA 227/2017

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO 227 OF 2017

________________________

BETWEEN

 CANTON PLUS ENTERPRISE LIMITED1st Plaintiff
 ANAIS DEVELOPMENT SA
(Suing on behalf of themselves as shareholders in
PROFIT FAR LIMITED (other than Team Sino Limited)
and PACIFIC BULK SHIPPING LIMITED )
2nd Plaintiff
 and 
 TONG ZHENJUN (童楨軍)1st Defendant
 LIANG PAN (梁攀)2nd Defendant
 LAU WING YAN (劉永人) 3rd Defendant
 PROSPEROUS ELITE VENTURES LIMITED
(also known as 鑫傑創投有限公司)
4th Defendant
 PACIFIC BULK CAPE COMPANY LIMITED5th Defendant
 PACIFIC BULK ENTERPRISES COMPANY LIMITED 6th Defendant
 PACIFIC BULK PANAMAX COMPANY LIMITED 7th Defendant
 PACIFIC BULK SUPRAMAX COMPANY LIMITED 8th Defendant
 PROFIT FAR LIMITED
(also known as 益遠有限公司)
9th Defendant
 PACIFIC BULK SHIPPING LIMITED10th Defendant

(By Original Action)

AND BETWEEN

 LAU WING YAN (劉永人)Plaintiff
 and 
 CHU KONG (朱江)1st Defendant
 CANTON PLUS ENTERPRISE LIMITED2nd Defendant
 ANAIS DEVELOPMENT SA3rd Defendant

(By Counterclaim)

________________________

AND

HCA 1026/2020

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO 1026 OF 2020

 CHU KONG1st Plaintiff
 TRENUS OCEANWAY LTD
(Suing on behalf of itself and all other
shareholders in SMARTPLACE LIMITED
(except Richland International Limited)
PACIFIC BULK SHIPPING (CAYMAN) LIMITED )
2nd Plaintiff
 and 
 LAU WING YAN (劉永人)1st Defendant
 CHANG DAFA (常大法)2nd Defendant
 RICHLAND INTERNATIONAL LIMITED3rd Defendant
 SMARTPLACE LIMITED4th Defendant
 PACIFIC BULK SHIPPING (CAYMAN) LIMITED5th Defendant
 PACIFIC BULK CAPE COMPANY LIMITED6th Defendant
 PACIFIC BULK ENTERPRISES COMPANY LIMITED7th Defendant
 PACIFIC BULK PANAMAX COMPANY LIMITED 8th Defendant
 PACIFIC BULK SUPRAMAX COMPANY LIMITED 9th Defendant
 ECOSUCCESS LIMITED10th Defendant

AND

HCA 2132/2020

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO 2132 OF 2020

BETWEEN

 CONNECT PLUS LIMITED
(suing on behalf of itself and all other shareholders in
PACIFIC BULK LINES COMPANY LIMITED
except GREAT SEA GLOBAL LIMITED and TUOXIN HOLDINGS LTD )
Plaintiff
 and 
 LAU WING YAN1st Defendant
 YANG HAITAO2nd Defendant
 WAT FUNG YING3rd Defendant
 YAN DONGHAI4th Defendant
 GO PROSPER INTERNATIONAL LIMITED5th Defendant
 PACIFIC BULK LINES COMPANY LIMITED6th Defendant

________________________

Before:  Hon Lisa Wong J on paper

Date of Written Submissions:  28 May 2021 (lodged by the parties represented by DLA Pipers Hong Kong and adopted by the parties represented by Simmons & Simmons (collectively “defendants”); 4 June 2021 [by the parties represented by Sit, Fung, Kwong & Shum (collectively “plaintiffs”); and 8 June 2021 (defendants’ reply submission)

Date of Decision:  22 July 2022

________________________

DECISION ON COSTS

________________________


1.  On 1 February 2021, upon the defendants’ applications by summonses dated 25 and 26 January 2021 (“Security Discharge Applications”)  and upon the performance by Mr Lau Wing Yan[1] and/or the corporate entities owned and/or controlled by him of all acts necessary to furnish the plaintiffs with a package of security of a combined value of USD32,829,327.35(“Security Package”), I discharged the injunctions, and stayed the disclosure obligations, granted to the plaintiffs upon their ex parte applications on 5 January 2021 (“5.1.2021 Orders”). For further detail, see [2021] HKCFI 273.

2.  To complete the procedural background, this matter came before me again on 13 April 2021 because the parties could not agree on which firm of solicitors should be appointed to investigate the title to a landed property included in the Security Package.

3.  I reserved the costs of the Security Discharge Summonses to myself pending the provision of the Security Package.

4.  On 26 April 2021, Mr Justice Anthony Chan refused to continue, and discharged, the 5.1.2021 Orders after an inter partes hearing.  His lordship also forthwith released the defendants from providing the Security Package.

5.  In light of such rulings, by a letter dated 27 April 2021 to the parties, at the risk of stating the obvious, I pointed out that certain outstanding issues regarding the provision of the Security Package have become academic and would not be dealt with anymore.

6.  I further ordered, on a nisi basis, the plaintiffs to pay the defendants the costs of and occasioned by the Security Discharge Applications, to be taxed if not agreed with certificate for 2 counsel for the hearings on 29 January, 1 February and 13 April 2021 (“costs orders nisi”).

7.  The defendants now seek indemnity taxation and payment forthwith of their costs (“Variation Applications”).

8.  The plaintiffs do not (and cannot)  dispute that they should bear the defendants’ costs of the Security Discharge Applications.

9.  The Security Discharge Applications were just a response to the 5.1.2021 Orders.  They had no independent existence from the 5.1.2021 Orders.  They were compelled by the plaintiffs’ ex parte applications for, and obtainment of, the 5.1.2021 Orders.  They were made to mitigate the prejudicial effects such orders had on the defendants’ businesses.  The defendants made them expressly without prejudice to their then pending applications for discharge on the grounds of misrepresentation and material non-disclosure by the plaintiffs at the ex parte hearing.  The hearing before this court on 29 January 2021 was confined to the question whether the package of security offered to be put up by the defendants would adequately protect the plaintiffs assuming that the 5.1.2021 Orders were rightly granted.  Hence, the parties made submissions on, and I allowed, the Security Discharge Applications without any reference to the merits of the 5.1.2021 Orders.  It was understood on all sides that the discharge/stay of the 5.1.2021 Orders against the Security Package was just a practical stopgap measure balancing both sides’ interests pending the determination of their respective summonses for continuation/ discharge of the 5.1.2021 Orders. 

10.  That being the case, the costs of the Security Discharge Applications should not be treated differently from the costs of the defendants’ applications for discharge of the 5.1.2021 Orders premised upon the plaintiffs’ misrepresentation and material non-disclosure.

11.  Hence, on further reflection with the benefit of the parties’ written submissions, I agree with the defendants that the costs order nisi should be varied to give them indemnity costs, which shall be paid once such costs is taxed.

12.  For the above reasons, I hereby vary the costs order nisi as follows: “the plaintiffs shall pay the defendants the costs of and occasioned by the Security Discharge Applications, to be taxed on an indemnity basis, if not agreed, with certificate for 2 counsel for the hearings on 29 January, 1 February and 13 April 2021 and to be paid forthwith upon taxation of such costs”.

13.  I also order the plaintiffs to pay the defendants the costs of and occasioned by the Variation Applications, to be taxed on an indemnity basis, if not agreed, with certificate for one junior counsel and to be paid forthwith upon taxation of such costs.  I take the view that the Variation Applications could be ably and adequately dealt by one junior counsel on each side.

 (Lisa Wong )
 Judge of the Court of First Instance
High Court

Mr William Wong, SC, Mr John Hui, Mr Michael Lok and Ms Jasmine Cheung, instructed by Sit, Fung, Kwong & Shum, for the 1st and 2nd plaintiffs in HCA 227/2017 (by original action), the 1st and 2nd plaintiffs in HCA 1026/2020 and the plaintiff in HCA 2132/2020

Simmons & Simmons for the 1st defendant in HCA 227/2017 (by original action)

Mr Victor Joffe and Mr Alexander Tang, instructed by DLA Piper Hong Kong, for the 3rd to 5th defendants in HCA 227/2017 (by original action), the 1st, 9th and 10th defendants in HCA 1026/2020 and the 1st and 5th defendants in HCA 2132/2020



[1] The leader of one of the two camps involved in these and other related proceedings.

[2021] HKCFI 1244-EN-2021-04-26

CANTON PLUS ENTERPRISE LTD AND ANOTHER v. TONG ZHENJUN AND OTHERS

HTML content

HCA 227/2017

[2021] HKCFI 1244

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO 227 OF 2017

________________________

BETWEEN

 CANTON PLUS ENTERPRISE LIMITED1st Plaintiff
 ANAIS DEVELOPMENT SA
(suing on behalf of themselves as shareholders in PROFIT FAR LIMITED (other than Team Sino Limited) and PACIFIC BULK SHIPPING LIMITED)
2nd Plaintiff
 and 
 TONG ZHENJUN (童楨軍)1st Defendant
 LIANG PAN (梁攀)2nd Defendant
 LAU WING YAN (劉永人)3rd Defendant
 PROSPEROUS ELITE VENTURES LIMITED
(also known as 鑫傑創投有限公司)
4th Defendant
 PACIFIC BULK CAPE COMPANY LIMITED5th Defendant
 PACIFIC BULK ENTERPRISES COMPANY LIMITED6th Defendant
 PACIFIC BULK PANAMAX COMPANY LIMITED7th Defendant
 PACIFIC BULK SUPRAMAX COMPANY LIMITED8th Defendant
 PROFIT FAR LIMITED
(also known as 益遠有限公司)
9th Defendant
 PACIFIC BULK SHIPPING LIMITED10th Defendant

(by Original Action)

________________________

AND BETWEEN

 LAU WING YAN (劉永人)Plaintiff
 and 
 CHU KONG (朱江)1st Defendant
 CANTON PLUS ENTERPRISE LIMITED2nd Defendant
 ANAIS DEVELOPMENT SA3rd Defendant

(by Counterclaim)

________________________

HCA 1026/2020

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO 1026 OF 2020

________________________

BETWEEN

 CHU KONG1st Plaintiff
 TRENUS OCEANWAY LTD
(suing on behalf of itself and all other shareholders in SMARTPLACE LIMITED (except Richland International Limited) and PACIFIC BULK SHIPPING (CAYMAN) LIMITED)
2nd Plaintiff
 and 
 LAU WING YAN (劉永人)1st Defendant
 CHANG DAFA (常大法)2nd Defendant
 RICHLAND INTERNATIONAL LIMITED3rd Defendant
 SMARTPLACE LIMITED4th Defendant
 PACIFIC BULK SHIPPING (CAYMAN) LIMITED5th Defendant
 PACIFIC BULK CAPE COMPANY LIMITED6th Defendant
 PACIFIC BULK ENTERPRISES COMPANY LIMITED7th Defendant
 PACIFIC BULK PANAMAX COMPANY LIMITED8th Defendant
 PACIFIC BULK SUPRAMAX COMPANY LIMITED9th Defendant
 ECOSUCCESS LIMITED10th Defendant

________________________

HCA 2132/2020

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO 2132 OF 2020

________________________

BETWEEN

 CONNECT PLUS LIMITED
(suing on behalf of itself and all other shareholders in PACIFIC BULK LINES COMPANY LIMITED except GREAT SEA GLOBAL LIMITED and TUOXIN HOLDINGS LTD)
Plaintiff
 and 
 LAU WING YAN1st Defendant
 YANG HAITAO2nd Defendant
 WAT FUNG YING3rd Defendant
 YAN DONGHAI4th Defendant
 GO PROSPER INTERNATIONAL LIMITED5th Defendant
 PACIFIC BULK LINES COMPANY LIMITED6th Defendant

________________________

(Heard Together)

Before:  Hon Anthony Chan J in Chambers

Date of Hearing:  26 April 2021

Date of Decision:  26 April 2021

________________________

D E C I S I O N

________________________


1.  These are the Plaintiffs’ applications to continue, and the Defendants’ applications to discharge, the ex parte Mareva and proprietary Injunctions granted in these 3 actions on 5 January 2021. For the present purposes, I ignore the Supplemental Note of the Plaintiffs which was only lodged with the court this morning because the Defendants have not had an opportunity to consider it.

2.  In my respectful view, it is clear that the Injunctions should not have been granted.  Although the Injunctions had been replaced by a “security package” put up by Mr Lau Wing Yan, I am in no doubt that the obtaining of such relief has caused real prejudice to the Defendants and the security package must be released without delay. 

3.  I shall endeavour to state succinctly my reasons for discharging the Injunctions.  

4.  These matters arose out of a particularly bitter business divorce between Mr Chu Kong and Mr Lau.  They used to jointly own a substantial shipping business conducted by the Pacific Bulk Group of companies.  In 2009, another shipping business under the Beibu Gulf Group of companies was set up. 

5.  The relationship between the business partners broke down in early 2014 and they endeavoured to divide their business and assets.  Whether the parties had reached an agreement on the division and, if so, what the terms were, are the subject matters, directly and indirectly, of extensive litigation by the 2 camps. 

6.  Excluding any litigation overseas, since 2014 there had been 33 actions and 25 of which remain on foot (including the 3 actions now before the court).  It is fair to say that these actions provide a fairly comprehensive coverage of the disputes between the 2 camps. 

7.  Importantly, the complaints made by the Chu camp which grounded the Injunctions, namely, the diversion of Pacific Bulk’s business to Lau’s companies and dissipation of assets belonging to the allegedly jointly owned Pacific Bulk companies by the Lau camp have been the subject matters of litigation since 2014. 

8.  Mr Joffe, who appears with Mr Tang for the Defendants, has helpfully identified in paras 21 and 24 of the Defendants’ skeleton arguments Chu’s pleadings in which such serious allegations were made.  It must be assumed that these pleas were made with adequate basis since they were signed by 3 counsel, including a senior counsel, in the case of HCCW 352/2014. 

9.  The Plaintiffs do not dispute that the said complaints have been the subject matters of litigation since 2014. 

10.  Mr Lau’s position in the dispute is that the parties had indeed come to agreement on the division of business and assets. It was agreed that he would take over the Pacific Bulk Group, whilst Chu would do likewise with the Beibu Gulf Group.  Also, Chu has since set up a rival business under the names of Quadrolink and Ausca.

11.  It is important to appreciate that Lau has stated his position openly since 2014, including his contention that the Pacific Bulk Group has become his wholly owned business since 2014, and he was free to conduct its business in whatever manner he sees fit.

12.  In light of the existence of these complaints since 2014, Lau’s position and the lack of any attempt to apply for any asset preservation relief over the years (with 1 unsuccessful attempt which I shall referred to below), it is quite astonishing for the Plaintiffs to have applied for ex parte Mareva relief on 5 January this year.  The application was purportedly grounded upon “new findings”, which I shall deal with below.

13.  I must first address the manner in which the application was made.  The ex parte application was supported by a 113 page affirmation.  Apart from the extraordinary length, the document was printed in an unusually small font size.  The exhibits ran to 3,000 pages.  The overbearing amount of details in the affirmation was obfuscated by submissions interwoven in the details.  There can be no doubt that it would have taken many hours to really understand and digest the materials.

14.  The ex parte skeleton arguments itself was another 38 pages of very dense material. 

15.  Given that the staleness of these matters, it is my respectful view that there was simply no justification for the application to have been made on an ex parte basis.  The court must be provided with a proper and balanced understanding of these complicated cases.  The best way to ensure such assistance is to have the matters ventilated with the input of the Lau camp.  If there was a real risk of dissipation (I shall deal with the alleged risk of dissipation below), the risk could have been mitigated with a hearing on notice outside banking hours.

16.  In my view, the alleged “new findings” were illusory.  Allegedly, such new findings constituted “solid proof” of (a) the methodology of the diversion of business; and (b) the extent and quantum of business diverted. 

17.  Firstly, solid proof was a red-herring.  Such proof was not required for injunctive relief. 

18.  Secondly, the precise methodology of the business diversion was not critical when Lau had long admitted to the diversion.  The use of BVI corporate vehicles to receive payments was common place in the context of substantial international business.  It appears that Chu himself has made use of such corporate vehicle(s).

19.  Further, I agree with Mr Joffe that the allegedly discovered methodology was nothing new.  The same methodology was deployed for one of the companies jointly owned by the parties called Central Minerals.

20.  Thirdly, the extent or precise quantum of the diversion would not have deterred Chu from applying for injunctive relief based on Lau’s admissions made no later than 2017 (see the materials referred to in paras 37 and 38 of the Defendants’ skeleton arguments).  Where appropriate, ancillary disclosure order might have been sought against Lau to find out the extent of the diversion. 

