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HKSAR v. FONG KING CHOI

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[2019] HKCA 776-EN-2019-07-23

HKSAR v. FONG KING CHOI

HTML content

CACC 319/2018

[2019] HKCA 776

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF APPEAL

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO 319 OF 2018

(ON APPEAL FROM DCCC NO 90 OF 2018)

_________________

 HKSARRespondent
 v 
 FONG King-choi (方琼財)Appellant

_________________

Before: Hon Macrae VP and Zervos JA in Court

Date of Hearing: 10 July 2019

Date of Judgment: 10 July 2019

Date of Reasons for Judgment: 23 July 2019

__________________________________

R E A S O N S   F O R   J U D G M E N T

__________________________________

Hon Zervos JA (giving the Judgment of the Court):

1.  The appellant, with leave of the Court, appealed against his sentence of 20 months’ imprisonment following his plea of guilty to a charge of blackmail, contrary to section 23(1) and (3) of the Theft Ordinance, Cap 210, which had been imposed on him by District Judge E Yip (the judge) on 9 October 2018.

2.  At the hearing of the appeal, we allowed the appeal and set aside the appellant’s sentence of 20 months’ imprisonment and substituted it with one of 14 months’ imprisonment.  We said we would hand down our reasons in due course, and this we now do.

The brief facts

3.  The facts as outlined to the judge and admitted to by the appellant were as follows.  In the early morning of 30 October 2017, at about 6:19 am, the appellant entered a 7-Eleven store in Mongkok, claiming repeatedly to a female member of staff that he was collecting protection money, while also thumping his hand on the cashier table.  The female store manager came forward and confronted him, but he kept on repeating his demand for protection money. She asked him the purpose of the protection money.  He said that he was from the region and was there to collect protection money.  He asked her if she would give him $100 but she responded that she was not in charge.  He then pointed at her, and asked her rhetorically whether that meant she was not paying.  He subsequently left the store and started to shout and kick things on the street outside.  He then returned, swearing and threatening the store manager, by saying that if she called the police, he would come back on another occasion.  During this time, there were customers present in the store.

4.  At about 6:21 am, he took two cans of beer and brought them down hard on the cashier table, swearing at the store manager and saying he was “tor-tei” (the local bully).  As he was about to walk out of the store, the store manager insisted that he had to pay for the beer.  He put $20 on a shelf and walked out of the store, shouting and swearing at the store manager. The actual cost of the two cans of beer was $12.90.  He remained outside the store, shouting abusive comments at the store manager.  At one stage, he claimed that he would bring his friends to the store, but the store manager and her staff ignored him as he walked off at about 6:25 am and loitered outside the store.  

5.  At about 6:28 am, the appellant was intercepted and arrested by the police.  The whole incident was captured on the store’s CCTV camera. 

6.  It was accepted that the appellant was intoxicated and boorish throughout this incident.

The appellant’s mitigation

7.  Mr Summly S Lee, who represents the appellant in this appeal, also represented him in the court below.  In mitigation, he noted that the appellant was 36 years of age and resided with his parents.  He explained that he had consumed a lot of alcohol prior to the incident because he was upset with his girlfriend.  He highlighted the following aspects of the case.  The appellant acted alone.  There was no actual violence or threat of violence, or damage to property.  The demand for money was a one-off incident and only involved a small sum ($100).  Despite declaring himself as “tor-tei”, he made no mention of any triad affiliation.  He noted that the appellant had prior criminal convictions, none of which included blackmail.  For those offences, he had either received a probation order or a fine, although there was one occasion when he was sentenced to attend a Drug Addiction Treatment Centre for possession of a dangerous drug.

8.  Mr Lee submitted to the judge the case of HKSAR v Wong Yin Chak,[1] where the Court of Appeal indicated that a starting point of 3 years’ imprisonment was appropriate for a case of blackmail that fell in the lower category of offending.  He compared the facts of that case with those of the present case and submitted that the facts of the former were more serious.  He invited the judge to adopt a starting point lower than 3 years’ imprisonment.

