CHEUNG SAU LIN 對 TSUI WAH EFFORD MANAGEMENT LTD

HCPI 505/2017

[2021] HKCFI 2871

香港特別行政區

高等法院原訟法庭

民事司法管轄權

傷亡訴訟2017年第505號

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判決書

I. 背景

1.  本訟案是一宗人身傷害的訴訟。原告人於2016年10月27日獲發法律援助證書，就她於2014年8月22日在意外中受傷一事提出法律程序以申索賠償，而法律援助署 (下稱「法援署」) 署長已委派柯廣耀、劉慧兒律師事務所為受助人代表律師。

2.  於2017年5月16日，原告人經其代表律師在本訟案入稟法庭，指稱她於2014年8月22日在其工作場所的廚房入口絆倒及跌倒，因而弄傷雙膝及右手 (下稱「該意外」)，其後亦被診斷患上適應障礙症併發憂鬱情緒 (adjustment disorder with depressed mood)，因此原告人向被告人 (即其前僱主) 就上述工傷意外追討賠償、利息及訟費。

3.  於同一天，原告人經其代表律師存檔其損害賠償陳述書及其醫療報告。該損害賠償陳述書作訴指稱，被告人應向原告人支付港幣3,320,618.00元的損害賠償，而上述賠償金額並未扣除原告人已收的僱員補償，亦未包括相關利息。

4.  於2017年6月12日，李炳剛區紹恩律師行存檔擬行事通知書，通知法庭他們在本訟案代表被告人。

5.  經雙方同意下，法庭於同一天登錄非正審判決，判決被告人就法律責任方面敗訴，而被告人須賠償予原告人有待評定的損害賠償及計算至2016年10月11日有關法律責任方面的訟費，如果雙方未能同意訟費數額，便有待訟費評定官評定。

6.  就評定損害賠償方面的案件管理事宜，專責人身傷亡的案件聆案官於2017年10月31日及2018年3月20日頒下案件管理指示，指令原被告雙方提呈有關證據：

(1)  原告人須送達她本人的證人陳述書，而被告人須送達其人事部劉婉華女士 (下稱「劉女士」) 的證人陳述書；

(2)  原告人委聘的骨科醫學專家Dr Tio Man Kwan Peter (下稱「Dr Tio」) 及被告人委聘的骨科醫學專家Dr Chun Siu Yeung (下稱「Dr Chun」) 須撰寫聯合骨科醫學專家報告；

(3)  原告人委聘的精神科醫學專家Dr Kwok Wai Ming Henry (下稱「Dr Kwok」) 及被告人委聘的精神科醫學專家Dr Yu Wai Tak (下稱「Dr Yu」) 須撰寫精神科醫學專家報告。

7.  於2018年5月21日，原告人經其代表律師存檔其經編正的損害賠償陳述書。原告人依據該經編正的損害賠償陳述書向被告人追討的賠償共港幣3,565,803.04元。

8.  於2018年7月9日，法援署署長存檔委派律師通知書，通知法庭已委派大律師出任受助人 (即原告人) 的大律師。

9.  於2018年7月18日，被告人經其代表律師存檔關於該經編正的損害賠償陳述書的回答書，反對該陳述書中作訴的賠償項目及金額。

10.  於2018年8月29日及11月6日，專責人身傷亡案件的聆案官頒下進一步案件管理指示，原被告雙方提呈進一步證據：

(1)  原告人委聘的骨科醫學專家Dr Tio及被告人委聘的骨科醫學專家Dr Chun須撰寫補充聯合骨科醫學專家報告；

(2)  原告人委聘的精神科醫學專家Dr Kwok及被告人委聘的精神科醫學專家Dr Yu須撰寫補充聯合精神科醫學專家報告。

11.  於2018年11月6日，經雙方同意下，專責人身傷亡案件的聆案官頒下指示，上述醫學專家報告及補充報告可作為呈堂證據而無需傳召醫學專家出庭作證。

12.  於2018年12月11日，原告人經其代表律師存檔「Notice of Appointment of Assessment of Damages Before Master」，述明高等法院聆案官周敏慧已訂定於2019年6月24-26日進行評定損害賠償之聆訊。

13.  於2019年5月28日，法援署署長存檔「取消法律援助證書」，通知法庭法援署已於當天取消於2016年10月27日發給原告人的法律援助證書。

14.  於2019年6月24-26日，本訟案的評定損害賠償聆訊在周聆案官席前進行。在評定損害賠償聆訊的第1天，原告人向法庭呈交一封由她的精神科醫生撰寫的信件，信件日期為2019年6月21日。該信件證明她那時經歷情緒危困 (emotional crisis)，精神上並不適宜如期出席聆訊。周聆案官要求原告人看看病情會否於服藥及休息後好轉，將聆訊押後至第2天。原告人於第2天出席聆訊時，沒有提出任何有關處理聆訊的困難。原告人和劉女士在庭上作供。周聆案官考慮了他們的證供、原被告雙方的醫學專家報告及補充報告、原告人的各項醫療報告及記錄、以及其他文件證據。

15.  於2019年8月9日，周聆案官頒下評定損害賠償的判決書 (下稱「9/8/19判決書」)，在扣除預先付款港幣33,852元後，周聆案官判給原告人的損害賠償為港幣59,146.80元。

16.  依據9/8/19判決書，周聆案官頒下日期為2019年8月9日的評定損害賠償後最終判決 (Final Judgment After Assessment of Damanges) (下稱「9/8/19判決」) 如下：

「This Plaintiff having on the 16^th day of June 2017 obtained interlocutory judgment herein against the Defendant for damages to be assessed with costs, and the amount found due from the Defendant to the Plaintiff having been certified at $59,146.80 together with interest on Pain, Suffering and Loss of Amenities (PSLA) at 2% per annum from the date of service of Writ (i.e 16^th May 2017) and at half the judgment rate on the award for pre-trial loss of earnings from the date of Accident and costs as appears by the Certificate of Master Chow filed on the 15^th day of November 2019.

IT IS THIS DAY ADJUDGED that:-

1. The Defendant do pay the Plaintiff damages assessed in the sum of $59,146,80;

2. The Defendant do pay the Plaintiff interests at 2% per annum on the award for PSLA from the date of service of Writ (i.e. 16^th May 2017) and at half the judgment rate on the award for pre-trial loss of earnings from the date of Accident (while no interest is awarded to Special Damages);

3. There be an order nisi that:-

(a) costs of the hearing on 24^th June 2019, with certificate for counsel, be paid by the Plaintiff to the Defendant at High Court scale; and

(b) subject to (a) above, costs of the assessment, including all costs reserved, to be paid by the Defendant to the Plaintiff at the District Court scale,

such costs to be taxed if not agreed.」

9/8/19判決第3段是周聆案官作出的暫准訟費命令 (下稱「該暫准訟費令」)。

17.  於2019年8月22日，被告人經其代表律師存檔傳票申請 (下稱「22/8/19傳票」)，要求修改周聆案官頒下9/8/19判決中的該暫准訟費令如下：

(1)  修改9/8/19判決中的該暫准訟費令，以下述內容取代 (並成為絕對訟費命令)：-

(i)  被告人需按訴訟各方對評基準，支付原告人直至2017年7月11日在本訟案之中的訟費，包括所有保留訟費，訟費需以區域法院訟費表計算，若雙方未能就訟費數額達成協議，則留待法庭評定；

(ii)  原告人需按彌償基準，支付被告人由2017年7月12日起直至評定損害賠償完結時在本訟案中的訟費連同大律師證書，包括所有保留訟費，訟費需以高等法院訟費表計算，若雙方未能就訟費數額達成協議，則留待法庭評定；

(iii)  原告人需向被告人支付22/8/19傳票附錄所列之代墊付費用 (如雙方未能就金額達成協議，則由法庭按彌償基準評定) 由2017年7月12日起直至2019年8月9日之加強利息，即是按每年5%之利率計算，其後需按判定利率計算，直至該代墊付費用完全清繳為止；

(iv)  原告人在法律援助被取消之前，其本身的訟費，需根據第91A章《法律援助條例》評定。

(2)  9/8/19判決中疼痛、痛苦和喪失生活情趣的損失賠償之利息應修改為自原訴令狀送達日期起直至2017年7月11日，按每年2%的利率就該賠償金額計算利息，但在2017年7月11日之後，該賠償金額不附帶任何利息；

(3)  9/8/19判決所判定的審訊前之收入損失賠償之利息應修改為自該意外發生日期起直至2017年7月11日，按判定利率的一半就該賠償金額計算利息，但在2017年7月11日後，該賠償金額不附帶任何利息；

(4)  法庭立即從被告人在2017年6月12日作出的附帶條款付款之港幣365,939.07元當中，透過法援署署長，向原告人支付該判決款項港幣59,477.71元 (包括以上述第 (2)-(3) 點所指的利息)，此安排受制於法援署署長的第一押記；

(5)  法庭立即從該附帶條款付款的剩餘款額港幣306,461.36元連同其利息 (如有的話) 透過被告人的代表律師支付予被告人。

22/8/19傳票的附錄列出上述第 1(iii)點提及的代墊支費用，即Dr Chun撰寫醫學專家報告及補充專家報告的費用，[1] Dr Yu撰寫醫學專家報告及補充專家報告的費用，[2]調解費用，[3]及大律師費用， [4]合共港幣386,000.00元。

18.  於同一天，被告人經其代表律師存檔其律師區紹恩 (下稱「區律師」) 的誓詞 (下稱「區1誓詞」)，用以支持22/8/19傳票的申請。

19.  區律師指稱，於2016年10月11日，即在本訟案之法律程序展開之前，被告人通過其保險公司 (下稱「保險公司」) 提出和解建議，建議和解金額為港幣400,000.00元 (包括被告人已經支付的僱員補償) (下稱「訴訟前和解建議」)。於2016年10月12日，原告人要求保險公司提出一個尚未包含僱員補償付款的和解建議，保險公司於同一天拒絕了該項要求。原告人於2017年5月16日發出本訟案的傳訊令狀。

20.  區律師指出，在本訟案之法律程序展開之後，被告人於2017年6月12日將一筆港幣365,939.07元款項 (下稱「該附帶條款付款」) (除原告人已收到的僱員補償金港幣34,060.93元預付款項以外) 支付至法院，而於2017年6月13日將在2017年6月12日存檔的相關附帶條款付款通知書送達予原告人。根據第4A章《高等法院規則》 (下稱「該規則」) 第22號命令第22(2)條規則，該附帶條款付款是於附帶條款付款通知書送達原告人當天 (即2017年6月13日) 作出的。按該規則第22號命令第15(1)條規則規定，不需經法庭批准而接受該附帶條款付款的28天期限於2017年7月11日屆滿 (該期限是自2017年6月13日作出該附帶條款付款時開始計算)。原告人並沒有在規定時間內接受該附帶條款付款，該附帶條款付款港幣365,939.07元仍存放於法庭。

21.  區律師指稱，原告人的法律援助證書於2019年5月28日被撤銷 (見上述第13段)。於2019年6月20日，即在評定損害賠償的聆訊展開前不久，原告人透過其前代表律師提出和解建議，建議和解金額為港幣1,350,000.00元 (當中已包括利息，但尚未包括原告人已經收到的僱員補償港幣33,852.00元)，但保險公司不接受此項和解建議。

22.  區律師指出，9/8/19判決書第89段指出原告人收到的僱員補償金額 (港幣33,852.00元) 與上述附帶條款付款通知書所示的港幣34,060.93元有所出入。根據被告人的經編正損害賠償陳述書之回答書第35段所指，原告人已收到港幣33,852.00元，這亦是法庭在該判決採納的金額。港幣33,852.00元這個金額是根據意外發生時被告人高級人事經理劉女士的證人陳述書的內容計算出來的，劉女士的證人陳述書第7(1) - (4)段載列給原告人的按期付款合共港幣33,852.00元 (港幣2,604.00元 + 港幣11,160.00元 + 港幣8,184.00元 + 港幣11,904.00元)，但上述附帶條款付款通知書則指出原告人已收取港幣34,060.93元。因此，該判決與附帶條款付款通知書之間存在港幣208.93元的差異。區律師指稱，原告人沒有在損害賠償評估的聆訊中質疑劉女士的證據，法庭也採納了劉女士的證據，因此區律師認為，港幣208.93元這個小差額不應是拒絕向被告人給予彌償基準訟費的理由，理由是原告人未能取得比該附帶條款付款更佳的判決，且判決的賠償金額與該附帶條款付款的金額有一大段距離。周聆案官於9/8/19判決書第89段裁定，原告人可得的賠償合共港幣59,146.80元 (經扣除預先付款金額港幣33,852.00元)。

23.  區律師指稱，自本訟案的傳訊令狀送達日期起，應按每年2%的利率對疼痛、痛苦和喪失生活情趣的損失賠償計算利息；另應自該意外發生日期起，按判定利率的一半 (即 4.0625%) 對審訊前的收入損失賠償計算利息。因此，應支付予原告人的利息總額為港幣330.91元，其計算方法如下：-

(1)  從2017年5月16日至2017年7月11日之疼痛、痛苦和喪失生活情趣損失的利息

港幣70,000元 x 57/365 x 2% = 港幣218.63元

(2)  審訊前收入損失的利息

港幣17,698.80元 x 57/365 x 4.0625% = 港幣112.28元

(1) + (2) = 港幣330.91元

因此，被告人應支付予原告人的總金額為港幣59,477.71元 (港幣59,146.80元的判決金額 + 港幣330.91元的利息)。區律師認為，原告人未能獲得比訴訟前和解建議及該附帶條款付款更佳的結果。

24.  在以上前提下，被告人聲稱，原告人只能按訴訟各方對評基準，並根據區域法院訟費表計算，獲得直到2017年7月11日在本訟案中的訟費，包括所有保留訟費，若雙方未能就訟費數額達成協議，則留待法庭評定。另外，區律師又認為，依據該規則第22號命令第23(4)(a)條規則，被告人有權按彌償基準申請訟費命令。故此，被告人要求原告人按彌償基準，支付被告人由2017年7月12日起在本訟案中的訟費連同大律師證書，包括所有保留訟費，訟費需以高等法院訟費表計算，若雙方未能就訟費數額達成協議，則留待法庭評定。被告人亦要求，原告人在法律援助被取消之前，其本身的訟費，應該根據第91A章《法律援助條例》評定。

25.  區律師指稱，由於被告人應支付予原告人的金額為港幣59,477.71元 (港幣59,146.80元判決金額 + 港幣330.91元利息)，被告人請求立即從存放於法庭的該附帶條款付款港幣365,939.07元當中撥款，透過法援署署長，向原告人發放港幣59,477.71元，此安排受制於法援署署長的第一押記，而該附帶條款付款的剩餘款額港幣306,461.36元連同其利息 (如有的話) 立即透過被告人的代表律師發放予被告人。

26.  區律師指出，就22/8/19傳票的附錄所提及被告人已經支付的代墊付費用，被告人亦要求加強利息。根據該規則第22號命令第23(4)(b) 條規則，被告人有權向法庭申請頒令按不高於判定利率10%的利率計算訟費的利息。在本訟案中，被告人由2017年7月11日之後至作出9/8/19判決之日為止，支付的代墊付費用合共港幣386,000.00元，其詳情列於22/8/19傳票的附錄 (見上述第17段)，而區1誓詞亦附上相關發票、繳款單及付款函件的副本為證物。就該代墊付費用 (如雙方未能就金額達成協議，則由法庭按彌償基準評定)，被告人要求從2017年7月12日起直至2019年8月9日之加強利息，即是按每年 5% 之利率計算，其後需按判定利率計算，直至該代墊付費用完全清繳為止。

27.  於2019年9月4日，法援署署長存檔通知申請法援的備忘錄，述明原告人作為本訟案的與訟人已申請法援「to prosecute an appeal against the assessment of damages dated 9 August 2019」。

28.  於2019年9月5日，原告人就9/8/19判決向上訴法庭提出上訴，並在CACV413/2019一案呈交上訴通知書 (下稱「CACV上訴通知書」)。CACV上訴通知書內的上訴理由針對 (1) 周聆案官評定損害賠償的判決及 (2) 評定損害賠償的聆訊第1天押後所牽涉的訟費，並要求上訴法庭作出如下的命令：

「1.  被告人需就原告人於2014年8月22日發生的意外向原告人賠償HK$3,396,580.00連利息；

2. 被告人需向原告人支付所有有關損害賠償評估的訟費，包括所有保留訟費，以高等法院基準計算。」

29.  CACV上訴通知書指稱周聆案官犯了若干事實裁斷及 / 或推斷的錯誤及頒下錯誤的訟費命令，並述明其上訴理由如下：

「上訴理由：

1. 周敏慧聆案官在2019年6月24-26日之損害賠償評估聆訊犯了以下錯誤：

1.1 不合理地拒絕接受原告人有關她的痛楚及苦況的口供

1.2 不合理地拒絕接受原告人主診醫生發出的實際病假 (主診醫生給予超過五年的病假紙，包括雙重假紙)

1.3 沒有充分考慮原告人主診醫生對原告人的診斷結果

1.4 不合理拒絕接受原告人骨科專家張醫生的專家證據

1.5 不合理地拒絕接受原告人精神科專家郭醫生的專家證據 (拒絕接受醫生有效證明原告人患有精神病) (原告人在周敏慧聆案官發出判詞後已書面證明因本案件而患上精神病) (主診醫生給予三年零二個月的病假紙)

1.6 不合理地基於原告人的情況沒有改善但仍然繼續接受治療推斷原告人覆診是為了獲得病假紙

1.7 不合理地作出原告人右手及雙膝傷勢輕微和精神症狀只有極輕微病徵的裁定

1.8 不合理地作出原告人可以重操故業的裁定

1.9 不合理地作出原告人誇大傷勢

2. 基於以上錯誤，加上忽略了第一天的休庭並沒有令損害賠償評估聆訊超過，周敏慧聆案官錯誤地裁定原告人需向被告人支付2019年6月24日以高等法院基準計算之訟費包括大律師費用，周敏慧聆案官其實應裁定被告人需向原告人支付所有有關損害賠償評估的訟費，包括所有保留訟費，以高等法基準計算。」

CACV上訴通知書亦附上北大嶼山醫院精神科Cheng Ka Fai醫生的日期為2019年8月23日證書，述明「[this] is to certified that the sick leaves issued to this patient from this clinic are all valid」。

30.  於2019年9月10日，被告人存檔傳票申請 (下稱「10/9/19傳票」)，要求將22/8/19傳票第4段所提及的港幣49,477.71元 (見上述第17(4)段) 更改為港幣61,443.68元，並將22/8/19傳票第5段提及的港幣306,461.36元 (見上述第17(5)段) 更改為港幣304,495.39元。

