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Miscellaneous Proceedings2017

C v. S

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Files (12)

[2022] HKCFI 1553-EN-2022-05-27

C v. S

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HCMP 929/2017

[2022] HKCFI 1553

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS NO 929 OF 2017

_______________________

 

IN THE MATTER of N, female, a child born on the 20th day of November 2008 in Hong Kong

 

and

 

IN THE MATTER OF Section 26 of the High Court Ordinance (Cap 4)

 

and

 

IN THE MATTER OF Order 90 rule 1 of the Rules of High Court (Cap 4A)

 

and

 

IN THE MATTER OF Section 3 the Guardianship of Minors Ordinance (Cap 13)

 

and

 

IN THE MATTER of the Inherent Jurisdiction of the High Court

______________________

BETWEEN  
 CPlaintiff
 and 
 SDefendant

______________________

Before:  Hon B Chu J in Chambers (Not Open to Public) (By Paper Disposal)

Date of Plaintiff’s Written Submission:  10 May 2022

Date of Defendant’s Written Submission:  10 May 2022

Date of handing Down of Ruling:  27 May 2022

____________________________________________________

RULING

(On Payment of Family Therapy Charges)

____________________________________________________

  

Introduction

1.  This Court handed down a judgment on 3 February 2021, and amongst other things dismissed Father’s application for custody, care and control of the ward N, subject to the Mother having to consult Father over N’s schooling and N’s psychiatric and/or psychological treatment, if any in future (“Judgment”).  I shall continue to use the abbreviations in the Judgment unless otherwise indicated herein.  

2.  Father lodged a notice of appeal against the Judgment.  In light of Father’s failure to comply with his obligations under order/s made by Judge Own in FCMP 67/2010 in relation to payments of various sums to Mother, the Court of Appeal made a “Hadkinson Order”, that unless Father complied with his obligations on or before 28 February 2022, his notice of appeal be dismissed[1]. I understand that Father failed to pay, and thus his notice of appeal was dismissed.

Relevant Access Orders

3.  The May 2017 Access Order was made by this Court in these wardship proceedings along the lines of the previous interim access order made by Judge Own in the Family Proceedings on 31 May 2016 (“2016 Access Order”) pursuant to which, the Father was to have access to N every Saturday from 10 am to 9 pm.

4.  In the Judgment, the Court gave directions in relation to further submissions in relation to access arrangements, and pending any further order on access, the May 2017 Access Order as supplemented by the September 2017 Access  Order[2] (collectively “2017 Access Orders”) to continue save that the access venue was to be either the Kowloon Tong Premises or a public place, to be agreed by N, and the pick up/delivery point be agreed, failing which it was to be at the entrance of the Kowloon Cricket Club (KCC) (“February 2021 Access Order”).

5.  Thereafter, the 2017 Access Orders were further varied to provide for the access venue and pick up/drop off and other arrangements (“June 2021 Access Order”).

6.  On 29 September 2021, this Court directed, amongst other things, the OS to obtain updated medical reports from Dr Ho, a psychiatrist, and Dr Mark, a clinical psychologist, of the YMT Child Service on their treatment and condition of N and further that the parties were to each provide to the Court names of 2 family therapists with their credentials and fee quotations for this Court to consider.  The case was further referred to the Director of Social Welfare for provision of co-parenting services and suggestion and alignment of NGOs providing co-parenting services (“September 2021 Access Order”).

7.  Subsequent thereto, Dr Poon Mak Siu Man Rachel (“Dr Poon”) was appointed as the family therapist on 11 October 2021.

8.  In the meantime, an issue arose by reason of N being enrolled into a dance club training sessions between 12:30 pm and 3:30 pm on Saturdays, namely during Father’s access time.  On 28 April 2022, the Court eventually granted leave for N to attend such sessions during Father’s access time but ordered that the Mother shall not arrange any other activities for N during Father’s access time without Father’s prior written consent or without court’s leave (“April 2022 Access Order”).  The Court also directed that a list of agreeable venues or activities be compiled by the OS in consultation with N for the performance of access.

9.  An issue then arose out of Dr Poon’s appointment as to the shouldering of her professional charges, which led to the Court directing the parents to each lodge written submissions on this issue.

Discussion 

10.  Father’s position is that the borrowed money in his bank accounts has been frozen by the garnishee order/charging order applied for by the Mother, and that taxation of bills of outstanding costs orders is coming up.  He has been deprived of the use of his bank accounts and the sale proceeds of his only property would also be subject to the injunction order placed against it by the Mother.  Father claims he owes his former legal representatives and friends a lot of money and that he cannot even afford to seek treatment for his own medical problems.  According to Father, he has had no income since 2015, and he is now 62 with many chronic diseases, and has lived entirely on borrowings. 

11.  Pending further order of the court, in the interim, Father has committed to pay for the first 5 sessions for family therapy, which sessions excluded Mother’s individual sessions.  Since, the family therapy has proceeded without Mother’s involvement and that the 3rd session took place on 11 April 2022.

12.  Father said he paid for the first 5 sessions out of borrowed monies.  His present proposal is to share Dr Poon’s fees, at HKD 2,400 per hour, equally, save each parent shall be responsible for costs of their respective individual sessions.

13.  Mother’s case is that she has been on legal aid since 2010, and that she has no means of her own and was and should have still been financially dependent on the Father.  Pausing here for a moment, although this has been Mother’s position throughout, she is in fact only entitled to a carer’s allowance and is not entitled to any maintenance from Father for herself, and in my view, she should also adopt a more realistic attitude, as such carer’s allowance would come to an end sooner or later.

14.  Mother has complained that from October 2018 onwards, Father has unilaterally ceased his reimbursement of N’s school-related and extra-circular activities expenses and since October 2020, Father has further stopped all payments to the Mother under the Judge Own’s orders in FCMP 67/2010, including Mother’s carer’s allowance and N’s maintenance.

15.  The financial matters have remained to be dealt with by Judge Own in the Family Court.  The fact is that the Court of Appeal has found that the Father claiming that he was unable to pay the outstanding sums clearly not justified[3]. As pointed out by the Court of Appeal, although Father said he had to rely on borrowing from friends and relatives to finance his litigation, the amounts of which amounted to some HKD 5.8m, these amounts were advanced to him without any security.  It was further pointed out by the Court of Appeal when Father ceased to pay N’s maintenance and Mother’s carer’s allowance altogether, he had borrowed HKD 1.9m from which he paid HKD 300,000 to his solicitors on 1 March 2021, which was to be compared with the total outstanding sum for N’s maintenance and Mother’s carer’s allowance as of that date which was only HKD 172,356 (excluding interest).  As said by the Court of Appeal, this belied his claim that he was concerned with N’s well-being and that he had to instruct prominent lawyers to fight for her.

16.  As found by the Court of Appeal, Father clearly had the capacity to borrow to finance his expenses.

17.  Having considered the parties’ respective submissions, I am not satisfied that Father has exhausted his capacity to borrow or he has exhausted all his financial resources.  There is no reason as to why he should not shoulder the entirety of Dr Poon’s fees for N and for him and for the Mother, whether they be joint sessions or individual sessions.  I note that Mother is happy for the family therapy to continue without individual sessions for her.  However, I am not sure whether this is going to assist Dr Poon.

18.  The OS has suggested that Dr Poon to provide a brief report on an overview of the therapy together with her suggestions at time (times) to be determined by her.  Father has immediately responded to say that Dr Poon should focus on her treatment plans without any disturbance such as writing report at least for the time being, as any of her report may likely to displease the parent(s).  Father has further suggested that there be an order to state that the parents should act in compliance with Dr Poon’s treatment plans and advice and suggestions concerning frequency of consultations, and that the parents have the right to consult Dr Poon about N’s condition either jointly or individually.

19.  In my view, a report on the overview is not necessary at this stage.  However, I am of the view that the Court would be assisted by a simple letter from Dr Poon to indicate to this Court her rough estimate of (i) the number of individual sessions with respectively N, the Father and/or the Mother; (ii) the number of joint sessions whether with two or all three of them; (iii) frequency of such sessions, whether individual or joint; and (iv) when it would be appropriate for Dr Poon to provide the Court with a progress report.  I would direct OS to obtain such a letter.

Conclusion

20.  I will direct OS to draw up a draft order on the above terms, for this Court’s approval.

21.  I make no order as to costs, and that Mother’s own costs be taxed in accordance with legal aid regulations.   

 ( Bebe Pui Ying Chu )
 Judge of the Court of First Instance
 High Court

The Plaintiff, acting in person

Solicitors of Stevenson, Wong & Co, for the Defendant

Mr Jason Chan of the Official Solicitor, for the Ward



[1]  CACV 84/2021, [2022] HKCA 173, 26.01.22

[2]  The September 2017 Access Order further provided as to the delivery/pick up arrangements in relation to the access

[3]  At para 39 of the CA judgment.

[2021] HKCFI 1662-EN-2021-06-23

C v. S

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HCMP 929/2017

[2021] HKCFI 1662

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS NO 929 OF 2017

_______________________

 IN THE MATTER of N, female, a child born on the 20th day of November 2008 in Hong Kong
 

and

 IN THE MATTER OF Section 26 of the High Court Ordinance (Cap 4)
 

and

 IN THE MATTER OF Order 90 rule 1 of the Rules of High Court (Cap 4A)
 

and

 IN THE MATTER OF Section 3 of the Guardianship of Minors Ordinance (Cap 13)
 

and

 IN THE MATTER OF the Inherent Jurisdiction of the High Court

_______________________

BETWEEN  
 CPlaintiff
 and 
 SDefendant

______________________

Before: Hon B Chu J in Chambers (Not Open to Public) (by Paper Disposal)

Date of Plaintiff’s written submissions: 29 April 2021

Date of Defendant’s written submissions: 13 May 2021

Date of Official Solicitor’s written submissions: 24 May 2021

Date of Handing Down of Decision: 23 June 2021

________________

DECISION

(On Access)

________________

Introduction

1.  This Court handed down a judgment on 3 February 2021 dismissing Father’s application for custody, care and control of the ward N, subject to the Mother having to consult Father over N’s schooling and N’s psychiatric and/or psychological treatment, if any in future (“Judgment”). I shall continue to use the abbreviations in the Judgment unless otherwise indicated herein.

2.  As set out in paragraphs 410 and 411 of the Judgment, the then proposals and submissions of the parties made at the time of the trial were overtaken by the event that HKFWS had decided to terminate the provision of its services at the Contact Centre at the end of December 2020.

3.  This Court then proceeded to give some preliminary views in relation to access and asked the parties to try to agree, with the assistance of the OS, a draft order on access for this Court’s approval.  It was further directed that if the parents could not reach an agreement over the draft order, they and OS were to each submit further written submissions within 28 days of not more than 10 pages on their respective proposed access arrangements and this Court will deal with the same on paper.

4.  It was further ordered that pending any further order, as stated in the Judgment, the May 2017 Access Order as supplemented by the September 2017 Access Order shall continue save that the access venue is to be either the Kowloon Tong Premises or a public place, to be agreed by N, and the pick up/delivery point to be agreed by the parents, failing which at the entrance of the Kowloon Cricket Club.

5.  Subsequent thereto, the Father lodged a notice of appeal against the Judgment.

6.  It was not until 29 April 2021 that Father’s written submissions were lodged by his solicitors.  Mother’s written submissions were lodged on 13 May 2021 and the OS lodged his submissions on 24 May 2021.

Father’s proposals

7.  Father’s proposals were set out in paragraph 28 of the written submissions lodged on his behalf:

8.  With an aim to rebuild the relationship between the Child and the Father, the Father proposes the following defined access arrangement of the Child:

“(1) Weekly Defined Access

The Father shall have weekly defined access from Thursday until 11:30 a.m. on Sunday morning. The Father shall pick up the Child after school on Thursday, alternatively if it is not a school day, the Mother shall take the Child to the Father’s residence at 9:30 a.m. or the Child should be picked up at a mutually agreed venue.

(2)  School Long Holidays (except summer holiday)

The Child shall spend half time with the Father and half time with the Mother except for summer holiday. Whoever takes the 1st half of the holiday will have the 2nd half the following year.

(3)  Summer Holiday

The Father shall have staying access from Monday until Sunday on alternate week. The Mother shall take the Child to the Father’s residence at 9:30 a.m. on Monday or the Child should be picked up at a mutually agreed venue while the Father shall be responsible to return the Child to her residence at 9:30 p.m. on Sunday.”

9.  In addition to the above, Father says he and his family should have N’s mobile phone number.

Mother’s proposals

10.  Mother’s proposals are set out in a draft order attached to written submissions lodged on her behalf as follows:

“UPON the Plaintiff and the Defendant agreeing, acknowledging and undertaking to the Court and to each other that they shall not denigrate or criticise or belittle each other in any manner in the presence of the Minor

1. The minor [N] (“the Minor”) shall continue to remain as a Ward of the Court until further order;

2. Paragraphs 4 and 5 of the Plaintiff’s Originating Summons filed on 20 April 2017 for custody, care and control of the Minor (“the Plaintiff’s Originating Summons”) be dismissed;

3. The Orders dated 19 May 2017 and 21 September 2017 for the Plaintiff’s access to the Minor be varied to the effect that, the Plaintiff do have defined access to the Minor, every Saturdays:-

(a) From 10:00 am to 9 pm, either in the Kowloon Tong Premises of the Plaintiff’s parents or public places, including but not limited to Kowloon Cricket Club, Tai Kok Tsui Public Library, the clubhouse of One SilverSea, Olympian City Mall and Harbour City Hall (“the Public Places”), as agreed by the Minor; and

(b) Pick-up point to be agreed by the Parties, failing which to be at the entrance of the Kowloon Cricket Club;

4. The Plaintiff and the Minor shall travel through public transport during the access;

5. The Minor shall be dropped off by the Plaintiff at the lobby of at the end of the access on Saturday;

6. The Plaintiff shall seek prior consent from the Minor and respect the Minor’s wishes if possible if the Plaintiff intends to:-

(a) invite other people such as his family members to join his access with the Minor; or

(b) take video recordings of the Minor during the access.

7. If the Minor is unable to attend any of the access sessions in Paragraph 3, make up access shall take place in Sunday afternoon(s) until the missed access session has been made up in full, either in the Kowloon Tong Premises or the Public Places, as agreed by the Minor, failing which remote access shall be provided via Zoom or FaceTime;

8. Upon the Plaintiff providing a mobile phone with a new phone number to the Minor, the Plaintiff shall contact the Minor as he sees fit and reasonable;

9. Updated Social Welfare Report and Updated Official Solicitor’s Report on access be called for in 6 months’ time; and

10. No order as to costs save that the Defendant’s own costs be taxed in accordance with the Legal Aid Regulations.

Discussion

11.  As pointed out by both the Mother and OS, Father’s written submissions were almost a re-run (and re-litigation) of his case and arguments already put forward in the trial.  As the OS has pointed out, Father “regrettably revealed little recognition of the difficulty and challenges afflicting the father and daughter relationship”.[1]

12.  As also submitted on behalf of the Mother, Father in his written submissions has continued to put blame on the Mother for her allegations, and that Father’s rehash of old arguments was unhelpful and only indicated his interests and focus still being fixated on proving what he believed to have happened in the past.

13.  As mentioned in the Judgment, HKFWS had had assisted the parties together with the OS in arranging the access sessions prior to the termination of its services at the Contact Centre.  The parents have also agreed that they will apply for therapy service from Asian Academy of Family Therapy (AAFT) which was previously lined up for the parties by the social workers of HKFWS.  During the ensuing sessions arranged by the parents themselves, N had visited shopping malls, the stationery shop at Yau Ma Tei and Kowloon Cricket Club (KCC) etc with Father.

14.  However, the OS reported that the carrying out and the quality of the most recent access sessions since late March/early April were not that desirable and that all the sessions took place only at KCC and not anywhere else, and the duration of each of the sessions was unfortunately very brief.  Father believed that the negative emotion or attitude on the part of N was related to the disagreement between the parties with regard to N’s schooling.  Mother had found a “direct subsidy scheme school” a good choice but Father opined that N should give up the offered placement by the “direct subsidy scheme school” but instead opt for “Central Allocation”.

15.  OS further reported that he had a meeting with N on 21 May 2021 over the access arrangements at KCC.  N commented that it was actually not about her emotion or attitude but she would sometimes observe that Father was not in a good mood and that he would dominate the conversation.

16.  The parties and N have attended 3 sessions with AAFT and as observed by OS, N was receptive of the Biofeedback process as well as the service rendered by AAFT and that N finds expressing herself at AAFT comfortable and she is willing to continue to attend the sessions at AAFT. However, as reported by OS, family therapy sessions with AAFT can only be arranged or resumed after all legal proceedings including the pending appeal are wrapped up and the parties form the decision that they will no longer resort to litigation at courts.  OS opines that as soon as the parties form the decision that they will not further resort to litigation at courts, family therapy sessions with AAFT should be proactively and promptly arranged.

17.  Ultimately, OS agrees with the terms of access as mapped out in Mother’s written submissions.

Conclusion

18.  Having considered the parties’ respective written submissions and all the above, and having regard to the N’s welfare and her best interests, I agree with OS’s and Mother’s submissions that Father’s rehash of old arguments is unhelpful.  I find his proposed access arrangements are unrealistic in light of his present relationship with N and that Mother’s proposals in paragraphs 3 to 8 are more appropriate in the present circumstances.  I will only add that upon determination of Father’s present appeal, the parties shall use their best endeavours to arrange and attend the family therapy sessions with N at the AAFT.

19.  Paragraphs 1 and 2 of Mother’s draft order were in fact made on 3 February 2021 pursuant to the Judgment and it is not necessary to repeat those orders.

20.  It is not clear as to whether Father is willing to voluntarily provide an undertaking not to denigrate or criticize or belittle Mother in any manner in the presence of N, as indicated in the Judgment.  If not, I make an order to this effect.  I also order in terms of paragraphs 3-9 of Mother’s draft order.

21.  As for costs, I will make no order as to costs and Mother’s own costs be taxed under Legal Aid Regulations.

( Bebe Pui Ying Chu )
Judge of the Court of First Instance
High Court

Solicitors of Chan & Chan, for the Plaintiff

Solicitors of Stevenson, Wong & Co, for the Defendant

Mr Jason Chan of the Official Solicitor, for the Ward


[1] At para 2, page 1

[2021] HKCFI 278-EN-2021-02-03

C v. S

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                                             HCMP 929/2017

[2021] HKCFI 278

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS NO 929 OF 2017

_______________________

 

IN THE MATTER of N, female, a child born on the 20th day of November 2008 in Hong Kong

 

and

 

IN THE MATTER OF Section 26 of the High Court Ordinance (Cap. 4)

 

and

 

IN THE MATTER OF Order 90 rule 1 of the Rules of High Court (Cap. 4A)

 

and

 

IN THE MATTER OF Section 3 of the Guardianship of Minors Ordinance (Cap. 13)

 

and

 

IN THE MATTER OF the Inherent Jurisdiction of the High Court

______________________

BETWEEN  
 CPlaintiff
 and 
 SDefendant

______________________

Before: Hon B Chu J in Chambers (Not Open to Public)

Dates of Hearing: 20-23, 27-30 October, 2-3, 6 November 2020

Date of Handing Down of Judgment: 3 February 2021

_________________

JUDGMENT

_________________

_____________________

Table of Contents

_____________________

A.  Introduction

B.  Main Relevant Events

C.  N’s Present Condition

D.  Schedule of Agreed and Disputed Issues

E.  The Witnesses and the Evidence

F.  General Credibility of Father and Mother

G.  Issue (1)

G.1  Legal Principles

G.2  Father’s Case

G.3  The 1st Abuse Allegation

G.4  The 2nd Abuse Allegation

G.5  The 3rd Abuse Allegation

G.6  The 4th Abuse Allegation

G.7  The 5th Abuse Allegation

G.8  Conclusion on the 5 Abuse Allegations

G.9  Mother’s direct attempts to suborn N

G.9.1  Allegation (1)

G.9.2  Allegation (2)

G.9.3  Allegation (3)

G.9.4  Allegation (4)

G.9.5  Allegation (5)

G.9.6  Allegation (6)

G.9.7  Allegation (7)

G.9.8  Conclusion on Father’s Allegations (1) to (7)

G.10   Mother’s Parental Failings

G.10.1  Failing to Encourage or Enforce Access

G.10.2  The Report Card Incident

G.10.3  The “Password Dispute”

G.11  The Evidence of Ms So

G.12  The Evidence of Mr Lam

G.13  The OS Reports

G.14  Conclusion On Issue (1): Parental Alienation

H.  Issue (2) and Issue (3)

I.  Issue (3), Issue (4) and Issue (5)

I.1  General Principles

I.2  Ascertainable Views of the Child

I.3  N’s Physical, Emotional and Educational Needs

I.4  Nature of N’s relationship with each of her parents    and with other persons

I.5  The likely effect on N of any change in her circumstances

I.6  N’s age, maturity, sex, social and cultural background     and any other characteristics of N that the Court     considers relevant

I.7  Other Welfare Checklist factors

I.8  N’s Custody, Care and Control

I.9  Access

J.  Costs

A.  INTRODUCTION

1.  As Mother decided not to proceed with her application to de-ward N prior to the commencement of the present trial, the remaining two disputed applications for this Court now to decide are:

(1)  Father’s application for custody, care and control of N;

(2)  Mother’s application for variation of the access arrangements.

2.  The detailed background of these wardship proceedings has been set out in numerous published judgments and will not be repeated here.  As of todate, there have been no less than 16 published judgments/decisions handed down by Judge Own in the Family Court (“Judge”), 7 judgments/decisions in the Court of Appeal on leave to appeal applications/interlocutory appeals and 9 judgments/decisions in these wardship proceedings.  Further there have been no less than 18 social welfare reports (referred to individually as “SWR”), 3 reports from the Official Solicitor as guardian ad litem for N (referred to individually as “OS Report”). I will follow abbreviations in previous decisions/judgments unless otherwise indicated herein.

3.  Mr Richard Todd and Ms Athena Wong appeared for Father at the trial and Ms Belinda Ma and Ms Peggy Pao appeared for Mother who is on legal aid.  Mr Jason Chan, the present representative of the Official Solicitor (“OS”), appeared as guardian ad litem/representative of N.

B.  MAIN RELEVANT EVENTS

4.  Although the parties have submitted an “Agreed Chronology” on 19 October 2020 as directed by this Court, it contained disputed inclusions, and no references to the page numbers in the trial bundles, and further between March to May 2013, the events were not even set out in a chronological order, which was confusing and unhelpful.  Upon the Court’s further directions, a further chronology was then submitted by the Father on 5 November 2020, which was again not agreed by the Mother, as Father’s chronology contained various disputed comments/interpretations by him.  The Mother did not submit any further chronology.  All this goes to demonstrate the way that the parties have been conducting this litigation, and that they were not even able to set out simple undisputed facts in a chronological order.  Their legal representatives did not seem to be able to assist either.

5.  To recapitulate, the ward N was born in November 2008, and is now 12 years old.  Father and Mother, who were not married, separated on 10 May 2009, when Mother left home with N.  N was then only 6 months old.

6.  Parties were not able to agree to N’s arrangements, and Father commenced the proceedings in the Family Court (“FCMP 67/2010”) on 25 March 2010 seeking custody and access.  On 19 October 2010, an interim access order was made, which was subsequently varied on 8 November 2011 (“2011 Access Order”)[1].  Briefly, under the 2011 Access Order, Father was to have:

(1)  weekday access every Thursday from picking up N from her school to 8:30pm in the evening; and

(2)  weekend staying access every Friday, from the time of picking her up from school to 9 pm on Saturday;

(3)  holiday staying access over Christmas 2011 and Lunar New Year 2012;

(4)  additional staying access over two nights in January 2012.

7.  As seen above, at that time, Father was enjoying quite generous access arrangements to N.  Eventually, the trial over custody, care and control took place before the Judge.  After a 16 day trial spanning from 29 February 2012 to 27 July 2012 (“2012 Trial”), on 5 October 2012, the Judge handed down a judgment (“Custody Judgment”) and granted N’s sole custody, care and control to the Mother with general access to the Father, details to be determined and pending determination or further order, the then access arrangements were to continue (“Custody Order”)[2].

8.  This was 8 years ago and N was then not yet 4 years old.

9.  The then access arrangements which were ordered to continue pursuant to the Custody Order were those set out in the 2011 Access Order.

10.  The Father had tried to appeal against the Custody Order, but eventually on 25 June 2013, the Court of Appeal refused to grant him leave.

11.  The matter did not rest there.  Five months after leave to appeal was refused by the Court of Appeal, on 5 November 2013, he issued a summons for variation of the Custody Order (“1st Variation Application”).  Father sought an order that the parties be granted N’s joint custody and that Father be granted N’s sole care and control[3].

12.  While Father’s application for leave to appeal was going on and prior to his issuing the 1st Variation Application, there was an “abuse allegation” made by the Mother on 9 March 2013 (“1st Abuse Allegation”), as a result of which Father’s access to N was suspended as from 14 March 2013. 

13.  On 20 March 2013, the Judge ordered that Father’s access to resume and that the access arrangements in the 2011 Access Order to continue[4]. Later , on 10 June 2013, Father’s access to N was increased and Father was entitled to staying access for half of N’s summer school holidays with leave granted to Father and Mother to temporarily remove N out of Hong Kong of not more than 7 days during the summer school holidays[5].

14.  As said, Father then took out his 1st Variation Application.

15.  Subsequently, the then interim access was varied by an order on 13 March 2014[6], in that Father’s interim access was increased to roughly half a week on an alternate weekly basis, namely one week from Wednesday (after school or 9:30am if no school) to Saturday at 9:30 pm and second week from Thursdays ( after school or 9:30 am if no school) to Sundays at 10 am (“2014 Access Order”). Later, there was also an order made on 2 July 2014 for Father to have staying access on an alternate weekly 7-day basis for the summer holidays in 2014.  At the time of the 2014 Access Order, N was only 5 years 4 months old and was attending kindergarten.

16.  After the 2014 Access Order, the trial for N’s financial provision took place before the Judge over a period of some 9 months between June 2014 and March 2015. The Judge handed down his judgment on 5 June 2015. 

17.  It was on 30 May 2015 that Mother made her second “abuse allegation” (“2nd Abuse Allegation”), as a result of which Father’s access was suspended again pursuant to an order made on 4 June 2015.  It was not until 14 August 2015 that Father was granted interim supervised access from 2pm – 5 pm on 4 days in August 2015 at the office of the social welfare officer.  On 31 August 2015, Father was granted further supervised access.

18.  On 21 September 2015, Father’s access under the 2014 Access Order was ordered to resume[7]. This was however followed by another “abuse allegation” (“3rd Abuse Allegation”) about a month later on 24 October 2015, and Father’s access was again suspended.

19.  On 12 November 2015, Mother applied to vary the 2014 Access Order to supervised day access.  The 3rd Abuse Allegation led to an interim order on 9 December 2015, when Father’s access was again ordered to be supervised , for 3 hours per week at the office of the social welfare officer[8].

20.  On 7 March 2016, Father applied to resume access as per the 2014 Access Order.  The Mother on the other hand opposed this and sought Father’s access to continue to be supervised.

21.  On 8 March 2016, Father decided to withdraw his then 1st Variation Application.

22.  Thereafter, by consent, on 31 March 2016, Father was granted interim access every Saturday from 10 am to 9 pm conditional on Father’s compliance with various undertakings/conditions (“2016 Access Order”)[9], and the undertakings/conditions (“Undertakings”) were:

(1)  that the interim defined access to take place in the Kowloon Tong premises with Father’s parents and his domestic helper Norma and/or Jennifer;

(2)  should Father take N out of the Kowloon Tong premises, the helper Norma and/or Jennifer must accompany them throughout;

(3)  Father to undertake to continue all the medical appointments of his own psychological treatment at the Kowloon Hospital and to take all medication as prescribed;

(4)  Father to be responsible for picking up and returning N together with domestic helpers Norma and/or Jennifer after each interim access;

(5)  Father to be responsible for delivery of N to any extra curricular activities or tuition classes during the interim access.

23.  The Kowloon Tong premises referred to in the above order is a house in Kowloon Tong owned by a company belonging to Father’s parents (“Kowloon Tong Premises”) and where Father has been living since 2001[10].

24.  Father’s application to resume access under the 2014 Access Order and Mother’s application to vary Father’s access to supervised day access were both ordered to be adjourned to a two day substantive trial.  After the trial, on 30 September 2016, the Judge ordered their respective applications be dismissed, and further ordered that unless Father was to apply within 21 days for the final determination of general access pursuant to the Custody Order, Father was to have reasonable access to N (ie without any defined access terms) (“Reasonable Access Order”)[11].

25.  Father applied for leave to appeal against the Reasonable Access Order, which he later obtained from the Court of Appeal.  In the meantime, Father continued to have access to N on Saturday from 10 am to 9 pm pursuant to the 2016 Access Order until the 4th Abuse Allegation set out hereinbelow.

26.  On 20 January 2017, Father applied for defined access over Chinese New Year and for N to visit her ailing grandmother.

27.  Then, on 21 January 2017, another incident was alleged by Mother to have taken place (“4th Abuse Allegation”), as a result which Father’s access to N was suspended again.

28.  Notwithstanding that the Judge had made an order on 24 January 2017 for Father to have defined access daily for 3 days over Chinese New Year in the company of Mother[12], such access eventually did not take place following the 4th Abuse Allegation whereupon Father’s access to N came to a halt.

29.  On 19 May 2017, Father issued the present wardship proceedings and made an urgent application for access to resume.  On that day, this Court ordered that Father to have interim access along the same terms of the 2016 Access Order and subject to the same Undertakings (“May 2017 Access Order”).  Notwithstanding this Court restoring the 2016 Access Order, there were disputes over the pickup point and venue which resulted in a further order on 21 September 2017 (“September 2017 Access Order”).  There was non compliance by the Mother of the terms of the May 2017 Access Order (as supplemented by the September 2017 Access Order) and a further order was later made on 29 September 2017 with a penal notice endorsed against the Mother. Again, Mother failed to comply alleging that it was N who did not want to attend access.  This resulted in an urgent application before G Lam J who made it clear that whether N wanted to attend access or not was not an answer to an order requiring delivery of N to the pickup point stated in the September 2017 Access Order and Mother was ordered to pay costs of those applications.

30.  On 4 October 2017, Mother then took out an application to vary the May 2017 Access Order as supplemented by the September 2017 Access Order.  On 12 October 2017, this Court granted the order sought by Father in the originating summons herein, namely that he was granted all the rights and authority that the law would allow him as father if N were born within wedlock.

31.  The Father eventually had access on 7 October 2017 after a 9 month disruption after the 4th Abuse Allegation and since then, Father had been having access which should take place weekly on Saturday morning for about 2 to 3 hours at the Parent-Child Contact Centre (“Contact Centre”) of the Hong Kong Family Welfare Society (“HKFWS”).

32.  However, less than a month later there was the so called “Watches Incident” at the Contact Centre during the access session on 4 November 2017.  This will be further elaborated later in this judgment.

33.  On 13 November 2017, Mother issued a summons to de-ward N.   

34.  It was at a directions hearing before this Court on 18 December 2017 that the Court was informed that N had told Mother that she had “visual images of stabbing her mother to death and ideation of killing her maternal grandparents, God and Buddha”, and that on 12 December 2017, N’s then treating government clinical psychologist Mr Alex Lam (“Mr Lam”) had written a referral letter for N to consult a government psychiatrist at the YMT Child Service.  Mother had taken N to see a private psychiatrist around middle of December without notifying Father.  N was diagnosed to be suffering from obsessive compulsive disorder (“OCD”). As an appointment to consult a government psychiatrist would take time to set up, this Court was of the view that N should receive urgent treatment from a private psychiatrist.  This was met with no objection from Father at the hearing who undertook to pay for such fees but the parents were not able to agree which private psychiatrist N should consult.   On 3 January 2018, a private psychiatrist Dr Joanna Lam (who was not Father’s choice) was selected and appointed by this Court to be N’s treating psychiatrist.  On 1 March 2018, despite Father’s opposition, this Court also ordered N to be separately represented by the OS.

35.  Subsequently, by an order of this Court on 20 June 2018, N started to receive treatment at the YMT Child Service as well as continuing to receive treatment from Dr Joanna Lam until 18 September 2020, when this Court made an order that the so called “parallel treatment” from Dr Lam was no longer necessary.

36.  Although access generally did take place at the Contact Centre, there were other disputes/disagreements between the parties including what was called a “School Report Incident”, and then on 21 September 2019, there was another allegation by Mother (“5th Abuse Allegation”).  This was again followed by suspension of access, which was eventually resumed on 2 November 2019.  Suffice to say, at this stage, for various reasons including the Covid 19 pandemic, there have been further disruptions in Father’s access to N.

C.  N’S PRESENT CONDITION

37.  N is now 12 years old and she has been attending primary 6 since September 2020 at the same school since primary 1.  On 25 July 2020, N’s then academic performance in primary 5 was assessed to be in Group D in a range of 5 Groups A to E with A being the strongest and E being the weakest.

38.  Due to the Covid 19 pandemic, N has been attending online classes on and off, and as seen later, there was a further dispute between Father and Mother over Father’s access to N’s school apps and passwords.

39.  As said earlier, this Court had ordered N to receive treatment at the YMT Child Service as well as from Dr Joanna Lam.  Dr Lily Ho, the government psychiatrist at the YMT Child Service had on 30 June 2020 prepared a very brief medical report[13] in which Dr Ho opined that the prognosis of N was highly affected by her communication and relationship with her family but that N was mentally stable at the last follow up appointment with Dr Ho on 7 April 2020.

40.  Later, as seen in a more detailed medical report dated 13 August 2020 prepared by the government clinical psychologist Dr Winifred Mark at the YMT Child Service[14], N was first known to the YMT Child Service on 29 May 2015 but no psychiatric diagnosis was made at that juncture, and N’ case was closed subsequently on 18 September 2015 with no psychiatric diagnosis warranted.  N was then seen again at YMT Child Service on 5 October 2018 by Dr Lily Ho after an order of this Court as mentioned earlier.  As said, N was diagnosed with OCD and later N was referred by Dr Ho to Dr Mark for cognitive behavioural therapy (“CBT”). 

41.  As reported by Dr Mark, after receiving the CBT sessions, N was increasingly able to generate balanced thoughts and that by August 2020, N had not been reported to have any intrusive thoughts and Mother had not observed any compulsions in N.  N’s OCD symptoms were considered to be subclinical by August 2020, and that on a psychiatric level, N had reached a relatively stable condition and ready for ending the then course of CBT, and that N’s case would be closed by end of 2020 if N’s OCD remained stable. 

42.  At the trial, this Court was informed that N’s psychiatric condition had continued to remain stable.

D.  SCHEDULE OF AGREED AND DISPUTED ISSUES 

43.  The parties have submitted a Scott Schedule containing their agreed and disputed issues in the present trial. As set out in the Scott Schedule[15], the issues were:

(1)  Has there been parental alienation by the Mother? (“Issue (1))

(2)  If there is a finding of parental alienation, should the Father be granted custody, care & control?  (“Issue (2)”)

(3)  If there is a finding of parental alienation, what should access be for either parent?  ( “Issue (3)”)

(4)  If there is a finding of no parental alienation, what should the access to the Father be?  (“Issue (4)”)

(5)  Should sole custody be granted to the Father if care and control goes to him? If not, joint custody?  (“Issue (5)”)

(6)  Should the Father be granted with joint custody if care and control does not go to him?  (“Issue (6)”)

E.  THE WITNESSES AND THE EVIDENCE

44.  There were a total of 14 of Father’s affidavits and 9 of Mother’s affidavits filed in the present proceedings which were included in the trial bundles, in which they had respectively exhibited certain affirmations/affidavits previously filed in FCMP 67/2010, and which were also included in the trial bundles.  They both attended trial and were cross examined.

45.  Father had called the following persons to support his case:

(1)  his friend Dr Winnie Wong Sau Yee (“Dr Winnie Wong);

(2)  his brother Mr Chan Cheong Lung Daniel (“Daniel”)

(3)  A psychiatrist Dr Hung Bing Kei Gabriel (“Dr Hung”);

(4)  Daniel’s domestic helper Ms Parsini Lestariningsih (“Sini”);

(5)  A domestic helper who works in Father’s household, Ms Reotita Norma R (“Norma”);

(6)  Another domestic helper who works in Father’s household, Ms Epil Jennifer De La Cruz (“Jennifer”)

46.  There have been a number of social welfare officers (referred to individually as “SWO”) involved in this case at various times.  Mrs Lam Yeung Kit-ching was the SWO who had prepared 3 reports in 2017 and 2018 and Ms So Hau Ping (“Ms So”) was the SWO who had prepared the 2 recent reports in 2020.  By the time of the trial, Mrs Lam had retired, and only Ms So attended the trial to given oral evidence and to answer questions by the parties.

47.  Even though the previous SWOs did not attend the present trial for questioning, under section 3(1)(i)(B) of the Guardianship of Minors Ordinance, Cap 13, this Court has to give due consideration to any material information contained in those SWRs in the trial bundles.

48.  The government clinical psychologist who was treating N from 10 November 2015 until January 2018, Mr Lam Ho Ming (“Mr Lam”), also attended trial to give oral evidence and to answer questions.

F.  GENERAL CREDIBILITY OF FATHER AND MOTHER

49.  Father and Mother were of course the main witnesses in this trial, and their evidence very much depended on their credibility.

50.  At the outset, I would mention that I find Father’s answers during cross examination in relation to two matters unsatisfactory.  In one of Father’s answers in relation to N’s schooling, Father had said that N had been accepted by a English School Foundation (ESF) school but Mother did not allow N to attend the interview as she and N had to go to Canada.  As seen in a decision given on 8 July 2016 by the Judge in FCMP 67/2010, there was no acceptance of N by the ESF school and there was only an appointment for an interview with that ESF school on 10 August 2016, which according to Father was for N to commence at the school for the school term commencing September 2016, ie a month later.  Father had, amongst other things, relied on the interview appointment to oppose and/or to place a condition on Mother’s application to take N to Canada for a holiday.  It was quite clear in the Judge’s decision that Father did not notify Mother or discuss with her before Father accepting the interview appointment, and there was no consent from Mother for N to change school for September 2016.   

51.  I accept what was submitted on behalf of Mother, what Father said under cross examination about having secured a place at the ESF school for N and Mother not allowing N to attend the interview was far from what the Judge had found, and what Father said under cross examination was thus, to say the least, misleading.  In fact, for reasons set out by the Judge in his decision, the Judge had said that he was not satisfied that it was in N’s best interests to attend that interview.

52.  The second matter was in relation to Father’s residential address.  Father had not stated his residential address in his affirmations/affidavits filed in these proceedings.  According to what was stated by the SWO Ms So in her SWR, Father had requested her to keep his residential address confidential.  Ms So confirmed during the trial that it was Father who had asked her to keep his residential address confidential. Even though Father had not asked Ms So’s predecessors to do so, I do not see any reason as to why Ms So would want to make up this part of her evidence.

53.  When Father was asked about this, he said he knew nothing about the requirement in Order 41 rule 1(4) of the Rules of the High Court.  However, as pointed out by Mother’s Counsel Ms Ma, it was Father who instructed his solicitors to write to the Family Court in 2014 for leave for his witness Dr Winnie Wong not to disclose her residential address, and further it was Father who instructed his present solicitors to write in 2018 in respect to the Judge’s then query to provide his residential address.

54.  When asked by this Court what was the address he provided in his affirmations/affidavits, Father said it was the business address of his solicitors and that it was provided as his correspondence address. He then tried to explain that if his parents saw any legal documents, they would be very sad, and that although his father had passed away, his mother is now very old and that he did not want to cause any psychological harm to his mother.  However, his explanation simply did not make sense and his answer was evasive.  Since he was legally represented throughout these proceedings, there was no reason as to why legal documents would not be sent to his solicitors and instead be sent direct to his home.

55.  As said, in those SWRs prior to those prepared by Ms So, Father’s address was stated to be that of the Kowloon Tong Premises. On the other hand, Father had in the past tried to give an impression that he was only living there temporarily.  This was seen during the financial provision trial when Father’s then evidence was that he was using the One Silver Sea property as his place of residence to oppose Mother and N being allowed to reside there[16] and later seen in particular in a long email marked “without prejudice” which he sent to Mother on 2 January 2017 (“WP Email”)[17].  In this email, he had said he was only frequently at the Kowloon Tong Premises for convenience sake, ie for access and also for looking after his parents.  As said earlier, the Judge had already said that he had been living there since 2001.  In any event, for reasons of his own, Father had not been forthcoming in his evidence as to why he did not provide his residential address in his affirmations/affidavits.  

56.  As will be further set out later in this judgment, I have found Father evasive in other answers as well, and he had also cherry picked evidence from various reports.  I do not find him a reliable witness. 

57.  There were no general submissions on Mother’s credibility in Father’s Closing Submissions.  In any event, having heard Mother’s evidence, by comparison to Father, I find Mother generally more direct in her answers during cross examination, and for reasons set out later in this judgment, I have preferred her version.

G.  ISSUE (1)

58.  Issue (1), ie parental alienation, is the main ground for Father’s application to vary N’s present status quo and to seek that custody, care and control of N be granted to him.

59.  In his 1st affirmation filed herein on 20 April 2017, Father stated that this matter had a long history and a series of unfounded child abuse allegations laid by the Mother[18], and that those repeated unfounded allegations, coaching and the serious alienation by Mother had adversely impacted repeatedly on N’s growth and her mental and physical health[19].  In Father’s 2nd affirmation herein, he had further set out the “pattern of alienation of Mother over the years”, the pattern being since 2013, in each and every instance of Mother’s allegations, she (i) first alleged an abuse incident; (ii) then blocked his access despite the court order in place and (iii) further alleged that N refused access as she was very fearful of him[20]. 

60.  As set out earlier, there were 5 Abuse Allegations relied on by Father, and four of them were incidents of alleged physical abuse and one incident was of an alleged sexual abuse.

G.1      Legal Principles

61.  In the decision in these proceedings of 28 May 2020, [2020] HKCFI 937, this Court had quoted the definition of the CAFCASS in UK[21], as referred to by Lord Justice Peter Jackson in paragraph 8 of his judgment in Re S (Parental Alienation: Cult) [2020] EWCA Civ 568.  What Jackson LJ had stated was as follows:

“8. ..… For working purposes, the CAFCASS definition of alienation is sufficient:

‘When a child’s resistance/hostility towards one parent is not justified and is the result of psychological manipulation by the other parent’

To that may be added that the manipulation of the child by the other parent need not be malicious or even deliberate.  It is the process that matters, not the motive.”

62.  In fact, in paragraphs 7 – 13 of his judgment, Jackson LJ had set out the law on parental alienation which this Court finds most helpful.

63.  To start with, Jackson LJ had said in paragraph 7:

“7. At the outset, it must be acknowledged that, whether a family is united or divided, it is not uncommon for there to be difficulties in a parent-child relationship that cannot fairly be laid at the door of the other parent. Children have their own feelings and needs and where their parents are polarised they are bound to feel the effects. Situations of this kind, where the concerned parent is being no more than properly supportive, must obviously be distinguished from those where an emotionally abusive process is taking place. For that reason, the value of early fact-finding has repeatedly been emphasised.” (emphasis added)

64.  I will not set out in full all those paragraphs 9 – 13 in Re S, which are summarised as follows:

(1)  Where a child's relationship with one parent is not working for no apparent good reason, signs of alienation may be found on the part of the other parent….(para 9);

(2)  Where a process of alienation is found to exist, there is a spectrum of severity and the remedy will depend upon an assessment of all aspects of the child's welfare, and not merely those that concern the relationship that may be under threat….(para 10);

(3)  Whilst a change in the child's main home is a highly significant alteration in that child's circumstances, such a change is not regarded as "a last resort” …..The judge must consider all the circumstances and choose the best welfare solution ( para 10);

(4)  Cases at the upper end of the spectrum of alienation place exceptional demands on the court.  It will recognise that the more distant the relationship with the unfavoured parent becomes, the more limited its powers become…. (para 11);

(5)  Unhappily, reported decisions in this area tend to take the form of a post mortem examination of a lost parental relationship…. (para 12). 

(6)  In summary, in a situation of parental alienation the obligation on the court is to respond with exceptional diligence and take whatever effective measures are available.  The situation calls for judicial resolve because the line of least resistance is likely to be less stressful for the child and for the court in the short term…. (para 13). 

(emphasis added)

65.  In the present case, the term “child abuse” has been used freely throughout by the parties.  The Court’s attention was not drawn to any definition of “child abuse” in the authorities submitted by the parties.  In so far as this Court can find, and as seen in  the “Child Protection Fact Sheet” published in June 2010 by the National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children (NSPCC), a charity in UK specialising in child protection,  there are 4 types of child abuse , namely (i) physical abuse ; (ii) emotional abuse; (iii) sexual abuse; and (iv) neglect, and as seen in the Fact Sheet, “bullying” has also been included therein[22].  It is further set out in the Fact Sheet that “physical abuse” may involve hitting, shaking, throwing, poisoning, burning or scalding, drowning, suffocating, or otherwise causing physical harm to a child. (emphasis added), and that physical harm may also be caused when a parent or carer fabricates the symptoms of, or deliberately induces, illness in a child. 

66.  In his judgment in CCL v SW FCMC 10564/2009, unrep, 17 December 2012, HHJ Bruno Chan had quoted with approval what was stated by Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead (who gave judgment for the majority) in Re H and R (Child Sexual Abuse: Standard of Proof) [1996] 1 FLR 80 as to the correct burden and the standard of proof to be applied in considering allegations of harm to a child[23].  To summarise, (1) any allegation of abusing or harming a child has to be proved; (2) whilst the standard or proof is on balance of probabilities, it is subject to a higher evidentiary burden in cases where serious abuse was alleged; (3) the burden of proof is on the accuser.

67.  With the above in mind, I turn to the present case.

G.2      Father’s Case

68.  As set out in Father’s Closing Submissions[24], Father’s focus on Issue (1) was essentially said to be:-

(1)  The times Mother had prevented access, and that these were typified by extraordinarily trivial or exaggerated incidents which Mother had magnified to justify her unilateral decision to sabotage access (“Incidents”);

(2)  Mother’s direct attempts to suborn N;

(3)  Mother’s parental failings.

69.  As seen in Father’s Closing Submissions, the Incidents which were relied on by Father were those in the 5 Abuse Allegations[25].  

G.3      The 1st Abuse Allegation

70.  The Incident in the 1st Abuse Allegation took place on 9 March 2013.

71.  According to Mother[26], when N came home after access at around 9 pm that day, Mother found that her right cheek appeared to be red with two scratch marks, and that N told her that Father hit her for lack of concentration when doing homework, and Mother said she then sent a text message to Father at 9:29 pm.  In the text message Mother stated that N told her that Father had hit N’s face hard many times and Mother asked Father whether this happened or not[27].

72.  In his reply text message, Father denied that he had hit N as alleged by Mother.

73.  Mother had produced a photograph taken by her of N of her injuries, and a copy of the text message she sent to Father.  The photograph showed some darkened area around N’s right eye, but no scratch marks were discernible[28].

74.  The Incident was not reported to the police by the Mother, nor did Mother take N for any medical examination.  Mother had produced an affirmation from a barrister Edward Chan Man Hon[29], who had been previously a solicitor and the former handling solicitor of Mother’s case.  Mr Edward Chan had made his affirmation as a factual witness for Mother at the time.  He confirmed that on 9 March 2013, he had received a call from the Mother at about 9 pm who told him that N said she was hit on the face by Father.  According to Mr Edward Chan, Mother said she first noticed two light marks on N’s face and had initially assumed that they were scratch marks, and that he then told Mother to take a snapshot of N’s face with the mobile phone and sent the photograph to him.  Mr Edward Chan claimed he could see the two marks on N’s face and that he thought N’s face was slightly red too, which was confirmed by Mother.  Mr Edward Chan said he had several telephone conversations with Mother that evening discussing what could or should be done about the matter, and that further along the conversation, N revealed to Mother that she was hit on the face many times and on the hand twice by Father.

75.  It was Mr Edward Chan’s evidence that he had covered with Mother the pros and cons of reporting the Incident to the police and that although N was only 4 years old, she would no doubt sense that something “big” was going on if police was involved, and that balancing the situation, he would prefer not to involve the police and that Mother seemed to agree with him.  Mr Edward Chan then said before the end of his conversation with Mother he told her she should make an application to court as soon as possible to suspend or vary the conditions of Father’s access pending a full investigation into the matter[30].

76.  Mr Edward Chan did not submit any witness statement in these wardship proceedings, nor was he called to give any oral evidence at the trial.

77.  On the other hand, in the present trial Father had called his friend, Dr Winnie Wong, to give evidence on his behalf.  Dr Winnie Wong had confirmed during trial the contents of her affirmation of 25 May 2020 containing her witness statement, in which she adopted the contents of her two earlier affirmations in FCMP 67/2010, the 1st one dated 19 March 2013 and 2nd one dated 17 November 2014[31].  