The reasons for sentence

9.  In sentencing the appellant, the judge noted that the appellant had only visited the store on a single day, and that the incident involved a demand for a one-off payment of a small sum of money.  He agreed that Wong Yin Chak was a more serious case of blackmail.  

10.  It would appear that the judge treated Wong Yin Chak as setting a sentencing guideline of 3 years’ imprisonment after trial for cases of this type where there are no aggravating features.  This is apparent from the judge’s following remarks:

“The Court of Appeal regarded an overall starting point of 3 years appropriate. It commented that the usual starting point of 3 years would be called for where no aggravating features such as triad affiliation, violence, or demand for regular payment or of large amount, were present.”[2]

11.  Relying on Wong Yin Chak, the judge adopted a starting point of 2 years and 6 months’ imprisonment in the present case which he reduced by one third for the appellant’s guilty plea to 20 months’ imprisonment.

The appellant’s submission

12.  The sole ground of appeal is that the judge erred in treating 3 years’ imprisonment as the overall and usual starting point for a blackmail case with no aggravating factors, and adopting a starting point of 2 years and 6 months’ imprisonment in the circumstances of the present case. 

13.  Mr Lee submitted that there was no sentencing guideline for the offence of blackmail, and that the present case fell into the lower category of offending for this offence.  He contended that this was not a serious case of blackmail and did not have any of the aggravating features that are usually present in such cases.  He repeated the matters raised in mitigation on behalf of the appellant, and submitted that for these reasons the starting point was manifestly excessive and wrong in principle.

The respondent’s submission

14.  Mr Derek Lau, for the respondent, submitted that the judge did not treat the case of Wong Yin Chak as providing a sentencing guideline for the offence of blackmail.  However, it would seem that the judge did rely on this case as providing a measure for the starting point to be adopted in the present case, even though it was expressly noted by the Court in Wong Yin Chak that there were no guidelines laid down for this type of offence.[3]

15.  After a review of a number of blackmail sentencing cases,[4] Mr Lau identified factors that are usually present in blackmail cases, such as the nature and amounts of the demand, and the nature and circumstances in and by which it was made that would have a bearing on the gravity of the offence and the appropriate starting point. 

16.  Mr Lau acknowledged that the present case was less serious than other cases of a similar nature because the appellant acted alone, the demand was one-off, the amount involved was small, and the store did not suffer any loss or damage to its property.  However, he pointed out that the present offence was nevertheless serious because it bore the hallmarks of a triad demand.  He submitted that this was apparent by the appellant referring to himself as “tor-tei” and threatening to call his friends, and by his aggressive and violent behaviour, repeatedly knocking on the cashier table, shouting loudly and kicking things outside the store.  He also added that the appellant committed the offence in a public place in the presence of other customers attending the store, and therefore caused a public disturbance.

17.  Mr Lau contended that the judge, by adopting a lower starting point of 2 years and 6 months’ imprisonment to distinguish it from other more serious cases, had appropriately reflected the gravity of the offence.  He submitted that the sentence imposed was neither wrong in principle, nor manifestly excessive.

Discussion

18.  Blackmail is an insidious crime that can be committed in an infinite variety of circumstances.  In general terms, it is committed when a person makes an unwarranted demand on another person with menaces.  The demand is usually accompanied by a serious or significant threat that is aimed to frighten or coerce the person on whom the demand is made to comply with it. There are no sentencing guidelines for the offence of blackmail but there are cases that have identified aggravating factors that would assist a sentencing court in determining the gravity of the offence and the culpability of the offender.