31.  於同一天，被告人存檔區律師的第2份誓詞 (下稱「區2誓詞」)，用以支持10/9/19傳票的申請。區律師指出，區1誓詞第15(b)段存在計算錯誤。根據9/8/19判決，應自該意外發生日期起，按判定利率的一半 (即4.0625%) 對審訊前的收入損失計算利息，原告人審訊前收入損失的利息為港幣2,078.25元。審訊前收入損失的利息的正確計法如下：-

審訊前收入損失的利息 (由2014年8月22日至2017年7月11日)

(即該意外發生日期起至不需經法庭許可而接受該附帶條款付款的最後一天) [5]

港幣17,698.80元 x 1,055/365 x 4.0625% = 港幣2,078.25元

如區1誓詞第15(a)段所示，疼痛、痛苦和喪失生活情趣的損失賠償之利息為港幣218.63元。因此，應支付予原告人的利息總額為港幣2,296.88元 (港幣218.63元 + 港幣2,078.25元)。

32.  區律師指出，區1誓詞第16段所示的數字並不正確 (見上述第23及25段)。在以上前提下，應支付給原告人的款項總額為港幣61,443.68元 (港幣59,146.80元的判決金額 + 港幣2,296.88元的利息)，原告人未能取得比訴訟前和解建議及該附帶條款付款更佳的判決。區律師指稱，由於上述計算錯誤，區1誓詞第20-21段所列數字並不正確，應支付予原告人的金額實為港幣61,443.68元。因此，被告人請求法庭立即從該附帶條款付款的港幣365,939.07元當中，透過法援署署長，向原告人支付港幣61,443.68元，此安排受制於法援署署長的第一押記。被告人亦要求法庭立即從該附帶條款付款的剩餘款額港幣304,495.39元連同其利息 (如有的話) 透過被告人的代表律師支付予被告人。

33.  於2019年11月15日，法援署署長存檔拒絕法律援助的申請通知備忘錄，述明已拒絕為原告人在本訟案提供法律援助。

34.  於2019年12月27日，22/8/19及10/9/19傳票於周聆案官席前進行聆訊。被告人代表律師及法援署代表律師皆出席當天聆訊，但原告人卻缺席聆訊。周聆案官於當天就上述傳票頒下如下的案件管理指示：

「1. There be leave to the Plaintiff and the Director of Legal Aid to file and serve affirmation in opposition within 21 days from the date of service of this Order;

2. There be leave to the Defendant to file and serve affirmation in reply within 14 days thereafter;

3. The hearing be adjourned to a date to be fixed for argument with 2 hours reserved; and

4. Costs of today’s hearing be in the cause of the Summonses.」

35.  於2020年3月9日，被告人經其代表律師及法援署代表律師簽署及存檔同意傳票 (下稱「9/3/20同意傳票」)，雙方同意下聯合向法庭申請下述的濟助：

「1. The costs order nisi in the Judgment dated 9^th August 2019 (‘the Judgment’) be varied and replaced by the following (which is a costs order absolute):-

(i)   The Defendant do pay the Plaintiff’s costs of the action, including all costs reserved, up to 11^th July 2017 on a party and party basis at District Court scale, to be taxed if not agreed.

(ii)   The Plaintiff do pay the Defendant’s costs of the action, including all costs reserved, from 12^th July 2017 until 6^th April 2018 on a party and party basis at High Court scale and from 7^th April 2018 until the discharge of legal aid certificate on 28^th May 2019 on an indemnity basis at High Court scale, to be taxed if not agreed.

(iii)   The Plaintiff do pay the Defendant enhanced interest on the disbursements as per the Schedule attached to the Summons filed on 22^nd August 2019 (to be taxed on a party and party basis if not agreed) and which have been actually incurred and paid by the Defendant (with proof) from the dates of actual payment made before 28^th May 2019 and up to the discharge of legal aid certificate on 28^th May 2019 at 2% per annum;

(iv)   The Plaintiff’s own costs prior to the discharge of legal aid to be taxed in accordance with Legal Aid Regulations.

2.  The interest on the award for PSLA made in the Judgment be varied. There be interest on the award at 2% per annum from the date of service of writ to 11^th July 2017, and there be no more interest on the award after 11^th July 2017.

3.  The interest on the award for pre-trial loss of earnings made in the Judgment be varied. There be interest on the award at half judgment rate from the date of Accident to 11^th July 2017, and there be no more interest on the award after 11^th July 2017.

4.  Subject to the first charge of the Director of Legal Aid, the judgment sum of HK$61,443.68 (inclusive of interest as per paragraphs 2-3 above) be paid out of Court to the Plaintiff through the Director of Legal Aid forthwith from the sanctioned payment in the sum of HK$365,939.07 made by the Defendant (‘the Sanctioned Payment’) on 12^th June 2017.

5.  The remaining balance of HK$304,495.39 of the Sanctioned Payment together with the interest accrued thereon (if any) be paid out of Court to the Defendant forthwith through its solicitors, Messrs. Au & Associates.

6.  There be no order as to costs of the Summonses respectively filed on 22^nd August 2019 and 10^th September 2019 and of this application between the Defendant and the Director of Legal Aid.」

從9/3/20同意傳票可見，被告人及法援署署長就原告人在法援受惠期間的訟費已達成協議，而9/3/20同意傳票有待法庭處理及審批。

36.  於2020年5月14日，22/8/19傳票、10/9/18傳票及9/3/20同意傳票在高等法院聆案官余敏奇席前進行聆訊。余聆案官經聆聽原告人、被告人代表律師及法援署代表律師的陳述後，頒下如下的案件管理命令 (下稱「14/5/20命令」)：

「1. 批准被告人修改 [22/8/19傳票]，修改之內容附於 [10/9/19傳票] 中的紅色部份 [見上述第30段]；

2. 免除向原告人送達修改的傳票；

3. 被告人於 [10/9/19傳票] 的訟費歸於原告人，而被告人與 [法援署署長] 之間不作任何訟費命令；

4. 修改的傳票押後辯論 ，預留1小時，由 [周聆案官]或專責傷亡訴訟案件的聆案官審理；

5. 被告人需於28天內 (即2020年6月11日或之前)，向原告人提供 [區1誓詞] 及 [區2誓詞] 的中文譯本；

6. 原告人需於收到中文譯本後的28天內 (即2020年7月9日或之前) 存檔及送達反對誓章；

7. 被告人需於其後14天之內，即2020年7月23日或之前，存檔及送達回應誓章；

8. [9/3/20同意傳票] 押後處理，由上述第4段負責處理的聆案官給予指示；

9. 豁免法律援助署署長出席押後辯論的聆訊；及

10. 今天訟費保留待決。」

37.  於2020年5月18日，被告人依據14/5/20命令存檔經修訂的22/8/19傳票 (下稱「18/5/20修訂傳票」)，除了下述第4-5段外，其內容與22/8/19傳票的內容相同：

「4. Subject to the first charge of the Director of Legal Aid, the judgment sum of HK$59,477.71HK$61,443.68 (inclusive of interest as per paragraphs 2-3 above) be paid out of Court to the Plaintiff through the Director of Legal Aid forthwith from the sanctioned payment in the sum of HK$365,939.07 made by the Defendant (“the Sanctioned Payment”) on 12^th June 2017.

5.  The remaining balance of HK$306,461.36HK$304,495.39 of the Sanctioned Payment together with the interest accrued thereon (if any) be paid out of Court to the Defendant forthwith through its solicitors, Messrs. Au & Associates.」

38.  原告人並沒有依據14/5/20命令於2020年7月9日或之前存檔及送達反對18/5/20修訂傳票的誓詞，而且直至下述第39段提及的2020年9月14日聆訊，原告人也沒有存檔任何反對誓詞。

39.  於2020年9月14日，18/5/20修訂傳票及9/3/20同意傳票在周聆案官席前進行聆訊。周聆案官在庭上聆聽原告人及被告人代表大律師的陳述，但法援署署長已獲豁免出席該聆訊。

40.  於2020年8月28日，答辯人 (即本訟案被告人) 於CACV413/2019一案存檔傳票，要求上訴人 (即本訟案原告人) 在28天內支付上訴訟費保證金。答辯人 (即本訟案被告人) 的主要申請理由是上訴人 (即本訟案原告人) 的經濟狀況不佳，無力支付任何訟費。此外，答辯人 (即本訟案被告人) 認為上訴人 (即本訟案原告人) 的上訴完全沒有合理得直機會。

41.  於2020年9月18日，原告人致函周聆案官 (並抄送給被告人代表律師)，要求「停止進行或取消被告人的申請」(即18/5/20修訂傳票的申請)，並指稱如下：

「原因：被告人同 [法援署署長] 私自相討案件相關內容，完全沒有通知或與 [原告人] 相討事宜。[原告人] 在不知情況下，被告人與 [法援署] 私下進行是不公平和不合理的。為討回公道，[原告人] 就原訟法庭判決案件申請上訴，並且已進行中，請求法官大人考慮 [原告人] 申請。」

42.  於2020年10月12日，上訴人 (即本訟案原告人) 在CACV413/2019一案存檔其誓詞，指稱她就9/8/19判決提出上訴的主要理由為周聆案官的判決有偏頗。上訴人 (即本訟案原告人) 又指稱，周聆案官質疑她的病情及裁斷她傷勢輕微，但有多位而非只有單一的醫生證明她的身理和心理病情。上訴人 (即本訟案原告人) 亦隨附25頁文件作為證物。

43.  於2020年10月19日，民事上訴司法常務官何志賢在CACV413/2019一案就有關答辯人 (即本訟案被告人) 於2020年8月28日存檔的上訴訟費保證金傳票及法援署於2020年10月8日存檔的申請法律援助通知備忘錄事宜作出以下指示：

「1. 由於原告人現正申請法律援助，本上訴申請的程序根據法律援助條例 (香港法例第91章) 第15條暫時擱置，直至2020年11月19日為止。

2. 基於以上原因，除非法庭另有指示，否則，被告人須呈交回覆誓詞的時間將順延至2020年11月26日或之前。

3. 原告人於2020年10月14日在申請法律援助期間所存檔的反對誓詞仍然有效。

4.  暫時擱置期限過後，雙方須繼續根據法庭於2020年9月2日作出的指示行事。」

44.  於2020年11月17日，周聆案官頒下書面判決書 (下稱「17/11/20判決書」)，修改該暫准訟費令，並以如下的絕對訟費令取代 (下稱「該絕對訟費令」- 見下述第1點)，並頒下其他命令 (下統稱「17/11/20命令」)：

「1. 更改 [周聆案官] 於 [9/8/19判決書] 中頒下的 [該暫准訟費令]，以下述內容取代 (並成為絕對訟費命令)：—

(1) 被告人需按訴訟各方對評基準，並根據區域法院訟費表計算，支付原告人直至2017年7月11日在本案之中的訟費，包括所有保留訟費。若雙方未能就訟費數額達成協議，則留待法庭評定。

(2) 原告人按 [9/8/19判決書] 第90段可得之利息只計算至2017年7月11日止。在2017年7月11日之後，該判定賠償額不附帶任何利息。

(3) 原告人需按訴訟各方對評基準支付被告人由2017年7月12日起直至2018年4月6日的訟費，包括所有保留訟費，訟費需以高等法院訟費表計算。若雙方未能就訟費數額達成協議，則留待法庭評定。

(4) 原告人需按彌償基準支付被告人由2018年4月7日起的訟費，包括所有保留訟費及連同大律師證書，訟費需以高等法院訟費表計算。若雙方未能就訟費數額達成協議，則留待法庭評定。

(5) 原告人需向被告人支付就原告人於 [18/5/20修訂傳票] 附件所列之代墊付費用 (如雙方未能就金額達成協議，就該傳票附件內第(i)(a)及(ii)(a)項目則由法庭按各方對評基準評定，而就該傳票附件內其他項目，則由法庭按彌償基準評定) 的加強利息，加強利息由該代墊付費用付款當日起計算直至2019年8月9日，按每年10%之利率計算，之後則以判定利率計算利息。

(6) 原告人在法律援助被取消之前，其本身的訟費，需根據《法律援助條例》評定。

2. 法庭立即從被告人在2017年6月12日作出的 [該附帶條款付款] 之港幣365,939.07元當中，透過 [法援署] 署長，向原告人支付該判決款項及原告人可得利息合共港幣61,443.68元，此安排受制於 [法援署] 署長的第一押記。

3. 法庭立即從 [該附帶條款付款] 的剩餘款額港幣304,495.39元連同其利息 (如有的話) 透過被告人的代表律李炳剛、區紹恩律師行支付予被告人。

4. 不就 [9/3/20同意傳票] 作出命令，亦不作任何訟費命令。

5.  此申請的訟費連同大律師證書 (包括之前保留待決的訟費) 須按彌償基準並以高等法院訟費表計算由原告人支付與被告人；若雙方未能就金額達成協議，則留待法庭評定。」

45.  於2020年11月30日，原告人存檔「向內庭的法官提交的上訴通知書 – 就聆案官的決定而提出的上訴」，就17/11/20命令提出上訴，並要求上訴的訟費由被告人付給原告人 (下稱「30/11/20上訴」)。

46.  於同一天，原告人存檔其誓詞 (下稱「張1誓詞」)，用以支持30/11/20上訴。張1誓詞述明原告人的上訴理據如下，並附上43頁的文件：

(1)  於2020年3月6日，被告人與法援署署長雙方私自討論訟費並達成協議，原告人不知情，這是不合理。

(2)  由於原告人沒有律師代表，並沒有法律知識，亦未能找到律師協助，所以才沒有在2020年7月9日存檔反對誓詞，但這並不代表原告人反不反對。

(3)  原告人由2014年8月22日工傷至今仍未能康復，所以她不同意港幣400,000元的訴訟前和解建議，這不足以醫治她的傷勢。原告人指稱劉成基醫生和深圳武警醫院建議她做手術，但需要龐大手術費用，但她至今未能獲得合理賠償，這導致她現在仍需看政府醫生舒緩痛楚，並排期等待骨科醫生檢查醫治。原告人亦指出該意外引致後遺症，導致心理、精神方面產生負面影響。

(4)  本訟案現進行上訴程序，所以港幣365,939.07元的該附帶條款付款的款項應仍然存放於法庭。

(5)  原告人不同意周聆案官判決港幣59,146.80元為最佳判決，而她的治療費用至今已遠超港幣59,146.80元，但她仍未康復，仍在接受治療。

(6)  原告人「現提交支持說法的誓章和證據，另外上訴案件已進入法律程序，並附上傳票申請及支持理據」。

47.  於張1誓詞，原告人亦附上下述的文件：

(1)  原告人致周聆案官的日期為2020年9月18日信函 (見上述第41段)；

(2)  上訴人 (即本訟案原告人) 於CACV413/2019一案存檔的CACV上訴通知書 (見上述第28-29段)；

(3)  上訴人 (即本訟案原告人) 在CACV413/2019一案於2020年9月12日存檔的「申請擇定上訴聆訊的日期」；

(4)  民事上訴司法常務官何志賢於2020年10月19日於CACV413/2019一案作出的書面指示 (見上述第43段)；

(5)  北大嶼山醫院精神科發出有關原告人因患「adjustment disorder, depressive reaction」及「Medical illness」的日期為2019年7月23日、8月9日、10月4日及10月23日醫生證明書，而該等醫生證明書建議給予原告人由2019年7月23日至2021年1月21日的病假；

(6)  北大嶼山醫院精神科Lam Hin Ha醫生於2020年10月23日發出的證書，述明「This is to certify that [原告人] is diagnosed with depression with post-traumatic stress disorder features. She also had knee tendinosis with chronic pain and gait disturbance. She is unlikely to be able to resume work as a waitress at the moment as she still had prominent depressive and pain symptoms. …….」；

(7)  仁濟醫院物理治療部、北大嶼山醫院身心治療科專科門診及仁濟醫院矯形創傷科就2020年11月13日、2021年1月22日及2020年10月7日覆診的預約便條；

(8)  上訴人 (即本訟案原告人) 在CACV413/2019一案於2020年10月12日存檔的誓詞 (見上述第42段)。

48.  於2020年12月24日，被告人代表律師致信本席的書記 (並抄送原告人)，就30/11/20上訴提出以下的看法：

「1. 17/11/2020命令是應被告人以 [18/5/20修訂傳票] 申請，更改周聆案官在評定損害賠償聆訊後於 [9/8/18判決書] 中所頒下的暫准訟費令 (‘該更改命令’) 而作出的，該更改命令並不屬非正審所頒下的命令。原告人於2019年9月5日就 [9/8/18判決書] 發出 [CACV上訴通知書] (案件編號CACV413/2019)，就賠償金額及訟費命令提出上訴，聲稱周聆案官犯了若干事實裁斷的錯誤 (見上訴理由第1.1-1.9項) 及頒下錯誤的訟費命令 (見上訴理由第2項)。因此，本行認為原告人無須另行就該更改命令提出該上訴，因為上訴法庭屆時會一併處理賠償金額及訟費的上訴申請。

2. 就該上訴中，原告人在誓詞中提出了6項上訴理據，並夾附了45頁文件，但她沒有指出她要就17/11/2020命令中的那一項要提出上訴，及她想要求法庭頒下甚麼命令。被告人認為17/11/2020命令是正確無誤的，而原告人的申請則毫無理據。

3. [30/11/20上訴] 排定於2021年1月11日於吳法官席前進行，預留一小時。基於以上原因，[被告人代表律師] 致函法庭，尋求法庭之指示：—

(a) [30/11/20上訴] 會否暫時押後，待原告人於CACV413/2019的上訴有結果後才處理，或 [30/11/20上訴] 會與CACV413/2019的上訴一併處理？

(b) 如該 [30/11/20上訴] 的聆訊如期舉行，被告人是否需要存檔反對誓詞、事件時序表、論點綱要和典據一覽表等？

請把此信轉交給吳法官考慮。」

49.  於2021年1月2-3日，原告人就上述信函向本席作出書面回覆 (並抄送被告人代表律師)：

(1)  原告人於2020年11月30日提出30/11/20上訴，就周聆案官頒下的17/11/20命令提出上訴。

(2)  雖然被告人提到更改訟費命令並不屬於非正審所頒下的命令，原告人「認為正審是 [周聆案官] 當時判決前的時候沒有看到原告人這麼多的醫療證據，包括在未作出判決，[原告人] 照咗兩份磁力共振報告，在正審時候被告人代表律師多次指控 [原告人] 輕傷，令 [原告人] 多麼委屈和傷害，正審非正審[周聆案官] 沒有看到 [原告人] 係11月30日入上訴法庭申請上訴的大部份醫療證明。被告人指證原告人申請毫無理據，根本就是抹黑，推卸責任的行為」。

