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Constitutional and Administrative Law Proceedings2017

MAMSA TARIQUE v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD / NON-REFOULEMENT CLAIMS PETITION OFFICE [Decision on Leave Application]

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[2020] HKCFI 2270-EN-2020-10-08

MAMSA TARIQUE v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD / NON-REFOULEMENT CLAIMS PETITION OFFICE

HTML content

HCAL 711/2017

[2020] HKCFI 2270

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST

NO 711 OF 2017

___________________

BETWEEN  
 MAMSA TARIQUEApplicant

and

 TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD /Putative Respondent
 NON-REFOULEMENT CLAIMS 
 PETITION OFFICE 

and

 DIRECTOR OF IMMIGRATIONPutative Interested Party

___________________

Before:Hon Campbell‑Moffat J in Chambers
Date of Hearing:8 October 2020
Date of Decision:8 October 2020

___________________

D E C I S I O N

___________________

Introduction

1.  This is an application dated 30 December 2019, to appeal my decision of 29 June 2018, refusing leave to apply for judicial review.  The applicant had 14 days in which to apply to appeal that decision.  He did not do so.  He now requires leave to extend time to appeal against that order.  The applicant attended court and had the benefit of an Urdu interpreter.

Procedural Background

2.  The applicant is a claimant under Article 3 of the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.  He entered Hong Kong lawfully on 15 July 2008 and was arrested on 15 July 2009 for overstaying.  He submitted a non‑refoulement claim on 16 June 2014 and was interviewed by the Director of Immigration (“the Director”) on 10 September 2014.  The Director dismissed his claim under all heads, by Notice of Decision on 22 September 2014 and by Notice of Further Decision 5 May 2017.  He appealed those Decisions to the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“the TCAB”).  The adjudicator of the TCAB, Ms Mary Yuen (“the Adjudicator”), dealt with the appeal on the papers.  The Adjudicator refused his appeal on 16 August 2017.  

3.  The applicant filed a notice of application on a Form 86 seeking leave to apply for judicial review on 3 October 2017 and did not request an oral hearing.  The matter was therefore considered on the papers.  His application for leave to apply for judicial review was refused on 29 June 2018.  He had 14 days from that date to appeal that decision which would have expired on 13 July 2018.  By way of summons dated 30 December 2019, he seeks leave to appeal out of time.

4.  An applicant does not require leave to appeal against a CFI judge’s refusal to grant leave to apply for judicial review (Order 59, rule 21(1)(g)).  The applicant may appeal as of right.  However, an applicant who wishes to appeal against a CFI judge’s refusal to grant leave to apply for judicial review, which is an interlocutory order, has to observe the time limits for appeal under Order 53, rule 3(4) of the Rules of the High Court which allows 14 days.  Where the applicant is out of time to appeal against a judge’s refusal to grant leave to apply for judicial review, an extension of time may be granted by a judge of the Court of First Instance under Order 59, rule 2B(6).  The Court is required to consider (1) the length of the delay; (2) the reasons for the delay; (3) the prospect of success in the intended appeal; and (4) the prejudice to the respondent if an extension of time were granted[1].

5.  In order to obtain that leave, an application must be made promptly and it must be supported by an affirmation or affidavit deposing to any facts relied upon by the applicant and giving a full account of and explanation for the whole of the delay since time expired.  

6.  Whilst the granting of an extension of time is entirely within the discretion of the Court, the applicant is required to explain the reasons for his delay as this forms part of the consideration of whether there is good reason to allow an extension of time.  The applicant accepted he was late and gave no reason within his Affirmation or in Court as to why that was the case but claimed he had a sole new ground of appeal.  That is not correct.  He accepts it is not correct.  He seeks a review of the merits of his claim and, in parallel, suggests that he did not receive the court correspondence.  The Court file suggests that, at the time of his Form 86, he was detained at Castle Peak Bay Immigration Centre (“Castle Peak”) and the Court was not informed of any address subsequent to that date.  The Form CALL‑1 and Order were therefore sent to Castle Peak but was returned and the Court therefore had to make enquiries of the Immigration Department (the “ID”) to track him down.  In July 2018, the ID provided an address at Room C, 8/F, No. 207A Tung Choi Street, Yau Tsim Mong.  The Form CALL-1 and Order were therefore sent to that address and were not returned.  It is therefore presumed he received it on or about 18 July 2018.  It is the same address he used for his summons.  No reason has been provided for the delay between July 2018 and December 2019.  He maintains that he was not informed of the decision of this Court until December 2019 when he attended the ID. It is the duty of a litigant to give the Court an address to which correspondence or notice can come to his attention in a timely manner[2].  The consequences of any delay arising from failing to do so will fall upon the litigant.[3]

