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Constitutional and Administrative Law Proceedings2017

ALLY AYUBU JUMBE v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD / NON REFOULEMENT CLAIMS PETITION OFFICE

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[2020] HKCFI 2155-EN-2020-08-26

ALLY AYUBU JUMBE v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD / NON REFOULEMENT CLAIMS PETITION OFFICE

HTML content

HCAL 971/2017

[2020] HKCFI 2155

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST

NO 971 OF 2017

___________________

BETWEEN  
 ALLY AYUBU JUMBEApplicant

and

 TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD /
NON REFOULEMENT CLAIMS PETITION OFFICE
Putative Respondent

and

 DIRECTOR OF IMMIGRATIONPutative Interested Party

___________________

Before:  Hon Campbell‑Moffat J in Chambers

Date of Hearing: 26 August 2020

Date of Decision:  26 August 2020

____________________

D E C I S I O N

____________________

Introduction

1.  This is an application dated 6 July 2020 to appeal my decision of 5 June 2020 refusing leave to apply for judicial review.  The applicant had 14 days in which to apply to appeal that decision.  He did not do so.  He now requires leave to extend time to appeal against that order.  The applicant did attend court for the hearing.  He was not assisted by an interpreter.

Procedural Background

2.  The applicant is a claimant under Article 3 of the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.  He entered Hong Kong legally on 31 August 2014 and thereafter overstayed.  He was arrested by the police on 7 March 2015 and on 15 April 2016 he lodged a non-refoulement claim form, having served a period of imprisonment in the interim.  He was interviewed by the Director of Immigration (“the Director”) on 11 May 2016.  The Director dismissed his claim under all heads, by Notice of Decision on 27 July 2016 and by Notice of Further Decision on 4 August 2017.  He appealed the Decision to the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“the TCAB”).  The adjudicator of the TCAB, Ms Betty Kwan (“the Adjudicator”), heard him on 25 July 2017.  The Adjudicator refused his appeal on 25 August 2017.

3.  The applicant filed a notice of application on a Form 86 seeking leave to apply for judicial review on 29 November 2017 and did not request an oral hearing.  The matter was therefore considered on the papers.  His application for leave to apply for judicial review was refused on 5 June 2020.  He had 14 days from that date to appeal that decision which would have expired on 19 June 2020.  By way of summons dated 6 July 2020, he seeks leave to appeal out of time.

4.  An applicant does not require leave to appeal against a CFI judge’s refusal to grant leave to apply for judicial review (Order 59, rule 21(1)(g)).  The applicant may appeal as of right.  However, an applicant who wishes to appeal against a CFI judge’s refusal to grant leave to apply for judicial review, which is an interlocutory order, has to observe the time limits for appeal under Order 53, rule 3(4) of the Rules of the High Court which allows 14 days.  Where the applicant is out of time to appeal against a judge’s refusal to grant leave to apply for judicial review, an extension of time may be granted by a judge of the Court of First Instance under Order 59, rule 2B(6).  The Court is required to consider (1) the length of the delay; (2) the reasons for the delay; (3) the prospect of success in the intended appeal; and (4) the prejudice to the respondent if an extension of time were granted[1].

5.  In order to obtain that leave, an application must be made promptly and it must be supported by an affirmation or affidavit deposing to any facts relied upon by the applicant and giving a full account of and explanation for the whole of the delay since time expired.

6.  Whilst the granting of an extension of time is entirely within the discretion of the Court, the applicant is required to explain the reasons for his delay as this forms part of the consideration of whether there is good reason to allow an extension of time.  The applicant stated that he did not receive the Form CALL-1 or Order within a reasonable period of time allowing him to appeal within the time frame.  I note this is similar wording and in a similar handwriting to other applications I have received, albeit he maintained that he had written the summons.  He gives no other reason within his affirmation as to why that was the case.  The court file suggests that it was properly served upon the address recorded by the Immigration Department at the time of service, which is not the same address the applicant uses today.  The documents were returned to the High Court as undelivered.  He submits that he changed addresses around the time of the Order and accepts that he did not inform the Court.  It is the duty of a litigant to give the Court an address to which correspondence or notice can come to his attention in a timely manner[2].  That includes the ability to receive letters properly at the address given.  In this instance as of June 2020, he had not provided a correct address to either the Immigration Department or to the Court.  The consequences of any delay arising from failing to do so will fall upon the litigant.[3]

7.  Even if the Court did accept that the explanation given for non‑receipt and that the delay is a reasonable one (which it does not), the Court is required to examine whether there is any merit in the applicant’s appeal[4]. Whether there is any such merit will depend upon well‑established legal principles[5] including the fact that the Court in judicial review is not to provide a further avenue of appeal on the merits of the underlying claim.  The question for the Court is whether these submissions truly seek to review the exercise of a judicial function and in so doing indicate a reasonable prospect of success in the intended appeal[6].  He made no such submissions.

