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Civil Action2018

CHOY HON KI AND ANOTHER v. 林家強

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[2024] HKDC 432-EN-2024-03-27

CHOY HON KI AND ANOTHER v. 林家強

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DCCJ 631/2018

[2024] HKDC 432

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

CIVIL ACTION NO 631 OF 2018

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BETWEEN

 CHOY HON KI(蔡漢佳)1st Plaintiff
 CHOI SHING CHAU(蔡成就)2nd Plaintiff

and

 林家強Defendant

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Before:Deputy District Judge Damian Wong in Court
Dates of Hearing:18, 19, 20 and 27 October 2023
Date of Judgment:27 March 2024

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JUDGMENT

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A. INTRODUCTION

1.  The present dispute concerns a piece of land known as Lot No 1919 in Demarcation District No 76, Pak Tin New Village, North District (“Lot 1919” or “Land”).

2.  The Land was acquired by Madam Tsoi Man Shi (蔡文氏), alias Man Chiu Hei (文照喜) (“Madam Man”), on 20 January 1941. Madam Man was the mother of the 1st Plaintiff (“P1”). After Madam Man’s death in 1982, Lot 1919 was transferred to P1 and his brother Choy Hon Wai on 20 December 1983. After division of family assets[1] (分家), P1 became the sole owner of the Land on 17 October 1990. On 4 May 2015, P1 transferred Lot 1919 to himself and his son, i.e. the 2nd Plaintiff (“P2”), as joint tenants.

3.  There is no serious dispute that the parents of the Defendant (“D”) started occupying Lot 1919 in around 1960s. Since then, D’s family has been living thereon. At present, D is still occupying a substantial part of the Land.

4.  The main dispute is whether D’s family occupied the Land as tenant as alleged by Ps (of which the tenancy has been terminated with effect from 29 December 2017) or as squatter as alleged by D.

B. THE PARTIES’ CASES

B1. The Plaintiffs’ case

5.  According to Ps, Lot 1919 is called “龍仔水田”. Prior to 1961, it was let to a tenant named Ng Tong Bor (吳湯波) (“Ng”).

6.  By a written Chinese tenancy dated 8 October 1961 of lunar calendar between 蔡祖勝 (“Tsoi Senior”) on behalf of Madam Man as landlord, and D’s father 林超 (“Lam Senior”) and one 沈根 (“Shum”) as tenants, Lot 1919 was let to Lam Senior and Shum for a period of 10 years from October 1961 to 1970 of the Chinese Lunar Calendar (“First Tenancy”). Tsoi Senior was the husband of Madam Man and father of P1.

7.  Upon expiry of the First Tenancy, another Chinese written tenancy was entered between Tsoi Senior on behalf of Madam Man as landlord and Lam Senior as tenant under which Lot 1919 was let to Lam Senior for another period of 10 years from 30 December 1970 to 29 December 1980 (“Second Tenancy” and, together with the First Tenancy, collectively referred to as the “Two Tenancies”).

8.  After the expiry of the Second Tenancy, Lam Senior and his family continued occupying Lot 1919 and became the yearly tenant by paying rent to Tsoi family on yearly basis covering the period from 30th December of the year to 29th December of the following year.

9.  Initially, leasing of Lot 1919 were handled by Tsoi Senior. In 1970s, P1 and his family emigrated to the Netherlands. After the death of Tsoi Senior in 1978 and Madam Man in 1982, Madam Lam Kam Yin (林金賢) (“Madam Lam”), P1’s wife and P2’s mother, was responsible for handling leasing of Lot 1919. According to Madam Lam, save for two years where she was sick, she returned to Hong Kong every year to worship ancestors (拜祖先) and collect rents. At first, Madam Lam collected rent from D’s mother, nicknamed 燒臘婆. After the death of D’s mother, other members of Lam family continued paying rent to her, either directly or through her sister who was living in the vicinity.

10.  At one stage, it came to Madam Lam’s notice that Lam family had sub-let a small portion of Lot 1919 to another family surnamed Leung (“Leung Family”). Madam Lam did not object to the sub-letting and continued collecting rent from Lam family for the whole of Lot 1919. Adopting the colours used in the Lot Index Plan annexed to the Statement of Claim, the portion of Lot 1919 occupied by Leung Family is referred to as the “Pink Part” and the portion occupied by Lam family is referred to as the “Green Part”.