19.  One form of blackmail that has been prevalent and of concern in Hong Kong is where an extortion demand for money is made with triad overtones.  The Court of Appeal has consistently made it clear that the courts must demonstrate to offenders that this type of activity will not be tolerated.[5] 

20.  In Lui ChunYeung,[6] the Court of Appeal reduced a sentence of 30 months’ imprisonment to 23 months’ imprisonment where the appellant had visited a salon and demanded from the female owner a monthly protection fee of $500, but agreed to accept $300, failing which the salon would be set on fire.  The Court observed that although the appellant was not part of a triad group, the offence carried certain triad overtones, and went on to say:

“6. …Demands for protection money are the mark of triad activity not least when, as in this case, the demand was not just for a one-off payment but for regular monthly instalments; and in addition, there was the threat of serious violence to the property. It little avails a defendant who makes demands of this character to say that he is not in fact a triad, when the circumstances of the offence convey those hallmarks.”

21.  The Court in reviewing the sentence, evaluated the facts of the case and distinguished them from other cases by identifying the usual aggravating factors that are present.

“7. … The present case can be distinguished from others in which similar starting points have been adopted in that the demands in many of the other cases are made by or in the presence of a group of thugs, a fact which is intended to give greater weight to the threat; the sums demanded tend to be significantly greater than in this case; and there are often repeat visits. None of this is to suggest that this offence was not in itself serious; the nature of the threat was indeed serious particularly by reference to an earlier fire in the neighbourhood but nonetheless it is different from the several cases to which we were referred where starting points in the region of 4 years were adopted. One further significant difference, which distinguishes the case markedly from the normal triad related protection fee demand, was the behaviour of the blackmailer, shortly after the offence was committed, in surrendering himself to the police; hardly the behaviour of a true thug.”

22.  The Court in resentencing the appellant, adopted a starting point of 3 years and 3 months’ imprisonment, which it reduced to 26 months for the appellant’s plea of guilty and then by a further 3 months because of the act of voluntary surrender by the appellant, resulting in a sentence of 23 months’ imprisonment.

23.  We agree with the observations in Lui Chun Yeung, which we feel may not have been properly appreciated in Wong Yin Chak.  In that case, the appellant together with another person made continuous demands for protection money, “tor-tei”, for the sum of $1,000 from a man, and later his wife, who operated a newspaper stall.  The first demand was made when the man was operating the stall at 3:05 am.  The man questioned them about their demand and as a result they splashed Coca-Cola over his stock and ran away.  At 6:15 am, they returned when the man’s wife had taken operation of the stall.  The appellant again demanded protection money but this time from the wife.  He told her that if she made the payment there would be no trouble and that she should confirm with her neighbours that they were paying “tor-tei”.  She told them that she was not the boss and they should return at noontime.  However, they did not return that day but came back two days later at 6:15 am.  The man’s wife was alone at the stall at the time. They asked her whether she had spoken to her boss, and whether she had confirmed with her neighbours that they had paid “tor-tei”.  She replied that she had, but none of them had said that a payment had been made.  The two men left but returned about 10 minutes later, and the appellant opened a can of Coca-Cola and spilt the contents all over the newspapers on display at the stall.

24.  In light of the facts of that case and the observations subsequently made in Lui Chun Yeung, we consider that the following comments by the Court in Wong Yin Chak did not correctly convey the seriousness of the offence.

“13.  We are satisfied that, despite the fact that he was accompanied by D2 and damaged the stall’s stock, the Appellant falls into that lower category of offenders.  He made no threats of physical violence towards either of the stallholders; neither did he claim to have a triad connection.  He made a one-off demand rather than a demand for the regular payment of protection fees.  There is no evidence that he has triad connections and his record, bad though it is, as we have already said, contains no convictions for blackmail or triad-related offences.  In our view the 4-year sentence the Appellant received is manifestly excessive and we are of the view that a starting point of 3 years’ imprisonment is appropriate for his offence. ...”

25.  Even though the appellant was accompanied by another person and damaged the stall’s stock, the Court in Wong Yin Chak considered that his case fell into the lower category of offending.  It was on this basis that the Court was of the view that a starting point of 3 years’ imprisonment was appropriate for his offence.