(3)  原告人不同意被告人代表律師的上述信函第1段提出的要求，並認為這是無理的要求。

(4)  原告人認為30/11/20上訴按程序應該在高等法院原訟法庭審理，「原因是賠償與訟費是兩件事情，訴訟內容不同」。

因此，原告人要求本席「考慮批准原告人原訟庭上訴」。

50.  於2021年1月4日，原告人存檔傳票，要求延後30/11/20上訴的2021年1月11日聆訊，而該申請的訟費由被告人支付給原告人 (下稱「4/1/21傳票」)。

51.  於同一天，原告人存檔其誓詞 (下稱「張2誓詞」)，用以支持4/1/21傳票的申請。原告人在張2誓詞指稱她正提出法律援助上訴而有關聆訊日期為2021年5月6日，因此她申請將30/11/20上訴的2021年1月11日聆訊押後至法律援助上訴判決之後。

52.  原告人於張2誓詞附上下述的文件：

(1)  原告人的日期為2020年12月23日法律援助上訴通知書，該通知書指出法援署署長於2020年12月16日拒絕為原告人提供法援，並認為原告人在CACV413/2019一案提出的上訴並沒有合理機會得直，原告人就此決定提出上訴；

(2)  法援署署長於2020年12月23日致原告人的信函，指出其法律援助上訴將於2021年5月6日於高等法院司法常務官席前聆訊。

53.  於2021年1月8日，4/1/21傳票在本席席前進行聆訊。經聆聽原告人及被告人代表律師的陳述後，本席頒下如下的命令 (下稱「8/1/21命令」)：

(1)  原訂於2021年1月11日進行有關30/11/20上訴的聆訊取消，並押後至2021年6月28日在本席席前進行聆訊，預留聆訊時間為1小時；

(2)  被告人需不遲於該押後聆訊前7天呈交法庭及送達予原告人聆訊文件冊、書面陳詞及案例典據；

(3)  該傳票的訟費保留至該押後聆訊決定。

於2021年1月8日的聆訊，本席一再提醒原告人必須細心考慮 (i) 高等法院原訟法庭是否具有司法管轄權審理30/11/20上訴；及 (ii) 她擬就17/11/20命令提出的上訴是否應該向上訴法庭提出。本席亦提醒原告人，本席頒下8/1/21命令將30/11/20上訴的2021年1月11日聆訊押後並不等於同意原訟法庭具有司法管轄權審理針對17/11/20命令的上訴申請。

54.  於2021年3月30日，上訴法庭在CACV413/2019一案就被告人以傳票方式提出的「上訴費保證金」申請頒下判案書 (下稱「30/3/21判案書」)，以及如下的命令 (下稱「30/3/21命令」)：

「(1) 原告人須於2021年4月27日下午4時前把港幣150,000元繳存法庭，作爲被告人在本上訴的訟費保證金；

(2) 本上訴的所有法律程序擱置，直至上述第 (1) 段訂明的訟費保證金全數繳存法庭；

(3) 倘若原告人未能於上述期限内將有關款項繳存法庭，本上訴會被隨即撤銷，毋須另行作出任何命令，而原告人亦須支付上訴的訟費予被告人，如雙方不能就該訟費數額達成協議，數額將由法庭聆案官評定；及

(4) 本申請傳票的訟費，不論上訴結果最終如何，須由原告人支付給被告人，金額循簡易程序評定為港幣100,000元。」

55.  上訴法庭副庭長林文瀚 (當時官階) 在30/3/21判案書敍述了下述事宜：原告人在本訟案的申索 (見上述第2段)、法庭在本訟案作出有關法律責任方面被告人敗訴的非正審判決 (見上述第5段)、周聆案官席前進行的評定損害賠償聆訊 (見上述第14段)、周聆案官頒下的9/8/19判決書及9/8/19判決 (見上述第15-16段)、周聆案官頒下的該暫准訟費令 (見上述第16段)、原告人於2019年9月5日在CACV413/2019一案存檔的CACV上訴通知書 (見上述第28-29段)、原告人於本訟案提出更改該暫准訟費令的22/8/19傳票 (見上述第17段)、被告人於2020年8月28日在CACV413/2019一案存檔要求原告人支付上訴訟費保證金的傳票 (見上述第40段)、周聆案官於2020年11月17日在本訟案頒下的17/11/20判決書及17/11/20命令 (見上述第44段)。

56.  林副庭長 (當時官階) 在30/3/21判案書考慮了有關原告人財政狀況的證據，認為原告人未能夠證明她有財力支付上訴訟費，因此有足夠理由相信原告人支付被告人的訟費有困難。但「話雖如此，…… 若原告人上訴成功機會很高或有其他的抗衡理據，[上訴法庭] 不會因爲她有財政困難而命令她支付保證金，以避免剝奪她實質上訴機會。就這申請而言，法庭只需要初步評估，不會詳細審視上訴的理據」(見30/3/21判案書第21段)。

57.  30/3/21判案書第22段提及原告人就其書面陳詞隨附多份文件，其中8份為審訊後事項的證據 (見上述第47(5)-(7)段提及的文件、1份北大嶼山醫院專科門診身心治療科預約單 (預約日期為2021年4月23日) 及1份2021年1月22日發出的病假紙)。但上訴法庭參考過上述文件及9/8/19判決書內的分析後，並不接受有任何一份文件能夠構成上訴成功的基礎 (見9/8/19判決書第48-57段)。雖然原告人尚未正式申請援引新文件作為上訴新證據，但上訴法庭認為，無論如何，上述的新文件對審理上訴沒有幫助，上訴法庭亦不會行使酌情權援引上述文件作為上訴用的新證據 (見30/3/21判案書第23-24段)。

58.  就原告人上訴的成功機會，30/3/21判案書提及原告人指稱9/8/19判決書有偏頗，卻沒有在反對誓詞中為該指稱作出任何解釋。根據CACV上訴通知書，原告人認為9/8/19判決書存有偏見，原因似乎是因為原告人認為周聆案官不合理地不接納對她有利的證據，這亦見於原告人聲稱周聆案官在評定損害賠償聆訊犯下的錯誤 (見上述第29段及30/3/19判案書第25-26段)。

59.  上訴法庭考慮原告人的上訴理據後及周聆案官在9/8/19判決書的判決理由，不認為原告人的上訴成功機會很高或有其他的理據足以抗衡訟費保證金的申請：

「27. 換而言之，原告人的上訴基本上是挑戰周聆案官對證據的評核及事實的裁定。

28.  上訴法庭不會輕易推翻原審法官對證人誠信和事實的裁斷，上訴人必須顯示該些裁斷明顯錯誤，這是很高的門檻。見：Ting Kwok Leung v Tam Dick Yuen (2005) HKCFAR 336及China Gold Finance Ltd v CIL Holdings Ltd & Ors CACV 11/2015，2015年11月27日。

29.  周聆案官在損害賠償判決書第24段至34段已經清楚考慮及分析兩名骨科專家醫生的證據。在損害賠償判決書第35段至47段，周聆案官清楚考慮及分析兩名精神科專家醫生的證據。在損害賠償判決書第48 to 53 段周聆案官引用Choy Wai Chung v Chun Wo Construction & Engineering Company Limited，CACV 172/2004，2005年7月15日及其他相關案例並詳細分析原告人的「病假紙」。在損害賠償判決書第55至57段周聆案官解釋她對原告人的主診精神科醫生，Dr Fong的證據之考量。

30.  在本案中原審時有不同證據分别支持雙方不同的立場或説法，而周聆案官的結論是接納被告一方的證據或説法。原告人不可以單單因為聆案官不接納她的證據或説法便指周聆案官犯了明顯無可置疑的錯或事實裁斷有何不妥。原告人未能指出周聆案官所裁定是 (i) 基於一項不合邏輯或有悖常理的事實裁定或推論；(ii) 沒有得到任何證據所支持；或 (iii) 出於法庭參閱了一些沒有關連的因素或沒有考慮一些有關連的因素。

31.  基於上述的初步評估，本庭認為原告人未能證明周聆案官的事實裁定犯了明顯或嚴重錯誤，其上訴的勝訴機會不高。

32.  原告人擬就周聆案官2019年8月9日的訟費暫准令關於審訊第一日的訟費命令提出上訴。但如上文提及，訟費暫准令已被2020年11月17日的絕對訟費命令取代。根據2020年11月17日的訟費判決書，周聆案官判決絕對訟費命令的原因不再是基於原告人浪費審訊第一日的時間。原告人沒有就絕對訟費命令提出上訴。基於上述的理由，原告人就暫准令上訴是沒有意義的。

33.  整體來說，考慮過原告人的上訴理據後及周聆案官在損害賠償判決書的判案理由，本庭不認為原告人的上訴成功機會很高或有其他的理據足以抗衡訟費保證金的申請。

……

34.  本庭經考慮雙方的誓章，書面陳詞和損害賠償判決書及訟費判決書，認爲原告人的財政狀況困難，而其上訴沒有很高的勝訴機會。故此，法庭應行使酌情權批准被告人的上訴訟費保證金申請。

35.  被告人律師在支持誓章當中提交了針對本上訴案件的概略訟費表，總額爲港幣303,000元。本庭同意被告人要求原告人把港幣150,000元繳存法庭作為保證金是合適的。」

60.  於2021年4月26日，原告人在CACV413/2019一案存檔「關於擬申請上訴許可的通知」，通知法庭及被告人她擬就30/3/21命令向上訴法庭申請上訴許可向終審法院提出上訴。於同一天，原告人存檔其誓詞，指稱她因為女兒未能抽空伴她到庭，所以才延遲未有於21天內提交上訴許可通知書。

61.  於同一天，原告人在CACV413/2019一案存檔「提出動議通知書」，申請許可針對30/3/21命令向終審法院提出上訴，而要求該項申請的費用由被告人支付，並隨附其上訴許可理由如下：

「1. 原告人自2014年2月20日入職，[被告人] 至今仍是 [被告人] 僱員，並一直有病假紙給予 [被告人]，原告人不同意是 [被告人] 的前僱員。

2. 原告人在工作場所的廚房門口發生意外，廚房門口有錄影拍攝到全程情況，而 [被告人] 並沒有提交錄影片至法庭，這對原告人十分不公平。

3. 原告人財困是因工傷所導致的。再者，如經濟情況許可，2015年劉成基醫生建議進行手術，原告人便能順利進行，不用受極大的痛苦和折磨。

4. 自2014年8月22日至今，不同的醫生給予的病假，難道醫生證明都不被接納嗎？

5. 原告人在發生意外後，不論生理以及心理都受到極大的折磨，因此難以找到工作。

6. 原告人的兩個女兒在原告人工作受傷後已成了 [被告人] 的代罪羔羊，一直承受著家庭開支的壓力。因此，原告人並不會要求兩個女兒協助支付訴訟的資金。

7.  總括而言，原告人受傷至今，一直受盡巨大的痛苦及折磨，雖然沒有法律知識，但仍尋求不同法律知識人士幫助，一直堅持至今就是為了取回應有的公道。然而，法庭認為原告人的上訴成功機會渺茫是未判先定，完全剝削了原告人權利；再者，法庭及 [被告人] 已知原告人財困，卻要求原告人提交港幣$150,000元成為保證金是十分不合理。」

62.  於2021年4月28日，民事上訴司法常務官何志賢就原告人於2021年4月26日存檔的「提出動議通知書」作出案件管理指示：

(1)  原告人須於2021年5月10日或之前向上訴法庭呈交及向被告人送達書面陳詞以支持其上訴許可申請；

(2)  被告人可在收到上述書面陳詞後14天向上訴法庭呈交及向原告人送達書面陳詞；

(3)  原告人只可在收到被告人的書面陳詞的情況下，在其後7天內向法庭呈交及向被告人送達回應陳詞。

63.  於2021年5月10日，原告人依據民事上訴司法常務官何志賢的日期為2021年4月28日指示呈交其書面陳詞。於2021年5月24日，被告人代表大律師呈交其書面陳詞。

64.  於2021年7月12日，上訴法庭頒下判案書 (下稱「12/7/21判決書」)，拒絕批准原告人向終審法院上訴，並撤銷原告人於2021年4月26日的「提出動議通知書」(下稱「12/7/21判決」)。上訴法庭林副庭長 (當時官階) 的判決理由如下：

「4. 原告人之提出動議通知書及2021年5月10日之書面陳詞，主要論點圍繞她對原審法官對證據的衡量。本庭在2021年3月30日之判案書第26至31段和34段已解釋這些論點不足以構成反對給予訟費保證金的抗衡因素。

5. 至於原告人引用的磁力共振報告，原審法官在2019年8月9日之損害賠償判決書第29至34段經已交待，本庭不認為原告人提出的論點可以顯示原審法官這方面的分析犯錯。

6. 本庭在2021年3月30日之判案書第15至16段和34段說明上訴案件内訟費保證申請的法律原則及法庭在該申請中考慮上訴成功機會的因由。基於這些案例已確立的法律原則及做法，本庭必須考慮原告人上訴成功機會是否可以抗衡原告人經濟困難可能導致被告人不能成功取回上訴訟費所帶來的不公。

7. 若原告人按命令繳存訟費保證金，她可以繼續進行上訴，上訴庭在審理上訴時亦不會受本庭2021年3月30日之判案書影響。因此不存在未審先判的問題。

8. 依本庭所見，原告人未能提出是次上訴有何重大廣泛或關乎公眾之重要性，或因其他理由，以致應交由終審法院裁決。」

65.  正如12/7/21判決書第7段 (見上述第64段) 所述，若原告人按30/3/21命令 (見上述第54段) 繳存訟費保證金，她可以繼續進行上訴。但直至本判決書的日期，原告人並沒有把港幣150,000元繳存法庭，作為她在CACV413/2019一案的訟費保證金。

66.  30/11/20上訴於2021年8月17日在本席席前進行辯論聆訊 (下稱「17/8/21聆訊」)。於17/8/21聆訊，原告人親自出庭應訊而沒有律師代表，被告人由郭大律師代表出庭應訊。原告人於17/8/21聆訊向本席呈交下述兩份文件，以示她已依據第484章《香港終審法院條例》第24(3)-(4)條於FAMV314/2021一案提交動議通知向終審法院申請許可就30/3/21命令提出上訴：

(1)  日期為2021年7月26日的「關於擬申請上訴許可的通知」「表格A」(下稱「表格A」)：表格A述明「現通知，申請人 [本訟案原告人] 擬就上訴法庭於2021年7月12日在 [CACV413/2019一案] 中所作判決 [即12/7/21判決] 向終審法院申請上訴許可」；

(2)  申請人 (即本訟案原告人) 的日期為2021年8月11日誓詞 (下稱「張3誓詞」)：張3誓詞述明「原告人於二零二一年八月七日以郵寄方式傳達文件包括表格A、表格B、兩份原審判決書、兩份上訴判決書及其上訴理據 (上訴通知書、原告人原審的結案陳詞、原告人上訴陳詞及發生意外地點的證據) 至被告人」。

但申請人 (即本訟案原告人) 沒有向本席提供張3誓詞所提及的「表格B」及其擬就12/7/21判決向終審法院提出上訴的上訴許可理據。郭大律師不反對原告人就30/11/21上訴的17/8/21聆訊採用上述表格A及張3誓詞。

II.    討論 – 原訟法庭的司法管轄權

67.  周聆案官頒下9/8/19判決是評定損害賠償後最終判決 (見上述第16段)，而該暫准訟費令是9/8/19判決相關的暫准訟費令 (見上述第16段)。後來，經由被告人的22/8/19傳票及隨後的18/5/20修訂傳票申請 (見上述第17及37段)，周聆案官頒下17/11/20命令，修改該暫准訟費令為該絕對訟費令 (見上述第44段)。由於該絕對訟費令取替了該暫准訟費令，該絕對訟費令便成為9/8/19判決的訟費令。簡而言之，該絕對訟費令 (以及已被取替的該暫准訟費令) 並非任何獨立於9/8/19判決的法庭命令，而是有關評定損害賠償所頒下9/8/19判決的相關訟費令。換言之，如果沒有9/8/19判決，根本便沒有該暫准訟費令及 / 或該絕對訟費令。

68.  原告人已就9/8/19判決於CACV413/2019一案向上訴法庭提出上訴。依據該規則第58號命令第2(b)條規則：

「來自聆案官在下列情況作出的任何判決、命令或決定 (非正審判決，命令或決定除外) 的上訴，須向上訴法庭提出--

……

(b)     根據第37號命令或在其他情況下評估損害賠償；……」

69.  該規則第37號命令第1條規則涉及由聆案官評定損害賠償，9/8/19判決正是周聆案官依據該規則第37號命令的評定損害賠償判決，因此原告人就9/8/19判決的上訴 (即CACV413/2019一案) 是向上訴法庭而不是向原訟法庭提出。

70.  正如上述第67段所述，17/11/20命令下的該絕對訟費令並非獨立非正審判決，而是基於評定損害賠償判決 (即9/8/19判決) 而產生的訟費令。明顯地，該絕對訟費令依附於9/8/19判決，而不是獨立於評定損害賠償的非正審法庭判決。其實，由聆案官評定損害賠償的聆訊是公開法庭聆訊，因此9/8/19判決的相關訟費令是正審判決而不是非正審的判決。雖然周聆案官頒下該暫准訟費令後，被告人以22/8/19傳票及18/5/20修訂傳票申請修改該暫准訟費令，而上述傳票於2020年9月14日在周聆案官席前進行內庭聆訊，這也不改變該絕對訟費令的性質，即聆案官正審評定損害賠償的相關訟費令。基於上述的分析，本席認為原告人應向上訴法庭提出針對17/11/20命令下該絕對訟費令的上訴，而本席作為原訟法庭法官根本沒有司法管轄權審理30/11/20上訴。

71.  代表被告人的郭大律師援引Lo Yuen Chong v IWS Environmental Technologies Limited (formerly known as Fook Woo Environmental Technologies) 案例 [6]。高等法院聆案官黃健棠於2016年10月28日頒下評定損害賠償的判決，並於2016年12月9日頒下勘誤。於2017年7月21日，黃聆案官頒下判決書，述明不同意修訂一般損害賠償的利息項目的判決，但他同意修改他頒下的暫准訟費令，因為原告人未能取得較被告人的附帶條款付款更佳的判決。原告人就黃聆案官的判決向原訟法庭提出上訴。於2018年3月20日，原訟法庭法官將該上訴押後，相關訟費保留待決。於2018年4月27日，原告人存檔傳票要求修改損害賠償評定中有關審前收入損害賠償的運算錯誤，但被告人不同意。黃聆案官在其判案書第6段留意到原訟法庭法官認為原告人應該向上訴法庭提出針對絕對訟費令的上訴 ^[7]，而黃聆案官亦在其判案書第4段及註腳1提到該規則第58號命令第2(b)條規則。本席認為Lo Yuen Chong案例中原訟法庭法官及黃聆案官的附帶意見 (obiter dicta) 也支持本席就司法管轄權方面的結論 (見上述第70段)。

