Case Detail

HCAL 1047/2017

[2019] HKCFI 1784

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST

NO 1047 OF 2017

___________________

BETWEEN
	ISLAM MOHAMMAD SHAHIDUL	Applicant
and
	TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD /	Putative Respondent
	NON-REFOULEMENT CLAIMS
	PETITION OFFICE
and
	DIRECTOR OF IMMIGRATION	Putative Interested Party

___________________

Before:

Hon Campbell Moffat J in Chambers

Date of Hearing:	16 July 2019
Date of Decision:	16 July 2019

___________________

D E C I S I O N

___________________

Introduction

1. This is an application dated 31 May 2019 for appeal from my decision of 30 April 2019 refusing leave to apply for judicial review. The applicant had 14 days in which to apply to appeal that decision. He did not do so. He now requires leave to extend time to appeal against that order. The applicant attended in person and was heard with the assistance of an interpreter.

Procedural background

2. The applicant is a claimant under Article 3 of the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. He entered Hong Kong illegally by boat on 28 June 2014 and was arrested the same day. He submitted a non‑refoulement claim form on 17 February 2016 and was interviewed by the Director of Immigration (“the Director”) on 1 June 2016. The Director dismissed his claim under all heads, by Notice of Decision on 4 July 2016 and by Notice of Further Decision on 31 March 2017. He appealed those decisions to the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“the TCAB”). The adjudicator of the TCAB, Ms Kay Ransome (“the Adjudicator”), heard him on 10 May 2017. The Adjudicator refused his appeal on 14 November 2017.

3. The applicant filed a notice of application on a Form 86 seeking leave to apply for judicial review on 11 December 2017 and did not request an oral hearing. The matter was therefore considered on the papers. His application for leave to apply for judicial review was refused on 30 April 2019. He had 14 days from that date to appeal that decision which would have expired on 14 May 2019. By way of summons dated 31 May 2019, he seeks leave to appeal out of time.

4. An applicant does not require leave to appeal against a CFI judge’s refusal to grant leave to apply for judicial review (Order 59, rule 21(1)(g)). The applicant may appeal as of right. However, an applicant who wishes to appeal against a CFI judge’s refusal to grant leave to apply for judicial review, which is an interlocutory order, has to observe the time limits for appeal under Order 53, rule 3(4) of the Rules of the High Court which allows 14 days. Where the applicant is out of time to appeal against a judge’s refusal to grant leave to apply for judicial review, an extension of time may be granted by a judge of the Court of First Instance under Order 59, rule 15. The court is required to consider (1) the length of the delay; (2) the reasons for the delay; (3) the prospect of success in the intended appeal; and (4) the prejudice to the respondent if an extension of time were granted.

5. In order to obtain that leave, an application must be made promptly and it must be supported by an affirmation or affidavit deposing to any facts relied upon by the applicant and giving a full account of and explanation for the whole of the delay since time expired. Whilst the granting of an extension of time is entirely within the discretion of the court, the applicant is required to explain the reasons for his delay as this forms part of the consideration of whether there is good reason to allow an extension of time. The applicant apologises to the court for being late but gives no further explanation as to why he was late save to say that he has language difficulties which delayed his filing of the appeal. The court file suggests that the Order was properly served upon the address given at that time, which is the same address the applicant uses today and he accepts this. It is the duty of a litigant to give the court an address to which correspondence or notice can come to his attention in a timely manner[1] and thereafter to act within the timeframe provided by the Rules of the High Court. The consequences of any delay arising from failing to do so will fall upon the litigant[2].

6. Even if the court does accept the reasons given for the delay, which was not a great period of time, the court is nevertheless required to examine whether there is any merit in the applicant’s appeal[3]. The applicant wishes to have the merits of his case re-considered. He has no complaint about the decision of this court. There being no actual grounds of appeal, this court is forced to the conclusion that there is no reasonable prospect of success in the intended appeal.

7. It must be emphasised that the role of the court in judicial review is not to provide a further avenue of appeal from the decisions of the Director and the Adjudicator[4]. It follows that an appeal from this court should not be founded upon any attempt to appeal those same decisions. It is an appeal from the decision of this court and the applicant should look to draft grounds of appeal on that basis. Despite having this explained to the applicant, he was unable to do so.