26.  In cases of an extortion demand of money, the factors bearing on the gravity of the offence, include: (1) the nature and amount of the demand; whether the demand was for a one-off payment or regular payments; (2) the nature and circumstances in and by which the demand was made; whether the offender acted alone or with others; whether the demand was made on a single occasion or on repeated occasions; whether there was actual or threatened violence to a person or damage to property; whether there was an expressed or implied triad connection; whether it was part of a sustained campaign of intimidation against other victims; and (3) the consequences of the demand and the effect on the victim; whether the victim yielded to the demand for extortion money and whether any loss was suffered.

27.  It was accepted that the appellant was intoxicated and agitated at the time of the offence, and behaving boorishly. There was no subtlety in this offence as the appellant openly behaved aggressively towards the staff of the store in the presence of customers.  He portrayed himself as a local bully when he made the demand for $100 from the store manager, but she promptly refused his demand and insisted that he had to pay for two cans of beer that he had taken, which he did.  He then stayed in the vicinity of the store, being abusive and drinking his cans of beer, and soon after he was arrested by the police.  It would seem that the store manager had control of the situation because it was an admitted fact that she and the other staff members ignored the antics of the appellant, and obviously treated him as being under the influence of alcohol and not a serious threat.

28.  In his appeal notice, the appellant acknowledged that he behaved badly at the store.  He attributed his behaviour to being intoxicated and emotionally distraught because he was upset with his girlfriend. He noted that at the time he had paid for the two cans of beer and that he had not caused injury to anyone or damage to any property. 

29.  Nonetheless, it needs to be stressed that this sort of behaviour will not be tolerated and will be visited by appropriate punishment.  Threatening female staff of a convenience store in the early hours of the morning is conduct that should and will be soundly deprecated, particularly when they have been subjected to unwarranted demands in a menacing manner.  Offenders of this type of criminal conduct must realise that the courts take a serious view of it, even at its lowest level.

30.  The judge was correct to impose a custodial sentence on the appellant.  He treated the case at the lower end of the scale for the offence of blackmail and he noted that there were none of the aggravating features that are usually seen in a crime of this type.  We agree, but we feel that the starting point was too high in the particular circumstances of this case.

31.  We are of the view that a starting point of 30 months’ imprisonment was excessive and that a more appropriate starting point is 21 months’ imprisonment.  After reducing the starting point by one third for the appellant’s guilty plea, the resultant sentence is 14 months’ imprisonment.

Conclusion

32.  For these reasons, we allowed the appeal and set aside the appellant’s sentence of 20 months’ imprisonment and substituted it with one of 14 months’ imprisonment.

(Andrew Macrae)(Kevin Zervos)
Vice PresidentJustice of Appeal

Mr Derek Lau, SPP of the Department of Justice, for the respondent

Mr Summly S Lee, instructed by K M Tang & Co, assigned by DLA, for the appellant



[1] CACC 126/2004, 17 December 2004, unreported.

[2] Appeal Bundle, page 9M-O.

[3] At paragraph 11.

[4]HKSAR v Wong Fu Waand Another [1999] 1 HKC 363; HKSAR v Cheung Wan Ing [2000] 3 HKC 762; HKSAR v Tam Yun Chuen CACC 118/2008, 7 September 2009, unreported; HKSAR v Wong Yin Chak, (supra); HKSAR v Lui Chun Yeung [2014] 2 HKLRD 993.

[5] This was first stated in Wong Fu Wa and Another,(supra), at 365D-F, and followed in the subsequent cases of Cheung Wan Ing, (supra), at 765F-766B; Wong Yin Chak, (supra), at paragraphs 11-13; and Tam Yun Chuen, (supra), at paragraphs 53-55.  See Footnote 4 for the citations of these cases.

[6] See Footnote 4 for the citation of this case.