78.  It was Dr Winnie Wong’s evidence that in the evening of 9 March 2013, at about 6 pm, she was invited to have dinner with Father and N at Kowloon City and when she met N, N was sleeping comfortably and calmly upon Father’s shoulder for the first half of the dinner, and when N woke up, she had dinner together with them, and that according to Dr Winnie Wong’s observation, N seemed to be very happy and intimate with Father.

79.  Dr Winnie Wong confirmed that she was also in the car when Father drove N back to his home at Kowloon Tong to pick up his helper to accompany N back to Mother’s home.  It was Dr Winnie Wong’s evidence that she did not see any scratches, marks and/or wounds on N’s face or anywhere else on her body which was uncovered by her clothes, and that she only saw a very happy child.

80.  Mother suspended access after the Incident on 9 March 2013.  There was a hearing on 20 March 2013 before Deputy District Judge Simon Lo, as he then was, and the Deputy District Judge ordered that Father’s access be restored and further directed a SWR be submitted.

81.  The SWR was submitted by a Ms Chow Yuet Ming on 21 May 2013[32]. Mother had reported to Ms Chow her allegation in relation to the Incident on 9 March 2013 and that according to N, Father said she was spiritless when doing homework, and he hit her face several times and her hands twice.  Mother told Ms Chow that she suspected that Father was impatient in teaching N in her homework.

82.  Mother had told Ms Chow that she sought legal advice but decided not to make a report to the police nor did she take N for medical examination, and she only hoped that access could be suspended until the matter was clarified.  Mother said this was the first time that she discovered injury marks on N’s body, and that the injury on N’s face was minor, and that there was no need for any special treatment.  Further, according to Mother, the injury marks had disappeared after 2 to 3 days, but as N had some unsettling emotions such as having nightmares and not willing to go to Father’s home, Mother expressed her wish for N to undergo a psychological assessment to ascertain the impact of the Incident on N[33].

83.  According to Ms Chow[34], Father completely disagreed with Mother’s allegation.  Father showed the SWO a video recording taken on 23 March 2013, which he was recorded to have shown N a photograph of her injuries, asking N how she got those injuries, and N had said that she was “scratching” in the school bus, and that when Father asked N again on 1 April 2014 as to how she got her injuries, N gave more or less the same answer.  Father insisted he did not hit N, and that N was very fragile, there was no need for him to exercise any physical discipline, and that he had written remarks on N’s homework book on more than one occasion that that this had nothing to do with her facial injuries[35].

84.  Ms Chow in her report however stated that when she interviewed N alone on 24 April 2013, N did express to her that Father had used his hand to hit her face, and N further used her finger to point at her right face to show Ms Chow where she was hit by Father, but N was reluctant to answer other questions raised by Ms Chow.  However, Ms Chow also reported that later Father produced to Miss Chow a video recording on 18 May 2013 during which Father had asked N whether he had hit her, and N had said no and when Father asked N as to whether she had told Ms Chow that he had hit her, N said she did, but then N said it was Mother who taught her to say this and that if N did not, Mother would be angry and that Mother would threaten her that she would not be able to spend overnight with Father[36].

85.  Anyway, according to Ms Chow, Mother had told her that after the Incident on 9 March 2013, N became very attached to her and that the evening before each access, N would ask Mother would pick her up after school and that N was still mentioning about Father hitting her and that she did not want to go to Father’s home.  On the other hand, Father had shown Ms Chow more video recordings said to be taken on 1, 2, 4, 5 and 6 April 2013 respectively after N was handed over by Mother to Father for access, when N was recorded as crying and saying that she wanted to be with Mother and that she was also unwilling for Father to carry her, and was repeatedly asking Father’s helper Norma to carry her.  When asked by Father, N had said she was worried that Mother might scold her for being carried by Father.

86.  However, in her report, Ms Chow had also stated that she had spoken to N’s school principal who expressed to Ms Chow that on Monday 11 March 2013 (2 days after the Incident and the 1st day of school after Father’s weekend access), that N’s face was clearly red then and when the school principal asked N, N refused to answer and went over to her class teacher.  Later the class teacher reported to the principal that N said Father had hit her.  Further, later that day, Mother had also called the class teacher asking the school to pay attention to N’s emotions that day and Mother also disclosed that N had been hit by Father, but thereafter N did not mention the Incident again at school[37].

87.  Anyway, Ms Chow concluded that (i) there was no police report or medical evidence in relation to the alleged child abuse by the Mother; (ii) by the time of the matter was brought to the attention of Ms Chow, it was already a number of days after the Incident; (iii) Father’s recordings were made by him unilaterally and it was difficult for the SWO to draw any conclusion from what was said in the video recordings; (iv) although N did mention Father had hit her face with his hand, she was unwilling to answer any further other questions asked by Ms Chow.  Ms Chow further pointed out that in fact N had by then undergone questioning by different people and she had given different answers to different people.  Having considered all this, Ms Chow was of the view that there was no need to investigate further into the Incident or to subject N to further questioning, as this would only lead to further distress and harm to N[38].

88.  Ms Chow reported that from her observation, there was no fear expressed by N towards Father, and that N was natural and close to Father and also her paternal grandparents.  Ms Chow was thus of the view that there was no reason to reduce access time, and in fact access time could be further increased[39].

89.  During the trial, when cross examined over this Incident, Mother said according to N, Father was teaching her mathematics and when N was not able to understand or to follow, Father became very angry and hit her face with open hand near the eye.  Although in her 5th affirmation in FMCP 67/2010, Mother’s evidence at that time was that Father had hit N on her right cheek, due to the passage of time, this inconsistency would not mean that Mother was not giving truthful evidence.

90.  Having said this, Father is tall, being about 6 ft 2 in, and it seems that if he did hit N’s face many times with force as complained by Mother in her text message, N would have suffered quite serious injuries.  In fact, from what Mother herself had told Ms Chow, the injury was minor and that it disappeared after 2 or 3 days.  Thus, it would appear there had been some exaggeration in what N had told Mother.  Having said this, it would appear that N’s school principal still noticed the redness on N’s face on the Monday 2 days following the Incident. 

91.  Dr Winnie Wong gave evidence as a factual witness on behalf of Father.  She had made it clear that she is a friend of Father’s and that there has been no romantic relationship with Father.  What is clear is that she was not actually present at the time when Father was supervising or teaching N to do her homework, when the hitting had allegedly taken place, and that Dr Winnie Wong only saw N during dinner time and in the car when N was being driven back to Mother. 

92.  Dr Winnie Wong had said during the trial she first met Father in January 2013 through mutual friends, and that Father was most concerned about N’s health and her legs and as Dr Winnie Wong had special interests in musculo skeletal medicine that was why Father wanted her to explain to him this field.  It was also Dr Winnie Wong’s evidence that the dinner on 9 March 2013 was not the first time she met N and that the first time was at about end of February 2013.

93.  What was odd was that Father did not seem to have mentioned Dr Winnie Wong’s evidence to the SWO Ms Chow, who was directed by the Family Court to investigate into the 1st Abuse Allegation, but, and yet Dr Winnie Wong was mentioned later by Father in June 2014 to another SWO when preparing a SWR on Father’s 1st Variation Application in relation to N’s development in her legs, knees and back[40].  By comparison, Mother did report to Ms Chow she had sought legal advice at the time and decided not to make a report to the police upon legal advice[41], and as said earlier, Mother did produce Mr Edward Chan’s affirmation to support what she had said.

94.  Dr Winnie Wong’s 1st affirmation was in fact made 10 days after the Incident.  Also, as Dr Winnie Wong herself had said, her main interest in N was in relation to N’s musco-skeletal issues. Anyway, in my view, as N’s facial injury was minor, the fact that Dr Winnie Wong did not notice such injury during dinner when most of the time N was sleeping on her father’s shoulder and later in the car would not necessarily mean that the Incident did not take place.  

95.  Further, although Father did not object to N undergoing any psychological assessment as indicated by Ms Chow, yet he refused to allow this assessment to be carried out by any clinical psychologist at the Social Welfare Department saying that he was then receiving counselling services from a Dr Bill Tsang at the Caritas Family Service, and yet when Ms Chow contacted Dr Tsang, he said he did not have any contact with N after the Incident until 3 May 2013 when he was told by Father[42].

96.  This Court’s attention was not drawn to any of the video recordings made by Father of N mentioned by Ms Chow.  However, as pointed out by Mother in her affidavit, during the 2012 Trial, Father had also produced various video clips, and in the Custody Judgment, the Judge had already said that he would not place any weight or any evidential value to the contents for video recordings taken by Father given the fact that they were all self serving and capable of being manipulated[43]. In fact, as Ms Chow herself had also stated, those video recordings were made by Father unilaterally and she found it difficult to draw any conclusions there from.  It was not clear under what circumstances or surroundings or in what context those video recordings were made by Father or whether they had been edited, and in any event, they had not been produced in the present trial.

97.  In Father’s 2nd affirmation dated 25 July 2017 filed in the present proceedings, his evidence was that the 1st Abuse Allegation was made up by Mother after he had made repeated requests to Mother for access during the Easter holidays, and that the day before Mother’s 1st Abuse Allegation, his solicitors had written to Mother that he would be making an application to court if the parties failed to reach agreement, and that Mother made the 1st Abuse Allegation as a pretext for denying him access to N during the Easter holiday.  Father also claimed that the 1st Abuse Allegation took place shortly after an incident on 9 February 2013 when the police was called as Mother, along with her father and sister-in-law caused a disturbance at his parents’ home with threatening language as Mother was trying to take N away but the police told her that N wanted to stay with Father[44].

98.  None of Father’s above allegations were reported by Ms Chow in her SWR and there was no evidence that Father had mentioned such allegations to Ms Chow at the time.  Nor were these allegations of Father’s put to Mother during the trial.  I see no sufficient evidence to support Father’s above allegations.  In any event, on 20 March 2013, Father was granted defined staying access over N’s Easter school holidays in April 2013 and access pursuant to the 2011 Access Order was resumed on 21 March 2013.

99.  What is clear is that there was no fact finding hearing held at that time.  Having considered all the evidence, I find there was no sufficient evidence that Mother had made up a story about the Incident in the 1st Abuse Allegation.  I accept Mother’s evidence that she was indeed told by N that Father had hit her face hard many times.  Further, there was no reason why N herself would want to make up such a story and in any event, I find there was no sufficient evidence that N had done so and that the Incident did take place, even though it was possible that there could have been some exaggeration on N’s part. 

100.  As I have found that Mother was indeed told by N that she was hit on her face hard many times by her father, it would not have been unreasonable that the Mother would want to suspend access until the matter had been investigated.  As the investigation showed there was no sufficient evidence of any abuse by Father, Father’s access to N was resumed after about 11 days. Further, as Ms Chow had found after her investigation, there was also no fear in N being with Father. 

101.  Thereafter as mentioned earlier, on 10 June 2013, Father’s interim weekly staying access was increased and he was also granted staying access for half of summer school holidays as defined, with leave to take N out of jurisdiction for not more than 7 days.  In fact, there was a further supplemental SWR on 25 October 2013, this time by another SWO Miss Wong Bo Ling.  According to the SWO, the access ordered on 10 June 2013 was carried out smoothly in the past 4 months[45] although notwithstanding this, and apart from access, unfortunately, there were still disputes, conflicts and misunderstanding between Father and Mother over N’s schooling, health and care etc[46]. As further seen in that SWR, N had been observed by a government clinical psychologist Dr Anita Leung to be close to both her parents but she was often caught in her parent’s conflict and this could have a long and deep effect on her psychologically, intellectually and emotionally, but fortunately at that time, the parental conflict was assessed to be not serious[47].  

102.  It was on 5 November 2013 that Father then issued his 1st Variation Application seeking sole custody care and control of N, and Father’s access to N was later increased under the 2014 Access Order[48]. With the consent of Mother, Father was also granted staying access on an alternate weekly 7 day basis during the summer holidays in 2014[49].  

103.  The Judge had called for a further SWR as a result of Father’s 1st Variation Application and the SWR prepared by Miss Kiu Ching Ha was submitted on 18 June 2014.  This SWR revealed that Father had since May 2014 arranged for N to receive treatment from Dr Bill Tsang.  It was indicated in Dr Tsang’s report of 27 May 2014 that N did disclose of having nightmares, and fear of being alone and of “monsters”, and Dr Tsang opined that N was suffering from anxiety and that both parents were aware that N’s anxiety originated from parental disputes.  However,  it was also stated in that report that both parents reported that the then access arrangement was smooth[50].

104.  It was also reported by Miss Kiu that during the home visit on 6 June 2014, N took the initiative to tell Miss Kiu that she wanted to live in her father’s home and only went to her mother’s home when she had the time[51].

105.  As further reported by Miss Kiu at that time, the parental conflict was not high and the parents had no dissented views over the major decisions affecting N’s welfare, and Ms Kiu opined that early settlement of the custody, care and control and access issues would definitely lower the anxiety level of N.  It was Miss Kiu’s views that although Mother was granted N’s sole custody, joint custody had actually been put into practice and that and that the parents shared the care and control of N almost equally.  Miss Kiu then recommended the parents be granted joint custody of N, and that instead of the parents arguing about the number of days in a week in which N should be spending with either parent, Father and Mother should seek counselling and therapy on co-parenting and relieving N from further distress[52].  

106.  Having considered all the above, I find no sufficient evidence N had exhibited any fear, or resistance or hostility towards Father at that time.  On the contrary, N had taken initiative to tell the SWO Miss Kiu that she wanted to live in Father’s home and only went to Mother’s home when she had the time.  There was no sufficient evidence Mother sabotaged access or N had been subjected to any parental alienation on the part of the Mother. 

G.4      The 2nd Abuse Allegation

107.  On 1 September 2014, N commenced attending primary one at her present school, which both parents in the end had agreed to be their first choice[53].

108.  It was Mother’s allegation that Father had on Saturday 30 May 2015 hit N and injured N’s face on the lower side of her right eye, and Mother suspended Father’s access.  This time, Mother also made a report to the police.  Father made an urgent application on 4 June 2015 for access, whereupon the Judge gave directions, including that the parties to write jointly to obtain a medical report on N and suspended access temporarily until further order.

109.  Mother filed her 12th affidavit in FCMP 67/2010 in response to Father’s application and to set out her reasons for suspending Father’s access[54]. As seen in Mother’s said affidavit, after staying access with Father from 27 – 30 May 2015, N’s maternal grandmother picked up N when N was driven back by Father accompanied by his helper, and maternal grandmother noticed that N had a “scar under her right eye”, and asked the helper who said she did not know.  When N was asked by her maternal grandmother at home, N said she was cutby the edge of a sticker.  By the time Mother got home that evening, N had already gone to sleep.  The next day, ie Sunday, when Mother asked N, N said when she was studying mathematics with Father in the morning of Saturday 30 May 2015, Father had hit her head with a stack of test papers, and that Father had also hit her head with his hands and poured tea on her face out of frustration of her performance during her studies, and then according to N, Father had told her to say that her scar was from a cut by the edge of a sticker and not to mention about the incident to anyone.  Upon hearing what N reported, Mother said she then made a report to the police.

110.  According to the Mother, the police came and N told the police what she had told Mother and that N had also said that the Incident was not an isolated event and that there had been 4 to 5 similar incidents in the past.  N was then sent to the Tseung Kwan O Hospital that night for medical examination and N told the doctor about the Incident again[55].  Following the medical examination, a police officer then took a statement from Mother.

111.  Mother was told that N would need to stay in hospital for observation for about a week.  N was admitted to the Tseung Kwan O Hospital on 31 May 2015[56] and remained there from 31 May to 10 June 2015.

112.  On 9 June 2015, N was interviewed by the police in the presence of a domestic violence SWO, which interview was video recorded. The interview took about an hour and was in the absence of Mother, and according to the Mother, after the interview the police told her that what N said accorded with what N had told Mother. 

113.  The police also took a statement from Father and according to Mother, Father was put on police bail.  As a result, there was a Multi-disciplinary Case Conference (“MDCC”) held on 16 June 2015.  The MDCC found there was no child abuse by Father.

114.  Prior to the Incident, Mother said she had agreed to Father having extra access with N on Father’s Day on 21 June 2015 but since the Incident, N had expressed her unwillingness to see Father.

115.  On 2 July 2015, the Judge directed, amongst others, a SWR in relation to resumption of access and subsequently one was submitted by the then SWO Ms Yim Heung Mui on 6 August 2015[57].  The Judge ordered Father to be granted interim supervised defined access to N at the office of the SWO until 31 August 2015.  Subsequently, by consent, Father was granted further interim supervised access until 12 September 2015.  Eventually, on 21 September 2015, the Judge ordered that Father’s access to resume pursuant to the 2014 Access Order as from 23 September 2015[58].

116.  Father’s then case can be gleaned from Ms Yim’s SWR of 6 August 2015, namely that Father insisted that he neither hit, slapped nor poured tea onto N during her revision of mathematics test papers.  Father said he brought N to swimming after revision and N appeared to be very joyful as indicated in photographs, and Father stressed that he did not notice any abrasion on N’s face before swimming and said he guessed that the abrasion might have resulted from wearing the swimming goggles[59].

117.  In his 23rd affidavit filed herein on 8 June 2020, Father had exhibited a copy of an affirmation made by one Madam Tsang Lai Ming on 1 December 2015[60]. Madam Tsang had stated therein her daughter JJ was a friend of N’s in the same playgroup and that Madam Tsang said she met Father the first time on 31 August 2014.  She stated that on 30 May 2015 JJ and N had gone swimming at the Kowloon Cricket Club and that Father had picked her and JJ up in Kowloon Tong at about 3:30pm and that there were Father and N in the car and that N had no injury on her face.  They arrived at the Kowloon Cricket Club at about 4 pm and JJ and N then went swimming.  At about 6 pm, she took JJ and N to the changing room to change and that she had noticed that there was a red mark on N’s face and when she asked N, N had said that it was because the swimming goggles were too tight and she later told Father.  Father said he was aware of that and that later he had adjusted the goggles.  According to Madam Tsang, N was very happy throughout that afternoon.  The Court was informed that Madam Tsang had sadly passed away and was thus not available to be cross examined during the trial.

118.  I do not attach any weight to Madam Tsang’s affirmation as firstly, she was not available for cross examination; secondly, Madam Tsang’s affirmation was made some 5 months after the Incident and there was no explanation as to how or why Madam Tsang would have remembered that it was on 30 May 2015 that her daughter went swimming with JJ. 

119.  Thirdly, there was in fact no sufficient evidence that Father had mentioned to the police or MDCC at the time that he had a witness, namely Madam Tsang.  Fourthly, there was no mention in Ms Yim’s SWR that Father had a witness at the time, ie Madam Tsang.  If Father had mentioned this, most likely Ms Yim would have spoken to Madam Tsang at the time when Ms Yim was preparing her SWR on resumption of access, as Ms Yim had spoken to other persons mentioned in her SWR.

120.  Although Ms Yim had in her SWR mentioned that the [MDCC] could not rule out the possibility of the abrasion was caused by swimming goggles[61], this was not what was actually stated in the minutes of the MDCC and in fact, in so far as this Court can see, there was no reference to “swimming goggles” in the minutes of the MDCC.  All MDCC stated was that the actual cause of the injury could not be ascertained. 

121.  In the Father’s 1st affirmation filed in these proceedings, Father had produced photographs in “CCMJ-3” which on the exhibit cover page, they were stated to be dated 30 May 2015.  However, the actual date on each of the 3 photographs exhibited was “31/05/2015”, and the respective time taken was 16:14, 19:57 and 19:58 and in fact N and JJ were seen holding some sort of a trophy[62].

122.  As seen in the medical report of the Tseung Kwan O Hospital, it was on 30 May 2015 that N was first admitted to the AED ( Accident and Emergency Department) for suspected child abuse and that through the AED N was then admitted to the hospital to stay on 31 May 2015.  Thus, those photographs of N exhibited by Father could not have been taken on 31 May 2015.  It is not quite clear why the dates on those photographs were not correct.

123.  Having considered all said above, I also do not attach any weight to N’s photographs bearing the date of 31 May 2015.

124.  In the medical report, under “Description of injury” it was stated “a 1 cm in length linear abrasion inferior to right eye”.  Under “Medical Opinion and Diagnosis” was stated “Suspected NAI” (non-accidental injury)[63].

125.  As seen in the minutes of the MDCC of 16 June 2015, the MDCC was held after receipt of referral by the Family and Child Protective Services Unit (FCPSU) for investigation into “suspected child abuse incident”[64]. The MDCC was attended by a Dr Ng from Tseung Kwan O Hospital who tabled a medical report and a nursing report and who had highlighted the findings therein, and further Dr Ng had supplemented his/her evidence by showing a photo of the injury on N’s face.  A Ms Carol Wong Man-Yan of the Hong Kong Police Force was also present, amongst others, who highlighted N’s disclosure in the video-recorded interview taken by the police on 9 June 2015.

126.  The MDCC members concluded that although there was an abrasion on N’s face, the actual cause of injury could not be ascertained and that based on the members’ knowledge of the father’s personality, he was not an aggressive and impulsive father and that he had genuine concern and love for the girl.  The level and nature of risk to the girl was thus considered by the MDCC members to be low”[65]. The MDCC members then considered that the case could not be concluded as a child abuse incident.  As said earlier, there was no mention by MDCC of Father’s allegation of swimming goggles.

127.  In his 1st affirmation filed herein, Father had produced a copy of the Judge’s decision of 21 September 2015 in which he ordered resumption of Father’s access pursuant to the 2014 Access Order.

128.  The hearing before the Judge were based on submissions and arguments made by Counsel on affidavit evidence.  What MDCC concluded was that case was not a child abuse incident.  The Judge found no sufficient evidence to support any child abuse by the Father and concluded that in the absence of any finding or conclusion of child abuse, previous access should be resumed.  There was no cross examination of the parties at the hearing.  There was no actual factual finding by the Judge as to whether N actually did tell Mother that she was hit by Father as alleged by Mother, nor was there any actual finding that Mother had made up the entire story. 

129.  What could be seen from Ms Yim’s SWR on 6 August 2015 was that N had expressed no fear of the Father during access and later in a further memorandum from Ms Yim dated 1 September 2015, even though N was anxious or tense initially when seeing Father, she warmed up and became relaxed.  It was under those circumstances that Ms Yim had recommended resumption of access as before the Incident and this was what the Judge ordered.

130.  In his 1st affirmation in the present proceedings, Father had claimed that he had explained to Mother at the time that N’s swimming goggles probably caused the “minor red mark under her eye” but that notwithstanding his explanation, Mother still made a report to the police[66]. Father had described Mother’s allegation was a “false allegation” and/or “unfounded allegation”[67].

131.  Father was clearly alleging that Mother had made it all up, but as I have said earlier, there was no such finding by the Judge at the time. Further in Mother’s 14th affidavit filed in the present proceedings, she had produced copies of her 5th, 8th, 10th, 12th,15th,16th, and 18th affidavits filed in FCMP 67/2010[68], and Mother had confirmed on oath during the present trial the truth of her 14th affidavit which included what Mother had said in relation to what N had told her regarding the Incident in the 2nd Abuse Allegation in Mother’s 12 affidavit in FCMP 67/2010.

132.  In his 1st affirmation , Father claimed that Mother’s unfounded allegation also resulted in “serious alienation”[69].  In his 2nd affirmation filed in these proceedings, Father had described what N had was “only a minor skin irritation”[70].  Father further said that from what some parents at N’s school told him, he verily believed that “Mother was pressuring the police to issue criminal charges against me to cut my access with our daughter off completely and then request for additional child maintenance[71]”.

133.  First, it was not merely  “minor red mark” or a “minor skin irritation” as described by Father.  During the trial, when asked to confirm that N did not have any injury on her face when she started staying access with Father on 27 May 2015 and that she had one after the staying access, Father said he would not term it as an injury.  His answer was clearly evasive.  As mentioned earlier, it was clearly stated in the medical report under “Description of injury” that there was a 1cm in length linear abrasion inferior to N’s right eye found upon medical examination.  Thus, the doctor had described it as an injury.

134.  Secondly, there was no sufficient evidence that Mother had exerted any pressureon the police to bring charges against Father.  Ms Yim had reported that on 16 June 2015, all members of MDCC concluded that it was not a physical child abuse case but she went on to say “Meanwhile, the police was seeking legal advice on how to dispose [of] of the case”[72]. Thus, it seemed that notwithstanding the MDCC’s conclusion, the police had to seek its own legal advice.  In fact, as seen in the MDCC minutes, it was highlighted by the chairman of the MDCC that the police although present would remain neutral as criminal investigation by police was still in progress at the date of the MDCC.  It was Mother’s evidence in her 16th affidavit filed in FCMP 67/2010 on 21 December 2015 that she was later told by a Ms Wong from the police, as well as a SWO Mr Ho (probably the Student Guidance Officer serving N’s school Mr Ho Chi Wing who was present at the MDCC),  the police decided not to prosecute Father but they had warned Father not to discipline N in the way he did[73]. There was no sufficient evidence to contradict what Mother had said.  

135.  Thirdly, at the time of the 2nd Abuse Allegation, the trial on financial provision had already been completed and whether Father’s access to N was cut off or not would have nothing to do with whether Father should pay additional maintenance for N, and this allegation of Father’s was also not put to Mother during cross examination in the present trial.

136.  Fourthly, as to Father noting that the 2nd Abuse Allegation was raised shortly prior to the preparation of a SWR in connection with his 1st Variation Application, it is not clear what he was trying to say or imply.  According to Ms Yim’s SWR of 6 August 2015, the updated report on Father’s 1st Variation Application was called for by the Judge on 10 June2015 which was after the 2nd Abuse Allegation[74], and this appeared to be by agreement of the parties and that it was thereafter, on 2 July 2015 that the Judge called for a further report in relation to resumption of access.  In fact, even though Ms Yim in her report on resumption of access was in favour of Father, it was Father who then decided to postpone his 1st Variation Application and expressed that he considered it not necessary to discuss his views on his 1st Variation Application with Ms Yim[75].  The reason as to why he decided to postpone his 1st Variation Application was, according to what Father told Ms Yim at that time, N had become a different child with obvious pressure and anxiety[76].

137.  In the present 15th affidavit herein, Father’s evidence was that he withdrew his 1st Variation Application in 2015 “for the mental well-being of [N] when he learned from the government psychologist’s report for MDCC, which investigated the unfounded 2nd Abuse Allegation made by [Mother], that [N] was so distressed and in fear of her Mother’s punishment and in fear of displeasing her Mother for liking and meeting her Father”[77].

138.  However, it was not quite clear as to which government psychologist report Father was referring to.  There were two psychologist reports mentioned in the MDCC minutes, one by Ms Irene Cheung of Yaumatei Child Psychiatric Centre dated 15 June 2015 on N and one by Ms Mandy Chan from the Kowloon Hospital Psychiatric Department on Father himself.  Ms Irene Cheung’s report concerned a referral by the Student Health Service Centre prior to the 2nd Abuse Allegation on N’s anxiety disorder with chronic stress caused by family problem.  Although Ms Cheung did state that N reported that she was afraid of being punished by Mother and that N had become tensed up and looked distressed when she mentioned that meeting her father might displease her mother, but N had elaborated that she had to be cautious in what she said in order to avoid upsetting either side of her parents.  N further admitted to Ms Cheung that she was being put in a difficult position, and that Ms Cheung had considered it important for N’s parents to seek professional help in order to facilitate communication between them.

139.  As for Ms Mandy Chan’s report on Father himself, it was stated in the MDCC minutes that in gist, Ms Mandy Chan’s preliminary impression was that Father had adjustment episode over the custody issues and that her work focus would be on [Father’s] mood regulation and enhancing the father-daughter communication.

140.  In any event, it was clear that in August 2015, according to Ms Yim, Father had only wanted to postpone his 1st Variation Application (which was in fact not formally withdrawn until 8 March 2016).  It was also clear that at the time Father did have the opportunity to seek a fact finding hearing in relation to the 2nd Abuse Allegation but he did not.

141.  During the present trial, Mother had said N told her at the time that it was a slap by Father using the work sheets and that Mother accepted that maybe it was the paper that had grazed N’s face.  Later, when Mother was asked whether she took what N said at face value, she had said she told N not to lie as she was going to call the police.  Further, when she was asked why she did not restore access when the MDCC concluded there was no child abuse, Mother had answered that she was told by the experts at the MDCC that even though it was concluded that it was not a child abuse incident, it did not mean that the Incident did not happen or Father did not hit N, and therefore, she still had concerns over access. 

142.  Under cross examination, Mother had made it clear that she would not accept that Father did not hit N on that occasion.  It was submitted on behalf of Father in Closing Submissions that the MDCC found that this was not a case of child abuse and then in brackets “(M’s case that the incident was serious whilst not actually being child abuse is not supported by the reports or the actions of the authorities who found the goggles explanation entirely credible).”[78] As said earlier, there was no mention by the MDCC of swimming goggles and it was not clear which authorities had found Father’s goggles explanation entirely credible, nor was it clear what Father’s submissions were based on.   

143.  The MDCC minutes of the 2nd and in fact also the 3rd Abuse Allegations were not even produced to this Court or included in the trial bundles by Father nor were N’s medical reports at the time, and this Court had to direct these be produced after the trial. 

144.  Anyway, it was not actually put directly to Mother that she had completely made up the 2nd Abuse Allegation. 

145.  In fact, in the 1st OS Report dated 19 March 2018 which was prepared at that time by Ms Juliana MK Chan on behalf of OS[79], at a meeting in the afternoon of 16 March 2018, N had told Ms Chan that she remembered Father taking her to Taiwan for holiday when she was in kindergarten, and that she got on well with the Father until several incidents happened since Primary 1, and that N had said she started to feel unhappy and to dislike Father after being hit by him when he was not happy with her school performance, and she remembered that he used the examination paper to hit her head and splashed tea on her.  N had also explained that Father could teach her slowly with patience if she did not understand.  Ms Chan had reported that it was N who took the initiative at the beginning at the meeting to explain how she felt about Father, about the few incidents that made her dislike Father and reasons why her chest felt painful[80].  At the meeting, N was alone, and she was not accompanied by any party during the meeting, save that Ms Chan’s assistant was present in the meeting to take notes.  As reported by Ms Chan, N did not appear to be nervous, she talked and responded well to questions asked of her, and she was not shy in expressing her feelings and views.

146.  What is clear from the MDCC minutes was that, as said earlier, the matter was referred to MDCC for consideration by the Family and Child Protective Special Unit (FCPSU) and there was a recorded interview of N by the police.  Further, a Dr Ng from the Tseung Kwan O Hospital had tabled the medical report of N and showed photographs of her injury.  Although N took the initiative to tell Ms Chan about being hit by Father and why she started to dislike Father, there was no evidence that N had been coached by Mother or any one.

147.  Notwithstanding the Father’s denial, having considered all the evidence, I do not find that there was sufficient evidence that Mother had made up a story about the Incident, and that I find that N did tell Mother that she was hit by Father on her head by some examination/test paper/s.  I also find that there was no sufficient evidence that N had lied to her mother or made up a story about the Incident.  In fact I find more probable than not, as Mother had said to the SWO Ms Yim and also during the present trial, Father had poor temper control, and that N was indeed hit by Father on her head by some examination/test paper/s on that occasion.  However, as Mother herself had also admitted at the trial, it could be the paper that had grazed N’s cheek accidentally and caused an abrasion.  There was no sufficient evidence that Father had intended to cause any injury or harm to N, and I accept that there was no sufficient evidence that the Incident was a child abuse and there could be exaggeration on N’s part.

148.  The Incident and N’s hospitalisation and also the investigations of the police and the MDCC came at a time when N was going to have her examinations.  As a result, N was not able to take part in her examinations properly and according to Father, N did poorly in her examinations and N was the only student in her class who had to repeat primary one.  Father claimed that N’s self-esteem and self-confidence was deeply hurt and he seemed to be blaming Mother for this.

149.  I accept that N’s hospitalisation and the subsequent police and MDCC investigations would have distracted N from concentrating on her studies or preparation for her examinations and certainly did not help her performance at school.  However, I do not think one can simply point the finger at Mother, as Father had done, as the evidence showed that N had not been doing well in her first term in primary one.  This can be seen in her school report for 2014-2015[81]. Further, as reported by the Student Guidance Officer serving N’s school, Mr Ho Chi Wing, to the MDCC members, N was performing below average academically in primary one[82]. In fact, the MDCC members had also raised their concern as to whether N was suffering from attention deficit disorder or dyslexia in view of N’s substantial lagging behind academically[83].

150.  The Mother said she could not recall whether she had asked Father about the Incident before calling the police.  Father said she did and he tried to explain the injury was caused by the swimming goggles.  In any event, the relationship between the parties was, and in fact continues to remain, one of deep mutual distrust.  Whether Mother did or did not ask Father about what she said N told her, as she had said, she would not have accepted Father’s explanation of swimming goggles.  In any event, Father had denied hitting N, and alleged Mother made a false allegation against him, which he has continued to do until the present.  The deep mutual distrust between her parents certainly did not help N. 

151.  The evidence showed that at the time Father had been receiving psychiatric and clinical psychological treatment at the Kowloon Hospital since March 2015, and he had also been receiving counselling service from medical social service unit of the Kowloon Hospital[84].  Further, N herself had also been assessed by the Student Health Service Centre as having anxiety disorder with chronic stress caused by family problem and she was referred to Ms Irene Cheung at the Yaumatei Child Psychiatric Centre for an assessment on 29 May 2015 during which Father and N were seen in the session.  This was only one day prior to the Incident[85].

152.  As said earlier, N had reported that she was afraid of being punished by her mother.  The conclusion of the clinical psychologist Ms Cheung at the time was that although [N] showed anxiety due to dilemma of parent conflicts and low mood due to anticipation or experience of separation from her father, these symptoms did not reach a clinically significant level.

153.  Ms Yim had arranged for 3 access sessions for Father and N after the 2nd Abuse Allegation, ie on 20 July 2015, 27 July 2015 and 3 August 2015.  The 1st and 2nd access took place in the playroom of the Social Welfare Office, and for the 3rd access, Father took N out walking around in a park and a shopping plaza.  Before the 1st access session, N “initiatively” (sic) expressed her fear to meet Father when N saw Ms Yim alone, as N reasoned that Father had requested her not to disclose his beating behaviours on her to others but she did it and so she worried that the Father would be angry with her and would take her away from Mother[86].  What N told Ms Yim was in fact consistent with what Mother had said in her 12th affidavit in FCMP 67/2010, namely that N was worried about seeing Father again especially when he found out that she had told Mother about the Incident[87].

154.  Anyway, N did agree to meet Father in the presence of Ms Yim, and although N appeared to be anxious, she warmed up after about a couple of minutes during the 1st session.  This was the same for the 2nd session although N had needed more time to warm up. However, for the 3rd session, N appeared to be tense and nervous and required the longest time in warming up, and further after the access, N expressed that she did not want to meet Father but could not further elaborate on it.

155.  As reported by Ms Yim, N could not explain why she showed a happy face during the 1st and 2nd access sessions and that she was relaxed after seeing Father, but then she then changed her reaction and showed anxiety towards Father during the 3rd access session.  Further, according to Ms Yim, N only repeated to say she did not want to see Father or return to his home but when N was asked her will if access were to resume to normal, N had kept silent[88].

156.  Thus, N had not really objected to resumption of access.

157.  As Ms Yim had concluded, the Incident seemed to be a parenting issue and suspending the contact between Father and N did not help in improving the family relationship and to the contrary, “it spotlighted [N] and pulled her in between her parents’ conflict”.  It was Ms Yim’s recommendation that the usual access was to resume as far as possible but Father was highly suggested to receive continual counselling and medical treatment from the Kowloon Hospital Psychiatric Department[89].

158.  Ms Yim had supervised two further access sessions on 27 and 28 August 2015.  Again, N was more relaxed after a while.  When N was interviewed alone, N had expressed to Ms Yim her fear to meet Father as she was worried that Father would take her away from Mother.  However, as reported by Ms Yim, Father was positive and humorous when interacting with N and that Mother was also cooperative in managing the handover.  Ms Yim reported that Mother took N for access on time, gave proper reassurance to N before the access and was pleasant and polite during the handover process after the access[90].

159.  Eventually, access under the 2014 Access Order was resumed on 21 September 2015 and that later, the SWO Mr Cheng had reported that access after resumption wassmooth[91]. 

160.  To summarise, according to Ms Irene Cheung, N had expressed anxiety over anticipation or experience of separation from her father and according to Ms Yim, N was also worried about Father taking her away from Mother.  Although N needed time to warm up during her access sessions with Father, there was no sufficient evidence that after the 2nd Abuse Allegation, N had shown resistance or hostility towards Father, nor was there any sufficient evidence that N had been subjected to any psychological manipulation or any parental alienation or any emotionally abusive process on the part of Mother.  

G.5      The 3rd Abuse Allegation

161.  This Incident in fact was about a month after Father’s access to N under the 2014 Access Order was resumed.  The Incident took place on Saturday 24 October 2015, when N returned to Mother’s home at 9:30 pm after staying access with Father.

162.  According to Mother’s evidence in her 15th affidavit filed in FCMP 67/2010 on 12 November 2015, N told her that when she was with Father before lunch and when she was doing her English revision under Father’s supervision, over whether the alphabet “s” should be in capital or not, and as N did not write it to Father’s satisfaction, he impatiently hit the top of her head many times, at first not too heavily, but that the last two times were heavy, and that thereafter, N had felt dizzy but dared not tell Father.  According to Mother, as N complained she was feeling dizzy, Mother then took her to the AED at Tseung Kwan O Hospital and the doctor there reported the matter to the police.  The police later came to investigate, and N underwent a blood test and a brain scan.  Mother said she was advised by the doctor that as N had to undergo a recorded interview with a SWO, N had to remain temporarily in hospital.

163.  Father’s access was again suspended.  On 30 October 2015, Father went to the hospital to see N.  According to Mother, during the visit which was held in the presence of the then SWO Miss Ho, N showed unwillingness to see Father and N was down emotionally and showed anxiety and nervousness, and that after Father left with Miss Ho, N had embraced Mother and cried loudly saying she was scared as Father was horrible and that he was hypocritical as in presence of others, he would behave in a friendly manner but he was different when he was alone with N[92].

164.  A MDCC was again held on 9 November 2015, and the members concluded that there was no child abuse.

165.  In Father’s Closing Submissions, it was submitted that “The MDCC did not accept what [N] said as alleged by [Mother]; instead MDCC said [N’s] words were not clear”[93]. 

166.  It was not clear what the above submissions were based on.  First of all, as mentioned earlier, the actual MDCC minutes were not exhibited by Father or produced by the Father during the trial.  Second, the Father had at that time only exhibited a letter dated 7 December 2015 from the Social Welfare Department in his 37th affirmation (FCMP 67/2010)[94], informing the parties that the members of MDCC were of the view that the Incident was not a child abuse case, but MDCC had made a number of recommendations including that (i) N should receive clinical psychological services and any follow up services; (ii) Mother’s case was to be followed up by the Tseung Kwan O (East) Integrated Family Service Centre; (iii) Father’s case was to be followed up by the social worker at the Kowloon Hospital Psychiatric Department; and (iv) N’s parents to continue to receive parenting counselling services as agreed by them.  There was nothing in that letter in relation to whether MDCC did or did not accept what N was as alleged by Mother or that MDCC had found that N’s words were not clear.  It was stated in the letter that the conclusion of MDCC was not binding on the police in their investigation or decision as to whether to lay charges against any one.  Third, there was no evidence in the SWR submitted by Mr Cheng on 24 February 2016 that the MDCC said N’s words were not clear[95].

167.  As seen in the minutes of MDCC subsequently produced, Ms Carol Wong Man-yan of the police was present at the MDCC and had highlighted N’s disclosure in the video-recorded interview on 29 October 2015.  Dr Wan of the Tseung Kwan O Hospital was present at the MDCC and he had under the “Incident of injury” stated that “hit by father with bare hand over the head.  [N]] was preparing for school tests while stayed over with [Father] over weekends.  After returning to home with [Mother] she reported being hit by [Father] with bare hand over the vertex of her head twice.  She felt dizzy with headache afterwards.  There were no vomit or loss of consciousness.  [Mother] had then reported to the police and brought [N] for medical attendance”.  It was reported by Mr Wan that N’s symptoms of headache and dizziness subsided soon after admission, and that she remained stable in ward.

168.  What the MDCC members found was that “though [N] gave a verbal account on her discomfort, the actual cause of the discomfort could not be ascertained”.  This was why the members considered that the case could not be concluded as a child abuse incident.

169.  What thus appeared from the medical report and the minutes of MDCC would be that N did have symptoms of headache and dizziness on admission, and that she did give a verbal account for her symptoms but the actual cause of her symptoms could not be ascertained.

170.  Again, if N did tell Mother as alleged, it would not have been unreasonable for Mother to be concerned and to take her to hospital for examination and to report to the police.  Mother had further applied on 12 November 2015 to vary the access terms of the 2014 Access Order to supervised day access.

171.  On 9 December 2015, the Judge ordered that Father’s access to be temporarily replaced by supervised access at the office of the SWO.  The Judge called for a SWR which was submitted by Mr Cheng on 24 February 2016[96].  As reported by Mr Cheng, in September 2015, N repeated primary one at her school and that her academic performance had since improved and her conduct was good.  She was the class prefect during the first term.  However, her school counsellor expressed that during her first term, N had shown unhappiness over access problems and had burst into tears during classes but the situation had improved after counselling.  It was also reported that when the counsellor met occasionally with her and asked her about access, N did not want to say much[97].

172.  Mr Cheng further reported that supervised access began on 23 December 2015 and that Mother would leave after bringing N to the social welfare office and later Mother would return to pick up N.  Mr Cheng reported when Mother brought N to the social welfare office, N would stay close to Mother and did not want her to leave, but after awhile, she did let Mother leave.  However, when Father appeared, N would show fear and would shout but after a few minutes, she would calm down but would sit on the sofa furtherest away from Father and N also told Father not to speak.  N said she would not talk to Father or reply to his questions.  N had also cried during access and said she did not want to see Father.  She had said she did not like Father asking her during access why she was unhappy and angry and often apologised to N, and all this had troubled her.  N also refused to address Father as father, but it seemed gradually from end of January onwards, she had become calmer[98].

173.  Mr Cheng reported that N had expressed to him that she did not want to see Father because she was afraid of Father and even though Father did not scold or hit her during those access sessions, she was still afraid of him.  N said that Father had apologised to her during access and that he wanted know why she was angry at him and that this had troubled her.  She repeatedly said she would not forgive Father as after apologising, Father would 重犯/“repeat the offence”, and he would not change.  When Mr Cheng asked her for her views over access at Father’s home, N said tearfully that she did not wish to see Father[99].

174.  Mr Cheng reported that according to the assessment of Kowloon Hospital Psychiatric Department, Father’s condition had improved and that there was no violent behaviour towards N and he would not harm N, and also there was no risk of Father harming N.  Thus, notwithstanding what N had said to Mr Cheng, it was Mr Cheng’s conclusion that Father posed no danger to N and Mr Cheng then recommended to restore the “normal access”, although initially N could be arranged to be accompanied by someone she would trust or a helper. Mr Cheng’s view was also shared by N’s then government clinical psychologist Mr Lam.  

175.  Father had applied to restore regular access as provided in the 2014 Access Order.  The Mother’s application and the Father’s application were fixed for a two day trial before the Judge which took place on 28 and 29 July 2016 (“July 2016 Trial”).  The parties were not called to give oral evidence nor were they cross examined.  Only Mr Cheng gave oral evidence and he was questioned by both sides.  As mentioned earlier, the Judge later handed down a judgment dated 30 September 2016 and dismissed both Mother’ application to vary access and Father’s application to restore regular access, and instead made the Reasonable Access Order.

176.  As also mentioned earlier, Father applied for leave to appeal against the Judge’s Reasonable Access Order which was eventually granted by the Court of Appeal and in the meantime, Father also issued the present wardship proceedings.  As seen in the Reasons handed down on 18 October 2017 by the Court of Appeal in HCMP 1269/2017, the Court of Appeal did not find it necessary to make any further order in relation to access as by then, this Court had made the May 2016 Access Order supplemented by the September 2017 Access Order.

177.  It is clear from the judgment of 30 September 2016 that the Judge was of the view that it was not in N’s best interests to restore automatically the arrangements in the 2014 Access Order, as by the time of the July 2016 Trial, it was some 2 ½ years since the 2014 Access Order which was made when N was still in kindergarten.  By that time, N’s circumstances had changed, and she was in primary school and her schooling, activities and other related factors had to be taken into account when considering access[100].  The Judge had also said he had difficulty to understand how the Court could make its own findings of fact on the Mother’s child abuse allegations simply by reference to the findings of other professional bodies such as the MDCC but without actually conducting a trial on the evidence[101].

178.  Irrespective of whether the Judge was correct or not to make the Reasonable Access Order in default, I share his above views, in particular that notwithstanding Father had had various solicitors and counsel acting for him, there was no application by Father at the time to seek a fact finding hearing after each of Mother’s 1st, 2nd and 3rd Abuse Allegations.  Further, the Judge clearly did not find it in N’s best interests to simply restore the access terms set out in the 2014 Access Order.

179.  Father had in the present trial called 4 witnesses, who were said by his Counsel to be present during the day of the Incident of the 3rd Abuse Allegation[102], namely his brother Daniel and 3 domestic helpers, Norma and Jennifer working in Father’s household and Sini working for Daniel.

180.  Daniel had made an affirmation on 27 November 2015[103] which was exhibited in his 2nd affirmation filed in these proceedings and which contents he confirmed during the trial.  However, what he said in his then affirmation was that he was in his shop at Franki Centre, Kowloon Tong on 24 October 2015, the day of the Incident.  According to Daniel, at around 4:40 pm that day, Father drove N to his shop to pay him a visit and that N was walking around in his shop for a few minutes and later his helper Sini picked her up and took N over to his wife’s care.  His wife then drove his son Dewy, his helper Sini and N to the Broadcast Drive Playground.  According to Daniel, while at his shop N appeared to be her normal, happy self and exhibited no signs of injury.

181.  Under cross examination, Daniel confirmed that he only saw N a few minutes inside his shop on 24 October 2015 and that he did not know what N was doing or what had happened to N earlier during the day.

182.  Daniel’s helper Sini also made an affidavit of 27 November 2015 which was exhibited in her 2nd affirmation filed herein[104] and which contents she confirmed during the trial.  Sini’s written evidence was that Daniel’s wife drove her son Dewy and Sini to Daniel’s shop where they picked up N, and then they went to the playground where Dewy and N played soccer, slide and ran around.  N did not have any fall or incur any injuries while she was at the playground, and N did not complain about feeling dizzy or that her head hurt and was happy the entire time.  They were at the playground for about an hour and Father then picked up N from the playground and delivered N home.

183.  Although under cross examination, Sini’s evidence initially was that N was picked up by Daniel’s wife and driven to the shop, she later clarified that she only went to pick up N from the shop and that she only saw N for about an hour at the playground, and that she did not know what had happened to N earlier.

184.  Norma and Jennifer were domestic helpers employed by Father’s mother (“Madam Wong”). 

185.  Norma had made an affirmation on 30 November 2015 which was exhibited in her affidavit filed herein[105] and which contents Norma had confirmed during trial. Norma was first employed by Madam Wong in 1991 until 1996 and she then went back to the Philippines for 5 years.  She returned to Hong Kong again in 2001 and has worked for Madam Wong until the present.  Her main work duties were to take care of Madam Wong and to do cleaning of the house.  She had said when N stayed in Father’s house at that time, N would sleep with Madam Wong on one bed, whereas Norma would sleep in a separate folding bed, also in Madam Wong’s room.  Norma was also the helper who would usually accompany Father when he made the trip to drop off N at Mother’s residence after access.

186.  The house is about 5,000 sq ft[106], and has a ground floor, and then 3 more floors and a rooftop, and also a small patio in the rear of about 100 sq ft.  Each floor is about 1,000 sq ft.  There are 4 bedrooms, one occupied by Madam Wong, one by Father’s elder brother and sister-in-law who work in Mainland China when they are in Hong Kong, and one is occupied by Father and one for N to live and play in.  The living room, the dining area, the kitchen and the helpers’ room are all on the 1st floor.  Madam Wong’s bedroom is on the 3rd floor.

187.  It was Norma’s evidence that normally when N had breakfast on the 1st floor, it would be Father and the other helper who would be assisting them as Norma would be on 3rd floor assisting Madam Wong.

188.  It was Norma’s evidence in her affirmation that on 24 October 2015, after breakfast, Father started to do revision of school work with N and that they went out before 2 pm.  Norma said she did not hear N cry or Father shouting at her when she was at the house and that N was very happy that day and never complained about having a headache or of being dizzy.

189.  Under cross examination, Norma had admitted that she was not with N all the time on 24 October 2015.  As it was also Norma’s evidence that she would normally be assisting and caring for Madam Wong on the 3rd floor in the morning, she could not have known what was going on on the 1st floor.