21.  Further, according to Chu’s own allegation made in HCMP 3134/2014, he alleged that Pacific Bulk Shipping Ltd (“PBHK”) (on behalf of which he is suing derivatively in HCA 227/2017): “… has no more business activities it is understood by Mr Chu that [PBHK] has lost all its customers and effectively ceased to carry on any business because Pacific Bulk Cape [Lau’s company] has taken over [PBHK]’s previous clients”.

22.  Furthermore, Chu’s allegation made in HCCW 352/2014 concerning Pacific Bulk Cayman (on behalf of which Chu sues in HCA 2026/2020) was that: “… PB Cayman became deprived of all its existing customers and had effectively ceased to carry on any business since around the end of 2014”. 

23.  Coupled with the fact that Chu must have a good knowledge of the profits made by the business before he was excluded from its operation, I fail to see why he was not in a position to provide a fair quantum assessment of the loss of business.

24.  Finally, I agree with Mr Joffe that Chu could have applied for a negative injunction to stop the Lau camp from taking away the business.

25.  In the premises, I regret to say that the picture painted before the learned ex parte Judge that Chu was not aware of the extent of the diversion was misleading. 

26.  In respect of the alleged diversion of money from PB Lines (on which behalf Chu sues in HCA 2132/2020), I agree with the submissions set out in paras 80-83 of the Defendants’ skeleton arguments that it was nothing new to Chu. 

27.  As regards the Defendants’ complaints of material non-disclosure (“MND”), I need only specifically mention one particularly relevant issue, the failure to make proper disclosure of which is quite inexcusable.  In HCCW 352/2014, Chu had applied inter parte for interim preservation relief by seeking the appointment of provisional liquidators over PB Cayman’s holding company, Smartplace Ltd (“PL Application”). 

28.  The PL application was based on allegations over Lau’s conducts, which allegedly gave rise to “urgent need for [PL] to be appointed in order to hold the ring and safeguard the assets and documents of [Smartplace]”[1].  It was also alleged that Lau had diverted the business of PB Cayman to his new companies and that PB Cayman had ceased its operation since around the end of 2014[2].

29.  Importantly, at the hearing before Harris J on 18 July 2017, the Companies Judge took the view that there was no urgency warranting an immediately appointment of PL.  The Application was subsequently withdrawn by Chu. 

30.  The transcript of the ex parte hearing shows that the learned Judge was concerned about the staleness of these matters.  In such circumstances, it is indefensible that the learned Judge was not informed that back in 2017 similar concern had troubled the Companies Judge and that the Plaintiffs saw fit to make only an inter parte Application.

31.  I am unable to accept the alleged risk of dissipation.  The staleness of these matters and openness of Lau in the conduct of Pacific Bulk business under his new companies speak volumes.  Further, Lau is a Hong Kong businessman with his roots here.  He is a man of considerable wealth.  Even if he had parked some of his cash with overseas companies, that would not stop any enforcement action against him to recover the funds, should Chu ultimately prove his case. 

32.  I should also say that I am unable to see a proper case of dissipation of assets against Mr Tong Zhenjun, the 1st Defendant in HCA 227/2017.

33.  For completeness, I agree with Mr Joffe’s criticisms over the proprietary relief as technically unsound when the Plaintiffs’ claims concern money as loss of profits, and there is no specific asset which could be identified as the profits or their present equivalent. 

34.  Further, there are clear merits in the Defendants’ challenge of the quantification of the alleged profits from loss of business on which the Injunctions were based in part.

35.  Finally, if it were necessary to consider the balance of convenience, I am unable to see the justice in granting an ex parte injunction affecting on-going businesses which have been carried on openly for a number of years with the knowledge of the Chu camp.  I fail to see what irreparable damage there is.  The security package put up by Lau demonstrates that if the Plaintiffs should ultimately succeed in their actions, Lau will likely be in a position to pay the damages. 

36.  For these reasons, the Injunctions are discharged.  The security package must be released.  I shall hear the parties on costs.

 (Anthony Chan)
 Judge of the Court of First Instance
High Court

Mr William Wong SC, Mr John Hui, Mr Michael Lok and Ms Jasmine Cheung, instructed by Sit, Fung, Kwong & Shum, for the Plaintiffs in HCA 227/2017, Plaintiffs in HCA 1026/2020 and Plaintiff in HCA 2132/2020

Mr Martin Lau, instructed by Simmons & Simmons, for the 1st Defendant in HCA 227/2017

Mr Victor Joffe and Mr Alexander Tang, instructed by DLA Piper Hong Kong, for 3rd – 5th Defendants in HCA 227/2017, 1st and 9th – 10th Defendants in HCA 1026/2020 and 1st and 5th Defendants in HCA 2132/2020



[1]  Para 6(b) and (c) of Chu’s skeleton submissions for the PL Application. 

[2]  Paras 27 and 29 of the said skeleton submissions.

[2021] HKCFI 273-EN-2021-02-01

CANTON PLUS ENTERPRISE LTD AND ANOTHER v. TONG ZHENJUN AND OTHERS

HTML content

HCA 227/2017
HCA 1026/2020 &
HCA 2132/2020

[2021] HKCFI 273

HCA 227/2017

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO 227 OF 2017

_________________

BETWEEN  
 CANTON PLUS ENTERPRISE LIMITED1st Plaintiff
 ANAIS DEVELOPMENT SA2nd Plaintiff
 (Suing on behalf of themselves as shareholders in 
 PROFIT FAR LIMITED (other than Team Sino Limited) 
 AND PACIFIC BULK SHIPPING LIMITED ) 

and

 TONG ZHENJUN (童楨軍)1st Defendant
 LIANG PAN (梁攀)2nd Defendant
 LAU WING YAN (劉永人)3rd Defendant
 PROSPEROUS ELITE VENTURES LIMITED4th Defendant
 (also known as 鑫傑創投有限公司) 
 PACIFIC BULK CAPE COMPANY LIMITED5th Defendant
 PACIFIC BULK ENTERPRISES COMPANY6th Defendant
 Limited 
 PACIFIC BULK PANAMAX COMPANY LIMITED7th Defendant
 PACIFIC BULK SUPRAMAX COMPANY LIMITED 8th Defendant
 PROFIT FAR LIMITED9th Defendant
 (also known as 益遠有限公司) 
 PACIFIC BULK SHIPPING LIMITED10th Defendant
 (By Original Action) 
 AND BETWEEN 
 LAU WING YAN (劉永人)Plaintiff

and

 CHU KONG (朱江)1st Defendant
 CANTON PLUS ENTERPRISE LIMITED2nd Defendant
 ANAIS DEVELOPMENT SA3rd Defendant
 (By Counterclaim) 

_________________

HCA 1026/2020

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO 1026 OF 2020

_________________

BETWEEN  
 CHU KONG1st Plaintiff
 TRENUS OCEANWAY LTD2nd Plaintiff
 (Suing on behalf of itself and all other 
 SHAREHOLDERS IN SMARTPLACE LIMITED 
 (except Richland International Limited) and 
 PACIFIC BULK SHIPPING (CAYMAN) LIMITED ) 

and

 LAU WING YAN (劉永人)1st Defendant
 CHANG DAFA (常大法)2nd Defendant
 RICHLAND INTERNATIONAL LIMITED3rd Defendant
 SMARTPLACE LIMITED4th Defendant
 PACIFIC BULK SHIPPING (CAYMAN) LIMITED5th Defendant
 PACIFIC BULK CAPE COMPANY LIMITED6th Defendant
 PACIFIC BULK ENTERPRISES COMPANY7th Defendant
 Limited 
 PACIFIC BULK PANAMAX COMPANY LIMITED8th Defendant
 PACIFIC BULK SUPRAMAX COMPANY LIMITED 9th Defendant
 ECOSUCCESS LIMITED10th Defendant

_________________

HCA 2132/2020

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO 2132 OF 2020

_________________

BETWEEN  
 CONNECT PLUS LIMITEDPlaintiff
 (suing on behalf of itself and all other shareholders in 
 PACIFIC BULK LINES COMPANY LIMITED 
 EXCEPT GREAT SEA GLOBAL LIMITED and 
 TUOXIN HOLDINGS LTD ) 

and

 LAU WING YAN1st Defendant
 YANG HAITAO2nd Defendant
 WAT FUNG YING3rd Defendant
 YAN DONGHAI4th Defendant
 GO PROSPER INTERNATIONAL LIMITED5th Defendant
 PACIFIC BULK LINES COMPANY LIMITED6th Defendant

_________________

Before: Hon Lisa Wong J in Chambers (Open to Public)
Dates of Hearing: 29 January and 1 February 2021
Date of Decision: 1 February 2021

_______________

DECISION

_______________

1.  These 3 actions arose out of a much larger dispute between parties split into 2 camps:

(1)  the camp led by Mr Chu Kong (“Mr Chu”); and

(2)  the camp led by Mr Lau Wing Yan (“Mr Lau”).

Mr Chu and Mr Lau were former partners in a shipping business carried on through, inter alia, the Pacific Bulk group of companies until early 2014 when they parted ways, each setting up new companies to operate independently in the same business.

2.  These are all derivative actions taken at Mr Chu’s behest on behalf of Pacific Bulk Shipping Limited (“PBHK”) (HCA 227/2017), Pacific Bulk Shipping Cayman Limited (“PB Cayman”) (HCA 1026/020) and Pacific Bulk Lines Company Limited (“PB Lines”) (HCA 2132/2020) on the alleged ground that Mr Lau and companies under his ownership and/or control had misappropriated the assets, and diverted the businesses, of PBHK, PB Cayman and PB Lines.

3.  On 5 January 2021, upon the ex parte applications by the plaintiffs in these 3 actions (“plaintiffs” collectively), Deputy High Court Judge A To granted Mareva and proprietary injunctions and ancillary disclosure orders (“5.1.2021 Orders” collectively) against the 1st, 3rd, 4th and 5th defendants in HCA 227/2017, the 1st, 9th and 10th defendants in HCA 1026/2020 and the 1st and 5th defendants in HCA 2132/2020 (collectively “defendants”) as summarised in Appendix I to the skeleton submissions on behalf of the defendants which I, in turn, attach as an appendix to this decision.

4.  By summonses issued on 12 January 2021 (“MND Discharge Summonses”), the defendants applied for the discharge of the 5.1.2021 Orders primarily on the grounds of material non-disclosure and misrepresentation.  By orders made on 15 January 2021, the return date of the plaintiffs’ summonses to continue the 5.1.2021 Orders (“Continuation Summonses”), Deputy High Court Judge Winnie Tsui adjourned the substantive argument of the Continuation Summonses and the MND Discharge Summonses.  DHCJ Tsui so directed after having formed the view that the defendants have made out an arguable case for discharge while the plaintiffs may have an arguable defence to the charges of material non-disclosure etc.  The substantive argument has now been fixed before Mr Justice Anthony Chan on 26 April 2021 at 10 am with 1 day reserved.  For the sake of completeness, DHCJ Tsui heard and dismissed the defendants’ applications to suspend the ancillary disclosure orders, made on the ground that the defendants’ then evidence disclosed the existence of sufficient assets within the jurisdiction to satisfy the plaintiffs’ claims herein.

5.  Before the court now are the defendants’ summonses dated 25 and 26 January 2021 (“Security Discharge Summonses”) for the immediate discharge of the injunctions as well as disclosure orders on the following undertakings by Mr Lau (“Lau Undertakings”), the fulfilment of which would furnish the plaintiffs with a sufficient “Security Package” for their claims herein:

(1)  to cause and procure the discharge of the existing tripartite legal charge/mortgage dated 4 October 2017 (“Existing Bel-Air Charge”) over Flat B, 33/F, Tower 3 and Private Cars Car parks Nos 133 and 134, Car Park Level 1, Bel-Air on the Peak, Island South, 68 Bel-Air Peak Avenue (“Bel-Air Property”) in favour of China CITIC Bank International Limited (“CITIC Bank”) as soon as practicable;

(2)  pending such discharge, to procure Pacific Bulk Panamax Company Limited[1] not to create any liabilities under the Existing Bel-Air Charge;

(3)  to cause and procure Smooth Day Management Limited[2] (“Smooth Day”) to execute and register a legal charge/mortgage[3] over the Bel-Air Property, the agreed value of which is USD14.5 million;

(4)  pending trial or further order, not to dispose of, deal with, or otherwise diminish the value of his direct or indirect interest in Sun Harvest Limited[4] (“Sun Harvest”), Up Profit Limited[5] (“Up Profit”) and/or Rooms 1901, 1902 and 1912, 19/F, West Tower, Shun Tak Centre, 168-200 Connaught Road, Hong Kong (“Shun Tak Property”) whether by himself, his agent, servants, associates or otherwise howsoever;

(5)  to execute all such necessary documents within his powers and to cause and procure Wat Fung Ying (also known as Bonnie Wat) (“Ms Wat”) to execute all such necessary documents within her powers[6] to enable Up Profit to execute and register a legal charge/mortgage[7] over the Shun Tak Property up to Mr Lau’s 50% indirect interest therein, which is agreed to be worth USD9.25 -10.65 million;

(6)  to cause and procure Pacific Bulk Cape Company Limited (“PB Cape”) to pay into court USD3,451,030.18 plus the USD equivalents of HKD9,736.97, AUD1,454.44 and EUR377.31 (i.e. approximately a total of USD3,453,868.10) standing to the credit in its bank account numbered 848-545588-838 with The Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation Limited (“HSBC”);

(7)  to execute all such necessary documents within his powers to enable Sea Premier Limited (“Sea Premier”) to pay into court USD2,415,459.25 standing to the credit in its bank account numbered 8018-896050 with HSBC, which represents Mr Lau’s no less than 50% indirect interest in Sea Premier’s funds; and

(8)  to cause and procure another USD3,210,000 to be paid into court[8].

6.  The applications by the Security Discharge Summonses are made expressly without prejudice to the MND Discharge Summonses.

7.  There is no dispute as to the said respective value of the Bel-Air Property or the Shun Tak Property.  The Lau Undertakings are intended to provide the plaintiffs with security amounting to USD32,829,327.35 for the satisfaction plaintiffs’ claims herein.  A breakdown of the said amount of USD32,829,327.35 is as follows:

Charge over the Shun Tak Property up to Mr Lau’s indirect share in 50% of its value USD9.25–10.65 million
Charge over the Bel Air Property USD14.5 million
Payment of the PB Cape’s bank balance into Court USD3,453,868.10
Payment of 50% of Sea Premier’s bank balance into court USD2,415,459.25
Sub-total: USD29,619,327.35
Additional payment into court USD  3,210,000.00

8.  What prompted the defendants to issue the Security Discharge Summonses ahead of the hearing and determination of the MND Discharge Summonses is that the defendants, particular, PB Cape[9] and Pacific Bulk Supramax Company Limited[10] (“PB Supramax”) which are actively trading in the dry bulk shipping business are gravely prejudiced by the continuing effect of the 5.1.2021 Orders.  Although the 5.1.2021 Orders against the corporate defendants are proprietary in nature, apparently banks have discriminately frozen all their bank accounts, without making any attempt to verify whether the funds in such accounts represent the traceable proceeds of the alleged misappropriated funds.   All the bank accounts of PB Cape and PB Supramax have as a result been frozen, making it difficult, if not impossible, to carry on as going concerns.  As for Mr Lau and Mr Tong Zhenjun (“Mr Tong”), the 1st defendant in HCA 227/2017, all their bank accounts in Hong Kong have been frozen and credit cards suspended.

9.  One of the objections raised by the plaintiffs to the Security Discharge Summonses is that the Security Package should have been offered before DHCJ Tsui when the defendants first argued to discharge the 5.1.2021 Orders or suspend the ancillary disclosure orders and that the defendants should not be allowed to have a second bite of the cherry.  In support reference was made to [16]-[17] of Compania Sud Americana De Vapores SA v Hin Pro International Logistics Ltd [2015] 2 HKLRD 458, citing Chanel Ltd v FW Woolworth & Co Ltd [1981] 1 WLR 485, to the effect that if a point was open to a party on an earlier interlocutory application and was not pursued, then it is not open to him to take the point at a later application when there has been no material change of circumstances and no new facts.

10.  In answer, Mr Victor Joffe (and, with him, Mr Alexander Tang), counsel for the defendants (except Mr Tong who is separately represented by Mr Martin Lau), drew my attention to Chu Hung Ching v Chan Kam Ming [2001] 1 HKC 396, in which a similar point was raised.  It was held by Mayo VP (with whom Le Pichon JA agreed) that there was nothing in the point; that was an on going interlocutory matter and it was always open to the court to entertain an application to discharge an interlocutory injunction.