[2019] HKCA 487-EN-2019-05-02

HKSAR v. FONG KING CHOI

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CACC 319/2018

[2019] HKCA 487

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF APPEAL

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO 319 OF 2018

(ON APPEAL FROM DCCC NO 90 OF 2018)

_______________

BETWEEN  
 HKSARRespondent

and

 FONG King-choi (方琼財)Applicant

_______________

Before:Hon Zervos JA in Court
Dates of Hearing:25 and 26 April 2019
Date of Decision:26 April 2019
Date of Reasons for Decision:2 May 2019

_____________________________

REASONS FOR DECISION

_____________________________

1.  On 26 April 2019, I granted leave to the applicant to appeal against his sentence of 20 months’ imprisonment which had been imposed on him on 9 October 2018, having pleaded guilty to the offence of blackmail. The offence involved the applicant making a demand for $100 from the manager of a 7-Eleven store on 30 October 2017. It was accepted that he was intoxicated and agitated at the time, although he behaved aggressively towards the staff of the store. I granted leave on the basis that it was reasonably arguable that the sentence that was imposed on him was manifestly excessive or wrong in principle.[1]

2.  The applicant applied for bail pending appeal.  He had by the time of the application served 335 days towards his sentence.  This was roughly the equivalent of having served 11 months’ imprisonment.  I was informed that after the imposition of the present sentence, the applicant had been sentenced to 6 months’ imprisonment in another case for possession of a dangerous drug of which 3 months was ordered to run consecutively to the present sentence.

3.  By section 83R of the Criminal Procedure Ordinance, Cap 221, the Court of Appeal may, if it thinks fit, admit an applicant to bail pending his appeal.[2]  The decision as to whether to grant bail pending appeal to an applicant will turn on whether it is just to do so.

4.  The test to be applied when considering an application for bail pending appeal was succinctly summarised by Chu JA in HKSAR v Sheung Kit Fung and Another, CACC 149/2013, 15 August 2013, unreported, as follows:

“5. Bail pending appeal is exceptional and generally speaking should only be granted where it appears that the appeal would be successful (‘merits’ ground), or where there is a risk that the whole or a substantial part of the sentence would have been served by the time the appeal was heard (‘time’ ground): HKSAR v Lau Man Kin [2010] 1 HKLRD 336. Where the ‘time’ ground is relied upon, an applicant must still demonstrate that his appeal is reasonably arguable.”

5.  A court will address the issue of bail pending appeal by asking the preliminary question whether the appeal has a strong likelihood of success and if it does, go on to consider matters relevant to whether or not to grant bail, and if so, whether it should be with or without conditions additional to the requirement for the applicant to surrender to the court as appointed.

6.  The court will next consider the question as to the likelihood that all or a substantial part of the sentence will be served before the disposal of the appeal.  It has been held that with respect to this ground, it also needs to be shown that the appeal is at least reasonably arguable[3] or promising[4].

7.  The relevant factors in this case were that I had determined that there was a reasonably arguable ground of appeal that the applicant’s sentence was manifestly excessive or wrong in principle, and that the applicant had so far served about 11 months of a sentence of 20 months’ imprisonment.  An additional relevant factor was that because of the circumstances of the case an expedited hearing of the applicant’s appeal was fixed for 10 July 2019.  The issue for consideration in this application centered on whether there was a real likelihood that the applicant would have served all or a substantial part of his sentence by the time the appeal was heard.  See HKSAR v AuYeung Chun Yee, CACC 438/2014, 25 April 2016, unreported, per McWalters JA.

8.  Assuming that the applicant’s ground of appeal would be successful and that the Court of Appeal would reduce his sentence, I found that there was a real likelihood that the applicant would have served all or a substantial part of the sentence of imprisonment before his appeal was heard.  I took into account that the resultant sentence on a successful appeal would be less than 20 months’ imprisonment which when further reduced by the one third remission for good behaviour would have brought the sentence to a term near or less than the time so far served by the applicant of about 11 months.  I was informed that the applicant had committed a number of disciplinary offences whilst in prison, and according to the prison authorities this would reduce his one third remission by only 8 days.  See Rule 69 of the Prison Rules, Cap 234A.