7.  As there is no explanation for the delay, which is substantial, the court is nevertheless required to examine whether there is any merit in the applicant’s appeal[4]. Whether there is any such merit will depend upon well‑established legal principles[5] including the fact that the Court in judicial review is not to provide a further avenue of appeal on the merits of the underlying claim.  The applicant suggests in his summons that he has a single ground of appeal, however within his affirmation in support he wishes to revisit his underlying claim which he maintains should have been considered by this Court and complains that he was not heard upon the matter.  The applicant did not previously request to be heard.  The question for the Court is whether the remainder of the submissions truly seek to review the exercise of a judicial function and in so doing indicate a reasonable prospect of success in the intended appeal[6]. 

8.  The applicant complains that this Court should have considered his underlying claim and did not provide an opportunity for him to clarify his case.  He says he was prejudiced by the fact that he did not read or write English.  As mentioned previously, the applicant did not request a hearing on the papers nor did he complain at that time that the TCAB Decision was concluded on the papers.  Secondly, I am very surprised that the applicant has no English given that he was born and educated in India, is a mature man and married to an Indonesian national.  In what language do they converse?  In any event he submitted that he had been travelling to Hong Kong since 2003 on business and has now been a resident of Hong Kong since 2008 and therefore must have some local Chinese and/or English and failing all else, some other Indian compatriots.  He makes no complaint about language issues within his Form 86.  Thirdly, the applicant submitted no grounds of review.  A consideration of the papers did not reveal any grounds of review.  The applicant misunderstands the jurisdiction of the court within the judicial review process.  The role of the court in judicial review is not to provide a further avenue of appeal from the Decisions of the Director and the Adjudicator.  If there is any criticism of the manner in which they carried out their functions, then the applicant is bound to identify them. The applicant sought to have his claim heard afresh by this court in his original leave application.  This application seeks to do the same.  An appeal from this Court should not be founded upon any attempt to appeal the decisions of the Director or Adjudicator.  It is an appeal from the decision of this Court and the applicant should look to draft grounds of appeal on that basis.  This was explained in some detail to the applicant when he appeared.

Conclusion

9.  The applicant has now been in Hong Kong since 2008.  That is a very long time.  He has been interacting with various government agencies since that date.  He has also been interacting with other claimants and clearly has access to legal or quasi‑legal advice as is his summons is professionally drafted although somewhat misleading.  He was not completely frank with the Court when it sought to ascertain the background facts.  The explanation he has offered to this Court, as to why he did not receive the order is not believed and in any event acceptable.

10.  In any event, I have considered his underlying application.  It has no merit as explained in the initial refusal of leave. There were no grounds of review and none could be ascertained from the papers. There was no complaint before the Court as to the decision to refuse leave. The applicant merely wishes the Court of Appeal to consider his situation afresh.  Having considered the length of delay, reason for the delay and underlying merits of his application, it would not be in the interest of justice to grant an extension of time in all the circumstances of this case.

11.  The applicant’s summons dated 30 December 2019 be dismissed.

(A P Campbell‑Moffat)
Judge of the Court of First Instance
High Court

  

The applicant appeared in person.


[1]Chee Fei Ming v Director of Food and Environmental Hygiene [2015] 4 HKC 134; Wong Yuk Man v Ng Leung Sing & Anor [2016] HKCU 157 (HCMP 3217/2015, 22 January 2016)

[2]Re Ahmed Zakar CAMP 17/2019, [2019] HKCA 566

[3]Islam Raja Rais v Director of Immigration HCMP 881/2017

[4]Re Mehmood Ikhlas CAMP 28/2019, [2019] HKCA 567; Re MK HCMP 2609/2016; Re Gurung Min Bahadur[2018] HKCA 226

[5]Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration[2018] HKCA 524; Re Md Shohel Sheak[2018] HKCA 714

[6]Re Ansar Muhammad[2018] HKCA 227

[2018] HKCFI 1110-EN-2018-06-29

MAMSA TARIQUE v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD / NON-REFOULEMENT CLAIMS PETITION OFFICE [Decision on Leave Application]

HTML content

HCAL711/2017

[2018] HKCFI 1110

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No. 711 of 2017

BETWEEN  
 Mamsa TariqueApplicant
 and  
 Torture Claims Appeal Board /
Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office
Putative Respondent
 and  
 Director of Immigration Putative
Interested Party

Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review
NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Ord. 53 r. 3)

Following;

   consideration of the documents only;     or
   consideration of the documents and the Applicant being present/absent in open court;

Order by The Honourable Mrs Justice Campbell‑Moffat:

Leave to apply for Judicial Review be refused.