11.  Chu Hung Ching was referred to by Kwan J (as she then was) in Bank of America NA, Canada Branch v Pang Wing Wah Johnnny, HCCL 6/2002, unreported, 8 February 2002, in which objection was taken to an application to vary the paragraph of an ex parte injunction relating to disclosure of information on the basis that an application to vary the same paragraph had already been made to the judge on the return date.  Kwan J entertained the application to vary.  At [6], Kwan J said:

“It would appear that the doctrine of res judicata would apply less stringently in interlocutory matters. I have some reservations if res judicata should apply here. I am not prepared to rule against the defendant on this point.”

12.  In any event, a party against whom a Mareva injunction was made can at any time obtain a release from such injunction if he provides security by paying the amount injuncted into court or makes provision for security in that sum by some other method agreed with the applicant or approved by the court.  Such exception is included in the standard form order under Practice Direction 11.2 and has been incorporated as an exception to each of the 5.1.2021 Orders.  For instance, paragraph (3) under “Exceptions to this order” of the order made in HCA 227/2017 reads as follows:

Paragraphs 2 and 3 of this Order shall cease to have effect against [Mr Tong] and/or [Mr Lau] if they (or any of them) provides security by paying the following sums into Court, or makes provision for security in that sum by some other method agreed with the Plaintiff’s solicitors or approved by the Court:

  Amount
3rd Defendant USD11,099,723.23 (or Hong Kong dollars equivalent at the time of payment)
1st Defendant USD8,899,364.63 (or Hong Kong dollars equivalent at the time of payment)

13.  There can be no argument that a Mareva injunction subject to such an exception would lapse upon the payment into court of the amount injuncted even if the payment into court is made after an unsuccessful application for discharge on other grounds on the return date.  By parity of reasoning, the same consequence should follow upon the provision of sufficient agreed or approved security since payment into court and provision of security are intended to be alternative ways of securing a discharge of a Mareva injunction.

14.  Mr William Wong SC (and, with him, Mr John Hui, Mr Michael Lok and Miss Jasmine Cheung), counsel for the plaintiff, however, reminded me that the 5.1.2021 Orders include proprietary injunctions, the purpose of which is to preserve the plaintiffs’ own assets.  It is against principle to allow a defendant who had converted the plaintiff’s property to continue the conversion by just putting aside a fund or otherwise giving security equivalent to its value simply because the defendants have deep pockets.

15.  As I understand from reading the evidence in support of the ex parte applications, the assets sought to be protected by the 5.1.2021 Orders are (1) monies allegedly misappropriated from the plaintiffs’ bank accounts and (2) profits estimated to have been lost to the plaintiffs by having their businesses allegedly diverted to the corporate defendants.  The alleged misappropriation and wrongful diversion of businesses mostly date back to 2014 and 2015.

16.  In short, the property for which the plaintiffs sought protection by applying for and obtaining the proprietary injunctions under the 5.1.2021 Orders is money.  As observed by A Chan J in DBS Bank (Hong Kong) Ltd v Tian Wen Qian, HCA 3228/2016, unreported, 12 October 2017, at [14], money is probably the most fungible asset, and a proprietary claim over cash is to be distinguished with, for example, a proprietary claim over a wedding ring or any property of a unique character.

17.  Further, insofar as the claims arising from the allegedly wrongful diversion of businesses are concerned, while the plaintiffs attempted to estimate the amounts of profits of which they had allegedly been deprived, there are no separate or specific funds earmarked as “estimated profits”.

18.  I can see nothing wrong in principle for a defendant to be released from a proprietary injunction protecting money upon provision of sufficient security for the proprietary claim aided by the injunction.  The matter is essentially a balancing exercise.   In the present instance, the balance is tipped in favour of acceding to the Security Discharge Summonses by also discharging the proprietary injunctions under the 5.1.2021 Orders, having regard to the facts/evidence that:

(1)  The 5.1.2021 Orders, if continued, may in reality cause the destruction of or occasion serious damage to Mr Lau’s businesses even before the hearing and determination of the MND Discharge Summonses.

(2)  Mr Chu and Mr Lau’s respective companies are business competitors.  In such circumstance, the court should be mindful of the possibility of the 5.1.2021 Orders taking effect to destroy or damage Mr Lau’s businesses to the advantage of Mr Chu, even if such consequence may be unintended when the ex parte applications were made.

(3)  Subject to proof of Smooth Day’s title to the Bel-Air Property and Mr Lau’s beneficial ownership of the shares in Smooth Day (for which provision will be made), the Security Package is, in my assessment, sufficient to secure the plaintiffs’ claims herein.  In so saying, I have not overlooked that the proprietary injunctions under the 5.1.2021 Orders also cover the traceable proceeds, substitutes or fruits etc of the allegedly misappropriated funds and estimated profits of allegedly diverted businesses. The extra USD3,210,000 agreed to be added to form part of the Security Package is to cater for such traceable proceeds, substitutes or fruits etc.

(4)  The Security Package is advantageous to the plaintiffs as it turns them into secured creditors for their claims in these actions.

19.  However, I do take on board Mr Wong SC’s point that the discharge of the injunctions should take place, not upon the Lau Undertakings, but upon the completion of the acts promised by such undertakings.  It goes without saying that notwithstanding the 5.1.2021 Orders, HSBC may permit the necessary withdrawals to be made from PB Cape and Sea Premier’s accounts.  For the avoidance of confusion to third parties served with the 5.1.2021 Orders, where deemed necessary, the defendants can come back to this court for orders discharging the 5.1.2021 with evidence of the realisation of the Lau Undertakings.  The applications can be made on paper upon affidavit(s), copied to the plaintiffs’ solicitors.

20.  In this regard, there is no controversy over the title to the Shun Tak Property given that Mr Chu himself is an indirect half owner of the property.  A legal charge of Mr Lau’s indirect half share in the Shun Tak Property and the 3 payments into court add up to total value of USD18,329,327.35 – USD19,729,327.35.  Such value, once provided by the execution of the legal charge over the Shun Tak Property and the making of the 3 payments into court, is sufficient to discharge the 5.1.2021 Orders in either (1) HCA 227/2021 and HCA 2132/2020 or (2) HCA 1026/2021 and HCA 2132/2020.  It appears to me fair to give the defendants the choice as to which two 5.1.2021 Orders (the injunction aspect) they wish to have discharged first before the execution of the legal charge of the Bel-Air Property.

21.  As for the Bel-Air Property:

(1)  CITIC Bank is hereby directed that the 5.1.2021 Orders do not prevent the discharge or release of the Existing Bel-Air Charge and it is hereby also directed to effect such discharge/release as soon as practicable. 

(2)  Regarding the charge to be executed by Smooth Day, I direct that the investigation of Smooth Day’s title to such property and Mr Lau’s beneficial ownership of the shares in Smooth Day should be undertaken and completed within 10 business days upon the provision of title deeds and documents by an independent firm of solicitors (who may, if necessary, instruct independent counsel of its choice to advise).  Such firm should be nominated by agreement of the parties, failing which, to be appointed by the court.  Should there be no agreement as to which firm to instruct by 4:30 pm on 2 February 2021, this court should be provided by each camp with a list of 3 firms and their respective quotations for undertaking the investigation needed by 10 am on 3 February 2021.

22.  That leaves the ancillary disclosure requirements under the 5.1.2021 Orders.  As observed by DHCJ Tsui at [10] of her decision dated 15 January 2021, a disclosure order ancillary to a Mareva injunction would enable the plaintiff to find out the whereabouts of the defendant’s assets and take steps accordingly to make sure that those assets are effectively frozen (e.g. by informing relevant banks which would proceed to freeze the defendant’s bank accounts).  Where the Mareva injunction is discharged upon provision of security approved by the court, the disclosure order can have no independent continuing force.

23.  As DHCJ Tsui further stated at [11], in the case of a proprietary injunction, an ancillary disclosure order would enable the plaintiff to locate, trace and thus preserve and pursue assets which the plaintiff says is beneficially his.[11]   Likewise, where a proprietary injunction is discharged upon provision of security approved by the court, including security for the traceable proceeds, substitutes and fruits etc of the plaintiff’s asset, I am not sure the ancillary disclosure order can conceptually continue to have independent force.  It appears to me that in the absence of a proprietary injunction, the location and tracing of the plaintiff’s assets should be left to discovery and the administration of interrogatories.

24.  Should I be wrong, I would in any event have stayed the compliance with the disclosure orders ancillary to the proprietary injunctions under the 5.1.2021 Orders until the hearing on 26 April 2021. 

25.  As stated above, most of the alleged misappropriations and wrongful diversions of businesses date back to 2014 and 2015.  I can readily imagine that tracing going back 6-7 years of a number of active businesses would be a daunting exercise. On the ancillary disclosure orders, Mr Wong SC relied on what DHCJ Tsui said at [28] of her said decision in refusing to stay the disclosure orders:

“Mr Wong[12] also pointed out the record to be disclosed by the defendants under the disclosure orders goes back to six years. It would be onerous task. I agree that time will need to be spent on this. While this is onerous, it is doable. …”

26.  DHCJ Tsui did not have the evidence now before me.  By way of highlights, 5 fee-earners of DLA Piper Hong Kong have taken around 10 days without producing anything tangible.  The defendants have since approached Deloitte which estimates that it would take them over 1,000 man-hours (utilising a team of 8 professionals) and around 2 to 4 months to complete the tracing exercise.  Yes, it is doable.  But at what costs?

27.  The underlying objectives of the Rules of the High Court (Cap 4A) include the increase of the cost-effectiveness of any practice and procedure to be followed in relation to proceedings before the court and the promotion of a sense of reasonable proportion and procedural economy in the conduct of proceedings.  See Order 1A, rule 1(a) and (c).  To compel the defendants to incur the time and costs needed to comply with the disclosure orders now when the injunctions to which they are ancillary are about to be discharged upon the provision of court- approved security would be to ignore or pay lip service to these underlying objectives.

28.  In summary, I order/direct as follows:

(1)  The 5.1.2021 Orders in HCA 227/2017 and HCA 2132/2020[13]  shall be discharged upon the following:

(a)    Mr Lau’s undertaking, pending trial or further order, not to dispose of, deal with, or otherwise diminish the value of his direct or indirect interest in Sun Harvest, Up Profit and/or the Shun Tak Property whether by himself, his agent, servants, associates or otherwise howsoever;

(b)    the production to the plaintiffs’ solicitors of a legal charge/mortgage over the Shun Tak Property up to Mr Lau’s 50% indirect interest therein executed by Up Profit as per pages 1-14 of “LWY-9” to Mr Lau’s 9th Affirmation;

(c)    the payment into court by PB Cape of the sum of USD3,451,030.18 plus the USD equivalents of HKD9,736.97, AUD1,454.44 and EUR377.31 standing to the credit in PB Cape’s account numbered 848-545588-838 with HSBC to secure the plaintiffs’ claims in these 3 actions;

(d)    the payment into court by Sea Premier of USD2,415,459.25 standing to the credit in Sea Premier’s account numbered 8018-896050 with HSBC to secure the plaintiffs’ claims in these 3 actions; and

(e)    the payment into court by or on behalf of the defendants of USD3,210,000 to secure the plaintiffs’ claims in these 3 actions;

(1A)  HSBC shall allow the withdrawals from PB Cape and Sea Premier’s said respective accounts for the purposes of the above first and second-mentioned payments into court notwithstanding the 2.1.2021 Orders;

(2)  The 5.1.2021 Orders in HCA 1026/2020 be discharged upon the production to the plaintiffs’ solicitors of a discharge or release of the Existing Bel-Air Charge by CITIC Bank and a legal charge/mortgage over the Bel-Air Property executed by Smooth Day as per pages 35-47 of “LWY-9” to Mr Lau’s 9th Affirmation;

(2A)  CITIC Bank shall effect the discharge/release of the Existing Bel-Air Charge as soon as practicable;

(3)  The parties shall by 4:30 pm on 2 February 2021 agree on and jointly nominate an independent firm of solicitors (who shall be at liberty to instruct independent counsel of its choice to advise where necessary) to investigate and verify Smooth Day’s title to the Bel-Air Property and Mr Lau’s beneficial ownership of the shares in Smooth Day within 10 business days at the defendants’ costs and expenses in the first instance;

(4)  Should there be no joint nomination by 4:30 pm on 2 February 2021, each side should provide the court with a list of 3 firms of solicitors and their respective quotations by 10 am on 3 February 2021;

(5)  Pending the discharge of the 5.1.2021 Orders as provided for in sub-paragraph (1) and (2) hereof, the ancillary disclosure orders under the 5.1.2021 Orders be stayed;

(6)  Liberty to apply to Hon Lisa Wong J.

29.  Needless to say, where Mr Chu’s co-operation is required, in particular, in signing the legal charges over the Shun Tak Property and the Bel-Air Property as agent for the Secured Parties, the written resolutions by the shareholders of Up Profit[14] and the written resolutions of the directors and shareholders of Sea Premier[15], this court expects Mr Chu’s co-operation to be forthcoming upon request by the defendants.

30.  I reserve the question of costs to myself pending the provision of the Security Package.

( Lisa Wong )
Judge of the Court of First Instance
High Court

Mr William Wong, SC, Mr John Hui, Mr Michael Lok and Ms Jasmine Cheung, instructed by Sit, Fung, Kwong & Shum, for the 1st and 2nd plaintiffs in HCA 227/2017 (by original action), the 1st and 2nd plaintiffs in HCA 1026/2020 and the plaintiff in HCA 2132/2020

Mr Martin Lau, instructed by Simmons & Simmons, for the 1st defendant in HCA 227/2017 (by original action)

Mr Victor Joffe and Mr Alexander Tang, instructed by DLA Piper Hong Kong, for the 3rd to 5th defendants in HCA 227/2017 (by original action), the 1st, 9th and 10th defendants in HCA 1026/2020 and the 1st and 5th defendants in HCA 2132/2020



[1] The borrower under the Existing Bel-Air Charge.

[2] Of which Mr Lau and his wife, Ms Wong Hiu Lui (“Ms Wong”), are the only shareholders and directors.  Mr Victor Joffe informed the court that he also acts for Ms Wong and confirmed to the court that she has no claim whatsoever, whether legal, equitable, matrimonial or otherwise in respect of the Bel-Air Property. 

[3] As per pages 35-47 of “LWY-9” to Mr Lau’s 9th Affirmation dated 25 January 2021 filed in HCA 227/2017.

[4] A company co-owned by Mr Chu and Mr Lau.

[5] The registered owner of the Shun Tak Property.  It is a company equally owned by Mr Chu and Mr Lau and of which Ms Wat is the sole director.

[6] As per pages 15-16 of “LWY-9” to Mr Lau’s 9th Affirmation.

[7] As per pages 1-14 of “LWY-9” to Mr Lau’s 9th Affirmation.

[8] This undertaking was originally offered as an alternative to the 6th and 7th Lau Undertakings.  At the hearing, upon the suggestion of the court, Mr Lau indicated through counsel that he is prepared to offer this as an additional undertaking.

[9] 5th defendant by original action in HCA 227/2017 and 6th defendant in HCA 1026/2020.

[10] 8th defendant by original action in HCA 227/2017 and 9th defendant in HCA 1026/2020.

[11] See, eg, A v C [1981] QB 956, Yau Chiu Wah v Gold Chief Investment Ltd [2002] 2 HKLRD 832 and China Shanshui Cement Group Ltd v Zhang Caikui, HCA 2880/2015, unreported, 15 January 2016.

[12] Mr Anson Wong SC.

[13] As elected by the defendants at the hearing on 1 February 2021.

[14] As per pages 17-18 of “LWY-9”.

[15] As per pages 71-72 and 73 of “LWY-9”.