8.  As the role of the Court in judicial review is not to provide a further avenue of appeal from the decisions of the Director and the Adjudicator, it follows that an appeal from this Court should not be founded upon any attempt to appeal those same decisions.  It is an appeal from the decision of this Court and the applicant should look to draft grounds of appeal on that basis.  This was explained in some detail to the applicant when he appeared but he clearly only wished to have his situation considered once more by the Court of Appeal.

Conclusion

9.  The applicant has now been in Hong Kong since 2014. He has been interacting with various government agencies since that date.  The explanation he has offered to this Court, as to why he did not receive the Order is not acceptable.

10.  In any event, I have considered his underlying application.  It has no merit as explained in the initial refusal of leave.  There were no grounds of review.  Nevertheless, the Court considered the papers with a view to identifying any grounds of review and could not do so.  In addition, there was no complaint before the Court as to the decision to refuse leave.  The applicant merely wishes the Court of Appeal to consider his situation afresh. Having considered the length of delay, reason for the delay and underlying merits of his application, it would not be in the interest of justice to grant an extension of time in all the circumstances of this case.

11.  The applicant’s summons dated 6 July 2020 be dismissed.

(A P Campbell‑Moffat)
Judge of the Court of First Instance
High Court

The applicant appeared in person.


[1]Chee Fei Ming v Director of Food and Environmental Hygiene [2015] 4 HKC 134; Wong Yuk Man v Ng Leung Sing & Anor [2016] HKCU 157 (HCMP 3217/2015, 22 January 2016)

[2]Re Ahmed Zakar CAMP 17/2019, [2019] HKCA 566

[3]Islam Raja Rais v Director of Immigration HCMP 881/2017

[4]Re Mehmood Ikhlas CAMP 28/2019, [2019] HKCA 567; Re MK HCMP 2609/2016; Re Gurung Min Bahadur[2018] HKCA 226

[5]Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration[2018] HKCA 524; Re Md Shohel Sheak[2018] HKCA 714

[6]Re Ansar Muhammad[2018] HKCA 227

[2020] HKCFI 1080-EN-2020-06-05

ALLY AYUBU JUMBE v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD / NON-REFOULEMENT CLAIMS PETITION OFFICE [Decision on Leave Application]

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HCAL 971/2017

[2020] HKCFI 1080

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO 971 OF 2017

BETWEEN

Ally Ayubu JumbeApplicant
and
Torture Claims Appeal Board /
Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office
Putative Respondent
and
Director of ImmigrationPutative Interested Party

Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review
NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Ord. 53 r. 3)

Following:

   consideration of the documents only;     or
   consideration of the documents and the Applicant being present/absent in open court

Orders by The Honourable Mrs Justice Campbell‑Moffat:

1. Extension of time for leave to apply for judicial review be allowed.

2. Leave to apply for judicial review be refused.

Observations for the Applicant:

Procedural history

1.  The applicant entered Hong Kong legally on 31 August 2014 and thereafter overstayed.  He was arrested by the police on 7 March 2015 and submitted a non-refoulement claim by way of written representation on 10 March 2015.  He was released upon recognisance on 22 April 2015.  On 26 September 2015, he was arrested for an unrecorded offence, for which he was sentenced to eight months’ imprisonment on 28 September 2015.  He was discharged from prison on 5 March 2016.  His non-refoulement claim form was submitted on 15 April 2016.

2.  The applicant attended a screening interview on 11 May 2016.  The Director of Immigration (“the Director”) dismissed his claim on all grounds (not including that under BOR 2) by Notice of Decision (“the Decision”) on 27 July 2016 and by Notice of Further Decision (re BOR 2) on 4 August 2017.  He appealed the Decision to the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“the TCAB”).  The adjudicator of the TCAB, Ms Betty Kwan (“the Adjudicator”), heard his appeal on 25 July 2017.  The Adjudicator considered his appeal on all applicable grounds including BOR 2 and refused his appeal on 25 August 2017.

