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Constitutional and Administrative Law Proceedings2017

MOHAMED SHABDEEN MOHAMED GAZARI v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD / NON-REFOULEMENT CLAIMS PETITION OFFICE

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[2019] HKCFI 1532-EN-2019-06-12

MOHAMED SHABDEEN MOHAMED GAZARI v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD / NON-REFOULEMENT CLAIMS PETITION OFFICE

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HCAL 961/2017

[2019] HKCFI 1532

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST

NO 961 OF 2017

___________________

BETWEEN  
 MOHAMED SHABDEEN MOHAMED GAZARIApplicant

and

 TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD /Putative Respondent
 NON-REFOULEMENT CLAIMS 
 PETITION OFFICE 

and

 DIRECTOR OF IMMIGRATIONPutative Interested Party

___________________

Before:Hon Campbell‑Moffat J in Chambers
Date of Hearing:12 June 2019
Date of Decision:12 June 2019

________________________

D E C I S I O N

________________________

Introduction

1.  This is an application dated 30 May 2019 for appeal from my decision of 30 April 2019, refusing leave to apply for judicial review.  The applicant had 14 days in which to apply to appeal that decision.  He did not do so.  He now requires leave to extend time to appeal against that order.  The applicant attended in person and had the benefit of a Sinhalese interpreter.

Procedural background

2.  The applicant is a claimant under Article 3 of the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.  He entered Hong Kong legally on 30 October 2002 and thereafter overstayed.  He was not arrested until 25 October 2013.  He submitted a non‑refoulement claim form on 22 September 2015 and was interviewed by the Director of Immigration (“the Director”) on 1 December 2015 and 31 March 2016.  The Director dismissed his claim under all heads, by Notice of Decision on 22 April 2016 and by Notice of Further Decision on 30 March 2017.  He appealed those decisions to the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“the TCAB”).  The adjudicator of the TCAB, Ms Gina Towney (“the Adjudicator”) heard him on 18 September 2017.  The Adjudicator refused his appeal on 16 November 2017.  

3.  The applicant filed a notice of application on a Form 86 seeking leave to apply for judicial review on 27 November 2017 and did not request an oral hearing.  The matter was therefore considered on the papers.  His application for leave to apply for judicial review was refused on 30 April 2019.  He had 14 days from that date to appeal that decision which would have expired on 14 May 2019.  By way of summons dated 30 May 2019, he seeks leave to appeal out of time.

4.  An applicant does not require leave to appeal against a CFI judge’s refusal to grant leave to apply for judicial review (Order 59, rule 21(1)(g)).  The applicant may appeal as of right.  However, an applicant who wishes to appeal against a CFI judge’s refusal to grant leave to apply for judicial review, which is an interlocutory order, has to observe the time limits for appeal under Order 53, rule 3(4) of the Rules of the High Court which allows 14 days.  Where the applicant is out of time to appeal against a judge’s refusal to grant leave to apply for judicial review, an extension of time may be granted by a judge of the Court of First Instance under Order 59, rule 15.  The court is required to consider (1) the length of the delay; (2) the reasons for the delay; (3) the prospect of success in the intended appeal; and (4) the prejudice to the respondent if an extension of time were granted.

5.  In order to obtain that leave, an application must be made promptly and it must be supported by an affirmation or affidavit deposing to any facts relied upon by the applicant and giving a full account of and explanation for the whole of the delay since time expired.  Whilst the granting of an extension of time is entirely within the discretion of the court, the applicant is required to explain the reasons for his delay as this forms part of the consideration of whether there is good reason to allow an extension of time.  He claims he did not receive the Order on time but gives no further explanation save that he accepted he had received all other official correspondence.  The court file suggests that it was properly served upon the address given at that time, which is the same address the applicant uses today. The applicant maintains that he only learnt of the refusal of leave from an officer of the Immigration Department.  It is the duty of a litigant to give the court an address to which correspondence or notice can come to his attention in a timely manner[1]. The consequences of any delay arising from failing to do so will fall upon the litigant[2].