190.  As for Jennifer, in her present affidavit, she had produced a copy of her affidavit made on 30 November 2015 and she had confirmed the contents thereof were true[107]. Jennifer started working for Madam Wong in April 2015 and her duties were mainly cleaning and helping out at the house.  Jennifer had said in her affidavit that on 24 October 2015, Father and N stayed at the studying table in the living room most of the time, and that N was happy the entire time.  She had said as she was cleaning the house during the day she was mostly in the living room and the kitchen, and that if Father had shouted at N, she would have heard it.  She did not hear N cry.

191.  Under cross examination, Jennifer had said that sometimes when Father and N were in the living room, and even when Jennifer was in the kitchen, she could still see N.  Jennifer also said when N woke up in the morning, after brushing teeth and washing face, N would have breakfast and thereafter she would be staying in the living room, and she would play and then stay at the “studying table”.  Jennifer had said Father and N would start revision of homework maybe around 10 am and that after lunch, they would start revision again until around 2 pm.

192.  Jennifer maintained that during the 4 hours between 10 am and 2 pm, she was around but she accepted during cross examination that she did not have her eyes on N all the time, as she had to prepare food and would move away, and she further accepted that there were times that her eyes had left N during the revision.  It was Jennifer’s evidence that N had a big smile on her face when she said goodbye to Jennifer that day.

193.  Of all the Father’s 4 witnesses, only Jennifer was on the same floor as N when she was doing revision of her school work with Father, and even Jennifer accepted that she did not have her eyes on N all the time.  As the 1st floor is about 1,000 sq ft and Jennifer was often in the kitchen, and even with the door open, it did not seem probable that she would be watching N throughout the 4 hours.  The fact that N did not cry out, or that N was a happy child when she went out with Father or at the end of access that day did not mean that she had not been hit on her head by Father sometime earlier.  

194.  Further, even though Norma and Jennifer are not directly employed by Father, they are working in the Kowloon Tong Premises and although they are said to be employed by Father’s mother, they invariably also work for Father, and thus their evidence has to be viewed in such light.

195.  As seen above, all 4 witnesses were not in fact present with N during the Incident and whether N was happy at the playground or at end of access did not mean she had not been hit by Father earlier on or that she did not have a headache or dizziness later.  In Father’s 1st affirmation filed herein, he had said that the 3rd Abuse Allegation was another serious obstruction to N’s access, and according to him during each of the Saturday access periods since 2 April 2016, N became her normal self within no time, and she was very happy, relaxed and playful and close to and getting along very well with Father and also her cousins, her grandparents, her aunts, her uncles and nephews, and that N was only seen to be anxious when Mother was in close proximity.

196.  Father had also produced a transcript of the oral evidence of Mr Cheng[108] to support his case but he had cherry picked part of Mr Cheng’s evidence.

197.  It can be seen from the transcript that when Mr Cheng was asked by the Judge about the reasons for N’s negative emotion towards Father during the supervised access following the 3rd Abuse Allegation, Mr Cheng had made it clear that the negative emotion was largely due to the “parental conflicts” which had put N in “loyalty conflict” although Mr Cheng did say that “loyalty conflict” did not necessarily happen with both parents and instead in many cases, this happened one-sided[109].

198.  It was not Mr Cheng’s evidence that this was as a result of any parental alienation or any psychological manipulation on Mother’s part.  In fact, as admitted by Mr Cheng when asked by the Judge, he agreed that it was every one’s guess as to whether Father had hit N or not[110].

199.  As said earlier, it appeared from the medical report that N did have the symptoms of headache and dizziness on admission to the hospital and there was also N’s own disclosure in the video-recorded interview on 29 October 2015.  The fact that MDCC found that the actual cause of N’s discomfort could not be ascertained did not mean that Father had not hit N’s head with bare hand.  There was no sufficient evidence that Mother had made up the Incident in 3rd Abuse Allegation or that it was “timed to deprive [the Father] of access with [N] particularly over Christmas and Chinese New Year”, as alleged by the Father in his 2nd affirmation filed herein[111].

200.  Further, the MDCC minutes did show there was a verbal account from N for her symptoms.  There was no reason as to why N would lie to her mother and having considered all the evidence, I find there was no sufficient evidence that N had made up a story or lied to her mother, and that N did tell her mother that Father had hit her head with bare hand.  I also find more probable than not that Father did hit N on her head.  Having said this, I find there was no sufficient evidence that Father hitting her head was the cause for N’s headache and dizziness and again there was probably some exaggeration on part of N.

201.  In any event, by end of January 2016, according to Mr Cheng, he was not present during most of the access sessions and that during the last access before Mr Cheng submitted his SWR, although N said she would not talk to Father, they did speak to each other and that N was able to calmly carry out the access with Father in the games room.

202.  As mentioned earlier, N had provided to Mr Cheng at the time her reasons as to why she did not want to see Father.  This had included that Father was always apologising to her and this had troubled her and also after apologising, Father would “repeat the offence”.  These reasons were proper reasons.  I do not find that there was sufficient evidence that the relationship between N and Father was not working by reason of N being subjected to any parental alienation or any psychological manipulation on the part of Mother, or that there had been any emotionally abusive process on the part of Mother.

G.6      The 4th Abuse Allegation 

203.  It was Mother’s accusation that on 21 January 2017, Father had frenziedly scolded N during his access, refused to bring the helper along when going out with N, and frightened N extremely by suddenly braking the car while driving on the road that day and that it had caused intense fear and anxiety in N.  Further, Mother alleged that N cried hysterically that night and refused to see Father again and that on the days that followed, Mother alleged that N became emotionally unstable and exhibited even more fear and anxiety. 

204.  Father denied what was alleged by Mother and alleged Mother had unilaterally denied access despite both the holiday access order and interim access orders in place.  Father also said towards the end of access that night, it was Daniel who drove N back to Mother’s place together with Dewy and Sini in the car, as Father was sending his mother, Madam Wong, to hospital, and that they all found N very happy, loud and playful during the journey home without any sign of anxiety and that there was no way that N had returned to Mother’s place crying hysterically.  Father had also produced photographs to show how N was happy during access.

205.  In Daniel’s 1st affirmation filed herein, his evidence was that N, Father and his family had dinner at his parents’ house on 21 January 2017, and that N was very happy to see them and she played with Dewy very happily when they saw each other.  Daniel confirmed that although usually, it would be Father who would drive N back to Mother’s home, that day as Madam Wong was crucially ill, and Father had to send her to hospital, and thus, it was Daniel who drove N home, and that Dewy and Sini were also in the car, and that N exhibited no signs of anxiety, worry or fear but a very lively, innocent and happy child.  Daniel had said he would not believe that N would not want to see Father or any of them in the family and that it was impossible that N would not want to play with his son Dewy.

206.  Daniel said under cross examination that he and his family went to his parents’ house for dinner on 21 January 2017 but could not remember what time they arrived, and that after arrival, Dewy would be the one who was with N most of the time, and they would play together.  Daniel agreed that as he was not with N all the time, he would not know what N was doing or what was happening to N when he was not with her.

207.  Mother was cross examined over her allegation during the trial.  Her evidence was that N told her Father was driving the car with her inside and that Father applied the brakes so abruptly, N was not wearing a seat belt, and that N had dashed forward and thought that there was a collision, and N had told Mother that Father was crazy and that she would not sit in his car again.  Mother said she did ask Father about it.

208.  It was Mother’s case that subsequent to the access on 21 January 2017, N showed resistance to attending access with Father.  

209.  When it was put to her that as Father had applied for holiday access on 20 January 2017 and on 24 January 2017, Father was granted defined access for 3 days during Chinese New Year from 25 − 27 January 2017 , Mother was looking for excuses to sabotage the access, Mother maintained that it was N who was crying and refusing to attend access, and that all along Mother was trying to persuade her to see her grandparents.

210.  In fact, what was put to Mother was not quite correct.  At the time of the Incident, the result of the Court order was not known.  Further, Mother had only objected to Father having staying access over the Chinese New Year holidays and in the end, the Judge ordered Father to have only daily access over the 3 days of Chinese New Year in the company of Mother.

211.  In any event, it was never put to Mother during the trial that she had made up the whole incident.  What Daniel said was only in relation to N being driven home at the end of access by him, and that the car braking incident which N had told Mother about, as seen later, in fact happened earlier that day. 

212.  There had been email exchanges between Mother and Father at the time.  Mother had sent an email on 21 January 2017 at 9:52 pm, ie shortly after N returned home after access with Father, describing what N had told her[112]. Father only replied the next day 22 January 2017 at 9:39 pm with two short sentences: “No such thing, don’t doubt and stir things up. I will only love Daughter dearly and protect Daughter”[113]. Mother then sent an almost immediate reply at 9:53 pm, namely “男人老狗,做得出怕乜嘢認!” / “You old dog, if you dared to it why fear to admit it!”[114]

213.  Father had also produced some SMS text messages which took place between Father and Mother after the Incident[115].  On 25 January 2017, the 1st day of Chinese New Year on which Father was to have access, Mother sent a message to say as N’s emotion was unstable, she was not able to attend access.  On 28 January 2017, Mother sent another message to say N’s emotion was still unstable and she still refused to attend access.  Father told her that they had arrived at Mother’s place to pick up N and that her paternal grandparents were anxious to see her, and Father had asked Mother to bring N down.  Mother replied to say that she was persuading N who was crying and refusing to get up saying she would not attend any access in future.  In response, Father entreated Mother not to do this, and that he could not understand N’s reasons, and that her paternal grandparents had been waiting for N and they had been anxious to see her for several days, and that at least Mother could telephone the paternal grandparents to explain and to allow N to speak to them so that N could at least “拜年” or send her greetings to her paternal grandparents the first day of the Lunar New Year. 

214.  Mother’s response was there was nothing she could do, and that Father’s abrupt braking of the car and frenzied scolding of N had caused great fear to N and that she had frequent nightmares and woke up crying, and just recently had cried until she almost vomitted, and she insisted on not attending access.  Father replied to say “Give a dog a bad name and hang it, I understand“欲加之罪,我明白”.  I would only drive normally and safely a small car which could not move fast to travel and pick up Daughter.  What you say has no bearing whatsoever with what I request you to give to my parents aged 173 in total”[116]. According to this Court’s understanding, what he said was that he understood the “trumped up” charge against him.  However, Father seemed to miss the point.  It was not a complaint about whether he was driving a car which could move fast or not or whether he was driving normally or safely or not.  The Incident complained of was that Father lost his temper and he scolded N severely like a mad man and then suddenly braking the car causing N to dash forward, and further in breach of the Undertakings in the 2016 Access Order, he had refused to allow Jennifer to accompany them.

215.  Anyway, on 4 February 2015, Mother sent a message to say that N was still unwilling to attend access and that Mother was still coaxing her, and when Father asked Mother to tell N that her aunt, Jennifer and Dewy could play with her and to go out, Mother said she had said whatever she could, but N was still crying very much and that she still had vivid image of Father’s abrupt braking and furious scolding and she was very scared and was even unwilling to go out of the room.  Mother had also said she was not at the scene and that everything came from N’s mouth.

216.  I find the above communications telling.  I do not find it probable that Mother could have made up all those details in her 1st email on 21 January 2017, 9:52 pm regarding what she was told by N.  All Father sent was simply a short denial.  By comparison to his response to Mother’s 5th Abuse Allegation, his response to Mother’s 1st email was rather mild.  In fact, as seen in Father’s Closing Submissions, he admitted that N had told him he could not take her out without a helper on 21 January 2017.  Further in the Updated OS Report of 30 September 2020, Father had also admitted that he might well have applied the brake during the Incident but he then gave a new explanation.[117]  In any event, in those messages he had not alleged that the trumped up charge was made up by Mother and in fact, he had thanked Mother initially for her efforts in persuading N to attend access.  Mother had said she was not present at the scene and that it was all told to her by N, and Father again did not contradict what Mother said or said N was telling a lie.  All Father said was that he did not believe that N would not even speak to or see all her other relatives and he then asked Mother to pay attention to her parenting skill and objective.  Mother then got upset at this message and asked Father how he could say this when she was trying her best to help Father to persuade N to attend access.  

217.  It was put to Father during cross examination that Father had allowed N to sit in his car without wearing her seat belt.  In particular, N was seen in photographs in a car not wearing a seat belt when she was about 2 years old and later N was again seen not wearing a seat belt in a video recording taken on 20 April 2016 when she was about 7 ½ years old. Father said he could not remember the occasion when N was 2 years old, and as for the video recording, he apologised for his oversight.

218.  Thus, Father’s own evidence showed that at least there had been occasions when N was not wearing a seat belt in a car.  As seen in the video of 20 April 2016, N was in fact playing with another boy inside a moving vehicle and yet neither child was wearing a seat belt.  I find it surprising that Father, who claimed to be a loving father and who is well educated, did not ensure that N would put on her seat belt every single time when she was travelling in a moving car with him, irrespective of whether he was driving or not.

219.  There was no social investigation report called around the time of the 4th Abuse Allegation.  After the commencement of the present proceedings, this Court had later on 10 August 2017 called for an updated SIR in relation to access arrangements.  The updated SWR was prepared by Mrs Lam Yeung Kit-ching and submitted on 8 September 2017[118].  Mrs Lam had reported that access pursuant to the 2016 Access Order was smooth in general during the period from April 2016 to January 2017 until the 4th Abuse Allegation, and that since 21 January 2017, access could not be arranged.

220.  As reported by Mrs Lam, Mother considered that Father’s poor temper control was the main reason contributing to N’s resistance to meet the Father, whereas Father believed that N refused to meet him due to the fact that she had been under the influence of Mother.  Mrs Lam opined that the Contact Centre was considered a suitable venue for the access to be conducted with the assistance of a facilitator and she recommended that the access could be resumed and conducted in the Contact Centre as early as possible.  Thus, what was recommended by Mrs Lam was supervised access.  

221.  In the 1st OS Report, Ms Juliana Chan (then for OS) had reported that N had told her that she remembered that when she was in primary 2, while she was travelling in her father’s car during access and she cried out for the helper when the Father forbade the helper to accompany her, Father suddenly applied the brake to stop the car which made her feel very frightened[119]. In the Updated OS Report mentioned earlier, when Mr Jason Chan of OS interviewed N, N had again stated that she could still recall being treated badly by Father when she was younger and one example she cited was her being disciplined by Father hitting her head with a small stack of papers.  Another incident N mentioned to OS was the incident of “braking suddenly” and N had told OS that during access years ago, Father wanted to drive her to a mall to do some shopping, and when N asked for the company of the domestic helper Jennifer, it was refused by Father.  According to N, she started to cry inside the car and that she remembered Father on that day suddenly applied the brake and scared her[120]. N had further told OS that she would never forgive her father even if he would say sorry to her as he was not truthful and she did not believe that he loved her.  N had also said she had no expectation from Father and that she did not want to see him or hear his voice and that she felt stressful and unhappy after seeing Father.  

222.  Having considered all the evidence, again I find there was no sufficient evidence that Mother had made up a story about the Incident in the 4th Abuse Allegation, and that she was indeed told by N that Father had refused to allow Jennifer to accompany her, scolded her like mad and had suddenly braked the car causing her to dash forward and his actions had frightened her during access on 21 January 2017.

223.  There was no sufficient evidence that N had herself made up a story about the car braking incident or lied to her Mother. I find it more probable than not that the Incident did happen.  Further, it seemed that N had also told Mother about being scolded by Father on other occasions.  There were some email exchanges between the parties in December 2016 over Mother’s proposed holiday to Thailand with N and Father’s proposed access over Chinese New Year.  Suffice to say, it seemed that Father had asked Mother why she had not yet signed the document indicating her consent to his access, and Mother had replied that during his access, he was always fierce with N or scolding N, and that who would want to spend more time with him during the holidays, and that if he could not control his temper then he should attend further treatment at the Kowloon Hospital.  Father then denied that he had been fierce towards N or he had scolded N, but Mother said she believed what N had told her more than what Father said.

224.  Later on 2 January 2017, in response to Father’s WP Email mentioned earlier,  Mother had also mentioned that during Father’s access on Christmas Eve and New Year Eve, instead of enjoying the festive season with N, Father had scolded N, over a sum of HKD 1,000 , and also when N said she did not want to switch to the ESF school, Father again scolded her like mad[121].

225.  It was not clear how Father had responded to the above email.  Even though Father had denied that he had scolded N fiercely, he did not say Mother was making it up or N was making it up, and if indeed N was making it all up, one would have though Father should show concern as to why N was doing so.  Having considered all the evidence, N had given reasons for not wanting to see Father.  I do not find that there was sufficient evidence that N’s unwillingness to see her father was because she had been subjected to any parental alienation or any process of psychological manipulation or emotionally abusive process on the part of the Mother .

G.7      The 5th Abuse Allegation

226.  According to Father’s 23rd affidavit filed on 8 June 2020, on Saturday 21 September 2019, Mother had sent him a what’s app message in the morning accusing him of having sexually abused N[122].

227.  Mother’s message followed one from Father that morning in relation to exchange of her school report card, as seen later under the heading of the Report Card Incident.  Mother had said to Father it was firstly Father who had taken N’s report card, and secondly, Father should cease all his provocative words to N such as “if she went out for a protest march, she would be definitely beaten to death by others” and his disgusting behaviour by deliberately extending his head to look at N’s private parts, and that such behaviour was unsettling and that he should be beware of it[123]. 

228.  Father had responded immediately, to say, amongst other things, that Mother was abnormal and that what she had accused of him was low class, shameless, falsification and immoral, and that there were many social workers and CCTV at the Contact Centre and that she should use more intelligence in making up a lie, and that Mother was vicious and that God would punish a shameless liar.

229.  Father said he then reported the accusation to Ms Wong at the HKFWS and requested HKFWS to report the Incident to the police for investigation, but HKFWS did not see the need to get the police involved and that they did not think Father had done such sinful act or anything near to it, and that they had checked with their staff and CCTV at the Contact Centre and that no such things ever happened.

230.  According to Father, Mother later in her 12th affidavit herein had said it could be a misunderstanding but that was complete opposite to what she told him and that up to Father’s 23rd affidavit, he had received no apologies.  Further, Father’s access was suspended from 21 September 2019 until 2 November 2019 and during the said period the Parenting Coordinators of the HKFWS did counselling with N every Saturday morning as Mother would only allow the counselling to be done during Father’s access times. 

231.  During the trial, Mother had produced more what’s app exchanges on 21 September 2019[124] in which Father had told Mother that in light of her accusation, she should make a report to the police about her accusation, notify HKFWS and OS, and she should also instruct her solicitors to apply for an injunction to restrain Father from having any further contact with N, and finally she should seek counselling from a child psychologist for N.

232.  Mother had in fact replied to Father at 3:52 on 21 September 2019 that after her finding out more from N, what was expressed by N was: (i) N admitted she was sitting with her legs open at the Contact Centre; (ii) when Father was entering the Contact Centre, he was looking at her lower parts and saying “睇吓你撞車個樣” (You look as if you had a car accident), and then he told her to sit properly; (iii) N had immediately responded by shouting to him “你死㗎” (are you dead?) to Father.  Mother said she then understood that Father had wanted N to sit properly but N was growing older and that she subjectively felt uncomfortable [about Father’s actions] and therefore she had a major reaction and that as N was going into puberty, Father should be more understanding; (iv) Father had said to N “if you go out on a protest march, you would definitely be beaten to death by others…”, and that they [parents] should try to learn how to communicate with a young person and how to express their words, and that they should use some suitable examples in order to make [N] accept what they said.

233.  Thus, Mother was trying to explain to Father on the same day what her understanding was after finding out more from N and Mother was clearly not making any sexual abuse allegation.  Father however retorted by continuing to abuse Mother, saying that she was a bad person full of nonsensical utterances.

234.  During the trial, under cross examination, Mother had said that Ms Wong of HKFWS had spoken to her and explained that the words used by Mother had not been proper.  Mother denied that that Father did not get access after her accusation.  Mother said she did take N to the Contact Centre and that she had left N there and she did not know that what was arranged by HKFWS and that she was told subsequently by social workers that it was Father who was not ready to see N after the allegation.  Mother disagreed that she had insisted that counselling took place during Father’s access time, and that what she had communicated to Ms Wong was that counselling should take place either before or after access at the Contact Centre, and it was best not to carry out counselling during weekdays as N was busy and that Ms Wong had understood this. 

235.  The record of dates of attendance at the Contact Centre produced by Father showed that he did not attend the Contact Centre during the period concerned.  On the other hand, Mother had produced her own attendance record at the Contact Centre to show that she did bring N to the Contract Centre on Father’s access days and that it was her evidence that Ms Wong saying to her that she remembered Father saying he was not ready for access.

236.  Suffice to say, it would appear to this Court that Mother had made an inappropriate accusation without first trying to understand what actually happened and in my view, the accusation was uncalled for.  However, Father had lost no time in abusing Mother either.  I accept that Mother did not apologise but she had clearly backed down by explaining she had found out more from N as to what happened.  

237.  No doubt, Father was very upset at Mother’s accusation.  In my view, although what Mother accused Father initially was quite inappropriate, she did try to explain later the same day.  Yet, Father was the one who did not seem to be prepared to accept her explanation and the matter then led to him not attending Contact Centre.  In my view, Father had also over-reacted.  There was no sufficient evidence that the suspension of access thereafter was engineered by Mother or caused by any parental alienation on her part.

G.8      Conclusion on the 5 Abuse Allegations

238.  To summarise, out of the Incidents of the 5 Abuse Allegations, there were two Incidents when N was taken for a physical medical examination.  On one occasion, there was a small abrasion and on the other occasion, there was headache and dizziness which disappeared shortly after admission to hospital.  As I have said earlier, the small abrasion was probably an accident when Father hit N with some paper.  As for the headache and dizziness, the cause could not be ascertained.  I find there was no sufficient evidence of “child abuse” on the part of the Father even though I have found that N did tell Mother that she was scolded and/or hit by Father during the Incidents alleged in the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Abuse Allegations and there was no reason why N would have made up a story about all those Incidents although there could be exaggeration on part of N, and I have found that the Incidents in the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Abuse Allegations did take place.  I have also found that N was the one who told Mother about the Incident in the 4th Abuse Allegation and that it did take place.  As for the 5th Abuse Allegation, I find that Mother had backed down from her allegation but that Father had also over-reacted.  I do not find that there was sufficient evidence that Mother had magnified the Incidents in the 5 Abuse Allegations to sabotage the Father access.

239.  It was only after the 3rd Abuse Allegation in October 2015 that the 2014 Access Order was eventually replaced by the 2016 Access Order and the Undertakings.  Notwithstanding the Reasonable Access Order in September 2016, it was only after the 4th Abuse Allegation on 21 January 2017 that N showed resistance to have any further contact with Father.  I find that by the time of the 4th Abuse Allegation, N’s relationship with Father was already encountering difficulties and as I have said, there was evidence of N telling Mother about other occasions when she was scolded by Father. I have found there was no sufficient evidence that N had been subjected to any parental alienation on the part of Mother, whether as a result if anyone of those Incidents or the aggregate of any or all of the Incidients.

G.9      Mother’s direct attempts to suborn N

240.  In paragraph 18.1 of Father’s Closing Submissions, it was submitted on behalf of Father that Mother’s direct attempts to suborn N included (i) punishing N for expressing a desire to spend time with Father and involving her in this litigation, (ii) interrogation of N after access and her insinuations against Father.

241.  However, as seen in paragraphs 57 to 64 of Father’s Closing Submissions, the submissions were mainly on Mother bringing N into the litigation and this was in relation to Father’s 7 allegations as set out under paragraph 57 thereof:

(1)  Mother telling N that OS/SWO could help her to inform the Court that she wanted to suspend Father’s access to her;

(2)  Mother telling N that F would use her paintings and drawings as evidence;

(3)  Mother warning N that F could not take her out without any maid;

(4)  Mother telling N that Father would take her away from her mother;

(5)  Mother telling N that Father accused Mother of stealing the watch;

(6)  Mother showing N the dialogues between Mother and Father; and

(7)  Mother telling N that Father threatened to send her mother to jail.

G.9.1   Allegation (1)

242.  There was a SWR submitted by Mrs Lam on 8 February 2018 which was called for by this Court in relation to Mother’s application for N to be separately represented in the court proceedings[125].  Father had initially made such an application himself in the originating summons herein but later withdrew it, and then opposed Mother’s application for N to be separately represented. Father’s change of position was already noted in this Court’s decision on separate representation of 1 March 2018[126].

243.  As reported by Mrs Lam, N had expressed to Mrs Lam her wish to be represented by the OS so that she could directly tell OS about her wish and that she could tell OS that she wanted to have Father’s access to be suspended temporarily because she felt stressful to see her father.

244.  In the 1st OS Report of Ms Juliana Chan (then OS) of 9 March 2018, N was reported to have said that Mother had told her that OS could help her to inform the Court that she wanted to suspend Father’s access and that she had said that she was going to the Saturday access because she needed to comply with the Court Order[127].  

245.  During cross-examination, Mother had said at the time N asked where she was being taken and whom she was taken to see, and that Mother had explained to N that that they were meeting with Ms Julianna Chan who was N’s legal representative and that whatever N wanted the Court to know, N could tell Ms Chan.

246.  As stated in the OS Report by Ms Juliana Chan, what N was told by Mother was only that OS could help her inform the Court what she wanted.  In fact, this was one of the purposes of having N separately represented in the proceedings.  I do not see why there should be a complaint by Father in relation to what N was told by Mother.  There was no sufficient evidence that Mother had coached N to say that she wanted to suspend access, if this was what Father was trying to imply.

G.9.2   Allegation (2)

247.  As for the Allegation (2), Father had said he was told by the SWO Mr Cheng who looked into the 3rd Abuse Allegation that N had said she was very angry with Father for using her drawings and photos as evidence[128], and that N would not only know unless Mother had told her[129].  It is not clear when Mr Cheng was alleged to have told Father this, as this did not seem to be reported in Mr Cheng’s SWR of 24 February 2016, nor in the transcript of Mr Cheng’s evidence at the July 2016 Trial produced by the Father.  When it was put to Mother that she had told N that Father had produced N’s drawings in the parties’ litigation, Mother had disagreed.

248.  As seen earlier, what was reported by Mr Cheng was that by end of January 2016, he was not present during most of the access sessions, and although N had said she would not talk to Father, they did speak to each other during access sessions which were carried out.

249.  There was no sufficient evidence that Mother had told N about Father’s use of her drawings and photos.  However, even if Mother did tell N, I do not find sufficient evidence that any of N’s then negative feeling against Father and her unwillingness to see Father was caused by what Mother had allegedly told N.  Further, as seen later in this judgment, I find that in fact both parties had been involving N in the litigation.

G.9.3   Allegation (3)

250.  Allegation (3) seemed to be in connection with the Judge’s decision of 30 September 2016 for the Reasonable Access Order.  It is in fact not quite clear what was being submitted in paragraphs 51.2.a.2, 51.2.1.3 and 60 of Father’s Closing Submissions, and in particular paragraph 60 appeared to be in draft form and contained what was later said to be “internal memoranda”[130]. Further, paragraph 60.1 referred to paragraph 48 of Father’s 1st affirmation [C137] but there was no such paragraph in Father’s 1st affirmation filed herein.  In fact, those “internal memoranda” appeared to be amendments/additions made by persons unknown, and Father’s legal representatives simply lodged the Closing Submissions (mistakenly typed as “Opening Submissions”) without even reading them.

251.  Anyway, from what I could gather, it would appear that Father was trying to submit that as a result of the Judge dismissing on 30 September 2016 Mother’s application for variation of access to supervised access, he was then granted access without any of the Undertakings but N told him that Mother warned her that he could not take [N] out without any maid.  Father then submitted for the accesses on 14 and 21 January 2017, N, while enjoying their access told Father she was worried that Mother would find out that they went out without a helper, and that Mother was again dragging N into litigation and putting fear in N in an effort to alienate her from him.  Father then referred to letters his solicitors had written to Mother’s solicitors in relation to this issue.  It is not clear what letters Father was trying to refer to as they seemed to be not included in the trial bundles.

252.  Anyway, as seen in paragraph 3 of the Judge’s decision of 30 September 2016, at the time of the July 2016 Trial, the then access arrangement, which was in place since 2 April 2016, was the 2016 Access Order with the Undertakings and this had by consent of the parties modified the interim order of 9 December 2015.  As the Judge had pointed out, Mother’s then application for variation to supervised day access was taken out prior to the interim order of 9 December 2015 and that by the time of the July 2016 Trial, Mother’s application was overtaken by the 2016 Access Order and the Undertakings.  The Judge further pointed out that Mother had not amended her variation application to state specifically what access order she was seeking at the July 2016 Trial and it was under those circumstances that the Mother’s application for variation was dismissed.

253.  Although the Judge did not make it clear, after dismissing Mother’s variation application, it seemed that the 2016 Access Order subject to the Undertakings should continue to be in place until replacement thereof by the Reasonable Access Order.

254.  In fact, according to paragraph 49 of Father’s 1st affirmation[131], thereafter, day access on Saturday from 10 am to 9 pm was allowed by Mother until the 4th Abuse Allegation.  What Mother had allowed was along the terms of the 2016 Access Order which was subject to the Undertakings.  Eventually, the terms of the 2016 Access Order subject to the Undertakings were continued by this Court in the present proceedings on 19 May 2017, as seen in the May 2017 Access Order.

255.  There was no reason as to why N should not be explained by Mother as to the terms of the 2016 Access Order and the Undertakings which were consented to by the parties.

256.  In my view, Father’s complaints/submissions under his Allegation (3) are groundless.

G.9.4   Allegation (4)

257.  As for Father’s Allegation (4), Father relied on what was stated in paragraph 18 of Ms Yim’s SWR of 6 August 2015[132].  This had been referred to earlier on, in that N had told Ms Yim that she was worried that Father would be angry with her and would take her away from her mother.

258.  Father was cherry picking what was stated by Ms Yim.  What Ms Yim was saying was that N was worried that Father would take her away from Mother.  Ms Yim did not state that it was Mother who told N that Father would take N away from her mother, as alleged by Father.  It was only the reason given by N herself and there was no evidence that that was what Mother had told N.  Again, I find Father’s Allegation (4) and submissions are groundless.

G.9.5   Allegation (5)

259.  Father’s Allegation (5) was in relation to Mother telling N that Father accused Mother of stealing his watch, namely the “Watch Stealing Incident”. 

260.  In Mother’s 5th affidavit, she had said on 4 November 2017, at about 12:15 pm, she received a call from the SWO Mr Cheng who told her that as Father had left the Contact Centre, she needed to go and pick up N from the Contact Centre[133]. Mother said when she arrived, N was very upset and told her that Father said to her that Mother had stolen things from him and that he would bring photos in relation to that next time.  Further, according to Mother, Mr Cheng who was present there and seeing the verbal fight between N and her father, had to separate them.

261.  In Father’s 14th affidavit[134], he claimed that it was completely false for Mother to say he had accused her of stealing at the Contact Centre in front of his daughter and that it never happened.

262.  In the SWR submitted on 28 May 2020 by Ms So Hau Ping, Ms So had reported that N considered that Father always bad-mouthed Mother and was unreasonable[135].

263.  The 4 November 2017 incident was also reported in the Updated OS Report submitted by Mr Jason Chan on 30 September 2020, in that N had said Father would badmouth Mother and that one incident N cited was that Father once told her during an access session at the Contact Centre that Mother had stolen his valuable watches, and that N viewed this as a false accusation against Mother[136].

264.  N had apparently scolded Father with very bad words during access on that occasion at the Contact Centre, saying that Father had lied in accusing Mother of stealing his watches.  Father had admitted during cross examination that he did show N a jewellery box and that the contents in the box were taken by Mother.  He said it was not a watch box. Father then tried to explain during the trial that in fact there were 2 access sessions involving this incident and that during the 1st access session at the Contact Centre, N was rude to him and very aggressive, and that N then mentioned about he falsely accusing Mother of stealing his watches, and that he had insisted to N that he did not.  Father then said that he then decided to bring along the jewellery box at the following 2nd access session to show N what he said was true.

265.  Father appeared to be saying that it was N who brought up the subject of him accusing Mother of stealing at the 1st access session and that it was Mother who had told N of Father’s accusation.

266.  It would appear that N had also brought up Father’s accusation before her then treating government psychologist Mr Lam. Mr Lam had given evidence that he had noticed that in certain ways, when he met N, she was “unnatural” and Mr Lam had said that on several occasions N had said to him that she had things to tell him but that he would not normally lead her on those few occasions and that it was N who took the initiative to tell him things and one of the examples given by Mr Lam was that during one access occasion, N told him Father had wrongly accused Mother of stealing things and that N had scolded Father back.  Mr Lam said when he asked N why she told him, N was unable to give an answer.  Mr Lam said he still remembered that he had written in his case notes that N was unnatural and that it was “out of the blue” what she told him.  When asked whether N had an agenda, Mr Lam had said he had such a hypothesis but it was difficult to confirm, and then he gave another example when in the middle of N playing games she suddenly told him that on one occasion Father suddenly braked the car and scared her and then she continued with her game, and that he did not see that she was scared.

267.  When the OS asked Mr Lam during the trial when N volunteered to tell him that Father accused Mother of stealing, Mr Lam said he could not recall and was not sure whether it was towards end of 2017.

268.  Whether it was “unnatural” or not, and although Mr Lam did say he did have a feeling that what N suddenly told him was “scripted”, he himself admitted that there was no sufficient evidence that it was.  Although Mr Lam had also said when he saw N with Mother, Mother would say in front of N many litigation matters with Father, and also the 1st time when N went to his office with Mother, whenever N was asked a question, she would look at her mother before answering the question.  Later, when he decided to see Mother alone first, and then N alone, N seemed to be at ease.  Mr Lam had seen N a total of 16 times[137], and he had said he could not recall when exactly he started to see N and Mother separately, but at least it was after about ½ of those times, and later he said he saw N alone on 5 occasions and it should be sometime from 2017.

269.  Anyway, even though Mr Lam’s evidence seemed to indicate that N might have brought up Father’s accusation of Mother stealing, during the trial, under cross examination, Father had himself admitted that he did say to N that Mother took away valuable items from the jewellery box without his permission, although he denied he had implied that Mother stole the items.

270.  When Father was asked by this Court whether it was N who suddenly became rude and aggressive and scolded Father without any provocation on the 1st access occasion, Father’s answer was he did not provoke her and he claimed that he did not know why N scolded her or became aggressive.  Father’s answer was clearly evasive.  In fact, if N had suddenly become rude and aggressive, Father should have been immediately concerned over N’s unprovoked scolding of him in bad words, and that the matter should have been reported by Father himself to at least Mr Lam but as set out above, it was N who suddenly told Mr Lam.

271.  It was put to Mother during the trial that it was her who told N that Father had alleged Mother taking his watches.  Mother denied this and that she was only informed by Mr Cheng who telephoned her to tell her that Father and N had an argument and Mother was asked to go and pick up N from the Contact Centre.

272.  Having considered the evidence, I do not find that there was sufficient evidence that it was Mother who told N to bring up during the access sessions or to confront Father about his accusation of Mother stealing watches which led to N scolding Father on the 1st access occasion on 4 November 2017.  I find Mother’s evidence credible in this respect, and that the incident took place during access in her absence and that she was then telephoned by Mr Cheng to collect N.  What is clear is that N and Father had a big argument at the Contact Centre and that Father then left leaving N there.  Further, there was no reason why Father would want to bring an empty jewellery box to an access occasion with N and I find his explanation did not make sense.  In my view, Father was clearly involving N in her parents’ dispute.  What this incident also showed was that Father was not able to handle or control a situation when N and he had an argument.

G.9.6   Allegation (6)

273.  Father had relied on what’s app messages between Mother and Father on 27 January2017[138] in support of his allegation that Mother showed N the exchanges between her and Father and that Mother had interrogated N.  These were part of the exchanges after the Incident in the 4th Abuse Allegation. 

274.  As seen in the messages, Father told Mother that they were waiting downstairs of Mother’s residence and told her bring N down for access and accused Mother of putting N under “long-term house arrest and isolating her from Father and his family was immoral and inhuman”[139].   Mother told him to call the police.  Father then said he had not mistreated N, much less hitting or scolded her and that he loved N deeply and that the experts had proved this point and that on the contrary, N was afraid of Mother’s cross examination, angry scolding and punishment.  In response, Mother said N said that it was Father who taught her to say the opposite things to the experts if not N would be scolded madly by him.  Father then responded that what Mother just said proved that she had used the content of the reports to cross-examine and blackmail N, to which Mother told Father that N saw what she just wrote. Father then accused Mother of showing their communications to N and dragging N into the puzzles and conflicts between parents and it was immoral conduct.

275.  Under cross examination, Mother had admitted that she did show the messages to N and explained that Mother was worried that N might subsequently pick up the messages since Mother would allow N to use Mother’s mobile phone.  On this matter, I do not quite understand what Mother was trying to explain, as even if N were to allow to use Mother’s mobile telephone, Mother should have taken care to make sure or control what contents in her telephone would be available for N to see.  In my view the messages showed both parent had involved N in their litigation.

G.9.7   Allegation (7)

276.  Father said Mother had told N that he threatened to send Mother to jail if the access order not complied with.  When Mother was asked about this during the trial, Mother said at the time, that was in fact what was happening and that Father had said if she refused to bring N to access, she needed to go to prison, and Mother said she did tell N that if N did not attend access, Mother could be sent to prison.

277.  As Mother was saying, this was indeed what Father was threatening to do by him obtaining those orders mentioned earlier before Lok J and G Lam J and it was only after those orders that N did start to attend access.  Although I accept that there were other methods Mother could use to persuade N to attend access as submitted by Mr Todd, I do not see why Mother could not have explained to N that if she failed to deliver N to the Contact Centre as ordered by the Court, then she could be found to be in contempt of Court and sent to prison.  In any event, this was part of Mother’s efforts to try to persuade N to attend access with Father. 

G.9.8   Conclusion on Father’s Allegations (1) to (7)

278.  Having considered the evidence and all the above, in my view, most of the Father’s submissions were based on evidence cherry picked by him and/or groundless.  Having said this, I accept that as Mr Lam’s evidence showed, Mother had mentioned a lot of the litigation matters to him in the presence of N.  On the other hand, as seen in the Watch Stealing Incident, and also later in this judgment in the 3 video recordings produced by Father himself, he was also asking N questions about how Mother had taught her homework and belittling Mother and also mentioning about what N was to say to the SWO.  As said earlier and as further seen later, in my view, both parents have been involving N in their litigation.  I find that both had in their own respective way questioned or “interrogated” N as to what happened when N was in the care of the other parent.

G.10    Mother’s Parental Failings

279.  In this respect, Father complained that Mother had taken no real steps to encourage or enforce access.  Father had also complained that Mother did not have any education plan for N.

G.10.1    Failing to Encourage or Enforce Access

280.  It was Mother’s evidence that she did her utmost in persuading N to see Father.  Father on the other hand claimed that this could not be true as “the Mother does not even allow [N] to love me and punished her severely for that, thus instilling fear and anxiety in my poor daughter.”[140]

281.  Father had relied on, amongst other things, Dr Hung’s evidence, Dr Winnie Wong’s evidence, and 3 video recordings he had previously produced in FCMP 67/2010.

282.  Dr Hung made an affirmation on 8 June 2020 containing his witness statement[141]. During the trial, Dr Hung said he first saw Father back in 2014 over N’s issues and that he was then arranged to meet N as Father’s friend on 12 December 2014.  Thereafter Dr Hung prepared a report on 28 May 2015[142].

283.  Dr Hung confirmed that Father had consulted him professionally at that time for his own treatment.  Dr Hung was reminded during the trial that the Judge had in his judgment on financial provision of 5 June 2015 mentioned 10 receipts being issued by Dr Hung[143].  According to Dr Hung, one of those receipts could be for meeting N on 12 December 2014, and he confirmed that he had only seen N on that one occasion but explained that Father would sometimes see him in relation to N and not just for his own treatment.  Later, during re-examination, he said he had seen Father for treatment not more than another 1 or 2 years after he saw N, ie around 2016 or at most 2017. Thereafter, Dr Hung only saw Father at about end of 2018/early 2019 when Father went to ask him for his CV.

284.  It was not in fact clear how much time Dr Hung spent with N.  In his report, he said the time of interview was 2 hours 20 minutes (20:00 to 20:20).  In his affirmation he said he observed N for 2 hours including 30 minutes together with Father.  During the trial, Dr Hung had mentioned it was about 1 ½ hours with N alone and later he then confirmed that his report was prepared after spending 1 hour 50 minutes with N.  Anyway, the time he spent with N alone was less than 2 hours and according to what he had stated in his report, the reason for N being referred to him was to assess N’s then state and anxiety (if any) and to make recommendations on coping skills and ways to facilitate her emotional wellbeing.

285.  Dr Hung confirmed that he had not seen N since 12 December 2014 and that he had never provided any treatment for N.  According to his then report, N had said, amongst other things that she felt happier with her father and that one time, when she told Mother she missed father, Mother got made at her and did not allow her to go to dance class as a way to punish her and did not allow her to listen to her father’s phone calls.  N also mentioned that she was happy to be with Father and was so scared that she would be “interrogated” by Mother when she returned to Mother after being with Father and dared not tell Mother she was happy with Father or she would get scolded and punished.  N had told him that one time, N told Mother she loved Father whereupon she was scolded and Mother punished her by forcing her to hold her ears and to stand outside the main door of Mother’s home alone for a long time and that she was very scared in the quiet corridor.

286.  Dr Hung confirmed that the report was based on what N had told him and on his own observations and that he did not meet Mother, nor saw N’s interaction with her mother.

287.  However, notwithstanding all N had said, what Dr Hung had reported that N said she loved both her mother and father.  Dr Hung’s then opinion was that N was very distressed and confused by the different messages she received from her parents, and that N should be allowed to love both her mother and father and that N felt that Mother did not allow her to love her father and punished her when she said she loved him or missed him.  Dr Hung opined that this had led to distress, intense anxiety and confusion and N felt compelled to act a certain way in front of her mother in order to avoid punishments.

288.  Dr Hung then recommended that amongst other things both parents and N to see a psychologist who specializes in families with young children to facilitate communication between the parents and to address issues in raising N and that both parents should work together and cooperate in order to facilitate N’s learning and upbringing[144].  He had also said that it was important for parents to emphasize the positive aspects of the other parent and not to talk negatively about the other parent in front of the child[145].

289.  When asked by OS, Dr Hung claimed that normally they could make a diagnosis at the 1st session.  Dr Hung also said he had seen Father in relation to N’s issues a total of at least 3 or 4 sessions, and that at least once before he met with N, and that his treatment of Father was after handling N’s issues.  It was pointed out to Dr Hung that he had already issued 10 receipts by February 2015 which was less than a month after he met with N.  Dr Hung then answered he did not know the dates of those receipts.  Unless the Judge had made a mistake, what was pointed out by OS to Dr Hung must be right.  Thus, by 7 January 2015, Dr Hung had already seen Father 10 times, and this was some 5 months before he wrote his report.  Dr Hung then said when he was treating Father, Father had mentioned a lot of issues of N which would affect his mental health.

290.  As said, Dr Hung saw N on only one occasion ie 12 December 2014 which was after the 1st Abuse Allegation and before the 2nd Abuse Allegation.  Even though Dr Hung was not giving his evidence as an expert in the present trial, what he had said in his report of 28 May 2015 was, amongst other things, that consisting parenting was essential to N’s emotional and physical growth and wellbeing and that both parents and N were recommended to see a psychologist specializing in families with young children to facilitate communication between parents and to address issues in raising N.   

291.  In any event, Dr Hung never saw the Mother and his evidence was only one sided based on his one and only meeting with N and his many meetings with Father.  His factual evidence has also been overtaken by events.  

292.  As for Father’s other witness Dr Winnie Wong, she had also mentioned an incident on 21 March 2013, when she went with Father to collect N for access.  Mother was there and claimed she had wanted to facilitate Father’s access as N did not want to see Father.  There were some discussions between Father, Mother and the school teachers regarding access issues and N was crying hysterically and was very anxious stressed and nervous and that Father told Dr Winnie Wong to take N to wait outside the school gate and when she asked N why she was crying, N told her that it was because she was very scared of Mother as Mother did not allow her to love and be nice to Father.  It was Dr Winnie Wong’s evidence that N had told her that she was very afraid that Mother would know she loved Father and that she would be scolded and punished by Mother if Mother knew she loved Father.  N had also said she wanted to live with Father, and that N did not dare express her wish to Mother.[146]

293.  The SWO Miss Kiu in her SWR of 18 June 2014 had also reported that N had told her that her father allowed her to love her mother but her mother did not let her love her father.  However, when N was asked how she knew, N replied that Father had told her so and she believed in Father’s words[147].

294.  On the other hand, N had also told Miss Kiu that she was afraid of being scolded by Mother and that once Mother scolded her for lying when she said that she would like to go to Father’s home but N added that she was telling the truth and she did want to live with Father[148].

295.  As also seen in the SWR, and as set out earlier, the access arrangements at that time were smooth and the parental conflict was not high and in fact according to the then SWO Miss Kiu, although Mother was granted sole custody, care and control of N, the parents were having almost equal care. 

296.  Father had also relied on 3 video recordings allegedly made by him on 20 December 2014, 7 and 21 May 2015.  In the 1st video recording of some 45 minutes, almost throughout, Father was asking N questions such as what time she went to bed when with Mother the previous evening and when N said 10:30 pm, Father then told N to tell Mother that N should go to bed earlier.  Father also kept asking N as to how Mother was teaching or supervising her homework and suggested the way he taught N was better and that N should also tell Mother not to change the contents of her homework record in relation to the date the work was done.  Thus Father appeared to be belittling Mother in her teaching methods.  At one stage, N had suggested that Father should himself write to tell Mother, but Father then said he did, and that Mother did not reply.  

297.  Then Father suddenly asked N why she had often mentioned that he would abandon her.  N answered because Mother had said this. Father assured N that he loved her and that he would never abandon her, and N started to cry and said she was not happy and that she was hurt and that Mother had often asked her whom she loved more.  Father had also asked N whether if she said to Mother she loved Father Mother would scold her, but N did not reply.  When Father asked N whether Mother would punish her, N said no. 

298.  Thus, although N had said Mother asked her whom she loved more, N did not say Mother would scold or punish her if she said she loved Father.  Anyway, it was Father who kept asking N how Mother taught her homework and then suggesting to N that his teaching method was better than Mother’s.  He was also asking N why she was at home all the time when she was with Mother, and whether it was because Mother (or they) were busy, and N replied she did not want to say and N then burst into tears.

299.  As seen in the above video recording, and as mentioned earlier Father was also questioning or “interrogating” N in his own way and drawing comparisons between her parents to N and N was obviously being put under stress.

300.  In the 2nd video recording said to be recorded on 7 May 2015, it would seem that N had been unwell and at the start of the recording, Father was seen saying to N that he had called her many times and that Mother did not answer, to which N had said she saw Mother not answering the calls saying that they were for advertisements but she saw from call display that the calls were from Father.  N then cried and complained that Father had ignored her that day when picking her up at school and instead he hugged other students.  Father tried to explain that he had to be nice to the student who helped carry the cello for N.  Father asked her why she was carrying so many things and that N should tell Mother not to let her carry so many things.  N was clearly upset that day and towards the end of that video recording, N had asked Father why the parents of her schoolmates could live together and would not quarrel, and why hers could not.  Father’s response was asking N whether she had seen Father quarrelling with Mother, and N had said no but repeated that other parents were happy together.  Father then said he and N could slowly teach Mother not to tell N not to love Father, upon which N then cried incessantly and Father had to calm her down.

301.  I do not understand why Father was trying to say that he and N could slowly teach Mother not to tell N not to love Father.  Again what Father had said was clearly involving N in her parents’ dispute and causing distress to N.

302.  In the 3rd video recording said to be made on 21 May 2015, at the commencement thereof, N was seen crying saying that she wanted to live with Father, and that she wanted to move to Father’s home to live with him, but Mother’s opinion was she had to live with her.  Father asked her not to worry and he would always love her and asked N to tell the SWO as to whom she wanted to live with.  Father also told N not to worry and that she would tell Ms Yim.  N kept crying.  Then suddenly Father asked her to discuss with Mother and Father where she wanted to study in future, and N had said she wanted to go to England.  Later N had also said she wanted “mummy” and “daddy” to live together but her parents were not able to do it.  She said she wanted all to live together.  She then burst into tears again.  N had said she wanted to be with Father but not sure whether they would “win”.  When Father asked her why she said “win”, N said she was worried that she would not see Father again.

303.  Again, by mentioning N to tell the SWO whom she wanted to live with Father was involving N in the litigation.  As said earlier, video recordings were made by Father unilaterally and it was not clear what led to the conversations recorded and the circumstances and context they were made.  It was also not clear whether they had been edited.  The 3rd video started with N already in a distressed state and it was not clear what led to that conversation.  Anyway, as seen in those 3 videos, Father was often asking N leading questions and further, what Father alleged what N had said in the 3 video recordings as set out by him in paragraphs 26, 29 and 30 of his 2nd affirmation herein[149] were only cherry picked from those video recordings.  In fact, for what they are worth, and as I have said earlier, the video recordings showed that Father himself had also been “interrogating” N and bringing N into the litigation and/or his conflicts with Mother. 