11.  In 2001, P1 and Madam Lam returned to Hong Kong for good. At that time, the rent of Lot 1919 was $2,400 per annum.

12.  In around 2009, P1/Madam Lam requested Lam family to sign a written tenancy agreement in respect of Lot 1919. There was discussion between P1/Madam Lam and 林家寶 (“Ka Bo”), one of D’s elder brothers, and a written draft tenancy was prepared by Ka Bo (“2009 Draft Tenancy”). The parties could not agree on the duration of the tenancy and no agreement was signed. However, Lam family continued paying rent every year by depositing it into Madam Lam’s Hang Seng Bank account no 233-092659-888 (“Madam Man’sAccount”).

13.  According to Ps, 林家龍 (“Ka Lung”), another elder brother of D, transferred $3,000 from his HSBC Bank account no 036-668713-833 (“Ka Lung’s Account”) to Madam Man’s Account on 19 November 2009 and 2 October 2010 (“Two Payments”) for payment of rent covering the years of 2010 and 2011 respectively.

14.  In the meantime, Madam Lam approached Leung Family directly. Leung Family agreed to sign a written tenancy agreement. Since 2010, written tenancy agreements have been entered between P1 and members of Leung Family every two years.

15.  After P2 became one of the registered owners of Lot 1919 in May 2015, P2 took over the leasing of the Land.

16.  In October 2015, Ps asked D (who was occupying the Green Part) to sign a written tenancy agreement again. According to Ps, D refused to sign written tenancy agreement but agreed to continue paying $5,500 per annum for rent. Subsequently, a sum of $5,500 was transferred to Madam Lam’s Account on 17 November 2015 covering the period up to 29 December 2016. It was the last payment of rent received by Madam Lam.

17.  By the letter dated 12 October 2016 from Messrs Leung Kin & Co (“Leung Kin”), Ps informed D that the tenancy in respect of the Green Part of Lot 1919 would terminate on 29 December 2017.

18.  On 20 April 2017, Ps and D met in Tai Po to discuss the leasing of the Green Part. According to Ps, D indicated that he would sign a written tenancy if Ps agreed to compensate him for the structures erected on the Green Part in the event that D was required to surrender the Green Part. Once again, no consensus was reached between the parties.

19.  Subsequently, Leung Kin issued another letter dated 10 May 2017 to D repeating that the tenancy in respect of the Green Part of Lot 1919 would terminate on 29 December 2017.

20.  On 9 October 2017, Ps and D met again in a Chinese restaurant in Tai Po (“9/10/2017 Meeting”). It is Ps’ case that D expressly admitted at the meeting that Lam family had all along been a tenant and paying rent to Tsoi family. D proposed to buy around 1,500 square feet of Lot 1919 at $500 per square feet.

21.  Upon D’s request, Ps and D met again in the same restaurant on 10 October 2017 (“10/10/2017 Meeting”). At that meeting, D offered to purchase around 2,500 square feet of Lot 1919 at $350 per square feet. D also proposed to pay the purchase price by 3 installments to be paid in 2 to 3 years. Ps indicated that they needed time to consider D’s offer.

22.  On 11 October 2017, P2 replied to D by WhatsApp that his offer was not accepted.

23.  As D had failed to surrender the Green Part, Ps commenced the present proceeding against D on 13 February 2018.

24.  Ps seek to recover the possession of the Green Part. They also claim arrears of rent from 30 December 2016 to 29 December 2017 at $5,500 per annum and mesne profit at the same amount from 30 December 2017 until delivery of possession.

B2. The Defendant’s case

25.  D has been living on Lot 1919 with his family since his birth in 1975. Lam Senior had 13 children and D was the youngest amongst them. His elder brothers and sisters moved out gradually from 1980 to 2000 and he is now the only person occupying the Green Part.

26.  D denied that his family was a tenant of Lot 1919. Prior to the death of his parents, he had never heard that Lot 1919 was rented or that they needed to pay rent in respect of the Land.