6.  Even if the court does accept the reasons given for the delay, the court is required to examine whether there is any merit in the applicant’s appeal[3]. The applicant was unable to provide any reason for his appeal save for the fact that he cannot return to his country and his fear of harm coming to his family.  The question for the court is whether these submissions indicate a reasonable prospect of success in the intended appeal.

7.  The role of the Court of Appeal in judicial review is not to provide a further avenue of appeal from the decisions of the Director and the Adjudicator[4]. It follows that an appeal from this court should not be founded upon any attempt to appeal those same decisions.  It is an appeal from the decision of this court and the applicant should look to draft grounds of appeal on that basis.  He has not done and could not identify any such grounds when given the opportunity to do so.

Conclusion

8.  The applicant has now been in Hong Kong since 2002.  He has been interacting with various government agencies since 2013 when he was finally arrested for overstaying and accepts he received all necessary documents and notifications and continues to do so.  The explanation he has offered to this court, as to why he did not receive the Order is not acceptable.

9.  In any event, I have considered his underlying application.  It has no merit as explained in the initial refusal of leave. There were no grounds of review and none could be ascertained from the papers. There was no complaint before the court as to the decision to refuse leave. The applicant wishes the Court of Appeal to consider his situation afresh. Having considered the length of delay, reason for the delay and underlying merits of his application, it would not be in the interest of justice to grant an extension of time in all the circumstances of this case.

10.  The applicant’s summons dated 30 May 2019 be dismissed.

(A P Campbell‑Moffat)
Judge of the Court of First Instance
High Court

  

The applicant appeared in person.


[1]Re Ahmed Zakar CAMP 17/2019, [2019] HKCA 566

[2]Islam Raja Rais v Director of Immigration HCMP 881/2017

[3]Re Mehmood Ikhlas CAMP 28/2019, [2019] HKCA 567

[4]Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration[2018] HKCA 524; Re Md Shohel Sheak[2018] HKCA 714

[2019] HKCFI 465-EN-2019-04-30

MOHAMED SHABDEEN MOHAMED GAZARI v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD / NON-REFOULEMENT CLAIMS PETITION OFFICE [Decision on Leave Application]

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HCAL 961/2017

[2019] HKCFI 465

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No. 961 of 2017

BETWEEN

Mohamed Shabdeen Mohamed GazariApplicant
and
Torture Claims Appeal Board /
Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office
Putative Respondent
and
Director of ImmigrationPutative Interested Party

Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review
NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Ord. 53 r. 3)

Following:

   consideration of the documents only;     or
   consideration of the documents and the Applicant being present/absent in open court

Order by The Honourable Mrs. Justice Campbell-Moffat:

Leave to apply for judicial review be refused.

Observations for the Applicant:

Procedural history

1.  The applicant entered Hong Kong lawfully on 30 October 2002 and was arrested on 25 October 2013 for overstaying.  He was transferred to the Immigration Department on 27 October and submitted a non-refoulement (“NRF”) claim by way of written representation on 29 October.  He was released upon recognisance on 5 December 2013.  His NRF claim form was submitted on 22 September 2015.

2.  The applicant attended screening interviews on 1 December 2015 and 31 March 2016.  The Director of Immigration (“the Director”) dismissed his claim (not including that under BOR 2) by Notice of Decision (“the Decision”) on 22 April 2016 and by Notice of Further Decision (re BOR 2) on 30 March 2017. He petitioned/appealed the Decision to the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“the TCAB”). The adjudicator of the TCAB, Ms Gina Towney (“the Adjudicator”), heard his appeal on 18 September 2017.  The Adjudicator considered his appeal on all applicable grounds including BOR 2 and refused his appeal on 16 November 2017.

3.  The applicant filed a notice of application on a Form 86 seeking leave to apply for judicial review on 27 November 2017 and did not request an oral hearing.  The matter was therefore considered on the papers.