[2021] HKCFI 181-EN-2021-01-15

CANTON PLUS ENTERPRISE LTD AND ANOTHER v. TONG ZHENJUN AND OTHERS

HTML content

HCA 227/2017
HCA 1026/2020 &
HCA 2132/2020
[2021] HKCFI 181

HCA 227/2017

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO 227 OF 2017

_________________

BETWEEN  
 CANTON PLUS ENTERPRISE LIMITED1st Plaintiff
 ANAIS DEVELOPMENT SA
(Suing on behalf of themselves as shareholders in
PROFIT FAR LIMITED (other than Team Sino Limited) and PACIFIC BULK SHIPPING LIMITED )
2nd Plaintiff

and

 TONG ZHENJUN (童楨軍)1st Defendant
 LIANG PAN (梁攀)2nd Defendant
 LAU WING YAN (劉永人)3rd Defendant
 PROSPEROUS ELITE VENTURES LIMITED
(also known as 鑫傑創投有限公司)
4th Defendant
 PACIFIC BULK CAPE COMPANY LIMITED5th Defendant
 PACIFIC BULK ENTERPRISES COMPANY LIMITED 6th Defendant
 PACIFIC BULK PANAMAX COMPANY LIMITED7th Defendant
 PACIFIC BULK SUPRAMAX COMPANY LIMITED 8th Defendant
 PROFIT FAR LIMITED
(also known as 益遠有限公司)
9th Defendant
 PACIFIC BULK SHIPPING LIMITED10th Defendant
 (By Original Action) 
 LAU WING YAN (劉永人)Plaintiff

and

 CHU KONG (朱江)1st Defendant
 CANTON PLUS ENTERPRISE LIMITED2nd Defendant
 ANAIS DEVELOPMENT SA3rd Defendant
 (By Counterclaim) 
_________________

HCA 1026/2020

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO 1026 OF 2020

_________________

BETWEEN

 CHU KONG1st Plaintiff
 TRENUS OCEANWAY LTD
(Suing on behalf of itself and all other shareholders in SMARTPLACE LIMITED (except Richland International Limited) and PACIFIC BULK SHIPPING (CAYMAN) LIMITED)
2nd Plaintiff

and

 LAU WING YAN (劉永人)1st Defendant
 CHANG DAFA (常大法)2nd Defendant
 RICHLAND INTERNATIONAL LIMITED3rd Defendant
 SMARTPLACE LIMITED4th Defendant
 PACIFIC BULK SHIPPING (CAYMAN) LIMITED5th Defendant
 PACIFIC BULK CAPE COMPANY LIMITED6th Defendant
 PACIFIC BULK ENTERPRISES COMPANY LIMITED 7th Defendant
 PACIFIC BULK PANAMAX COMPANY LIMITED8th Defendant
 PACIFIC BULK SUPRAMAX COMPANY LIMITED 9th Defendant
 ECOSUCCESS LIMITED10th Defendant
_________________

HCA 2132/2020

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO 2132 OF 2020

_________________

BETWEEN

 CONNECT PLUS LIMITED
(suing on behalf of itself and all other shareholders in PACIFIC BULK LINES COMPANY LIMITED except GREAT SEA GLOBAL LIMITED and TUOXIN HOLDINGS LTD)
Plaintiff

and

 LAU WING YAN1st Defendant
 YANG HAITAO2nd Defendant
 WAT FUNG YING3rd Defendant
 YAN DONGHAI4th Defendant
 GO PROSPER INTERNATIONAL LIMITED5th Defendant
 PACIFIC BULK LINES COMPANY LIMITED6th Defendant

_________________

Before: Deputy High Court Judge Winnie Tsui in Chambers

Date of Hearing: 15 January 2021

Date of Decision: 15 January 2021

_______________

DECISION

_______________

1.  This is the return day for the ex parte injunctions granted by Deputy High Court Judge To on 5 January 2021 in the three actions.

2.  The injunctions were granted against the 1st, 3rd, 4th and 5th defendants in HCA 227/2017, the 1st, 9th and 10th defendants in HCA 1026/2020 and the 1st and 5th defendants in HCA 2132/2020.  I shall refer to them as the defendants below.

3.  Before me today are the plaintiffs’ summonses for continuation of the injunctions and the defendants’ summonses for discharge of the injunctions primarily on the ground of material non-disclosure.

4.  The three actions arise out of a common background where the two protagonists are Mr Chu Kong and Mr Lau Wing Yan. The two of them have been involved in a multitude of civil proceedings both here in Hong Kong and overseas since about 2014.  The present three actions are derivative actions commenced by Mr Chu and his related companies on behalf of companies from which, Mr Chu alleges, funds and businesses had been wrongfully misappropriated by Mr Lau and his related companies.

5.  At the conclusion of the ex parte hearing, the judge granted a mareva injunction against Mr Lau in each of the three actions and against Mr Tong Zhenjun, the 1st defendant in HCA 220/2017.  Proprietary injunctions were granted against companies related to Mr Lau for sums that are now alleged to have been wrongfully misappropriated by them.

6.  Mr Tong is separately legally represented from Mr Lau.

7.  The alleged misappropriation and wrongful diversion of funds and businesses mostly date back to 2014 and 2015.  The plaintiffs launched the application for interlocutory injunctions on an ex parte basis on the basis of new materials which had come to their attention only in September and December 2020.

8.  Earlier this morning, I have adjourned the discharge summonses for substantive argument.  The remaining issue before me is whether pending the substantive disposal of the discharge summonses, I should stay the disclosure orders granted by Deputy High Court Judge To in aid of both the mareva injunctions against Mr Lau and Mr Tong and also in aid of the proprietary injunctions against the corporate defendants.

9.  The underlying purpose of a disclosure order in the present context is to make sure that the injunctions granted are effective to serve their purposes.

10.  A mareva injunction is granted to protect a plaintiff from the risk of having nothing or not enough to enforce if it succeeds in obtaining a judgment after trial.  An ancillary disclosure order would enable the plaintiff to find out the whereabouts of the defendant’s assets and take steps accordingly to make sure that those assets are effectively frozen (eg by informing the relevant bank which would proceed to freeze the defendant’s bank accounts).

11.  In the case of proprietary injunction, an ancillary disclosure order would enable the plaintiff to locate, trace and thus preserve and pursue assets which the plaintiff says is beneficially his.  See, eg, A v C [1981] QB 956, Yau Chiu Wah v Gold Chief Investment Ltd [2002] 2 HKLRD 832 and China Shanshui Cement Group Ltd v Zhang Caikui HCA 2880/2015, 15 January 2016.

12.  Plainly, these considerations apply to the present case.  For instance, for some of the alleged misappropriations, the plaintiffs do not even know to which bank or bank account of the defendant entities the funds had gone.

13.  The burden is squarely on the defendants to justify why I should depart from the above default position.  The defendants have put forward a few grounds as justification. 

14.  Among them, I am of the view that prima facie there is force in the contention that given Mr Lau owns (indirectly) one half share in a commercial property in Sheung Wan and the entire interest in a residential property in Bel-Air, they are assets in Hong Kong which are readily available to satisfy a good part of the plaintiffs’ claim: see Chen Wenjun v Liu Luyuan CACV 168/2014, 1 September 2014.  The total amount provided for by the marvea injunctions is about US$27 million.  The estimated value of Mr Lau’s alleged interest in the two real properties is about US$24 million.

15.  In this situation, even in the absence of the ancillary disclosure orders, that is to say, even when the plaintiffs are in the dark as to what other assets the defendants may own, the plaintiffs are at least protected up to the value of their properties.  In that case, there is much to be said for dispensing with the disclosure orders in the meantime.

16.  The question is – have the defendants made out a good case that Mr Lau in fact owns the real properties?

17.  There is a particular question mark over the Bel-Air property.

18.  In the course of submissions today, the plaintiffs handed up to the court land search results which show that the Bel-Air property is owned by Smooth Day Management Limited and it has since October 2017 been subject to a mortgage granted to China CITIC Bank International Limited.  The mortgage is granted to secure any indebtedness that may be incurred by Pacific Bulk Panamax Company Limited to the bank.  This suggests that the property is apparently not free from encumbrance.  Further, there is no information before the court today as to precisely how the property is eventually held by Mr Lau and whether it is in fact owned 100% beneficially by him.

19.  Mr Anson Wong, SC informed the court from the Bar Table that Smooth Day is a BVI company and has 2 shareholders, Mr Lau and his wife.  Further, he informed the court that his wife holds the shares on trust for Mr Lau.  But Mr Wong could not tell the court anything about that trust eg whether it was done orally or in writing. 

20.  Mr Wong further informed the court from the Bar Table that as of today, no debt is due to China CITIC Bank by Pacific Bulk Panamax Company Limited.  However, Mr Wong appeared to be unable to tell this court with certainty the exact shareholding of Mr Lau in Pacific Bulk Panamax.  Mr Wong said that Pacific Bulk Panamax would give an undertaking that it would not incur any debt under the mortgage facility so that the Bel-Air property would remain to be free from encumbrance in the meantime. 

21.  These are very extensive factual evidence given from the Bar Table, which is of course not permissible.

22.  It is notable that even though Mr Lau filed an affirmation in support of the discharge summonses and the stay application, he made no mention at all of the above matters.

23.  There is no good explanation why such crucial evidence in support of the stay application would be missing.

24.  In the circumstances, and in the face of the existence of the mortgage document registered against the property, I am not in a position at all to find that Mr Lau in fact owns 100% of the interest in the Bel-Air property beneficially and that the property is or is going to be free from encumbrance.

25.  Mr Wong asked for time to file further supporting affidavits.  I refuse to adjourn the stay application for that purpose.  These urgent interim applications are to be dealt with expeditiously without delay.  The evidence required to support the stay application is very straightforward and should be easy to prepare, if it does exist in the first place.    The defendants had the opportunity to adduce such evidence.  They did not make use of the opportunity with no apparent good reason.  There is no reason why indulgence should be granted.  It may or may not be open for the defendants to renew their stay application on further evidence being produced. This is something for them to reflect on.  But it would be unfair to the plaintiffs if indulgence is granted now for the defendants to “perfect” their application when they had had adequate opportunity to do so.

26.  On the present state of the evidence, the only real property beneficially owned by Mr Lau is the half share in the Sheung Wan property which is estimated to be worth about US$10 million.  That means we are dealing with a shortfall of about US$17 million.  That is clearly and plainly a sizable sum of money.

27.  As such, the protection or comfort that one can derive from Mr Lau’s ownership of real property in Hong Kong is limited.

28.  Mr Wong also pointed out the record to be disclosed by the defendants under the disclosure orders goes back to six years.  It would be an onerous task.  I agree that time will need to be spent on this.  While this is onerous, it is not undoable.  It only goes to the issue of how much time should be allowed for the defendants to come up with the documents.

29.  Mr Wong also pointed out that the defendants have a strong case of material non-disclosure such that the injunctions would be set aside in due course.  Earlier today, I have already ruled that they do have an arguable case but the plaintiffs have also put forward answers to the various allegations of material non-disclosure.  The answers are also arguable.

30.  Where there is disagreement on whether a disclosure order should be in place pending the resolution as to whether an injunction should be discharged (as in the present case), the court has to carry out a balancing exercise.

31.  If the court grants a disclosure order but eventually the injunction is discharged, the defendants would have disclosed his assets when he should not have been required to do so.  This is a serious intrusion of personal privacy and is irreversible.  In this case, the intrusion is arguably more serious since for the proprietary injunctions, the defendants would have to disclose private transactions from 2014 onwards.

32.  However, that risk has to be weighed against the risk to the plaintiffs if the disclosure orders are stayed in the meantime. The plaintiffs may be irremediably prejudiced in the sense that the mareva and proprietary injunctions cannot be properly policed in the meantime if the disclosure orders are stayed: Chen Wenjun.

Conclusion

33.  The defendants have failed to put forward sufficient justification why the ancillary disclosure orders should be stayed while the interlocutory mareva and proprietary injunctions remain effective.  I dismiss the stay application.

34.  On the continuation and discharge summonses, I would make an order in terms of those proposed by the defendants and agreed by the plaintiffs, save that the stay order should be taken out.  I should also direct that the injunctions granted by Deputy High Court Judge To on 5 January 2021 do continue until the disposal of the discharge summonses, or further order of the court.  Also, as agreed by the plaintiffs, the disclosure orders should be varied as follows: in paragraphs 3(1) and (2), the reference to “5 days” be replaced by “14 days from today” and in paragraph 3(3), the reference to “HK$10,000” be replaced by “HK$100,000”.

35.  I should also give liberty to apply.

[Submissions on costs]

36.  I order that the plaintiffs do have costs of the stay application, with certificate for one senior counsel and one junior counsel, to be summarily assessed if not agreed.  The plaintiffs do lodge and serve their statement of costs within 7 days from today.  The defendants do lodge and serve their lists of objection, if any, within 7 days thereafter. The costs will be summarily assessed on paper after the deadline.

( Winnie Tsui )
Deputy High Court Judge

Mr William Wong, SC, Mr John Hui, Mr Michael Lok and Ms Jasmine Cheung, instructed by Sit, Fung, Kwong & Shum, for the 1st and 2nd plaintiffs in HCA 227/2017 (by original action), the 1st and 2nd plaintiffs in HCA 1026/2020 and the plaintiff in HCA 2132/2020

Mr Martin Lau, instructed by Simmons & Simmons, for the 1st defendant in HCA 227/2017 (by original action)

Mr Anson Wong, SC and Mr Alexander Tang, instructed by DLA Piper, for the 3rd to 5th defendants in HCA 227/2017 (by original action), the 1st, 9th and 10th defendants in HCA 1026/2020 and the 1st and 5th defendants in HCA 2132/2020

[2020] HKCFI 497-EN-2020-03-26

CANTON PLUS ENTERPRISE LTD AND ANOTHER v. TONG ZHENJUN AND OTHERS

HTML content

HCCW 352/2014 & HCA 227/2017 & HCA 228/2017

(HEARD TOGETHER)

[2020] HKCFI 497

HCCW 352/2014

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

COMPANIES WINDING‑UP PROCEEDINGS NO 352 OF 2014

____________________

 IN THE MATTER of Smartplace Limited
 

and

 IN THE MATTER of section 327(3)(c) of the Companies (Winding Up and Miscellaneous Provisions) Ordinance (Cap 32) and section 724 of Companies Ordinance (Cap 622)

____________________

BETWEEN  
 TRENUS OCEANWAY LTDPetitioner

and

 RICHLAND INTERNATIONAL LIMITED1st Respondent
 SMARTPLACE LIMITED2nd Respondent

____________________

ANDHCA 227/2017

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO 227 OF 2017

____________________

BETWEEN

 CANTON PLUS ENTERPRISE LIMITED1st Plaintiff
 ANAIS DEVELOPMENT SA2nd Plaintiff
 (Suing on behalf of themselves as shareholders in PROFIT FAR LIMITED (other than Team Sino Limited) and PACIFIC BULK SHIPPING LIMITED) 

and

 TONG ZHENJUN(童楨軍)1st Defendant
 LIANG PAN(梁攀)2nd Defendant
 LAU WING YAN(劉永人)3rd Defendant
 PROSPEROUS ELITE VENTURES LIMITED4th Defendant
 (also known as鑫傑創投有限公司) 
 PACIFIC BULK CAPE COMPANY LIMITED5th Defendant
 PACIFIC BULK ENTERPRISES COMPANY LIMITED 6th Defendant
 PACIFIC BULK PANAMAX COMPANY LIMITED7th Defendant
 PACIFIC BULK SURAMAX COMPANY LIMITED8th Defendant
 PROFIT FAR LIMITED9th Defendant
 (also known as 益遠有限公司 ) 
 PACIFIC BULK SHIPPING LIMITED10th Defendant
 (by original action) 


BETWEEN

 LAU WING YAN(劉永人)Plaintiff

and

 CHU KONG(朱江)1st Defendant
 CANTON PLUS ENTERPRISE LIMITED2nd Defendant
 ANAIS DEVELOPMENT SA3rd Defendant
  (by counterclaim)  

____________________

 

ANDHCA 228/2017

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO 228 OF 2017

____________________

BETWEEN

 CHU KONG(朱江)Plaintiff

and

 LAU WING YAN(劉永人)Defendant
____________________
 (HEARD TOGETHER) 
Before:Hon Harris J in Chambers
Dates of Hearing:13 September 2019
Date of Decision:13 September 2019
Date of Reasons for Decision:26 March 2020

________________________________

REASONS FOR DECISION

________________________________

1.  On 13 September 2019 I heard three summonses, which I determined that day:

(1) The 1st Respondent’s summons dated 12 June 2019 in HCCW 352/2014 for the petition and HCA 227/2017 and HCA 228/2017 (and corresponding summonses in the two High Court Actions) to be tried together or at the same time.  These summonses I dismissed and ordered that the 1st Respondent pays the Petitioner’s costs forthwith with a certificate for two counsel.

(2) The 1st Respondent’s summons dated 23 August 2019 to extend time for the parties to take out any interlocutory applications pursuant to an order dated 17 July 2019.  I granted an order in terms.

2.  In addition there was a summons dated 11 February 2019 issued by the 1st Respondent to stay the Petition, which was withdrawn.  I ordered that the costs be paid by the 1st Respondent.

3.  In this decision I summarise for the record why I dismissed the summonses to have the Petition and the High Court Actions heard together.