27.  According to D, Lot 1919 is called 竹坑邊田地 and Lam Senior acquired it from Ng in 1962 at a consideration of $4,500. The transaction was evidenced by a receipt dated 30 March 1962 (“1962 Receipt”) and a deed of transfer dated 8 April 1962 (“1962 Assignment”). It is D’s case that 龍仔水田 is the name of Lot 1918 and the Two Tenancies concerned Lot 1918, not Lot 1919.

28.  D admitted that the Two Payments were made by Ka Lung but denied that they were rent for Lot 1919. D also admitted that he met Ps at the 9/10/2017 Meeting and 10/10/2017 Meeting (collectively referred to as the “Two Meetings”) to discuss the matters relating to the Land. According to D, there were many people from Ps’ side and he was only on his own. The situation at the Two Meetings was very chaotic and he might have said something which was inconsistent with his knowledge or the truth.

29.  In short, it is D’s case that Lam Senior and he have been in continuous and exclusive occupation of Lot 1919 since 1960s with the intention of possessing the same as if they were the sole owners of the Land. D seeks a declaration that Ps’ title to Lot 1919 has been extinguished.

C. ISSUES IN DISPUTE

30.  Based on the parties’ cases, the main disputes concern the following:-

(a) What was the name of Lot 1919? Whether the Two Tenancies concerned Lot 1919 (as alleged by Ps) or Lot 1918 (as alleged by D)?

(b) If the Two Tenancies concerned Lot 1919 and Lam Senior was a tenant to start with, whether Lam Senior and members of Lam family paid any rent to Tsoi family throughout the years? When was the last payment of rent?

(c) Whether Lam Senior and D had the intention to dispossess the paper owner of Lot 1919?

D. HOUSEKEEPING MATTERS

31.  There are two housekeeping matters that I need to mention for record purpose.

32.  The first is about D’s application on 10 July 2023 to exclude all records of communications between Ps and D from 2016 to 2020 which include the audio recordings of the Two Meetings on the ground of “without prejudice” privilege. On 11 October 2023, Deputy District Judge Alexander Tang handed down the Decision[2] directing that evidence relating to communications from 24 May 2018 onwards be expunged (“Expunged Evidence”). Pursuant to the Decision, the Expunged Evidence was removed from the trial bundles. For avoidance of doubt, I confirm that I have not read the Expunged Evidence.

33.  The second is about another application, of D taken out on the same day of the Decision, for leave to file and serve his 2nd Supplemental Witness Statement to “briefly explain the situation of his three brothers”, namely 林家達 (“Ka Tak”), Ka Bo and Ka Lung. On the first day of the trial, upon Mr Lee’s confirmation that Ps had no objection to the application, I granted leave to D to file and serve his 2nd Supplemental Witness Statement.

E. WITNESSES

34.  Madam Lam and P2 gave evidence at the trial. In addition, Ps also called Ms Lam Tim Mui, who is Madam Lam’s niece, to testify.

35.  On the other hand, D was the only factual witness from his side. D also called Mr Tang Sze Kin Eric, a land surveyor, to give expert evidence which focused on occupation of the Land.

36.  Sadly, two witnesses (one from each side) had died before the trial and were unable to give evidence. As a result, their witness statements are excluded as evidence.

F. APPLICABLE LEGAL PRINCIPLES

37.  The legal principles on adverse possession are well-settled and not in dispute which can be summarized as follows:-

(a) A person claiming to be in adverse possession must be shown to have both possession and the requisite intention to possess; Wong Tak Yue v Kung Kwok Wai David (1997-98) 1 HKCFAR 55 at 68E per Li CJ;

(b) The owner of the land with the paper title is deemed in possession of the land. If the law is to attribute possession to a person who can establish no paper title to possession, and claims to be a mere trespasser, the burden is upon him to establish his intention to exclude the whole world: including the owner of the land; Wong Tak Yue at 70E per Litton PJ;

(c) Possession is never adverse if it is enjoyed under lawful title. A person occupies or uses land by licence of the owner with the paper title and his licence has not yet been determined, he cannot be treated as having been in “adverse possession” as against the owner with the paper title; Adverse Possession by Jourdan and Radely-Gardner, 2nd edition (2011) at §6-16;

(d) Where the occupier has made self-serving statements as to what his intention was, whether during the period of occupation or when challenged in legal proceedings, the courts should approach them with some skepticism. The courts would scrutinize the circumstances in which they were made and would give them such weight if any as they may deserve. Conversely, where the occupier has made statements as to what his intention was and such statements are against his interest, the courts would usually accord to them considerable weight; Wong Tak Yue at 69B per Li CJ; and

(e) Where a squatter acknowledges the true owner’s title, the acknowledgment, whether oral or in writing, may show, when taken with the other circumstances of the case, that the squatter did not have the animus possidendi; or it may show that the squatter was in possession with the licence of or as agent for the true owner; Adverse Possession (supra) at §9-102.