3.  The applicant filed a notice of application on a Form 86 seeking leave to apply for judicial review on 29 November 2017.  He was four days late in so doing but this court has granted him an extension of time so to do.  He did not request an oral hearing for his application for leave.  The matter was therefore considered on the papers.

Background

4.  The applicant is a Tanzanian national.  He was born on 1 April 1985, in Tanga.  He received 11 years of formal education and worked as a businessman in Dar‑es‑Salaam between 2006 and 2013. He is single and was a Muslim but converted to Christianity in 2016, whilst imprisoned in Pik Uk.  The applicant’s claim arises out of a dispute with his brother‑in‑law “Rajabu”.  In 2006, the applicant and Rajabu started a garment business together, in which the applicant operated the business and Rajabu provided the finance.  In 2013, the applicant travelled to China to purchase goods.  Whilst in China, the applicant maintains that USD 9,000 was stolen from him.  He says that he reported the matter to the local police and to his brother‑in‑law, who was very angry and who threatened to kill the applicant if he returned to Tanzania.  In fear for his life, and believing Rajabu was capable of having him killed in China, the applicant fled to Hong Kong.  He adds that since then, he has converted to Christianity and that his home state is ruled by Sharia law and therefore he is at risk of being killed for his faith.

The non-refoulement claim

5.  Under the Unified Screening Mechanism (“USM”), the applicant’s claim is to be assessed on all applicable grounds which are:

i.     Risk of torture under Part VIIC of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap 115 (“torture risk”).  Under torture risk, the applicant must establish he has substantial grounds for believing he will be subjected to torture if returned to his home state.  Those grounds cannot be speculative or theoretical and the risk of torture must be real and personal.  The standard of proof is a low one.

ii.     Risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment under Article 3 of section 8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance (“the HKBORO”), Cap 383 and Article 7 of the ICCPR (“BOR 3 risk”).  Under BOR 3, the applicant must establish that he has a genuine and substantial risk of being subject to mental or physical torture; cruel, inhuman or degrading ill treatment; or punishment, if returned to his home state.  The level of such mental or physical torture etc. must reach a minimum level of severity.

iii.     Risk of persecution with reference to the non-refoulement principle under Article 33 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (“persecution risk”).  Under persecution risk, the applicant must establish that he has a well-founded fear that there is a real chance that he will face persecution based upon race, religion, nationality or membership of a social group or political opinion if he is expelled and returned to his home state.

iv.     Risk of a violation of the right to life under Article 2 of section 8 of the HKBORO, Cap 383 and Article 6 of the ICCPR (“BOR 2 risk”).  Under BOR 2, the applicant must establish a real risk that he will be arbitrarily deprived of his life, have a death penalty imposed upon him; or be the victim of genocide or otherwise be deprived of his rights under BOR 2.

6.  It is the duty of both the Director and the Adjudicator to weigh all of the available credible, reliable evidence and ascertain whether the applicant had established the factual basis of his claim.  The Director and the Adjudicator must then assess the level of harm the applicant says he fears.  Each ground of claim above has a relevant level of risk.  It is for the applicant to establish that he is the subject of such risk.  Under the HKBORO, he must show substantial grounds for believing that the harm which he fears is “foreseeable, real, personal and present”.  The question is whether there is a real riskor real chance of the occurrence or recurrence of the harm which he fears.

Decision and Further Decision of the Director

7.  The applicant seeks to review the decisions of both the Director and the Adjudicator.  As the applicant has already utilised the channel of appealing the Director’s decision to the TCAB and the TCAB treated the appeal as a rehearing, the Decision of the Director is not susceptible to judicial review once an appeal to the Board has been pursued by the claimant and dealt with[1].