304.  Having considered all the evidence, I do not find there was sufficient evidence to support what Father had alleged, that Mother had punished N severely for N loving her father, thus instilling fear and anxiety in N, or that Mother had told N not to love her father.  The most can be said would be that it is probable that Mother could have asked N whom she loved more, which I agree is inappropriate.  The evidence showed that at the time, namely 2013/2014, N was enjoying her stay at Father’s house and that she was close to Father.  N clearly felt torn between her two parents.  As has been said by the clinical psychologist Ms Irene Cheung to whom N was referred by her school Student Health Service Centre in June 2015 at the meeting on 29 May 2015, N had elaborated to her that she had to be cautious in what she said in order to avoid upsetting either side of her parents and that she was put in a difficult position, and expressed her wish of having a complete family and living together with her parents as she desired to spend time with both her parents.   

305.  Father had submitted a “Schedule of Access” setting out his case as to how his access was affected or suspended often by Mother pursuant to those “child abuse allegations” and/or otherwise affected or deprived (“Access Schedule”), which was divided into two parts, namely Part 1 and Part 2.  Part 1 sets out Father’s entitled period from 9 March 2013 (date of the 1st Abuse Allegations) up until 7 October 2017 when access resumed (“Part 1 Period”), with blue inclusions by Father but disputed by Mother, and purple inclusions by Mother but disputed by Father.  Part 2 of the Schedule sets out Father’s entitled access periods from 21 October 2017 until 3 October 2020 (“Part 2 Period”), with an additional comments in red setting out Father’s deprived access, to which again there was no agreement from Mother. 

306.  In so far as Part 1 is concerned, according to Father, he did not have access or just had very limited supervised access in the Part 1 Period and that the number of days of access affected or undelivered created by the 1st – 4th Abuse Allegations were 743 days.  Mother on the other hand said it was only 67 days + 6 hours.  It is not helpful for the parents to go into detailed computation of days of suspension of access.  The fact is that there is no dispute that there had been disruption of access after each Abuse Allegation and the reasons have been set out earlier. 

307.  Part 2 of the Access Schedule sets out the access affected or undelivered at the Contact Centre since 21 October 2017 when Father was to have access from 10:30 am to 1 pm, namely 2 ½ hours, every Saturday at the Contact Centre.  The Father had included in Part 2 all his comments (in blue and in red) in relation to each access period, which was disputed by Mother.

308.  In so far as I can see, the “undelivered access” (in red) in Part 2 of the Access Schedule was when Father was deprived of access for various reasons including (i) the Contact Centre was closed for public holidays or Covid -19 pandemic; (ii) N had a school event or other scheduled activity; (iii) N was allegedly sick or tired; (iv) N did not want to see Father because of the “Report Card Incident” as set out below.  There was also the 5th Child Abuse Allegation, after which Mother said it was Father who was not ready to see N but that she did deliver N to the Contact Centre for access.  This has been dealt with earlier.

309.  In so far as (i) or (ii) above, these had nothing to do with Mother or N, or within their control.  According to Part 2 of the Schedule of Access, there were some 14 access occasions when the Mother alleged N was sick and/or tired over a 3 year period between 19 October 2017 until 3 October 2020, namely from October 2017 to August 2018, there were 7 occasions, from November 2018 to June 2019, there were 6 occasions, and from November 2019 to October 2020 there was 1 occasion.  On most of those occasions, medical sick leave certificates/medical certificates were provided to Father.  I find there was no sufficient evidence that N was not sick/unwell/tired on those occasions claimed.

310.  Anyway, Father complained that there was no make up access on all those occasions when his access failed to take place.  So far as this Court is aware, there has been no application made by him nor was there any Court order for make up access, save that according to Father, this was supported by HKFWS.  As seen later, this is now also no longer opposed by Mother.

G.10.2    The Report Card Incident

311.  During the Part 2 Period, there was a period of disruption of access between 20 July 2019 and 14 September 2019 which was caused by what has been described as the “Report Card Incident”.

312.  This incident was brought up by Mother in her 13th affidavit filed on 29 May 2020, namely that Father’s access to N at the Contact Centre was going smoothly in general except that it was temporarily interrupted for about 1 ½ months and she then described what happened on Parents Day at N’s school on 12 July 2019[150]. 

313.  According to Mother, on that day, Father took possession of the original of N’s school report card of 2018-2019 (“Report Card”) without N’s nor Mother’s consent.  Father told Mother that he was entitled to keep the Report Card as he had the parental right and that he wished to apply for schools for N with the Report Card.  Mother said N found out later and was very upset by Father’s action, as it was N’s wish to keep the Report Card and N viewed the Report Card had embodied the fruit of her hard work over the year, but despite Mother’s repeated requests and written requests by her solicitors, Father still refused to return the same to N.  N then told Mother she refused to attend further access sessions until Father returned the Report Card to her, and that thereafter, N did not attend the access sessions from 20 July2019 to 7 September 2019 despite Mother’s best efforts in persuading N to attend the same. 

314.  In Father’s 23rd affidavit filed on 8 June 2020, he stated that before the summer holiday in July 2019, N’s class teacher passed him the Report Card in the presence of Mother for him to prepare N’s application for secondary school and that Mother agreed with it, but Mother later asked for the return of the Report Card alleging that N did not want him to keep the Report Card and that N hated Father very much for signing the Report Card and therefore, N did not want to attend access to see Father. This then resulted in Father’s access being suspended until 7 September 2019. 

315.  Thereafter, 14 September 2019 was a public holiday.  Father did have access on 21 September 2019, but as seen earlier, there was then 5th Abuse Allegation after Father’s access on 21 September 2019 and access was suspended again.

316.  It was Mother’s case that the original Report Card was taken by Father without her consent, whereas Father’s case was to it was given to him by the school in Mother’s presence on 12 July 2019 and that he had given Mother a very clear colour copy to Mother later that day and one to N on Saturday 13 July 2019 during access.  According to Father, on that day, Ms Wong of HKFWS had explained to N at the Contact Centre that she needed not be involved in the School Report issue, which would be handled by adults and that N had understood that she had the autonomy to read the original upon request[151].

317.  The what’s app messages between the parties at the time showed that on 12 July 2019 Mother sent a message to Father to say N found out that Father had taken the original Report Card and Mother asked Father to give her the Report Card during access the following day, ie Saturday 13 July 2019.  Father replied to say he would provide a “scan copy” and that there was no need to tell N and to involve N.  Mother then responded to say why should she not tell N, unless Father wanted her to lie to N.  Mother then later sent another message to say N was very angry saying that the Report Card was hers and that she wanted the original[152].  Mother then tried to explain that as N was the one who had worked hard, she should have the original, and asked again Father to bring the original to N the following day, as not only N was angry, she was also emotional, and that since the relationship between Father and N was already not good.  Mother said she felt there was no point for the relationship to get worse because of the Report Card and that there was no problem in Father keeping the copy, and that N was disappointed in not being able to see the Report Card on the Students Day, namely the 12 July 2019.  However, Father then replied to say the relationship between him and N was not good because of Mother’s alienation and that had nothing to do with N.

318.  Mother had also said that when N saw Father’s signature on the Report Card, N then became emotional, and Mother said she was concerned that N’s OCD would resurface, and Mother said she could not understand why Father could not give N the original, and suggested that he should explain it to N direct the following day.  Father’s response was that Mother was creating an incident, and that his signature had nothing to do with why N had OCD or N wanted to kill Mother.  Mother then responded that N’s OCD was caused by Father applying for wardship and threatening to send her to prison over access[153]. Suffice to say, the parents ended up in a squabble.

319.  Father had produced a copy of his email to Mother on 12 July 2019 in relation to the original Report Card which he said he would let Mother use the original when necessary and asking her to stop dragging N in to the parental conflict.  This was again repeated in his solicitors’ letters of 23 July 2019 and 31 July 2019.

320.  Father was not cross examined as to his evidence in his affidavit.  On the other hand, under cross examination when Mother was asked why she did not ask the school for a duplicate copy immediately she said she did not think of it then, and thereafter the school was closed for summer holidays.  Mother admitted it was her who told N about the Father taking the original of the Report Card, and that Mother had asked N to ask Father for it.

321.  Having considered Mother’s evidence, it would appear that on 12 July 2019, Father took away the original and at the time, no copy was available to Mother and when Mother returned home without the same, N was then told by Mother that Father had taken away the original Report Card and N was thus unable to see it.  Mother however could have pacified N and told her a scanned copy would be available for her.  Instead, the incident was blown out of all proportions.  I am satisfied that in relation to the Report Card Incident, Mother did not try to pacify N and instead had involved N in her dispute with Father by asking her to ask Father for it.  N then probably became upset when Father refused to hand over the original to her when she asked him the next day.  As advised by Ms Wong at HKFWS, N should not have been involved and it was a matter to be sorted out by her parents as to who should keep the original.

322.  Having said this, if the Father had indeed needed the original to make any application for secondary school for N, he could have explained it properly to Mother or N or made an immediate application for the same from this Court.  There was no sufficient evidence that the school would only provide a duplicate copy to the Mother and not to the Father.  Mother had said that Father later handed the original to Ms Wong at the HKFWS and that Ms Wong had suggested that when both the original and the duplicate were with her, she would ask N to decide which one to take.  Father claimed that the original was handed over by him to Ms Wong since end of July 2019 but the Mother said it was early August 2019.  It appeared that the duplicate or re-issued copy should be with Ms Wong by September 2019. Thereafter, it would appear that the original had remained with Ms Wong and it was not taken by N, nor Mother.

323.  Mother had pointed out, had Father been willing to hand over the original earlier during his access with N on 10 July 2019, the dispute would have been resolved and N would have continued to attend access. Thus, had Father been indeed interested in having access to N, he could have done so earlier as he did not have any genuine purpose of keeping the original.   

324.  Although I am of the view that Mother should not in the first place involve N in this dispute, Father could have brought this trivial dispute to an end earlier, and yet he chose to stand firm in his own stance. The original could also have been deposited into Court or with OS, and whoever had a genuine use for it, could have written to the Court or to OS to collect it with an undertaking to return it to the Court or OS after use.  Both Father and Mother were so entrenched in their dispute that they nor their respective legal representatives seemed not to be able to think of any other alternative. In the end, N was again involved in her parents’ dispute, which was not in N’s best interests and in my view, both parents had contributed to this.

G.10.3    The “Password Dispute”

325.  The position as set out in Father’s Closing Submissions was that there were two levels of web access to N’s schooling: a general one which Mother had provided to Father, and a lower interactive level which included eClassroom and GoogleClassroom.  The Father needed to know for all levels (a) the App; (b) the Username; and (c) the Password.

326.  It was only during the trial that upon this Court directing Mother to hand over all the information, then Mother finally provided the full information, as written down in exhibit D3 for both eClassroom and GoogleClassroom.

327.  There had been numerous correspondence between the parents’ respective solicitors over Father’s access to N’s eClassroom and GoogleClassroom and Father was not able to obtain the necessary username or password from the school. 

328.  During the trial, Mother tried to explain that GoogleClassroom had needed an update and that the password was sent in the eClassroom app, and that Mother said she recalled N telling her this and that GoogleClassroom was for students to use and not for parents.  According to Mother, on the Parents’ Day, Father was told that the teacher had put the promotion powerpoint in the GoogleClassroom app, and that was why Father wanted access to GoogleClassroom.  Mother said she did not know the password in August 2020 to the GoogleClassroom and that it was N who saw the eNotice sent by the school on 31 August 2020 in relation to the revised student’s google account log-in information[154] and had signed receipt on 31 August 2020 for Mother.  The Mother had said that when directed by this Court to provide all log in information into the GoogleClassrom, she then asked N to provide all the information. 

329.  This matter seemed to have resulted in correspondence over some 3 years.  As said by this Court during the trial, when the Mother claimed to have provided the log-in information to the Father, either parent’s solicitor could have tested such log-in information or authorised the OS to test such information to see whether the username and password provided would work, instead of keep writing letters and arguing over what was provided and/or whether what was provided would work or not.  

330.  Having considered the evidence, I find that Mother had indeed failed to provide proper log-in information and/or updated log-in information provided by the school expeditiously to Father, and it was not until the actual trial before this Court that Father finally obtained all the log-in information.

331.  However, although the failure to provide proper log-in information by the Mother to N’s school apps would mean that school information was withheld from Father, there was no sufficient evidence that this had alienated N from Father or had further worsened the relationship between N and Father.

332.  It was Father’s case that Mother also gave him false information about N’s email address on 4 August 2020 which had not worked for Father[155] .  It was only on 30 October 2020 after the hearing on that day that Mother gave Father a new email address of N’s which N had used for a few months.  Mother then claimed Father could still access N’s old email address.  However, there was no reason why Mother could not have provided N’s new email address to Father earlier instead of arguing about the matter.   Further, when asked about setting up a what’s app between N and Father, Mother’s response was that as this would involve providing Father with N’s mobile phone number and N was not willing for her mobile phone number to be provided to Father.  According to Mother, she had asked N and that N was only willing to provide her email address to Father, but not her mobile phone number.  It was put to Mother that what she said was nonsense as Mother could have set up the what’s app for N and it was up to N whether to use it or not.  Further, in a letter from Father’s solicitors to Mother’s solicitors, it was explained that Father would need to ask for N’s telephone number and mobile social media access for at least any emergency contact, and it would always be up to N to decide whether she would answer her father’s phone calls or instant messages, and that Father did not believe Mother was incapable to guide and teach N to act properly.

333.  On this matter, in my view, one solution would be for Father himself providing N with a separate mobile phone for her use in communicating with him, and he would then be able to find out whether N would use it or not.  I understand that Mother has no objection to this.

G.11     The Evidence of Ms So

334.  The two recent SWOs were prepared by Ms So respectively on 28 May 2020 and on 30 September 2020 and as said earlier, Ms So was the only SWO who attended trial to be cross examined.

335.  It was submitted on behalf of Father that Ms So accepted during the trial she was constrained by the fact that she started from the position of there being no parental alienation and that those recent reports did not sit that well with the prior more in-depth reports of previous SWOs, which had all emphasised lack of substance in Mother’s allegations and up to 2016, those previous social workers had emphasised the need for a shared care regime, which Mother alone prevented from happening[156].

336.  Although Ms So agreed that when she wrote her 1st SWR, it was not based on there being parental alienation, what Ms So had made clear under cross examination was that it was not for her to say whether there was parental alienation or not because there were child psychiatrists involved in the case, and she had not heard any single professional mention that parental alienation had taken place.  As seen in her SWR, Ms So had spoken to Dr Lily Ho, Dr Winnifred Mark and the social workers of HKFWS.

337.  Ms So had in her 1st SWR mentioned that N had expressed to Dr Mark as to why N had expressed her intrusive thoughts of hurting her mother and pet dogs that she loved and respected and that she was troubled by such thoughts and Ms So had reported that follow-up investigation and treatment to N was required.  When asked during the trial whether she had asked Dr Mark about why N had such thoughts, Ms So said she did not mention it but that Dr Mark had told Ms So that N’s emotions were stable.

338.  In her 2nd SWR, Ms So had also said according to Dr Ho, N was assessed to have stable mental condition although “[N] would be prompt to conflict with [Father] when going with him.”[157]  During the trial, when asked whether she had raised with Dr Ho that Father believed that N was “scripted” into saying such things, Ms So had said that she had asked Dr Ho about parental alienation but Dr Ho said she would not deal with this and she had no comment.

339.  According to Ms So’s 1st SWR, N had told her that she had “sweet time” with Father but it was never returned after he repeatedly used violence to discipline her in the past years and told lies to cover up his acts and that N felt unhappy that Father blamed Mother repeatedly for not bringing her for the access and that N elaborated that she did not want to attend the contact sessions at the Contact Centre because she did not want to meet Father.  N further expressed to Ms So that she did not want Father to get involved and handle “her issues”, and that N recalled that she an episode a few months ago that she refused to let Father to keep her report report, and that Father then scolded at N very loudly and blamed Mother of breaking her promise of giving him the report.  N also considered that Father always spoke bad-mouth of Mother and was unreasonable[158]. 

340.  During the trial, Ms So was asked to explain what issues N was referring to that she did not want Father to handle, and Ms So had mentioned school reports, Parents Day, medical appointments. 

341.  According to Ms So’s 2nd SWR, N had described to her that Father was “overweening” in front of her and she somehow felt being looked down by him during their contact and N gave examples of having quarrels with Father during contact sessions on 4 July 2020 that Father was proud of making his pudding and that on 15 August 2020, he urged N to show her drawings to him.  She showed strong resistance to go with Father especially when he was appraising himself or forced her to do whatever she disliked[159].

342.  During the trial, Ms So had further explained that N said when she was doing revision of school work, on several occasions Father had hit her and they, [referring to the social workers] did not believe N.  Ms So said she did not ask her further more questions on this as N did not wish to talk about it.

343.  Under cross examination, Ms So had also said N was reluctant to tell SWOs anything about Father because she felt discouraged and disbelieved by the SWOs.  It was also Ms So’s evidence that although N felt stress or pressure when facing Father, N did not have fear for Father.  

G.12    The Evidence of Mr Lam

344.  Mr Lam is a clinical psychologist who has been working for the Social Welfare Department since 2003.  He first started to provide services to N in November 2015.  As seen in a letter dated 10 May 2018 sent to the parents[160], Mr Lam had a total of 16 sessions at the time, but he confirmed during trial that after 18 January 2018, he saw N on one further occasion upon Father’s request, on 7 December 2018.

345.  It was Mr Lam’s evidence that on 11 December 2017, he received a phone call from Mother about certain symptoms displayed by N including having visual images of stabbing her mother to death, and that was why he wrote a letter of reference on 12 December 2017 for N to see a government psychiatrist[161]. He said Mother was very anxious on the phone when she spoke to him. 

346.  When asked whether N had ever told him that there was any abuse by Father, Mr Lam replied that N did not use the word “abuse” but she had mentioned Father had scolded her.  When asked whether Mother had told him about any “abuse” which he should investigate, Mr Lam said Mother did mention the background of the case during their 1st meeting on 10 November 2015 and that N did not want to have contact with Father and that at one homework supervision session, Father had hit N and that N felt dizzy and went to hospital for observation.  Mother had mentioned to him that she wanted to change access arrangements, but Mr Lam had explained to Mother that his role was to provide psychological services to N, not writing a custody report.

347.  As said earlier, Mr Lam had observed that Mother at the time lacked the awareness that she should avoid discussing litigation in front of N, and that later, he decided to see N and Mother separately.

348.  Mr Lam also confirmed he later spoke to the then SWO in charge of writing the report, namely Mr Cheng, who prepared the SWR on 24 February 2016 and that Mr Lam had indicated that normal access should be resumed and this was then reported by Mr Cheng in his SWR.

349.  Mr Lam also confirmed that Mother had never shown him what N had written on her worksheet[162] even though Mother had said she had fears over N.

350.  Father had said in his affirmation that Mr Lam told him that N “was like a tape machine playing back recordings made by Mother”[163]. It was not clear what Father’s evidence was based on.  When asked during the trial, Mr Lam said he had no impression that he had ever said to Father in such direct way.  As said earlier, Mr Lam had only said he had noticed when N told him certain things, N was “unnatural”, and that N would suddenly say to him that she had things to tell him.  Although Mr Lam had said he had a feeling or a hypothesis that N was “scripted” or “as if she had an agenda”, Mr Lam said ultimately there was insufficient evidence to confirm that.

351.  When asked whether when Mother was present, N was pressured to behave in certain way, Mr Lam had responded that he only had enough evidence to say that the first time N met with him, for each and every question N had to look at Mother as if she needed to get approval, for the remaining time, he did not quite see N had the pressure to perform[164].

352.  When asked by the OS, when N mentioned Father had scolded her, whether this was over trivial matters, Mr Lam had answered that one time it was about N refusing to get into Father’s car and there was delay for 45 minutes, and that N had also mentioned that she refused to call Father “father” and that Father then scolded her.

G.13    The OS Reports

353.  There were altogether 3 OS Reports filed, excluding the OS Updated Letter enclosing the report of Dr Lily Ho, one by Ms Juliana Chan, one by Mr Ben Li Chi Keung and the latest one by Mr Jason Chan.  As said earlier, Ms Juliana Chan reported that N took the initiative at the beginning of the meeting to explain about the few incidents that made her dislike Father and that N had showed resentment towards her father and was resolute that she would not give Father any chance and she did not want to see Father and had requested for suspension of access with Father.  Notwithstanding N’s views, Ms Chan did not agree and was of the view that it was in N’s best interests to have access[165].

354.  Mr Li’s OS Report and the OS Updated Letter were in connection with the question of whether it was necessary for N to receive parallel treatment from her private treating psychiatrist Dr Joanna Lam as well as from Dr Lily Ho, the government psychiatrist at the YMT Child Service, and this matter was subject of this Court’s decision of 18 September 2020.

355.  Mr Jason Chan submitted an Updated OS Report on 30 September 2020.  He also personally attended access sessions at the Contact Service and made some helpful observations.  N had mentioned to him regarding some of the Incidents in the Abuse Allegations and that Father had bad mouthed Mother and the OS opined that there was no evidence of N being programmed or brainwashed.[166] OS further opined that “the insistent, dominating and always critical Father in the eyes of [N] is not a pleasant role.  The Mother who probably is seen by her as “the oppressed party” earns her support too”[167].  Suffice to say, OS took the view that the formation of negative feeling and resentment towards Father by N is indeed something spontaneous and from within herself and that N had actual experience of Father belittling of Mother and that Father’s attribution of all these resentment and attitude of disapproval to parental alienation and brain-washing practised by the Mother was not adequately evidenced[168].  Further, OS opined that in arriving at his conclusion, Father missed an important perspective, namely the formation of rejecting attitude by N in the context of all the dynamics of the protracted litigation as well as the continuing experience of the acrimonious parental disputes. 

G.14   Conclusion On Issue (1): Parental Alienation 

356.  What seems clear is that N did have a very good relationship with Father when she was attending kindergarten, and that she had enjoyed staying at Father’s house and from all accounts, she loved her father. In my view, such relationship started to change when N was in primary one when no doubt she would be under greater pressure over school work and she was put under stress when caught between her parents’ constant conflict. 

357.  I accept that both parents love N, but neither parent is a perfect parent, if ever there is one.  As said earlier, both parents had involved N in their disputes.  I accept that Mother had not been prompt in providing or sharing with Father any information on N, nor had Mother been proactive in encouraging access or encouraging N in improving her relationship with Father.  However, as found earlier, N did tell Mother of those Incidents in the 5 Abuse Allegations and there was no sufficient evidence that N had lied or made up those Incidents and that I find more probable than not that Father did lose his temper when supervising N over her school work or on other occasions, that he had scolded N or hit her with paper over her head, and/or braked the car suddenly.  Father’s denial in these allegations and then pointing his finger at Mother for having fabricated those allegations would mean that he was saying either Mother or N was lying, neither would go down well with N, who on all accounts, was/is close to her mother with whom she has lived since about 6 months old and as N grows older, as said by OS, unsurprisingly she has formed a firm bondage and an empathy for the Mother.

358.  Having considered all the above, I have come to the conclusion that N has not been subjected to any parental alienation as alleged by Father.

H.  ISSUE (2) AND ISSUE (3)

359.  As there is no finding of parental alienation, Issue (2) and Issue (3) need not to be considered.

I.     ISSUE (3), ISSUE (4) AND ISSUE (5)

360.  These issues concern whether there should be any variation in N’s present status quo.

I.1     General Principles

361.  The general principles in relation to custody or upbringing of a child have been set out in s 3(1)(a)(i) of the Guardianship of Minors Ordinance, Cap 13.  Although Father’s counsel still referred to “welfare” of the child in his Closing Submissions[169], the law in Hong Kong has been changed since April 2012 to the “best interests” of the child.  However, it has been said the two terms are synonymous and as with “welfare”, the term “best interests” is usually construed in the widest possible manner[170].  Further, the Court in having regard to the best interests of the child shall give due consideration to (A) the views of the child[171] if , having regard to the age and understanding of the child and to the circumstances of the case, it is practicable to do so; and (B) any material information including any report of the Director of Social Welfare available to the court at the hearing[172].

362.  The Law Reform Commission of Hong Kong in its report on “Child Custody and Access” in 2005 has also recommended a statutory checklist should be introduced, to include the following factors:

“(a) the ascertainable wishes and feelings of the child concerned considered in the light of his age and understanding.

(b) the child’s physical, emotional, and educational needs.

(c) the nature of the relationship of the child with each of the child’s parents and with other persons;

(d) The likely effect on the child of any change in the child’s circumstances;

(e) The child’s age, maturity sex, social and cultural background, and any other characteristics which the court considers relevant.

(f) The attitude to the child, and to the responsibilities of parenthood, demonstrated by each of the child’s parents

(g) Any harm which the child has suffered or is at risk of suffering;

(h) Any family violence involving the child or a member of the child’s family;

(i) How capable each of the child’s parents, and any other person in relation to whom the court considers the question to be relevant, is of meeting his needs;

(j) (a broader formulation along the lines of) the practical difficulty and expense of a child having contact with a parent and whether that difficulty or expense will substantially affect the child’s right to maintain personal relations and direct contact with both parents on a regular basis;

(k) The range of powers available to the court under this Ordinance in the proceedings in question.

(l) Any other fact or circumstance that the court thinks is relevant”.

(“Welfare Checklist”)

363.  Although the Welfare Checklist has not yet been introduced in our legislation, the courts have found it helpful in considering the best interests of a child.

364.  As submitted by the OS, the factors (a) to (e) are especially applicable and relevant in determining of N’s best interests in the present case.

I.2     Ascertainable Views of the Child

365.  As said, N is now 12 years old.  From all SWRs, OS Reports and from all accounts, N is capable of understanding that there are disputes and conflict between her parents, in particular as to where and with whom she is to live.  As seen in the Updated OS Report, she was observed by the OS to be forthcoming and spontaneous as well as capable of expressing her views and feelings from her own mind.  From my view, what N has expressed should be given consideration.

366.  N informed Ms So that she had maintained peaceful living with Mother all along and that she liked sharing with Mother like friends and would discuss with Mother all topics including peer linkage, school issue and the future.  N indicated that she felt being encouraged and respected by Mother and that N enjoyed being with Mother and under her care continuously.  On the other hand, N showed strong resistance to go with Father especially “when he was appraising himself or forced her to do whatever she disliked”.  Also as revealed in the SWR dated 28 May 2020, N had expressed that she felt unhappy that Father blamed Mother repeatedly for not bringing her for the access, and that N elaborated she did not want to attend the contact sessions at the Contact Centre only because she did not want to meet Father and as mentioned earlier, N also expressed to Ms So that she did not want Father to be involved and to handle her issues. 

367.  In the Updated OS Report dated 30 September 2020, OS reported that N had similarly expressed to him that she had a very close relationship with the Mother.  She also voiced out firmly that her relationship with the Father would just become worse if she would have to move to live with him. 

368.  It is clearly N’s views that she wants to continue to be under Mother’s sole custody, care and control.

I.3     N’s Physical, Emotional and Educational Needs

369.  As set out earlier, N had suffered from anxiety problems and also from OCD.  Notwithstanding Father seemed to point his finger at Mother for N causing N’s problems as N had visions of stabbing her mother (ie not be father) to death, there was no sufficient evidence from any of the government experts that the cause of N’s problems was brought on by Mother.

370.  Further, although in June 2014, Miss Kiu had in her SWR reported that Father and Mother had almost N’s shared care and control equally at that time under the 2014 Access Order, this came to an end after the 3rd Abuse Allegation, and as set out earlier, since the 3rd Abuse Allegation in October 2015, Father has not had staying access to N.   

371.  Mother has been N’s primary carer since her birth and Mother has developed strong emotional bonding with N[173]. 

372.  I also find that Father has indicated a lack of sensitivity towards N’s feelings as seen in particular in the Watch Stealing Incident, the Report Card Incident and also the Incident in the 5th Abuse Allegation as reported by N to Mother.  Having considered all the evidence, and with N growing into a teenager, I am of the view that Mother is in a better position than Father in meeting N’s physical and emotional needs.

373.  So far as N’s education is concerned, she is currently studying primary 6 and she will be going to secondary school in September 2021.  Father had complained that Mother did not have any secondary educational plan for N[174].

374.  As seen in his solicitors’ 2nd letter of 19 June 2020 sent to Mother’s solicitors, it was Father’s case that he had first presented his thoughts and initial plan for N’s education to Mother at HKFWS over a year ago, ie in about May 2019, pending Mother’s feedback for refinement but no feedback as promised by Mother was ever obtained.  Father also complained that Mother had refused to have a mediation session to handle N’s education matters.  Father then asked Mother to provide him with her secondary education plan for N with clearly elaborated reasons without delay, and that if Mother’s plan was beneficial to N and could be afforded by Father, it was stated therein that Father would make his best efforts to give support[175].

375.  In Mothers’ solicitors’ reply of 2 July 2020[176], she denied Father’s accusation of her having excluded him from N’s education.  She then asked Father to send (or resend) her his thoughts and initial plan for N’s education to try to facilitate discussion.

376.  However, instead of sending or resending to Mother his thoughts and plan, in Father’s solicitors’ letter of 3 July 2020, he repeated that he had presented his education plan to Mother at HKFWS in the presence of Ms Wong long ago.  Father then urged Mother to produce her education plan for N without further delay[177].

377.  Father’s solicitors wrote a further letter on 13 July 2020[178], in which Father claimed, amongst other things, he had had detailed discussions with N’s school principal and her class teacher, and the head of student welfare and social worker at the school and that his observations and proposed initial plans for N’s education had been confirmed collectively by the principal, class teacher and related school staff as being correct.

378.  Yet, as Mother’s solicitors had pointed out in their reply of 14 July 2020, up until then, Father had not clearly set out in writing or anything on record as to his education plan for N in his solicitors’ letter.

379.  Then in a subsequent letter on 20 July 2020 from Father’s solicitors[179], Father went back in history again and referred to what happened in the past when he tried to enrol N for primary one and insisted that Mother had to confirm first whether she would follow his guidancebefore he would give her his plan in writing of N’s education.  This was then followed by another letter on 23 July 2020 from Father’s solicitors with further criticisms about Mother occupying N all day and evening with homework.

380.  Quite rightly in my view, Mother’s solicitors then pointed out in reply that they did not see it reasonable for Father to demand Mother to follow his guidance as a precondition for him to let her know what his plan is.  Further, N’s education plan would have to be linked with payment of the tuition fees.  Thus, Mother replied to say given the way in which Father had honoured (or dishonoured) his [financial] undertakings in disputing N’s school bus fees, she intended for N to continue her education in the public school system and through the “Secondary School Places Allocation (SSPA) System”[180].

381.  During the trial, Mother had produced some what’s app messages between her and Father in relation to N’s schooling[181].  On 27 July 2020, at 12:24 pm, Father had sent Mother a message asking her whether she would agree to N attending a face to face interview at a Po Leung Kuk primary school (“PLK Primary School”) which could be a stepping stone for N to then be enrolled in a Po Leung Kuk Secondary School (“PLK Secondary School”), and it would appear that Father’s proposal was for N to switch from her present school to the PLK Primary School to attend primary 6 for the September 2020 term.  However, he then told Mother that he had to inform the principal at the PLK Primary School before 3 pm that day.

382.  Mother replied at 1:18 pm to thank Father for his arrangement but as there would be only one year left at N’s present primary school, Mother would not consider any change of school for N at that time, and further explained that that according to N’s class teacher, a child would need 3 to 6 months to adjust to a school and the pandemic would not end soon.  Mother also said if N were really to change school, then immediately thereafter, before she had acclimatised to the new school, she had to face an important examination and Mother was worried that this would affect N’s self confidence.

383.  Father sent a long message to explain why he had arranged for the interview for N and complained that Mother did not even answer his telephone call when he tried to discuss with her. Mother had tried to explain that she did not hear the phone ringing, and this then led to another series of disputes as to whether Mother had refused to answer his calls or not.

384.  Father claimed that he had come up with an excellent school namely the PLK Secondary School which is a very interactive school and where there is excellent one-to-one teaching especially in music as N plays the cello. 

385.  PLI Secondary School may well be an excellent school but Father’s proposal involved an immediate change of primary school for N.  I find what Mother had said to Father was reasonable, and that whether N should suddenly switch school for her final year at primary school to a completely new primary school, with a view to enter yet another new secondary school, was a matter which should involve detailed discussion between the parents and N, and Father could not simply impose his proposal on Mother and N in a rushed manner.

386.  Anyway, as seen in Father’s Closing Submissions, criticisms were again launched at Mother that she had failed to come up with any plan and Father complained that Mother in the end only set out a “preliminary choice” of 3 schools in her solicitors’ letter of 19 August 2020[182] and that Mother had done nothing about N’s schooling.

387.  I find Father’s complaints completely unjustified.  As seen in those solicitors’ letters, similarly, Father himself had also failed to set out clearly his concrete plan in writing.

388.  In fact, even at the trial, Father’s attitude was one of evasiveness.  This Court was not even able to elicit a clear answer from Father when this Court first asked him for his proposals on N’s schooling.  In the end, the Court had to ask him to think again as to whether he wished to put forward his proposals in writing and further gave him time for him to write down names of his proposed schools for N with respective tuition fees which Father eventually did during his re-examination on 27 October 2020[183] together with a confirmation said to be signed by his mother Madam Wong[184], that if N were to attend any of those 4 schools written down by Father, and if Father did not have the ability to pay for N’s tuition fees, Madam Wong confirmed that she would pay on his behalf.

389.  By way of an observation, those tuition fees would seem to pale if compared with the amount of legal costs spent by Father in all the litigation since 2010.  Suffice to say, notwithstanding all the criticisms which Father had launched at Mother, there was no concrete plan from the Father himself even at the commencement of the trial.  At one stage, during the trial, the Father seemed to indicate that he was planning to apply for a variation of the financial provision order for N in that he wanted to reclaim possession of the One Silversea Property which had been settled for N’s residence with her mother until N is 18 or completes full time education and that his education proposals would depend on whether he would succeed in his intended variation.  This proposal was put to rest by his own Counsel Mr Todd who had pointed out that there was no power for the Judge to vary the settlement of property order he made for the benefit of N.

390.  The evidence showed that having agreed with Mother for N to study at her present primary school, Father then seemed to want N to switch primary schools, firstly, as mentioned earlier, to attend an interview in August 2016 for N to switch to study primary 2 at the ESF school, and later in January 2017, as seen in the WP Letter, he had continued to ask Mother to allow N to attend an interview with the ESF school which appeared to be for primary 4.  Then more recently, as set out earlier, he wanted N to change school for primary 6 being her final year at her present primary school.  Bearing in mind N already has firstly suffered from anxiety problems and later from OCD, one would have thought N would need at least stability in her schooling. 

391.  Having said this, I accept that N’s educational needs would be best be provided for by joint discussions between her parents.  Mother should consult Father over N’s education.  I agree with what was submitted by OS, the education plan and educational needs of N should be hammered out by rational discussion between her parents and by forging a joint front for the interests of N.  It would be best for them to have joint discussions with N, in the presence of OS, in relation to a suitable secondary school.  If they are not able to agree, then they will have to take out a separate application for N’s schooling later.  I will also add, Father’s mother Madam Wong is not a party in these proceedings and there is no reason why this Court will accept an undertaking from a non party and thus any schooling plans for N will need to be accompanied by an undertaking from Father himself to meet all N’s education expenses.

I.4     Nature of N’s relationship with each of her parents and with other persons

392.  At present, there is no doubt that N has a very close relationship with Mother and as said earlier, there is a firm emotional bonding between them.  On the other hand, the present relationship between N and Father would need much improvement.  It would appear that N has not seen her paternal grandmother or her paternal side of the family for some time.  Although N had visited her paternal grandfather the Friday before he passed away on Monday 21 May 2018, according to Mother, N did not wish to go the hospital to see him again on the Monday, nor did N want to attend the funeral on 5 June 2018.  This was sad and I accept that Mother should have done more to persuade N to see her paternal grandfather before he passed away.  From the latest update scan OS, N also seemed to have visited Madam Wong in December 2020.

393.  The evidence seems to indicate that N also had a good relationship with her cousin Dewy but there has been not much recent information on this or on her relationship with other family members, whether paternal side or maternal side, although OS had reported that N had occasionally met her maternal grandparents.[185]

I.5     The likely effect on N of any change in her circumstances

394.  The OS had observed that the change of N’s status quo now sought by the Father will not be just difficult and challenging, but could well be risky and damaging as well as end up pushing the father and daughter relationship further apart. 

395.  N’s mental condition has only been found to be stable not too long ago.  I agree with OS’s view that it is indeed too drastic and too risky a change to happen to N given all these years of living with the Mother and the strong emotional bonding between them and also N’s own history of anxiety and OCD.

I.6     N’s age, maturity, sex, social and cultural background and any other characteristics of N that the Court considers relevant

396.  As pointed out by OS, N is now an adolescent girl who has been drawn into her parents’ disputes and ceaseless legal battles for a very substantial portion of her years, and that she definitely maintains strong emotional and social connections with the Mother.  She has received treatments from a number of professionals for her psychiatric condition which has recently become stabilized.  

I.7     Other Welfare Checklist factors

397.  As I have found earlier, there was no sufficient evidence of N being subjected to any parental alienation on the part of Mother as alleged by Father and there was no sufficient evidence of any harm that N has suffered or at risk of suffering if she were to continue to live with Mother.  Further, N has only just become stable in her OCD and there was no evidence before this Court as to whether any harm would be suffered by N if she were to be removed from her mother’s care and residence against her will, and this is a matter of serious concern of this Court.

398.  As for whether there was any family violence involving N or a member of N’s family, as said earlier, there was no sufficient evidence of “child abuse” on part of Father even though I have found that the Incidents did take place even if there was exaggeration by N.

399.  I have found that Mother is more capable of meeting N’s physical and emotional needs and that Mother should consult Father over her education and that Mother and Father should discuss jointly with N in relation to her educational needs.  I find there is no practical difficulty or expense in N having contact with her parent.

400.  Apart from the above, I would only add that I am somewhat concerned over what Father has said in his WP Email, in that what he was saying in the last paragraph of that email was that Mother should let him have full time care of N and that he would give Mother whatever she was entitled to, and that if Father were able to earn money, he would leave his wealth to N; however, if N were not under his care, that it would only be normal that he and his family would not leave a single cent for N, and in this case, N would have a difficult life after she completes her education and that N may not even to be able to pay her rent.

401.  What Father was saying seemed to be, that he and his family would not leave N anything unless N were to be under his full time care.  It is of course up to Father to leave his money to whomever he wanted.  However, if Father is indeed concerned over N’s welfare and interests and he genuinely loves N, then he should not have involved N as a bargaining chip with Mother.

I.8     N’s Custody, Care and Control

402.  In light of all above said, and having considered N’s best interests, I find there is no ground to vary the current arrangements of Mother having N’s sole care and control. 

403.  Although in relation to Father’s 1st Variation Application in FCMP 67/2010, the then SWO Miss Kiu had recommended Father and Mother be granted joint custody and a shared care and control arrangement to be agreed, this was in June 2014, over 6 ½ years ago.  As set out above, much has taken place, and the conflicts and litigation between the parents have continued until the present.  They have not been able to come to any agreement about any major issues over N, indeed her schooling and her psychiatric treatment, or even who is to keep N’s report cards.  There has been no sufficient evidence that the parents are likely to cooperate in future over major decisions over N.  In the present proceedings, both SWOs Mrs Lam and Ms So have opined that N’s sole custody, care and control should continue to vest in Mother. OS has also opined that the proposed change by Father in N’s status quo does not work in the best interests of N.

404.  Having considered all the circumstances of this case, I find no reason to vary the status quo and I am also satisfied that it is in N’s best interests for Mother to retain N’s sole custody, as well as sole care and control.

405.  However, I am of the view that Mother should consult Father over the following specific issues:-

(1)  N’s schooling;  

(2)  N’s psychiatric and/or psychological treatment, if any in future.

I.9     Access

406.  I have directed the Father and Mother to submit draft orders in their respective Closing Submissions over access arrangements for this Court’s consideration.  Father’s draft order for access, in the event of Mother continuing to have sole custody, care and control of N, is to the following effect:

(1)  He is to have the following defined access:

(a)  Weekly Defined Access: Friday (from picking up after school or from the Ward’s home at 9:30 am if the Ward does not attend school) until 11:30 am on Sunday morning.

(b)  School Long Holidays:

(i)  School long holidays (except summer holiday): half time with Father and half time with Mother.  Whoever takes the 1st half of the holiday will have the 2nd half the following year; and

(ii)  School summer holiday: Father shall have staying access on alternate week, from the N’s home at 9:30 am on Monday to 9:30 pm on Sunday.

407.  Mother’s proposals are that Father to have defined access to N every Saturday which include the following:

(1)  from 10:30 am to 1 pm at the Contact Centre of HKFWS;

(2)  from 1 pm to 9 pm in public place, either the Tai Kok Tsui Public Library, the clubhouse of One SilverSea, Olympian City Mall or Harbour City Mall(“Public Places”) with the assistance of a professional nanny agreed upon by the parties within a deadline , failing which the nanny to be appointed by the Court;

(3)  if HKFWS is unavailable for access, access shall take place in the Public Places in the presence of the nanny from 10:30 am to 9 pm with pick up at the Social Welfare Office as arranged by the SWO at 10:30 am.

408.  Ms So’s recommendation in her SWR of 30 September 2020 recommended that Father be granted defined access at the Contact Centre every Saturday and be supervised by a SWO for 12 months and that a progress report was suggested.  In short, Ms So’s recommendation was to maintain the present status quo re access.

409.  In his Closing Submissions, OS agreed that the present access arrangements ie access sessions held at the Contact Centre should be extended or enhanced to forge a progressive path towards normalization of the access regime with resumption of staying access as the goal.

410.  All the above proposals and submissions were made at the trial which have now overtaken by the latest development.

411.  After the trial, this Court received a letter dated 4 December 2020 from OS informing that Court that HKFWS had decided to terminate the provision of its services at the Contact Centre at the end of December 2020 due to alleged breach of the duty of confidentiality on the part of Mother as enshrined in the service agreement signed by the parents with HKFWS.  There were to be 4 scheduled access sessions before termination.

412.  Through the assistance of the staff of HKFWS and in the presence of OS, the parties were able to hammer out an agreed plan through amicable discussion for the sessions respectively on 5 and 7 December 2020 to take “offsite” and for longer hours.  Ms Cheung of HKFWS had agreed to continue to be present to facilitate, and the plan was for the parents to meet again with the staff of HKFWS and OS to hammer out the arrangements for the remaining two sessions on 12 and 19 December 2020. The parents have also agreed that they will apply for therapy service from Asian Academy of Family Therapy (AAFT) and the staff at HKFWS will help to liaise. 

413.  At this Court’s further direction, OS has sent a letter dated 19 January 2021 to update the Court on N’s access sessions.  In light of the latest development, I will set out hereunder my preliminary views on access.

414.  Having considered the SWRs and the OS Reports, I am of the view that staying access is premature at this stage.  However, Father should continue to have access every Saturday.  From Mother’s proposed draft order, Mother seems to agree to Father having access between 10:30 am to 9 pm every Saturday subject to her conditions.  I do not think those conditions are really necessary. In particular, I do not find it is necessary to involve any professional nanny.  As seen in the access sessions on 19 December 2020 and on 2 January 2021, N was quite capable of running away from Father and getting on a taxi on her own to go home when she felt a bit unhappy or tired or when she had a disagreement with Father.  On the other hand, Father has also shown understanding and for the 5 December 2020 session, Father agreed to cut short the access after N saying she did not feel quite well after spending about one and half hours with Father.

415.  I find that 10:30 am to 9 pm, namely a period of some 10 ½ hours may be a long time to be spent in a public place or public places and realistically, none of the access sessions mentioned by OS in his latest letter had lasted that long.

416.  I am of the preliminary view that there should be flexibility and realistically, the time should be shorter if access is to take place in a public place.  Quality of access is more important than quantity of access.  A better arrangement would be say for Father to meet N at about 11:30 am , have lunch with N and then spend some time with N after lunch either at the Kowloon Cricket Club or a public place unless N is willing to go to the Kowloon Tong Premises, and that access is to end, say not later than 6 pm. I am also of the view that the entrance of the Kowloon Cricket Club may be a good pick up and delivery venue for N and that Father and N should travel through public transport during access.

417.  Father has to seek N’s consent before involving other family members to his access sessions with N.  Afterall, the access sessions are for Father to rebuild his relationship with N which Father should concentrate on first.  Father also has to seek N’s consent before taking video recordings of N.  

418.  Mother has agreed to make up access in the event if N is unable to attend any of the weekly Saturday sessions.  Mother has agreed to Father to provide N with a mobile telephone with a new number for Father and N to communicate direct with each other.  I understand that Father has no objection to this.

419.  I am also of the view that the parents should each provide an undertaking not to denigrate or criticize or belittle each other in any manner in the presence of N.

420.  The access arrangements should be reviewed after 6 months, and that an updated SWR and OS Report be submitted in relation to access in 6 months’ time.

421.  The above are my preliminary views in relation to access.  I will ask the parties to try to agree, with the assistance of OS, a draft order on access for this Court’s approval.  If the parents cannot reach an agreement over the draft order, they and OS are to each submit further written submissions within 28 days of not more than 10 pages on their respective proposed access arrangements and this Court will deal with the same on paper.

422.  Pending any further order, the May 2017 Access Order as supplemented by the September 2017 Access Order shall continue save that the access venue is to be either the Kowloon Tong Premises or a public place, to be agreed by N, and the pick up/delivery point to be agreed by the parents, failing which at the entrance of the Kowloon Cricket Club.

J.    COSTS

423.  As for costs, although Father has failed in his application, I have also found Mother has not been proactive in encouraging access or encouraging N in improving her relationship with her father and also both parents have involved N in their litigation.  Having considered all the circumstances of this case, I make no order as to costs save that Mother’s own costs be taxed under Legal Aid Regulations.  This is an order nisi, which shall be made final after 21 days.

 ( Bebe Pui Ying Chu )
 Judge of the Court of First Instance
 High Court

Mr Richard Todd and Ms Athena Wong, instructed by Chan & Chan, for the Plaintiff

Ms Belinda Ma and Ms Peggy Pao, instructed by Stevenson, Wong & Co, for the Defendant

Mr Jason Chan of the Official Solicitor, for the Ward



[1]  G:3077

[2]  G:3083

[3]  C1:261

[4]  G:3087

[5]  G:3090-3095

[6]  According to the Agreed Chronology

[7]  G:3123

[8]  G:3125

[9]  G:3132

[10]  See the Judge’s judgment on financial provision, para 63, D5, 1489

[11]  G:3136

[12]  G:3139-3141

[13]  E:2661

[14]  E:2663-2664

[15]  A:10-11

[16]  See para 58, D5:1486

[17]  D3:1017-1019

[18]  At para 4 C1:28

[19]  At para 9 C1:29

[20]  At para 8, C1:50

[21]  Children and Family Court Advisory and Support Service in United Kingdom

[22]  See “Child Protection Fact Sheet” published in June 2010 by the National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children (NSPCC), a charity in UK specialising in child protection

[23]  At para 34, CLL v SW

[24]  At para 18.1, pg 9

[25]  At paras 28-56

[26]  See para 6 of her 5th affidavit filed on 24 September 2013 in FCMP 67/2010, D10:2298

[27]  D10:2318

[28]  D10:2316

[29]  D10:2320-2324

[30]  See para 6, D10: 2322

[31]  C2:279-281; 1st affirmation of 19.03.13 at D5:1395-1399, and 2nd affirmation of 17.11.14 at D5:1400-1414

[32]  E:2554-2568

[33]  At paras 9 -10, E:2556-2557

[34]  At paras 11-12 of the 21.05.13 SWR

[35]  At paras 11-12, E:2557

[36]  At paras 15,16, E:2558

[37]  At para 14, E:2557

[38]  At para 33, E:2566

[39]  At para 34, E:2567

[40]  At para 29, E:2584

[41]  At para 9, E:2556

[42]  At paras 12-13

[43]  At para 116, Custody Judgment

[44]  See paras 77, 78, C1:65

[45]  At para 4, E:2570

[46]  At 14, E:2575

[47]  At para 17, E:2576

[48]  G:3103

[49]  G:3107

[50]  At para 16, E:2581

[51]  At para 27, E:2584

[52]  At para 31, E:2584

[53]  In para 12, E:2581

[54]  D10: 2430 - 2437

[55]  See paras 6 and 7, D10:2432

[56]  See Tseung Kwan O Hospital Medical Report prepared for the MDCC on 16 June 2015

[57]  E:2586-2595

[58]  G:3122-3124

[59]  At para 7, E:2588

[60]  D4:1176-1179

[61]  In para 8, E:2588

[62]  D1:436-439

[63]  As seen in the medical report after the 3rd Abuse Allegation

[64]  At para 14

[65]  At para III. 1,1, pg 3 of the MDCC minutes

[66]  See para 28, C1:33

[67]  In paras 35, 36 and 38, C1:34-35

[68]  As exhibit SSM-14-3, D10:2295-2524

[69]  At para 38, C1:35

[70]  At para 80, C1:65

[71]  At para 81, C1:66

[72]  In para 27, E:2574

[73]  See para 3, D10: 2445

[74]  See the 1st para E:2586

[75]  See para 5, E:2597

[76]  In para 2, E:2596

[77]  At para 8, C1:192

[78]  On pg 22, Father’s Closing Submissions

[79]  E:2641-2647

[80]  At para 7, E:2645

[81]  D6:1682

[82]  Para 3.1, pg 2, minutes of MDCC , 16 June 2015

[83]  At para 2.1, pg 3, minutes of MDCC, 16 June 2015

[84]  See para 9, E:2589

[85]  See report dated 15 June 2015 issued by Miss Irene Cheung, the clinical psychologist at the Yauma Tei Child Psychiatric Centre.