Observations for the Applicant:

Procedural history

1.  The Applicant entered Hong Kong legally on 15 July 2008 on a visitor’s visa.  He was arrested on 15 July 2009 for overstaying.  He was transferred to the Immigration Department and released upon recognisance on 23 July 2009.  The Applicant submitted a non-refoulement (“NRF”) claim by way of written representation on 18 July 2009, and his claim form on 16 June 2014.

2.  The Applicant attended a screening interview on 10 September 2014.  The Director of Immigration (“the Director”) dismissed his claim (not including that under BOR 2) by Notice of Decision (“the Decision”) on 22 September 2014, and by Notice of Further Decision (re BOR 2) on 5 May 2017.  He appealed the Decision to the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“the TCAB”) on 6 October 2014.  The Adjudicator of the TCAB, Ms Mary Yuen, confirmed from the papers that it would be proper to consider his appeal without hearing the Applicant further.  She considered his appeal on all applicable grounds including BOR 2.  The Adjudicator refused his appeal on 16 August 2017.

3.  The Applicant filed a notice of application on a Form 86 seeking leave to apply for judicial review on 3 October 2017, and did not request an oral hearing.  The matter was therefore considered on the papers.

Background

4.  The Applicant is an Indian national and a Sunni Muslim.  He is now 34 years of age and married his Indonesian wife in 2010. They now have a son and they live with him in Hong Kong.  He was born and raised in Kidder Pore, Kolkata and was educated to primary 5.  He had originally trained to be a chef but latterly had run a wholesale garment and mobile phone business.  This business necessitated trips to Hong Kong and he undertook several such trips, dating back to 2003, prior to arriving here lawfully in July 2008.

5.  In January 2005, the Applicant met a Hindu girl who was from a higher caste.  This led to an altercation with her family in 2006, in which the Applicant was slapped once and received death threats.  The Applicant was not injured and did not report the incident to the police. The relationship continued without either family knowing until 2007, when his girlfriend’s family stopped him in the street and beat him up.  He did not receive any injuries and did not report the matter to the police.  The discovery of their intimate relationship has meant that she cannot find a suitable marriage partner and, as a result, her family are still very angry with the Applicant.  He was beaten again in April 2008, but treated himself with pain killers and did not report the matter.  He suffered another assault from her family a month later but this time someone used a hockey stick as a weapon and he received a cut to his forehead near to his left eye for which he needed stitches.  Shortly afterwards his home was vandalised by her family and his family was threatened.  Neither incident was reported because the Applicant was of the view that his girlfriend’s family was far more important and influential.

The non-refoulement claim

6.  Under the Unified Screening Mechanism (“USM”), the Applicant’s claim was assessed on all applicable grounds which are:

i.  Risk of torture under Part VIIC of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap 115 (“torture risk”).  Under torture risk, the Applicant must establish he has substantial grounds for believing he will be subjected to torture if returned to his home state.  Those grounds cannot be speculative or theoretical and the risk of torture must be real and personal.  The standard of proof is a low one.

ii.  Risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment under Article 3 of section 8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance (“HKBORO”), Cap 383 and Article 7 of the ICCPR (“BOR 3 risk”).  Under BOR 3, the Applicant must establish that he has a genuine and substantial risk of being subject to mental or physical torture; cruel, inhuman or degrading ill treatment; or punishment, if returned to his home state.  The level of such mental or physical torture etc. must reach a minimum level of severity.

iii.  Risk of persecution with reference to the non-refoulement principle under Article 33 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (“persecution risk”).  Under “persecution risk”, the Applicant must establish that he has a well-founded fear that there is a real chance that he will face persecution based upon race, religion, nationality or membership of a social group or political opinion if he is expelled and returned to his home state.

iv.  Risk of a violation of the right to life under Article 2 of section 8 of the HKBORO, Cap 383 and Article 6 of the ICCPR (“BOR 2 risk”).  Under BOR 2, the Applicant must establish a real risk that he will be arbitrarily deprived of his life, have a death penalty imposed upon him; or be the victim of genocide or otherwise be deprived of his rights under BOR 2.