72.  由於本席沒有司法管轄權處理30/11/20上訴，30/11/20上訴申請必須撤銷。

III.    討論 – 30/11/20上訴

73.  假設本席就上述有關司法管轄權限的裁決犯錯 (但本席不同意)，本席進一步考慮30/11/20上訴申請。

74.  原告人的30/11/20上訴是根據該規則第58號命令提出的。一般而言，向在內庭的法官提出源自聆案官的「判決、命令或裁定」的上訴，實際上是對有關申請 (即聆案官的相關「判決、命令或裁決」所源自的申請) 重新進行聆訊，而法官會視有關事宜為首次出現在他席前，雖然法官對聆案官早前的決定會給予應有的比重，但不受其約束。[8]

75.  原告人於2020年11月30日存檔了張1 誓詞 (見上述第46-47段)，用以支持30/11/20上訴。原告人是未得到法庭的許可而存檔張1誓詞。根據該規則第58號命令第1(5)條規則，除非有特別理由，法庭聆訊此類上訴，不得收取進一步證據 (但關乎在作出有關判決、命令或裁決的日期後發生的事宜的證據除外)。所謂特別理由，早有定案，乃指以下條件：(1) 即使採取合理步驟，也未能在原來聆訊時提供該些證據；(2) 新證據雖然未必具決定性，但必須對案件結果起著重要的影響；及 (3) 新證據必須可信。[9]

76.  從上述第47段可見，張1誓詞附上多份文件，郭大律師同意該等文件均在評定損害賠償聆訊 (即2019年6月24-26日) 及 / 或頒下9/8/19判決書之後才出現，所以該等文件屬該規則第58號命令第1(5)條的「除外」情況，原告人要求法庭在30/11/20上訴收取該等新的文件證據並不須要證明有特別理由。雖此，法庭仍須細心考慮應否行使酌情權收納進一步的文件證據。本席將以暫准形式 (de bene esse) 考慮張1誓詞附有的進一步文件，但鑑下述分析及裁斷 (尤其是下述第78(1)-(4)段所述)，本席認為不應行使酌情權容許原告人援引上述文件作為30/11/20上訴的新證據。

77.  至於張1誓詞的內容 (見上述第46段)，該等內容可視為原告人的上訴理據及 / 或陳述，而原告人實在只是重提她一直以來的論據，郭大律師也不反對原告人採用張1誓詞的內容，因此本席許可原告人在30/11/20上訴聆訊依賴張1誓詞的6點內容。

78.  就著上述第47段提及附在張1誓詞的新文件，值得留意以下事項：

(1)  被告人其實從來沒有質疑醫院及診所發給原告人醫生證明書 (俗稱「病假紙」) 的真確或有效性，而評定損害賠償聆訊的爭議是原告人的病假長短及 / 或原告人是否真的有需要該等病假。

(2)  就上述第47(6)段提及的北大嶼山精神科的日期為2020年10月23日證書，該證書聲稱原告人的診斷為具有創傷後遺症徵狀的抑鬱症，又聲稱原告人患有膝蓋肌腱炎和長期疼痛和步態障礙，但在評定損害賠償聆訊的呈堂醫學證據中，原被告雙方的兩位精神科醫學專家的共同意見 [10] 及兩位骨科醫學專家的共同意見 [11] 與上述不同。明顯地，北大嶼山精神科的2020年10月30日證書聲稱原告人患有的症狀與評定損害賠償聆訊時精神科及骨科醫學專家的診斷不同。

(3)  原告人亦將上述第47(5) 及 (7)段提及的文件和進一步的醫生證明書及預約便條呈交上訴法庭 (見上述第57段)。雖然原告人尚未正式向上訴法庭申請援引上述新文件作為CACV413/2019一案中針對9/8/19判決而提出上訴的新證據，但上訴法庭已細閱該等文件，並認為該等新文件對審理上述上訴沒有幫助，上訴法庭不會行使酌情權援引上述文件作為上訴使用的新證據 (見上述第57段)。既然該等進一步文件很大可能不能成為針對評定損害賠償判決上訴的新證據，本席認為該等進一步文件也對30/11/12上訴 (即針對評定損害賠償判決的相關訟費的上訴) 沒有重要幫助。

(4)  上訴法庭亦留意到原告人擬引用及依賴磁力共振報告，但上訴法庭指出9/8/19判決書第29-34段已就這方面作出交待，而上訴法庭不認為原告人提出這方面的論點顯示周聆案官這方面的分析犯錯 (見12/7/21判決書第5段及上述第64段)。

79.  30/11/20上訴是針對訟費令而提出的上訴。訟費一般都是由法庭行使酌情權的決定，而該規則第62號命令第3(2)條規則述明如下：

「如行使其酌情決定權的法庭，認為適合就任何法律程序 (非正審法律程序除外) 的訟費或附帶費用作出任何命令，則除本命令另有規定外，法庭須命令該等訟費須視乎訴訟結果而定，但如法庭覺得就有關案件的情況而言，應就該等訟費的全部或任何部分另作命令，則屬例外。」

80.  本席於陳淑惠對劉祖榮及另一人 一案[12]解釋就聆案官頒下訟費令而提出上訴的相關法理原則，即處理上訴的法官不會批准該訟費令上訴，除非上訴一方能證明聆案官的訟費令犯上法律方面的錯誤及 / 或不合理：

「21. 本席認為這並非可爭辯的上訴理據。就訟費而言，通力電梯(香港)有限公司對鄭智勇一案 [13]涉及被告人就聆案官所頒下的訟費命令提出逾期上訴。高等法院原訟法庭法官任懿君述明相關法律原則如下，並認為聆案官已考慮了有關情況，亦已經將訟費數額下調，因此撤銷被告人的上訴：

「4. 根據Hong Kong Civil Procedure 2010，第 58/1/6 段是這樣說的：[14]

‘Appeal as to costs—In general, a judge in chambers will not allow an appeal from a master’s costs order unless it is unreasonable or the master erred in law: Hoddle v CCF Construction [1992] 2 All ER 550, Morland J.; see also Lessy S.A.R.L. v Pacific Star Development Chain Development Co. Ltd (t/a Century Chain Property Agency) [1996] 2 HKLR 18; see also Paul Y-ITC Construction Ltd v Kin Shing Co. Ltd [1999] 1 HKC 511 at 515 per Sakhrani J.: ‘as this is an appeal as to costs only from the discretion of the master, such application should not be allowed unless it can be shown that the order made by the master was unreasonable or erred in law, i.e.,if he either failed to take into account proper matters or took into account matters that should not have been taken into account.’’

……

7. 況且，訟費的一貫原則乃是「勝方可得訟費」，被告人的處境並非應考慮的因素。

8. 本席認為歐陽聆案官的命令並沒有任何不合理 (‘unreasonable’) 的地方，同時被告人亦沒有指歐陽聆案官犯了任何法律上的錯誤 (‘erred in law’)，所以本席撤銷被告人的上訴。

9. 原告人兼得本次上訴的訟費。」」

81.  正如上述第46及77段所述，原告人提出6項上訴理據，但她沒有清楚述明她是針對17/11/20命令下該絕對訟費令的那一項提出上訴或她要求原訟法庭作出什麼訟費令。但被告人的主張立場十分清晰，被告人認為17/11/20命令下該絕對訟費令正確無誤，而原告人的30/11/20上訴毫無理據。

82.  就上述第46(1)段提及的上訴理由 (亦見於原告人的日期為2019年6月27日的書面陳詞 (下稱「原告陳詞」))，本席不同意這構成可爭辯的上訴理據。被告人及法援署雙方達成9/3/20同意傳票下有關訟費的濟助，但該等同意訟費濟助只是被告人及法援署之間的協議 (見上述第35段)，這對原告人沒有約束力，而且9/3/20同意傳票仍有待法庭處理。於2020年5月14日的聆訊，余聆案官批准被告人修訂22/8/19傳票，並將該修訂傳票及9/3/20同意傳票押後一併進行聆訊 (見上述第36段)。於2020年9月14日，18/5/20修訂傳票及9/3/20同意傳票在周聆案官席前進行聆訊 (見上述第39段)。周聆案官在庭上聆聽原告人及被告人代表大律師陳述後在2020年11月17日頒下17/11/20判決書，但不就9/3/20同意傳票作出命令，亦不作任何訟費令 (見上述第39及44段)。

83.  原告人指稱被告人與法援署私自討論訟費並達成協議而她不知道是不合理，但上述協議對原告人沒有約束力，亦沒有即時成為法庭命令。9/3/20同意傳票是經過押後聆訊進行辯論陳述，而原告人亦在該押後聆訊陳述其立場主張及 / 或提出反對，周聆案官經考慮後才頒下判決，本席認為沒有程序不公。無論如何，周聆案官並沒有就9/3/20同意傳票作出命令，因此17/11/20判決是經原被告人雙方辯論陳述後的判決，而非按被告人和法援署互相協議的同意判決。再者，在2019年5月28日之前，原告人是法律援助受惠人 (見上述第13段)，法援署有法定責任支付及 / 或處理法庭頒下指令原告人需支付被告人的訟費，因此法援署是有身份地位與被告人就相關訟費事宜交涉，但鑑於法援署署長的第一押記，法援署及被告人交由法庭考慮9/3/20同意傳票協議，而法庭亦給予原告人機會提出其立場及 / 或反對才作出命令，本席認為程序正確，這並非有效的上訴理由。

84.  就上述第46(2)及(6)段提及的上訴理由，原告人指稱她沒有律師代表，並沒有法律知識，亦找不到律師諮詢，所以才沒有在2020年7月9日存檔反對誓詞，但這不代表原告人不反對，原告人現已經由張1誓詞提交其反對誓詞及證據文件。

85.  本席留意到原告人親自出席2020年5月14日於余聆案官席前關於22/8/19傳票、10/9/18傳票及9/3/20同意傳票的聆訊，因此她在庭上聽取余聆案官頒下的14/5/20命令 (見上述第36段)，而在聆訊當日已知悉他須於2020年7月9日或之前存檔及送達反對誓詞。原告人自2016年10月27日在本訟案已親自行事，沒有律師代表，在2020年7月9日前她親自出庭應訊處理評定損害賠償的聆訊。原告人也親自行事於CACV413/2019一案存檔CACV上訴通知書,詳列其針對9/8/19判決的上訴理據。本席未能接受原告人不懂如何作出反對誓詞。其實，原告人存檔張1及張2誓詞時乃是親自行事，沒有律師代表，但這也不阻礙她以誓詞形式述明她的立場主張。

86.  更重要的是，原告人現已存檔張1誓詞，而本席已批准原告人依賴張1誓詞內容提及的6點，亦採用暫准形式 (de bene esse) 考慮張1誓詞附有的證物文件 (見上述第75-77段)，所以原告人指稱她未有機會存檔反對誓詞並非有效的上訴理由。本席認為，基於上文所述及下文分析，張1誓詞內容提及的6點並非有效的上訴理據，而本席採納上述第75-76段及78段的分析及裁斷，認為張1誓詞附為證物的文件很大可能不會在CACV413/2019一案的上訴被收納為新證據，因此亦不構成30/11/20上訴的有力證據，在此不贅。

87.  上述第46(3) 及 (5)段提及9/8/19判決的評定賠償港幣59.146,80元及 / 或保險公司的訴訟前和解建議港幣400,000元均不足以支付原告人至今的醫療費用及 / 或劉成基醫生和深圳武警醫院建議的手術費用，她至今仍未康復，而仍然接受治療。本席亦認為這些指稱也非有效上訴理由 (見下述第89-90段的分析)。

88.  原告人亦於原告陳詞指稱如下，但基於下述第89-90段的分析，本席亦認為這些指稱並非有效的上訴理由：

「9. 原告人在工作場所的廚房門口左腳絆倒廚房門口的一條固定鐵條，跌倒導致雙膝同右手大力撞落地下嚴重受傷。

10. 廚房門口有錄影影到全程情況，但被告人不呈交錄影片段法庭同交還原告人。

11. 雖然法庭判有關法律責任，被告人敗訴非正審判決，可惜法庭法官沒有看到原告人跌倒過程。

12. 如果真的輕傷，被告人為何不呈交錄影片段法庭呢？

13. 受傷之後照咗四份磁力共振，證門原告人傷勢和病情。

14. 精神科四位醫生證明原告人是傷殘人士。」

原告人在17/8/21聆訊亦就9/8/19判決的事實裁斷及 / 或推斷表示不滿，並認為周聆案官不理解她遭受是次意外及隨後治療的情況及證據，而Dr Chun的醫學專家評估及意見是完全錯誤及「講大話」，其不負責任的說法令她十分憤怒，因為她實在傷勢不輕。

89.  原告人在上述第87-88段的指稱是針對有關評定損害賠償的9/8/19判決之是非曲直裁決及裁決理由，原告人已就9/8/19判決於CACV413/2019一案提出上訴。上訴法庭在CACV413/2019一案頒下30/3/21命令，命令原告人須於2021年4月27日下午4時把港幣150,000元繳存法庭，作為被告人在該上訴的訟費保證金，但倘若原告人未能於上述期限內將有關款項繳存法庭，CACV413/2019的上訴會被隨即撤銷，毋須另行作出任何命令 (見上述第54段)。上訴法庭之後亦頒下12/7/21判案書，拒絕批准原告人向終審法院上訴，並重申原告人須按30/3/21命令繳存訟費保證金才可繼續進行CACV413/2019一案的上訴 (見上述第64段)。原告人至今仍未將訟費保證金繳存法庭，但於FAMV314/2021一案向終審法院申請許可就30/3/21命令提出上訴，但是否將會獲批准上訴仍未有裁決。

90.  但即使原告人依據30/3/21命令繳存訟費保證金的命令暫款執行而CACV413/2019一案的上訴仍然有效，本席也不會就30/11/20上訴重新考慮與訟雙方就評定損害賠償的論據及相關爭辯的是非曲直。除非上訴法庭撤銷9/8/19判決，該判決對與訟雙方仍具約束力，被告人提出更改該暫准訟費令並不意味與訟任何一方因不滿評定損害賠償的判決而可要求再重新辯論後由法庭再作出考慮及裁斷，這實非法庭於30/11/20上訴可以處理的事宜。因此，原告人在上述第46(3) 及 (5) 和87-88段提及的立場 / 主張，並不能左右訟費判決，也不構成30/11/20上訴的有效上訴理由。如果CACV413/2019一案仍未自動撤銷，那麼上訴法庭仍未裁定是否維持或撤銷9/8/19判決，本席依據9/8/19判決書的裁斷考慮30/11/20上訴是正確的做法，也無損原告人的權利。如果原告人就9/8/19判決向上訴法庭提出的上訴獲得勝訴，上訴法庭便隨其判決結果再考慮判決合宜的訟費命令。即使原告人就9/8/19判決向上訴法庭提出的上訴敗訴，上訴法庭在適當的情況下也可行使其訟費酌情權就該上訴法律程序的訟費及 / 或在下級法院的相關法律程序的訟費作出考慮及命令。

91.  就上述第46(4) 及 (6)段提及的上訴理由，即原告人已就9/8/19判決提出上訴，而CACV413/2019一案已進入法律程序，原告人在原告陳詞 (見原告陳詞第2、6及8段) 陳述認為，「案情未來不知道哪一方勝，哪一方負」，該絕對訟費令應被撤銷。

92.  本席重複上述第89-90段的分析，在此不贅。即使CACV413/2019一案的CACV上訴通知書仍未被自動撤銷，CACV413/2019一案的結果也與18/5/20修訂傳票及9/3/20同意傳票的判決沒有直接關連，因為周聆案官處理該等傳票及原訟法庭處理30/11/20上訴仍須依據9/8/19判決書的裁斷作出訟費令，只是如果原告人就9/8/19判決向上訴法庭提出的上訴獲得勝訴，上訴法庭便隨其判決結果再考慮合宜的訟費令，而即使CACV上訴通知書敗訴，上訴法庭也可在適當的情況下行使酌情灌就上訴法律程序及 / 或下級法院法律程序的訟費作出考慮及命令 (見上述第90段)。因此，上述第47(2)-(4) 及 (8) 段提及的進一步文件根本不會左右30/11/20上訴判決結果，本席不予接納為30/11/20上訴的新證據。無論如何，正如郭大律師所陳述，上訴法庭於30/3/21判案書第28及30-31段已指出，原告人在CACV上訴通知書的上訴理由主要是針對證人誠信和事實裁斷，但上訴法庭不會輕易推翻原審聆案官就這方面的裁決，而經初步評估，上訴法庭認為原告人未能證明周聆案官在9/8/19判決書的事實裁定犯了明顯或嚴重錯誤，原告人針對9/8/19判決的上訴勝訴機會不高 (見上述第59段)。本席認為原告人在上述第91段提及的上訴理由並非30/11/20上訴的有效上訴理據。

93.  原告人在原告陳詞第6-7段提及她已就是次意外提出僱員補償申索的訴訟 (DCEC2438/2014)，但於Cheung Sau Lin v Tsui Wah Efford Management Ltd一案 [15]被區域法院撤銷，而她已就該判決於CACV434/2018一案提出上訴，該上訴案件仍在上訴法庭進行中。本席看不到原告人「工傷案」的上訴與其「疏忽案」的上訴 (即本訟案評定損害賠償判決之相關訟費令上訴) 有何關連，這並非有效的上訴理據。無論如何，上訴法庭在CACV434/2018一案於2021年8月25日頒下判案書^[16]，認為原告人須就被告人在該上訴案中的訟費交出保證金，並作出如下的命令：

「22. 本庭作出命令如下：

(1) 申請人 [即本訟案的原告人] 須於本命令的日期起28天內，將$200,000港元繳存法院，作為上述上訴案中就答辯人 [即本訟案的被告人] 的訟費支付的保證金。

(2) 在申請人把該筆款項繳存法院，並就此通知民事上訴案司法常務官和答辯人的代表律師之前，本上訴的所有法庭程序均暫時擱置。

(3) 如申請人未能於上述時限內把該筆保證金繳存法院，而答辯人的代表律師又已向民事上訴案司法常務官證明款項並未繳存，則本庭將在不作任何其他命令的情況下駁回有關上訴，屆時申請人須向答辯人支付訟費；如雙方未能達成協議，則訟費金額將由法庭評定。

23.  此外，本庭亦下令申請人支付答辯人在訟費保證金申請牽涉的訟費。至於訟費金額方面，答辯人擬備的，日期為2021年1月8日，訟費總額為$59,094港元的訟費陳述書已送達申請人。她對於答辯人的訟費陳述書上的各個項目均沒有提出任何實質的反對。本庭現循簡易程序，將本申請中答辯人的訟費評定為$40,000港元。」