[86]  At para 18, E:2591

[87]  At para 9, D10:2432

[88]  At para 24, E:2593

[89]  See para 30, E:2594

[90]  At para 5, E:2599

[91]  See para 4, E:2601

[92]  In para 8, D10:2440

[93]  At para 48.2, pg 29,

[94]  At D4:1220

[95]  E:2600-2606

[96]  E:2600-2606

[97]  At para 11, E:2602

[98]  See paras 14-17, E:2602-2603

[99]  At para 22, E:2604

[100]   At para 23

[101]   At para 24

[102]   In para 48.3, on page 29, Father’s Closing Submissions

[103]   Exhibit CCLD-1, at D5:1417-1418

[104]   Exhibit PL-1 , at D5:1421-1423

[105]   Exhibit RNR-1, at D5:1426-1430

[106]   According to Father, gross area of the house is about 4,000 sq ft, and usable area a bit less but during cross examination, it was put to Father by Mother’s Counsel that the saleable area is in fact 4,737 sq ft and the gross is about 6,000 sq ft to which Father had no comment.

[107]   Exhibit EJDLC -1. at D5:1432-1437

[108]   D:521-527

[109]   At para 56, C1:39

[110]   At line U, D1: 523

[111]   At para 82, C1:66

[112]   D3:1015

[113]   D1:537; see Father’s English translation at D1:538

[114]   D1:537; see Father’s English translation at D1:538

[115]   D1:574-580

[116]   At D1: 576 and Father’s English translation at D1:582

[117]   Para 14, E:2675

[118]   E:2607-2612

[119]   E:2644

[120]   Para (i), E:2673

[121]   D3:1017

[122]   At para 10, C1:249

[123]   D3:1115

[124]   Exhibit D-2(a)

[125]   E:2613-2617

[126]   At para 33

[127]   E:2645

[128]   At para 41, C1:58

[129]   At paras 41-43, C1:58

[130]   See opening paragraph in Father’s Reply Submissions

[131]   C1:37

[132]   See para 61, of Father’s Closing Submission, pg 51, and  para 18, E:2591

[133]   Para 23, C2:352

[134]   At para 20, C1:160

[135]   In para 24, E:2630

[136]   At para 11(iv), E:2674

[137]   D4:1199

[138]   D1:640-643

[139]   At D1:641

[140]   In para 22, Father’s 2nd affirmation, C1:54

[141]   C2:302-308

[142]   D1:622-628

[143]   At paras 163-164, D5:1495

[144]   At para 9.7, D1:628

[145]   At para 9.2

[146]   Paras 10-13, C2:1403-1405

[147]   In para 19 E:2582

[148]   In para 20, E:2682

[149]   C1:55

[150]   At paras 27-28, C2:400-401

[151]   See letter from Father’s solicitors to Mother’s solicitors on 23 July 2019, D9:2181-2182

[152]   B9:2199

[153]   D9:2202

[154]   Exhibit P-4

[155]   At D4:1295

[156]   At paras of Father’s Closing Submissions, pg 13

[157]   At para 11, E:2634

[158]   At para 24, E:2630

[159]   At para 27.  E:2638

[160]   D4:1199

[161]   D2:770

[162]   D5:1473

[163]   At para 44, C1:254

[164]   At pg 17, Father’s Closing Submission

[165]   At para 9, E:2646

[166]   Para 12, E:2674-2675

[167]   In para 22, E:2679

[168]   At para 23, E:2679

[169]   At para 73, pg 62

[170]   See H v N ( children: variation of interim order) [2012] 5 HKLRD 498, at paras 24-25, pg 507

[171]   “View” has replaced “wishes” since April 2012

[172]   See s 3(1)(a)(i) of Cap 13

[173]   See para 15, E:2622

[174]   At page 57 of Father’s Closing Submissions

[175]   D4:1335-1336

[176]   D4:1337

[177]   D4: 1338-1339

[178]   D4:1340-1341

[179]   At D4:1344

[180]   At D4:1348

[181]   Exhibit D-2(d)

[182]   D4:1366-1367

[183]   Exhibit P-2

[184]   Exhibit P-3

[185]   See para 11, E:2673

[2020] HKCFI 2427-EN-2020-09-18

C v. S

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HCMP 929/2017

[2020] HKCFI 2427

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS NO 929 OF 2017

________________________

 IN THE MATTER of N, female, a child born on the 20th day of November 2008 in Hong Kong
 and
 IN THE MATTER OF Section 26 of the High Court Ordinance (Cap. 4)
 and
 IN THE MATTER OF Order 90 rule 1 of the Rules of High Court (Cap. 4A)
 and
 IN THE MATTER OF Section 3 of the Guardianship of Minors Ordinance (Cap. 13)
 and
 IN THE MATTER OF the Inherent Jurisdiction of the High Court

________________________

BETWEEN

 CPlaintiff
 and 
 SDefendant

________________________

Before:  Hon B Chu J in Chambers (Not Open to Public) (By Paper Disposal)

Date of Hearing:  29 October 2019

Date of Defendant’s Written Submissions:  24 October 2019

Date of Plaintiff’s Written Submissions:  25 October 2019

Date of Defendant’s Supplemental Submissions:  4 December 2019

Date of Defendant’s Second Supplemental Submissions:  29 July 2020

Date of Plaintiff’s Written Submissions:  13 August 2020

Date of Defendant’s Reply Submissions:  28 August 2020

Date of Official Solicitor’s Written Submissions:  10 September 2020

Date of Decision:  18 September 2020

________________________

D E C I S I O N

(On Payment/Reimbursement of Costs of Psychiatric Treatment)

________________________


Introduction

1.  The detailed background of these wardship proceedings has been set out in the numerous published judgments and will not be repeated here.

2.  The present application was taken out by the Mother on 16 January 2019 (“Reimbursement Summons”), for the Father to pay and/or to reimburse her the costs of the psychiatric treatments received by the ward N from her treating private psychiatrist Dr Joanna Lam (“Dr Lam”). Mother issued the Reimbursement Summons in person.  This Court’s understanding was that at the time of issue, she had not yet been granted legal aid for the issue of that summons, but since then, she has obtained legal aid, and her present solicitors and Counsel Mr Kevin Li have taken over the conduct of the matter. 

3.  Father instructed Counsel Mr Richard Todd and Ms Athena Wong over this matter.  Mr Jason Chan of the Official Solicitor lodged written submissions on behalf of N.

The relevant orders of this Court in relation to N’s psychiatric treatment

4.  The Reimbursement Summons arose out of an order made by this Court on 18 December 2017 (“December 2017 Order”)[1] and an order of this Court made on 20 June 2018 (“June 2018 Order”)[2].

5.  On 18 December 2017, upon learning of symptoms displayed by N at around that time, this Court ordered that N should receive urgent psychiatric treatment from a private psychiatrist as soon as possible, as an appointment with a Government psychiatrist at the YMT Child Service, which was recommended by N’s then Government clinical psychologist, could take time. At the hearing, the parties agreed to this course, save that they were not able to agree to who should be the private psychiatrist.

6.  The drawn up order of 18 December 2017 (as amended) states in paragraph 5 as follows:

“Unless agreed, parties to submit two names of private psychiatrists to the Court with their full CVs and the Court will decide on who should be the treating psychiatrists for the Ward. Costs of the psychiatrists should be paid by the Plaintiff in the interim and the treatment is to start as soon as possible[3].” (emphasis added)

7.  4 days after the above order, on 22 December 2017, Father’s solicitors wrote to Mother’s solicitors to make clear that should public treatment later become available at the YMT Child Service, this could be chosen at the time. 

8.  Thereafter, on 3 January 2018, this Court directed by letter that one of the psychiatrists proposed by Mother, namely Dr Lam, be appointed as the treating psychiatrist for N (“03.01.18 Directions”). This Court further directed that :

(i)  A joint letter of instructions to be sent to Dr Lam by the parties;

(ii)  N to be accompanied by parties jointly to Dr Lam’s clinic but neither parent was to be present at time of treatment;

(iii)  If agreed, referral also be made to the YMT Child Service and if no agreement, parties to issue a proper application.

9.  The Father was clearly not happy with the appointment of Dr Lam.  Notwithstanding this, eventually a joint letter of instructions was sent to Dr Lam, and N started receiving treatment from Dr Lam as from 2 February 2018[4].

10.  In the meantime, Mother’s solicitors had responded to Father’s solicitors’ letter of 22 December 2017 informing Father that the YMT Child Service was no longer in service.  However, Father then found out that this was not in fact correct, and that the YMT Child Service had only been relocated to another address.

11.  This led to Father issuing a summons on 6 February 2018, 4 days after N started to receive treatment from Dr Lam, to replace Dr Lam with the YMT Child Service, which eventually led to the June 2018 Order.    As seen in the June 2018 Order, this Court ordered that, amongst other things, that there be leave for N to receive treatment or service at the YMT Child Service as well as continuing to receive treatment from Dr Lam.

12.  Thereafter, Mother issued the Reimbursement Summons.

13.  Subsequently, the Father failed to sign a written consent within the stipulated deadline to allow Dr Lily Ho Nga Lei (“Dr Ho”) or any medical professionals at the YMT Child Service to have the authority to treat, interview, assess N in any way professionally considered appropriate by them.  This led to the Official Solicitor to issue a summons on 7 May 2019. Thereafter, Father then proposed to impose certain terms to the written consent.

14.  On 21 June 2019, the Court made an order as sought by the Official Solicitor, refusing Father’s proposal to include additional terms (“June 2019 Order”).  The effect of the June 2019 Order was to allow the medical professionals of the YMT Child Service to have a free hand in formulating a treatment plan for N.  So far, N has attended sessions with Dr Ho, and also a clinical psychologist Dr Winnifred Mark (“Dr Mark”) at the YMT Child Service.

The Reimbursement Summons

15.  In the Reimbursement Summons, the Mother sought, amongst other things, the following orders against the Father:

(i)  To comply with the December 2017 Order and to pay direct to Dr Lam direct all her fees or to reimburse Mother for Mother’s payments to Dr Lam;

(ii)  To reimburse Mother for all payments Mother had already made to Dr Lam;

(iii)  To pay all expenses at the YMT Child Service (comprising both Dr Ho and Dr Mark), either directly or to reimburse Mother for payments made by her.

16.  The Reimbursement Summons was supported by Mother’s 7th affidavit.  According to the Mother:

(i)  As from 2 February 2018 until 14 September 2018, Father had initially failed to reimburse her for 3 treatments with Dr Lam (on 23 March 2018, 4 May 2018 and 18 May 2018) and upon her solicitors pressing for payment, eventually Father paid for 2 of those 3 treatments, leaving the treatment on 18 May 2018 unpaid as at 16 January 2019 (date of Mother’s 7th affirmation);

(ii)  On 5 October 2018, Father announced to Mother that as N could receive treatment at the YMT Child Service, he would no longer pay for any of Dr Lam’s fees, and thus, Mother had herself paid Dr Lam’s fees;

(iii)  As from 5 October 2018 until 16 January 2019, N had attended 3 sessions at the YMT Child Service, but according to the Mother, she had paid part of the treatment fees and medications which Father had failed to reimburse her.

17.  The Reimbursement Summons first came before this Court on 19 March 2019, together with various other matters, and directions were given for the further filing of affirmation evidence, and the matter was to be fixed for a 2 hour substantive argument.

18.  Subsequently, Father’s 18th affidavit was filed in response to Mother’s application.  Essentially, he argued that the December 2018 Order did not order him to pay Dr Lam’s fees “for ever but only on an interim basis”[5]. It was further his case that Mother had flouted the 03.01.18 Directions, in particular in respect of the 3 treatments mentioned in Mother’s 7th affirmation.  Father complained that Mother made the appointments for 2 out of those 3 treatments well knowing that Father was unable to accompany N on those dates for reasons set out by Father and that Mother made the appointment for 18 May 2018 without even informing Father.  It was Father’s allegation that Mother had been constantly and persistently trying hard to exclude him and to obstruct his involvement in N’s medical care.

19.  Anyway, according to Father, save for the 18 May 2018 session, he had paid all other medical bills of Dr Lam until 5 October 2018.  There was no mention by the Father of the payment of any fees incurred on N’s behalf at the YMT Child Service. 

20.  Mother had filed her 10th affidavit in reply to Father’s 18th affidavit.  

21.  The substantive hearing was fixed on 29 October 2019 (“Hearing”).

22.  First, in the December 2017 Order, it was stated that the costs of the psychiatrists should be paid by Father in the interim and the treatment was to start as soon as possible.  It was not disputed that this order was at the time made with Father’s agreement. However, Father’s case was that he had only agreed to pay for the private psychiatrist in theinterim, namely only pending the appointment being made at the YMT Child Service.  

23.  Second, although pursuant to the June 2018 Order, this Court gave leave for N to receive treatment at the YMT Child Service as well as continuing to receive treatment from Dr Lam, this had been interpreted by the Mother to mean that N was to have a session with Dr Lam after each of N’s session with Dr Ho, and which had been described as “parallel treatment”.  Anyway at the Hearing, it was not exactly clear as to the number of sessions N had had respectively with Dr Lam and Dr Ho. 

24.  In light of the above issues, the parties agreed that the  Hearing should be further adjourned to 6 December 2019 for (i) Mother to file a table of appointments schedule of N with Dr Lam, and with Dr Ho, from 1 October 2019 (which was clearly a typing error and later amended to 1 October 2018) to 12 November 2019; (ii) for the Official Solicitor to consult Dr Lam and Dr Ho as to whether “parallel treatment” would be necessary; (iii) whether YMT Child Service will be able to take care of N on an urgent basis if such need arises, such as during midnight or weekend, and reschedule of appointment to an earlier date.  Further, on a without admission of liability basis, the Father agreed to reimburse the Mother for Dr Lam’s fees of HKD 24,940 up to 29 October 2019 and all fees of Dr Ho of the YMT Child Service of HKD 420 up to 29 October 2019, and to pay for any further fees at the YMT Child Service either direct or to reimburse Mother upon provision of receipts, until further order of the Court (“October 2019 Order”).

25.  Thereafter, Dr Lam submitted a report dated 16 November 2019 and the Official Solicitor submitted a report dated 29 November 2019.  As seen in the Official Solicitors’ Report dated 29 November 2019, Dr Ho had stated that in case of any emergency, N can always use the service of the A&E Department. 

26.  The 2nd hearing on 6 December 2019 later had to be vacated and on a without admission of liability basis, Father agreed to pay for Dr Lam’s fees or reimburse the Mother of the same upon production of receipts/proof of payment, up to the adjourned hearing.  

27.  Subsequently, the substantive hearing was refixed to 18 June 2020.  The parties then agreed to the Reimbursement Summons to be dealt with on paper.

What was Father’s agreement regarding the payment of the costs of the private psychiatrist at the hearing of 18 December 2019

28.  As can be seen from the transcript of the hearing on 18 December 2017 (“Transcript”)[6], it was at that hearing that Mother’s solicitors handed to the Court the 1st Referral Letter of 12 December 2017 written by Mr Alex Lam, who was at that time the clinical psychologist treating N and who had referred N to receive urgent psychiatric assessment at the YMT Child Service due to certain symptoms displayed by N. It was then disclosed by Counsel appearing for the Mother, Mr Li, to the Court that on the Saturday immediately preceding the hearing on the 18th which was a Monday, that the Mother had taken N to see a private psychiatrist, a Dr Lee recommended by N’s school psychiatrist whom N also saw.  All this was done without informing the Father, and in fact Mr Li further disclosed that Mother had also registered with the Union Hospital for an appointment for psychiatrist treatment, and Mr Li had explained that as the government psychiatrists would take a long time to get a first appointment and although signing up for such an appointment, at the same time N was seeing the private psychiatrist.

29.  Father admitted that he had received Mr Lam’s 1st Referral Letter and that he had suggested that rather than waiting for an appointment from the government service, N should see a private psychiatrist for treatment and he had suggested Dr Gabriel Hung who had previously seen N and who had provided evidence in previous proceedings in the Family Court.

30.  It was in light of the above exchanges and the Mr Lam’s 1st Referral Letter that, this Court directed that N should consult a private psychiatrist to be agreed by the parties who were then directed to send in two proposals each for the Court to decide.

31.  This Court had initially asked the parties whether the costs of the private psychiatrist should be shared equally[7].  Mr Li explained that Mother was out of a job and that all the financial provisions of N had been paid by Father.  The Court had queried over Mother’s taking N to see a private psychiatrist prior to that hearing without alerting the Father and that she had paid for the fees herself and Mr Li explained that it was on an urgent basis and she paid it, and that if treatment was going to be routine, she would have to apply to increase the financial provision from Father.  The Court then asked the Father’s side, and his then Senior Counsel Mr Coleman had said that he would certainly pay in the interim until other arrangements were made.

32.  Having read the Transcript, I am of the view that when Father said he agreed to pay in the interim, it was pending the arrangements were made with any government service and further order of the Court, since any further arrangements would have to be subject to Court’s approval, N being this Court’s ward.  The December 2017 Order in relation to Father’s payment in the interim was based on his then agreement. However, this Court did not order that Father’s payment was to cease immediately upon an appointment being made with the YMT Child Service, nor did the Court make any order as to who was to pay for the government service.

33.  Further in the 03.01.18 Direction, all the Court directed was that if the parties agreed, referral should also be made to the YMT Child Service, and if no agreement, the parties were to issue proper application. As mentioned earlier, this then led to the June 2018 Order. Neither the 03.01.18 Direction, nor the June 2018 Order stipulated as to who was to pay for N’s ongoing psychiatrists’ fees, whether Dr Lam’s or those of the YMT Child Service.

34.  It was open to Father to seek an order or direction to clarify  or to vary the December 2017 Order, rather than simply refusing to pay both Dr Lam’s fees and even those of Dr Ho and the YMT Child Service until at least around 25 October 2019[8]. In particular, those fees of Dr Ho at the YMT Child Service amounting HKD 80 per consultation and HKD 15 per medicine, and totalling HKD 420 outstanding in October 2019 were really de minimis, compared to the legal fees and counsel fees the Father was prepared to spend on this matter, and also considering it was Father who sought an order that N should receive treatment at the YMT Child Service. 

Whether N should continue to receive “parallel treatment”

35.  Mother’s position is that “parallel treatment” from Dr Lam and YMT Child Service is necessary for N.  Mr Li referred the Court to the following paragraphs of Dr Lam’s two reports dated respectively 16 November 2019 and 4 June 2020:

Report dated 16 November 2019

“She has reported to have emotional outbursts during consultations at YMTPC on many occasions, thus requiring counselling by me on the next day. She also described herself as being reluctant to talk to Dr Ho of YMTPC, withholding important information including exacerbation of her OCD symptoms, or some of her recent stressors which were usually the most distressing ones. She has mentioned she felt comfortable talking about those to me but not to Dr Ho.

As [N] has yet to form a good therapeutic relationship with Dr Ho, it is impossible for Dr Ho to fully understand her situation and treat her optimally.  A parallel treatment by Dr Ho and I together would be necessary until [N] fully trusts Dr Ho.”

Report dated 4 June 2020

“Regarding her therapeutic relationship with Dr Ho at YMT Psychiatric Centre (YMTPC), [N] has reported less reluctance to communicate with Dr Ho. She started to express more of her feelings to Dr Ho. However, she still does not feel totally comfortable with Dr Ho. As [N] has yet to conform a good therapeutic relationship with Dr Ho, it is impossible for Dr Ho to fully understand her situation and treat her optimally. A parallel treatment by Dr Ho and I together would be necessary until [N] fully trusts Dr Ho.”

36.  Mr Li submitted that in light of Dr Lam’s above reports, it would be rather risky at this stage to completely cut off Dr Lam from N’s treatment programme, and that there was no medical evidence suggesting that keeping the status quo would have any adverse impact of N’s well being.

37.  The Official Solicitor had sent a letter dated 4 June 2020 to Dr Ho setting out the queries he sought Dr Ho’s updated feedback and/or input on.  Dr Ho’s replies were :

“1. The prognosis [of N] would be influenced by her communication and relationship with her family.

2. the patient [ N] is not on any medication.

3. [N] is mentally stable in the last follow-up appointment on 7 April 2020.

4. The therapeutic relationship is building.

5. [parallel treatment] not necessary.”

38.  Although Dr Ho did not provide detailed information, her answers were quite direct, clear and to the point.  It was thus submitted on behalf of the Father that there was simply no need for what was called “parallel treatment”.

39.  First of all, I would refer to the following paragraphs in my decision of 20 June 2018 which resulted in the June 2018 Order:

“24. Having read the parents’ respective affirmations, I do not see sufficient evidence as to why N cannot see both a private psychiatrist and a Government psychiatrist at the YMY Child Service, or why it should be either one or the other.

25. I do not see the parents’ attitude is in the best interests of N and it is clear that N is much disturbed by being the focus of the prolonged parental disputes and being trapped in between for years, as observed by Ms Chan.

26. Although N’s condition is observed to have improved after receiving treatment from Dr Joanna Lam, there is no evidence as to when she will fully be recovered, and as pointed out by Ms Chan, so long as the parental disputes continue to put N in a stressful position, there is a real possibility that N would require psychiatric treatment from time to time. As further pointed out by Ms Chan, as N does not have her own means and needs to rely on the Father for financial support, and in view of the protracted disputes between her parents, which are still in high conflict and ongoing, it will be in N’s best interest for an appointment to be secured with YMT Child Service, as not only would it provide professional and affordable psychiatric services to N when in need, it will also serve as a medical safety net for N, and the proposed appointment will not deprive N the right to seek private psychiatric treatment if required.

27. The first available appointment from YMT Child Service is likely to be after December 2019.

28. I agree with the views put forward by Ms Chan, that the appointment with YMT Child Service should not be regarded as a means to replace the current treatment that N is receiving from Dr Joanna Lam.”

40.  As seen in the above paragraphs, and as correctly pointed out by the Official Solicitor, the Court simply took a pragmatic approach at the time, and this Court had never directed any “parallel treatment” in the way as referred to by the parties.  Mother had lodged a table of appointments of N from 1 October 2019 until 12 November 2019, as directed by this Court at the Hearing (“Table of Appointments”).  It can be seen in the Table of Appointments the Mother had brought N to see Dr Lam after each session N had with the YMT Child Service, and in fact initially, it was on the same day.  Between 5 October 2018 – 30 October 2019, N had attended the same number of sessions with Dr Lam as with Dr Ho.

41.  When Dr Lam wrote her report of 16 November 2019, N had only just started consulting Dr Ho, N’s 1st session being in early October 2019. 

42.  Mr Chan of the Official Solicitor in paragraph 7 of his submissions has set out the timeline of the N’s treatment process and the progress.  It can be seen therein, that N started to consult Dr Lam in February 2018, and as said earlier N started to consult Dr Ho in early October 2018.  N also started to consult the clinical psychologist at the YMT Child Service, Dr Mark, in early December 2019, at the referral by Dr Ho.

43.  By the time of Dr Lam’s report of 4 June 2020, this was some 6 months later.  By June 2020, N had attended approximately over 11 sessions with each psychiatrist.  Although Dr Lam was of the view that N still did not feel totally comfortable with Dr Ho, Dr Ho had said their therapeutic relationship was building.  Further, both psychiatrists confirmed in June 2020 that N was at that time “not on any medication”. 

44.  Dr Mark had provided a report dated 13 August 2020 to the Official Solicitor who reported that N was referred to Dr Mark by Dr Ho in early December 2019 for Cognitive Behavioural Therapy (“CBT”) for N’s  obsessive compulsive symptoms, and by August 2020, N had received a total of 6 CBT sessions from her and that in her report Dr Mark stated that on a psychiatric level, N has reached a relatively stable condition ready for ending the current course of psychological treatment and it is expected that the case will be closed by end of this year if N’s obsessive compulsive condition remains stable.

45.  The Official Solicitor (Mr Chan) also reported that he had chances of attending and observing the access sessions at the Parent-Child Connect Support Central of the Hong Kong Family Welfare Society in May and June 2020.  Mr Chan said he had a brief conversation with N at the end of one session in June 2020 and that N said she still found it not entirely comfortable to talk to Dr Ho, but her communication with Dr Mark was much more comfortable and relaxed.

46.  It was Mr Chan’s observation that there was a good therapeutic rapport between N and Dr Mark.

47.  Mr Chan also reported that at the joint conference held at YMT Child Service on 2 July 2020 which was attended by the treating doctors as well as the Co-Parenting Social Worker and the Coordinator at the Parent-Child Connect Support Centre (“Joint Conference”), it was concluded that, amongst other things :

(i)  N has become stable and that reliance on medications is no longer necessary and the progress is promising, and it is expected that the case will be closed if N’s condition remains stable;

(ii)  On the other hand, the psychiatric treatment at YMT Child Service will not explore or deal with the roots or causes of the thoughts and compulsions or how the family dynamics and relationship would affect the same. For family oriented treatment, the doctors will have to leave to other experts and this will depend on the parents’ motivation and intention to strive for the best interests of N, and that the Co-Parenting Social Worker at the Hong Kong Family Welfare Society will assist aligning the parents’ agreement to treatment/family therapy and identifying the appropriate therapist. (emphasis added)

48.  As seen in Mr Chan’s submissions, he is of the opinion that:

(i)  Dr Ho and Dr Mark work together in a collaborative and supplementary fashion, and the psychiatric condition of N is currently stable and well taken care of by the YMT Child Service;

(ii)  the pattern of N’s appointments with Dr Lam appears to suggest sort of “soothing” role for Dr Lam, and that against the present stable condition of N, and the progress of the psychological treatment, the therapeutic value of the sessions with Dr Lam is currently minimal;

(iii)  With the treatment regime that YNT Child Service is capable of rendering N, by now, the continuation of the “parallel treatment” is no longer necessary.

This Court’s views 

49.  Having considered the reports, I agree with Mr Chan’s opinion that Dr Lam has been taking more of a “soothing” role, or of a facilitative role, to assist N in building up a therapeutic relationship or rapport with Dr Ho, which has been helpful.  Although, even by June 2020, N still has not found it entirely comfortable to talk to Dr Ho, her communication with Dr Mark is much more comfortable and relaxed even though N had only met Dr Mark a few times.  

50.  In any event, it can be seen that pursuant to the June 2019 Order, the team at the YMT Child Service was to have a free hand in formulating a treatment plan for N and the treatment plan formulated seems to have worked well so far and N’s mental condition has been considered stable since, in fact, April 2020 which appeared to be the last occasion N saw Dr Ho followed by Dr Lam.  However, according to Father, N had a total of 6 sessions with Dr Mark since 13 May 2020 and the following appointment should have been on 8 September 2020.  In any event, Dr Ho is of the firm view that “parallel treatment” is not necessary.

51.  Further, provided that N’s condition remains stable, it seems that by end of this year, or in 3 months’ time, she may no longer need any treatment at the YMT Child Service, whether from Dr Ho or from Dr Mark. This is indeed positive news.  If this is the case, there is no need for N to receive any further “parallel treatment” from Dr Lam.  In my view, this also accords with N’s best interests.  As seen earlier in the conclusions at the Joint Conference, to explore or deal with the roots or causes of N’s thoughts and compulsions, this will need other experts for family oriented treatment, and this will depend on the parents’ motivation and intention to strive for the best interests of N.  Thus, at this stage, with N’s psychiatric condition remaining stable, what is required for her is family oriented treatment, rather than N continuing to receive psychiatric treatment on her own.

Conclusion

52.  Having regard to all said above, I have come to the view that as from the date of this Order, N no longer needs any parallel treatment from Dr Lam. 

53.  As for payment, I will order that Father will only need to pay for Dr Lam’s fees for N’s sessions which have taken place prior to the date of this Order, or reimburse Mother for all fees paid by her upon her production of receipts/evidence of payments.  As for N’s sessions at the YMT Child Service, Father has already agreed to pay for those and he should continue to pay until further order.

Costs of the Reimbursement Summons

54.  There was no concession from the Father until just prior to the Hearing and that it was only then that Father had confirmed that he would pay all N’s fees at the YMT Child Service either direct or to reimburse Mother upon provision of receipts.  I have pointed out earlier, that it was open to Father to take out a summons earlier to seek an order or direction to clarify the December 2017 Order rather than simply refusing to pay both Dr Lam’s fees and even those fees incurred at the YMT Child Service. 

55.  Having said this, I am of the view that Mother’s attitude in this matter has also been rather inflexible.  There seemed to be no indication on her part that she was willing to gradually reduce the frequency of N’s sessions with Dr Lam notwithstanding there being signs of improvement of N’s therapeutic relationship with Dr Ho as time went on.   

56.  In light of all said above, and in the circumstances of this case, I have come to the view there should be no order as to costs of and incidental to the Reimbursement Summons.  Mother’s own costs will be taxed in accordance with Legal Aid Regulations.

57.  The above are costs orders nisi, which shall be final after 21 days.

 (Bebe Pui Ying Chu)
 Judge of the Court of First Instance
High Court

Mr Richard Todd and Ms  Athena Wong, instructed by Chan & Chan, for the plaintiff

Mr Kevin Li, instructed by Stevenson Wong & Co, for the defendant

Mr Jason Chan of the Official Solicitor, for the ward



[1]  A:4-7

[2]  A:8-11

[3]  A:1

[4]  See paras 11 and 12 of the June 2018 Decision

[5]  At para 4, B:6

[6]  B:22, at D

[7]  B:51, at E

[8]  See para 8, Father’s Skeleton Argument, dated 25 October 2-19

[2020] HKCFI 937-EN-2020-05-28

C v. S

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HCMP 929/2017

[2020] HKCFI 937

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS NO 929 OF 2017

_______________________

 IN THE MATTER of N, female, a child born on the 20th day of November 2008 in Hong Kong
 

and

 IN THE MATTER OF Section 26 of the High Court Ordinance (Cap. 4)
 

and

 IN THE MATTER OF Order 90 rule 1 of the Rules of High Court (Cap. 4A)
 

and

 IN THE MATTER OF Section 3 of the Guardianship of Minors Ordinance (Cap. 13)
 

and

 IN THE MATTER OF the Inherent Jurisdiction of the High Court

______________________

     BETWEEN

 CPlaintiff
 and 
 SDefendant

______________________

Before:Hon B Chu J in Chambers (Not Open to Public)
Dates of Hearing:3 December 2019 and 6 May 2020
Date of Decision:28 May 2020

___________________________________________

D E C I S I O N
(Leave to Adduce Expert Report and Retrospective Leave for Disclosure of Documents)

  ___________________________________________

Introduction

1.  The detailed background of these wardship proceedings has been set out in the numerous published judgments/decisions of the Family Court, this Court and the Court of Appeal.  I shall not repeat the same.  In this decision, I shall adopt the same abbreviations in previous judgments and decisions of this Court, unless otherwise indicated.

2.  The trial of Father’s application for sole custody, care and control of N and Mother’s application for de-warding N has been scheduled on 19 March 2019 for 14 days commencing from 20 October 2020 to 9 November 2020 (“Trial”) and the final and 6th Pre-Trial Review has been fixed on 15 June 2020 (“PTR”).  An updated social welfare report is to be submitted on or before 5 June 2020 and the updated OS Report to be submitted on or before 20 August 2020[1].

3.  As seen later in this decision, Father’s application for custody, care and control of N in the originating summons issued herein is in effect an application to vary the order made on 5 October 2012 by the then DDJ Own (“Judge”) of the Family Court granting Mother sole custody, care and control of N.

4.  Presently before this Court are two summonses taken out by the Father, namely:

(i)     Summons issued on 15 March 2019 for, amongst other things, leave to adduce a report from Dr Wong Chung Kwong (“Dr Wong”) dated 11 March 2019 attached (“Expert Summons”);

(ii)     Summons issued on 17 December 2019 for retrospective leave for Father to disclose documents in these proceedings and the FCMC 67/2010 (“Family Proceedings”) and to take N to see Dr Wong (“Retrospective Leave Summons”).

5.  As seen later in this decision, the report which the Father now seeks to adduce is in fact the 2nd report of Dr Wong (“2nd Report”).

6.  The Expert Summons was issued over a year ago but the substantive argument was only fixed for a hearing before this Court on 3 December 2019 (“1st Hearing”).  Counsel Mr Richard Todd and Ms Athena Wong appeared for the Father at the 1st Hearing and Mr Kevin Li appeared for the Mother.  The Mother opposed the application and in particular, she had raised a complaint that as these are wardship proceedings, the Father should not have disclosed any documents in these proceedings to Dr Wong in the first place and/or to take N to see Dr Wong, without her consent and without leave of this Court.

7.  In light of Mother’s complaint, this Court referred Mr Todd and Ms Wong to paragraph 5(1) of the Judicial Proceedings (Regulation of Reports) Ordinance, Cap 287 which states as follows:

“5(1) The publication of information relating to proceedings before any court sitting in private shall not of itself be contempt of court except in the following cases, that is to say –

(a) where the proceedings relate to the wardship or adoption of an infant or wholly or mainly to the guardianship, custody, maintenance or upbringing of an infant, or rights of access to an infant;

(ab)     …”

8.  As the Father was clearly already in contempt of court under the above provision, and possibly even his solicitors Messrs Chan & Chan (since instructions appeared to be given to Dr Wong through his solicitors[2]), this Court declined to hear further from the Father until he has sought retrospective leave from this Court.  The Expert Summons was then adjourned upon the Father’s undertaking to file within 14 days a summons seeking retrospective leave and further directions were given by this Court in relation to the filing evidence.  The Court further directed OS to attend the next hearing.

9.  Pursuant to his undertaking, the Father issued the Retrospective Leave Summons on 17 December 2019.

10.  At the hearing on 6 May 2020 (“2nd Hearing”), Father was represented by Senior Counsel Mr Paul Shieh and Counsel Ms Athena Wong, and Mother was represented by Solicitor Mr Karl Wong.  Mr Jason Chan appeared for the Official Solicitor.

The Retrospective Leave Summons

11.  Mother had drawn this Court’s attention to the fact that this was not the first time that Father had attempted to adduce expert reports which were prepared without first seeking leave from the Court. 

12.  As pointed out on behalf of the Mother, paragraph 21 under Part K on Expert Evidence in PD 15.12 provides as follows :

“21. In Matrimonial Proceedings / Family Proceedings relating to children, which are held in chambers and not open to public,

(1) the Court’s permission is required to instruct an expert. Such proceedings are confidential and, in the absence of the Court’s permission, disclosure of information and documents relating to such proceedings risks contravening the law of contempt of Court or statutory provisions protecting this confidentiality.

(2) Before permission is obtained from the Court to instruct an expert, it will be necessary for the party wishing to instruct an expert to make enquiries designed so as to provide the Court with information about that expert which will enable the Court to decide whether or not to give permission.

(3) Such preliminary enquiries, and the disclosure of anonymised information about the case which is a necessary part of such enquiries, will not require the Court’s permission and will not amount to any contempt of Court.

22.     In Matrimonial Proceedings (except as provided in rule 121 of the MCR) and in Family Proceedings, no document filed or lodged in the registry, other than a decree or order made in open Court, shall be open to inspection by any person without leave of the Court, and no copy of any such document, or of an extract from any such document, shall be taken by, or issued to, any person without such leave.  Thus, permission should first be sought from the Court before any copies of documents are provided to any expert to be instructed.”

13.  Although PD 15.12 does not apply to wardship proceedings (see paragraph 5 thereof), it clearly applies to the proceedings under the Guardianship of Minor Ordinance, Cap 13 issued by the Father in the Family Proceedings.

14.  The trial of the custody, care and control in the Family Proceedings took place in the Family Court over 16 days between February – July 2012 before the Judge.  At the time of the trial, N was about 3 years and 10 months old, and Father’s case at the time was that Mother was unfit as a primary care giver of N[3]. He sought custody, care and control of N, which was opposed by Mother.  As seen in the Judge’s judgment handed down on 5 October 2012 (“Custody Judgment”)[4], the Judge ultimately ordered that Mother should have sole custody, care and control of N, with general access to Father to be determined, and pending such determination, the then interim access arrangements were to continue.

15.  As set out in the Custody Judgment, the trial commenced as scheduled and on the 10th day of the trial (29 March 2012), when Mother had been under cross examination for 5 days already, the Court was informed by Father’s then counsel that the parties had reached settlement over the matter, and the trial was then adjourned to 20 April 2012 to enable the parties to lodge a formal consent summons.  On 19 April 2012, the day before the hearing, Father changed solicitors and counsel and alleged that he agreed to the settlement under duress and undue influence by his former counsel.  Without going into further details, the trial was eventually ordered to continue on 24 July 2012.  Then, the day before, on 23 July 2012, Father attempted to file his 9th affirmation attaching a 51 page psychiatric report from Dr Wong attaching another 40 pages of extracts from research publications, totalling 91 pages (“1st Report”).

16.  The Judge decided not to admit Father’s new evidence including the 1st Report and had commented that Father, with the full benefit of legal advice at all times, should not and indeed could not take the litigation procedure in his own hands and simply threw in whatever materials he thought useful to him and at any time he wanted[5].

17.  Further, in paragraph 102 of the Custody Judgment, the Judge had mentioned that the Father, who had all along being legally represented, had produced two other reports form doctors as expert evidence without complying with the procedural rules and the Judge had also set out in full Part K of PD 15.12.  The Judge in the end did not admit those reports.

18.  After the Custody Judgment was handed down in October 2012, Father had attempted to appeal, seeking leave first before the Judge which was dismissed and his application to renew his leave application before Court of Appeal was dismissed on 25 June 2013 under HCMP 178 of 2013.  Whilst the issue of general access under the terms of the Custody Judgment had yet to be determined and finalized, Father issued a summons for a variation of the custody, care and control order on 5 November 2013, 5 months after the Court of Appeal refused his application for leave to appeal (“1st Variation Application”)[6]. 

19.  For the purpose of his 1st Variation Application, Father had issued a summons on 4 July 2014 seeking leave of Court to file medical reports on N.

20.  Prior to the issue of the above summons, Father had earlier issued two other summonses:

(i)     a summons issued on 17 October 2013 in which he had sought leave to file medical reports in relation to N’s leg deformities problems, namely from Dr Stanley Lam dated 2 July 2013 and Dr Andrew Ip dated 8 July 2013; and

(ii)     a summons issued on 5 November 2013 in which he had again sought leave to file medical reports in relation to N’s leg deformities problems, namely the two above reports plus another report from Dr Cheung Ho Man dated 11 June 2013.

21.  In the summons issued on 4 July 2014, Father had then again sought leave to file all 3 of the above mentioned reports, ie of Dr Cheung Ho Man, Dr Stanley Lam and Dr Andrew Ip.

22.  As seen in the Judge’s decision dated 12 December 2014, in relation to the summons of 4 July 2014 (“Medical ReportsDecision”)[7] all 3 reports were obtained by Father without leave in advance from the court and that he saw fit to obtain those medical reports during his access times with Nwithout prior consent of Mother.  The Judge dismissed Father’s summons, refusing leave to Father to produce the medical reports of Dr Cheung and Dr Lam, and that as Dr Ip’s report had already been produced and considered at the joint meeting of the parties’ respective experts, the Judge said there was no question of seeking leave for that report.  In particular, the Judge stated as follows:

“[Father] should not be allowed to obtain expert evidence and then chose to produce them any time he wished or for any purpose he wanted without compliance with the requite rules and procedures The [Father’s] way of handling experts’ evidence appears to be that if the expert evidence tends in his favour then he may choose to adduce them in the proceedings by seeking retrospective leave to do so. How about if the expert evidence obtained unilaterally and without leave does not support his case? [Father] would then have the liberty to decide whether to produce such expert evidence or, if he has the means and resources to do so, obtain further expert evidence since the Court had not been involved in the obtaining of that piece of expert evidence which turns out to be not support his case, or the Court would not even know about tis existence, unless he chooses to disclose it voluntarily. Such practice is improper and unfair. It is trite that a party in litigation who obtains expert evidence without leave do so at his or her own risks. There are plainly no justifiable reasons why [Father] could have the privilege of not having to comply with the Practice Direction in terms of the obtaining of expert evidence, and , on the other hand, also enjoying the benefit of choice of disclosure only if he so wishes[8].”

23.  I cannot agree more with what was said by the Judge above.  In any event, by reason of what was said in the above Medical Reports Decision, Father should be clearly aware of the procedural rules on expert evidence and the provisions of PD 15.12.

24.  N became a ward of this Court on 20 April 2017. It is not quite clear as to when Father instructed Dr Wong to prepare his 2nd Report.   In fact, even after the 2nd Report, Father had continued to send documents filed in the present proceedings to Dr Wong, as seen in a letter dated 1 June 2019 from Dr Wong in which it would appear, that he was asked to respond to Mother’s 9th affidavit dated 30 April 2019[9].

25.  In his 21st affidavit filed in support of his Retrospective Leave Summons, Father tendered apologies to the Court and the Mother for not having first sought leave.  It was said that that the mistake was committed due to his oversight and out of his overwhelming concern about N’s wellbeing.  However, all Father said in explanation of his behaviour was that he was not “sufficiently aware of the necessity of the permission of the Court” and further “it was purely oversight on his part as to the correct procedures to follow”[10]. I find what he said rather amazing as he seemed to have completely forgotten about his own previous applications in the Family Proceedings and, in particular, what had been said by the Judge in the Medical Reports Decision, and further in particular, since commencement of these wardship proceedings, he has often been represented by two counsel, in particular for the present applications.

26.  Having said all this, although I do not accept Father’s explanations, I decide to grant retrospective leave as sought by Father and this is only because I ought to consider whether it is in the best interests of N to allow Father to adduce the 2nd Report.  Further, Mother (who is under legal aid) in the end adopted a neutral stance and did not really oppose Father’s Retrospective Leave Summons, and OS also adopted a neutral stance.  

The 2nd Report

Preliminary Comments

27.  According to Dr Wong, in his 2nd Report, he followed the same objective, method and rationale as stated in Section (I) of his 1st Report[11].  The “objective” in Section (I) of his 1st Report was stated “to provide psychiatric opinions on the issues of care and control of [N]” and that he was to do so with the best interests of N in mind[12].  Having said he followed the same objective in his 1st Report, Dr Wong then said in the 2nd Report his independent professional opinions were provided focusing on two core issues (1) the well-being of N; and (2) the mental health and parental competence of Father and Mother (“Core Issues”).  

28.  Although there were medical reports and evidence that Father was/is suffering from some mental health issues, there did not seem to have been any medical report and/or evidence in relation to Mother suffering from any mental health issues in the past.  Further, all along Dr Wong was described as a specialist in “child psychiatry”, it seemed only to be in Father’s 21 affirmation filed in support of the Retrospective Leave Summons that Dr Wong’s expertise in “adult psychiatry” was mentioned.

29.  In any event, Dr Wong’s 2nd Report seemed to cover a very wide scope including making recommendations on custody, care, control and access of N.

30.  During the 2nd Hearing, this Court had asked what instructions were sent to Dr Wong for the preparation of the 2nd Report, but was informed that there were no written instructions and oral instructions were sent to Dr Wong direct by Father.  However, this appears to be contrary to what Dr Wong himself had said, since his 2nd Report was addressed to Messes Chan & Chan, Father’s solicitors, thanking them for asking him to provide his professional opinions on the case of N.  It would thus appear that Father’s instructions to Dr Wong were given through his solicitors, in which case they should be in writing.  It is not clear why such instructions were not produced.  

31.  According to Father’s 17th affidavit, he said he sought leave to adduce the 2nd Report on the issues of custody, care, control and access of N[13], and the purpose would seem to be a very general one.  It was only in Father’s counsel’s submissions at the 1st Hearing that it was really made clear that Father sought to use the 2nd Report in addressing the issue of  “parental alienation” and “to speak to [N’s] emotional and mental condition over the past years and roles of the parents”[14].

32.  In preparing both his 1st Report and his 2nd Report, Dr Wong did not have the opportunity to meet with Mother.  As for N, Dr Wong only interviewed her on one occasion on 15 June 2012, ie when she was about 3 years and 7 months old, prior to his 1st Report and Dr Wong has not seen her since.  On the only occasion that Dr Wong met N on 15 June 2012, the duration was 1.5 hours during which Dr Wong first met with Father, then N by herself, and finally again with Father.  Dr Wong’s interview with N could not have been long.

33.  Dr Wong accepted that he had not interviewed Mother and had not had the opportunity of examining N again prior to preparing the 2nd Report, but he said, having studied the documents he was provided with,  he was confident about the professional opinions that he would formulate in his report[15]. He had explained in paragraph 22 of the 2nd Report that:

“22.    In the diagnostic exercise in medical practice (including psychiatric practice), it is common clinical experience that provided the doctor has obtained an accurate “history of the illness”, he/she can usually arrive at a diagnosis or at least a provisional diagnosis. … In forensic psychiatric practice in particular, a common case is to decide the testamentary capacity of a person who has already passed away. … Even though there is no patient to examine, provided that there is sufficient and valid clinical information, it is often not difficult to decide retrospectively with certainty or at least a high degree of probability the mental health condition of the deceased when he/she made his/her will.”

34.  Thus, according to Dr Wong, what he did was to perform a diagnostic exercise, having studied the documents.  He also said he followed 3 principles: (i) relying on direct rather than indirect information; (ii) mainly using information provided by professionals; (iii) selecting information that is pertinent to the [Core Issues][16].

Core Issue (1): Well-being of N

35.  Under the 1st of the Core Issues, ie the “Well-being of N”, Dr Wong first of all set out at length some 20 paragraphs from his 1st Report, namely paragraphs 121-141.  As set out earlier and as seen in the Custody Judgment, the Judge did not admit the 1st Report.  Dr Wong had referred to the Procedural Guide for Handling Child Abuse Cases Revised 2015 published by the Social Welfare Department and he then said his opinion was that N’s well-being had been substantially affected because important aspects of her needs had not been met[17]. 

36.  He then elaborated on his views under 5 aspects, namely (1) physical aspects; (2) emotional aspects; (3) educational aspects; (4) psychiatric aspects; (5) life-long aspects.

37.  On (1) N’s physical aspects, Dr Wong referred to (i) N’s not receiving proper treatment for her orthopaedic conditions, (ii) not receiving proper attention to her “poor hygiene”[18], and (iii) frequent physical sickness and (iv) being given improper medications[19].  

38.  In fact, (i), (ii), (iv) were “old complaints” in that Father had made those complaints during the trial before the Judge and such  complaints were considered in detail by the Judge in paragraphs 81-113 of his Custody Judgment[20]. Dr Wong has however claimed that N is at present still suffering from active orthopaedic conditions and that she has not received proper attention to her “poor hygiene”. 

39.  It is not clear what evidence Dr Wong based his comments on in relation to N’s present conditions.  In so far as I can see, Dr Wong referred to matters about N’s orthopaedic condition being addressed in the Social Investigation Report dated 18 June 2014[21], over 4½ years ago.  For N’s oral hygiene or dental problems, the last dental report referred to by Dr Wong appeared to be 4 July 2013[22], over 6 years ago.

40.  Dr Wong had said N’s physiotherapy sessions in Kowloon Hospital had never been discharged but those sessions were stopped after Mother’s 2nd and 3rd child abuse allegations, respectively on 31 May 2015 and 24 October 2015. 

41.  Further, Dr Wong had referred to Dr Stanley Lam’s report of 2 July 2013[23] and also Dr Andrew Ip’s report of 8 July 2013[24] in his 2nd Report.  As said earlier and set out in the Medical Reports Decision, Dr Stanley Lam’s report of 2 July 2013 had not been admitted by the Judge. Dr Andrew Ip was Father’s then expert in relation to N’s genu recurvatum and flat foot problems and there was a Joint Statement prepared between Dr Ip and Mother’s then expert and yet neither Mother’s expert report nor the Joint Statement was referred to by Dr Wong[25].  

42.  As for (iv), ie improper medication, it seems Dr Wong’s statement that Mother has continued to give inappropriate medication to N is based on a witness’s affirmation filed on 9 March 2013[26].