38.  When assessing credibility, the Court takes into account the inherent plausibility of a witness’ testimony and considers whether any part of it is, in a material way, contradicted by other undisputed or indisputable evidence (such as contemporaneous documents). Where it is shown that a witness has been discredited over one or more matters to which he has testified (using the above tests), this fact is relevant to the assessment of his overall credibility. Likewise, regard may be had to a witness’s motive for deliberately not giving truthful testimony. For example, telling the truth may prejudice his interest, or a just determination of the litigation may affect his interest. See Hua Tyan Development Ltd v Zurich Insurance Co Ltd [2012] 4 HKLRD 827, §27, per Chung J.

G. THE TWO TENANCIES

39.  The Two Tenancies were handwritten and signed in duplicate in two books entitled “立批水田合約部” (collectively as “Agreement Books” or individually as “Agreement Book”) which were produced by Ps and D respectively[3]. Save for some very minor discrepancies, the content of the Two Tenancies in the two Agreement Books is identical.

40.  In the Amended Defence and Counterclaim[4], D alleged that the signatures of “林超” on the two Agreement Books in respect of the First Tenancy were not signed by Lam Senior and therefore the First Tenancy were invalid (無效). However, save for a bare assertion in his witness statement that the two signatures of Lam Senior in the Agreement Books are strikingly different, D has failed to adduce evidence, let alone credible evidence, to support his allegation.

41.  Conversely, it is D’s own evidence that the Agreement Book produced by him was obtained from Ka Tak, his eldest brother, after the commencement of the proceedings. According to D, when Ka Tak knew about the present proceedings, he told D that Lam Senior had left some documents with him and he gave the documents to D which included an Agreement Book. In other words, the Agreement Book produced by D had been kept by Lam Senior during his lifetime and then passed on to Ka Tak after his death. It is inherently improbable that Lam Senior would have kept the Agreement Book for so many years if his signature thereon was forged by someone else as alleged by D. In my view, D’s challenge on the authenticity and validity of the Agreement Books is totally groundless. It is not surprising that the challenge was not pursued by Ms So at the trial.

42.  The First Tenancy started with the following:-

“立批水田契人嶺仔村蔡祖勝兹將名下禾田土名龍仔水田兩塊種籽壹斗八升租與林超沈根耕種” (emphasis added)

43.  Ps’ case is that “龍仔水田” was the name of Lot 1919. D’s case is that the name of Lot 1919 was “馬尾下竹坑邊” and “龍仔水田” was the name of Lot 1918.

44.  It is D’s argument that:-

(a) In the 1962 Receipt[5], Ng acknowledged receipt of $4,500 from Lam Senior and the land referred therein was called “馬尾下竹坑邊田地”;

(b) In the 1962 Assignment[6], Ng transferred the structures, tools, etc. on the land known as “馬尾下嶺仔村竹坑邊水田” to Lam Senior and Shum, together with a Modification of Tenancy No 32102 (“MOT”);

(c) The subject land referred to in the MOT[7] was Lot 1919;

(d) Putting these documents together, it is clear that the name of Lot 1919 was “馬尾下竹坑邊田地”; and

(e) As it is illogical for one land to be known by two different names, “龍仔水田” could not be the name of Lot 1919.

45.  It is also D’s argument that:-

(a) By a written Chinese lease entered in October 1970 of Chinese Lunar Calendar (“1970 Lease”)[8], Tsoi Shu Lun (蔡樹麟) (“TSL”) let the land known as “水田土名龍仔大小五塊” to Lam Senior;

(b) According to land search, TSL was the registered owner of Lot 1918 at the material time;

(c) Once again, putting these documents together, it is clear that “龍仔水田” was the name of Lot 1918; and

(d) As it is equally illogical for two lands in the same vicinity to be known by the same name, “龍仔水田” could not be the name of Lot 1919.