4.  The Petition has been fixed for hearing commencing on 12 October 2020 with 10 days reserved.  The central and principal issue in the Petition concerns the existence of an alleged restructuring agreement.  The ambit of the dispute is fairly discrete. The issue also arises in the High Court Actions.  However, those Actions concern additional issues.  They are nowhere near as advanced.  Pleadings have closed.  No further steps have been taken in the Actions.  In the High Court Actions the Defendants filed a case management summons on 6 September 2019 for a hearing not earlier than 15 January 2020. Putting to one side the impression that this gives that the Defendants are in no hurry to advance the High Court Actions it seems to me that there is no sensible reason now to vacate the trial dates and leave the Petition to await the progress of the High Court Actions.  On the contrary it seems to me that resolution of the issue in the Petition is more likely than not to narrow the room for argument in the High Court Actions and hopefully (although given the animosity between the owners of the respective corporate parties this may be overly optimistic) some negotiated resolution of their dispute.

(Jonathan Harris)
Judge of the Court of First Instance
High Court

  

Mr William Wong SC, Mr Michael Lok and Ms Jasmine Cheung, instructed by Sit, Fung, Kwong & Shum, for the petitioner (in HCCW 352/2014) and 1st to 2nd plaintiffs (by original action  in HCA 227/2017) and the defendants (by counterclaim in HCA 227/2017) and the plaintiff (in HCA 228/2017)

Mr Anson Wong SC and Mr Martin Kok, instructed by DLA Piper Hong Kong, for the 1st respondent (in HCCW 352/2014) and the 3rd, 5th to 8th defendants (by original action in HCA 227/2017) and the defendant (in HCA 228/2017)

Attendance of Jingtian & Gongcheng LLP, for the 1st and 2nd defendants (by original action in HCA 227/2017), was excused

 

[2018] HKCFI 1402-EN-2018-06-22

CANTON PLUS ENTERPRISE LTD AND ANOTHER v. TONG ZHENJUN AND OTHERS

HTML content

HCA 227/2017

[2018] HKCFI 1402

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO 227 OF 2017

______________

BETWEEN
 CANTON PLUS ENTERPRISE LIMITED1st Plaintiff
 ANAIS DEVELOPMENT SA
(suing on behalf of themselves as shareholders in PROFIT FAR LIMITED (other than Team Sino Limited) and PACIFIC BULK SHIPPING LIMITED)
2nd Plaintiff
and
 TONG ZHENJUN (童楨軍)1st Defendant
 LIANG PAN (梁攀)2nd Defendant
 LAU WING YAN (劉永人)3rd Defendant
 PROSPEROUS ELITE VENTURES LIMITED4th Defendant
 (also known as 鑫傑創投有限公司) 
 PACIFIC BULK CAPE COMPANY LIMITED5th Defendant
 PACIFIC BULK ENTERPRISES COMPANY LIMITED6th Defendant
 PACIFIC BULK PANAMAX COMPANY LIMITED7th Defendant
 PACIFIC BULK SUPRAMAX COMPANY LIMITED8th Defendant
 PROFIT FAR LIMITED (also known as 益遠有限公司) 9th Defendant
 PACIFIC BULK SHIPPING LIMITED10th Defendant
______________
(By Original Action)
AND BETWEEN
 LAU WING YAN (劉永人)Plaintiff
and
 CHU KONG (朱江)1st Defendant
 CANTON PLUS ENTERPRISE LIMITED2nd Defendant
 ANAIS DEVELOPMENT SA3rd Defendant
______________
(By Counterclaim)

______________

Before: Deputy High Court Judge Saunders in Chambers
Date of Hearing: 10 May, 13 and 14 June 2018
Date of Decision: 22 June 2018

__________________

D E C I S I O N

__________________

Introduction

1.  This case concerns the delicate interface between the provisions of the Rules of the High Court (“RHC”) contained in Order 29, rule 2, entitled “Detention, preservation etc., of subject-matter of cause or matter”, which empowers the court to make orders both for the preservation of property and the inspection of that property, and Order 24, rule 10, entitled “Inspection of documents referred to in pleadings and affidavits” which empowers the court to make orders for the inspection of documents in the discovery process.

2.  At the heart of these proceedings is a dispute between Lau Wing Yan (劉永人) (“Mr Lau”) and Chu Kong (朱江) (“Mr Chu”), over the ownership of a group of companies known as the Pacific Bulk Shipping Group, (the PB Group). Ultimately, the court will have to decide whether documents made in January 2014 had the effect of transferring Mr Chu’s 50% interest in the PB Group to Mr Lau. 

3.  Mr Chu says agreement has not been concluded nor completed, and the PB Group is still owned by Mr Chu as to 50% and Mr Lau as to 50%.

4.  Mr Chu says the documents constitute an effective agreement and he now owns 100% of the Group, and has done so since January 2014.

5.  In the meantime, the litigation is being hard fought with every point being taken and virtually every application being vigourously opposed.  The proceedings have spawned significant satellite litigation.  It appears that the parties are determined to occupy the time of the court with satellite litigation rather than direct their attention to the real issues between them.

6.  As always, when examining and applying the RHC, it is necessary for the court to bear in mind the objectives of the Rules and in particular, in this case, Order 1A, rule 1.  In this case I have regard to all six subparagraphs of that rule, and in particular the requirement to ensure that a case is dealt with as expeditiously as is reasonably practical: Order 1A, rule 1(b), to promote a sense of reasonable proportion and procedural economyinto the conduct of the proceedings: Order 1A, rule 1(c) and to ensure fairness between the parties: Order 1A, rule 1(d).

Background to this application

7.  It is necessary, first, to review briefly the pleadings, as the claim and counterclaim provide the fundamental backdrop to the applications that have been made.

8.  Since 2008 Mr Chu and Mr Lau have been engaged, by way of a network of companies, owned either between them or individually, or through other companies, in the business of operating Capesize vessels with the centre of its business operation based in Hong Kong.  Capesize vessels are vessels which are too large to pass through the Suez Canal or the Panama Canal, and consequently must make their passage between oceans by way of Cape Horn or the Cape of Good Hope.  The network of companies used fall roughly into two categories, the Pacific Bulk companies (“PB Group”) and the Beibu Golf Ocean Group (“BBG Group”).

9.  The dispute between the parties in respect of the BBG Group is the subject of litigation in the British Virgin Islands.  The litigation with which this court is concerned is in relation to the PB Group.

10.  It is not in dispute that in around January 2014 discussions took place between Mr Chu and Mr Lau with a view to dividing the PB Group and the BBG Group equally between them.  There is a significant issue for the trial as to whether or not any agreement was reached, and if agreement was reached, whether or not that agreement was performed. 

11.  I do not understand that be any disagreement that essentially from 29 January 2014 Mr Chu and Mr Lau each operated independently, with each setting up new companies through which to undertake business in relation to Capesize vessels.

12.  The case for Mr Chu is that in fact no agreement was reached, and that he has been wrongly denied access to the documents, premises and profits of the PB Group and the BBG Group.  He says that Mr Lau has wrongfully misappropriated US$9 million from the accounts of the PB Group.  Mr Chu says further that as a no agreement between himself and Mr Lau has either been reached or completed, he remains a 50% owner of the PB Group.

13.  In January 2017, Mr Chu issued a writ of summons endorsed with a statement of claim.  The action is a double derivative action brought by the plaintiff companies on behalf of themselves as shareholders in two other companies which I understand to be the principal owners of the PB Group and the BBG Group.  The statement of claim alleges breaches of duty by directors of the companies, breaches of a “Common Understanding”, diversion of company business and poaching staff, misappropriation of funds, unauthorised use of trademarks, passing off, a conspiracy to injure and/or fraud/deception.  The relief sought by the statement of claim comprises, inter alia, declarations of liability in respect of the misappropriation of funds, tracing of those funds and assets, an accounting and an assessment of damages.

14.  On 31 May 2017, Mr Lau filed a defence and counterclaim. The defence asserts that two restructuring agreements were entered into between Mr Chu and Mr Lau in January 2014, one in respect of the PB Group and one in respect of the BBG Group (the “PB Restructuring Agreement” and the “BBG Restructuring Agreement”). 

15.  The allegation is that Mr Chu would immediately withdraw from the PB Group and from 1 January 2014, Mr Lau would be solely responsible for the management, operation and profit of loss of the PB Group.  It is alleged that Mr Chu’s shareholding and interest in the PB Group would be assigned to Mr Lau, the price for which would be equivalent to 50% of the total audited net asset value of the PB Group as at 31 December 2013.  Although there are minor references to the BBG Group, the counterclaim is essentially concerned with the PB Group.

16.  For reasons that the parties dispute, an audit has not been completed.  It seems not to be in dispute that steps were taken to begin undertaking an audit of the PB Group.  Although the two restructuring agreements are asserted in the counterclaim, relief in the counterclaim is limited to that in respect of the PB Group Restructuring agreement.

17.  In the defence, Mr Lau alleges that Mr Chu has unlawfully misappropriated approximately US$70 million from the PB Group. Annexed to the counterclaim is a nine page schedule setting out the dates, the PB Group companies and accounts from which funds were deducted or credited, and the companies and accounts controlled by Mr Chu from which funds were deducted or credited and the amount of each transaction.  The net balance, which Mr Lau says Mr Chu owes to the PB Group, is a little under US$70 million.

18.  By way of relief sought in the counterclaim, Mr Lau seeks specific performance of the “PB Restructuring Agreement”, appropriate declarations as to the ownership of shares, delivery of relevant documents, injunctions and damages or equitable compensation to be assessed.

19.  Although not specifically (or even tangentially) referred to in the counterclaim, Mr Anson Wong SC accepted my proposition that in the event that Mr Lau’s case was established, it would be contended that the US$70 million allegedly misappropriated by Mr Chu should be credited to Mr Chu by way of a part payment of the sum to which Mr Chu would be entitled under the PB Agreement.  Thereafter there would have to be an accounting to determine the final situation.

The removal of documents

20.  Prior to January 2014 Mr Chu and Mr Lau together, used a property in the Shun Tak Centre as office space in which documents relating to the PB Group were held.  Prior to that time both Mr Chu and Mr Lau had full access to all of the documents held.  Both parties appear to accept that from January 2014 although Mr Chu had physical access to the office space, he had been denied access to the operating documents and accounting documents of the PB Group.

21.  On 16 June 2017, the documents relating to the PB Group, and other documents, were unilaterally, and without notice to Mr Chu, removed by Mr Lau from that office space.  I will refer to the documents removed on 16 June 2017 as “the removed documents” collectively.  Mr Anson Wong says that approximately 1,000 lever arch files were removed and are now in storage.  He estimated the number of documents at millions, however I doubt that there are that many documents.  The average box file will contain something in the order of 350 pages, which would mean some 350,000 pages of documents.

22.  Mr Chu has taken great exception to the removal and apparent securing of the removed documents.  His case now is that as he is still a 50% shareholder of both the PB Group and the BBG Group he is fully entitled to access to all of the removed documents.

23.  Mr Lau, on the other hand, says that he is solely entitled to the assets of the PB Group, and consequently he is the sole owner of all of the removed documents.  Mr Lau does not deny that he did not inform Mr Chu of the intended removal of the documents, nor did he obtain Mr Chu’s consent or agreement to the removal of the documents.

24.  The dispute now before the court is what is to be done with the removed documents, who may have access to them, and in what form or manner that access should be allowed.

25.  On 1 August 2017, Mr Chu issued a summons, pursuant to Order 29, rule 2, for the following orders to be made:

“ 1. [Mr Lau] be ordered to provide to (Mr Chu) in writing within 7 days thereof, a list of all properties removed from the Rooms 1901, 1902 and 1912, 19th Floor, West Tower, Shun Tak Centre, Nos 168–200 Connaught Road Central, Hong Kong (the ‘Property’) on 16 June 2017;

2. Until trial or further order, (Mr Lau) be ordered to deliver up within 3 days hereof all documents removed from the Property on 16 June 2017 (the ‘Removed Documents’) to the office of Messrs Zhong Lun, or alternatively, Messrs DLA Piper, or alternatively, such other places as may be agreed between the [Mr Lau] and [Mr Chu] (the ‘Storage Location’), subject to an undertaking not to release the same without the consent of the parties or an order of the Court; and

3. Until the trial or further order, [Mr Lau] be ordered to enable reasonable repeated access into the Storage Location and the inspection of the Removed Documents by [Mr Lau] whether acting by himself or by his agents or otherwise, upon the giving of 24 hours’ notice.

Dated this 1st day of August 2017”

26.  On 4 August 2017, Deputy High Court Judge Kenneth Kwok SCheard leading counsel for both Mr Chu and Mr Lau on this summons. The Judge made an interim order in the following terms:

“ Upon the application of the 1st and 2nd Plaintiffs (by Original Action)(the ‘Plaintiffs’) by way of Summons filed herein on 1 August 2017 (the ‘Summons’)

AND UPON reading the Affirmation of [Mr Chu] filed herein on 2 August 2017 together with the exhibits referred to therein and the Affirmation of [Mr Lau] filed on 3 August 2017 together with the exhibits referred to therein

AND UPON hearing Senior Counsel for the Plaintiffs and Senior Counsel for [Mr Lau]

IT IS ORDERED that:–

1. [Mr Chu] and [Mr Lau] do by 4:00 pm on 18 August 2017 jointly appoint an independent third party firm of solicitors (the ‘said Firm’) for the purposes mentioned below. In the event that the parties cannot agree on the firm to be appointed, a firm be nominated by the President of the Law Society shall be appointed;

2. [Mr Lau] do provide to the said Firm access to all documents within his possession, custody or power (including those previously located in Rooms 1901, 1902 and 1912, 19th Floor, West Tower, Shun Tak Centre, Nos. 168–200 Connaught Road Central, Hong Kong (the ‘Property’)) belonging to the companies listed in the Appendix herein (the ‘said Companies’), by 4:00 pm on 18 August 2017 for the purpose of making copies, save and except such documents as to which there is a claim of privilege or other reason for not providing a copy, which dispute shall be agreed or decided by a Master of the High Court;

3. [Mr Chu] do provide to the said Firm access to all documents within his possession, custody or power belonging to the said Companies (if any) by 4:00 pm on 18 August 2017 for the purpose of making copies, save and except such documents as to which there is a claim of privilege or other reason for not providing a copy, which dispute shall be agreed or decided by a Master of the High Court;

4. The said Firm do retain and safekeep the copies of the documents made pursuant to paragraphs 2 and 3 above, and shall not release the same to any other party (including[Mr Chu] and [Mr Lau] withoutfurther order of the Court or agreement of [Mr Chu] and [Mr Lau]. Upon completion of copying in paragraphs 2 and 3 above, the said Firm shall return the original documents;

5. Costs of the said Firm (including storage costs) in relation to performance of paragraphs 1 to 4 above be shared by [Mr Chu] and [Mr Lau] in equal shares at first instance, such costs shall form part of the costs of the Action herein;

6. The Summons be adjourned for argument with 1 day reserved in consultation with Counsel’s diary;

7. [Mr Lau] do have leave to file and serve affirmation evidence in opposition to the Summons by 4:00 pm on 1 September 2017;

8. The Plaintiffs do have leave to file and serve affirmation evidence in reply by 4:00 pm on 22 September 2017 (if so advised);

9. There be no further affirmation evidence without leave of the Court;

10. Costs of the Summons and today’s hearing be reserved with certificates for two counsel.

Dated the 4th day of August 2017.

[The Appendix to the Interlocutory Order contains a list of 31 companies.]”

27.  It is to be noted that the order made was not one sided, as was the summons, but posed reciprocal burdens on each of Mr Lau and Mr Chu.

28.  On 14 September 2017, Mr Lau issued a summons containing an application for leave to appeal the interim order, and a stay of execution.  Following various procedural steps which are irrelevant to the present proceedings, by the time the matter came to me, Mr Chu had abandoned his appeal, but a stay granted by the Court of Appeal remained in place.  The terms of the interim order have not been put into effect.  The documents remain in each party’s sole possession, and to date neither has not given access to those documents to the other.

29.  Now, there must be a substantive decision on Mr Chu’s application.

The reciprocal application by Mr Lau

30.  Central to the argument of Mr William Wong SC, when the matter first came before me on 10 May 2018, was a contention that fairness demanded that there should be an “equality of arms” between the parties to the litigation.  Mr Lau, Mr William Wong said, had had access to all of the removed documents to enable him to prepare his case.  Fairness demanded, the submission was, that Mr Chu should have equal access to those documents to prepare his case.

31.  Mr Anson Wong countered that argument with an assertion that to allow Mr Chu access to the removed documents uninhibited would be to prejudge the case, and in effect to hold, at this early stage, that Mr Chu and Mr Lau were equally entitled to the assets of the PB Group.  The fallacy of the argument is seen in an examination of the reverse proposition.  It may equally be argued that to deny Mr Chu access to the documents would be, in effect, to hold that Mr Lau was now the sole owner of the PB Group. 