94.  原告人於上述第46(4)段及原告陳詞第1及5段「反對 [17/11/20判決書] 第三頁第四段及第十一頁第二十六段」，而認為被告人的該附帶條款付款港幣365,393.07元應繼續存放存法庭。原告人提及17/11/20判決書第3頁第4段應該是指該判決書第3段提及22/8/19傳票要求更該暫准訟費命令，而其中的更改如上述第17(4)段，即法庭立即從被告人在2017年6月12日作出的附帶條款付款之港幣365,393.07元 (即該附帶條款付款) 當中，透過法援署署長，向原告人支付9/8/19判決款項港幣59,477.71元 (包括相關利息)，而此安排受制於法援署署長的第一押記。後來，被告人存檔的18/5/20修訂傳票修改了22/8/19傳票所要求的上述濟助，述明判決款項應是港幣61,443.68元而非港幣59,477.71元 (見上述第37段)。另外，原告人提及17/11/20判決書第11頁第26段便是周聆案官頒下17/11/20命令的該絕對訟費令下的第2及3段 (見上述第44段)。簡而言之，原告人不同意在扣除支付歸屬原告人在9/8/19判決下的判決款項港幣61,443.68元外，該附帶條款付款的餘款連同利息將即時發還被告人。

95.  原告人沒有述明仍須保存該附帶條款付款的餘款在法庭的原因。如果她指稱因為CACV413/2019一案的上訴「案情未來不知道哪一方勝，哪一方負」，本席重覆上述第89-90段的分析及裁斷，在此不贅，但認為這並非有效的上訴理由。如果原告人認為17/11/20命令的該絕對訟費令是錯誤判決，她並未指出17/11/20判決書的裁斷理由如何犯錯及 / 或正確的判決是怎樣的訟費令。但無論如何，基於下文的分析，本席認為周聆案官在17/11/20判決書的裁斷理由正確，沒有犯上法律及 / 或其他錯誤。因此，周聆案官裁定將該附帶條款付款的餘款發還給被告人並非不合理，也沒有法律上的錯誤。

96.  周聆案官在17/11/20判決書引述區1誓詞提及的訴訟前和解建議港幣400,000元 (包括被告人已經支付的僱員補償) (見上述第19段)，及本訟案展開後被告人於2017年6月12日存入法庭該附帶條款付款的港幣365,939.07元 [17]，但原告人沒有在規定時間內 (即2017年6月13日送達該附帶條款付款通知書28天後的2017年7月11日或之前 [18]) 接受該附帶條款付款 (見上述第20段)。由於9/8/19判決的判定賠償數額為59,146.80元 (見17/11/20判決書第10段及上述第16段)，而連同相關利息的應付原告人數額實為港幣61,443.68元 (見17/11/20判決書第21-22段及上述第31-32段)，所以周聆案官認為 (而本席亦同意) 原告人未能取得較該附帶條款付款更佳的判決。

97.  正如17/11/20判決書第23段指出，「若原告人在2017年7月11日或之前接受了該附帶條款付款，那天之後的訟費便不會產生，所以原告人應支付被告人從那天起的訟費」。本席同意郭大律師的陳述，在以上前提下，原告人只能按訴訟各方對評基準並根據區域法院訟費表計算，獲得直至2017年7月11日在本訟案中的訟費，包括所有保留訟費，若雙方未能就訟費數額達成協議，則留待法庭評定 (見上述第24段)，而法援署署長亦同意此安排 (見9/3/20同意傳票第1(i)段 – 見上述第35段)。

98.  原告人未能取得較該附帶條款付款更佳的判決，依據該規則第22號命令第23(4)(a)條規則 (詳細條文見17/11/20判決書第11段)，法庭可以命令被告人有權獲付他在原告人本無需法庭許可而接受有關付款的最後日期 (即2017年7月12日) 後的按彌償基準計算訟費。因此，被告人以22/8/19傳票及18/5/20修訂傳票向法庭申請頒令原告人需向被告人的訟費按彌償基準計算。

99.  周聆案官在17/11/20判決書第15段指出，「[該條例] 第22號命令的原意是鼓勵雙方採取積極行動，儘快就爭議達成和解，避免產生不必要和昂貴的訟費。若一方選擇冒着訴訟的風險，不接受對方所提出和解的條件，該方便需要承擔因為最終不能超越對方提出的和解條件而招致更大的訟費責任」。上述原意亦反映於該規則第22號命令第23(5)規則 [19] 及第23(6)條規則 [20] 的條文。

100.  周聆案官考慮了原告人陳述指稱訴訟前和解建議數額實在很少，但認為訴訟前和解建議及該附帶條款付款「…… 顯示縱使原告人有機會取得比 [9/8/19判決書] 較佳的結果，但原告人沒有抓緊機會，而直至審前和解建議時 [21]，原告人仍堅持收取超出該附帶條款付款很多的賠償額」(見17/11/20判決書第14段)。

101.  周聆案官指出「被告人在2017年6月12日，即在此申索案件啟動後不足一個月，便已作出該附帶條款付款，明顯地，被告人在案件比較早段的時期已作出該附帶條款付款」 (見17/11/20判決書第16段)，而該附帶條款付款是為了節省時間和解決雙方在本訟案的爭議，而原告人未能取得較訴訟前和解建議及該附帶條款付款更佳的判決。周聆案官亦作出下述的考慮：

「至於雙方可獲得的資料，骨科專家的兩份聯合報告日期分別為於2017年10 月10日及2018年10月11日，而精神科專家的兩份聯合報告日期分別為2018年4月6日及2018年10月29日。須留意的是，第二份骨科專家聯合報告主要是專家對原告人接受兩次磁力共振檢測結果的分析，他們對原告人骨科傷勢的意見已在第一份骨科專家聯合報告說明。同樣地，兩位精神科專家在他們第二份聯合報告主要是就第一份報告內一些意見加以闡述。換句話說，原告人在2019年6月24日評定損害賠償的聆訊之前約13個月已擁有相關證據可評估及考慮被告人的附帶條款付款金額是否合適。」

但原告人選擇承擔訴訟風險不接受該附帶條款付款，並主觀認為其案情良好而繼續其針對被告人的申索。正如郭大律師陳述指出，參閱Lai Sin Yan Elsie v Tata Communications (Hong Kong) Limited[22]及Shih Pik Nog v G2000 (Apparel) Ltd[23] 的案例，上述事宜並不構成超越該規則第22號命令第23條規則下的強制性指示。基於沒有什麼不公正的地方，周聆案官頒令原告人需向被告人支付按彌償基準計算的訟費。

102.  其實，被告人在上述規則下是有權要求原告人按彌償基準支付被告人由2017年7月12日起在本訟案的訟費連同大律師證書 (包括所有保留的訟費)，而相關訟費以高等法院訟費表計算，如果雙方未能就訟費數額達成協議，則留等法庭評訂。因此，被告人要求如下的訟費：

(1)  2017年7月12日至2018年4月6日 [24] – 由於被告人與法援署達成9/3/20同意傳票下第1(ii)段的協議 (見上述第35段)，被告人要求法庭作出對原告人較有利的訟費命令，即原告人需按訴訟各方對評基準，支付被告人由2017年7月12日起直至2018年4月6日的訟費，包括所有保留訟費，訟費需以高等法院訟費表計算，若雙方未能就訟費數額達成協議，則留待法庭評定；

(2)  2018年4月7日至2019年5月28日 (即原告人的法律援助證書取消當日) – 被告人要求原告人需按彌償基準支付被告人的訟費，訟費需以高等法院訟費表計算，若雙方未能就訟費數額達成協議，則留待法庭評定，而這亦符合被告人與法援署達成9/30/20同意傳票下第1(ii)段所協議 (見上述第35段)；

(3)  2019年5月28日或之前 (即原告人的法律援助證書取消之前) – 被告人亦要求法庭頒下命令，原告人在這段期間的自身訟費依據第91A章《法律援助規則》評定；

(4)  2019年5月29日及之後 – 被告人要求原告人需向被告人支付彌償基準計算這段期間的訟費。

103.  除了上述96-102段的分析外，周聆案官也在17/11/20判決書考慮了下述事宜：

「18. 此外，被告人指出，原告人在其修訂損害賠償書索償合共港幣3,565,803.04元。被告人表示，原告人在此案件明顯誇大了她的賠償索償金額。於2019年6月20日，原告人透過其前代表律師提出的審前和解建議，建議和解金額為港幣1,350,000.00元，比修訂損害賠償書的金額減少了62%。被告人認為，這清楚地反映原告人及 / 或她的律師必定意識到，最初的港幣3,565,803.04元索償金額是完全不現實和不合理。最終，法庭判給原告人的賠償金額為港幣59,146.80元，與原告人的修訂損害賠償書索償金額比較起來大幅折扣了98%。

19.  原告人誇大其索償金額，是客觀的事實。正如被告人提及的案例，Lam Wai Chun v Tam Chi Wai [2001] HCPI 1352/2000, 6 October 2001及Maxwell v Keliston Marine (Far East) Limited (In Liq) & Anor [2012] 2 HKC 249所說，原告人及／或她的律師應認真審查證據，以確保索償金額在事實上是正確的，在法律上是合理的。」

因此，周聆案官「 經衡量所有有關事情，…… 不認為按[該規則第22號命令]第23條第(2)，(3)及(4)款作出命令會做成不公正之處」，並頒下17/11/20命令第1(1)、(3)-(4) 及 (6)段的絕對訟費令。本席細心考慮郭大律師及原告人的陳述，認為周聆案官的分析有理，本席認同其分析及裁斷，並認為上述絕對訟費令沒有任何不合理的地方，也沒有犯上法律上的錯誤。

104.  被告人在18/5/20修訂傳票就被告人已經支付的代墊付費用要求加強利息。根據該規則第22號命令第23(4)(b)條規則，被告人有權向法庭申請頒下不高於判定利率10%的利率計算訟費的利息 [25]。基於周聆案官在17/11/20判決書作出下述第105段所述的分析，亦基於上述的分析及該規則第22號命令第23(4)(6)、23(5) 及 23(6)條規則的條文，本席認為周聆案官頒下17/11/20命令下有關加強利息的絕對訟費令 (見17/11/20命令第1(2) 及 (5)段 – 見上述第44段) 沒有什麼不公正的地方，而該訟費令並非不合理，也沒有犯上法律上的錯誤。

105.  周聆案官認為，基於原告人未能取得較該附帶條款付款更佳的結果，被告人應得加強利息，其理由如下：

「24. 被告人就已經支付的代墊付費用，要求加強利息至10%的年利率，相關項目 (“該等項目”) 可見於 [18/5/20修訂傳票] 的附件 (“該附件”) [26]。…… 該等項目全是被告人於2017年7月11日之後作出。被告人要求的加強利息是在判定利率的8%年利率加2% (即2%+8%=10%)，比其在 [22/8/19傳票] 的要求調低了。被告人要求的加強利率不超過該第23條的上限。從[9/3/20同意傳票] 可見，署長亦同意就法律援助證書取消之前的期間，被告人就該等項目 [27]收取利息以每年10%之利率計算。本席認為原告人不論就法律援助證書取消前 [28]或後 [29]至該判案書日期的那段時間，亦應以同樣利率支付加強利息予被告人。按上文第23段所述原因，若雙方未能就金額達成協議，則就專家們第一份聯合報告，即該附件內第(i)(a)及(ii)(a)項目，由法庭以各方對評基準評定，而就其他該等項目，由法庭以彌償基準評定。」

106.  原告人未有接受訴訟前和解建議及 / 或該附帶條款付款而選擇進行訴訟。被告人應支付予原告人的金額為港幣61,443.68元 (港幣59,146.80元判決金額 + 港幣2,296.88元利息)。因此被告人請求，而周聆案官在17/11/20判決書第26(一)段同意 (見17/11/20命令第2段 – 見上述第44段)，立即從存放於法庭的該附帶條款付款港幣365,939.07元當中撥款，透過法援署署長，向原告人發放港幣61,433.68元，此安排受制於法援署署長的第一押記，而法援署署長亦同意被告人此項申請 (見9/3/20同意傳票第4段 – 見上述第35段)。再者，基於上述分析及裁斷，17/11/20命令第1段的絕對訟費令 (見上述第44段) 正確無誤，所以周聆案官於17/11/20判決書第26(二)段頒下命令，將該附帶條款付款的剩餘款額港幣304,495.39元連同其利息 (如有的話) 立即透過被告人的代表律師發還予被告人，亦沒有犯上法律上的錯誤，也沒有任何不合理。本席亦留意到法援署亦同意被告人此安排 (見9/3/20同意傳票第5段 – 見上述第35段)。

107.  被告人亦要求 (1) 9/8/19判決中痛楚、痛苦及失去生活樂趣的損失賠償之利息應修改為自傳訊令狀送達日期起直至2017年7月11日，按每年2%的利率對該賠償金額計算利息，而在2017年7月11日之後，該賠償金額不附帶任何利息，及 (2) 9/8/19判決中判定的審訊前之收入損失的賠償之利息應修改為自意外發生日期起直至2017年7月11日，按判定利率的一半對該賠償金額計算利息，而在2017年7月11日後，該賠償金額不附帶任何利息。本席認為被告人的上述要求是17/11/20命令下修改該暫准訟費令的附帶更改，而相關利率是一般人身傷亡案件中就痛楚、痛苦及失去生活樂趣及審訊前之收入損失賠償所採用的利率，法援署也同意被告人的上述要求 (見9/3/20同意傳票第2-3段 – 見上述第35段)。本席認為周聆案官接受被告人的要求並頒下17/11/20命令第1(2)段 (見上述第44段) 沒有犯上法律錯誤，也並非不合理。

108.  由於上述的絕對訟費令已包含9/3/20同意傳票所涉事宜，周聆案官認為她不用就該等事宜另外作出命令，亦就9/3/20同意傳票不作任何訟費令 (見17/11/20判決書第27段及17/11/20命令第4段 – 見上述第44段)。

109.  本席認為原告人沒有提出任何有效理據以示周聆案官錯誤地行使訟費酌情權頒下17/11/20命令，因此該絕對訟費令正確無誤，周聆案官隨判決結果頒下17/11/20命令第5段有關18/5/20修訂傳票的訟費令 (見上述第44段) 也同樣沒有犯錯。

IV.    總結

110.  基於上述原因，本席現駁回30/11/20上訴。

111.  其實，被告人代表律師已於2020年12月24日去信法庭並抄送原告人述明17/11/20命令不屬非正審的命令，因此「…… 原告人無須另行就 [17/11/20命令] 提出 [30/11/20上訴]，因為上訴法庭屆時 [處理CACV413/2019一案的上訴會] 一併處理賠償金額及訟費的上訴申請」 (見上述第48段)。本席於2021年1月8日的聆訊又一再提醒原告人必須細心考慮原訟法庭是否有司法管轄權處理30/11/20上訴 (見上述第53段)。但原告人沒有理會上述的提示，而依然故我繼續30/11/20上訴，但30/11/20上訴已因原訟法庭沒有司法管轄權而被撤銷。本席認為，原告人必須支付被告人有關30/11/20上訴及4/1/21傳票所涉的訟費 (包括所有保留待決的訟費)，如果雙方未能同意訟費數額，則由訟費評定官評定。

HCPI 505/2017

[2020] HKCFI 2892

香港特別行政區

高等法院

原訟法庭

傷亡訴訟2017年第505號

________________________

________________________

________________________

判決書

________________________

1.  原告人於2014年8月22日在工作期間發生意外（“該意外”），原告人因此受傷。原告人於2017年5月16日展䦕此傷亡訴訟向被告人追討賠償。經雙方同意下，法庭在2017 年6 月16 日登錄被告人敗訴的非正審判決。被告人只對原告人提出的賠償金額表示異議。評定損害賠償之聆訊於2019 年6 月24 日至26 日在本席席前進行。原告人於2016年10月27日獲批法律援助，但法律援助證書於2019年5月28日取消。

2.  本席於2019年8月9日頒發判案書（“該判案書”），裁定原告人在扣除港幣33,852.00元的預期付款後，可得損害賠償合共港幣59,146.80 元（“判定賠償額”）。就訟費方面，本席作出了以下暫准令（“該暫准令”）：

(a)  costs of the hearing on 24 June 2019, with certificate for counsel, be paid by the plaintiff to the defendant at High Court scale; and

(b)  subject to (a) above, costs of the assessment, including all costs reserved, to be paid by the defendant to the plaintiff at District Court scale

3.  被告人於2019年8月22日存檔傳票作出申請（“更改傳票”），要求更改該暫准令。其後被告人於2019年9月10日提出修改更改傳票的申請，而修改申請於2020年5月14日獲法庭批准，亦即是說被告人要求把該暫准令更改至如下：

“1.  The costs order nisi in the Judgment dated 9^th August 2019 (“the Judgment”) be varied and replaced by the following (which is a costs order absolute):-

(i)  The Defendant do pay the Plaintiff’s costs of the action, including all costs reserved, up to 11^th July 2017 on a party and party basis at District Court scale, to be taxed if not agreed.

(ii)  The Plaintiff do pay the Defendant’s costs of the action, including all costs reserved, from 12^th July 2017 until the conclusion of the assessment of damages on an indemnity basis with a certificate for counsel at High Court scale, to be taxed if not agreed.

(iii)  The Plaintiff do pay the Defendant enhanced interest on the disbursements as per the Schedule attached hereto (to be taxed on an indemnity basis if not agreed) from 12^th July 2017 to 9^th August 2019 at 5% per annum, and thereafter at judgment rate until full payment of the same.

(iv)  The Plaintiff’s own costs prior to the discharge of legal aid to be taxed in accordance with Legal Aid Regulations.

2.  The interest on the award for PSLA made in the Judgment be varied.  There be interest on the award at 2% per annum from the date of service of writ to 11^th July 2017, and there be no more interest on the award after 11^th July 2017.

3.  The interest on the award for per-trial loss of earnings made in the Judgment be varied.  There be interest on the award at half judgment rate from the date of Accident to 11^th July 2017, and there be no more interest on the award after 11^th July 2017. 

4.  Subject to the first charge of the Director of Legal Aid, the judgment sum of HK$61,443.68 (inclusive of interest as per paragraphs 2-3 above) be paid out of Court to the Plaintiff through the Director of Legal Aid forthwith from the sanctioned payment in the sum of HK$365,939.07 made by the Defendant (“the Sanctioned Payment”) on 12^th June 2017. 

5.  The remaining balance of HK$304,495.39 of the Sanctioned Payment together with the interest accrued thereon (if any) be paid out of Court to the Defendant forthwith through its solicitors, Messrs. Au & Associates. 

6.  Costs of this application be paid by the Plaintiff to the Defendant with a certificate for counsel on an indemnity basis at High Court scale, to be taxed if not agreed.”