Decision of the Adjudicator

8.  The Adjudicator analysed the applicant’s claim on all applicable grounds.  She arranged for an oral hearing and treated the appeal as a rehearing.  The Adjudicator considered both the issue of the applicant’s conversion and of the threat from his brother-in-law and took account of all relevant COI.  She considered the facts, assessed his credibility and then she correctly set out the law and key legal principles including the burden and standard of proof.  The Adjudicator suggested that both Muslim and non-Muslim people lived together peacefully in Tanzania and that the mix was 50/50.  The applicant accepted this general premise and that he could re-locate, however he said that if his family were to find out about his conversion they would kill him.  He added, for the first time, that there was a group called “Uamsho” who had warned his family that he should not return.  Even though the Adjudicator did not accept his claim that he had recently converted to the Christian faith, she nevertheless assessed the claim with the benefit of that assertion and found it wanting.  As for the financial debt owed to the brother-in-law, the Adjudicator noted that she had difficulty obtaining satisfactory particulars on that issue and that it was clearly a personal debt, if it existed, which was a matter between family members and there was no state involvement.

Leave to apply for judicial review

9.  Judicial review is not a rehearing of the merits of the applicant’s original application for refugee status.  This is an application to apply for leave to judicially review the decision of the Adjudicator.  The applicant must show an arguable case that there was either unlawfulness, unreasonableness or unfairness by those bodies or persons when dealing with his application in order to obtain leave to judicially review them.

Grounds of review

10.  There were no grounds of review.  The applicant seeks a re-hearing of his appeal.  He has not complained of any procedural irregularity, unfairness or unreasonableness.  The applicant has a duty to state the grounds of his intended judicial review and show that they are reasonably arguable and enjoy a realistic prospect of success: Po Fun Chan v Winnie Cheung (2007) 10 HKCFAR 676.  I have nevertheless considered whether the papers indicate any such ground for the purposes of considering whether to grant leave.

Conclusion

11.  Despite the fact that the applicant did not submit any grounds of review, I have considered the paperscarefully.  I have looked in particular inter alia, into the suggestion that the applicant was at risk of persecution in his home state for converting to Christianity and whether he had shown a well-founded fear of persecution for a Refugee Convention reason.  Having done that, I have not found any error of law or procedure.  I see no evidence of procedural unfairness nor a failure to adhere to a high standard of fairness throughout.  Despite the onus being upon the applicant, the Adjudicator engaged in a joint endeavour with the applicant and considered all relevant criteria; gave the applicant a reasonable opportunity to state his case and enquired into that case appropriately.  There is no criticism of her determination, which was open to her on the facts and was eminently reasonable.

12.  In my judgement, there is no reasonably arguable basis upon which the applicant could found a claim for judicial review and, as such, there would be no realistic prospect of success if he were to be granted leave.  I therefore refuse leave for judicial review.

Dated the 5th day of June 2020.

 (Marcus Wong)
 for Registrar, High Court

Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence.




Notesfor the Applicant:

If leave has been refused, and the Applicant wishes to appeal this decision, the Applicant or his solicitors must: 
a) file any notice of appeal within 14 days from the date of judgment or order; and

b) serve any notice of appeal on the respondent and such interested parties as may be directed by the Court; and

c) within 7 days after the date on which service of the notice of appeal was effective, the appellant must lodge with the Registrar:

  (i)  a copy of the sealed judgment or order and copy of the reasoned decision; and
  (ii)  two copies of the notice of appeal, one of which shall be endorsed with the amount of the fee paid and the other indorsed with a certificate of the date of service of the notice (Order 59, rule 5(1)); and

d) the Registrar shall then cause the appeal to be set down in the list of appeals and within 4 days thereafter the appellant must give notice to that effect to all parties on whom the notice of appeal was served (Order 59, rule 5(3)); and

e) comply with Order 59 of the Rules of the High Court to properly progress the appeal.
Sent to the Applicant
on 5 June 2020

Ally Ayubu Jumbe
Applicant’s ref. no:
Nil. 
Sent to the Putative Respondent / the Putative Respondent’s solicitors / such Putative Interested Parties as may be directed by the Court / the Putative Interested Parties’ solicitors
on 5 June 2020

Torture Claims Appeal Board
/
Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office
Putative Respondent’s ref. no.:
USM 4364/16/8/83/TA8
 
Department of Justice
for Director of Immigration
Putative Interested Party’s ref. no.:
QA T/C 673/16 (formerly RBCZ/10910/15) RBCZ/9002418/17
QA/528/17 [previously RBCL/622/15 (CZ)] 



Form CALL-1

 


[1]Re Moshsin Ali CACV 54/2018; [2018] HKCA 549