9.  I was also informed, although it was not made very clear to me, that according to the prison authorities that if bail were to be granted to the applicant in relation to the present sentence then the other sentence would be set off against the days served by the applicant (as at the date of the other sentence), and his present sentence would be recalculated, taking into account the remaining days served by the applicant, after the present sentence was finally determined on appeal. As the other sentence was 6 months’ imprisonment, of which 3 months was to run consecutively to the present sentence, I was still satisfied that there was a real likelihood that the applicant would have served all or a substantial part of his sentence by the time the appeal was heard.

10.  For these reasons, I granted the application, subject to the various terms and conditions.

 
 

 (Kevin Zervos)
 Justice of Appeal

  

Mr Gary Leung, SPP, of the Department of Justice, for the respondent

The applicant appeared in person



[1]HKSAR v Fong King-choi, CACC 319/2018, 25 April 2019, unreported.

[2] The section refers to an “appellant” who is defined under section 2 of the Ordinance as including a person who has given notice of application for leave to appeal.

[3]HKSAR v Chan Chi Chiu Louis, CACC 249/2012, 17 August 2012, unreported; HKSAR v Kulemesin Yuriy, CACC 19/2010, 26 February 2010, unreported; HKSAR v Lau Man Kin [2010] 1 HKLRD 336.

[4]R v Lee Hoi Kwong, CACC 229/1992, 7 October 1993, unreported.

[2019] HKCA 446-EN-2019-04-25

HKSAR v. FONG KING CHOI

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CACC 319/2018

[2019] HKCA 446

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF APPEAL

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO 319 OF 2018

(ON APPEAL FROM DCCC NO 90 OF 2018)

_______________

BETWEEN  
 HKSARRespondent

and

 FONG King-choi (方琼財)Applicant

_______________

Before: Hon Zervos JA in Court

Date of Hearing: 25 April 2019

Date of Judgment: 25 April 2019

_______________

J U D G M E N T

_______________

1.  In the early morning of 30 October 2017, the applicant entered a 7-Eleven store, claiming to a female member of staff that he was collecting protection money, “tor tei”, while thumping the cashier table. He did this repeatedly when the female store manager confronted him. He demanded that she hand over to him $100 which she refused to do. He left the store shouting loudly and kicking things on the street outside. Throughout his outburst, customers were present or entering the store. He returned to the store and shouted at the manager, swearing and threatening her, saying that he would come back another time. He then took two cans of beer and knocked them down on the cashier table. As he was about to walk out of the store, the manager insisted that he pay for the beer. He put $20 on a shelf and walked out of the store shouting and swearing at the manager. The actual cost of the two cans of beer was $12.90. He remained outside the store, shouting loudly abusive comments at the manager. At one stage, he claimed he would bring his friends to the store, but the manager and her staff ignored him as he walked off and loitered outside the store.

2.  The duration of this incident was from 6:19am to 6:25am, and at 6:28am he was intercepted and arrested by the police.  The incident was captured on the store’s CCTV camera.

3.  On 9 October 2018, the applicant pleaded guilty to the offence of blackmail in relation to this incident before District Court Judge E Yip (“the judge”).  It was alleged that he made an unwarranted demand of $100 from the manager with menaces. 

4.  In mitigation, it was submitted on the applicant’s behalf that he was 36 years of age and residing with his parents.  It was explained that he had consumed a lot of alcohol prior to the incident because he was upset with his girlfriend.  It was further submitted that there was no actual violence or threat of violence, and that he acted alone without causing any damage to property.  The applicant had a criminal record in relation to offences that did not include blackmail, for which he either received a probation order or a fine, although there was one occasion where he was sentenced to attend a drug addiction treatment centre for possession of a dangerous drug.

5.  Counsel on the applicant’s behalf submitted HKSAR v Wong Yin Chak, CACC 126/2004, 17 December 2004, unreported, and invited the judge to adopt a starting point lower than 3 years’ imprisonment.