43.  In any event, those complaints of Father in relation to N’s orthopaedic conditions, poor oral hygiene and improper medications were investigated during the 16 day trial in 2012 and/or raised again at the time of Father’s 1st Variation Application, but not pursued which in the end was withdrawn by Father on 8 March 2016[27].

44.  As for (iii) in relation to N’s frequent physical sickness, Dr Wong referred to N’s school report for the academic year 2017-2018 which showed she was absent for 10 days during 1st term and 14.5 days during her 2nd term[28].  Father said Mother told him N was sick and therefore was not able to attend access on a total of 14 days, referring to a record of his access times[29].  Dr Wong said it would seem if the two records were taken together, N had continued to be frequently “sick”.  It is however not clear how Dr Wong was taking the two records together, in particular whether Dr Wong thinks that 24.5 days of absence amount to “frequently sick” or not, and if so on what basis.

45.  The actual dates of N’s absences from school were not known, and thus it was not known whether the dates of N’s absences from school coincided with or related to those dates when she was absent during access.  In any event, without all the medical reports of N, the reasons of why she took 24.5 days of absences from school are not known.  Father did not make any application seeking N’s medical reports for her absences.  As for N’s admission to St Teresa’s Hospital from 9-10 March 2018, according to the medical report, this seemed to be related to “psychosomatic disorder”[30].

46.  As to (2) in relation to N’s emotional aspects, in paragraphs 118 and 119 of the 2nd Report[31], Dr Wong opined that N’s crucial emotional need to have a secure father-daughter relationship has been severely interfered with and interrupted by Mother.  Dr Wong opined that N has two unsafe homes, in that N’s home with Father was rendered unsafe by Mother’s inducing rejection and fear against Father and by her showing N displeasure that N enjoys being with Father and N’s home with Mother is also unsafe because of her inducing rejection and fear and that N has been under emotional distress is also manifested in her obsessive symptom of having repetitive thoughts of killing Mother[32].

47.  However, Dr Wong did not set out clearly in his above paragraphs as to what evidence his opinions were based on.

48.  Dr Wong had referred to there being an “important” social investigation report dated 18 June 2014 by Ms Kiu Ching-ha (“Ms Kiu”) which was prepared 15 months after Mother’s 1st Child Abuse Allegation[33]. As set out by Ms Kiu, her report was called for by the Judge was in relation to, amongst other things, Father’s 1st Variation Application.  Dr Wong had opined that Ms Kiu was fully justified in her opinions and recommendations at that time, namely Father and Mother be granted joint custody of N and sharing the care and control and access of N.

49.  Thus, as at 18 June 2014, it seemed that were no allegations of parental alienation at that time by Father, and that he was applying for joint custody and for N to stay with him for as many days a week as possible[34]. As said earlier, he then withdrew his 1st Variation Application.  

50.  N was first referred to the YMT Child Service by a doctor at the Student Health Service of Department of Health on 2 January 2015 due to anxiety disorder/chronic stress caused by family member[35].  Dr Wong opined that this was clearly a red flag that N was probably already suffering from an “early stage of psychiatric morbidity”.

51.  The 2nd Child Abuse Allegation was over an incident on 30 May 2015.  Dr Wong then referred to the report of Ms Irene Cheung of YMT Child Service (“Ms Cheung”) in her clinical psychology report dated 15 June 2015[36], who concluded that at that time N was not assessed as having any psychiatric disorder and her symptoms did not reach a clinically significant level.  Although Dr Wong then referred to his opinions based on Ms Cheung, what Dr Wong did not mention was Ms Cheung’s observation of N having difficulty in finding a secure position during parental conflict and she had to take side with one of the parents when she was under his/her custody, and that the anxiety and distress originated from such difficulty and had placed her psychosocial and emotional development at risk[37].

52.  Dr Wong also referred to the observations of a social worker Ms Yim Heung Mui (“Ms Yim”) in her social investigation report dated 6 August 2015, in relation to 5 access sessions from 20 July 2015 to 28 August 2015, which showed N’s increasing rejection of Father[38].  Dr Wong had set out his opinions on Ms Yim’s report, including posing two questions, namely “why [N] should be so rejecting and fearful of Father?” and “Why should Mother induce in [N] the rejection and fear of Father?”.  To the first question, he opined the reason was because Mother had been inducing the rejection and fear, and to the second question, he himself had said, as he had not had the chance to examine Mother, he was not able to give a definitive answer, and then he went on to say that a likely explanation was Mother’s fear of losing N[39]. 

53.  However, it was clear from Ms Yim’s “Remarks” that it seemed to be a parenting issue, and that N was pulled in between the parents’ conflicts, which had caused N much stress as reflected in by the assessment of N’s clinical psychologist[40]. Thus, from Ms Yim’s remarks, although there was a big team of professionals to support the parents and N, “the most powerful one was still the parents themselves to reassure and nurture [N] that she could get the love from both parents without any worry to upset either one.”

54.  The 3rd Child Abuse Allegation was made on 24 October 2015.  There was a social investigation report dated 24 February 2016 by Mr Cheng Cho Hong[41] (“Mr Cheng”).  Dr Wong had opined that namely (i) Mother made her 3rd Child Abuse Allegation after the 2nd one and very soon after Father had resumed normal access with N, which was again proven untrue, and the close proximity in time from the 2nd Child Abuse Allegation showed that Mother’s mental condition had not improved; (ii) N’s rejection and fear of Father had obviously intensified; (iii) there was only one reason for (ii), Mother had continued to induce in N rejection and fear of Father; (iv) Father’s depression had improved; (v) N had continuously been assessed and treated by clinical psychologists at YMT Child Service, and they recommended resumption of normal access (vi) the professionals involved in the Multi Disciplinary Case Conference (“MDCC”) concluded once again that Father was a loving father and was never abusive to N.

55.  Mr Cheng had set out the recommendations of the MDCC, including the MDCC’s recommendation that (i) N’s situation had to be followed up by the clinical psychological services at the East Tseung Kwan O Social Welfare Department Family Services Centre, (ii) Father to continue to receive clinical psychological services at Kowloon Hospital and also counselling services by the hospital social worker, and (iii) Father and Mother to receive the co-parenting services provided by the Hong Kong Family Association[42].

56.  There was no recommendation by MDCC on Mother’s mental condition or that Mother was to receive any clinical psychological services.  

57.  Mother made the 4th Child Abuse Allegation on 21 January 2017, and in an email she sent to Father on that day, she had described what N had told her[43], Dr Wong referred to what was said by Mrs Lam Yeung Kit Ching (“Mrs Lam”) in her Social Welfare Report dated 8 September 2018 (sic).  The report of Mrs Lam referred to by Dr Wong  should be the one dated 6 March 2018[44].  Dr Wong criticised Mrs Lam and amongst other things, that she had not fully fathomed the profound psychopathology in this case and that her opinions and recommendations were based on the self-serving account by Mother. 

58.  However, Mrs Lam had set out Father’s views in paragraphs 10 and 11[45]. Although Father was reported to have considered that Mother had influenced N not to see him leading to N’s manifestation of psychiatric symptoms, he did not allege any parental alienation even though he had made such allegations in his 1st and 2nd affirmations herein.  In fact, Father had agreed that there was some improvement in access as N had improved her attitude towards him during the recent access, and was polite to him. 

59.  Mrs Lam’s social investigation report was called for by this Court after the Father had commenced the present wardship proceedings and it was submitted on behalf of Father at that time that by reason of Father’s express concerns on N being seen by too many professionals, the Court should direct that the social worker not to interview N when preparing the report.  It was under those circumstances that the Court made that direction.

60.  Dr Wong also referred to the OS Report dated 19 March 2018 prepared by Ms Juliana MK Chan[46] (“Ms Chan”).  Dr Wong had said from what N had told Ms Chan, Mother had continued to induce in N rejection and fear of Father.  

61.  On the other hand, Ms Chan had set out her views, that N herself had provided explanations as to how she felt about Father, about the few incidents that made her dislike the Father and the reasons why her chest feel painful, and N showed resentment towards her father and was resolute that she would not give Father any chance and that she did not want to see Father[47].

62.  On (3) education aspects, Dr Wong opined that N had been absent from school much more frequently than the usual child.  There had been no statistics produced in relation to absence of an “usual child” of N’s age from school.  As seen in Mrs Lam’s report, there was no sufficient evidence that N’s absences had aroused the concerns of the school[48].  Further, for the 1st term for the academic year 2018-2019, she was absent on only 1 day[49].

63.  Dr Wong said N wasted one year of life because she needed to repeat the P1 year and that was due to Mother’s false child abuse allegation against Father, as N missed her final examination of P1 year because she was admitted to Tseung Kwan O Hospital for nearly two weeks, consequential upon the child abuse allegation[50]. What Dr Wong was referring to appears to be Mother’s 2nd Child Abuse Allegation on 30 May 2015, which Mother reported to the police on 31 May 2015, and as a result of which N was admitted to Tseung Kwan O Hospital[51].  Subsequently a MDCC was held on 16 June 2015 at the Tseung Kwan O Hospital. 

64.  It was not disputed that N repeated P1 in September 2015.

65.  The above was reported by the social worker Ms Yim in her social investigation report dated 6 August 2015, which was called for by the Judge in relation to resumption of Father’s access (suspended after the above 2nd Child Abuse Allegation), and which was during the adjournment of Father’s 1st Variation Application[52].  It was reported in that report that the members of the MDCC held on 16 June 2015 suggested that N was to be referred for child psychological assessment in view of her substantial lagging behind academically[53]. Further, Ms Yim had reported on N’s results in her then latest school report, and it showed that N did not get good grades, and that she was required to repeat P1.

66.  In fact, prior to the 2nd Child Abuse Allegation, as seen in a report dated 28 May 2014 of Dr Gabriel Hung, a psychiatrist who was instructed and arranged by Father to see N, it would appear that N was caught in between her parents who had differing approaches to learning and upbringing which would make it more difficult to maintain steady and effective academic progress, and Dr Hung had recommended that the parents should work together and cooperate and communicate as much as possible, ensuring that homework and preparation for school was being effectively managed according to N’s abilities, potentials, amount of work needed, necessary playtime and the amount of rest required[54].

67.  In light of all the above, there was no sufficient evidence that the reason that N having to repeat P1 was caused solely by Mother’s 2nd Child Abuse Allegation.  N repeating P1 was during the academic year 2015/2016.  For P3 during 2017-2018, save with “General English”, she had achieved above C in all her other subjects, and Mrs Lam in her report in March 2018 reported that N had maintained average school performance at school.  It would thus appear that after repeating P1, N’s school performance has been stable.

68.  On (4) on N’s psychiatric aspects, as said earlier, according to the report of Ms Cheung, as at 15 June 2015, N was not assessed as having any psychiatric disorder at that time, although N showed, amongst other things, anxiety due to dilemma of parental conflicts[55].  On 16 December 2017, N was diagnosed as suffering from “Obsessive Compulsive Disorder”, and N has since February 2018 been prescribed with psychiatric medication and required to take the medication once daily[56].

69.  Dr Wong opined that N suffers from psychiatric symptoms partly consequential upon the deprivation of her emotional needs to have a secure father-daughter relationship and partly because of the rejection and fear of Father induced in her by Mother[57].

70.  Dr Wong opined that the treatment of this disorder requires not only psychiatric medication but also psychological intervention in terms of resolving anxiety, fear and anger and enhancing equanimity and happiness and that N needs an emotionally safe home to bring about the best treatment effects for her Obsessive Compulsive Disorder.  He then concluded that if Mother’s induction of rejection and fear were to persist and aggravate, it is likely that N may develop other psychiatric disorders on top of Obsessive Compulsive Disorder.

71.  However, it is not exactly clear as to what evidence that Dr Wong’s opinion was based on in paragraphs 121 and 11 of the 2nd Report.

72.  As for N’s “life-long aspects”, Dr Wong concluded that the “deprivation and abnormalities” N has been subject to in the 4 aspects above have significant life-long impacts on her. 

Core Issue (2): Mental health and parental competence of Father and Mother

73.  As for the mental health and parental competence of Father and Mother, Dr Wong is of the view that although Father has suffered from depression, he only had mild symptoms of depression, based on various psychiatric and/or psychological reports and Dr Wong’s mental state examination on Father on 29 January 2019[58].

74.  As for Mother’s mental health, Dr Wong first set out in his 2nd Report paragraphs 98-120 of his 1st Report[59] and he then said having studied all the documents that he was provided with, particularly the observations and opinions of third-party professionals, he maintained his opinion that Mother is likely to have been suffering from Obsessive Compulsive Disorder.

75.  As for Mother’s competence as a parent, Dr Wong again referred to the 4 aspects of N, namely physical, emotional, educational and psychiatric.  In relation to N’s physical aspect, Dr Wong again referred to N’s orthopaedic conditions and oral hygiene and Mother’s lack of attention of those matters.  As for emotional aspect, Dr Wong said Mother has alienated N from Father and has caused her to be deprived of a loving and secure father-daughter relationship.  In relation to the education aspect, Dr Wong again referred to N’s sick leaves, and added Mother had continued to exclude Father from school correspondence which was to exclude him from taking active part in N’s education.  As for psychiatric aspect, Dr Wong referred to Mother’s persistent alienation of N from Father.

76.  Dr Wong then came to the view that Mother has not properly satisfied N’s needs and rather she has deprived N of her needs and further referred to 4 likely reasons to explain Mother’s behaviour of physical abuse and psychological abuse of N.

Discussion

77.  To summarise, as said earlier, Dr Wong’s opinions in his 2nd Report on N’s physical aspect of orthopaedic conditions, poor oral hygiene and being given improper medications were “old complaints” which had been investigated by the Judge during the 2012 trial and his findings have been set out in the Custody Judgment.  Further, N taking 24.5 days of sick leave has been overtaken by events, in that there was only 1 day of sick leave in the 1st term of 2018-2019 and there has been no further evidence as to the frequency of N’s absences from school.  As for N’s emotional aspect, Dr Wong appeared to have drawn different conclusions from the various reports of the professionals and/or social workers set out earlier, and also from the report of Ms Chan who on behalf of OS represented N at the time.  As for N’s education aspects, as mentioned earlier, Dr Wong’s opinion was based mainly on N’s absences from school and her repeating P1, which again has been overtaken by events.  So far as N’s psychiatric aspects are concerned, as said earlier, Dr Wong was be of the view that N’s psychiatric symptoms were partly consequential upon the deprivation of her emotional needs to have a secure father-daughter relationship and partly because of the rejection and fear of Father induced in her by Mother.

78.  However, most of those professionals/social workers, save with the exception of Mrs Lam, had all seen and interviewed N.  Most of them had interviewed both Father and Mother, save those instructed by Father unilaterally.

79.  As set out earlier and by Dr Wong, all he did was to carry out a diagnostic exercise, and while this would have to be done in the event of the testamentary capacity of a person who had already passed away, or where there was no patient to examine, this is not the case here. Dr Wong accepted that he had not had the opportunity to examine Mother, and that if the Court sees fit, and if Mother is agreeable, Dr Wong has indicated that he will be happy to conduct psychiatric assessment on her[60].

80.  As seen during the hearings, Mother has made it quite clear and that she will not give her consent to be psychiatrically assessed by Dr Wong.

81.  If Dr Wong’s 2nd Report were to be admitted, then Mother has indicated that she may seek leave for her to produce her own expert report, and if necessary for her expert to see N.  For each parent to have his/her own expert, and if N has to be interviewed by them, this will mean N may have to see the two further psychiatric experts, and the effect of this has to be assessed in light of N’s present psychiatric condition. 

82.  Further, if Dr Wong’s 2nd Report were to be admitted, the Mother would no doubt challenge the basis of Dr Wong’s opinions and his conclusions.  This will in effect mean a re-visit of some of those allegations made by Father previously which had been adjudicated upon and resulted in the Custody Judgment.  This cannot be right since Father’s leave to appeal had been dismissed firstly by the Judge and later by the Court of Appeal.

83.  Also, as mentioned earlier, Dr Wong’s 1st Report had never been admitted, nor was Dr Stanley Lam’s report, and Dr Ip was only Father’s expert and there was a Joint Statement which was not referred to.  As pointed out on behalf of Mother, by admitting Dr Wong’s 2nd Report, it would mean all the unadmitted reports will be admitted “through the back door”.

84.  In any event, as Dr Wong’s opinions and/or conclusions drawn from some of the reports differed from those professionals and/or social workers who prepared them, and this may mean that the makers of the reports would have to be called to give evidence at the Trial, as well as Mother’s own expert, and this could seriously lengthen the Trial and/or even “derail” the Trial, which is only about 5 months away. 

85.  Even though 14 days have been set aside for the Trial, and at the time of fixing the dates on 19 March 2019, it was anticipated that there could be expert evidence as Father had filed the Expert Summons a few days before the dates for the Trial were fixed, the Father had not brought on his application expeditiously.  In Father’s 1st and 2nd affirmations filed in support of these wardship proceedings in April 2017, Father had already alleged alienation on the part of the Mother, going back to 2013.  There was no reason as to why he had to wait some two years before issuing the Expert Summons.  After issue, he should have applied for an urgent substantive hearing date as soon as practicable, and yet he did not do so at the hearing on 19 March 2019.  For some reasons, the substantive hearing of the Expert Summons was fixed some 8 to 9 months away.  Then, it was discovered that he had omitted to seek leave to send all the court documents to Dr Wong, and the 1st Hearing had to be adjourned for him to file the Retrospective Leave Summons.

86.  Anyway, any possibility that the Trial could be “lengthened”, and/or “derailed” is in my view not conducive to N’s best interests.

87.  It is not disputed that N is now suffering from Obsessive Compulsive Disorder.  She has been receiving treatment from a private psychiatrist Dr Joanna Lam, as well as from the YMT Child Service.  Her treating psychiatrist at the YMT Child Service is Dr Lily Ho and her treating psychologist is Dr Winnifred Mark, and pursuant to directions given by this Court on 21 June 2019, the doctors at the YMT Child Service have been given autonomy and flexibility to formulate their own treatment plan. Mr Jason Chan, on behalf of OS informed the Court that N attended a session with Dr Ho on 19 December 2019 (there were also 10 previous sessions conducted), but sessions were disrupted by the Covid-19 pandemic, and N resumed her session with Dr Ho on 7 April 2020, and Dr Ho reported N’s current condition to be “stable”.  As for Dr Mark, she first had a session with N on 2 December 2019, and thereafter there was the disruption caused by the Covid-19 pandemic.  Dr Mark subsequently met with Father face to face and had a telephone conversation with Mother and the next appointment for N was scheduled on 13 May 2020.  Dr Mark reported that judging from her first session with N on 2 December 2019, N appeared to be “willing to talk” and “positive”.  A joint conference at YMT Child Service has also been scheduled on 2 July 2020 between Dr Ho, Dr Mark, Ms Wong, various professionals/social workers, the parents, and the OS.

88.  Although this Court has raised the possibility of appointing a single joint expert, this was met with opposition from Father’s side.  It was submitted on behalf of Father that if Mother were to appoint her own expert, he would consider agreeing Mother’s expert to assess him but I understand that this would be on the basis that Mother would agree to Dr Wong assessing her.  However, Father seemed to have great reservation about any single joint expert assessing N.

89.  Mr Chan, acting for N, has in his submissions sounded out “a cautious observation in relation to the possible ripple effect or sidetracking effect the present exercise may have on the present course of treatment of N… and that parties should be guarded against any risk of disruption of the ongoing development in the treatment course”[61].

90.  During the 1st Hearing, I have raised a query with Mr Todd that whether any expert assistance will be helpful to the Court on the issue of parental alienation where the expert has not seen the child.  At the 2nd Hearing, Mr Shieh SC had referred this Court to the Court of Appeal decision in LYAG v YSG, HCMP 802/2016, 14 November 2016, which was on Mr Todd’s list of authorities for the 1st Hearing.  In that case, the Family Court Judge made directions for psychiatric evidence in relation to both parents without the psychiatrists being required to see the child.  The issue in that case was however whether the Father was fit to have unsupervised access, and as accepted by Mr Shieh, it was not a case on parental alienation. It is not clear how that case will assist Father. 

91.  Mr Shieh also referred to another case GCML v EJR FCMC 11629 of 2017, unrep, 7 March 2019, in which it was agreed that the single joint expert was to prepare a clinical psychological report on the parents, but subsequently, the mother wanted to expunge the report as she complained that the expert had made some findings of fact in his report and as a result became an “advocate” for the father.  Again, I do not see how that case is to assist Father.

92.  I do not query that there are circumstances where parents’ own mental, or indeed physical, fitness is raised as an issue, or where there are concerns about the psychological wellbeing of each of the parents, the Court may direct the parents to produce necessary evidence, where there is no objection thereto by the parents.  As I have mentioned during the 2nd Hearing, in the present case, the Father’s allegation is that there has been parental alienation and it was in this context that during the 1st Hearing, I said I had not come across a case when the expert did not even see the child concerned and I asked Father’s Counsel to provide relevant authorities on this issue[62]. No further authorities had been produced at the 2nd Hearing on parental alienation.

93.  I understand that there have been many such authorities in England which should assist the Court in the right approach in cases where parental alienation has been raised.  Lord Justice Peter Jackson of the UK Court of Appeal in a recent judgment in Re S (Parental Alienation: Cult) [2020] EWCA Civ 568 has said:

“… For working purposes, the CAFCASS definition of alienation is sufficient:

‘When a child’s resistance/hostility towards one parent is not justified and is the result of psychological manipulation by the other parent’

To that may be added that the manipulation of the child by the other parent need not be malicious or even deliberate.  It is the process that matters, not the motive’[63].”

94.  Lord Justice Jackson went on to say that :

“Where a process of alienation if found to exist, there is a spectrum of severity and the remedy will depend upon an assessment of all aspects of the child’s welfare, and not merely those that concern the relationship that may be under threat …[64]”

95.  As seen in the above case, the court below refused the father’s application for a psychological assessment of the child, but granted his application for a report to be provided by the independent social worker, who saw the child and each parent[65].

96.  As said earlier, some of the evidence relied on by Dr Wong in arriving at his opinions in relation to N’s well-being were based on evidence some 4 or 5 years ago, if not more, and in particular it was after Father made his 1st Variation Application, which he then withdrew on 8 March 2016.  The 1st, 2nd and 3rd Child Abuse Allegations were respectively on 9 March 2013, 31 May 2015 and 24 October 2015, which meant they were all prior to Father withdrawing his 1st Variation Application.  Then about a year after Fathers withdrawal of his 1st Variation Application, on 20 April 2017, he issued the present wardship proceedings and made another application for custody, care, control and access of N.  As I have indicated, the Father’s application for custody, care, control and access of N is in effect a 2nd variation, and the main issue should really be whether there had been any change in circumstances after his withdrawal of the 1st Variation Application.

97.  In any event, whether there has been any parental alienation, to the extent that there should be a transfer of custody, care and control to Father, is essentially a question which this Court has to decide at the Trial, during which the Court will conduct a fact finding exercise.  The well being of N is again a matter which this Court will decide at the Trial, bearing in mind N’s best interests.

98.  Having considered all the above and the circumstances of this case, and for all the reasons set out earlier, I do not find Dr Wong’s 2nd Report relevant, in that I do not find it helpful to this Court, and in fact, it will cause unnecessary delay and/or may derail the Trial, and in my view, this cannot be in the best interests of N.

Order

99.  In light of all said above, I dismiss the Expert Summons. 

100.  I order costs of and incidental to the two summonses be paid by Father, to be summarily assessed and to be paid by Father within 14 days of summary assessment.  Mother and Official Solicitor are to submit a statement of costs within 14 days, and Father his list of objections within 14 days thereafter.  This is an order nisi which shall be made final after 21 days.

(Bebe Pui Ying Chu)
Judge of the Court of First Instance
High Court

  

Mr Richard Todd and Ms Athena Wong, instructed by Chan & Chan, for the plaintiff on 3 December 2019

Mr Paul Shieh SC and Ms Athena Wong, instructed by Chan & Chan, for the plaintiff on 6 May 2020

Mr Kevin Li, instructed by Stevenson Wong & Co, for the defendant on 3 December 2019

Mr Karl Wong of Stevenson Wong & Co, for the defendant on 6 May 2020

Official Solicitor, for the ward excused on 3 December 2019

Mr Jason Chan of the Official Solicitor, for the ward on 6 May 2020


[1] CB: 198-202

[2] See CB:4

[3] At para 27, E: 554

[4] E:542-637

[5] At paras 40-41, E:561

[6] See para 5, CB:239-240

[7] CB:238-260

[8] See para 25, CB:247

[9] CB:222-230.

[10] See paras 3 and 4, CB:204

[11] See para 7, CB:10

[12] At para 5, CB:46

[13] Para 3, B:204

[14] At paras 27, 29

[15] At para 22, CB:14

[16] Paras 10-20 in 2nd Report, CB:11-14

[17] At para 115, CB:79

[18] Presumably Dr Wong referred to N’s oral hygiene problems although he did not make clear

[19] Paras 116-117, 2nd Report, CB:80

[20] Paras 81-115, Custody Judgment E:594-610

[21] Paras 82-83, CB:57-84

[22] In para 40, CB:35

[23] Para 75, CB:54

[24] See para 76, CB:55

[25] See para 43 CB:256

[26] See para 55, CB:42

[27] See para 25, E:532

[28] Appendix C, CB:109

[29] Appendix D, CB:110-112

[30] At para 110, CB:72

[31] A:80

[32] At para 119, A:80

[33] Dr Wong’s reference at para 56, CB 42, and Ms Kiu’s report at D:472

[34] Para 25, D:477

[35] At para 59, CB:45

[36] At D:487-488

[37] At para 62 of 2nd Report, CB:47

[38] D:489-498

[39] Para 71, CB:52

[40] See para 29, D:497

[41] D:499-505

[42] At para 6, D:500

[43] At para 90, CB:64

[44] D:506-511

[45] D:508-509

[46] D:512-518

[47] Para 7 D:516

[48] See para 7, D:507

[49] C:445

[50] Para 72, CB:53

[51] Para 61, CB:46

[52] D:489-498

[53] See para 9, D:491

[54] Para 9.7 D:486

[55] Sat D:488

[56] See para 8, D:508

[57] See para 121 A:81

[58] At para 125, CB:83

[59] A:85-93

[60] At para 152, A:98

[61] See para 13

[62] At CB: 291, M-T; CB:300, H-J; and CB:302, B-K

[63] At para 8

[64] At para 10

[65] At paras 37 and 39

[2019] HKCFI 2068-EN-2019-08-22

C v. S

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HCMP 929/2017

[2019] HKCFI 2068

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS NO 929 OF 2017>

________________________

 IN THE MATTER of N, female, a child born on the 20th day of November 2008 in Hong Kong
 and
 IN THE MATTER OF Section 26 of the High Court Ordinance (Cap. 4)
 and
 IN THE MATTER OF Order 90 rule 1 of the Rules of High Court (Cap. 4A)
 and
 IN THE MATTER OF Section 3 of the Guardianship of Minors Ordinance (Cap. 13)
 and
 IN THE MATTER OF the Inherent Jurisdiction of the High Court

________________________

BETWEEN

 CPlaintiff
 and 
 SDefendant

________________________

Before: Hon B Chu J in Chambers (Not Open to Public)
Date of Plaintiff’s Skeleton Argument: 5 July 2019
Date of Official Solicitor’s Written Submissions: 18 July 2019
Date of Defendant’s Written Submissions: 18 July 2019
Date of Plaintiff’s Reply Written Submissions: 5 August 2019
Date of Decision: 22 August 2019

________________________

D E C I S I O N
(On Leave to Appeal)

________________________

Introduction

1.  As said before, the detailed background of these wardship proceedings has been set out in the numerous published judgments of the Family Court, this Court and the Court of Appeal. 

2.  This Court handed down a decision on 21 June 2019 in respect of the summons taken out by the Official Solicitor on behalf of N on 7 May 2019 (“21.06.19 Decision”).  I will follow the previous definitions, unless otherwise indicated.

3.  For the reasons set out in the 21.06.19 Decision, I allowed the application by OS and ordered that the medical professionals at the YMT Child Service be authorized to formulate any treatment plan, interview sessions for N that may involve either or both parties.  The Court did not include any of the directions which the Father sought to impose at the time.

4.  The Father (plaintiff) now seeks leave to appeal against the order.  The leave application is directed to be dealt with on paper.

5.  Counsel Mr Richard Todd and Ms Jennifer Fan lodged their written submissions for the Father.  Counsel Mr Eric Leung lodged written submissions for OS and Messrs Stevenson Wong & Co lodged their written submissions for the Mother. 

Father’s draft grounds of appeal 

6.  There are altogether 6 grounds of appeal (“Grounds”). Briefly, this Court was wrong in :

1)  Refusing to consider the Father’s directions;

2)  Condemning the Father for being unavailable for the hearing on 29 May 2019;

3)  Holding that Father did not consent to OS’s summons;

4)  Condemning Father for wanting to meet the OS and Dr Ho;

5)  Criticising the Father for asking for 4 directions which would cause delay;

6)  Holding that the usual order in a child welfare matter was that costs should follow the event.

Ground (1)

7.  As pointed out by Mr Leung on behalf of the OS, this Court did consider those additional directions proposed by Father, including the need for the medical professionals to involve “either parent” or “both the parents” in interview with N should the medical professional need to do so and this can be seen in paragraphs 38 and 40 of the 21.06.19 Decision.

8.  Further, as submitted by Mr Leung, the Father’s proposed additional directions were unnecessarily onerous not only on the parties but also on the treating medical professional who should have the autonomy to formulate the treatment plan for his/her patient as deemed fit.  As I have said, I do not see “at this stage” how those directions would assist the treating doctor who should have a free hand.

9.  As further submitted on behalf of Mother, this Court was aware of the proposed directions and the then objections from OS and the Mother.  It was after considering the submissions from all that this Court made the order. 

10.  There is nothing to stop Father, or indeed Mother, to issue a summons to seek further directions in relation to the treatment plan for N, if such need should arise in future.  

11.  I am of the view that Father had not made out Ground (1).

Ground (2)  

12.  “Condemn” is a strong word.  It would appear that Father and his two Counsel Mr Todd and Ms Fan had completely misunderstood the observation made by this Court in paragraph 29.  So far as this Court is aware, there is no requirement imposed by this Court that Father has to attend personally any hearing before the Court so long as his legal representatives appear on his behalf.  There was no reason for this Court to “condemn” him if he were to be absent at the hearing.  The observation made by this Court in paragraph 29 was made only because the Father was trying to use his inability to attend (as alleged by him) to try to seek an adjournment and to seek a further 28 days to file an affirmation in reply and to seek a 2 hour hearing, and those directions sought by Father would no doubt substantially delay the substantive hearing of a matter which his own Counsel had described as relatively simple.  Father himself had accepted way back in December 2017, namely 18 months ago that N needed urgent treatment.  There was obvious urgency for the treating doctor to formulate a treatment plan and any delay would not have been in the best interests of N.

13.  I find there was no prospect of success on Ground (2).

Ground (3) 

14.  When OS sent his summons before issuing the same to the Father by letter dated 30 April 2019, no consent was given by Father. When Mother wrote to Father on 29 May 2019, inviting him to give his consent with the issue on costs to be dealt with separately, no consent was given by Father. 

15.  In my view, consent subject to Father’s proposed directions/conditions of improvement means no consent.  As submitted on behalf of Mother, the suggestion that Father consented to OS’s summons but with strings attached is the same as Father consenting to it defies common sense. It is not clear on what basis Father’s Counsel had put forward this submission.

16.  I find Ground (3) has not been made out.

Ground (4)

17.  Again, Father and his Counsel seemed to have misunderstood what this Court had said.  This Court did not “condemn” Father for wanting to meet the OS and Dr Ho.  What this Court had observed in paragraph 15 of the 21.06.19 Decision was that Father did not consent to OS’s suggestion and instead requested that the OS and Dr Ho to see him individually first, namely Father was imposing conditions before he was willing to consent to OS’s suggestion.

18.  OS represented N, and Father had his own solicitors representing him.  OS had made his position clear and as set out in paragraph 19 of the 21.06.19 Decision that as Father was legally represented, OS failed to see why the Father insisted on seeing OS direct.

19.  It is not clear why Father’s Counsel would submit that OS’s position was “bizarre”.  Even though OS was actively involved with the Father including attending mediation sessions with him and the Mother, this would not mean that OS would find it appropriate to see Father direct without his solicitors.  Further, so far as this Court is aware, Father did not follow up on the matter or to explain to OS why he had wanted to see OS direct without his solicitors or to make an application to see OS direct. 

20.  I do not find this Ground has been made out.

Ground (5)

21.  It now appears Father’s Counsel is submitting that any delay was de minimis in any event.  It is further submitted on behalf of Father that the delay was caused by Mother’s failure to agree to 4 reasonable directions.

22.  Suffice to say, as mentioned earlier, Father had accepted in December 2017 that N needed urgent psychiatric treatment.  As pointed out on behalf of the Mother, it was Father’s decision to withhold consent to OS’s summons until the proposed directions were agreed which had caused delay.

23.  Again, I do not find this Ground made out.

Ground (6)  

24.  Costs are in the discretion of this Court. As stated in paragraph 43 of the 21.06.19 Decision, I have taken into account the letters from Father’s solicitors which indicated Father’s stance was to, say the least, un-cooperative and not conducive to an early resolution of the matter and it was under those circumstances, namely the Father’s conduct in this litigation, that I said I saw no reason why costs should not follow the event.  The Father had not been able to demonstrate why this Court was “plainly wrong”.

Conclusion  

25.  Having considered the Father’s intended grounds of appeal, I am not satisfied that the appeal has any reasonable prospect of success or there is any other reason in the interests of justice why the appeal should be heard.

26.  In the above circumstances, I decline to grant leave, and dismiss the Father’s summons issued on 5 July 2019.

27.  I further order the Father to pay the costs of the Official Solicitor and the costs of the Mother of and incidental to this leave application.  Such costs are to be summarily assessed and to be paid within 7 days of summary assessment.  The Official Solicitor and the Mother are to lodge their respective statement of costs within 7 days and the Father to lodge any list of objections within 7 days thereafter.

 (Bebe Pui Ying Chu)
 Judge of the Court of First Instance
 High Court

Mr Richard Todd and Ms Jennifer Fan, instructed by Chan & Chan, for the plaintiff

Messrs Stevenson Wong & Co, for the defendant

Mr Eric Leung instructed by the Official Solicitor, for the ward

[2019] HKCFI 1592-EN-2019-06-21

C v. S

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HCMP 929/2017

[2019] HKCFI 1592

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS NO 929 OF 2017

_______________________

 IN THE MATTER of N, female, a child born on the 20th day of November 2008 in Hong Kong
 and
 IN THE MATTER OF Section 26 of the High Court Ordinance (Cap. 4)
 and
 IN THE MATTER OF Order 90 rule 1 of the Rules of High Court (Cap. 4A)
 and
 IN THE MATTER OF Section 3 of the Guardianship of Minors Ordinance (Cap. 13)
 and
 IN THE MATTER OF the Inherent Jurisdiction of the High Court

_______________________

BETWEEN  
 CPlaintiff
 and 
 SDefendant

______________________

Before: Hon B Chu J in Chambers (Not Open to Public)
Date of Hearing: 29 May 2019
Date of Official Solicitor’s Supplemental Written Submissions: 17 June 2019
Date of Plaintiff’s Further Written Submission: 18 June 2019
Date of Defendant’s Further Written Submissions: 18 June 2019
Date of Decision: 21 June 2019

__________________________________

D E C I S I O N
(On Directions to Medical Professionals)

__________________________________

Introduction

1.  The detailed background of these wardship proceedings has been set out therein and in the numerous published judgments of the Family Court and the Court of Appeal in relation to the ward N.  I shall not repeat the same.

2.  The present summons was taken out by the Official Solicitor (“OS”) on behalf of N on 7 May 2019 (“Summons”). In brief, the OS seeks an order that all medical professionals of the Yaumatei Child and Adolescent Mental Services (“YMT Child Service”) be authorized to formulate any treatment plan, interview sessions for N that may involve either or both parties.

3.  The Summons was fixed for a 30 minutes hearing on 29 May 2019.  Unfortunately, the matter could not be agreed.  This Court then gave further directions, as the Father sought time to file evidence, and that after further evidence and submissions from parties, the matter be dealt with on paper.

Background leading to the Summons

4.  On 20 June 2018, this Court made an order (“Order”) for N to receive treatment or service at the YMT Child Service as well as continuing to receive treatment from a private psychiatrist Dr Joanna Lam, and amongst other things, N is to be accompanied by her parents jointly to YMT Child Service but neither parent is to be present at the time of treatment (“Paragraph 3”).

5.  Since Mr Li Chi Keung Ben became the handler of this case for the OS, he had had various telephone contacts with some of the medical professionals and Dr Lily Ho Nga Lei (“Dr Ho”) who is currently the treating psychiatrist of N at the YMT Child Service.

6.  In Mr Li’s affirmation in support of the Summons, he explained that he had a telephone conversation and discussion with Dr Ho on 1 March 2019 during which Dr Ho opined that she would like to have a free hand in treating N and that it is usual for her to design treatment programme that may involve either/both parents.  She expressed concern that her so doing might breach paragraph 3 of the Order.

7.  It was as a result of Dr Ho’s concern that Mr Li had tried to discuss with the parties to try and ease their tension over N’s consultation and he had earlier prepared a consent form respectively for the Father and the Mother to sign, which was then duly signed by N’s parents (“Consent Form”).

8.  N’s follow up medical consultation at the YMT Child Service went smoothly on 28 March 2019.  Mr Li said Dr Ho had repeatedly raised with him again the matter that she needs to treat N in the way that she professionally considers most appropriate and this may include holding individual interview sessions with a combination with different parties, such as N with the Mother, N with the Father and N with both parents.  Dr Ho was concerned over the wording of Paragraph 3 of the Order which may not allow her to formulate a programme that will contain holding interview sessions with different parties.

9.  It was in light of the above concerns of Dr Ho that Mr Li then wrote to the parties on 29 March 2019 inviting them to give their respective consent to allow Dr Ho, or any medical professionals at the YMT Child Service to have the authority to treat, interview, assess N in any way professionally considered appropriate.

10.  The Mother duly signed her consent on 4 April 2019.

11.  However, the Father claimed that given the importance of the matter, he needed 14 days to reply.

12.  As the next follow up treatment was on 14 May 2019, there was some time, and Mr Li agreed to give the Father the time requested, instead of making an immediate application to the Court.

13.  It was only on the last day of the 14 day deadline, namely on 15 April 2019, that the Father’s solicitors wrote. Suffice to say at his stage, I do not understand why the Father would need 14 days to consider the matter.

14.  First of all, in the letter, the Father requested that OS and Dr Ho to see him individually allowing him to present the facts to them and to have the open exchanges with both the OS and any medical professionals such as Dr Ho before OS making an application to the Court.  As I understand it, the Father’s reasons were:

(i)  N is more likely affected by stress, pressure, anxiety, the deep worries of needs of taking side and repeated alienation harm happening to her, and that the Father would like to facilitate the treating doctors with the full picture and treat N with his/her professional knowledge;

(ii)  The Father claimed that despite signing the Consent Form, he still could not talk to Dr Ho individually and that the Mother had obstructed Dr Ho to talk to him without her presence, even in the presence of the OS;

(iii)  The Father says it is his role to protect N and that parents have the responsibilities to safe-guard and protect the medical wellbeing of their children and that he cannot neglect his duty in monitoring the medical wellbeing for N;

(iv)  The Father does not agree to uplift the restrictions in Paragraph 3 of the Orderand that the Consent Form stated clearly that the treating doctor could talk to either parent when exercising his/her professional knowledge[1].

15.  In short, the Father did not agree to the OS’s suggestion and instead requested that the OS and Dr Ho to see him individually first.

16.  Mr Li said he then tried to contact the Father’s handling solicitors regarding their letter of 15 April 2019 but failed.  

17.  This led to OS writing to the Father’s solicitors on 24 April 2019 to explain and clarify that that the Consent Form only addressed the cooperation that the parties would render at the request/directions of any medical professionals.  What Dr Ho wants is she be authorised to design such programme to treat N.

18.  The Father’s solicitors then replied that the Father will support Dr Ho’s refined treatment plan for N after he has the chance to talk to Dr Ho and the OS soonest[2].

19.  On 25 April 2019, Mr Li wrote to highlight the point that it was Dr Ho who raised the request for having the autonomy to treat N, and that does not mean that she must first see the Father before she can medically formulate anything and that there should not be a prerequisite set for the treating doctor.  Further, as the Father was legally represented and OS failed to see why the Father insisted on seeing OS direct.

20.  The Father claimed that Dr Ho had requested to communicate with him and that this was obstructed by the Mother, and appeared to still want to communicate with the OS direct.  Although the Father then seemed to say that he was not aiming at setting a pre-requisite for Dr Ho, there was no indication from his solicitors’ letter of 26 April 2019 that the Father was consenting to OS’s proposal.

21.  On 30 April 2019, OS sent the draft summons with the proposed amendments to the Order for the Father’s consideration.  There being no agreement from the Father, OS then issued the summons on 7 May 2019.

22.  Thereafter, suddenly on 23 May 2019, the Father’s solicitors wrote to say that the Father was just notified by the Queen Mary Hospital that he had to attend two full day medical examination appointments on both 22 May 2019 and 29 May 2019 and sought an adjournment of the summons for a substantive hearing for the summons on a date to be fixed with 2 hours reserved and sought, amongst other things, 28 days to file an affirmation in reply to OS’s affirmation.

23.  Naturally, the OS did not consent to any adjournment for substantive argument for 2 hours or the time table proposed by the Father.

24.  Then, on 25 May 2019, the Father’s solicitors suddenly sent a letter claiming that there was a misunderstanding and that it was not the Father’s stance that the treating doctor must talk to him before formulating any treatment plan, but the Father then sought to add further terms to the OS’s proposed order.

25.  This was followed by another letter sent by the Father’s solicitors the day before the hearing, with a proposed consent summons containing the direction sought by the OS and 4 additional directions[3].

26.  OS objected to 2 out of those 4 directions, and the Mother objected to all 4 of them.

27.  Due to the lack of consent coming from the Father to the terms sought by OS in the Summons prior to 15 May 2019, it was most unfortunate that the original follow up consultation for N at the YMT Child Service had to be postponed from 15 May 2019 to 4 July 2019.

Discussion 

28.  First of all, there was no evidence at all from the Father as to when he made those “medical appointment” at the Queen Mary Hospital, which I understand were usually made by telephone, nor was there any evidence as to when he was notified of those “medical appointments”. I note from the “Scan Appointment Notice” sent from Queen Mary Hospital to the Father that those appointments were for a scan/ “Myocardial Perfusion” and there was no reason given by the Father as to why the dates could not be moved.  Further, the Notice seemed to indicate that the appointments were made on 7 May 2019[4], the date of the issue of the Summons.  Further, there was also no reason why the Father would require 28 days to file any affirmation in reply or a 2 hours hearing.

29.  Secondly, there was clearly no consent from the Father to the amendments proposed by OS, and those letters from the Father’s solicitors gave this Court an impression that he was first trying to place unnecessary reservations on OS’s proposal and then he was trying to delay the matter. In short, the impression I got was that the Father was being, to say the least, uncooperative, making no positive suggestions until the last minute, apart from saying he wanted to see Dr Ho and the OS direct.

30.  There was no justification from the Father’s legal representatives as to why there needed to be a two hours substantive argument on the matter or that the Father needed 28 days from 23 May 2019 to file an affirmation.

31.  The Father’s own counsel, Ms Crystal Lai, had in her submissions said that it was a relatively simple matter made unnecessarily complicated.  

32.  I have to say it was made unnecessarily complicated only by the Father.

33.  Ms Lai in her “Speaking Note” for the hearing on 29 May 2019 had said that the Father’s stance of him needing to see and meet Dr Ho and the OS before he would consent to the summons was so that before Dr Ho proceeds to formulate a medical plan for N, it would be in the best interests of N for Dr Ho to be updated and informed by the Father (and possibly the Mother, if she wishes) on N’s needs and well-being.  It was submitted on behalf of the Father that his stance should be uncontroversial and that it was surprising that both OS and the Mother were not willing to consent to the Father’s course of action.

34.  First of all, neither the words in the brackets above, nor the Father’s reasons, were ever made clear to the Mother or the OS. It was never made clear to the Mother or the OS that the Father was suggesting both of them could go to see Dr Ho before Dr Ho proceeds to formulate her medical plan.  What was clear from those letters was that the Father, as he had said, he would support Dr Ho’s refined treatment plan for Nafter he had had the chance to talk to Dr Ho and the OS[5].  This was the Father’s stance prior to the issue of the Summons.    

35.  In any event, if any update is required, in light of the history of this matter, I am of the view that it is in the best interests of N for such update to be provided by the OS to the treating doctor, and not from the Father or the Mother individually. 

36.  There was no submission from Ms Lai in her Speaking Note as to what reasons the Father had for wanting to see the OS direct before consenting to the Summons. 

37.  In her subsequent written submissions, Ms Lai submitted that as Dr Ho is treating N’s psychiatric problems and OS is representing N, it accords with common sense that the Father, in discharge of his parental obligations and responsibilities should remain in effective and close communications with these parties and that it should not cause any concern to anyone that there be an effective channel of communications between the Father and Dr Ho.  It was further the Father’s evidence that Dr Ho had requested to talk to him without interruptions and obstructions of the Mother many times and that Dr Ho had requested that the Mother be absent for Dr Ho to conduct a private individual session with him on 28 March 2019.

38.  Indeed, if as the Father’s evidence was that Dr Ho had requested to talk to him in the absence of the Mother, then I see no reason at all why the Father cannot simply leave the matter with Dr Ho and let her have a free hand as she is the professionally qualified person and not the Father.  Instead of making the matter simple, he then proposed to include 4 further directions, which then cause further delay in the matter.

39.  In any event, if the Father was prepared to consent to the OS’s proposed amendments, he should have simply made his stance clear at the outright.  As pointed out by Mr Li, if the Father wanted further directions and such could not be agreed, there was nothing to stop the Father issuing his own summons.   

40.  At this stage, I do not see how any of those directions sought by the Father would assist Dr Ho or any treating doctor at the YMT Child Service in formulating a treatment plan for N.  The treating doctor at the YMT Child Service, whether Dr Ho or not, should be allowed to formulate his/her own treatment plan for a patient. 

41.  As submitted on behalf of the Mother, the Father’s case put to the highest, and even if all those allegations made by him were true, this had nothing to do with the Summons which was about Dr Ho and her treatment plan for N.

Conclusion 

42.  In light of the above, I find it is in the best interest of N for an order to be made in terms of paragraph (1) of the Summons.  I am not prepared to order any other directions as sought by the Father.

43.  I see no reason why costs of the Summons should not follow the event.  As I have said earlier, those letters from the Father’s solicitors indicated his stance was to say in the least, un-cooperative and not conductive to an early resolution of this matter. 

44.  Costs are to be summarily assessed and paid within 14 days from the date of assessment.   OS and the Mother to submit their statements of costs within 7 days, and the Father to submit his list of objections within 7 days thereafter. 

 
 

  (Bebe Pui Ying Chu)
 Judge of the Court of First Instance
 High Court

  

Ms Crystal Lai, instructed by Chan & Chan, for the plaintiff

Mr Karl Wong of Stevenson Wong & Co, for the defendant

Mr Li Chi Keung Ben of the Official Solicitor, for the ward



[1] B:29

[2] B:32-33

[3] B:67-69

[4] B:54

[5] See 1st sentence, B:32

[2018] HKCFI 2106-EN-2018-09-19

C v. S

HTML content

HCMP 929/2017

[2018] HKCFI 2106

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS NO 929 OF 2017

_______________________

 IN THE MATTER of N, female, a child born on the 20th day of November 2008 in Hong Kong
 and
 IN THE MATTER OF Section 26 of the High Court Ordinance (Cap. 4)
 and
 IN THE MATTER OF Order 90 rule 1 of the Rules of High Court (Cap. 4A)
 and
 IN THE MATTER OF Section 3 of the Guardianship of Minors Ordinance (Cap. 13)
 and
 IN THE MATTER OF the Inherent Jurisdiction of the High Court

_______________________

BETWEEN  
 CPlaintiff
 and 
 SDefendant

_______________________

Before:  Hon B Chu J in Chambers (Not Open to Public)

Date of Hearing:  12 September 2018

Date of Decision:  19 September 2018

__________________

D E C I S I O N

(Leave to Appeal)

__________________

Introduction

1.  On 20 June 2018, this Court handed down a decision (“20.06.18 Decision”), granting (a) leave for N to receive treatment or service at the YMT Child Service as directed by Mr Lam Ho Ming Alex, N’s clinical psychologist at the Social Welfare Department, as well as continuing to receive treatment from her private psychiatrist Dr Joanna Lam (“Treatment Order”), and (b) no order as to costs (“Costs Order”).

2.  The Father now seeks leave to appeal against the above orders.

3.  The detailed background of these wardship proceedings has been set out in the numerous published judgments and will not be repeated here.  The circumstances leading to the 20.06.18 Decision have also been set out therein.