46.  I am unable to accept D’s argument because of the following:-

(a) Firstly, there is no evidence to show that TSL had authorized Tsoi Senior to enter into a lease in respect of Lot 1918 on his behalf in 1961. On the contrary, it was Madam Lam’s evidence, which was not challenged, that Tsoi Senior was the person who handled the leasing of Lot 1919 at the material time;

(b) Secondly, if the Two Tenancies related to Lot 1918 which belonged to TSL, why one of the Agreement Books was kept by Tsoi family, instead of by TSL’s family?

(c) Thirdly, there is no dispute that the term “壹斗八升” in the First Tenancy refers to the area of the land. In the 1970 Lease, the area of the land was “二斗” which is larger than the area stated in the First Tenancy. If both the First Tenancy and the 1970 Lease concerned the same piece of land (i.e. Lot 1918) as alleged by D, there is no reason why the size of the land is different. On the contrary, the area of the land stated in both the 1962 Receipt and the 1962 Assignment (collectively referred to as “1962 Documents”) was “壹斗八升” which is exactly the same as the area stated in the First Tenancy. This supports the conclusion that the land referred to in the First Tenancy is the same land referred to in the 1962 Documents (i.e. Lot 1919);

(d) Fourthly, the land referred to in the First Tenancy Agreement is “龍仔水田兩塊” whereas the land referred to in the 1970 Lease is “龍仔大小五塊”. Once again, if the First Tenancy and the 1970 Lease concerned the same land, there is no reason why there is a difference in the number of portions that the land consisted of;

(e) Fifthly, if the First Tenancy concerned Lot 1918, it means that the lease of the said Lot had been renewed in October 1970 by the 1970 Lease. Why then Lam Senior needed to sign the Second Tenancy in the Agreement Books to renew the lease of the same Lot again? This strongly suggests that the 1970 Lease and the Second Tenancy, which were entered into at around the same time, concerned two different pieces of land;

(f) Sixthly, the rent stated in the 1970 Lease was $250 per year whereas the rent stated in the Agreement Books (which applied to both the First Tenancy and the Second Tenancy) was “租谷一千斤”. It is impossible that the rent to be paid in two different ways for the same land;

(g) Seventhly, D’s argument is premised on the assumption that two lands in the same vicinity cannot be known by the same name and one land cannot be known by two different names. However, there is no evidence on how the lands in the village were named. There is nothing to show that, before naming the land, the owner would ask around to make sure his proposed name would not duplicate the existing name of other villagers’ lands;

(h) Although Madam Lam agreed under cross-examination that one land would not be called two different names, I do not think her answer would assist D because the name of Lot 1919 was not given by her. It was named by Madam Man and Madam Lam’s evidence was that she did not even bother to know what other villagers’ lands were called.

47.  A document that can shed light on this issue is the 2009 Draft Tenancy[9]. Under cross-examination, D agreed that the document was prepared in 2009 when the parties were negotiating the tenancy of Lot 1919. There was no serious challenge to Madam Lam’s evidence that the document was prepared by Ka Bo. It is particularly noted that the land in the 2009 Draft Tenancy was described as “新界粉嶺嶺仔村龍仔第76約第1919地段農地壹塊” (underlining added). This shows that members of Lam family also called Lot 1919 as “龍仔”.

48.  D further argued that it was inherently improbable for Lam Senior to have spent $4,500, which was a substantial amount in 1962, to acquire Lot 1919 from Ng if he were already a tenant of the Land under the First Tenancy.

49.  I do not accept D’s argument. It is important to note that, in the 1962 Documents, Ng expressly referred to Tsoi Senior as landowner (田主). In the 1962 Assignment, Ng even acknowledged that the subject land was rented (承租) from Tsoi Senior. It was also expressly provided in both of the 1962 Documents that the rent book (租簿) was to be delivered, amongst other items, to Lam Senior and Shum upon completion. If the land was not subjected to tenancy, why was it necessary for Ng to deliver the rent book relating to the land to them?