6.  The judge noted that the applicant had only visited the store on a single day, and the incident involved a demand for a one-off payment of a small sum of money.  He compared the applicant’s case with a more serious case of blackmail, Wong Yin Chak, where the Court of Appeal in the circumstances of that case regarded an overall starting point of 3 years’ imprisonment as being appropriate in relation to two offences of blackmail.  In that case, the appellant together with another person made continuous demands for protection money, “tor tei”, in the sum of $1,000 from a man and later his wife who operated a newspaper stall.  The first demand was made when the man was operating the stall at 3:05am.  The man challenged them about their demand and as a result they splashed Coca-cola over his stock and ran away.  At 6:15am, they returned when the man’s wife had taken over operation of the stall.  The appellant again demanded protection money from her.  He told her that if she made the payment there would be no trouble and that she should confirm with her neighbours that they were paying “tor tei”.  She told them that she was not the boss and they should return at noontime.  However, they did not return that day but came back two days later at 6:15am.  The woman was alone at the stall at the time.   They asked her if she had spoken to her boss, and if she had confirmed with her neighbours that they had paid “tor tei”.  She replied that she had, and none of them had said that a payment had been made.  The two men left but returned about 10 minutes later, and the appellant opened a can of Coca-cola and spilt the contents of it over the newspapers on display at the stall.  A report was made to the police and the two men was later arrested.

7.  Even though the judge acknowledged that Wong Yin Chak was a more serious case than the one before him, it is arguable that he treated it as providing a sentencing guideline of 3 years’ imprisonment after trial for cases of this type where there were no aggravating features.  In reference to Wong Yin Chak, he said: “The Court of Appeal regarded an overall starting point of 3 years appropriate.  It commented that the usual starting point of 3 years would be called for where no aggravating features such as triad affiliation, violence, or demand for regular payment or of large amount, were present.”[1] However, the Court of Appeal in Wong Yin Chak expressly noted that there were no guidelines laid down for this type of offence.[2]  The Court went on to state that despite the fact that the appellant was accompanied by another person and damaged the stall’s stock, his case fell into the lower category of offenders.  The Court noted that: “He made no threats of physical violence towards either of the stallholders; neither did he claim to have a triad connection.  He made a one-off demand rather than a demand for the regular payment of protection fees.”[3]  It was on this basis that the Court was of the view that a starting point of 3 years’ imprisonment was appropriate for his offence.

8.  It is arguable that the judge was guided by the starting point of 3 years’ imprisonment in Wong Yin Chak and adopted a starting point of 2 years and 6 months’ imprisonment in the present case which he reduced by one third for the applicant’s guilty plea to 20 months’ imprisonment.

9.  By notice dated 31 October 2018, the applicant applies for leave to appeal against his sentence on the basis that it is manifestly excessive in the circumstances, however, he acknowledges that he behaved badly at the 7-Eleven store.  He attributes his behavior to being intoxicated and emotionally distraught because he was upset with his girlfriend.  He noted that at the time he had paid for the two cans of beer and that he had not caused injury to anyone or damage to any property. 

10.  From the admitted facts and the CCTV footage, the applicant was abusive and threatening to the staff of the store.  He intimated that his friends would come to the store to back up his demand for “tor tei”.  On the other hand, it appears that he was under the influence of alcohol, and behaving erratically.  Notwithstanding the belligerent manner of the applicant, the staff of the store were able to deal with him, even to the point of making him pay for the two cans of beer before he left the store.  He was behaving like this in open view of other persons who were either inside or outside the store.

11.  I am of the view that in light of the circumstances of this case, it is reasonably arguable that the starting point was manifestly excessive and wrong in principle, and I therefore grant the applicant leave to appeal against his sentence.

12.  I also grant the applicant legal aid in the conduct of his appeal pursuant to Rule 12(3) of the Legal Aid in Criminal Cases Rules, Cap 221D.

  (Kevin Zervos)
 Justice of Appeal

Mr Gary Leung, SPP, of the Department of Justice, for the respondent

The applicant appeared in person

[1] Appeal Bundle, page 9M-O.

[2] At paragraph 11.

[3] At paragraph 13.