Conclusion

8. The explanation the applicant has offered to this court for his tardiness is unfortunate and he has no grounds of appeal but I have, nevertheless re‑considered his underlying application lest there being something which was overlooked on the previous occasion and to ensure absolute fairness to the applicant. Unfortunately for him, it has no merit as explained in the initial refusal of leave. There were no grounds of review and none could be ascertained from the papers. The facts relied upon by the applicant were very simple and did not evidence the basis for UNHCR protection. Nor was there any complaint before the court as to this court’s decision to refuse leave and a review of that decision does not evidence any grounds. The applicant merely wishes the Court of Appeal to consider his situation afresh as he does not want to go back to Bangladesh. Having considered the length of delay, reason for the delay and underlying merits of his application, it would not be in the interest of justice to grant an extension of time in all the circumstances of this case.

9. The applicant’s summons dated 31 May 2019 be dismissed.

	(A P Campbell Moffat)
	Judge of the Court of First Instance High Court

The applicant appeared in person.

[1]Re Ahmed Zakar CAMP 17/2019, [2019] HKCA 566

[2]Islam Raja Rais v Director of Immigration HCMP 881/2017

[3]Re Mehmood Ikhlas CAMP 28/2019 [2019] HKCA 567

[4]Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration CAMP 54/2018 [2018] HKCA 524; Re Md Shohel Sheak CACV 233/2018 [2018] HKCA 714

HCAL 1047/2017

[2019] HKCFI 469

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No. 1047 of 2017

BETWEEN

	Islam Mohammad Shahidul	Applicant
	and
	Torture Claims Appeal Board / Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office	Putative Respondent
	and
	Director of Immigration	Putative Interested Party

Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review
NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Ord. 53 r. 3)

Following:

consideration of the documents only; or
consideration of the documents and the Applicant being present/absent in open court

Order by The Honourable Mrs. Justice Campbell-Moffat:

Leave to apply for judicial review be refused.

Observations for the Applicant:

Procedural history

1. The applicant entered Hong Kong illegally by boat on 28 June 2014, from Bangladesh via China and was arrested the same day. He submitted a non-refoulement (“NRF”) claim by way of written representation on 1 July 2014 and was released upon his own recognisance on 1 August 2014. His NRF claim form was submitted on 17 February 2016.

2. The applicant attended a screening interview on 1 June 2016. The Director of Immigration (“the Director”) dismissed his claim (not including that under BOR2) by Notice of Decision (“the Decision”) on 4 July 2016 and by Notice of Further Decision (re BOR 2) on 31 March 2017. He appealed the original Decision to the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“the TCAB”). The adjudicator of the TCAB, Ms Kay Ransome (“the Adjudicator”), heard him on 10 May 2017. She considered his appeal on all applicable grounds including BOR 2. The Adjudicator refused his appeal on 14 November 2017.

Background

4. The applicant is a Bangladeshi national. He was born on 7 March 1984 and comes from Joshurgao. He is married with two daughters and was a farmer and labourer. He farmed land which was owned by the applicant’s father but had been passed on to the applicant and his three brothers upon his father’s death without further registration. In 2014, members of the Awami League (“AL”) built a hut upon part of the land and attempted to cultivate it. The applicant, his brothers and several others attempted to evict the settlers. However, more members of the AL arrived and a fight ensued in which the applicant was hit once with a bamboo stick. He and his brothers intended to make a report to the police but were persuaded not to do so by members of their own political party i.e. the Bangladesh National Party (“BNP”), as AL was in power at the time and reporting the incident would be fruitless. Because of this, the applicant and his brothers could no longer farm their own land for fear of being threatened by members of AL. The applicant thought he was being targeted by AL and therefore left the country on 27 June 2014.

The non-refoulement claim

5. Under the Unified Screening Mechanism (“USM”), the applicant’s claim is to be assessed on all applicable grounds which are:

i.  Risk of torture under Part VIIC of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap 115 (“torture risk”). Under torture risk, the applicant must establish he has substantial grounds for believing he will be subjected to torture if returned to his home state. Those grounds cannot be speculative or theoretical and the risk of torture must be real and personal. The standard of proof is a low one.
ii.  Risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment under Article 3 of section 8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance (“HKBORO”), Cap 383 and Article 7 of the ICCPR (“BOR 3 risk”). Under BOR 3, the applicant must establish that he has a genuine and substantial risk of being subject to mental or physical torture; cruel, inhuman or degrading ill treatment; or punishment, if returned to his home state. The level of such mental or physical torture etc. must reach a minimum level of severity.
iii.  Risk of persecution with reference to the non-refoulement principle under Article 33 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (“persecution risk”). Under “persecution risk”, the applicant must establish that he has a well-founded fear that there is a real chance that he will face persecution based upon race, religion, nationality or membership of a social group or political opinion if he is expelled and returned to his home state.
iv.  Risk of a violation of the right to life under Article 2 of section 8 of the HKBORO, Cap 383 and Article 6 of the ICCPR (“BOR 2 risk”). Under BOR 2, the applicant must establish a real risk that he will be arbitrarily deprived of his life, have a death penalty imposed upon him; or be the victim of genocide or otherwise be deprived of his rights under BOR 2.