4.  其後於2020年3月6日，被告人與法律援助署署長(“署長”)基於他們兩方就2019年5月28日（即原告人法律援助證書被取消那天）前涉及的訟費達成的協議，提交了協議傳票，申請更改該暫准令。由於法律援助署已不是原告人的代表律師，此協議傳票亦是本席須處理的申請。

5.  為支持更改該暫准令的申請，被告人於2019年8月22日存檔了Au Siu Yan 的非宗教式誓詞，及於2019年9月10日存檔了Au Siu Yan 的第二份非宗教式誓詞。按余敏奇聆案官於2020年5月14日作出的命令，原告人需於2020年7月9日或之前存檔及送達反對誓章。原告人沒有作出任何反對誓章。

6.  被告人在提交的誓詞中提到，於2016年10月11日，即是在本案之法律程序展開之前，被告人通過其保險公司即富勤保險（香港）有限公司（“富勤保險”）提出和解建議，建議和解金額為港幣400,000.00元（包括被告人已經支付的僱員補償）（“訴訟前和解建議”）。於2016年10月12日，原告人要求富勤保險提出一個尚未包含僱員補償付款的和解建議，富勤保險拒絕了該項要求。原告人於2017 年5月16日發出傳訉令狀。

7.  在本案之法律程序展開之後，被告人於2017年6月12日將一筆港幣365,939.07元款項（“該附帶條款付款”）（除原告人已收到的僱員補償金港幣34,060.93元預付款項以外）支付至法院。該附帶條款付款通知書在2017年6月13日送達予原告人。因此，原告人按《高等法院規則》第22號命令第15(1)條規則規定，可不需法庭批准而接受該附帶條款付款的28天期限於2017年7月11日屆滿。原告人並沒有在規定時間內接受該附帶條款付款，該附帶條款付款港幣365,939.07元仍存放於法庭。

8.  雖然該附帶條款付款通知書提及原告人已收取港幣34,060.93元，但該判案書採納了被告人在評定損害賠償聆訊時的口頭證供，以港幣33,852.00元作為原告人已收取之僱員補償金額。被告人在其誓詞中指出，這港幣208.93元的差異不應是拒絕被告人所作更改該暫准令這申請的理由。原告人沒有就這差異作出任何陳述，亦沒有表示這差異有損她任何權益。本席因此接受被告人的說法。

9.  被告人在其誓詞中亦指出，於2019年6月20日，即是在評定損害賠償聆訊展開前不久，原告人透過其前代表律師提出和解建議（“審前和解建議”），建議和解金額為港幣1,350,000.00元（當中已包括利息，但尚未包括原告人已經收到的僱員補償港幣33,852.00元）。富勤保險不接受此項和解建議。

10.  判定賠償額是港幣59,146.80 元。原告人未能取得比該法庭附帶條款付款更佳的判決。

11.  《高等法院規則》第22號命令第23條規則（“該第23條”）訂明原告人未能取得比附帶條款付款更佳的結果時，法庭可作出的訟費命令。該第23條規則規定如下 : —

“23. 原告人未能取得比附帶條款和解提議或附帶條款付款更佳的結果時的訟費後果(第22號命令第23條規則)

(1) 如原告人 ——

(a) 未能取得比附帶條款付款更佳的判決；或

(b) 未能取得比被告人的附帶條款和解提議更有利的判決，

則本條規則適用。

(2) 法庭可藉命令，不准予若非本款規定本須根據本條例第48條就判給原告人的全部或部分款項而支付的全部或部分利息，該筆利息是就在本可無需法庭許可而接受有關付款或提議的最後日期後的某段或整段期間計算的。

(3) 法庭可命令原告人支付被告人在有關付款或提議本可無需法庭許可而被接受的最後日期後所招致的任何訟費。

(4) 法庭亦可命令被告人有權獲付 ——

(a) 他在原告人本可無需法庭許可而接受有關付款或提議的最後日期後的按彌償基準計算的訟費；及

(b) 按不高於判定利率10% 的利率計算的第(3)款或(a)段提述的訟費的利息。

(5) 凡本條規則適用，法庭須作出第(2)、(3)及(4)款提述的命令，但如法庭認為作出該等命令並不公正，則不可作出該等命令。

(6) 法庭在考慮作出第(2)、(3)及(4)款提述的命令是否不公正時，須考慮案件的整體情況，包括 ——

(a) 附帶條款付款或附帶條款和解提議的條款；

(b) 附帶條款付款或附帶條款和解提議在法律程序的哪個階段作出；

(c) 附帶條款付款或附帶條款和解提議作出時各方可獲得的資料；及

(d) 為作出或評核有關付款或提議，各方在提供資料或拒絕提供資料方面的行為舉措。

(7) 法庭根據本條規則而具有的權力，屬增補法庭在判給或不准予利息方面的任何其他權力。”

12.  法庭在考慮作出該第23條第(2)、(3)及(4)款提述的命令時，須考慮案件的整體情況，包括該第23條第(6)款的各項因素。

13.  原告人所作的口頭陳詞，主要是她對判決不滿的意見。原告人在其口頭及書面陳述[1]亦要求停止本案，因為她已提出上訴。原告人沒有提交誓章，以支持她的說法。在沒有證據支持的情況下，本席不可接納她的陳述。不單如此，訴訟一方提出上訴是不會自動產生暫緩執行判決的效果，提出上訴方須提出傳票申請及支持理據。在申請及理據均欠奉的情況下，本席無法准予原告人的要求。

14.  對於審前和解建議。原告人表示，那實在是很少的數目，原告人只不過志在和解。被告人提及訴訟前和解建議，該附帶條款付款及審前和解建議，除了如下文所述，為支持被告人認為原告人誇大索償金額的陳述外，目的是顯示縱使原告人有機會取得比該判案書較佳的結果，但原告人沒有抓緊機會，而直至審前和解建議時，原告人仍堅持收取超出該附帶條款付款很多的賠償額。

15.  《高等法院規則》第22號命令的原意是鼓勵雙方採取積極行動，儘快就爭議達成和解，避免產生不必要和昂貴的訟費。若一方選擇冒着訴訟的風險，不接受對方所提出和解的條件，該方便需要承擔因為最終不能超越對方提出的和解條件而招致更大的訟費責任。

16.  被告人在2017年6月12日，即在此申索案件啟動後不足一個月，便已作出該附帶條款付款，明顯地，被告人在案件比較早段的時期已作出該附帶條款付款。

17.  至於雙方可獲得的資料，骨科專家的兩份聯合報告日期分別為於2017年10 月10日及2018年10月11日，而精神科專家的兩份聯合報告日期分別為2018年4月6日及2018年10月29日。須留意的是，第二份骨科專家聯合報告主要是專家對原告人接受兩次磁力共振檢測結果的分析，他們對原告人骨科傷勢的意見已在第一份骨科專家聯合報告說明。同樣地，兩位精神科專家在他們第二份聯合報告主要是就第一份報告內一些意見加以闡述。換句話說，原告人在2019年6月24日評定損害賠償的聆訊之前約13個月已擁有相關證據可評估及考慮被告人的附帶條款付款金額是否合適。

18.  此外，被告人指出，原告人在其修訂損害賠償書索償合共港幣3,565,803.04元。被告人表示，原告人在此案件明顯誇大了她的賠償索償金額。於2019年6月20日，原告人透過其前代表律師提出的審前和解建議，建議和解金額為港幣1,350,000.00 元，比修訂損害賠償書的金額減少了62%。被告人認為，這清楚地反映原告人及/或她的律師必定意識到，最初的港幣3,565,803.04元索償金額是完全不現實和不合理。最終，法庭判給原告人的賠償金額為港幣59,146.80元，與原告人的修訂損害賠償書索償金額比較起來大幅折扣了98%。

19.  原告人誇大其索償金額，是客觀的事實。正如被告人提及的案例，Lam Wai Chun v Tam Chi Wai [2001] HCPI 1352/2000, 6 October 2001及Maxwell v Keliston Marine (Far East) Limited (In Liq) & Anor [2012] 2 HKC 249所說，原告人及／或她的律師應認真審查證據，以確保索償金額在事實上是正確的，在法律上是合理的。

20.  經衡量所有有關事情，本席不認為按該第23條第(2)，(3)及(4)款作出命令會做成不公正之處。

21.  上文第3段提及的港幣61,443.68元是判定賠償額加了被告人按該判決書第90段計算原告人截至2017年7月11日可得利息的總額，計算方式亦已在其兩份誓詞交代。本席接納被告人的陳述，按包華禮法官於Novo Steel (HK) Limited v Peako Engineering Co. Limited [2015] 2 HKLRD 598一案中所述，原告人可得的利息，應以其可無須法庭許可接受附帶條款限期那天截算，即2017年7月11日。

22.  不過就利息的計算，由於判定利率不時浮動，本席指示被告人在聆訊後提交書面陳述，顯示原告人可得利息會否因判定利率的浮動而有所改變。從被告人補充訟費陳詞可見，就2014年8月22日至2017年7月11日這段期間而言，判定利率一直是8%，所以審訊前收入損失的利息應以4%計算，而非被告人採用的4.0625%。既然被告人在其誓詞及陳述均以港幣2,296.88元這對原告人較為有利的數字作為原告人可得的利息，本席就以該數字作準。

23.  若原告人在2017年7月11日或之前接受了該附帶條款付款，那天之後的訟費便不會產生，所以原告人應支付被告人從那天起的訟費。由於原告人於2018年4月6日能獲悉專家對她聲稱因該意外所受人身傷害的意見，該天或之前的訟費應以各方對評基準，並以高等法院訟費表計算，但該天之後的訟費，則應以彌償基準，並以高等法院訟費表計算。

24.  被告人就已經支付的代墊付費用，要求加強利息至10%的年利率，相關項目（“該等項目”）可見於經修改更改傳票的附件（“該附件”）。根據該第23條第(4)(b)款，法庭可命令被告人有權獲付有關限期後的訟費按不高於判定利率10%的利率計算訟費的利息。該等項目全是被告人於2017年7月11日之後作出。被告人要求的加強利息是在判定利率的8%年利率加2%（即2%+8%=10%），比其在更改傳票的要求調低了。被告人要求的加強利率不超過該第23條的上限。從上文第4段提及的協議傳票可見，署長亦同意就法律援助證書取消之前的期間，被告人就該等項目收取利息以每年10%之利率計算。本席認為原告人不論就法律援助證書取消前或後至該判案書日期的那段時間，亦應以同樣利率支付加強利息予被告人。按上文第23段所述原因，若雙方未能就金額達成協議，則就專家們第一份聯合報告，即該附件內第(i)(a)及(ii)(a)項目，由法庭以各方對評基準評定，而就其他該等項目，由法庭以彌償基準評定。

25.  綜上所述，本席認為須按該第23條更改該暫准令，以下述內容取代（並成為絕對訟費命令）:

(一)  被告人需按訴訟各方對評基準，並根據區域法院訟費表計算，支付原告人直至2017年7月11日在本案之中的訟費，包括所有保留訟費。若雙方未能就訟費數額達成協議，則留待法庭評定。

(二)  原告人按該判案書第90段可得之利息只計算至2017年7月11日止。在2017年7月11日之後，該判定賠償額不附帶任何利息。

(三)  原告人需按訴訟各方對評基準支付被告人由2017年7月12日起直至2018年4月6日的訟費，包括所有保留訟費，訟費需以高等法院訟費表計算。若雙方未能就訟費數額達成協議，則留待法庭評定。

(四)  原告人需按彌償基準支付被告人由2018年4月7日起的訟費，包括所有保留訟費及連同大律師證書，訟費需以高等法院訟費表計算。若雙方未能就訟費數額達成協議，則留待法庭評定。

(五)  原告人需向被告人支付就原告人於2019年8月22日存檔的經修訂傳票附件所列之代墊付費用（如雙方未能就金額達成協議，就該傳票附件內第(i)(a)及(ii)(a) 項目則由法庭按各方對評基準評定，而就該傳票附件內其他項目，則由法庭按彌償基準評定）的加強利息，加強利息由該代墊付費用付款當日起計算直至2019年8月9日，按每年10%之利率計算，之後則以判定利率計算利息。

(六)  原告人在法律援助被取消之前，其本身的訟費，需根據《法律援助規例》評定。

26.  本席亦就該法庭附帶條款付款作出以下命令: —

(一)  法庭立即從被告人在2017年6月12日作出的附帶條件付款之港幣365,939.07元當中，透過法律援助署署長，向原告人支付該判決款項及原告人可得利息合共港幣61,443.68元，此安排受制於法律援助署署長的第一押記。

(二)  法庭立即從該附帶條件付款的剩餘款額港幣304,495.39元連同其利息（如有的話）透過被告人的代表律師李炳剛，區紹恩律師行支付予被告人。

27.  上述第25及26段的命令已包含上文第4段提及那協議傳票涉及的事宜。因此，本席不用就該等事宜另外作出命令，亦不作任何訟費命令。

28.  由於被告人提出更改訟費暫准令的申請成功，此申請的訟費連同大律師證書（包括之前保留待決的訟費）亦須按彌償基準並以高等法院訟費表計算由原告人支付與被告人；若雙方未能就金額達成協議，則留待法庭評定。

HCPI 505/2017

[2019] HKCFI 1960

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

PERSONAL INJURIES ACTION NO 505 OF 2017

_________________________

__________________________

ASSESSMENT OF DAMAGES

__________________________

1.  An accident occurred to the plaintiff on 22 August 2014 while she was employed by the defendant (“Accident”).  By consent, interlocutory judgment was entered against the defendant on 16 June 2017.  This is the assessment of damages to be awarded to the plaintiff for personal injuries sustained as a result of the Accident.   

2.  The plaintiff was born on 4 February 1968 and was 46 years old at the time of the Accident.  She was born in China and had completed primary school education.  She is married with three children and she lives with her husband and their children.  The plaintiff was working as a waitress at the Tsui Wah Restaurant of the defendant located at Shop No. 101, 1/F, Fu Tung Plaza, 6 Fu Tung Street, Tung Chung, New Territories (“Workplace”) at the time of the Accident and she had worked for the defendant since March 2014. 

3.  A witness statement was made by the plaintiff on 20 December 2017. This was adopted by her at the hearing as evidence in chief.  劉婉華 (“Madam Lau”), the Senior Human Resources Manager of the defendant at the time of the Accident, appeared as witness on behalf of the defendant and she adopted the witness statement she made on 31 December 2017 in relation to the plaintiff’s connected claim for employees’ compensation in DCEC 2438/2014 (“DCEC case”) as her evidence in chief.  Madam Lau used to work for the defendant but she has since left their employment.  The testimony of Madam Lau mainly deals with the pre-accident salary of the plaintiff. 

4.  Other evidence takes the form of two MRI reports and the medical records of the treatments and therapies received by the plaintiff in the public and private sectors.  In addition, there are two joint medical reports by Dr Tio Man Kwun Peter and Dr Chun Siu Yeung, orthropaedics experts appointed by the plaintiff and the defendant respectively, as well as two joint psychiatric reports by Dr Henry W M Kwok and Dr Peter W T Yu, psychiatry experts appointed by the plaintiff and the defendant respectively. 

THE ACCIDENT

5.  On 22 August 2014, the plaintiff tripped on a metal frame or tube on the floor at the entrance of the kitchen at the Workplace.  She fell forward and landed on both knees and her right hand.  The plaintiff suffered from right hand pain and pain on both knees.  She rested at the Workplace for the rest of the day and did not seek medical attention or treatment on that day.  The plaintiff went home after work hoping that her pain would subside after a night’s rest. 

MEDICAL TREATMENTS

6.  An attendance record dated 11 October 2017 issued by North Lantau Hospital (“NLH”) is in the hearing bundle.  As at the date of this document, the plaintiff has sought treatment from NLH on numerous occasions, including visiting its Department of Accident and Emergency (“A&E”) on 46 occasions, its Department of Orthopaedics and Traumatology (“OTD”) on 8 occasions, its Department of Physiotherapy (“PD”) on 72 occasions, its Department of Occupational Therapy (OD”) on 146 occasions, and its Department of Psychiatry Unit (“PsyD”) on 13 occasions.  The plaintiff has also sought treatment from Princess Margaret Hospital (“PMH”) and Chinese medical practitioners on a number of occasions.  

7.  The plaintiff also attended the Psychosomatic Clinic of Kwai Chung Hospital on 17 November 2015 for depression.  She was diagnosed to have adjustment disorder, depressive reaction.  Her treatment by the psychiatrists there is still continuing. 

8.  The plaintiff first attended A&E for the injury she sustained in the Accident on 23 August 2014.  Physical examination revealed right wrist tenderness and mild bruising on both knees.  There was no joint effusion or laxity noted over her knees.  X-ray of right wrist was done and found to be unremarkable.  The provisional diagnosis was bilateral knees and right wrist injury.  The plaintiff was given analgesic and sick leave.  In the various medical reports of the treating doctors of different departments and of different hospitals, the findings of no swelling or deformity of the right wrist, and no inflammation, no effusion, full or almost full ranges of movement of both knees, no ligamentous laxity and negative Lachman tests had been consistent. 

9.  The plaintiff has had three rounds of physiotherapy treatment.  She was first referred to physiotherapy by A&E on 13 September 2014 and treatment commenced on 6 January 2015 at NLH.  The plaintiff received 30 treatment sessions that included electrotherapy, mobilization and strengthening exercises of bilateral knee.  She was discharged on 23 December 2015 due to static condition, but was referred to physiotherapy a second time by the OTD on 8 January 2016.  Treatment started again on 16 February 2016 and she had a total of 26 sessions of treatment that included pain relief and grip power strengthening exercise of the right hand.  The plaintiff was discharged on 7 November 2016 due to her condition having plateaued.  The third time the plaintiff was referred to physiotherapy was on 28 December 2016 by OTD for bilateral knee pain.  She was also referred to physiotherapy by the Anesthesia Department of PMH for chronic wrist and knee pain on 5 September 2017.  As of 29 September 2017, the date of the medical report of the PD, the plaintiff was still under the care of the physiotherapists and had by then received 18 sessions of treatment that included electrotherapy, heat treatment, balance training, wrist pain management and strengthening exercise. 

10.  The reports of the OD show that the plaintiff was first referred to occupational therapy by the General Out-patient Clinic of NLH for work rehabilitation on 19 November 2014 and for a second time by A&E on 18 December 2015.  During the therapy sessions, interventions included lower limb functional training, work hardening program and work rehabilitation.  At least 4 work rehabilitation assessments had been carried out by the OD, on 4 January 2016, 26 February 2016, 20 December 2016 and 13 June 2017.  Every time it was found that the capacity of the plaintiff did not match her work demand, with significant degree of limitation. 