50.  In my view, there is no conflict between the First Tenancy and the 1962 Documents. After entering the First Tenancy with Tsoi Senior, it was up to Lam Senior and Shum to negotiate with the former tenant (i.e. Ng) for handing over of the Land together with the structures, chattels, MOT, etc. The 1962 Documents represented the deal between the out-going tenant and in-coming tenants for handing over of the Land and the items thereon when there was a change of tenants.

51.  Ps’ case that Lam Senior was a tenant of Lot 1919 is also supported by a consent letter dated 15 March 1979 signed by Madam Man[10] (“1979 Consent Letter”). The 1979 Consent Letter was submitted to Tai Po District Office in relation to Lam Senior’s application for reconstruction of existing structures on Lot 1919. In the 1979 Consent Letter, Lam Senior was repeatedly described as “tenant” (租用人).

52.  I appreciate that Lam Senior did not sign on the 1979 Consent Letter. However, one can infer from the circumstances that it was Lam Senior who asked Madam Man to sign the 1979 Consent Letter to facilitate his application for reconstruction and he must have known the content of the document. It was inherently improbable that Madam Man would have agreed to sign the 1979 Consent Letter if the Land had been trespassed by Lam Senior since 1960s as alleged. The 1979 Consent Letter was produced by D and he could not give any explanation why Lam Senior was described as tenant therein.

53.  By reasons of the aforesaid, I find on balance that:-

(a) “龍仔水田” was the name of Lot 1919;

(b) The subject land of the Two Tenancies was Lot 1919; and

(c) Lam Senior was a tenant under the Two Tenancies.

H. PAYMENT OF RENTS

H1. Madam Lam’s evidence

54.  It is Ps’ case that Lam Senior and his family had been paying rent since 1960s until the last payment on 17 November 2015 (covering the period up to 29 December 2016). This was denied by D. It is D’s case that his family had never paid rent to Tsoi family since 1960s.

55.  According to Madam Lam, it was Tsoi Senior who managed the leasing of Lot 1919 until he died in 1978, and then it was Madam Man. After Madam Man’s death in 1982, the responsibility fell on Madam Lam. It was Madam Lam’s evidence that, save for two years where she was sick, she came back to Hong Kong from the Netherlands every year to visit Madam Man, worship ancestors and collect rents. After P1’s retirement, she and P1 returned to Hong Kong in 2001 and she continued collecting rent from Lam family every year. She recalled that the rent in late 2000s was $2,400 per year.

56.  In 2009, she and P1 asked Lam family to sign a written tenancy. She explained that, as they were getting old, they wanted a black-and-white record of the tenancy of the Land so that it would be easier for their children to deal with the Land after they died. They once went to Lot 1919 to visit Lam family. They met three members of Lam family, namely Ka Bo, either Ka Lung or Ka Lung’s twin brother (Madam Lam could not be sure), and D. Ka Lung or Ka Lung’s twin brother agreed to sign a written tenancy but D objected. Ka Bo told P1 and Madam Lam that the family members needed to discuss the matter amongst themselves.

57.  Subsequently, Ka Bo went to P1’s residence in Tai Po and brought with him the 2009 Draft Tenancy. Ka Bo proposed a term of 8 years at the yearly rent of $3,000 and the lease would be automatically renewed for another 8 years upon expiry. Ka Bo asked P1 to sign the 2009 Draft Tenancy but P1 said he needed time to consider the terms. After consulting a friend, Madam Lam and P1 were of the view that the period of 16 years was too long and they proposed to reduce it to 5 years. They had no objection to the rent of $3,000. Their proposed amendments were marked in red on the 2009 Draft Tenancy and the revised draft was returned to Ka Bo. Ka Bo did not accept their proposed amendments and no written tenancy was signed.

58.  Thereafter, Lam family continued paying rent to Madam Lam by depositing it into Madam Lam’s Account. The first two deposits into Madam Leung’s Account were made by Ka Lung on 19 November 2009 and 2 October 2010 through Ka Lung’s Account (i.e. the Two Payments). Thereafter, the rent was deposited into Madam Lam’s account in cash and there is no evidence as to who made the payments. The rent increased gradually from $3,000 to $5,500 and the last payment was made on 17 November 2015.