32.  Whatever decision is made, I am satisfied that the case is in no way being prejudged.  The steps to be taken in respect of the documents cannot be dictated by this factor.  Access to the removed documents must be determined simply in accordance with the rules of court.

33.  However, the concept of “equality of arms”, was an attractive concept which, together with the reciprocal nature of the interim order, led me, at that time, to suggest to Mr Anson Wong that if an order was to be made against Mr Lau, then Mr Lau may well be entitled to a reciprocal order against Mr Chu in respect of any documents he held that were relevant to the proceedings.  I invited Mr Anson Wong to make an oral application to that effect at the hearing.  The application was made.

34.  Mr William Wong then informed the court that on that day he did not represent Mr Chu, but only the plaintiff companies.  He said that as Mr Chu was not before the court and oral application could not proceed as Mr Chu was entitled to due process and to receive a formal application with an affidavit in support which he could then consider.  The proposition that Mr William Wong did not represent Mr Chu at that time came as somewhat of a surprise to both myself and Mr Anson Wong, as there had been copious reference to the counterclaim which named Mr Chu individually.  However as it was the stated proposition of Mr William Wong that he was not representing Mr Chu that day, the statement was accepted.

35.  The matter was then adjourned to 13 and 14 June to enable the argument to continue, and to enable Mr Anson Wong’s solicitors, if so instructed, to file an appropriate application with an affidavit in support.  A summons was duly filed seeking preservation and inspection pursuant to Order 29, rule 2, by both Mr Chu and Mr Lau, in relation to the documents of 102 companies listed in an appendix to the summons.  In due course I will refer to that summons and to the schedule of the companies, which was divided into a total of five different groups.

Discussion

36.  Mr William Wong said that the jurisdiction of the court to make the order he sought arose first, under the inherent jurisdiction, second, under Order 29, rule 2, and also under Order 24, rule 10.

37.  In so far as the inherent jurisdiction was concerned, Mr William Wong submitted that at least up until January 2014, when it was not in dispute that both parties were the joint owners of the PB Group, common sense must prevail, and each party must have been entitled to inspect the documents they jointly owned.

38.  As to the Order 29, rule 2 jurisdiction, Mr William Wong said that the jurisdiction was plain, that in the light of Mr Lau’s conduct it was clear that preservation of the removed documents was a vital, and as Mr Lau had access to the removed documents to prepare his case it was entirely logical that Mr Chu should be able to inspect the documents in order to prepare his case.

39.  Hong Kong Civil Procedure 2018, Vol 1 (“HKCP”), at 29/8/1, records that “It would seem that, in relation to [the interlocutory orders available under Order 29, rules 2 and 3], the source of the court’s power is the inherent jurisdiction to secure by orders a just and proper trial of the issues.”  That must be right. 

40.  In support of his argument that an order could be made under Order 24, rule 10, Mr William Wong referred me to the decision of Harman J in Dun & Bradstreet v Typesetting Facilities [1992] FSR 320 (Ch D), where the judge treated an application under Order 29, rule 2, for inspection, as an application under Order 24, rule 10, and ordered inspection.  That decision arose in an action for breach of copyright.  That was a case where inspection was sought before the issue of the statement of claim. 

41.  The judge pointed out that literal inspection of the items sought would be of no value as what was required in reality was disclosure of information contained in electronic form.  He held that Order 29, rule 2 wasnot the appropriate route to achieve what the plaintiff sought.  However, the judge found that where there was a genuine case in breach of confidence and copyright infringement on its merits, that in order to plead a full and proper statement of claim for the proper determination of the case, it was essential as well as being sensible, desirable and/or reasonable to allow inspection.  Inspection was accordingly ordered under Order 24, rule 10.

42.  The case is, in my view, one which turns very much on its own particular factual circumstances, and in this case does not assist Mr William Wong, other than to demonstrate that there are cases where it may be appropriate for the court to treat an application under Order 29, rule 2 as an application under Order 24, rule 10.  Each such case will turn very much on its own particular facts.

43.  On an application under Order 29, rule 2, an order may be made in relation to property in the form of a document: see Re Saxton [1962] 1 WLR 859.  However, that decision also makes it clear that it is appropriate to make an order under Order 29, rule 2 when what is in issue is the form of the document or by whom it is made.  Where what is in question is the content of the document, an application for inspection is governed by the rules relating to discovery of documents: see Huddleston v Control Risks Information Services Ltd [1987] 2 All ER 1035.  It is this situation that gives rise to the interface between inspection under Order 29, rule 2 and inspection under Order 24, rule 10.

44.  It is unusual to order inspection under Order 24, rule 10 without there having been a previous order for an affirmation under Order 24, rule 7. An important element of that affirmation is that the other party is not entitled to contravene what is sworn or affirmed in the affirmation by a further contentious affidavit or by obtaining an order to cross-examine the party, since the affirmation in answer is conclusive at the interlocutory stage of the action: see HKCP 24/7/1.  An affirmation under Order 24, rule 7 is accordingly a precursor to a series of further steps which might give rise to an order for inspection.

Preservation

45.  As I understood his position, by the end of the argument, Mr Anson Wong did not dispute that it would be appropriate for a preservation order to be made in respect of the removed documents.  In the circumstances of this case that was a sensible position to adopt.  It is equally sensible, in the hard fought circumstances of this case, that both parties should be required to preserve the documents each holds.

46.  In my view the removed documents will fall into four broad categories.  First, there will be a group of documents, I suspect small and limited, which belong to neither Mr Chu or Mr Lau, either individually or collectively, but which belong to employees and which were held by them in the premises.  Those should be easily identifiable and easily separated from the other documents.  Neither Mr Lau nor Mr Chu will be entitled to inspect those documents.

47.  Second, there will be a group of documents which solely belong to either Mr Chu or Mr Lau.  In respect of those documents a right of inspection will be appropriately dealt with under the discovery procedure where it is necessary for the party seeking inspection and disclosure of those documents to establish, in terms of the rules of Court an entitlement to inspect the documents.  It may well be that some of those documents are simply irrelevant to the present proceedings in which case neither party will be entitled to inspect the other party’s documents falling into this category.

48.  Third, there will be the PB Group documents which came into existence prior to January 2014, to which both parties were in possession prior to the removal.  In respect of those documents prior to removal, Mr Chu would have had unlimited rights of inspection.  Those rights have been taken away from Mr Chu, unilaterally, by Mr Lau’s “self-help” action in removing and securing the documents. 

49.  I accept Mr William Wong’s submission that in respect of those documents was that Mr Chu should not have to, as Mr William Wong put it, “jump through the technical hoops” of the discovery procedure.

50.  Fourth, there will be PB Group documents which came into existence after January 2014, during a period when it appears that each were conducting separate businesses.  Here, the question of inspection is more delicate.  It is plain that the inspection sought by Mr Chu is not simply to establish the existence of the documents or to identify them or to ascertain who made them, but to examine their content for the purpose of the preparation of his case.  It seems to me that inspection for that purpose falls more appropriately and comfortably within the category of discovery.

51.  In so saying I do not disregard Mr Chu’s assertion that he equally owns the documents with Mr Lau, but that is an assertion which is in issue and is yet to be determined.  In my view before any right in Mr Chu to inspect the PB Group or BBG Group documents that have arisen after January 2014 can be established, the body of documents will have to be identified.  That is an exercise which can be undertaken by way of orders for preservation and identification.

52.  It will not be necessary to identify individual documents.  Documents may be identified by either their box file or by a bundle.  For example, some of the box files will contain a series of similar documents, such as bank statements or invoices.  Such a file would be appropriately and sufficiently identified as being “File containing X Company Limited bank statements with Y Bank for the period 1 February 2014 to 31 March 2014”.  Each file should be appropriately identified, whether prior to January 2014 or after that date.

53.  I am accordingly satisfied that there must be an order under Order 29, rule 2 that the documents removed from the premises by Mr Lau bepreserved and identified in accordance with this decision.  There must also be an order under Order 29, rule 2 requiring Mr Chu to preserve and identify in accordance with this decision, all documents and all bank statements relating to the companies listed in the appendix to the order, within his possession, custody or power. 

Inspection

54.  Mr Anson Wong took the position, by the end of the argument, that it was too soon at this stage of the proceedings to make orders for inspection.  There were issues, he said, as to which documents Mr Chu would be entitled to inspect, and whether the inspection was under Order 29, rule 2 or Order 24, rule 10.  If the entitlement to inspection arose under discovery procedures, certain criteria were required to be established.  I think that is right.  For the reasons I have already given it appears to me that quite different criteria apply to the entitlement to inspection under the two rules.

55.  Further, it may well be, but in my view cannot be determined until the categories of documents are identified, that certain of the documentsshould be made available to Mr Chu’s solicitors only.  The usefulness of thatprocedure was identified by Hoffmann J (as he then was) in Lock Internationalplc v Beswick [1989] 1 WLR 1268, 1281, and see per Sakhrani J in Overholt v Overholt [1999] 2 HKLRD 445.

56.  I accordingly do not propose to order inspection at this time but reserve the issue of inspection to be considered following preservation, identification and copying of the documents. 

57.  Leave is accordingly reserved to apply.

The reciprocal application

58.  Annexed to the draft order prepared by Mr Anson Wong in respect of the reciprocal application was a schedule of 102 companies in respect of which Mr Lau sought a reciprocal order against Mr Chu.  Although the application was couched in terms of Order 29, rule 2, I understand that some of those companies at least are companies which came into existence after January 2012. In so far as that is the case, the application is properly to be considered under Order, 24 rule 10, an application for inspection.  As indicated above, a pre-requisite to the application for inspection under that Order is an affirmation under Order 24, rule 7.

59.  The case for Mr Chu is that he had no documents in respect of all of those companies except for 10 on a list which was attached to a draft order prepared by Mr William Wong.  Mr Chu had made an affirmation to that effect. 

60.  That however proved not to be the case, for Mr William Wong was obliged to acknowledge that companies number 85 – 91 in the appendix to the draft order prepared by Mr Anson Wong were companies in which the pleadings on the part of Mr Lau recorded were involved in the alleged misappropriation.  Plainly, documents held by Mr Chu in respect of those companies were properly discoverable.

61.  Mr Anson Wong submitted that the assertion by Mr William Wong that an affirmation already filed by Mr Chu Mr Chu asserting that he held no documents for any other companies was not sufficient.  Mr Anson Wong said, correctly in my view, that that affirmation was not an affirmation made under Order 24, rule 7, and that such an affirmation was essential to commence the series of steps that needed to be taken if it was intended to challenge the conclusiveness of an O 24 r 7 affirmation.  For that reason, Mr Anson Wong said that the order to be made under the reciprocal application should require a further affirmation from Mr Chu. 

62.  I agree.  More than enough technical points have been taken in these proceedings to date, and the door should not be opened to further technical delays.

63.  However, I do not order inspection of any documents referred to in an Order 24, rule 7 affirmation to be made by Mr Chu at this stage, for the same reasons that I do not order inspection of the removed documents at this stage.  Requiring Mr Chu and Mr Lau to make Order 24, rule 7 affirmations at this stage will assist in advancing the proceedings.  It will ensure that the proceedings are not delayed by a technical objection that there is no Order 24, rule 7 affirmation.

The entities to be the subject of Order 24, rule 7 affirmations

64.  Mr Anson Wong’s draft order in respect of the reciprocal application set out a list of the entities in respect of which Mr Lau requested that Mr Chu should make an affirmation.  The list contains five categories.

65.  The first category were 31 companies relating to the PB Group Restructuring Agreement and referred to in the order made on 4 August 2018.  I do not understand Mr William Wong to dispute that list other than in respectof Pacific Logistics CN-Net Limited.  I am satisfied that the evidence establishes in correspondence that Mr Lau has made a claim in respect of that company and that it is accordingly to be included in the list.

66.  The second category comprised a list of 19 companies which were involved in the PB Group but not included in the original list.  I did not understand Mr William Wong to dispute that list and those 19 companies must be included.

67.  The third category are described as companies relating to the BBG Restructuring Agreement.  Mr Anson Wong was obliged to acknowledge that neither the claim nor the counterclaim related to the BBG Restructuring agreement.  There is accordingly no basis upon which documents relating to that group might be the subject of orders.  As the matter presently stands they are irrelevant.  In the event that the pleadings develop further they may become relevant, but that is a matter for the future.

68.  The fourth category of documents are described as companies related to the suspected misappropriations.  Attached to the counterclaim is a schedule setting out details of the transactions which Mr Lau contends amount to misappropriations.  Each of the 7 companies in this category are contained in that list, described as either the payers or recipients of the sums of money alleged to have been misappropriated.  However, as Mr William Wong says, any right of disclosure or inspection must be limited to the documents establishing the transactions alleged in the schedule.  The order in that respect will be so confined.

69.  The fifth category are described as “other companies”.  As I understand it, companies 92 – 96 on the list are companies owned by Mr Chu and are companies which he has used to conduct the business since January 2014.

70.  If, as is asserted by Mr William Wong, Mr Chu does not hold any documents that are relevant he must say so in an affirmation, in proper form, pursuant to an order under O 24 r 7. 

71.  I understand that the companies listed as 97 – 102 were not part of the PB Group or the BBG Group and are personal companies owned by Mr Chu which are not relevant to the proceedings.  No affirmation need be made in respect of those companies, but leave is reserved to apply.

The order

72.  I propose that the order will be in the following terms:

1.   Mr Chu Kok Wing (Mr Chu) and Mr Lau Wing Yan (Mr Lau) shall by 4.00 p.m., 28 days after the sealing of this Order, jointly appoint an independent third party firm of solicitors (the Firm) for the purposes mentioned below.  In the event that the parties cannot agree, within that time, on the Firm to be appointed a firm to be nominated by the President of the Law Society of Hong Kong, not more than 7 days thereafter, shall be appointed.

2.   Mr Lau shall provide to the Firm access to all documents within his possession, custody or power, including all those documents previously located in Rooms 1901, 1902 and 1912, 19th Floor, Shun Tak Centre, Nos 168-200 Connaught Road Central, Hong Kong, (the property), belonging to the companies listed in the Appendix hereto (the Companies) not later than 14 days after the appointment of the Firm.

3.   The Firm shall, as soon as convenient, identify the documents provided by Mr Lau in accordance with paragraph 46 of the Decision herein.  A copy of the list of documents so identified shall be provided by the Firm to Mr Lau and Mr Chu following the completion of the identification.

4.   Mr Chu shall provide to the Firm access to all documents within his possession, custody or power belonging to the Companies, not later than 14 days after the appointment of the Firm.

5.   The Firm shall, as soon as convenient, identify the documents provided by Mr Chu in accordance with paragraph 46 of the Decision herein.  A copy of the list of documents so identified shall be provided to Mr Lau and Mr Chu following the completion of the identification.

6.   In the event that either Mr Lau or Mr Chu wishes to object to the disclosure of any document or group of documents upon the basis of a claim of privilege or other proper reason for nondisclosure, he shall provide a list of the documents identified to which objection is taken no later than 14 days following the provision by the Firm of the list of identified documents in which objected documents are included.  In the event of any dispute in relation to an objection that dispute shall be resolved by the parties by agreement, or if no agreement can be reached, determined by a Master of the High Court.

7.   The Firm shall, as soon as convenient following the completion and supply of the lists of documents, make copies of all documents provided by Mr Lau and Mr Chu, save and except such documents as to which a claim for nondisclosure has been made pursuant to paragraph 6 hereof. Following the resolution of any such claim copies shall be made of all documents in respect of which a claim has failed.  In the event of a successful claim for nondisclosure, the relevant documents shall be returned to the provider following the resolution of the claim, without being copied.

8.   Neither Mr Lau nor Mr Chu shall, without further order of the Court, be entitled to inspect the copies of the documents provided by the other to the Firm.

9.   The Firm will retain and safekeep the copies of the documents made pursuant to paragraph 7 herein and shall not release the same to any other party (including Mr Lau and Mr Chu) without further order of the Court or the agreement of Mr Lau and Mr Chu.

10.   Upon completion of the copying referred to in paragraph 7 hereof, the Firm shall return the original documents to the parties who provided them to the Firm.  Upon receipt of the returned original documents Mr Lau and Mr Chu shall preserve the said documents.

11.   Pursuant to O 24 r 7 Rules of the High Court, within 14 days following the provision of the list containing the identification of the documents provided by Mr Lau pursuant to paragraph 3 hereof, Mr Lau shall make an affirmation as to the list of documents. 