11.  Apart from the doctors in the public sector, the plaintiff also consulted Dr Lau Sing Ki Kenric, a private orthopaedic doctor from 16 February 2015 to 11 May 2015.  Dr Lau suggested surgery and his notes recorded the plaintiff’s refusal to have surgery in the private sector.

12.  The plaintiff has MRI done twice, first in Mainland China and later in Hong Kong.  The earlier one was carried out in March 2015 while the later one was carried out in August 2015.  The first MRI showed bilateral knees medial meniscus posterior horn and lateral meniscus anterior horn grade 2 signal change.  The radiologist noted the need of clinical correlation for such signals, and the impression that the plaintiff had bilateral knees osteoarthritis.  No abnormal signals for the ligaments or the soft tissues were detected.  The later MRI revealed low-grade partial tear in the anterior cruciate ligaments and the upper insertions of both the medial and the lateral collateral ligaments, with no other significant abnormality in the right knee and no significant osteochondral lesion. 

13.  The plaintiff was referred by the Department of Family Medicine of NTH to the Department of Psychiatry on 6 June 2015 for low mood, inability to sleep and her negative thoughts about her pain, finance and other situations.  In a letter from a doctor of the Department of Medicine of NTH to urge for the advancement of her psychiatric appointment, other symptoms were mentioned, including frequent crying and vague suicidal idea.  The plaintiff was first seen by a psychiatrist on 17 November 2015 and the medical records show that such consultation is still continuing. 

EXPERTS’ REPORTS

14.  The plaintiff was examined by Dr Chun and Dr Tio on 29 September 2017.  Two reports were prepared by these experts, one dated 10 October 2017 (“1^st JMR”) and the other dated 11 October 2018 (“2^nd JMR”), collectively referred to as the “JMRs”.  These two experts have gone through the records kept by the treating doctors and therapists, and the history of the plaintiff having consulted various doctors, including psychiatrist and clinical psychologists, as well as attended physiotherapy, occupational therapy and acupuncture.  They had also considered the reports of the two MRI examinations undergone by the plaintiff. 

15.  The then current complaints of the plaintiff were noted by the orthropaedics experts in the JMRs, including bilateral knee pain that was continuous and nonstop with intensity fluctuating from 6-8/10, anterior thigh pain down to the upper leg bilaterally that occurred intermittently and triggered by factors that the plaintiff did not know, ulnar half of the right palm pain, also continuous and nonstop, which was a numbing pain from grade 1-2 to grade 3-4, with pain increasing if she was not careful in pressing the palm or when wringing a towel.  The plaintiff was using a stick to walk which she said was instructed by physiotherapists.  As for her mood, the plaintiff was feeling very sad or bad and suffered from insomnia 5 times a week with nightmares. Apart from the pain, the plaintiff was worried about whether she could work and how much longer she had to consult doctors and the money she had to spend for the purpose. 

16.  The reports of the treating doctors and therapists of the plaintiff, as well as the results of the MRIs, are set out in the JMRs.  The two orthopedics experts also recorded their findings upon the physical examination conducted.  The two experts agreed on those findings.  They then set out their respective opinions in terms of diagnosis, causation, prognosis, effect on ability of work and the sick leave that should be granted.  I shall go into these in greater detail below. 

17.  The plaintiff was jointly examined by the two psychiatry experts on 19 October 2017.  Two reports were prepared, one dated 6 April 2018 and the other dated 29 October 2018, collectively referred to as the “JPRs”.  They set out the physical and mental symptoms reported by the plaintiff, the treatments received by her, and the gist of the 1^st JMR.   

18.  At the time of the joint examination by the psychiatry experts, the complaints of the plaintiff included persistent pain over both knees and right hand and the need to take analgesics, more absent-mindedness, low mood and irritable mood which was affected by pain and sleep problem, ability to sleep for about 4 hours only, with improvement after taking psychiatric medication, nightmares had become less frightening.  In addition, the sex life and social life of the plaintiff had been affected and she had not resumed working. 

19.  The psychiatry experts agreed that the plaintiff had adjustment disorder with depressed mood and there were no pre-existing conditions.  They however differed greatly on diagnosis, causation, degree of disability, prognosis, further treatment, work capacity and appropriate sick leave.  I will go into greater detail of the contents of the JPRs in the discussions below. 

WORK SINCE THE ACCIDENT

20.  The certificates produced by the plaintiff show that she had been given uninterrupted sick leave from 24 August 2014 to 2 April 2019, about 4½years.  Except for having tried to return to work with the defendant for one day, the plaintiff had not worked during the entire period.  She has also not made any effort in finding work all through this period and up to trial, whether on a full-time or part-time basis.  It is clearly the view of the plaintiff that the fact that she was granted sick leave means that she had been unfit to work because of her physical and/or mental conditions.

21.  In addition, when cross-examined, the plaintiff has repeatedly mentioned her belief that no one would employ someone that needs to walk with the aid of a stick or has such medical or mental conditions as hers.  She also referred to her limited education and lack of language skills in English and Putonghua as being the reasons for her perceived inability to find any job.  She had no answer to offer when the fact that even more severely handicapped people are able to find work was put to her, and reiterated that she felt being stared at by people for walking with a stick.  When her attention was drawn to the opinion of all the orthopaedics and psychiatry experts that she would be able to work, the plaintiff said she did not understand how they carried out their assessment.    

EMPLOYEES’ COMPENSATION CASE

22.  The DCEC case was dismissed by HH Harold Leung on 7 August 2018. The learned judge found, inter alia, that there was no reasonable cause for the failure of the plaintiff to undergo an examination by a medical practitioner named by the defendant under section 16 of the Employees’ Compensation Ordinance.  There has been no appeal of the decision in the DCEC case.  There is no dispute that the plaintiff had received advance payment in the sum of HK$33,852 from the defendant before the dismissal of her employees’ compensation claim. 

EXTENT OF THE INJURY

23.  At the hearing, the plaintiff walked with the aid of a stick.  She confirmed that her conditions were the same as when she was examined by the two orthopaedics experts, that she had continuous nonstop pain in both her knees and her right hand.  She disagrees with the opinions of the experts and the medical records where they are not supportive of her case, sometimes accusing the people involved to have framed her.  In her view, the fact that the treating doctors continue to ask her to go back for consultation shows that she is still suffering from those symptoms. 

24.  Both orthopaedics experts agreed that the plaintiff suffered from contusion of both knees and right wrist and there was no fracture of bones, but otherwise their views on diagnosis, causation and prognosis are quite different.  In gist, Dr Chun took the view that the plaintiff had reached maximal medical improvement, that she had long recovered from the injury (at most within 6 weeks) and had since been exaggerating her symptoms.  To him, the non-specific degenerative changes are not consistent with the mechanism of the injury, but are part and parcel of the osteoarthritic knee change, something developmental and pre-existing, and there is a strong possibility that the plaintiff will have knee pain in association with the osteoarthritic features of the knees at any time in any event. 

25.  Dr Tio opined that the symptoms of the plaintiff could be caused partially by pre-existing degeneration and partially by the Accident and it would not be possible to attribute the exact contribution from those conditions.  However, referring to her ability to carry on her duty without any problem before the injury, Dr Tio said the plaintiff should not have developed her current knee symptoms in 10 years’ time if there was not such an accident. Given that the contribution of the two possible causes cannot be worked out, Dr Tio had actually provided no scientific basis for this estimate of 10 years. 

26.  In addition to pointing out that there was no objective evidence of ligamental or meniscal injury, to illustrate his view about exaggeration, Dr Chun cited many examples of features presented by the plaintiff during the examination which he found to be inconsistent with the normal course of post contusion injury.  Dr Tio responded on one such example by saying that the feature could be genuine and that is the keeping of the knees flexed at 40 degrees bilaterally on examination couch and during x-ray.  I share Dr Chun’s doubt on the genuineness of such feature.  The knees were at rest or near at rest when the plaintiff was examined by the orthopaedics experts and she kept them bending at 40 degrees, but she was able to walk before me without any bending of knees or any contortion that would have been brought about by the pain in her knees while walking.     

27.  Rather than pointing to objective medical findings that can explain the complaints of the plaintiff, Dr Tio was quite prepared to accept her physical conditions as per her complaints.  For instance, Dr Tio gave his opinion that most patients with similar injuries could present with intermittent residual pain, stiffness, weakness and reduced endurance.  That cannot however explain the continuous nonstop pain complained of.  Similarly, the opinion of Dr Tio that the plaintiff had reached a state of maximal medical improvement, and only residual pain in her knees and on and off pain is expected in her right wrist does not support a case of the plaintiff still having nonstop pain of the magnitude she described. 

28.  The view of Dr Tio about the ability of the plaintiff to resume work and the appropriate sick leave period is also relevant, as that goes directly against the subjective complaints of the plaintiff of chronic pain.  Dr Tio opined that the plaintiff would be able to resume light duty after a period of 3 months purely in terms of her orthopaedic conditions.  After such period of light duty, the plaintiff might be able to gradually resume her pre-injury duty as a waitress though with reduced capacity and efficiency, with a need to take intermittent breaks of 15 minutes after each 2 hours’ work.  With the pain that the plaintiff said she has, I cannot see how she can work as a waitress even with the recommended breaks and rest.  Hence, there is no substantive explanation from Dr Tio for the subjective complaints of the plaintiff about continuous nonstop pain of both knees and the right hand.  

29.  The 2^nd JMR dealt mainly with the results of the two MRIs done by the plaintiff of her knees.  On the discrepancies noted in the two reports, the two orthopaedics reports agreed that false positive and false negative results from MRI studies are not uncommon, and variations can also arise because of interpretations by different radiologists as well as different machines. 

30.  On the assessment of the MRIs results, I find the opinion of Dr Chun to be helpful.  Not only did he identify the discrepancies between the two sets of results, he also provided an analysis of how these changes can be accounted for from a medical point of view, in addition to the possibility of variations being caused by different machines and interpretations by different radiologists.  He mentioned that the missing of change of signal intensity, and hence the indication of injury to the 4 ligaments (anterior and posterior cruciate, medial and lateral collateral ligaments), is unlikely.  Hence, the absence of signal change with all the 4 ligaments as observed in the first MRI means that there was no sprain or partial tear.  The signal change detected in the second MRI on the anterior cruciate ligament and collateral ligaments, if indeed real, could not therefore have been caused by the Accident. 

31.  There are two other signal changes at the anterior and posterior horns of the menisci detected in the earlier MRI but not in the later MRI.  Dr Chun explained that, if the changes detected were real, they were due to myxoid degeneration and not a meniscal tear.  

32.  Dr Tio did not carry out any similar exercise.  According to him, one could only be confident to tell from the MRIs that there was no significant ligament tear with some meniscal degeneration that was compatible to the age of the plaintiff.  He then stated that it would be more likely that her current knee problems should be related to the accident rather than due to mild degree of pre-existing degeneration which could be asymptomatic. 

33.  The detection of signal change showing ligament tear in the later MRI is of some significance.  That is an objective finding that may pertain to the knee pain of the plaintiff, but Dr Tio did not address the matter specifically.  The inorganic causes mentioned in paragraph 29 above comprise all the explanation he gave, despite the view of Dr Chun that change of signal intensity is not easy to miss.   

34.  In light of the above analysis, I find the opinion of Dr Chun to be more supported by objective findings and reasoned analyses, while that of Dr Tio tends to have relied heavily on the subjective complaints of the plaintiff.  I therefore prefer the opinion of Dr Chun, to the extent it differs from the opinion of Dr Tio.  This means that the pain the plaintiff complained of cannot be explained from the orthopaedics perspective.    

35.  Since both orothopaedics experts recognized the possibility of the symptoms of the plaintiff being compounded by psychiatric or psycho-social conditions, the JPRs have to be considered in detail.  The symptoms reported by the plaintiff, her psychosocial functioning as well as the mental state examination carried out by the two psychiatry experts were noted in the JPRs.  Although both psychiatry experts agreed on the diagnosis of adjustment disorder with depressed mood and that the plaintiff did not have any pre-existing mental disorder, they failed to agree on the other matters covered by the JPRs.  

36.  Dr Kwok opined that the development of the psychiatric disorder was wholly a result of the Accident.  In his opinion, the stressor is the aftermath of the Accident and her emotional turmoil is reactive to the persistent pain, her functional impairment and inability to return to her job.  Dr Kwok described the situation as a vicious cycle, with the physical and mental conditions of the plaintiff causing the exacerbation of each other.  

37.  Dr Kwok took the view that the disorder of the plaintiff has become chronic, when the disturbance has lasted over 6 months, and it being unlikely that she would have any significant improvement of her psychiatric problems in the near or medium term future with further treatment.  The symptoms of the plaintiff are, in the opinion of Dr Kwok, manageable and her psychiatric disorder is of mild severity.  Whether the plaintiff would have her residual psychiatric symptoms cleared up depends on the progression of her pain symptoms, her employment, the settlement of her compensation and support from her family. 

38.  As for Dr Yu, he basically considered the plaintiff to be exaggerating her physical and mental conditions, it being his view that the plaintiff has recovered or had minimal symptoms.  Dr Yu was of the view that the development of mental symptoms subsequent to the Accident was attributable to the Accident, but their persistence was attributable to the compensation litigation.  With the prognosis, Dr Yu opined that it depends entirely on the outcome of the compensation litigation, with the plaintiff suffering great frustrations if it is not in her favour or instead she may be able to come to terms with it and move on. 

39.  Dr Yu explained in great detail the analysis he had carried out before coming to such conclusion.  I note, on the other hand, the different views of Dr Kwok on all the matters commented upon by Dr Yu, and his observation that the view of Dr Yu is over-simplistic or likely speculation.  However, having considered the further elaboration by Dr Kwok and Dr Yu, I find Dr Yu to be more critically analytical while Dr Kwok, like Dr Tio, had a tendency of relying on the subjective complaints of the plaintiff.  

40.  For instance, the lack of response to the treatments by the doctors and therapists is one of the main reasons relied on by Dr Yu for coming to the view that the plaintiff was exaggerating.  Dr Yu referred to a number of the findings of both Dr Chun and Dr Tio in the JMRs when he explained why he casted doubt on the genuineness of the physical symptoms of the plaintiff, and why they do not support the persistence of pain of such degree as was reported. 

41.  On her physical conditions in particular, Dr Yu referred to the opinion of Dr Chun that the plaintiff does not need any stick to aid in walking, which although not specifically commented upon by Dr Tio, is supported by the view of Dr Tio that the plaintiff can resume work as a waitress, albeit with an initial period of light duty only as adjustment.  Dr Kwok, on the other hand, merely said that there was no reason for a patient not to follow the advice of a professional physiotherapist, which the plaintiff said was the reason she used a walking stick. 

42.  Referring to the aim of a physiotherapist as being the mobilization of a patient with musculoskeletal injuries, Dr Yu questioned the account of the plaintiff of the physiotherapists advising her to use a stick.  In answer, Dr Kwok pointed to the medical record of a consultation with a doctor of the Department of Orthopaedics & Traumatology of PMH as indicating that the plaintiff does need a stick to aid walking.  This medical record of PMH would naturally be based on the subjective complaints of the plaintiff. 

43.  Dr Yu explicitly mentioned that the plaintiff had not reported her mental symptoms truthfully and accurately and responded directly to the challenge of Dr Kwok that there was no logical basis for this statement.  The memory difficulties complained by the plaintiff is, as pointed out by Dr Yu, not supported by the outcome of the assessment on cognitive functions done at the joint examination.  More importantly, there were no psychiatric out-patient records of reported or observed mental slowness. 

44.  The nature of the nightmares reported by the plaintiff was one of the matters where there was a lot of crossfire between the two psychiatry experts. Dr Yu pointed to the nightmares of the plaintiff stepping onto a rod and falling with resultant limb deformity and bone exposure, then pointed out that the Accident was not a traumatic event as the plaintiff was not exposed to actual or threatened serious injury.  There was some effort on the part of Dr Kwok to justify the reporting of nightmares by his statement that some nightmares with content related to the accident are very common.  That does not explain why the content of the nightmares was out of proportion with the seriousness of the injury. 

45.  The reporting of flashback of the Accident was, according to Dr Yu, intrusive symptoms that are unique to a mental disorder called Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD).  Dr Yu even went further to explicitly say that the attending psychiatrists had ignored such symptoms as the plaintiff was not expected to suffer them.  Dr Kwok disagreed and stated that flashback may occur in acute stress disorder, obsessive-compulsive disorder, PTSD as well as in people suffering from manic depression, depression, near-death experiences, epileptic seizures and drug abuse.  Dr Kwok might well have given examples of other disorders where patients can experience flashback, but these disorders are not what he and Dr Yu diagnosed the plaintiff as suffering from.  

46.  In addition to the above, I had the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the plaintiff myself.  On the first day of trial, the plaintiff presented a letter from her treating psychiatrist dated 21 June 2019, certifying that she had recent emotional crisis and was mentally unfit to attend the trial as scheduled.  I asked the plaintiff to see if her conditions would improve after taking medicine and having some rest and to return the next day.  The plaintiff did not indicate any problem with handling the trial when she came back on the second day.  At times there were short outbursts from the plaintiff, but she would then, sometimes after a short adjournment but sometimes without any break, be able to continue without any difficulty.  Apart from such outbursts, the plaintiff was alert and focused all through the hearing and showed a clear understanding of the questions put to her and what was going on.  She was also able to prepare closing submissions in her own handwriting to set forth her points within a rather short time frame, quite an accomplishment for a lay person of her educational level.  The submissions she made were coherent and sensibly formulated.  There is no indication whatsoever that the plaintiff’s alleged conditions had inhibited her attendance at the trial. 

47.  For the reasons set forth above, I prefer the opinion of Dr Yu over that of Dr Kwok.  

48.  A point repeatedly emphasized by the plaintiff, while she was testifying as well as when she was presenting her case, is that how could she be not suffering from the pain and problems she was complaining of when the doctors were prepared to grant her sick leave.  As submitted by the defendant, the court is not bound by the sick leave certificates that have been granted to the plaintiff.  The following passage from the judgment of Rogers VP in the case of Choy Wai Chung v Chun Wo Construction & Engineering Company Limited, CACV 172/2004, 15 July 2005 is worth noting:

“On this appeal Mr Chan SC, who appeared on behalf of the plaintiff, placed great reliance upon the fact that the plaintiff had been given sick leave certificates. In my view the judge was perfectly entitled to reject these as an indication of the plaintiff’s inability to work for the reasons which she (sic) gave. It was for the judge to decide whether on the evidence the plaintiff had been able to work and, if he had been unable to work, the extent to which he was able to work. Obviously in doing so the judge must have regard to the medical evidence. Nevertheless, the judge cannot be bound by the mere issue of sick leave certificates. As the judge pointed out the issuance of sick leave certificates would be primarily because of the subjective symptoms reported to the doctors by the plaintiff.”