4.  The Official Solicitor has been appointed to separately represent N since about 1 March 2018.  Previously, Ms Juliana Chan of the Official Solicitor’s office acted for N, and Mr Ben Li has now replaced Ms Chan.

5.  In his intended appeal, what the Father is essentially seeking is an order to set aside the Treatment Order and the Costs Order and for N to receive treatment or service at the YMT Child Service only upon an appointment being secured there, and for costs of the appeal and below be to him.

The Father’s draft grounds of appeal

6.  To summarise, the Father’s draft grounds of appeal are, amongst other things, that :

(1) This Court erred in expressing that she did not see either parents’ attitude as being in the best interests of N;

(2) This Court erred in having proceeded on wrong assumptions and on the wrong basis that N’s condition had improved;

(3) This Court erred in ordering simultaneous treatment when, amongst other things, no party had suggested simultaneous treatment and the Court had misunderstood the Official Solicitor’s submission;

(4) This Court erred in making the Costs Order which was plainly wrong.

Ground (1)

7.  The Father’s complaint under this ground was that it was only the Mother’s behaviour which had not been in the best interests of N and that he had acted wholly in the best interests of N.

8.  The arrangement for N to see a psychiatrist arose at a hearing before this Court on 18 December 2017.  As stated in the 20.06.18 Decision, N’s clinical psychologist Mr Lam has been treating N since 2011.  On 12 December 2017, Mr Lam referred N to the YMT Child Service for N to receive psychiatric assessment and professional intervention as a result of certain statements N had made to the Mother, including that she had “visual images of stabbing her mother to death and ideation of killing her maternal grandparents, God and Buddha”.  The Mother said that N’s symptoms started in November 2017 but she did not immediately tell the Father until after the 1st Referral Letter was issued by Mr Lam, and without informing the Father and without obtaining leave of this Court (as N is a ward of this Court), the Mother took the Child to see a private psychiatrist Dr Li Seung Yau on 16 December 2017.  All this was only disclosed to the Father and to the Court at the hearing on 18 December 2017. 

9.  As a result, this Court was of the view that N should receive urgent psychiatric treatment from a private psychiatrist, as an appointment with a Government psychiatrist would take time, and this was agreed by the Father.  However, the parties were not even able to agree to which private psychiatrist N should consult.  The failure of either party to compromise on the appointment of the private psychiatrist led to further delay in N receiving treatment.  On 3 January 2018, the Court directed that Dr Joanna Lam be appointed (“03.01.18 Direction”).  The Father’s solicitors then wrote a letter to ask the Court to review the appointment.  This Court declined to do so.  All this again caused further delay and eventually an appointment was made for N to see Dr Joanna Lam on about 2 February 2018.  4 days after this 1st session with Dr Lam, the Father took out a summons for the Mother to make an appointment with the YMT Child Service for N to see a Government psychiatrist.  This then led to the 20.06.18 Decision.

10.  It was clear that the Father was not happy with this Court appointing Dr Joanna Lam instead of one of the two psychiatrists proposed by him.  Although in his summons, he did not specifically seek an order that Dr Lam be replaced, his supporting affirmation indicated that he regarded the engagement of the private psychiatrist was in the interim pending the service at YMT Child Service and further his supporting affirmation contained various criticisms of Dr Lam.  However, instead of seeking leave to appeal against the 03.01.18 Direction, the Father chose to issue his summons essentially for an appointment to be made for N at YMT Child Service, but it was clear from his affirmation that upon an appointment being made with the YMT Child Service and N started receiving service there, then N should cease seeing Dr Lam.  The Mother opposed the summons.

11.  As I have said in paragraph 21 of the 20.06.18 Decision, as in the past, the Father and the Mother both launched criticisms and attacks against each other in their respective affirmations.

12.  Suffice to say, the above were all part of the reasons why I found both parents’ attitude as not being in the best interests of N.

Ground (2)

13.  The Father maintained that the treatment by Dr Lam was only “in the interim”.  As pointed out by the Mother’s Counsel, Mr Kevin Li, this was not the effect of 03.01.18 Direction.  It was not this Court’s intention that Dr Lam’s services were to cease upon an appointment being made for N with the YMT Child Service.  Under the 03.01.18 Direction, this Court had directed that, if the parties agreed, referral also be made to YMT Child Service and if no agreement between them, the parties were to issue proper application.

14.  The Social Welfare Officer has in her report of 6 March 2018 observed that N’s obsessive behaviour had been reduced though she became a bit quiet and tired after the medication from Dr Lam, and stated that N’s mental condition was stable under medication.  At the present hearing, it appears that the Father is now challenging this observation by the Social Welfare Officer.  However, whether N’s condition had in fact improved after receiving treatment from Dr Lam or not, in paragraph 26 of the 20.06.18 Decision, this Court has stated that there is a real possibility that N would require psychiatric treatment from time to time so long as her parental disputes continue to put her in stressful position.

15.  The Father seemed to rely on a letter from the Mother’s solicitors to the Court dated 14 March 2018 to say that N was not just having suspected “obsessive and compulsive disorder” but also “psychosomatic disorder” and alleged that this was “contrary evidence of deterioration” from St Teresa Hospital.  I do not see any medical evidence of deterioration from the said letter of 14 March 2018 from the Mother’s solicitors.

Ground (3) 

16.  As submitted by Mr Ben Li for the Official Solicitor, this Court was entitled to take a holistic view of the case.  The Court, in exercising the wardship jurisdiction, which is a parens patriae jurisdiction, is not bound by the parties’ submissions.  The Court may in exercising its inherent jurisdiction make any order or determine any issue in respect of a ward unless limited by case law or statute, and in doing so, the Court shall regard the best interests of the ward as the first and paramount consideration.

17.  The Court was informed at the present hearing that after the handing down of the 20.06.18 Decision, the Father had made an appointment with YMT Child Service and the first appointment initials given was 14 February 2020, but the appointment was later moved forward to 5 October 2018 due to urgency. Even so, it would appear to take some 3 months to secure an urgent appointment with the YMT Child Service.  It is not clear at the moment, which Government psychiatrist and indeed whether it will be a designated psychiatrist who will be treating N, and further it is not clear whether N will be given any follow up appointment and if so, when that is going to be.

18.  As submitted by Mr Kevin Li, and seen in paragraphs 26-28, the approach this Court took in the 20.06.18 Decision was a pragmatic one which, in this Court’s view, was/is in the best interests of N.

Ground (4)

19.  Costs are in the sole discretion of this Court, and the usual order in children cases is no order as to costs unless one party is guilty of unreasonable conduct.  Although I found that the Mother was unreasonably inflexible and notwithstanding the order of 2 March 2018, there was no appointment made by the YMT Child Service by the Mother.  However, as said earlier, I do not see either parent’s attitude being in the best interests of N, and in the end, neither parent had succeeded in obtaining the order he/she sought. 

20.  Mr Ben Li has also highlighted the statutory provisions in the Legal Aid Ordinance Cap 91, namely s16C and s17(3).  There was no finding by this Court that the Mother had acted improperly in defending the Father’s summons by not agreeing to Dr Lam being replaced.

Conclusion

21.  Having considered the Father’s intended grounds of appeal, I am not satisfied that the appeal has a reasonable prospect of success or there is any other reason in the interests of justice why the appeal should be heard.

22.  In the above circumstances, I decline to grant leave, and dismiss the Father’s summons issued on 4 July 2018.

23.  I further order the Father to pay the costs of the Official Solicitor and the Mother’s costs of this leave application.  Such costs are to be summarily assessed and to be paid within 7 days of summary assessment.  The Official Solicitor and the Mother are to lodge their respective statement of costs within 7 days and the Father to lodge any list of objections within 7 days thereafter.

 (Bebe Pui Ying Chu)
 Judge of the Court of First Instance
 High Court

Mr Russell Coleman SC, instructed by Chan & Chan, for the plaintiff

Mr Kelvin Li, instructed by Stevenson Wong & Co, for the defendant

Mr Lee Chi Keung Ben of the Official Solicitor, for the ward

[2018] HKCFI 1381-EN-2018-06-20

C v. S

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HCMP 929/2017

[2018] HKCFI 1381

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS NO 929 OF 2017

_______________________

  IN THE MATTER of N, female, a child born on the 20th day of November 2008 in Hong Kong
  and
  IN THE MATTER OF Section 26 of the High Court Ordinance (Cap. 4)
  and
  IN THE MATTER OF Order 90 rule 1 of the Rules of High Court (Cap. 4A)
  and
  IN THE MATTER OF Section 3 of the Guardianship of Minors Ordinance (Cap. 13)
  and
  IN THE MATTER OF the Inherent Jurisdiction of the High Court

______________________

BETWEEN
 CPlaintiff
 and
 SDefendant

______________________

Before: Hon B Chu J in Chambers (Not Open to Public)
Date of Plaintiff’s Written Submissions: 9 May 2018
Date of Defendant’s Written Submissions: 23 May 2018
Date of Plaintiff’s Reply Written Submissions: 30 May 2018
Date of Official Solicitor’s Written Submissions: 7 June 2018
Date of Decision: 20 June 2018

____________________________________

D E C I S I O N
(On Replacement of Treating Psychiatrist)

____________________________________

Introduction

1.  The detailed background of these wardship proceedings has been set out in the numerous published judgments and will not be repeated here.

2.  The plaintiff and the defendant are respectively the Father and the Mother of N who is now 9 years old.  N’s parents have been litigating since March 2010 when N was less than two years old.  On 5 October 2012, the Mother was granted sole custody, care and control of N with access to the Father.  Since then, there had been a number of applications in relation to issues over access.  In the meantime, there was also the Mother’s financial applications.

3.  On 5 June 2015, the Family Judge ordered, amongst other things, the Father’s property “One Silver Sea” at Tai Kok Tsui be settled on trust for the use of N and the Mother until N reaches 18 years of age or ceases full time education, whichever is the later.  Although the Mother was given the keys to the property since April 2017 there was an issue over renovation expenses.  Anyway, according to the Social Welfare Report dated 8 February 2018, N and the Mother have been living in One Silver Sea since 31 January 2018.  Prior to moving in, they were living in Tsueng Kwan O.

4.  In the meantime, the Father issued these wardship proceedings in April 2017 and on 12 October 2017, the Father was granted all the rights and authority that the law allows him under s 3(1)(d) of the Guardianship of Minors Ordinance.

5.  The Official Solicitor has been appointed to separately represent N since about 1 March 2018.

6.  At present, the outstanding applications pending trial in these wardship proceedings are (i) the Father’s Custody Application with the related issue over access, and also (ii) the Mother’s application for N to be de-warded.

7.  The present summons was issued by the Father on 6 February 2018 for N to receive psychiatric service at the Yaumatei Child and Adolescent Mental Health Service (“YMT Child Service”) as per the referral letter dated 12 December 2017 by N’s clinical psychologist Mr Lam Ho Ming, Alex (“Mr Lam”) of the Social Welfare Department.

8.  Mr Lam has been treating N since 2011.  On 12 December 2017, Mr Lam issued the letter of referral (“1stReferral Letter”) to the consultant of YMT Child Service for N to receive psychiatric assessment and professional intervention, as N had told the Mother that she had “visual images of stabbing her mother to death and ideation of killing her maternal grandparents, God and Buddha”.

9.  The Mother had then said that N’s symptoms started in November 2017 but she did not tell the Father until after the 1st Referral Letter was issued, and further without informing the Father and without obtaining leave of this Court (as N is a ward of this Court), the Mother took the Child to see a private psychiatrist Dr Li Seung Yau on 16 December 2017.  All this was only disclosed to the Father and to the Court at a hearing on 18 December 2017. 

10.  As a result of what was informed to the Court at the hearing on 18 December 2017, this Court was of the view that N should receive urgent psychiatric treatment from a private psychiatrist as soon as possible, as an appointment with a Government psychiatrist at the YMT Child Service could take time.  The parties were not able to agree to which private psychiatrist.  Thus, on that day, this Court ordered, amongst other things, that

“Unless agreed, parties to submit two names of private psychiatrists to the Court with their full CVs and the Court will decide on who should be the treating psychiatrist for the Ward. Costs of the psychiatrist should be paid by the Plaintiff in the interim and the treatment is to start as soon as possible.”

11.  Eventually, on 3 January 2018, this Court directed, amongst other things, that Dr Joanna Lam be appointed as the treating psychiatrist for N. 

12.  There was a further hiccup when the Father was not happy with this Court appointing Dr Joanna Lam, but eventually, as directed by this Court, a joint letter of instructions was finally sent to Dr Joanna Lam on 30 January 2018, and the 1st session took place on 2 February 2018.

13.  After this Court’s order of 18 December 2017, in a letter dated 22 December 2017, the Father had made it clear that notwithstanding the appointment of the private psychiatrist, should public treatment later become available at the YMT Child Service, this could be chosen at that time.  However, the Mother replied on 6 January 2018 that the YMT Child Service was no longer in service.

14.  As it turned out this was not correct, the YMT Child Service had only been relocated to another address.

15.  The Father found out the new location of the YMT Child Service prior to the joint letter of instructions was sent to Dr Joanna Lam and urged the Mother to make an appointment the earliest.  The Mother replied to say that as N was about to start receiving treatment from Dr Lam soon, it might be premature to arrange for N to receive further treatment from YMT Child Service.

16.  As pointed out by Ms Juliana Chan on behalf of the Official Solicitor, on 3 January 2018, this Court had also directed that, if the parties agreed, referral also be made to YMT Child Service and if no agreement between them, the parties to issue proper application.

17.  It was under the above circumstances that the Father then issued his present summons on 6 February 2018 to replace Dr Joanna Lam with the YMT Centre.

18.  At the direction hearing on 2 March 2018, the Court gave directions for filing of affirmations and written submissions, and further directed the Mother to make an appointment with YMT Child Service without prejudict to her position, as follows:

“Without prejudice to the Defendant’s position on the Plaintiff’s Summons the Defendant to make an appointment with YMT Child Service at Queen Elizabeth Hospital on or before 7 March 2018 for the first available appointment after 1 June 2018. The Defendant to inform the Plaintiff and the Official Solicitor the date of appointment within 3 days from the date of receiving notification of the appointment.”

19.  After the above order, the Mother left it until the last day 7 March before trying to make an appointment and then claimed that she was unable to make one as she did not have the address proof of One Silver Sea.  Then, the 3 month validity period of the Referral Letter lapsed, and much difference arose between the parents before a fresh referral letter dated 10 May 2018 was finally obtained from Mr Lam on 14 May 2018 (“2nd Referral Letter”).  According to the Father, the 2nd Referral Letter was only received by his solicitors on 16 May 2018, and that he was awaiting N’s original ID card to make the appointment.  In the meantime, the Father’s father/N’s paternal grandfather sadly passed away on 21 May 2018. 

20.  Anyway, it would appear that up until now no appointment has yet been made for N at YMT Child Service by the Mother, notwithstanding the order of 2 March 2018.

Discussion

21.  The Father and the Mother, as they have been in the past, launched criticisms and attacks against each other in their respective affirmations.  The Father had also criticized Dr Joanna Lam’s professionalism which, in my view, was completely uncalled for. 

22.  On the other hand, the Mother had not explained why she could not produce any address proof for the making of the appointment as ordered by this Court on 2 March 2018, or why there had been no further steps taken by her to secure an appointment.  I agree with Ms Chan’ s observations on this matter.  In my view, the Mother has been unreasonably inflexible.

23.  The reason why this Court ordered N to see a private psychiatrist in December last year was because an appointment with the YMT Child Service would take time, as with most Government doctors, and the Court was of the view that N should receive urgent treatment.  The Court did not exclude the possibility that N should also receive treatment from a Government Psychiatrist, as seen in the direction made on 3 January 2018.

24.  Having read the parents’ respective affirmations, I do not see sufficient evidence as to why N cannot see both a private psychiatrist and a Government psychiatrist at the YMY Child Service, or why it should be either one or the other.

25.  I do not see the parents’ attitude is in the best interests of N and it is clear that N is much disturbed by being the focus of the prolonged parental disputes and being trapped in between for years, as observed by Ms Chan.

26.  Although N’s condition is observed to have improved after receiving treatment from Dr Joanna Lam, there is no evidence as to when she will fully be recovered, and as pointed out by Ms Chan, so long as the parental disputes continue to put N in a stressful position, there is a real possibility that N would require psychiatric treatment from time to time. As further pointed out by Ms Chan, as N does not have her own means and needs to rely on the Father for financial support, and in view of the protracted disputes between her parents, which are still in high conflict and ongoing, it will be in N’s best interest for an appointment to be secured with YMT Child Service, as not only would it provide professional and affordable psychiatric services to N when in need, it will also serve as a medical safety net for N, and the proposed appointment will not deprive N the right to seek private psychiatric treatment if required.  

27.  The first available appointment from YMT Child Service is likely to be after December 2019.

28.  I agree with the views put forward by Ms Chan, that the appointment with YMT Child Service should not be regarded as a means to replace the current treatment that N is receiving from Dr Joanna Lam.

Conclusion 

29.  Hearing considered all the circumstances, I am prepared to order as follows:

(i)   Leave for N to receive treatment or service at the YMT Child Service as directed by Mr Lam Ho Ming Alex in the 2nd Referral Letter, as well as continuing to receive treatment from Dr Joanna Lam;

(ii)   The Mother do within 7 days hand over to the Father all necessary documents concerning N requested by the Father for the purpose of making the appointment, including the original of 2nd Referral Letter and the original of N’s HKID card, upon the Father’s undertaking to make an appointment within 3 days upon receipt and to return to the Mother all original documents within 2 days after an appointment has been made for N. 

(iii)   N is to be accompanied by her parents jointly to YMT Child Service but neither parent is to be present at the time of treatment.

30.  As neither party has succeeded in full in obtaining the orders sought by him/her, I make no order as to costs.  The Mother’s own costs to be taxed under Legal Aid Regulations.

  

  

 (Bebe Pui Ying Chu)
 Judge of the Court of First Instance
High Court

  

Ms Athena Wong, instructed by Chan & Chan, for the plaintiff

Mr Kevin Li, instructed by Stevenson Wong & Co, for the defendant

Ms Juliana Chan Miu Kuen of the Official Solicitor, for the ward

[2018] HKCFI 390-EN-2018-03-01

C v. S

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HCMP 929/2017

[2018] HKCFI 390

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS NO 929 OF 2017

_______________________

  IN THE MATTER of N, female, a child born on the 20th day of November 2008 in Hong Kong
  and
  IN THE MATTER OF Section 26 of the High Court Ordinance (Cap. 4)
  and
  IN THE MATTER OF Order 90 rule 1 of the Rules of High Court (Cap. 4A)
  and
  IN THE MATTER OF Section 3 of the Guardianship of Minors Ordinance (Cap. 13)
  and
  IN THE MATTER OF the Inherent Jurisdiction of the High Court

______________________

BETWEEN
 CPlaintiff
 and
 SDefendant

______________________

Before: Hon B Chu J in Chambers (Not Open to Public)

Date of Hearing: 18 December 2017

Date of Defendant’s Written Submission: 2 January 2018

Date of Plaintiff’s Written Submission: 16 January 2018

Date of Decision: 1 March 2018

_________________________

D E C I S I O N
(On Separate Representation)

_________________________


Introduction

1.  This Court has earlier handed down Reasons for Decision on 12 February 2018 (“Reasons”) in relation to the parties’ respective transfer applications, and the detailed background of these wardship proceedings has been set out therein and in the numerous published judgments of the Family Court and the Court of Appeal in relation to the ward N.  I shall adopt the same abbreviations as in the Reasons unless otherwise indicated herein.

2.  The plaintiff and the defendant are respectively the Father and the Mother of N who is now 9 years old.

3.  As seen in the Reasons, this Court has decided against transferring the Family Proceedings up to this Court, and also against transferring the Father’s application for custody, care and control (“Custody Application”) down to the Family Court. 

4.  At present, the outstanding applications in these wardship proceedings are the Father’s Custody Application with the related issue over access, and also the Mother’s application for N to be de-warded.

5.  The Mother had issued a summons, in person, on 3 October 2017 for (i) variation of the 19.05.17 Order in relation to N’s access; (ii) N to be interviewed by the judge; and (iii) N to be separately represented by the Official Solicitor (“OS”).  The application was opposed by the Father.  At a hearing on 18 December 2017, this Court gave directions for the lodging of written submissions and that the matter to be dealt with on paper.  Due to matters raised by the Father, this Court also called for an urgent social investigation report to seek N’s views on separate representation.

6.  The Mother’s submissions were lodged by Counsel Mr Kevin Li on her behalf, while the Father’s were lodged by Mr Russell Coleman SC and Ms Athena Wong.  Both parties’ written submissions appeared to focus only on whether N should be separately represented by the OS.

Brief background

7.  The Father and the Mother were not married to each other but were in a cohabitation relationship. In about May 2009, the Mother left home with N, who was then only about 6 months old.  Since then, N has been living with the Mother. 

8.  The Father commenced the Family Proceedings in March 2010, and the Custody Order was made in October 2012 giving the Mother sole custody, care and control (“Custody Order”).  Since then and until the 30.09.16 Order, there had been issues over the Father’s access.  As seen in the Reasons, after access on 21 January 2017, the Father was not able to exercise any access to N until 7 October 2017.

9.  In the meantime, the 08.09.17 SWR was submitted in which it was stated by the social work officer Mrs Lam Yeung Kit-ching (“Mrs Lam”) that Ms Wong of the Hong Kong Family Welfare Society (who had been providing co-parenting service to the family) reported that when N was interviewed on 29 August 2017 she was emotionally settled and addressed the Father as “daddy” spontaneously but N had however expressed resistance towards the Father due to his poor temper and tense relationship with the Mother.  Thereafter this Court directed that the access took place at the Contact Centre in Wong Tai Sin but access was still not successful and the Father then issued an application for contempt proceedings against the Mother. 

10.  Eventually, access took place on 7 October 2017 and according to the Father, N still displayed negative emotions towards him. It is clear that although access did take place thereafter, such access was not satisfactory and it would appear that each session lasted for only about two to four hours at the Contact Centre although the 19.05.17 Order allowed the Father to have access every Saturday from 10 am to 9 pm. 

11.  According to the Father, the Mother had on 4 occasions made allegations about child abuse against the Father, but such allegations were later found to be not substantiated.  However, the Mother maintained that N had complained to her about the Father’s poor temper and physical behaviour.

12.  Mr Li had drawn this Court’s attention to some observations made by the then social work officer Mr Cheng Cho Hong in an earlier social welfare report dated 24 February 2016.  Mr Li said the purpose of referring to the report was not intended to attribute any fault on part of the Father but to show to the Court the psychological side of N and her disapproving behaviour towards the Father. 

13.  As for the incident on 21 January 2017, what exactly happened was not quite clear except it was alleged that N was scolded by the Father.

14.  Anyway, so far, there has been no finding of any child abuse by the Family Court or by any social worker. 

15.  The Father had complained in his 1st affirmation filed in support of the originating summons herein that there had been parental alienation on the part of the Mother, whereas the Mother’s case was that it was N who was unwilling to see the Father.

PDSL 6:Guidance on Separate Representation for Children in Matrimonial and Family Proceedings

16.  PDSL 6 was introduced on 3 October 2012.  In paragraph 15 thereof, it has set out, solely by way of guidance, a non- exhaustive list of 17 circumstances where the judge could consider making an order for a child to be separately represented, and I will set these out hereunder:

(i) Where there is an intractable dispute over custody or access including where all access has ceased or where there is irrational but implacable hostility to access or where the child may be suffering harm associated with the access dispute or where it is intended that there be termination of access;

(ii) Where a parent is under a disability and represented through a guardian ad litem or next friend and custody/access is in dispute;

(iii) Difficult cases which involve a foreign element, immigration problems or permanent removal from the jurisdiction such that it would for all practical purposes exclude the other party from the possibility of access to the child;

(iv) Where the child has a standpoint or interests which are inconsistent with or incapable of being represented by any of the adult parties or cannot be adequately metby a report to the court;

(v) Where an older child is opposing a proposed course of action;

(vi) Where the child is apparently alienated from one or both parents;

(vii) Where there are real issues of cultural or religious differences affecting the child;

(viii) Where there are complex medical or mental health issues to be determined or there are other unusually complex issues that necessitate separate representation of the child;

(ix) Where there are serious allegations of physical, sexual or other abuse in relation to the child or there are allegations of domestic violence not capable of being resolved with the help of a social welfare officer;

(x) Where the proceedings concern more than one child and the welfare of the children is in conflict or one child is in a particularly disadvantaged position;

(xi) Where there is a contested issue about blood testing;

(xii) Where the conduct of either or both of the parents or some other person having significant contact with the child is alleged to be anti-social to the extent that it seriously impinges on the child’s welfare;

(xiii) Where on the material filed by the parents, neither parent seems a suitable custodian;

(xiv) Where a child of mature years is expressing strong views and if given effect would involve changing a long standing custodial arrangement or a complete denial of access to one parent;

(xv) Where it is proposed to separate siblings;

(xvi) In relation to applications in the court’s welfare jurisdiction relating in particular to the medical treatment of children where the child’s interests are not adequately represented by one of the parties;

(xvii) Where none of the parties are legally represented.

Mother’s grounds for application

17.  The Mother’s grounds for her application appeared to be based on the following:

(i) N is 9 years old and she is perfectly capable of expressing her views and affections.

(ii) Whatever explanations or matters of concern raised by the Mother will not be believed and accepted by the Father.

(iii) To find out the “root cause” of N’s negative feelings towards the Father.

18.  In other words, the Mother’s main reason for her application was to enable N’s views and feelings to be fully investigated and reflected and the issue of allegation of “alienation” fully investigated.  This appears to be a misapprehension on her part since it is not the role of the OS, or guardian ad litem of a child to investigate a child’s views and feelings.  This should be done by a clinical psychiatrist or psychologist.  The role of the OS or a guardian ad litem of a child is to represent the child’s interests, which may not always accord with the child’s own views, (emphasis added) and that the primary duty of a guardian ad litem is to represent the child’s interests which are likely to be conveyed to the court in a report which should have regard to the welfare checklist[1].

19.  The role of the OS as a child’s separate representative is twofold, as an officer of the court the OS investigates how the child’s interests are best served while simultaneously representing the child’s views as his solicitor in the proceedings[2].

20.  It was held in Mabon v Mabon and others [2005] Fam 366 that, amongst other things, the guardian’s first priority was to advocate the welfare of the child and his second priority was to put before the court the child’s feelings and wishes and sometimes those priorities could conflict[3].  Thorpe LJ had explained that :

“In testing the sufficiency of a child’s understanding, I would not say that welfare has no place. If direct participation would pose an obvious risk of harm to the child arising out of the nature of the continuing proceedings and, if the child is incapable of comprehending that risk then the judge is entitled to find that sufficient understanding has not been demonstrated. But judges have to be equally alive to the risk of emotional harm that might arise from denying the child knowledge of and participation in the continuing proceedings[4].”

21.  It is clear from the above that the judge will have to balance the risk of harm to the child in the case of direct participation, if any, and the risk if the child is denied the knowledge of and participation, if any.

Father’s grounds for opposition

22.  The Father’s grounds for opposition were briefly the following:

(i) Direct participation would pose an obvious risk of harm to N;

(ii) In light of N’s grave fear of “displeasing her mother”, dragging her into this litigation would intensify her fear and distress and exacerbate any couching and interrogation, as N is now living with the Mother;

(iii) There is no evidence that N has demonstrated the necessary understanding and maturity at this stage to be involved in the proceedings; in contrast, the anxiety and distress N exhibited and her grave fear of displeasing and being punished by the Mother suggests the reverse;

(iv) There has been no recommendation in the 14 social welfare reports or any of the professionals involved that N should be separately represented by the OS, and instead the recommendation seems to be for N to stay out of the parental conflicts and not to be subjected to further questioning or interviews by strangers;

(v) There is no such need to drag N into the course of this litigation as other alternatives are available and indeed in place. N’s views and wishes have been reflected in the various reports.

23.  I must say I find that the Father’s present stance somewhat contradictory since it was he who in the Originating Summons had originally sought an order for N to be separately represented on the basis that there was evidence of parental alienating behaviour in the Mother’s home and that having N separately represented would help to safeguard the welfare of N in view of the history of unfounded allegations made by the Mother and the “deeply conflicted relationship between the parties”[5]. The Father then suddenly withdrew his application for N to be separately represented at the hearing on 10 August 2017, and I understood his reason was he did not wish to subject N to being interviewed by another stranger.  However, at the time when he made that application, all the grounds now put forward by him to oppose the Mother’s application were there and had presumably been considered by him.  In fact, since then, N has been subjected to seeing new strangers, such as the psychiatrist Dr Joanna Lam.  Anyway, for reasons best known to him, the Father clearly changed his mind.

The Official Solicitor

24.  The Mother has contacted the OS directly to enquire whether there is any objection on his part to represent N.  Ms Juliana Chan of the OS’s Office replied on 17 January 2018 and set out reasons why she did not agree with the Mother’s basis of her application but if the Court were to consider it appropriate for N to be separately represented, the OS would have no objection. 

The urgent social welfare report

25.  As mentioned, this Court had called for an urgent social welfare report to seek N’s views on separate representation.  Mrs Lam submitted her report on 8 February 2018 (“08.02.18 SWR”).  In the report, Mrs Lam reported that N had expressed her wish to be separately represented by the OS so that she could directly tell the OS about her wish, that she wanted to have the access to be suspended temporarily because she felt stressful to see the Father.

26.  Mrs Lam pointed out that N’s views had been well reflected in the many reports submitted to the Court over the past years, and that N had admitted that she would feel anxious if she had to express her views in front of the OS or the Judge.  Mrs Lam opined that appointing the OS would inevitably cause further stress to N so long as N was caught in the parental conflicts, and that N had showed difficulty to understand the appointment of the OS and her participation in the Court proceedings given that she was only 9 years old.  Further, Mrs Lam considered now not an appropriate time to appoint the OS for N particularly when she had manifested psychiatric symptoms recently and her mental condition was yet to be assessed.

27.  Mrs Lam said N should receive psychiatric treatment as appropriate while the parents should be encouraged to settle their disputes as soon as possible in order to reduce further psychological harm to N.

28.  To summarise, there are two reasons for Mrs Lam to opine that the appointment of the OS is not recommended at this stage, namely (i) N’s views had been well reflected in various reports and that N showed difficulty in understanding the appointment of the OS and that she felt anxious if she had to express her views in front of the OS or the Judge; and (ii) N has manifested psychiatric symptoms recently, and appointing the OS would cause further stress to N.

Discussion

29.  As provided under s 3(1)(a)(i)(A) of GMO, the court shall give due consideration to the views of a minor, if, having regard to the age and understanding of the minor and to the circumstances of the case, it is practicable to do so.

30.  Thus, whether a minor is of sufficient age and understanding for his/her views to be given consideration, and/or the weight to be given to such views will be a matter for the Judge to decide in the circumstances of each case. This provision is irrespective of whether the minor is to be separately represented or not.

31.  One of the Father’s grounds of opposition was that there was no evidence that N had demonstrated the necessary understanding and maturity at this stage to be involved in the proceedings.

32.  Mr Colemen and Ms Wong referred the Court to In re S (A Minor) (Independent Representation) [1993] Fam 263.  It was not clear how that case would assist the Father.  The child S was about 12 at the time of the hearing of the appeal, and he applied for leave to participate in the proceedings with his own legal representatives and for the removal of his guardian ad litem.  The judge refused leave for S to do so and his appeal was dismissed by the Court of Appeal. 

33.  Ms Wong had quoted a passage of Sir Thomas Bingham MR when giving judgment in the Court of Appeal, namely where any sound judgment on the issues in the proceedings called for insight and imagination which only maturity and experience could bring, the court and the solicitor would be slow to conclude that the child’s understanding was sufficient[6].  The comments made by the Master of the Rolls were made in relation to Rule 9.2A of the Family Proceedings Rules 1991[7] and had to be viewed in the context of that case, in particular the tests in paragraphs (1)(b)(i) and (6) of Rule 9.2A.

34.  Briefly, those provisions allow a minor to begin or prosecute proceedings without a next friend or to defend proceedings without a guardian ad litem, having never had one. The Master of the Rolls was considering whether S had sufficient understanding to participate as a party in the proceedings concerned or proposed without a next friend or guardian ad litem.

35.  There is at present no equivalent provision as Rule 9.2A in Hong Kong.  Further, the circumstances of the present case are completely different.  There was no suggestion from the Mother that N should participate in these proceedings without any guardian ad litem. 

36.  That N may not have the maturity and experience in participating in these proceedings directly without the OS is one matter but whether she is of sufficient age and understanding for her views to be taken into account by this Court is a different matter.

37.  Mr Coleman and Ms Wong had also referred to this Court’s judgment in R v N (Separate Representation of Children) [2010] HKFLR, 285 where this Court concluded that it was not in the interest of two children, aged 13½ and 7¾, for them to be separately represented.  This Court had considered those circumstances set out in the direction of the then President of the Family Division in England in relation to separate representation of children in family proceedings, including that the children in that case had not expressed a wish to be separately represented and there was no more intractable conflict in that case than most of the other contested custody or access cases, and came to the conclusion it was not in the best interest of the children to be separately represented by the OS at that late stage of the proceedings.

38.  Indeed, it was after the above case that PDSL 6 was brought in to set out those relevant circumstances in which separate representation could be considered, and to provide guidance to practitioners. 

39.  Mr Coleman and Ms Wong had also referred to another of this Court’s judgment in an international child abduction case YYW HWW [2017] HKCU 1527 where the children were said to object to the return.  Such cases by their nature have to be dealt with expeditiously and in that case, the parties had not explored other alternatives of ascertaining the children’s views. The parties then agreed for a social welfare officer to seek the children’s views urgently first.  Thereafter, there was no further application/ suggestion for the children to be separately represented.

40.  Again, I am not sure how the above case would assist the Father, since in the present case, N had already been interviewed many times by social workers and/or psychologists.  In any event, the circumstances of each case are different and further the views of a guardian ad litem may not accord with that of N.

41.  The Father said he did not wish N to be drawn into the litigation.  The Mother alleged that during the access on 4 November and 11 November 2017, the Father had told N that the Mother had stolen things from him, and that he had told N that she was greedy by wanting to live in One Silversea.  This was denied by the Father, but if true, then it would be the Father who was himself dragging N directly into the parties’ dispute.  However, if untrue, then either the Mother or N has been making things up.  This would equally be of concern to this Court.

42.  N has been seen by the clinical psychologist at the Social Welfare Department Mr Alex Lam since December 2011, and recently on 12 December 2017, Mr Lam has written a letter of referral to the Consultant of Service of the Yaumatei Child and Adolescent Mental Health Service (“Letter of Referral”).  In this letter, Mr Lam reported that while N had continually expressed her reluctance to meet her father on weekend for months, she continued to manifest stable behaviour at school.  However, the Mother telephoned Mr Lam on 11 December 2017 and reported a number of repetitive and compulsive symptoms, including that N had “visual images of stabbing her mother to death and ideation of killing her maternal grandparents, God and Buddha”.  It was reported by the Mother that N was fearful towards these symptoms and blamed herself for not being able to suppress them.  As a result, Mr Lam referred N to receive psychiatric assessment and professional intervention at the Government service in Yaumatei.

43.  This matter was raised urgently before this Court by the Father’s Mr Coleman at the hearing on 18 December 2017, but in light of the possible waiting time at the Government service, this Court directed that N to see a private child psychiatrist and the Father had agreed to bear the costs in the interim.  This Court further directed that, if the parties could not agree on the treating psychiatrist, each party was to submit two names for the Court to decide.  However, even after the Court had made a decision for Dr Joanna Lam to be the treating psychiatrist, the Father’s solicitors wrote and asked this Court to reconsider and this court declined.

44.  Thereafter, there were further communications over the joint letter to be sent to Dr Lam.  As a result of all this, I understand that N was not taken to see Dr Lam until sometime after 25 January 2018.

45.  It is of grave concern to this Court that there is such an intractable dispute and distrust between the parties over N that they could not even agree on such a matter which resulted in delay in N receiving treatment.  In fact, this matter is not at an end, as at the hearing, the Father has not issued another summons for N to see a Government psychiatrist to whom the Letter of Referral was addressed originally.

46.  So far, there have already been 14 social welfare reports and various social workers and psychologists have already involved.  Even though the Father said that N should not be subjected to being questioned or interviewed by yet another stranger, it seems he now wishes N to see yet another new psychiatrist.  

47.  In my view, the long history of non compromising attitude of both parties since N was some 6 months old, and the fact that this litigation has been going on since March 2010, almost 8 years ago, is an indication of an intractable dispute between the parties. It is not clear what attempts the parties have made for mediation and I would expect the parties’ legal representatives to report to this Court at the next hearing.  

48.  As I have said, it was the Father’s case in his 1st affirmation filed in these proceedings that there was parental alienation on the part of the Mother, namely alienating N from him.  This would be one of the circumstances in PDSL 6 for this Court to consider whether to order N to be separately represented.  However, since the Father has now changed his stance in relation to the separate representation, it is not clear whether this is still an allegation he is making.

49.  It appears to this Court from the present evidence that N has already been drawn into her parents’ disputes and very much affected by and indeed suffering harm associated with the disputes between her parents, if those symptoms as reported by the Mother are true.  It appears that N has been diagnosed as suffering from obsessive compulsive disorder.  According to Mrs Lam, N has expressed the view that she wanted to have the access to be suspended temporarily because she felt stressful to see the Father.  

50.  In my view, there appears to be evidence of intractable dispute of the kind set out in paragraph 15(i) of PDSL6.

51.  Due to the urgency of the report, it is understandable that Mrs Lam may not have given sufficient consideration to whether any of the circumstances in paragraph 15 of PDSL 6 exist in the present case before coming to her recommendation.  N’s mental state is of course our prime concern presently.  She has however also expressed wish for access to be suspended and a wish to be separately represented, albeit she may not fully understand what this means.  However, there have been cases where children of much younger age have been separately represented by the OS when there has been intractable dispute between their parents as a result of which they may suffer harm or where other circumstances set out in paragraph 15 of PDSL 6 exist.

52.  As set out in paragraph 14 of PDSL 6, the question of separate representation is a balance between the risk of potential harm to the child if he has no voice in the proceedings, the risk of adverse effects on a child who is reluctant to be drawn into a parental dispute and the cost and time burden to the courts which increased representation will bring.  Having weighed up the balance and having considered the long history of intractable dispute between the parties, notwithstanding Mrs Lam’s recommendation, I have come to the view that it is in N’s best interests to be separately represented by the OS.  In fact, in my view, the OS may also be able to assist N in receiving mental health/psychiatric treatment.

Conclusion

53.  In light of the above, I will order N to be separately represented by the OS in these proceedings.

54.  Since neither of the parties can be said to have succeeded in his/her arguments and that this Court is making the order on grounds other than those submitted on behalf of the Mother, I make no order as to costs as to this application, save that the Mother’s own costs to be taxed in accordance with the legal aid regulations. 

 (Bebe Pui Ying Chu)
 Judge of the Court of First Instance
High Court

Mr Russell Coleman SC and Ms Athena Wong, instructed by Chan & Chan, for the plaintiff

Mr Kevin Li, instructed by Stevenson Wong & Co, for the defendant



[1] See paras 5, 6 of PDSL 6

[2] See para 11 PDSL 6

[3] See Holding in Headnote

[4] At para 29

[5] At paras 82-83, Father’s 1st affirmation filed herein on 20 April 2017

[6] At 276 and 244H

[7] Brought in by the Family Proceedings (Amendment) Rules 1992

[2018] HKCFI 294-EN-2018-02-12

C v. S

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HCMP 929/2017

[2018] HKCFI 294

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS NO 929 OF 2017

_______________________

  IN THE MATTER of N, female, a child born on the 20th day of November 2008 in Hong Kong
  and
  IN THE MATTER OF Section 26 of the High Court Ordinance (Cap. 4)
  and
  IN THE MATTER OF Order 90 rule 1 of the Rules of High Court (Cap. 4A)
  and
  IN THE MATTER OF Section 3 of the Guardianship of Minors Ordinance (Cap. 13)
  and
  IN THE MATTER OF the Inherent Jurisdiction of the High Court

______________________

BETWEEN
 CPlaintiff
 and
 SDefendant

______________________

Before: Hon B Chu J in Chambers (Not Open to Public)
Date of Hearing: 6 February 2018
Date of Decision: 6 February 2018
Date of Reasons for Decision: 12 February 2018

_____________________________________________

REASONS FOR DECISION

_____________________________________________

Introduction

1.  The plaintiff and the defendant are respectively the Father and the Mother of a girl N who is now 9 years old. 

2.  By an originating summons issued on 20 April 2017 (“Originating Summons”), the Father has made N a ward of this Court.  In the Originating Summons the Father sought the following orders:

(i)   N be made a ward of this Court during her minority until further order;

(ii)   N be separately represented by a guardian ad litem;

(iii)   The Father shall have all the rights and authority of N under s 3(1)(d) of the Guardianship of Minors Ordinance, Cap 13;

(iv)   The Father do have custody, care and control of N (“Custody Application”);

(v)   The Mother to have access to N (“Access Application”).

3.  Upon the issue of the Originating Summons, N has become a ward of this Court.  So far as (ii) was concerned, namely for N to be separately represented, the Father had withdrawn that application on 10 August 2017.  In relation to (iii), this Court made an order on 12 October 2017 granting the Father all the rights and authority that the law would allow him under s 3(1)(d) of the Guardianship of Minors Ordinance.  So far as the Originating Summons is concerned, only the Father’s Custody Application and the Access Application are outstanding.  The Father had issued a summons for the entire proceedings in the Family Court to be transferred up to be dealt with by this Court and as part of the wardship proceedings, and the Mother had issued a summons for N to be dewarded, and for all outstanding applications before this Court to be transferred down to be dealt with by the Family Court.

4.  The Father’s Custody Application, Access Application and the Mother’s dewarding application have been fixed for a directions hearing on 20 March 2018.

5.  The parties’ respective applications for transfer up/down were heard before this Court on 7 February 2018.  This Court dismissed both applications on that day, with reasons to be handed down.  The reasons are set out hereinafter.

6.  The Father was represented by Counsel Ms Athena Wong and the Mother by Counsel Mr Kevin Li.

Background

7.  There has been protracted litigation between the parties over N in the Family Court, under FCMP 67/2010 (“Family Proceedings”), since early 2010 when N was only one year old, resulting in no less than 16 published judgments/decisions from the Family Court, 3 published judgments for leave to appeal and 1 judgment from the Court of Appeal, and further the judgement given by this Court on 12 October 2017, giving the Father the parental rights as mentioned earlier.

8.  Custody care and control of N was granted to the Mother on 5 October 2012 (“Custody Order”).  Deputy Judge Own, as he then was (“Family Judge”), further ordered that the Father to have general access to N, details to be determined at a hearing to be fixed, and pending determination of the details of the general access, the Family Judge ordered the then interim access arrangement was to continued. 

9.  However notwithstanding various leave to appeal applications and/or appeals, the Father’s attempt to apply for a variation of the Custody Order and issues over the Father’s access and allegations of child abuse by the Mother, no final hearing had ever been fixed for the determination of general access as directed by the Family Judge under the Custody Order. 

10.  To cut the long story shorter, on 31 March 2016, there was an interim order for the Father to have access to N every Saturday from 10 am to 9 pm (“31.03.16 Order”).  There were then applications taken out respectively by the Mother and the Father, culminating in an order made by the Family Judge on 30 September 2016, as set out below.

11.  On 30 September 2016, the Family Judge made an “Unless Order”, namely that unless the Father was to proceed to apply for determination of general access arrangement pursuant to the provisions of the Custody Order, the Father was to have reasonable access to N (“30.09.16 Order”).  The Father applied for leave to appeal and eventually obtained leave from the Court of Appeal on 13 October 2017.

12.  It was the Father’s case that he continued to encounter difficulties in access and in particular since 21 January 2017, he had had no access and it was under those circumstances that the Father issued the Originating Summons to make N a ward of this Court.

13.  The Mother had alleged that the Father had scolded and frightened N on 21 January 2017 and the Father said this was the 4th time that the Mother had “falsely” accused the Father of abusing N since the year of 2013.  Anyway, the Father had no access after 21 January 2017.

14.  When the Originating Summons came up before this Court for the 1st hearing on 19 May 2017, this Court ordered, amongst other things, the Father to have interim defined access order along the same undertakings and terms of the 31.03.16 Order and the continuation of the wardship, with no opposition from the Mother (“19.05.17 Order”).  To be fair to the Mother, she was unrepresented at that hearing, since her legal aid had not been extended in time for her lawyers to represent her at that hearing.

15.  Notwithstanding the 19.05.17 Order, the Father continued to experience difficulties over access to N.  It was the Father’s complaint that there was parental alienation on the part of the Mother, whereas the Mother alleged it was N who was unwilling to see the Father.

16.  This Court then called for a social investigation report which was submitted on 8 September 2017 (“08.09.17 SWR”). It can be seen therein that the social worker Ms Wong of the Hong Kong Family Welfare Society reported, amongst other things, that when N was interviewed on 29 August 2017 she was emotionally settled and addressed the Father as “daddy” spontaneously, but that N had expressed her resistance towards the Father due to his poor temper and tense relationship with the Mother and Ms Wong opined that the social worker at Wong Tai Sin Community Centre (“Contact Centre”) could be a facilitator to the access arrangement.  This Court then made a further order on 21 September 2017 for access to take place at the Contact Centre.  This was initially not successful, and the Father then issued an application for contempt proceedings against the Mother. 

17.  Eventually, access took place on 7 October 2017, after a gap of some 9 months.  Mr Li had set out in his submissions what happened on those days of access after 7 October 2017.  The Father denied the allegations therein. 

18.  However, what is clear is that each session lasted for only about two to four hours at the Contact Centre on those Saturdays even though the 19.05.17 Order allowed the Father to have access from 10 am to 9 pm every Saturday pursuant to the 31.03.16 Order. 

The present applications

19.  Ms Wong submitted that all matters relating to N should go before this Court so that the decision serving N’s best interest could be made by a single docket judge who has a complete picture of all aspects of N’s wellbeing, such as health, educational and financial, which are often intertwined, and that a wardship judge shall have complete and absolute control over the ward and no important or major steps in the life of a ward may be taken without the leave of the Court.

20.  I could understand this had the wardship proceedings been taken out on day one or earlier.  However, these proceedings were only taken out less than a year ago.  On the other hand, the Family Judge has been the docket judge of the Family Proceedings for over 7 years and had written some 16 published decisions/judgments.  If there should be one single docket judge, then in my view, it should be the Family Judge. 

21.  In fact, this was exactly Mr Li’s argument, that N should be dewarded and all matters be transferred back down to the Family Court.  Since the Father opposed the dewarding of N, at the moment, the dewarding application has been fixed for hearing together the Custody Application and the Access Application.

22.  At present, so far as the Family Proceedings are concerned, the last Order was the 30.09.16 Order for reasonable access order which is still pending the Father’s appeal.  As seen in the Court of Appeal’s Reasons for Decision[1], the reason for granting leave was because it was reasonably arguable that the ‘reasonable access’ order would not work.  Since then, as set out above, access had resumed pursuant to the 19.05.17 Order in these proceedings.  I understand that the Father is still intending to proceed with his appeal.  I am not sure why as the appeal would appear to be academic, in light of these wardship proceedings and the 19.05.17 Order and that the Father had resumed access to N.

23.  Subject to what the Court of Appeal may say, there are no further outstanding applications in the Family Proceedings concerning custody, care, and control, and/or access.

24.  On the financial side, the Family Judge had made an interim maintenance order on 7 November 2013.  Eventually, on 5 June 2015, the Family Judge handed down a judgment in respect of the Mother’s application for financial provision.  By this order, the Family Judge ordered, amongst other things, that the Father’s property, referred to as the One Silver Sea Property, be settled on trust for the use of N and the Mother until N reaches age of 18 years old or ceases full time education, whichever is later, and in addition thereto, the Father to pay various reimbursements pursuant to Father’s undertakings, and also periodical payments for the benefit of N (“Financial Provision Order”). The Father had sought leave to appeal.  His leave application was eventually dismissed by the Court of Appeal on 7 December 2015[2].

25.  Numerous affirmations and/or Form Es had been filed in connection with the Mother’s application for financial provision as can been seen in the Family Judge’s Judgement of 5 June 2015.  The trial took almost 7 days.

26.  The Mother is now complaining that the Father has not complied in full the terms of the Financial Provision Order, and has applied for enforcement, and this is pending before the Family Judge.  

27.  Apart from enforcement, there has also been a further application by the Mother for renovation costs etc concerning the One Silver Sea Property (“Renovation Summons”).  This Court was informed that the amount claimed by the Mother was less than HK$1m, and that the summons had been recently adjourned sine die by the Family Judge with liberty to restore, pending mediation between the parties.  The Mother has all along been receiving legal aid, and whereas I note, the Father has on occasion instructed both Senior and Junior Counsel. 