12.   Pursuant to O 24 r 7 Rules of the High Court, within 14 days following the provision of the list containing the identification of the documents provided by Mr Chu pursuant to paragraph 4 hereof, Mr Chu shall make an affirmation as to the list of documents.

13.   The costs of the Firm (including storage costs) in relation to the performance of the provisions of this Order shall be shared by Mr Lau and Mr Chu in equal shares at first instance and shall be payable forthwith upon the receipt of an invoice from the Firm.  Any such costs shall form part of the costs of the action herein.

14.   Leave is reserved to apply.

15.   Costs are reserved.

73.  In the event of any disagreement as to the precise form of the order I would hope that the parties’ solicitors and counsel will be able to resolve the disagreement in accordance with this decision.  If any issue arises, leave to apply at short notice is reserved.

Costs

74.  The issue of inspection of documents, the ultimate object of both applications, is far from complete.  The question of costs is reserved.

  

  

 (John Saunders)
 Deputy High Court Judge

  

Mr William Wong SC, leading Mr Michael Lok and Ms Cherry Xu instructed by Sit Fung Kwong & Shum, for the 1st and 2nd plaintiffs
(by original action) and the 1st defendant (by counterclaim)

Mr Anson Wong SC, leading Mr Martin Kok, instructed by DLA Piper Hong Kong, for the 3rd defendant (by original action)
and the plaintiff (by counterclaim)

  

112750-EN-2017-12-15

CANTON PLUS ENTERPRISE LTD AND ANOTHER v. TONG ZHENJUN AND OTHERS

HTML content

HCA 227/2017

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO 227 OF 2017

______________

BETWEEN

 CANTON PLUS ENTERPRISE LIMITED1st Plaintiff
 ANAIS DEVELOPMENT SA
(suing on behalf of themselves as shareholders in PROFIT FAR LIMITED (other than Team Sino Limited) and PACIFIC BULK SHIPPING LIMITED)
2nd Plaintiff

and

 TONG ZHENJUN (童楨軍)1st Defendant
 LIANG PAN (梁攀)2nd Defendant
 LAU WING YAN (劉永人)3rd Defendant
 PROSPEROUS ELITE VENTURES LIMITED
(also known as 鑫傑創投有限公司)
4th Defendant
 PACIFIC BULK CAPE COMPANY LIMITED5th Defendant
 PACIFIC BULK ENTERPRISES COMPANY LIMITED6th Defendant
 PACIFIC BULK PANAMAX COMPANY LIMITED7th Defendant
 PACIFIC BULK SUPRAMAX COMPANY LIMITED8th Defendant
 PROFIT FAR LIMITED (also known as 益遠有限公司) 9th Defendant
 PACIFIC BULK SHIPPING LIMITED10th Defendant
______________
 (By Original Action) 
AND BETWEEN  
 LAU WING YAN (劉永人)Plaintiff

and

 CHU KONG (朱江)1st Defendant
 CANTON PLUS ENTERPRISE LIMITED2nd Defendant
 ANAIS DEVELOPMENT SA3rd Defendant
______________
 (By Counterclaim) 

Before:  Deputy High Court Judge Kwok SC in Chambers

Date of Hearing:  29 November 2017

Date of Decision:  15 December 2017

______________

D E C I S I O N

______________

Introduction

1.  The issue for my decision is whether the application for leave to appeal against my interlocutory order was out of time.

2.  The Writ endorsed with a Statement of Claim was issued on 27 January 2017.  Lau Wing Yan (劉永人) was named as the 3rd defendant.  Chu Kong (朱江) was not named as a party in the Writ.

3.  The Defence of the 3rd, 5th to 8th defendants and Counterclaim of the 3rd defendant was dated 31 May 2017.  Chu Kong (朱江) was named as 1st defendant in the Counterclaim.  Sit Fung Kwong and Shum did not acknowledge service of the Counterclaim on behalf of Chu Kong (朱江) until 30 August 2017.

4.  The Statements of Truth in the following pleadings were signed by Chu Kong (朱江):

(1) Statement of Claim, as director of the 1st and 2nd plaintiffs, on 27 January 2017;

(2) Voluntary Further and Better Particulars of the Statement of Claim, as director of the 1st and 2nd plaintiffs, on 22 June 2017; 

(3) Reply to the Defence of the 1st and 2nd defendants, as director of the 1st and 2nd plaintiffs, on 1 September 2017[1]; and

(4) Reply to the Defence of the 3rd, 5th – 8th defendants and Defence to Counterclaim of the 3rd defendant, as director of the 1st and 2nd plaintiffs and as the “1st Defendant by Counterclaim”, on 1 September 2017[2].   

5.  On 1 August 2017, Sit Fung Kwong & Shum, describing themselves as “Solicitors for the 1st and 2nd Plaintiffs”, issued a summons against the 3rd defendant (by Original Action)[3] for the following orders to be made:

“ 1. The 3rd Defendant (by Original Writ)[4] be ordered to provide to Mr Chu Kong acting in the name of the 1st and 2nd Plaintiffs[5](“Mr Chu”[6]) in writing within 7 days thereof, a list of all properties removed from the [sic] Rooms 1901, 1902 and 1912, 19th Floor, West Tower, Shun Tak Centre, Nos 168–200 Connaught Road Central, Hong Kong (the ‘Property’) on 16 June 2017;

2. Until trial or further order, the 3rd Defendant (by Original Writ)[7]be ordered to deliver up within 3 days hereof all documents removed from the Property on 16 June 2017 (the ‘Removed Documents’) to the office of Messrs Zhong Lun, or alternatively, Messrs DLA Piper, or alternatively, such other places as may be agreed between the 3rd Defendant[8] and [Chu Kong (朱江)][9] (the ‘Storage Location’), subject to an undertaking not to release the same without the consent of the parties or an order of the Court; and

3. Until the trial or further order, the 3rd Defendant (by Original Writ)[10] be ordered to enable reasonable repeated access into the Storage Location and the inspection of the Removed Documents by [Chu Kong (朱江)][11] whether acting by himself or by his agents or otherwise, upon the giving of 24 hours’ notice.

Dated this 1st day of August 2017”

6.  At least one other application in a related action[12] was listed before me on 4 August 2017.  Neither the application in that action nor the Order I made in that action was included in the hearing bundles for the hearing on 29 November 2017.

7.  On 4 August 2017, Mr Clifford Smith SC, leading Mr Michael Lok[13] and Ms Cherry Xu, instructed by Sit Fung Kwong & Shum[14], appeared for the plaintiff in HCA 197/2017 and the 1st and 2nd plaintiffs in HCA 227/2017.  Ms Catrina Lam and Mr Vincent Chiu, instructed by Zhong Lun Law Firm, appeared for the defendant in HCA 197/2017.  Mr Douglas Lam SC, leading Mr Martin Kok[15], instructed by DLA Piper Hong Kong[16], appeared for the 3rd defendant in HCA 227/2017[17].

8.  In §1(2) of their “Skeleton Submissions of the Applicants/‌Plaintiffs” for the hearing on 4 August 2017, Mr Clifford Smith SC, Mr Michael Lok and Ms Cherry Xu stated that the application in HCA 227/2017 was an “application by [Chu Kong (朱江)] in the name of” the plaintiffs[18] for orders against Lau Wing Yan (劉永人).

9.  In the course of his submission, Mr Clifford Smith SC referred to Chu Kong (朱江) as “my client[19]” [20].

10.  At the resumed hearing in the afternoon of 4 August 2017, I had been given 4 draft orders, 2 in landscape form submitted by the team led by Mr Clifford Smith SC and 2 in portrait form submitted by the team led by Mr Douglas Lam SC.  None of these 4 draft orders was included in the hearing bundles for the hearing on 29 November 2017.  Sit Fung Kwong and Shum and Mr Michael Lok were solicitors and counsel present at the 4 August 2017 hearing and should have a copy of those 4 draft orders.  So were DLA Piper Hong Kong and Mr Martin Kok.

11.  After hearing counsel, I indicated the orders which I proposed to impose and went on to say that:

“ Unless there is any violent disagreement I will ask the parties to come up with a draft to give effect to what I have indicated.”[21]

12.  No written communications (a) among solicitors for the parties and (b) between solicitors for the parties and my clerk leading to the approval by my clerk of the formal order(s) was included in the hearing bundles for the hearing on 29 November 2017.  This is perplexing since the parties were to “come up with a draft to give effect to what I have indicated”.  The court should be provided with copies of written communications to see if the parties had time and opportunity to come up with their own drafts and comment on drafts prepared by the others.  The parties and their legal advisers must present a complete, balanced and relevant picture of how the Order sought to be appealed against came to be made.

The Interlocutory Order (dated 4 August 2017)

13.  I made an Order dated 4 August 2017 (“Interlocutory Order”) in HCA 227/2017 which read as follows:

“ Upon the application of the 1st and 2nd Plaintiffs (by Original Action) (the ‘Plaintiffs’) by way of Summons filed herein on 1 August 2017 (the ‘Summons’)

AND UPON reading the Affirmation of [Chu Kong (朱江)][22] filed herein on 2 August 2017 together with the exhibits referred to therein and the Affirmation of [Lau Wing Yan (劉永人)] filed on 3 August 2017 together with the exhibits referred to therein

AND UPON hearing Senior Counsel for the Plaintiffs and Senior Counsel for [Lau Wing Yan (劉永人)]

IT IS ORDERED that:-

1. [Chu Kong (朱江)] (‘Mr Chu’), the 1st Defendant by Counterclaim herein) and Mr Lau Wing Yan (‘Mr Lau’, [Lau Wing Yan (劉永人)]), do by 4:00 pm on 18 August 2017 jointly appoint an independent third party firm of solicitors (the ‘said Firm’) for the purposes mentioned below. In the event that the parties cannot agree on the firm to be appointed, a firm be nominated by the President of the Law Society shall be appointed;

2. [Lau Wing Yan (劉永人)] do provide to the said Firm access to all documents within his possession, custody or power (including those previously located in Rooms 1901, 1902 and 1912, 19th Floor, West Tower, Shun Tak Centre, Nos. 168–200 Connaught Road Central, Hong Kong (the ‘Property’)) belonging to the companies listed in the Appendix herein (the ‘said Companies’), by 4:00 pm on 18 August 2017 for the purpose of making copies, save and except such documents as to which there is a claim of privilege or other reason for not providing a copy, which dispute shall be agreed or decided by a Master of the High Court;

3. [Chu Kong (朱江)] do provide to the said Firm access to all documents within his possession, custody or power belonging to the said Companies (if any) by 4:00 pm on 18 August 2017 for the purpose of making copies, save and except such documents as to which there is a claim of privilege or other reason for not providing a copy, which dispute shall be agreed or decided by a Master of the High Court;

4. The said Firm do retain and safekeep the copies of the documents made pursuant to paragraphs 2 and 3 above, and shall not release the same to any other party (including[Chu Kong (朱江)] and [Lau Wing Yan (劉永人)]) without further order of the Court or agreement of [Chu Kong (朱江)] and [Lau Wing Yan (劉永人)]. Upon completion of copying in paragraphs 2 and 3 above, the said Firm shall return the original documents;

5. Costs of the said Firm (including storage costs) in relation to performance of paragraphs 1 to 4 above be shared by [Chu Kong (朱江)] and [Lau Wing Yan (劉永人)] in equal shares at first instance, such costs shall form part of the costs of the Action herein;

6. The Summons be adjourned for argument with 1 day reserved in consultation with Counsel’s diary;

7. [Lau Wing Yan (劉永人)] do have leave to file and serve affirmation evidence in opposition to the Summons by 4:00 pm on 1 September 2017;

8. The Plaintiffs do have leave to file and serve affirmation evidence in reply by 4:00 pm on 22 September 2017 (if so advised);

9. There be no further affirmation evidence without leave of the Court;

10. Costs of the Summons and today’s hearing be reserved with certificates for two counsel.

Dated the 4th day of August 2017.

[The Appendix to the Interlocutory Order contains a list of 31 companies.]”

Summons for leave to appeal (dated 14 September 2017)

14.  On 14 September 2017, Sit Fung Kwong & Shum, describing themselves as “Solicitors for the Plaintiffs (by Original Action) and the Defendants (by Counterclaim)”, issued a summons containing an application by the “1st and 2nd Plaintiffs (by Original Action) and the 1st Defendant (by Counterclaim)[23] ” (“Applicants”) for an order that:

“ 1. The 1st and 2nd Plaintiffs (by Original Action) and the 1st Defendant (by Counterclaim)[24] do have leave to appeal against paragraphs 2 and 3 of the Order of Deputy High Court Judge Kwok SC dated 4th August 2017 (the ‘Order’) to the extent and upon the grounds as per the draft Notice of Appeal annexed hereto;

2. There be a stay of execution of paragraph 3 of the Order pending the final determination of the said appeal [25]; and

3. Costs of this application be in the cause of the said appeal.

Dated this 14th day of September 2017.”

Lau Wing Yan (劉永人)’s application for stay

15.  On 23 November 2017 [26], DLA Piper Hong Kong, describing themselves as solicitors for the 3rd, 5th – 8th defendants, issued a summons containing an application by the 3rd defendant (by Original Action)[27] for an Order that:

“ 1. In the event that (a) leave to appeal is given under Paragraph 1 of the Summons filed by the Plaintiffs (by Original Action) and the 1st to 3rd Defendants (by Counterclaim[28] on 14 September 2017 (the “Summons”) and/or a stay of execution pending the said appeal is granted under Paragraph 2 of the Summons, there be a stay of execution of paragraph 2 of the Order of Deputy High Court Judge Kwok SC dated the 4 August 2017 pending the final determination of the said appeal; and

2. Costs be provided for.”

Issue raised on 29 November 2017

16.  At the hearing on 29 November 2017, I asked Mr William Wong SC whether the application for leave to appeal against the Interlocutory Order was in time.  Mr William Wong SC said it was and added that if it was not, he would ask for leave to appeal out of time.  I asked for authorities.  Mr William Wong SC asked for time and I stood down the hearing at his request.  At the resumed hearing, he cited section 31 of the High Court Ordinance, Cap 4, and Chung Fai Engineering Co v Maxwell Engineering Co Ltd [2001] 3 HKC 24 in support of his contention.

17.  After hearing counsel, I said I would consider whether the application was made in time and would hand down my decision on 15 December 2017.

Relevant statutory provisions

18.  Section 31(1) of the High Court Ordinance, Cap 4, as amended by section 23 of Ordinance No 52 of 1987 and section 2 of Ordinance No 25 of 1998, reads as follows:

“ Computation of vacation period and validity of acts therein

(1) Where by any law regulating civil procedure, or by any special order of the High Court, any period not exceeding one month is appointed or allowed for the doing of any act or the taking of any proceeding, no days included in the Summer vacation shall be reckoned in the computation of such time, unless the Court otherwise directs: (Amended 52 of 1987 s. 23; 25 of 1998 s. 2)

Provided that nothing in this section shall be deemed to extend the time for entering appearance to any writ endorsed with a statement of claim.  (Amended 79 of 1979 s. 2)”

19.  Section 29 of the High Court Ordinance provides that:

“ Vacations

(1) The following vacations shall be observed in each year in the High Court and the Registries— (Amended 25 of 1998 s. 2)

(a) the Summer vacation; (Amended 52 of 1987 s. 22)

(b) …

(c) ….

(2) The dates of the vacations referred to in subsection (1) shall be prescribed by rules of court.

(3) The days of the commencement and termination of each vacation shall be included in such vacation.”

20.   Order 1, rule 4(1) of the Rules of the High Court, Cap 4A, defines “vacation” as meaning “the interval between sittings of the High Court as prescribed by Order 64; (25 of 1998 s. 2)”.

21.   Order 64, rule 1 of the Rules of the High Court, Cap 4A, provides that:

“ Sittings of the Supreme Court (O. 64, r. 1)

(1) The sittings of the Court of Appeal and of the Court of First Instance shall be three in every year, that is to say— (25 of 1998 s. 2)

(a) the Winter sittings which shall begin on 4 January and end on the Thursday before Easter Sunday;

(b) the Spring sittings which shall begin on the second Monday after Easter Sunday and end on 31 July;

(c) the Autumn sittings which shall begin on 1 September and end on 23 December. (L.N. 404 of 1991)”

22.   The combined effect of Order 1, rule 4(1) and Order 64, rule 1(1) is that the Summer vacation begins on 1 August and ends on 31 August.

Chung Fai Engineering Co

23.   Chung Fai Engineering Co v Maxwell Engineering Co Ltd [2001] 3 HKC 24 was a decision by Keith JA (sitting alone) handed down on 10 April 2001.  He held that the time for serving a notice of appeal did not run during the month of August and that a notice of appeal cannot be said to be a pleading (within the meaning of Order 3, rule 3).  With respect, I am unable to derive any assistance from this case on the issue before me.