7.  It is the duty of the Director and the Adjudicator to weigh all of the available credible, reliable evidence and ascertain whether the Applicant had established the factual basis of his claim. The Director and Adjudicator must then assess the level of harm the Applicant says he fears.  Each ground of claim above has a relevant level of risk.  It is for the Applicant to establish that he is the subject of such risk.  Under the HKBORO, he must show substantial grounds for believing that the harm which he fears is “foreseeable, real, personal and present”.  The question is whether there is a real riskor real chance of the occurrence or recurrence of the harm which he fears.

Decision and further decision of the Director

8.  The Director analysed the Applicant’s claim on all applicable grounds.  He considered a wide range of documentary evidence. He correctly set out the law, key legal principles and made reference to relevant materials.  The Applicant was given every opportunity to state his case.  In coming to his decision to reject the Applicant’s claim under the various heads, he acted reasonably and explained his decision on the merits in a clear and intelligible manner.  In so far as the Further Decision is concerned he was sent a letter on 19 April inviting him to submit on this head of claim, which he declined to do.  There was no basis within his original claim to suggest that this head of claim would be in any way applicable to his case.

Decision of the Adjudicator

9.  The Adjudicator analysed the Applicant’s claim on all applicable grounds.  She did not arrange an oral hearing as she was satisfied could be justly determined without doing so having reminded herself of the appropriate test for so doing.  On the facts of this case, it is was within her discretion to do so.  The Adjudicator treated the appeal as a rehearing.  She correctly set out the law and key legal principles including the burden and standard of proof.  This was an entirely private dispute, no longer live and one in which the Applicant failed to approach any person in authority to seek protection.  There was nothing to indicate that there would be any supplemental information which could have raised what was, on any view, a hopeless case.

Leave to apply for judicial review

10.  Judicial review is not a rehearing of the merits of the Applicant’s original application for refugee status.  This is an application to apply for leave to judicially review the Decisions of the Director of Immigration and the Adjudicator.  The Applicant must show an arguable case that there was either unlawfulness, unreasonableness or unfairness by those bodies or persons when dealing with his application in order to obtain leave to judicially review them.

Grounds of review

11.  There were no grounds of review.  The Applicant asks for a re-hearing of his appeal.  He has not complained of any procedural irregularity, unfairness or unreasonableness but I have nevertheless considered whether the papers indicate any such ground for the purposes of considering whether to grant leave.

Conclusion

12.  Despite the fact that there were no grounds of review, I have considered the papers, grounds and submissions carefully.  I have not found any error of law or procedure.  I see no evidence of procedural unfairness nor a failure to adhere to a high standard of fairness throughout.  The Director and Adjudicator considered all relevant criteria, The Applicant was given a reasonable opportunity to state his case before the Director, which could not have been improved upon before the Adjudicator given its very narrow confines.  They both enquired into that case appropriately.  There is no criticism of their determinations nor the procedure adopted, which were open to them on the facts and eminently reasonable.

13.  In my judgement, there is no reasonably arguable basis upon which the Applicant could found a claim for judicial review and, as such, there would be no realistic prospect of success if he were to be granted leave.  I therefore refuse leave for judicial review.

Dated 29th day of June 2018.



 (Queenie Mak)
 for Registrar, High Court


Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence




Notes for the Applicant:

If leave has been granted, the Applicant or his solicitors must:
 
    
a) serve on the respondent and such interested parties as may be directed by the Court the order granting leave and any directions given within 14 days after the leave was granted(Order 53, rule 4A);

b) issue the originating summons within 14 days after the grant of leave and serve it in accordance with Order 53, rule 5; and

c) supply to every other party copies of every affidavit which the Applicant proposes to use at the hearing, including the affidavit in support of the application for leave (Order 53, rule 6(5)).
 Sent to the Applicant
on 29/6/2018
Mamsa Tarique

Applicant’s ref. no:
Nil.
 Sent to the Putative Respondent / the Putative Respondent’s solicitors / such Putative Interested Parties as may be directed by the Court / the Putative Interested Parties’ solicitors on 29/6/2018

Torture Claims Appeal Board /
Non-Refoulement Claims
Petition Office

Putative Respondent’s ref. no.:
USM 291/14/10/8/IN84

Director of Immigration
Putative Interested Party’s ref. no.: RBCZ 90001412/17 (formerly RBCZ 1836/09)

Department of Justice,
Senior Assistant Law Office
(Civil Law)
(Civil Litigation Unit 2)




Form CALL-1