Background

4.  The applicant is a Sri Lankan national.  He was born on 9 February 1977, in Colombo.  He is a Muslim and a Moor.  From 1999 to 2001, the applicant worked as a cashier in a casino.  In about 2000, the applicant started to deal in cannabis, which was illegal.  He supplied, amongst others, a person called Roshan but after a while Roshan stopped paying him for the cannabis and the applicant got into debt with his suppliers, who started threatening him.  The applicant decided to put pressure upon Roshan and, along with a group of friends, the applicant kidnapped Roshan and assaulted him.  As a result, the applicant and his friends were arrested the next day and whilst in custody he says that he was beaten by two police officers.  They were brought before the magistrate and remanded in custody for 12 days in order for the police to produce Roshan.  On the second and third hearings, the police were unable to locate him and therefore the assailants were eventually released upon bail but the applicant decided to go into hiding and did not attend any further hearings.  An arrest warrant was therefore issued against him.  The applicant obtained a passport on 30 September 2002 and left the country on 28 October, maintaining that the relevant officials were bribed in order to allow him to leave.

The non-refoulement claim

5.  Under the Unified Screening Mechanism (“USM”), the applicant’s claim is to be assessed on all applicable grounds which are:

i.  Risk of torture under Part VIIC of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap 115 (“torture risk”).  Under torture risk, the applicant must establish he has substantial grounds for believing he will be subjected to torture if returned to his home state.  Those grounds cannot be speculative or theoretical and the risk of torture must be real and personal.  The standard of proof is a low one.

ii.  Risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment under Article 3 of section 8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance (“HKBORO”), Cap 383 and Article 7 of the ICCPR (“BOR 3 risk”).  Under BOR 3, the applicant must establish that he has a genuine and substantial risk of being subject to mental or physical torture; cruel, inhuman or degrading ill treatment; or punishment, if returned to his home state.  The level of such mental or physical torture etc. must reach a minimum level of severity.

iii.  Risk of persecution with reference to the non-refoulement principle under Article 33 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (“persecution risk”).  Under “persecution risk”, the applicant must establish that he has a well-founded fear that there is a real chance that he will face persecution based upon race, religion, nationality or membership of a social group or political opinion if he is expelled and returned to his home state.

iv.  Risk of a violation of the right to life under Article 2 of section 8 of the HKBORO, Cap 383 and Article 6 of the ICCPR (“BOR 2 risk”).  Under BOR 2, the applicant must establish a real risk that he will be arbitrarily deprived of his life, have a death penalty imposed upon him; or be the victim of genocide or otherwise be deprived of his rights under BOR 2.

6.  It is the duty of the Director and the Adjudicator to weigh all of the available credible, reliable evidence and ascertain whether the applicant had established the factual basis of his claim.  The Director and the Adjudicator must then assess the level of harm the applicant says he fears.  Each ground of claim above has a relevant level of risk.  It is for the applicant to establish that he is the subject of such risk.  Under the HKBORO, he must show substantial grounds for believing that the harm which he fears is “foreseeable, real, personal and present”.  The question is whether there is a real riskor real chance of the occurrence or recurrence of the harm which he fears.

Decision and Further Decision of the Director

7.  As the applicant has already utilised the channel of appealing the Director’s Decision to the TCAB and the TCAB treated the appeal as a rehearing, the Decision of the Director is not susceptible to judicial review once an appeal to the Board has been pursued by the claimant and dealt with.