Civil Justice Reform

24.   Prior to the Civil Justice Reform, a party has a right of appeal to the Court of Appeal against an interlocutory judgment or order of the Court of First Instance.

25.   The Civil Justice Reform introduced the requirement of leave for interlocutory appeals.  Section 14AA[29] was added to the High Court Ordinance, Cap 4, by section 25 of the Civil Justice (Miscellaneous Amendments) Ordinance, 2008, Ord No 3 of 2008, to require leave to appeal. Section 14AA now provides as follows:

“ Leave to appeal required for interlocutory appeals

(1) Except as provided by rules of court, no appeal lies to the Court of Appeal from an interlocutory judgment or order of the Court of First Instance in any civil cause or matter unless leave to appeal has been granted by the Court of First Instance or the Court of Appeal.

(2) Rules of court may specify a judgment or order of any prescribed description to which subsection (1) does not apply and accordingly an appeal lies as of right from the judgment or order.

(3) Leave to appeal for the purpose of subsection (1) may be granted—

(a) in respect of a particular issue arising out of the interlocutory judgment or order; and

(b) subject to such conditions as the court hearing the application for leave considers necessary in order to secure the just, expeditious and economical disposal of the appeal.

(4) Leave to appeal for the purpose of subsection (1) shall not be granted unless the court hearing the application for leave is satisfied that—

(a) the appeal has a reasonable prospect of success; or

(b) there is some other reason in the interests of justice why the appeal should be heard.

(5) This section does not apply in relation to an interlocutory judgment or order of the Court of First Instance made before the commencement of this section[30].

  (Added 3 of 2008 s. 25) ”

26.   Section 14AA must be read with the relevant rule governing application for and grant of leave to appeal.  The relevant rule is Order 59, rule 2B which was added to the Rules of the High Court, Cap 4A, by rule 203 the Rules of the High Court (Amendment) Rules 2008.  The amendment rules came into operation on the day appointed for the commencement of the Civil Justice (Miscellaneous Amendments) Ordinance 2008, ie 2 April 2009.  Order 59, rule 2B provided as follows:

“ Application for leave to appeal
against interlocutory and other
judgments or orders of Court
(O. 59, r. 2B)

(1) Subject to paragraph (4) and any other enactment, an application for leave to appeal against—

(a) an interlocutory judgment or order of the Court;

(b) a judgment or order of the Court specified in section 14‌(3)(e) or (f) of the Ordinance; or

(c) any other judgment or order of the Court against which an appeal may be made with leave of the Court or the Court of Appeal,

may only be made[31] to the Court in the first instance within 14 days from the date of the judgment or order.

(2) So far as is practicable, the application must be made to the judge or master against whose judgment or order leave to appeal is sought.

(3) Where the Court refuses the application, a further application for leave to appeal may be made to the Court of Appeal within 14 days from the date of the refusal.

(4) If the Court of Appeal allows, the application may be made direct to the Court of Appeal within 14 days from the date of the judgment or order.

(5) An application under this rule must be made inter partes if the proceedings to which the judgment or order relates are inter partes.

   (L.N. 152 of 2008) ”

Construction of section 14AA, Order 59 rule 2B and section 31

27.   Section 14AA and Order 59, rule 2B were changes made under the Civil Justice Reform.  They should be construed together and with other changes made to the civil practice and procedure under the Civil Justice Reform.

28.   In Wynn Resorts (Macau) SA v Mong Henry [2009] 5 HKC 515, HCA 192/2000, 10 August 2009, Chu J (as she then was) held that the Court of First Instance only had power to deal with an application for leave to appeal under Order 59 rule 2B(1) that was made before the expiration of the 14-day time limit.  Her Ladyship went on to hold that the power to extend time under Order 3, rule 5(1) should not apply to an application for leave to appeal and the power under Order 3, rule 5(2) to extend time notwithstanding the application was made after the expiration of the time limit did not apply to an application for leave to appeal.  Her Ladyship said:

“ 10. In my view, the starting point is to consider the wordings in O 59 r 2B(1), pursuant to which the application for leave to appeal is made.  The material part of r 2B(1) provides that: ‘… an application for leave to appeal … may only be made to the Court in the first instance within 14 days from the date of the judgment or order’ (emphasis added).  The language suggests that an application to the court below for leave to appeal its judgment or order can only be made within the 14-day time limit.

11. There is no other provision in O 59 enabling the court below to extend time for applying for leave to appeal.  Order 59 r 15, which deals with extension of time, provides that:

‘Without prejudice to the power of the Court of Appeal or a single judge under Order 3, rule 5, to extend or abridge the time prescribed by any provision of this Order, the period for serving notice of appeal under rule 4 or making application ex parte under rule 14(3) may be extended or abridged by the court below on application made before the expiration of that period.’

12. Previously, the power under r 15 to extend time might extend to applications for leave to appeal by reason of the reference to ‘application ex parte under rule 14(3)’.  This is no longer the case as a result of amendments to O 59 brought about by the Civil Justice Reform.  O 59 r 14(2) and r 14(3), dealing with applications for leave to appeal, had been repealed and applications for leave to appeal are now dealt with under the new rr 2A, 2B and 2C.  The new r 14(13) further expressly provides that r 14 does not apply in relation to an application for leave to appeal.  Consequently, the reference in r 15 to ‘application ex parte under rule 14(3)’ can no longer cover an application for leave to appeal, quite apart from the fact that such application is now generally made inter partes: O 59 r 2A(2) and r 2B(5).  It should also be noted that the power under r 15 can only be invoked by the court below if the application to extend time is made before the expiration of the time limit, which is not the case here.

13. Having regard to the wordings of r 2B together with the legislative intent as appeared from the legislative development and the absence of express provision conferring a power to extend the time for applying for leave to appeal, I am of the view that the court in the first instance, which includes the Court of First Instance,only has power to deal with an application for leave to appeal under O 59 r 2B(1) that is made before the expiration of the 14-day time limit.  And that the power to extend time under O 3 r 5(1) should not apply to an application for leave to appeal.  Similarly the power under O 3 r 5(2) to extend time notwithstanding the application is made after the expiration of the time limit does not apply to an application for leave to appeal.  Such a construction is also consistent with the underlying objective in O 1A r 1(b).

14. Additionally, it is instructive to contrast the position in Rules of the High Court with that in Rules of the District Court. The new O 58 r 2(4) of Rules of the District Court (Cap 336H), which was introduced at the same time as O 59 r 2B(1) of Rules of the High Court, is differently worded.  It merely states that an application for leave to appeal ‘must be made’ within the time limit specified in the sub-rule.  At the same time, O 58 r 2(10) of Rules of District Court expressly empowers the District Court to extend the time for applying for leave to appeal and the power may be exercised at any time and notwithstanding the time limit for so doing has expired.  This reinforces the construction stated above.

15. For these reasons, leave to apply for leave to appeal out of time is refused.”

29.   I should add that Order 1A, rule 1(b); Order 3, rule 5(1) and Order 3; rule 5(2) provide that:

Order 1A, rule 1(b):

“ The underlying objectives of these rules are … to ensure that a case is dealt with as expeditiously as is reasonably practicable.”

Order 3, rule 5(1):

“ The Court may, on such terms as it thinks just, by order extend or abridge the period within which a person is required or authorized by these rules, or by any judgment, order or direction, to do any act in any proceedings.”

Order 3, rule 5(2):

“ The Court may extend any such period as is referred to in paragraph (1) although the application for extension is not made until after the expiration of that period.”

30.   Significantly, Her Ladyship ruled that the general provision on extension of time under Order 3, rule 5(1) and (2) did not apply to the new and particular 14-day time-limit under Order 59, rule 2B(1)(a). 

31.   Wynn Resorts (Macau) SA was applied by To J in Menno Leendert Vos v Global Fair Industrial Limited HCA 4200/1995, 23 April 2010.  His Lordship agreed entirely with §§10 – 15 of Wynn Resorts (Macau) SA and added his own observations.

“ Jurisdiction to grant extension of time to apply for leave to appeal

3. Since the implementation of the Civil Justice Reform (‘CJR’), leave is required to appeal against interlocutory and certain other judgments or orders of the court and such application may only be made to the court in the first instance, referred to as the ‘court below’, within 14 days from the date of the judgment or order being appealed against: Order 59 rule 2B(1) of the Rules of the High Court.  The orders being appealed against were made on 25 March 2010.  The time to apply for leave to appeal expired on 8 April 2010.  The application is therefore out of time by 7 days.

[In §4, the learned judge quoted §§10 – 15 of Wynn Resorts (Macau) SA]

5. I have quoted the relevant parts of Chu J’s judgment in full.  I agree entirely with her Ladyship’s construction of Order 59 rule 2B(1), and have the following observations to add.  Under this new scheme introduced by the CJR into Order 59, leave to appeal against an interlocutory judgment or order may be made to the court below and so far as is practicable to the judge or master against whose judgment or order leave to appeal is sought: rule 2B(1) and (2).  If that application is refused, the applicant may make a further application for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal within 14 days from the date of the refusal: rule 2B(3).  Where leave is given, whether by the court below or by the Court of Appeal, the appellant has to serve a notice of appeal to all parties to the proceedings specifying the grounds of the appeal and the precise form of the order which the appellant proposes to ask the Court of Appeal to make: rule 3. This notice of appeal must be served within stipulated period, depending on the type of case concerned: rule 4.  Rule 15 gives the court below the power to extend or abridge the period for serving notice of appeal under rule 4 on application made before the expiration of that period. 

6. The phrase ‘may only be made’ in Order 59 rule 2B(1) is unequivocal, indicating that an application to the court below for leave to appeal against its judgment or order may only be made within the stipulated 14-day period.  As observed by Chu J, there is no other provision in Order 59 giving the court below jurisdiction to extend the time for applying for leave to appeal.  It should be noted that under this new scheme even where leave to appeal has been granted, rule 15 expressly gives the court below power to grant extension of time for serving notice of appeal.  Even then, such application has to be made before the expiration of that period.  Thus, a fortiori, in the absence of express provision giving the court below power to grant extension of time to apply for leave to appeal, it must necessarily follow that the court below does not have such power, in the light of the unequivocal language used in rule 2B(1).

7. Two of the underlying objectives of the CJR are to ensure that a case is dealt with as expeditiously as is reasonably practicable and to promote a sense of reasonable proportion and procedural economy in the conduct of proceedings.  The construction that rule 2B(1) requires an appellant to apply for leave to appeal against an interlocutory judgment or order of the court within strict time limit without any power in the court to grant extension of time best serves these objectives.  A strict time limit is particularly justified for appeals against interlocutory judgments and orders.  Such construction enables cases to move forward expeditiously without being dragged behind by delays caused by appeals against interlocutory judgments or orders, especially delays as a result of dilatory conduct of the intending appellant.  Such a construction also promotes proportionality and procedural economy.  This construction, which is consistent with the unequivocal language used and which best serves these objectives, must have been what was in the contemplation of the legislature when passing the amendments to the new Order 59. 

8. For the same reasons as given by Chu J and the above reason, I find that as the court below, I have no jurisdiction to grant extension of time to apply for leave to appeal against my interlocutory order after the stipulated 14-day period has expired.”

32.   The Civil Justice Reform introduced the requirement of leave to appeal for interlocutory appeals.  Order 59, rule 2B(1) imposes a strict time limit of 14 days to apply to the first instance court for leave and there is no jurisdiction to extend time.  This is to achieve the two objective requirements referred to in §7 of the judgment in Menno Leendert Vos.

33.   Section 31 was a general provision on reckoning time enacted before the Civil Justice Reform to provide that:

“ Where by any law regulating civil procedure, or by any special order of the High Court, any period not exceeding one month is appointed or allowed for the doing of any act or the taking of any proceeding, no days included in the Summer vacation shall be reckoned in the computation of such time, unless the Court otherwise directs …”

34.   Section 31 does not sit well with section 14AA and Order 59, rule 5B(1), read together and together with the other changes introduced by the Civil Justice Reform.  Interlocutory appeals are no longer as of right.  Leave to appeal is necessary.  The period “appointed or allowed” under Order 59, rule 2B(1)(a) is a strict time limit of 14 days without any jurisdiction to extend time.  If section 31 were to continue to apply as the applicants contended, then they would effectively have 31 – 4 + 14 = 41 days to apply.  This far exceeds 14 days from the date of the judgment or order.  The applicants seemed to have scant respect for the time limits imposed under the Interlocutory Order[32] as they did not issue the summons for leave to appeal and for stay of §3 of the Interlocutory Order until 14 September 2017. 

35.   For these reasons I hold that section 31 does not apply to applications made under Order 59, rule 2B(1)(a).  

Rules of the High Court (Amendment) Rules 2017

36.   Mr William Wong SC did not cite Rules of the High Court (Amendment) Rules 2017 which came into operation on 1 December 2017.

37.   Rule 3 of the Amendment Rules added rule 2B(6) to Order 59 rule 2B.  Rule 2B(6) provides as follows:

“(6)  The Court or the Court of Appeal may extend the period for making an application for leave to appeal before or after the expiry of the period. “ (L.N. 122 of 2017)

38.   As Rule 2B(6) had not come into operation on:

(1) 18 August 2017 when the period for application to me expired;

(2) 14 September 2017 when the summons for leave to appeal was issued; and

(3) 29 November 2017 when the summons for leave to appeal was heard;

it had no application in this case and the application was out of time.  In any event, there was no application by Mr William Wong SC for extension of time.

Disposition

39.   The application for leave to appeal from the Interlocutory Order was out of time and I dismiss the application. 

40.   The consequence of my dismissing the application for leave to appeal is that the applications for stay of execution must also be dismissed.

41.   I dismiss the summons dated 14 September 2017 issued by the Applicants and the summons dated 23 November 2017 issued by Lau Wing Yan (劉永人).  I order the Applicants to pay the costs of the Lau Wing Yan(劉永人) in respect of the summons dated 14 September 2017 and at the hearing on 29 November 2017, to be taxed if not agreed, with certificate for counsel. There be no order as to costs in respect of the summons dated 23 November 2017.

42.   If the applicants wish to take this interlocutory matter any further, they should include in the hearing bundles the documents referred to in §§6, 10 and 12 above.

 (Kenneth Kwok SC)
 Deputy High Court Judge

Mr William Wong SC, leading Mr Michael Lok, instructed by Sit Fung Kwong & Shum, for the 1st and 2nd plaintiffs by Original Action and the 1st defendant by Counterclaim

Ms Rachel Lam and Mr Martin Kok, instructed by DLA Piper Hong Kong, for the 3rd defendant by Original Action (the plaintiff by Counterclaim)



[1] This pleading was included in the hearing bundles.

[2] This pleading was included in the hearing bundles.

[3] Lau Wing Yan (劉永人).

[4] Lau Wing Yan (劉永人).

[5] Emphasis added.

[6] Referred to in this Decision as “Chu Kong (朱江)”.

[7] Lau Wing Yan (劉永人).

[8] Lau Wing Yan (劉永人).

[9] Emphasis added.

[10] Lau Wing Yan (劉永人).

[11] Emphasis added.

[12] HCA 197/2017.

[13] Who also represented the Applicants in the hearing before me on 29 November 2017.

[14] Who also represented the Applicants in the hearing before me on 29 November 2017.

[15] Who also represented Lau Wing Yan (劉永人) in the hearing before me on 29 November 2017.

[16] Who also represented Lau Wing Yan (劉永人) in the hearing before me on 29 November 2017.

[17] Lau Wing Yan (劉永人).

[18] Emphasis added.

[19] Emphasis added.

[20] Transcript p 20 against letter C.

[21] Transcript p 37 against letter N.

[22] Emphasis added.

[23] Chu Kong (朱江).

[24] Chu Kong (朱江).

[25] The time limit for compliance with §3 of the Interlocutory Order was “4:00 pm on 18 August 2017”.  The first and only application for stay of this paragraph was not made until 14 September 2017.

[26] The time limit for compliance with §2 of the Interlocutory Order was “4:00 pm on 18 August 2017”.  The first and only application for stay of this paragraph was not made until 23 November 2017.

[27] Lau Wing Yan (劉永人).

[28] The summons issued on 14 September 2017 did not state that it was issued by the 2nd and 3rd defendants (by Counterclaim).

[29] Which came into effect on 2 April 2009.

[30] 2 April 2009.

[31] Emphasis added.

[32] The time limit under §§1, 2 and 3 of the Interlocutory Order was 4:00 pm on 18 August 2017.