6. It is the duty of the Director and the Adjudicator to weigh all of the available credible, reliable evidence and ascertain whether the applicant had established the factual basis of his claim. The Director and the Adjudicator must then assess the level of harm the applicant says he fears. Each ground of claim above has a relevant level of risk. It is for the applicant to establish that he is the subject of such risk. Under the HKBORO, he must show substantial grounds for believing that the harm which he fears is “foreseeable, real, personal and present”. The question is whether there is a real riskor real chance of the occurrence or recurrence of the harm which he fears.

Decision and Further Decision of the Director

7. As the applicant has already utilised the channel of appealing the Director’s Decision to the TCAB and the TCAB treated the appeal as a rehearing, the Decision of the Director is not susceptible to judicial review once an appeal to the board has been pursued by the claimant and dealt with.

Decision of the Adjudicator

8. The Adjudicator analysed the applicant’s claim on all applicable grounds. She arranged for an oral hearing and treated the appeal as a rehearing. The applicant had the assistance of an interpreter. She correctly set out the law and key legal principles including the burden and standard of proof. She addressed each head of claim and provided lengthy reasons for the applicant’s failure thereunder, despite accepting that there was an underlying land dispute. What the Adjudicator did not accept was that the dispute was politically motivated. In that respect, she commented upon the credibility of the applicant. In all, she found he had not established the burden placed upon him to the requisite standard.

Leave to apply for judicial review

9. Judicial review is not a rehearing of the merits of the applicant’s original application for refugee status. This is an application to apply for leave to judicially review the Decision of the Adjudicator. The applicant must show an arguable case that there was either unlawfulness, unreasonableness or unfairness by the Adjudicator when dealing with his application in order to obtain leave to judicially review him.

Grounds of review

10. There were no grounds of review. The applicant asks for a re-hearing of his appeal. He has not complained of any procedural irregularity, unfairness or unreasonableness. The applicant has a duty to state the grounds of his intended judicial review and that they are reasonably arguable and enjoy a realistic prospect of success: Po Fun Chan v Winnie Cheung (2007) 10 HKCFAR 676. I have nevertheless considered whether the papers indicate any such ground for the purposes of considering whether to grant leave.

Conclusion

11. Despite the fact that the applicant did not submit any grounds of review, I have considered the papers carefully. I have not found any error of law or procedure. I see no evidence of procedural unfairness nor a failure to adhere to a high standard of fairness throughout. Despite the onus being upon the applicant, the Adjudicator engaged in a joint endeavour with the applicant and considered all relevant criteria; gave the applicant a reasonable opportunity to state his case and enquired into that case appropriately. There is no criticism of her determination, which was open to her on the facts and eminently reasonable.

12. In my judgement, there is no reasonably arguable basis upon which the applicant could found a claim for judicial review and, as such, there would be no realistic prospect of success if he were to be granted leave. I therefore refuse leave for judicial review.

Dated the 30^th day of April 2019.

(Marcus Wong)
for Registrar, High Court

Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence

Notesfor the Applicant:

If leave has been granted, the Applicant or his solicitors must:

a) serve on the respondent and such interested parties as may be directed by the Court the order granting leave and any directions given within 14 days after the leave was granted (Order 53, rule 4A);

b) issue the originating summons within 14 days after the grant of leave and serve it in accordance with Order 53, rule 5; and

c) supply to every other party copies of every affidavit which the Applicant proposes to use at the hearing, including the affidavit in support of the application for leave (Order 53, rule 6(5)).

Sent to the Applicant on 30 April 2019

Islam Mohammad Shahidul

Applicant’s ref. no:
Nil.

Sent to the Putative Respondent / the Putative Respondent’s solicitors / such Putative Interested Parties as may be directed by the Court / the Putative Interested Parties’ solicitors on 30 April 2019

Torture Claims Appeal Board /
Non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office
Putative Respondent’s ref. no.:
USM 4129/16/7/99/B567

Department of Justice for Director of Immigration
Putative Interested Party’s ref. no.:
RBCZ 9001008/17 (formerly RBCZ 2330/14)

Form CALL-1

ISLAM MOHAMMAD SHAHIDUL v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD / NON-REFOULEMENT CLAIMS PETITION OFFICE [Decision on Leave Application]

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