Decision of the Adjudicator

8.  The Adjudicator analysed the applicant’s claim on all applicable grounds.  She arranged for an oral hearing and treated the appeal as a rehearing.  She correctly set out the law and key legal principles including the burden and standard of proof.  In particular, the Adjudicator referred to the applicant’s earlier desire to submit documentation in support of his claim and noted that a significant number of years had passed and no documentation was forthcoming.  The applicant maintained that he had no documents and could not obtain them because there were problems with Sinhalese and Muslims in Sri Lanka.  In any event, the documents referred to by the applicant were not directly relevant to the suggested fear of harm from Roshan. Although the Adjudicator was extremely sceptical about the applicant’s veracity, taken at its highest, the Adjudicator took the view that the greatest threat to the applicant, if his story were true, was lawful prosecution for an admitted assault.  Ultimately, having considered his evidence in detail, the Adjudicator rejected it, giving an explanation as to why that was the case.  On each occasion, giving the applicant an opportunity to answer it but without success.

Leave to apply for judicial review

9.  Judicial review is not a rehearing of the merits of the applicant’s original application for refugee status.  This is an application to apply for leave to judicially review the Decision of the Adjudicator.  The applicant must show an arguable case that there was either unlawfulness, unreasonableness or unfairness by those bodies or persons when dealing with his application in order to obtain leave to judicially review them.

Grounds of review

10.  There were no grounds of review.  The applicant reiterates that he has been dealt with unfairly by reason of the fact that he has not been given more time to substantiate his claim with documentary proof.  The same complaint he made below and which was dealt with by the Adjudicator.  He has not complained of any specific procedural irregularity, unfairness or unreasonableness other than that.  The applicant has a duty to state the grounds of his intended judicial review and that they are reasonably arguable and enjoy a realistic prospect of success: Po Fun Chan v Winnie Cheung (2007) 10 HKCFAR 676.  I have nevertheless considered whether the papers indicate any such ground for the purposes of considering whether to grant leave.

Conclusion

11.  Despite the fact that the applicant did not submit any proper grounds of review, I have considered the papers carefully.  The unfairness which the applicant complains of is irrelevant to his claim.  Even if he can show that he was arrested, as he suggests, then he should face justice when he returns to Sri Lanka as he admits that he assaulted Roshan.  That would not be a sufficient reason to offer him protection under the relevant regime.  None of the documentation he wishes to rely upon support any suggestion of previous harm or potential harm from Roshan and that is the only harm which he says he fears.

12.  I have not found any error of law or procedure on the part of the Adjudicator.  I see no evidence of procedural unfairness nor a failure to adhere to a high standard of fairness throughout.  Despite the onus being upon the applicant, the Adjudicator engaged in a joint endeavour with the applicant and considered all relevant criteria; gave the applicant a reasonable opportunity to state his case and enquired into that case appropriately and extensively.  There is no criticism of her determination, which was open to her on the facts and eminently reasonable.

13.  In my judgement, there is no reasonably arguable basis upon which the applicant could found a claim for judicial review and, as such, there would be no realistic prospect of success if he were to be granted leave.  I therefore refuse leave for judicial review.

Dated the 30th  day of April 2019.

 (Marcus Wong)
for Registrar, High Court

Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence




Notesfor the Applicant:

If leave has been granted, the Applicant or his solicitors must:

    

a) serve on the respondent and such interested parties as may be directed by the Court the order granting leave and any directions given within 14 days after the leave was granted (Order 53, rule 4A);

b) issue the originating summons within 14 days after the grant of leave and serve it in accordance with Order 53, rule 5; and

c) supply to every other party copies of every affidavit which the Applicant proposes to use at the hearing, including the affidavit in support of the application for leave (Order 53, rule 6(5)).

 

Sent to the Applicant on 30 April 2019

Mohamed Shabdeen Mohamed Gazari

Applicant’s ref. no:
Nil.

 

Sent to the Putative Respondent / the Putative Respondent’s solicitors / such Putative Interested Parties as may be directed by the Court / the Putative Interested Parties’ solicitors on 30 April 2019

Torture Claims Appeal Board /
Non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office
Putative Respondent’s ref. no.:
USM 3583/16/5/1/S75

Department of Justice for Director of Immigration
Putative Interested Party’s ref. no.:
RBCZ 762/14;
RBCZ 900845/17 (T2S9)




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