Hence, sick leave certificates have to be evaluated in the light of all the available evidence including the medical evidence before the court. 

49.  Another challenge by the defendant relating to the sick leave certificates obtained by the plaintiff is that she went to see the doctors when the sick leave periods covered by such certificates were up or almost up.  When the plaintiff was cross-examined on this, she said she did not visit the doctors for getting sick leave certificates only, she also consulted them and obtained medication.  When further asked why she kept on getting the medicines which had not been able to relieve her, the plaintiff said she wanted to save money and so went to the doctors only when the sick leave period was going to expire.  To the question of whether she had told the doctors that the medication was of little use to her, the plaintiff said she dared not challenge the doctors. 

50.  The following observations of the court in Li Cheuk Lam v Cheung Sun Tai, HCPI 1102/2015, 13 October 2017 on a similar scenario are applicable in the present case:

“12. I would expect any reasonable patient with a persisting pain and unable to work would be very keen for full recovery and to return to earn a living. So if the patient attended a doctor and was given a certain medication and a period of sick leave, and if pain persisted despite the medication, he is unlikely to wait until the sick leave period expired before seeking further medical treatment. This behavior would be even more unlikely if he has done this repeatedly and each time he has been prescribed with the same type of, if not exactly the same, medication.

13. Instead, I would expect any reasonable patient with persistent pain would return to the doctor very promptly if the treatment did not help. He would likely request stronger medications, further investigations or even referral to a specialist.

14. If a patient chooses to passively take the same medications (despite the obvious failure of such medications to cure the persistent pain) and sit out until the last day of every sick leave period, this rather suggests that the patient is more concerned in obtaining continuous sick leaves than about curing any alleged complaints.”  

51.  The plaintiff did not agree to the suggestion of Ms Kwok, counsel for the defendant, that she went to see the doctors for the purpose of getting sick leave certificates.  When Ms Kwok specifically referred the plaintiff to the notes of her treating doctors recording her being worried of inability to apply for several weeks of sick leave and her being relieved when sick leave was granted, the plaintiff denied ever having told the doctors so.  

52.  The answers the plaintiff gave to the questions about her pattern of obtaining sick leave certificates are disingenuous.  As pointed out by the defendant, going back to the doctors hundreds of time for ineffective treatment defies common sense.  It is apparent that the plaintiff was more concerned with seeking sick leave than getting genuine medical treatment.  This leads to serious doubts on her credibility about the pain she still has.  

53.  The grant of incessant sick leaves by the treating doctors is also not supported by the four experts.  Dr Yu took the view no sick leave should be granted, while the period of sick leave considered appropriate by Dr Chun, Dr Tio and Dr Kwok is 6 weeks, 12 months and the period from June 2015 to February 2016 respectively.  There is no objective evidence at all that the plaintiff had to take leave, whether because of her physical or mental conditions, for the very long period that she had stayed away from work.      

54.  The caveat noted by the court in 莫錦平對葉家啟及另一人 HCPI 546/2014, 5 October 2016 is equally applicable in the present case.  In paragraph 58 of the judgment of the case, it is said that

“在沒有客觀證據，證明原告人有連續性的受傷下，當原告人聲稱長期因傷，直至正常復原時期以外，仍感到痛楚，法庭必須格外小心：見Butler v Blaylock [1981] BCJ No 31”

55.  The hearsay nature of the records of the treating doctors and therapists has long been recognized by court.  The following discussions in Gurung Kamala v Hong Wei Limited DCPI 1660/2010, 26 March 2012 are illuminating:

“78.  However, when reading medical documents like records and reports, the court must be aware that it is not the usual duty of the attending doctors (and therapists) to judge whether a patient’s subjective complaints (e.g. pain and tenderness) are truthful or not.  A doctor is bound by “doctor-patient trust” and it is not a doctor’s role to “test” the evidence or to “cross-examine” the patient, so as to say, to ascertain their truthfulness.

79.  Of course, one would expect a doctor to document such if there were glaringly obvious inconsistencies of complaints which could not be explained by any known scientific medical knowledge.  However, most of the time, in the absence of such inconsistencies, a doctor would most likely record what he or she was told by the patient as the “medical history”.

80.  Thus, the “medical history” of a patient is essentially subjective and may be treated, under the proper circumstances, as no more than hearsay evidence as what the patient has informed the doctor at the time of consultation.

81.  The court may often be in a better position to assess the truthfulness of any subjective medical history in that it can, amongst others, review all available evidence and hear the opposing counsels “testing” the evidence.”

56.  Such nature of the role of the treating doctor is also confirmed by what Dr Yu said in the JPRs when he explained why he believed the plaintiff had misled the public clinic psychiatrist(s): “In a treatment situation the psychiatrist does not doubt the veracity of the patient’s symptoms.  This is posited on the shared goals of the patient’s desire to get well and the psychiatrist’s commitment to help the patient to get well.  Thus, a malingerer could mislead the public sector doctors…”.

57.  I note Dr Kwok’s disbelief that Dr Fong, the treating psychiatrist of the plaintiff, an associate consultant at PMH, would be fooled or misled by the plaintiff.  I have to bear in mind though that, unlike the experts retained in this case who have pledged to be impartial and independent, the role of Dr Fong would naturally be affected by the ‘shared goals’ referred to by Dr Yu.  

58.  The specific incidents referred to above are illustrative of the quality of the testimony of the plaintiff, which I find to be not credible in general. The plaintiff was evasive and often responded by saying “I don’t know how to answer”.  I am not prepared to accept the plaintiff’s testimony about her physical and mental conditions. 

59.  Having considered all the evidence before me as a whole, I find the plaintiff to have failed to show that she had suffered any injury other than the minor contusion to her right hand and her knees.  As for her mental conditions, I find the plaintiff to have adjustment disorder with depressed mood but at most she only has minimal symptoms, meaning that, in the words of Dr Yu, symptoms rarely occur, are of a very mild intensity and of brief duration, and lead to no functional impairment.  The chronic nonstop pain of her right hand and two knees, as well as the mental symptoms she complains of, are merely exaggerations by the plaintiff.  I also find that there had been recovery of her injuries after 6 weeks, if not earlier.

ABILITY TO RESUME PRE‑ACCIDENT WORK

60.  The plaintiff places great emphasis on the recommendation in the reports of the OD of her work capacity as “not matching job demands, with significant degree of limitation”.  In the first place, all such reports of OD record the essential job tasks of a waitress, as narrated to the therapists by the plaintiff.  There has been no matching of work capacity with the task requirements of other jobs.  Furthermore, in view of the subjective nature of the complaints which formed the basis of the assessment of the occupational therapist, the forensic evidence of the experts on this is therefore more relevant. 

61.  All four experts opined that the plaintiff is able to resume work.  Dr Chun, Dr Yu and Dr Tio expressed the view that she is able to work as a waitress, without limitation in the opinion of Dr Chun and Dr Yu, but periodic breaks would be required in the opinion of Dr Tio.  It is the opinion of Dr Kwok that she can take on more sedentary job, such as a telephone operator, but not work as a waitress, and initially on a part-time basis and switching to full-time after at least half a year.  The alleged inability of the plaintiff to find any employment is not supported by any objective conditions.  

62.  It is my finding as a result of the Accident, the plaintiff suffered only minor contusion to the right hand and her two knees, and adjustment disorder with depressed mood.  I also find the plaintiff to have recovered fully from her physical injuries and only have had minimal mental symptoms after 6 weeks from the Accident.  The plaintiff has therefore been fully capable of returning to her previous employment since then and that she will not be affected by the injury she had from the Accident in fulfilling the duties under that job. 

63.  In light of such finding, there is no need to deal with the defendant’s submissions on the failure of the plaintiff to mitigate her loss.  Nonetheless, for the sake of completeness, I will briefly address the point here.  Quoting from paragraph 9-004 of McGregor on Damages 20^th ed., the term “mitigation” means that “…the claimant must take all reasonable steps to mitigate his or her loss consequent upon the defendant’s wrong and cannot recover damages for any such loss which he or she failed, through unreasonable action or inaction, to avoid.  Put shortly, the claimant cannot recover for reasonably avoidable loss.”  

64.  Granted that a tortfeasor has to take his victims as he finds them, I do not accept the defendant is not answerable for the plaintiff’s failure to find employment owing solely to limitations in her education and language skills. However, the perceived inability to find employment owing to her physical and/or mental conditions, had they been genuine, is only the subjective belief of the plaintiff.  Not only the truth of such belief has not been tested by attempts to look for lighter work or shorter part-time work, but it is also countered by the objective fact that people with more severe disability are indeed members of the local labour force. 

65.  Indeed, as submitted by the defendant, the ability to return to employment is based on objective findings instead of the plaintiff’s subjective wish.  In admitting to not having made any attempts to find employment at all, there is no evidence of the plaintiff taking any reasonable action to avoid the loss that she is now seeking to recover from the defendant.  Hence, even if I were to find otherwise, I would have found the plaintiff to have failed squarely in her duty to mitigate her loss.

PAIN, SUFFERING AND LOSS OF AMENITIES (“PSLA”)

66.  Five cases were referred to by the defendant in relation to the plaintiff’s claim for PSLA, Lo Yin Fong v Maxim’s Caterers Ltd DCPI 1424/2009, 15 March 2011, Tam Wai Chun v Choi Siu Kwong DCPI 2647/2007, 6 October 2008, Cheung Yiu Kwong v Yu Wing Hong DCPI 158/2007, 26 June 2008, Sulakhan Singh v Federal Securities Limited DCPI 231/2007, 6 June 2008 and Li Cheuk Lam v Chung Sun Tai HCPI 1102/2015, 13 October 2017.  The awards for PSLA in those cases range from HK$50,000 to HK$90,000. The plaintiff claims PSLA in the amount of HK$450,000.  Ms Kwok submitted that the award for PSLA should not be more than HK$70,000 - HK$100,000. 

67.  The assessment of HK$50,000 for PSLA in the Lo Yin Fong Kin case was based on the pain over the knees, right hip and both shoulders sustained by the claimant after having slipped and fallen.  The court considered the injuries of the claimant to be mild and took note of the fact that she had been able to return to her former work. 

68.  The claimant in the Tam Wai Chun case was hit by a car and was hospitalized for a few days for her left knee injury.  She was subsequently put on a knee brace and received physiotherapy.  The pain still affected the claimant at the time of the trial and both experts opined that she still felt pain in her left leg in the range of 0-8/10.  The court assessed PSLA at HK$80,000.

69.  The court awarded HK$90,000 in the case of Cheung Yiu Kwong.  The claimant in that case was injured in a traffic accident, and was found to have injured his left knee, with tenderness, swelling and a 2- cm laceration, but no effusion or fracture.  He was discharged after the wound was sutured. Days later, he complained of neck and right shoulder pain but the condition became better after treatment, with his knee pain being the main complaint at the time of trial. 

70.  The claimant, a security guard, in the Sulakhan Singh case had a slip and fall accident and was awarded HK$60,000 for PSLA.  Whilst taking into account the pre-existing degenerative changes on his right knee, the award was made on the basis of the soft tissue injuries to his right knee and lower back from which he had recovered. 

71.  The Li Cheuk Lam case is also about personal injury arising out of a road traffic accident.  There was double impact as the claimant’s container truck was hit from behind, causing his vehicle to hit the vehicle in front.  On the basis of his having suffered a soft tissue injury or contusion of his right knee (with pain, slight swelling, redness, decreased range of knee extension and flexion and uncomplicated by any open wounds, bony or ligament injuries) and from which he had fully recovered in less than 3 months’ time, HK$70,000 was awarded for PSLA. 

72.  All the cases referred to can only offer guidance, as there are bound to be differences in terms of the injuries sustained, the treatments undergone, the extent of residual pain, and the effect of the injury on the claimant’s life, from case to case.  It is my finding that the plaintiff has only shown to have suffered contusion of her right hand and both knees and adjustment disorder with depressed mood as a result of the Accident and that at most 6 weeks later, she had recovered fully from her physical injuries and has only minimal mental symptoms.  Having considered all these matters as well as inflation, I award HK$70,000 as damages for PSLA.    

PRE‑TRIAL LOSS OF EARNINGS AND MPF

73.  Despite the claim of HK$14,000 as her pre-accident monthly salary in the Revised Statement of Damages (“RSOD”), the plaintiff confirmed at the hearing that the figure she adopts should be $13,950.  This is based on the amount stipulated by the defendant in the Form 2 filed, being the monthly salary of the plaintiff for July 2014, the month immediately prior to the occurrence of the Accident.  The defendant’s case is that the average monthly earnings of the plaintiff at the time of the Accident should be HK$12,040, being the average of the earnings for March-July 2014, the five full months for which the plaintiff had worked for the defendant prior to the Accident.  Madam Lau did testify to the earnings of the plaintiff for each of these months and the records of the defendant on such earnings have been produced.   

74.  According to the employment agreement made between the plaintiff and the defendant, the plaintiff was to be paid a basic salary plus overtime and other allowance.  The actual take-home pay thus varied from month to month.  For the purpose of calculation of the monthly earnings of an employee under the Employees’ Compensation Ordinance, the formula set out in section 11 of that Ordinance is applicable.  Applying that formula, the monthly earnings of the plaintiff at the time of the Accident would be HK$13,950.  For the purpose of the present assessment, that section 11 is not applicable.  I accept the defendant’s case that the average for the previous 12 month’s period should be adopted and since the plaintiff had worked for the defendant under a year, the average for March-July 2014 is to be adopted.  

75.  Having found the plaintiff to have recovered and able to return to her employment with the defendant after at most 6 weeks from the Accident, the appropriate sick leave period should be 6 weeks.  No damages should be awarded for pre-trial loss of earnings beyond that point.  Damages under this head should therefore be $17,698.80 ($12,040 x 42÷30 x 1.05). 

POST‑TRIAL LOSS OF EARNINGS AND MPF

76.  In light of the findings above on the extent of her injury and her ability to resume work, there would be no loss of earnings post trial.  No award is made under this head.  

LOSS OF EARNING CAPACITY

77.  As noted in Kings Light Industrial Limited v Lo Wai Keung CACV 80/1992, 21 December 1992, damages for loss of earning capacity is to be awarded where the claimant faces a risk of losing his employment at some future point of time during the claimant’s working life.  Such award is to compensate the claimant for financial loss because of his disadvantage in the labour market. 

78.  The claim of the plaintiff under this head is HK$84,000, pitching this on her need to take more short breaks, rendering her more inefficient, unproductive and less competitive than other fit and healthy women of her age.  On the basis of the greater difficulty for the plaintiff to find a new job and the higher risk of losing employment, the estimate of 6 months’ earnings (HK$14,000 x 6) is put forward in the RSOD. 

79.  The assessment of loss of earning capacity by Dr Chun and Dr Yu was 0.5% and 0% respectively.  Dr Chun had qualified his assessment as being made on the basis of the possible but unlikely mild residual pain upon very heavy exertion of the right wrist and very prolonged ambulation for the knees.  

80.  With the job demands of a waitress, exertion of the right wrist is definitely required, but very heavy exertion of the right wrist is not expected.  The same goes for ambulation for the knees, prolonged ambulation, but not very prolonged ambulation, would be required only around meal times but when the restaurant is not as busy, the waiting staff would be able to rest. There is thus no objective basis to justify an award for loss of earning capacity.

FUTURE MEDICAL EXPENSES

81.  At trial, the plaintiff repeatedly referred to her intention to have an operation done for her knees, something recommended by Dr Lai, the private orthopaedics practitioner she consulted, once she has the money for it.  This claim is actually not included in the RSOD, but for the sake of completeness, I will deal with it here as well. 

82.  Both orthopaedics experts expressed the opinion that the plaintiff has reached maximum medical improvement and that she would not benefit from further treatment on the orthopaedics side.  Hence, there is no basis for making any award for the intended surgery. 

83.  There is still the claim of HK$33,600 in the RSOD for future expenses for psychiatric treatments, based on the further psychiatric treatments recommended by Dr Kwok and the costs of such treatments in the private sector. Dr Kwok did so indicate in the JPRs, stating that the plaintiff should benefit from receiving further psychiatric treatment for at least 9-12 months after the settlement of this litigation, and also the costs for each consultation of a psychiatrist in private practice being around HK$1,500 to HK$2,000, plus cost of prescription of $200 per week, whereas the costs of psychiatric treatment in the public sector is about HK$100 - HK$150 per consultation with medication included.  The defendant offers HK$1,500 for this item.  I note that Dr Kwok actually suggested further psychiatric treatment in the public sector for the sake of continuity.  In any event, in light of the above finding, I see no basis to award any sum under this head.  

SPECIAL DAMAGES

84.  The plaintiff claims HK$38,828 for medical expenses, HK$5,000 for travelling expenses, HK$5,000 for over-the counter medications and medical supplies, and HK$10,000 for tonic food.  Except for the medical expenses, no receipts have been produced for these items. 

85.  With the medical expenses, since I find the plaintiff to have fully recovered after 6 weeks from the Accident, such expenses as may have been incurred up to 4 October 2014 are recoverable.  According to the schedule of medical receipts, there were 12 consultations during this period and the total amount comes up to HK$1,300. 

86.  The defendant offers payment of HK$2,000 for travelling expenses, HK$2,000 for non-prescribed medication, and $5,000 for tonic food.  The offer of the defendant for non-prescribed medication at HK$2,000 was accepted by the plaintiff when she testified.  For the remaining items under this head, in light of the above findings, the offers of the defendant are generous.  I award the sum of HK$1,000 for travelling expenses and HK$1,000 for tonic food. 

87.  The total award for special damages is therefore HK$5,300.

DEDUCTIONS

88.  The plaintiff has received a sum of HK$33,852 as advance payment for her claim for employees’ compensation.  This sum should be deducted from the damages awarded in this action. 

SUMMARY

89.  The following table sums up the computation of the damages assessed to be payable by the defendant to the plaintiff: 

	HK$
PSLA	$70,000.00
Pre-trial loss of earnings and MPF	$17,698.80
Special damages	$5,300.00
Advance payment	($33,852.00)
______________________________________________________________________________________________________
Total	$59,146.80

90.  Interest at 2% per annum is to be awarded on the award for PSLA from the date of service of writ and at half the judgment rate on the award for pre-trial loss of earnings from the date of Accident. 

COSTS

91.  The defendant seeks costs for the first day hearing because of the plaintiff claiming that she had a mental crisis and cannot proceed with the hearing as scheduled.  I agree that actually no adjournment was necessary and the plaintiff should bear the costs.  On a nisi basis, I award

(a)  costs of the hearing on 24 June 2019, with certificate for counsel, be paid by the plaintiff to the defendant at High Court scale; and

(b)  subject to (a) above, costs of the assessment, including all costs reserved, to be paid by the defendant to the plaintiff at the District Court scale,

such costs to be taxed if not agreed.