28.  At the moment, the only outstanding matter in the Family Proceedings is the Mother’s enforcement application.  There are therefore no parallel applications in the Family Court and this Court.  

29.  Having considered the history of the financial applications, I had indicated at an earlier direction hearing in December last year, that I saw no reason why the financial matters, in particular the enforcement application should be transferred up.  

30.  Since there was no outstanding application in the Family Court in relation to access or N’s arrangements, and I saw no reason why the financial matters should be transferred up, I came to the view that no transfer up was necessary at this stage.

31.  As for the Mother’s application to transfer down, I agreed that this was linked with the dewarding application.  It was premature.

Conclusion

32.  Having considered the circumstances and the history of this case, and for the above reasons, I came to the conclusion that both transfer applications should be dismissed and the above were my reasons. 

33.  The Father had also issued a summons to stay the Family Proceedings pending this Court’s decision on the transfer applications. Leave was granted to the Father to withdraw that summons at the hearing.

34.  The order I made at the hearing was :-

a.   The Father’s summons issued on 20 October 2017 be dismissed;

b.   Paragraph 2 of the Mother’s summons issued on 13 February 2017 be dismissed;

c.   Leave to the Father to withdraw his summons issued on 13 December 2017 for stay of the Family Proceedings.

35.  I ordered no order as to costs of all summonses, save for the Mother’s own costs to be taxed under the legal aid regulations.

  

  

 (Bebe Pui Ying Chu)
 Judge of the Court of First Instance
High Court

  

Ms Athena Wong, instructed by Chan & Chan, for the plaintiff

Mr Kevin Li, instructed by Stevenson Wong & Co, for the defendant



[1]CCMJ and SSM, HCMP 1269/2017, Reason for Decision 18 October 2017

[2]CCMJ and SSM, HCMP 2059/2015, Judgment dated 7 December 2015

112158-EN-2017-10-12

C v. S

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HCMP 929/2017

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS NO 929 OF 2017

_______________________

 IN THE MATTER of CJX, female, a child born on the 20th day of November 2008 in Hong Kong
 

and

 IN THE MATTER OF Section 26 of the High Court Ordinance (Cap. 4)
 

and

 IN THE MATTER OF Order 90 rule 1 of the Rules of High Court (Cap. 4A)
 

and

 IN THE MATTER OF Section 3 of the Guardianship of Minors Ordinance (Cap. 13)
 

and

 IN THE MATTER OF the Inherent Jurisdiction of the High Court

______________________

BETWEEN

 CPlaintiff
 and 
 SDefendant

______________________

Before: Hon B Chu J in Chambers (Not Open to Public)
Date of Hearing: 10 August 2017
Date of Plaintiff’s Written Submission: 8 August 2017
Date of Defendant’s Written Submission: 8 August 2017
Date of Plaintiff’s Supplemental Written Submission: 24 August 2017
Date of Defendant’s Supplemental Written Submission: 7 September 2017
Date of Plaintiff’s Written Submission in Reply: 14 September 2017
Date of Judgment: 12 October 2017

________________

J U D G M E N T

________________

Introduction

1.  The plaintiff and the defendant are respectively the father and the mother of a female child who will be 9 years old in November this year.  The present application concerns the parental rights of the father.

2.  There has been protracted litigation between the parties over the child (“Child”) since 2010 in the Family Court (“FCMP 67 of 2010”), resulting in no less than 16 published judgments from the Family Court, 3 published judgments for leave to appeal and 1 judgment from the Court of Appeal.

3.  So far as the present proceedings are concerned, the father (“Father”) issued the originating summons herein in May 2017 to make the Child a ward of this Court.  In the originating summons, one of the orders sought by the Father is under section 3 (1) (d) of the Guardianship of Minors Ordinance, Cap 13 (“GMO”), for him to have all the rights and authority that the law would allow him as father if the ward were legitimate (“Rights”).

4.  The mother (“Mother”) opposes the application. At the hearing for argument on this issue, this Court directed further written submissions be lodged by Counsel, and that the matter be dealt with on paper.

5.  Counsel Ms Athena Wong appeared for the Father at the hearing and prepared the first two sets of written submissions.  Mr Russell Coleman SC and she then jointly prepared the further submission in reply.  Counsel Mr Felix Leung appeared for the Mother at the hearing and lodged the written submissions on behalf of the Mother.

6.  In this judgment, I have used the word “illegitimate” to describe children born out of wedlock, as this is still the terminology used in our statutes[1]. However, I am conscious that the use of the word “illegitimate” or the expression “illegitimate child” has been considered to be demeaning to the child being referred to and that it offends and violates that child’s dignity, and that one option is to describe children born out of wedlock “non-marital” or “extra-marital” children, as opposed to “marital” children or those born within wedlock.  This will be a matter for the law draftsman to consider in due course.

7.  Before I consider the facts of the present case, I will first of all set out the development in England and Wales concerning parental rights of an illegitimate child and also the development in Hong Kong leading to the current s3(1)(d) of GMO.

Development in England & Wales

8.  Without going too far back in history, prior to the Family Law Reform Act 1987, the position in England and Wales was provided by s85 (7) of the Children Act 1975, namely while the mother of an illegitimate child is living, she has the parental rights and duties exclusively of her illegitimate child. 

9.  The Family Law Reform Act 1987 was then brought in on 15 May 1987, “to reform the law relating to the consequences of birth outside marriage, to make further provision with respect to the rights of duties of parents and the determination of parentage, and for connected purposes”.  The 1987 Act provides for no distinction is to be drawn between a child whose parents are married and one whose parents are not, for the purposes of an application made under s9 of the Guardianship of Minors Act 1971[2]. 

10.  So far as parental rights were concerned, these however still rest in the mother of a child born outside marriage, although s4 (1) of the Family Law Reform Act 1987 provides that on the application of the father of an illegitimate child, the court may order that he shall have all the parental rights and duties with respect to the child.

11.  Mr Coleman and Ms Wong had referred to the case of Re H (Illegitimate Children: Father: Parental Rights) (No 2), [1991] 1 FLR 214, a decision of the English Court of Appeal in November 1990, which related to an application for a parental rights order under s4 (1) of the Family Law Reform Act 1987.  As explained by Balcombe LJ[3], the method adopted by s4 (1) of the 1987 Act was not to equate the father of a child born out of wedlock with the father of a legitimate child and this was because the position of the natural father can be infinitely variable, namely that at one end of the spectrum his connection with the child may be only the single act of intercourse (possibly even rape) which led to conception and at the other end of the spectrum he may have played a full part in the child’s life from birth onwards, only the formality of marriage to the mother being absent. 

12.  Further, Balcombe LJ said :

“In considering whether to make an order under s4 of the 1987 Act, the court will have to take into account a number of factors, of which the following will undoubtedly be material (although there may well be others, as the list is not intended to be exhaustive):

(1) The degree of commitment which the father has shown towards the child;

(2) the degree of attachment which exists between the father and the child;

(3) the reasons of the father for applying for the order[4].”

13.  S4 (1) of the Family Law Reform Act 1987 was the predecessor of s4 (1) of the Children Act 1989. When the Children Act 1989 came into effect on 16 November 1989, s4 (1) became:

“4 (1)Where a child’s father and mother were not married to each other at the time of his birth —

(a) the court may, on the application of the father, order that he shall have parental responsibility for the child; or

(b) the father and mother may by agreement (“a parental responsibility agreement”) provide for the father to have parental responsibility for the child.”

14.  As seen in the Children Act 1989, by then there had been a shift in England & Wales from the concept of “custody” and “parental rights” to “parental responsibility”, and this was reflected in the then s4 (1) of the 1989 Act.

15.  Balcome LJ also gave the leading judgment in Re E (A Minor) (Parental Responsibility) [1994] 2 FCR 709.  Further to what he had held earlier in Re H, he had also referred to a subsequent case of the Court of Appeal, namely Re C (Minors) (Parental Rights) [1991] FCR 856 which was in relation to an application for a parental rights order under the 1987 Act by the father of illegitimate children.  Mustill LJ in giving the judgment of the court in Re C, had referred to the factors which could be relevant to the making of a parental rights order, even in circumstances where the father was not having physical contact with his children.

16.  Balcombe LJ in particular quoted the following passage of Mustill LJ in Re C:

“Though existing circumstances may demand that his children see or hear nothing of him, and that he should have no influence upon the course of their lives for the time being, their welfare may require that if circumstances change he should be reintroduced as a presence, or at least as an influence, in their lives. In such a case, a [parental rights order] , notwithstanding that only a few or even none of the rights under it may currently be exercisable, may be of value to him and also of potential value to the children[5].”

17.  Balcombe LJ concluded in Re E that he would certainly approach any application for a parental responsibility order under the Children Act 1989 by a father who has shown the degree of attachment and commitment to this child as the father has shown to C in Re E on the basis that such an order would be prima facie for the welfare of the child, and that he would require to be convinced by cogent evidence that the child’s welfare would be adversely affected by the making of such an order.

18.  s4 (1) of the Children Act 1989 underwent substantial amendments in 2003, and at present, ss4 (1), (1A), and (1B) of the 1989 Act  state:

“(1) Where a child’s father and mother were not married to each other at the time of his birth, the father shall acquire parental responsibility for the child if —

(a) he becomes registered as the child’s father under any of the enactments specified in subsection (1A);

(b) he and the child’s mother make an agreement (a “parental responsibility agreement”) providing for him to have parental responsibility for the child; or

(c) the court, on his application, orders that he shall have parental responsibility for the child.

(1A) The enactments referred to in subsection (1)(a) are —

(a) paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) of section 10(1) and of section 10A(1) of the Births and Deaths Registration Act 1953;

(b) paragraphs (a), (b)(i) and (c) of section 18(1), and sections 18(2)(b) and 20(1)(a) of the Registration of Births, Deaths and Marriages (Scotland) Act 1965; and

(c) sub-paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) of Article 14(3) of the Births and Deaths Registration (Northern Ireland) Order 1976.

(1B)   The [Secretary of State] may by order amend subsection (1A) so as to add further enactments to the list in that subsection.”

Development in Hong Kong

19.  So far as Hong Kong is concerned, GMO first came into effect on 17 February 1977.  In 1982, there were legislative amendments/replacement of section 3 subsection (1) (a)(ii) and (b) (“1982 Amendments”) and after the 1982 Amendments, section 3 became as follows:

“3. (1) In relation to the custody or upbringing of a minor, and in relation to the administration of any property belonging to or held in trust for a minor or the application of the income of any such property —

(a) In any proceedings before any court (whether or not a court as defined in section 2) the court —

(i) shall regard the welfare of the minor as the first and paramount consideration and in having such regard shall give due consideration to —

(A) the wishes of the minor if, having regard to the age and understanding of the minor and to the circumstances of the case, it is practicable to do so; and

(B) any material information including any report of the Director of Social Welfare available to the court at the hearing; and

(ii) shall not take into consideration whether, from any other point of view, the claim of the father, in respect of such custody, upbringing, administration or application is superior to that of the mother, or the claim of the mother is superior to that of the father; (Replaced, 69 of 1982, s.2)

(b) a mother shall have the same rights and authority as the law allows to a father, and the rights and authority of mother and father shall be equal and be exercisable by either without the other.

(2)   Paragraphs (a)(ii) and (b) of subsection (1) shall not apply in relation to a minor who is illegitimate. (Replaced, 69 of 1982, s.2)”

20.  The 1982 Amendments have removed any superior rights a father may have over the mother historically under common law, and to state that a mother shall have the same rights and authority as the law allows to a father, and the rights and authority of mother and father shall be equal. However, as seen above the 1982 Amendments do not apply in relation to a minor who is illegitimate.  At the time, applications relating to an illegitimate child would have to be brought under the Affiliation Proceedings Ordinance, Cap 183 which came into effect on 7 October 1971 and which was finally repealed in 1997.

21.  The background leading to the 1982 Amendments can be gleaned from the Report on Illegitimacy issued by the Hong Kong Law Reform Commission in October 1991 (“1991 Report”).  Although none of the Counsel had referred to this report, I find it helpful in understanding the development leading to s3 (1)(d) of GMO.

22.  It is stated in paragraph 2.21 of the 1991 Report, at common law, parental and custodial rights over a legitimate child resided with the father to the exclusion of the mother and no one possessed parental or custodial rights in respect of an illegitimate child[6].  The 1991 Report referred to the case of Barnardo v Mchugh [1891] AC 388, which held that at equity the wishes of the mother were a primary consideration for the court when exercising its equitable powers in respect of the custody of an illegitimate child, but there was some doubt as to the application of that case in Hong Kong. 

23.  As set out in the 1991 Report, the Explanatory Note to the Guardianship of Minors (Amendment) Bill 1982 indicates that the intention of the 1982 Amendments was to retain the application of the equitable principle which gives the mother of an illegitimate child a greater claim than the father.  As pointed out in the 1991 Report, it may be inferred from this that although the welfare of the child is the paramount consideration in all custody disputes (see the then s3 (1)(a)(i) which applies to all proceedings involving children, whether legitimate or illegitimate), in proceedings involving an illegitimate child the court must also consider the superiority of the claim of one parent over that of the other.  In the case of an illegitimate child this would mean that the mother’s claim would be superior to that of the father[7].

24.  However, as further pointed out in the 1991 Report, Mr Leonard Pegg, in an article published in Hong Kong Law Journal in 1983 had commented and suggested that “the law has been drastically changed” and that, if the welfare of the child is paramount, the inherent superiority of one parent’s claim over the other should be no more relevant in relation to an illegitimate than to a legitimate child[8]. 

25.  It was recognized in the 1991 Report that by then the child’s interest had already invariably been considered as paramount and less weight had been attached to parent rights in disputes over custody before the court, whether child be legitimate or illegitimate.

26.  About 7 years after the 1982 Amendments, the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child was adopted by the States Parties on 20 November 1989, and later came into force on 2 September 1990.

27.  It was probably in light of the UN Convention that in December 1989 the matter of illegitimate persons was referred to the Law Reform Commission (“Commission”) which eventually led to the 1991 Report.  The terms of reference for the Commission was “To consider the law relating to legitimation and illegitimate persons, having particular regard to the provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and to recommend such changes in the law as may be thought necessary”[9]. 

28.  In the 1991 Report, the Commission had considered, amongst other things, the legal effects of illegitimacy and the law in other jurisdictions and concluded that change was necessary.  The Commission came to the view that the law should be changed to provide a general rule that there be legal equality for all children, regardless of the marital status of their parents, and that this general rule should be subject only to specific limited exceptions, and that in reaching that conclusion, the Commission had taken particular of the reasoning and approach of the English and Scottish Law Commissions[10].

29.  I will not repeat here all the discussions in the 1991 Report which ultimately led to the amendments in 1993 of the GMO, in particular the addition of ss3 (1)(c)(ii) and 3 (1)(d).  Suffice to say, the Commission had considered the pros and cons of three main alternatives, namely (1) to grant all parental rights automatically to parents, married or unmarried and to provide the mother with the legal means to seek a court order to remove the father’s parental rights in certain circumstances ; or (2) to grant parental rights automatically to unmarried father who were cohabiting with the mother for a special period; or (3) to grant parental rights automatically to the mother, whether she is married or unmarried to the father, but to grant the father those rights and responsibilities only by virtue of marriage or by a court order[11].

30.  As for (1) above, the Commission was of the belief that the paramount concern in allocating parenting rights (as in so many other areas of family law) should be the welfare of the child, and that end would be met by providing that parental rights would be automatically granted to all parents, married or unmarried, but it would have the undesirable effect of, for instance granting rights to a father who had had no contact with the mother since the act of intercourse resulting in the child’s birth, and that such a situation would be a source of constant uncertainty for both mother and child, with the possibility that the absent father might at any stage assert his parental rights when it suited him.  Providing the mother with the legal means to seek a court order removing the father’s parental rights in such circumstances would resolve the situation but the Commission did not think it reasonable that the law should place that burden on the mother in order to protect the child’s welfare.

31.  Further, the Commission had referred to there being general agreement on consultation to the Scottish Law Commissions’ view that “it would not be desirable to give the father of an illegitimate child parental rights automatically.  This would give rights to fathers where the child had resulted from a casual liaison or even from rape; it would fail to recognize that many men do not have any continuing relationship with their illegitimate children. It would cause offence to mothers who had struggled alone to bring up their children with no support from the fathers”[12] (Scottish Law Commission Report No 82, at paragraph 2.5).

32.  The concerns of the Commission on alternative (1) were thus  quite clear, and the main reason for not recommending (1) was the Commission shared the views of the English and the Scottish Commissions, namely that fathers who do not have any continuing relationship with their illegitimate children should not be granted automatically parental rights, eg in a case where the father was a rapist and/or had only one act of intercourse with the mother, and thereafter had no continuing relationship with the child.

33.  The current s3 of GMO states:-

“3. (1) In relation to the custody or upbringing of a minor, and in relation to the administration of any property belonging to or held in trust for a minor or the application of the income of any such property—

(a) In any proceedings before any court (whether or not a court a defined in section 2) the court—

(i) shall regard the best interests of the minor as the first and paramount consideration and in having such regard shall give due consideration to—

(Amended 1 of 2012 s4)

(A) the views of the minor if, having regard to the age and understanding of the minor and to the circumstances of the case, it is practicable to do so; and

(Amended 1 of 2012 s4)

(B) any material information including any report of the Director of Social Welfare available to the court at the hearing; and

(ii) shall not take into consideration whether, from any other point of view, the claim of the father, in respect of such custody, upbringing, administration or application is superior to that of the mother, or the claim of the mother is superior to that of the father; (Replaced 69 of 1982 s2)

(b) except where paragraph (c) applies, a mother shall have the same rights and authority as the law allows to a father, and the rights and authority of mother and father shall be equal and be exercisable by either without the other;

(Amended 17 of 1992 s19)

(c) where the minor is illegitimate—

(i) a mother shall have the same rights and authority as she would have by virtue of paragraph (b) if the minor were legitimate;

(ii) a father shall only have such rights and authority, if any, as may have been ordered by a court on an application brought by the father under paragraph (d);
(Added 17 of 1993 s19)

(d)   the Court of First Instance or a judge of the District Court may, an application, where it is satisfied that the applicant is the father of an illegitimate child, order that the applicant shall have some or all of the rights and authority that the law would allow him as father if the minor were legitimate.

(Added 19 of 1993 s19. Amended 25 of 1998 s2)

(2)   Subsection (1)(a) shall have effect as regards any application under subsection (1)(d).

(Replaced 17 of 1993 s.19)

[cf 1971 c3 s1 UK; 1973 c29 s1(1) UK]”

34.  The 1991 Report thus provided detailed background which led to the various amendments in s3 of GMO, in particular the addition of s 3(1)(d) (“1993 Amendments”).

35.  The 1993 Amendments have brought into effect in Hong Kong s4 (1) of the Family Law Reform Act 1987.  Since then, there have been no substantial changes to s3 (1)(d) of GMO.  However, as seen earlier, in England & Wales, s4 (1) of the Family Law Reform Act 1987 was replaced by s4 (1) of the Children Act 1989 and then underwent substantial changes in 2003.  Thus, the Hong Kong position remained that in England & Wales in 1987, or basically, the law in this area has been at a standstill for 30 years. 

36.  Having said this, there were attempts made. After the 1991 Report, the Commission appointed a sub-committee in 1995 “to consider the law relating to guardianship and custody of children, and to recommend such changes as may be thought appropriate”, and after some 10 years, the Report on Child Custody and Access was finally issued in March 2005 (“2005 Report”).

37.  Mr Coleman SC and Ms Wong had referred to the major problems with the current law identified in the 2005 Report[13].  Further it was stated in paragraph 1.3 of the 2005 Report, that in other common law jurisdictions, there has been a shift away from the legal emphasis on the rights and authority of each of the parents over their children, towards a more child-focused concept of “joint parent responsibility”, and that this newer approach was examined in the 2005 Report. Following research and public consultation, the 2005 Report recommended a paradigm shift from the current concept of “custody” to “parental responsibility”.

38.  In particular, the Commission in its Recommendation 9 of the 2005 Report recommended that the language of s3 (1)(c)(ii) and (d) of GMO which relates to the “rights of authority” of an unmarried father, should be changed to reflect the new language of responsibilities rather than rights, and further in Recommendation 10, the Commission recommended that an unmarried fathershould be capable of acquiring parental responsibilities and rights by signing the birth register, and that the proposed legislation should include this in a list of the ways in which parental responsibility can be acquired by the unmarried father, although the Commission does not recommend automatic acquisition of parental responsibility or rights of unmarried fathers (emphasis added). 

39.  Fast-forwarding from the 2005 Report, eventually after another 10 years, on 25 November 2015, the Labour and Welfare Bureau issued a Consultation Paper on the proposed Children Proceedings (Parental Responsibility) Bill (“Proposed Bill”).

40.  In particular, clause 6 under Part 2 of the Proposed Bill sets out as follows :

“6. Acquisition of parental responsibility by father

(1) If a child’s father and mother were not married to each other at the time of the child’s birth, the father acquires parental responsibility for the child when—

(a) he is married to the mother of the child after the child’s birth;

(b) he becomes registered as the father of the child under section 12 of the Births and Deaths Registration Ordinance (Cap 174);

(c) he makes an agreement with the mother of the child providing for him to have parental responsibility for the child (parental responsibility agreement);

(d) he assumes guardianship over the child as a guardian appointed under Part 3; or

(e) the court makes an order under subsection (2) that the father has parental responsibility for the child.

(2) On an application by a person, the court may, if satisfied that the person is the father of a child, order that the person has parental responsibility for the child.

(3) For the purposes of this Ordinance, a parental responsibility agreement does not have effect unless—

(a) it is made in the prescribed form; and

(b) it is recorded in the prescribed manner.

(4)   For the purposes of this Ordinance, if a child’s father has acquired parental responsibility for his child under subsection (1) and has not ceased to have it as provided in section 7(1), he is treated as a surviving parent of the child on the death of the child’s mother.”

41.  The above clause 6 in the Proposed Bill will introduce some provisions of the current version of s4 (1) of the Children Act 1989, after the 2003 amendments.  Although the Proposed Bill has not yet been laid before the Legislative Council, the shift towards the focus from parents’ rights and authorities to parental responsibility and rights of the child is likely to take place in not too distant future, and the ways in which an unmarried father can acquire the parental responsibilities and rights in relation to his child will be further streamlined and spelt out clearly.

42.  In so far as case law is concerned, Jeremy Poon J, as he then was, in H v N (Children: variation of interim order) [2012] 5 HKLRD 498, had referred to the “Equality principle”, namely in approaching s3 (1) of GMO, subject to the position under illegitimacy, the court will always put the competing parents on an equal footing and any role or gender discrimination is not permissible[14] (“Equality Principle”).  In this, he had quoted what was said by Hartmann JA, as he then was in PD v KWW (Child: Joint Custody) [2010] 4 HKLRD 191, in particular the following:

“It is widely recognized today that the long-term best interests of a child are invariably best protected if, despite the breakdown of the marital union, both parents are able to continue to play an equal role in making the important decisions that will determine the child’s upbringing[15].”

43.  Poon J then went on to explain that in the case of illegitimacy, the position is a little different, and at common law, an illegitimate child was regarded as a filius nullius, a child of nobody.  He had no legal relationship with the mother or father, and common law had developed to allow the mother to claim custody of her illegitimate child.  However, Poon J recognized that it remains the case that the unmarried father has no legal parental rights over his illegitimate child, but pointed out that although the common law disparity in parental rights in cases of illegitimacy still lingers, it can be redressed by the court under s3 (1)(d).  He further said whether and how the court will do so must depend on the actual circumstances of the case, but surely the court will firmly bear in mind the Equality Principle when dealing with a father’s application[16]. (emphasis added)

Parental rights

44.  As the law currently stands, there is no definition to “rights and authority” or parental rights under s3(1)(d) of GMO. 

45.  In the 1991 Report, the Commission had already recognized the difficulty of defining what was meant by “parental rights”.  The Commission had referred to section 8 of the Law Reform (Parent and Child) (Scotland) Act 1986 which defined “parent rights” as

“tutory, curator, custody or access, as the case may require, and any right or authority relating to the welfare of upbringing of a child conferred on a parent by any rule of law[17].”

46.  The Commission had also referred to a suggestion of Mr Pegg, namely that:

“The rights and powers exercisable over a child included [at common law] the right to physical care and control, the rights to the services of the child, the right of chastisement, the right to determine the form of religious and secular education, the right to control the child’s property, and the right to appoint a testamentary guardian, although the list is far from being exhaustive[18].”

47.  Paragraph 2.10 of the 2005 Report has set out a list of “rights and authority” of parents as used in GMO, as found at common law and in statute and they include the following[19]:

(i) the right to live with the child and control the child’s day-to-day upbringing;

(ii) the right to the physical “possession” and “services” of the child;

(iii) the right to choose the child’s education;

(iv) the right to choose the child's religion;

(v) the right to choose the child’s surname;

(vi) the right to inflict moderate punishment on the child;

(vii) the right to consent to medical treatment for the child;

(viii) certain rights to enter into contracts on the child’s behalf;

(ix) the right to act for the child in legal proceedings;

(x) the right to administer the child's property;

(xi) the right to appoint a testamentary guardian for the child;

(xii) the right to consent to an application for a passport for the child;

(xiii) the right to arrange for the child to leave or emigrate from the jurisdiction;

(xiv) the right to consent to the child’s marriage;

(xv) the right to consent to the child’s adoption.

48.  The above list is by no means exhaustive. In the 2005 Report, what the Commission in the end recommended was a draft section on the definition of parental rights based on the then section 2 of the Children (Scotland) Act 1995.  This has now found its way into clause 5 of the Proposed Bill.

49.  Clause 5 under Part 2 of the Proposed Bill defines “parental responsibility” to mean the responsibilities specified in subsection (2)   thereunder and the rights specified in subsection (3) thereunder.  Subsection (3) states :

“(3) The rights are the rights of a parent—

(a) to have the child living with the parent or otherwise regulate the child’s residence;

(b) to control, direct or guide the child’s upbringing in a manner appropriate to the stage of development of the child;

(c) if the child is not living with the parent, to maintain personal relations and direct contact with the child on a regular basis; and

(d) to act as the child’s legal representative.”

50.  With all the above in mind, I now turn to consider the present case.

Brief Background of the present case

51.  The background of the present case and the hisbory of the  parties’ dispute has been set out in the numerous previous judgments of the Family Court and/or the Court of Appeal. 

52.  Briefly,

(i) The parties met in 2005 and thereafter they started a relationship and they started cohabitation in about 2007.  They were never legally married, although there was a Chinese marriage ceremony in June 2008.

(ii) The Child was born in November 2008.  She will be 9 years old soon.  

(iii) On 10 May 2009, the Mother left home together with the Child who was then 6 months old, apparently over an argument over milk power.

(iv) In March 2010, the Father commenced FCMP 67/2010 seeking custody, care and control of the Child.

(v) Interim ataying access was granted to the Father in October 2010. 

(vi) After a 16 day trial before Deputy Judge George Own, as he then was (“Family Judge”), he handed down a judgment on 5 October 2012 (“05.10.12 Judgment”).  The Mother was granted sole custody, care and control of the Child and the Father was to have general access, with the details to be determined at a further hearing, and in the interim, the then access arrangements were to continue (“Custody Order”).

(vii) The Father had tried to appeal, but without success.

(viii) According to the Father, since May 2013, the Father’s access to the Child has been either cut off, reduced or distorted as a result of the Mother’s repeated unfounded allegations of abuse. 

(ix) The Father said, notwithstanding the Mother’s 1st allegation of abuse, the Father was subsequently granted access under an order dated 13 March 2014, to roughly half a week as follows: (a) one week from Wednesday (from after school or 9:30 am if no school) to Saturday at 9:30 pm; and (b) the second week from Thursday (from after school or 9:30 am if no school) to Sunday at 10:00 am (the “13.03.14 Access Order”).

(x) After the Mother’s 2nd allegation of abuse, there was a temporary interruption of access on 4 June 2015, although eventually the 13.03.14 Access Order was restored.

(xi) The Mother’s 3rd abuse allegation was made in October 2015 and the Mother then applied to vary access on that ground.  The 13.03.14 Access Order appeared to be suspended again and then replaced by (1) first a supervised access order, then (2) by a conditional access order on 31 March 2016, of one day a week, on Saturday from 10 am to 9 pm, conditional on the Father’s compliance with certain undertakings (“31.03.16 Access Order”). The Father made an application to resume access pursuant to the 13.03.14 Access Order.

(xii) The parties’ respective applications ended in another trial in July 2016 with a decision handed down by the Family Judge on 30 September 2016 dismissing both applications, but ordering that unless the Father was to proceed with the general access arrangement per the Custody Order, he would only be entitled to reasonable access (“30.09.16 Decision”).  Suffice to say, the Father is now seeking leave from the Court of Appeal to appeal against the 30.09.16 Decision.

53.  In the course of the above various applications in relation to custody and access of the Child, the Mother has also taken out applications for financial provision for the Child.

54.  Anyway, notwithstanding all the applications, the Father has not been to have any contact with the Child since January 2017.  The Father then decided to issue the present wardship proceedings on 20 April 2017, since when the Child has been a ward of this court.

55.  At the first hearing of these proceedings, on 19 May 2017, this Court granted the Father “interim defined access along the same undertakings and terms of the Order dated 31 March 2016 made in FCMP 67/2010 until further order” (“19.05.17 Access Order”).  The Mother was present at the hearing, although legally unrepresented at the time, but she expressed no objection to the 19.05.17 Access Order,

56.  Notwithstanding the interim access order, the Father has not been able to exercise access, and there are now further applications before this Court.  The Mother’s case is that it is the Child who resists contact with the Father.

The Mother’s grounds of opposition to the present application

57.  In his 1st submissions, Mr Li submitted that, the court retains a discretion under s3 (1)(d) of GMO as to whether to make the order sought, and if so, whether the Father shall have “all” or just “some” of the Rights. He referred to the Court of Appeal’s decision upon refusing the Father’s leave to appeal against the Custody Order, namely CCMJ v SSM, [2013] 3 HKLRD 497, HCMP 178/2013, where the Court of Appeal has said:

“18. The learned judge made the order after expressly considering the principles in Y v P and PD v KWW. Those principles include the court’s recognition that if in a particular case it is clear that joint custody was unworkable, a joint custody order should not be made solely for the purpose of encouraging the parties to overcome their differences or to recognize the continuing role of the parties (Y v P, para 21).  The court would not make a joint custody order as a matter of “wishful thinking”; it must consider the “practical reality” of the situation (para 24).  The court has recognized that “there may be occasions when the ability of the parents to reach any sensible accord in respect of important matters concerning the upbringing of their child is so deeply undermined that to compel attempts at co-operation will not protect the interests of the child but only leave the child more vulnerable” (PD v KWW para 57).

19. In the present case there was ample evidence for the judge to take the view that the father’s overbearing attitude demonstrated in the past 2 years makes cooperation simply “wishful thinking”.  In Rogers VP’s words in Y v P, the father here was determined to “micromanage every aspect and every minutiae of a child’s life”.  This makes a joint custody order impossible.  The statements in the preceding paragraph support the learned judge’s decision not to make a joint custody order.  It cannot be said that the judge had made an error in law or had failed to take any relevant matters into account or that his decision was “plainly wrong”.

58.  Further, Mr Li submitted that the Father’s desire to obtain the Rights will only create more disturbance and chaos to the Child, especially when it is unclear as to why the Father would wish to ask for such an order and what he wants to do with such an order in the practical terms.

59.  In his 2nd submissions, Mr Li referred to the two cases H v N and PD and KWW cited earlier and what was stated/quoted by this court earlier.  Mr Li submitted that a sole custodian parent has the final decisions on the major matters concerning the upbringing and day to day activities of a child and the non-custodian parent does not have the right to decide on those matters nor the right to veto; however, the non-custodian parent still retains the right to be consulted and to have his/her views considered and this hierarchy serves to prioritise the decision making process so that the custodian parent can made the final decision without the need of coming to court for every disagreement between the parents.

60.  What Mr Li submitted is correct in relation to the differences between sole custody and joint custody, as explained by Hartmann JA in PD v KWW,but the present application is not in relation to custody, but to the Rights.

61.  In any event, in the case of a mother who is the sole custodian of a child born within wedlock, and who will be able to make the final decision on the upbringing and day to day activities of the child, the non-custodian father of a child born within wedlock will still have the right to be consulted, and if necessary, the parent can make an application to the court to prevent the custodian parent in carrying out any decisions which the non-custodian parent may consider unreasonable.  Further, even a sole custodian mother of a child born within wedlock will still need to make an application to the court for leave to permanently remove the child out of jurisdiction of the court and the father does have a right to veto in such an application.

62.  Without over-simplying it, when the parents of a child born within wedlock are unable to agree on a matter relating to the upbringing of the child, the burden of making an application to the court will be on the non-custodian parent.  Thus, even in a high conflict case between parents of a child born within wedlock, the need of coming to court for every disagreement between them may not necessarily be reduced by one parent being granted sole custody.

63.  As Mr Coleman and Ms Wong pointed out in their submissions, Mr Li’s submissions on behalf of the Mother in fact highlight the Mother’s attitude and approach towards the present application, and as described by the Father’s Counsel, it is an “wholly inapt approach which centres on exclusion of the Father in all respects”.

64.  The Father has already complained that the Mother had been keeping him in the dark in respect of the Child’s upbringing[20] and had further been very hostile and uncooperative when the Father asked her about the schooling matters of the Child and in particular she had kept him in the dark about the Child being required to repeat Primary 1 in the summer of 2015.

65.  In any event, a custody, care and control, or access order, even if said to be “final”, this does not necessarily mean that an order expressed as such will bring finality to the matter, since in relation to a child, a parent can make an application for variation, where there is a material change of circumstances.  The Father has in the present proceedings again applied for custody, care and control of the Child, and if he is not granted the Rights, it may be argued that he is not even entitled to make such an application, or indeed any application for access. 

66.  To be fair to the Mother, she has not sought to argue this whether in these proceedings, or so far as I am aware, or in the proceedings in the Family Court.  In fact, the fact that Mother has not sought to put forward such arguments is also in my view indicative of the fact that the Mother has never really challenged that the Father possesses parental rights and authority, until now.

67.  Mr Li referred to the protracted litigation between the parties and the Father’s litigation conduct which, as observed by the Family Judge posed a genuine concern not only with the Mother but also with the Family Judge, and that the Court of Appeal lately also saw fit to order indemnity costs against the Father in dismissing his application for leave to appeal against the Financial Order, as defined below.

68.  Mr Li referred to the 05.10.12 Judgment and emphasized   what was said by the Family Judge therein, namely that the Father was challenging the Mother on virtually all aspects over the child care given to the Child as he possibly could.

69.  Mr Li also referred to the various social welfare reports and psychologist’s reports relied on by the Family Judge in the 05.10.12 Judgment and had submitted that the Father’s tendency to challenge the Mother and the court orders did not stop, and that he continued to be as obstructive as possible in respect of the Child’s financial provisions and access issues. 

70.  The Family Judge made an order for financial provision and a settlement order of a property known as One Silver Sea Property (“Property”) on 5 June 2015 (“Financial Order”) which, as mentioned earlier, the Father had sought leave to appeal, and which was dismissed by the Court of Appeal with indemnity costs and this was on 7 December 2015.  Apparently, the Father failed to comply with the settlement part of the Financial Order and the Mother had to seek a possession order, and eventually on 3 March 2017, the Father was ordered to deliver vacant possession of the Property.  Apparently, recently, in April 2017, the Mother then made a further application, seeking renovation costs of the Property.

71.  Since the Custody Order, the Father had already made one application for variation before the Family Judge, apart from his leave applications to appeal, and these proceedings.

72.  So far as access is concerned, as mentioned earlier, by now, the Father has not been able to have access to the Child for more than 9 months and so far, the 19.05.17 Access Order has not been complied with by the Mother.

73.  Mr Li complained of the Father’s litigation conduct.  I can only say at this preliminary stage, it takes two to litigate, and there seems to be serious hostility between the parties. 

74.  Mr Li submitted that given the Father’s determination to micromanage every aspect and every minutiae of the Child’s life, his desire to obtain the Rights will only create more disturbance and chaos to the Child, especially when it is unclear as to why the Father would wish to ask for such rights.

75.  Even if it may appear that the Father was over controlling or micromanaging, this is not a sufficient reason for him to be excluded from the Child’s life or have no parental rights.

76.  Anyway, in my view, the Mother’s objections are misconceived.  The fact is that the Mother has been granted sole custody, care and control, and this means the Mother continues to have the right to make the final decision on matters relating to the upbringing of the Child, and whether the Father is granted the Rights or not, this will not affect the Mother’s sole custodian rights.  Further, as Mr Li has submitted that the Father has the right to be consulted, this seems to this court to be a concession by the Mother that the Father does have rights, since the right to be consulted is part of the Rights.

The 3 Factors in Re H

The 1st Factor : Degree of commitment

77.  It is the Father’s case that all along he has been loving and caring towards the Child and has been fulfilling his duties as a father and had been actively involved in every aspect of the Child’s living, prior to his access completely being blocked off by the Mother since the last access on 21 January 2017.  The Father had staying access since the Child was less than 2 years old, and recognizing the positive role the Father played in the Child’s growing up, his access had steadily increased since 2010, to roughly half a week under the 13.04.14 Access Order and such access was suspended respectively followed the Mother’s 2nd abuse allegation on 30 May 2015 and her 3rd abuse allegation on 24 October 2015.  Both allegations were found to be unsubstantiated by Multi-disciplinary case conference/MDCC and in fact the Father was found to be a loving and concerned father.

78.  The Father’s case is that he has also been paying for the Child’s financial provision both prior to and after the Financial Order.  The Financial Order provides that he has to pay maintenance for the Child of HK$13,726 per month and carer’s allowance of HK$10,000 per month, plus undertaking to pay other expenses of the Child including all extra-curricular activities expenses not exceeding HK$10,000 per month.

79.  It is further the Father’s case that all of the Child’s schooling from playgroup to her current primary school was arranged through his efforts. In terms of health, the Child’s health issues were addressed and attended by the Father promptly and prudently.

80.  I note in the Social Welfare Report dated 17 July 2012, the social welfare officer Ms Ma has observed, that “事實上,陳先生對女兒的各種需要均無微不至,在生活及學習上亦提供經濟支持,盡力為女兒作好榜樣。”[21].

2nd Factor: Attachment between the Father and the Child

81.  The Father’s case is that the Child has been very close to him throughout the years as observed by many professionals, among others, and as evidenced by various photos of the Child smiling.

82.  The Child can be seen smiling broadly in seeing the Father on 3 September 2014 when he picked her up from school and when the Mother was not present[22].

83.  In the Social Welfare Report dated 18 June 2014, the social welfare officer Miss Kiu observed, “Dr Bill TSANG, Counselling Psychologist of Human Empowerment and Achievement Training, Caritas Family Services, was contacted over phone.  Dr TSANG observed that [the Child] had positive emotional response to her father who was supportive and resourceful to the girl’s cognitive and health development.”[23].

84.  The Child told the social welfare officer Miss Kiu when they were alone that “she was very afraid of being scolded by her mother who always scolded her.  When asked to give the details, [the Child] at first replied that she had forgotten them.  She then mentioned that her mother once scolded her for lying when she said that she would like to go to her father’s home.  The girl added that she was telling the truth and she did want to live with her father.  [The Child] said that when she did something wrong, her father would reason with her and that he had never scolded her.”[24].

85.  Mr Coleman submitted that the Child’s close attachment to the Father can also be seen from what she told the specialist in psychiatry Dr Gabriel Hung when they two met alone[25]:

(a) “[The Child] said she dares not to tell her mother that she loves her father, because her mother gets mad and punished her.”;

(b) “One time, she told her mother she loves her father.  Her mother scolded and punished her by forcing her to hold her ears and stand outside the main door of her mother’s home.  She was forced to stand there alone for a long time and she was very scared in the quiet corridor.”;

(c) “[The Child] said that she loves both her mother and father.  She said that her father never asked her who she loved more.  She said that her father told her to Love both her mother and father.”;

(d) “On one occasion, [the Child] told her mother that she missed her father.  Her mother got mad at her and did not allow her to go to dance class as a way to punish her and did not allow her to listen to her father’s phone calls.”; and

(e) “[The Child] said she is excited when she can go back to her father’s home.  However, she needs to hide the excitement from her mother or else her mother would get mad at her.”

86.  Mr Coleman also referred to consistent observations  mentioned by the government clinical psychologist Miss Irene Cheung in her report done for the MDCC[26].

87.  The Child is also said to be very close to the Father’s parents. The Child has also been close to the Father’s other family members. During each of the Saturday access periods since 2 April 2016, the Child was very relaxed and playful, and getting along very well with the Father, her cousins, her aunts, her uncles and nephews.  In addition to playing, the Father and the Child also had a good time in doing revision or practice for various subjects.  There was no objective evidence to contradict what was alleged by the Father.

3rd Factor: Reasons for the Father’s application

88.  The Father alleges that the Mother has been abusing her parental rights to the detriment of the Child.  The Child has been deprived, is being deprived, of having the Father properly participating in her upbringing.  

89.  The Father also complains that the Mother did not even tell him about the status of the Child in seeing the clinical psychologist Mr Lam from the Social Welfare Department, nor the Child’s performance at school.  In particular, the Father complains:

(a) Education: As mentioned earlier, the Mother did not inform the Father the Child was required to repeat Primary 1. 

(b) Medical: The Mother complained through her lawyers that the Father should not be taking the Child to seek medical treatment during his access without her consent.

(c) Choice of school: The Mother instructed her solicitors to write to say unless the Father would withdraw his custody variation application the Child could not take part in the 41 School Net Primary One Allotment (POA). Although the Father helped the Child to be accepted by many private schools, the Mother never allowed the Father to take part in deciding the school for the Child. 

(d) Religion: The Mother baptised the Child without even informing the Father.

90.  The Father further complains that the Mother has been alienating the Child from the Father as well as keeping the Father in dark in respect of the Child’s upbringing, thus creating more conflict between the parties.

Other considerations

91.  There is no doubt that this is a high conflict case, and that unless the parties’ hostility towards each other is to be reduced, there will be continuing litigation between the parties.  The Child is now said by the Mother to be reluctant or unwilling to see the Father, after allegedly being scolded by the Father.  However, as seen earlier, the Father had had regular access to the Child.  Even though there was an issue over the delivery of the Property, there was no sufficient evidence to contradict what the Father has said, namely that all along he has been paying maintenance for the Child.

92.  In any event, as submitted by the Father’s Counsel, the Mother has introduced no objective evidence to refute the various evidence of the Father showing (i) his strong commitment towards the Child, (ii) the strong attachment existed between the Father and the Child and (iii) the Mother has been abusing her parental rights.

93.  Having considered the present evidence before the Court, I am of the view that the Father has satisfied this court of the 3 Factors in Re H. In my view, the Father has shown ample attachment and commitment to the Child, and as said by Balcombe LJ in Re E, an order for him to have all the Rights would be prima facie for the welfare of the Child, (or for her interest) and the Mother has to come up with cogent evidence that the Child’s welfare would be adversely affected by the making of such an order.  In my view, the Mother has not been able to come up with such evidence. 

94.  Section 12 of the Births and Deaths Registration Ordinance, Cap 174, provides for the registration of father of illegitimate child as follows:

“(1) Notwithstanding sections 7 to 10, in the case of an illegitimate child—

(a) no person shall, as father of the child, be required to give information concerning the birth of the child; and

(b) there shall not be registered in the register the name of any person as father of the child, except in the circumstances provided in subsection (2).

(2) The circumstances referred to in subsection (1)(b) are —

(a) at the joint request of the mother and the person stating himself to be the father of the child; or

(b) at the request of the mother on production of —

(i) a declaration made by the mother stating that that person is the father of the child; and

(ii) a statutory declaration made by that person stating himself to be the father of the child; or

(c) at the request of that person on production of —

(i) a declaration by that person stating himself to be the father of the child; and

(ii) a statutory declaration made by the mother stating that that person is the father of the child; or

(d) at the request of the mother or that person on production of —

(i) a certified copy of a relevant order; and

(ii) if the child has attained the age of 16 years, the written consent of the child to the registration of that person as his father.

(3) In this section and in section 12A, “relevant order” (有關命令), in relation to a request under subsection (2)(d) that the name of any person be entered in the register as father of a child, means any of the following orders, namely —

(a) a declaration of a court under Part IV of the Parent and Child Ordinance (Cap 429) that the person is or was the father of the child;

(b) an order of a court under the Guardianship of Minors Ordinance (Cap 13) —

(i) under section 3(1)(d) granting that person any right or authority in relation to the child;

(ii) under section 10(1) granting that person custody of or access to the child; or

(iii)  under section 10(2) requiring that person to make any lump sum or periodical payment in respect of the minor. (Amended 32 of 2000 s14) (c) (Repealed 32 of 2000 s14) …”

95.  The Father is stated to be the informant of the Child’s birth on the Child’s birth certificate and he signed as father of the Child thereby acknowledging he is the father of the Child.  This alone would have entitled him to acquire all the Rights under the Proposed Bill if it comes into effect. In any event, there is no challenge to the Father being the father of the Child under s3(1)(d) of GMO, and I am so satisfied.

96.  Notwithstanding submitting that this court has no discretion to grant the Father only some of the Rights, the Mother has not actually come up with what of the Rights should not be granted.  Nor have any authorities be shown to this court where only some of the Rights have been granted.  The Child clearly has a close relationship with the Father until the incident in January 2017.  She is fully aware that the Father is her father, and in my view and bearing in mind the Equality Principle, to have a father with some rights and not other rights, and a mother with all the rights, will cause even more confusion and chaos in the Child’s life and cannot be said to be in the best interests or the welfare of the Child.  There was no cogent evidence from the Mother that the Child’s interests or welfare would be adversely affected by an order granting the Father all the Rights.

97.  Having considered all the above and all the circumstances of this case, I am of the view that it is in the Child’s best interests for the Father to be granted all the Rights under s3 (1)(d) of GMO. 

98.  It was held in Re P (Child: Parental Responsibility Order) [1993] 2 FCR 689 that an order for parental responsibility under s4(1)(a) of the Children Act 1989 gave the unmarried father no power to override the decision of the mother, and that it was important to be clear that an order for parental responsibility to the father did not give him a right to interfere in matters within the day-to day management of the child’s life[27].

99.  In the present case, similarly, and as I have said earlier, giving the Father all the Rights under s3 (1)(d) of GMO would not give him any power to override the decision of the Mother who holds sole custodian rights, and that he will only have a right to be consulted on matters of consequence that relates to the Child’s upbringing, plus all others of the Rights.

Order

100.  I order that the Father shall have all of the rights and authority that the law would allow him as father if the Child were legitimate.

101.  As for costs in children cases, there is generally no order as to costs unless one party has been unreasonable in the litigation.  In my view, the Mother has opposed this application unreasonably.  She regarded the application as a custody application and was contradictory as she conceded that the Father does have a right to be consulted over major matters concerning the Child.  She was unable to say what rights the Father should not have.  The Father obviously does not fall into that category of fathers who had played no part in the Child’s life.  Having considered her grounds of opposition, in my view, the Mother should bear the costs of this application.  I am aware that the Mother is under legal aid, but that does not entitle her to oppose an application unreasonably.  I therefore order that the Father’s costs of this application be paid by the Mother, to be taxed and paid forthwith. The Mother’s own costs be taxed under legal aid regulations.  This is an order nisi, to be made absolute after 21 days.

(Bebe Pui Ying Chu)
Judge for the Court of First Instance
High Court

 

Mr Russell Coleman SC and Ms Athena Wong, instructed by Chan & Chan, for the plaintiff

Mr Kevin Li, instructed by Stevenson Wong & Co, for the defendant



[1] See also para 6, pg 2 of the 1991 Report defined later in the judgment

[2] Similar to s 10 of GMO

[3] At pg 218

[4] At pg 218

[5] At D-F, pg 716, Re E

[6] At pg 16 of the 1991 Report

[7] See para 2.22, pg 16, 1991 Report, and see Pegg, (1983) HKLJ 358

[8] See para 2.23, supra

[9] See para 1, pg 1, 1991 Report

[10] See para 5.7, pg 50, 1991 Report

[11] See discussions from 5.8 – 5.16, pgs 50-53, 1991 Report

[12] See para 5.9, pg 50, 1991 Report, and see also Scottish Law Commission Report No 82, at para 2.5

[13] See para 1.2 of the 2005 Report

[14] At para 18, pg 505

[15] At para 47

[16] At paras 19-20, pgs 505-506

[17] At para 4.57, at pg 38, 1991 Report

[18] At para 2.18, pg15, 1991 Report; see also Pegg: Family Law in Hong Kong, second edition, at pg 193

[19] At pg 19, 2005 Report, and see also footnote 8

[20] B:99 paras 103-105

[21] Para 21, C:150

[22] See DII: 460

[23] C:181, para 28

[24] C:179, para 20

[25] D(II):446, paras 7.10-7.15, Dr Hung’s Report

[26] D(II): 451

[27] See Holding on pg 690