59.  Due to old age, Madam Lam handed over the leasing of the Land to P1 in around 2009. In 2015, P1 transferred the Land into Ps’ names and P2 started to manage the leasing of the Land.

60.  Ms So submits that Madam Lam’s evidence was not credible.

61.  Firstly, Ms So criticized that Madam Lam was prone to reciting some catchphrases such as “年年交租” which were helpful to Ps’ case.

62.  I do not find that Madam Lam was particularly prone to reciting the catchphrases as alleged. The so-called “catchphrases” were said by Madam Lam when answering Ms So’s questions and I do not find any absurdity in Madam Lam’s answers. The fact that Madam Lam’s answers are helpful to Ps’ case does not necessarily mean that they are not credible. The question is whether her evidence makes sense in the circumstances of the case and whether it sits well with other undisputed or undisputable evidence. I will come to that in due course.

63.  Secondly, Ms So criticized that Madam Lam’s answers on the yearly tenancy after 1981 were confusing. For instance, whilst the First Tenancy provided that the rent was one thousand catties of grain, Madam Lam said that it was 12 piculs (擔), i.e. 1,200 catties, but they only received 10 piculs.

64.  Ms So also criticized Madam Lam’s evidence on the amount of rent received from 1980s to 2000s. It was Madam Lam’s evidence that the rent was calculated by reference to the prevailing market price of grain and paid in cash. Madam Lam said that the market price of grain in 1980s was around $30-$40 per picul, so the rent was about $300 to $400 per year. She continued using the same method to calculate the rent until late 2000s and the rent at that time had increased to $2,400. Ms So submitted that there is no evidence to support Madam Lam’s allegation that the price of grain had increased by more than five-fold during the 20 years from 1980s to 2000s. It was also inherently improbable that, even by 2000s, the yearly rent was still calculated based on a process where Madam Lam would go and find out the market price of grain at the given time.

65.  I accept that there are some inconsistencies in Madam Lam’s evidence in this aspect. However, one need to bear in mind that Madam Lam was 87 years old at the time of the trial and those events happened many decades ago. It was not surprising that Madam Lam’s memory might fade and she might get confused with some of the matters. Some mistakes in details are understandable. After all, assessment of credibility is not a test of memory.

66.  For the increase of rent from 1980s to 2000s, there is no evidence on the price of grain during these years and there is no basis for the Court to make any finding on whether the more than five-fold increase in the price of grain is reasonable or not. Further, I do not find it inherently improbable for Madam Lam to adopt the same methodology in calculating the rent even in 2000s, when it had been used since the commencement of the First Tenancy in 1960s.

67.  Thirdly, Ms So submitted that it was not believable that Madam Lam would come back almost every year to collect the rent which ranged from a few hundreds to at most $2,400 as it was unreasonably disproportionate to the air fare and other travelling cost. Ms So also criticized Ps for failing to produce Madam Lam’s passports for proof.

68.  I am unable to accept Ms So’s submissions. It was not Madam Lam’s evidence that she came back to Hong Kong every year only for collecting rent. Her evidence was that, save for two years where she was sick, she came back to Hong Kong every year during Chung Yeung festival to visit Madam Man, worship ancestors and collect rent. According to Madam Lam, the family emigrated to the Netherlands in 1970s and they operated a restaurant in Chinatown. They had three children who were very young at that time. It was impossible for both P1 and Madam Lam to come back at the same time because one of them had to stay behind in the Netherlands to operate the restaurant and take care of the children. Considering the family background, I do not find it incredible that Madam Lam came back almost every year to Hong Kong for those purposes.

69.  Madam Lam also explained that she used her Hong Kong Identity Card to enter into Hong Kong when she came back and one could not find any record of her entrance into Hong Kong in her Netherland passports. In my view, Madam Lam’s answer makes perfect sense and I accept her evidence.

70.  When assessing Madam Lam’s evidence, I have considered the following circumstantial evidence:-

(a) Firstly, Lam Senior must have paid rent during the tenure of the First Tenancy, otherwise Madam Man would not have agreed to renew the lease when the First Tenancy expired;

(b) Lam Senior must also have been paying rent when Madam Man signed the Consent Letter in 1979 as it was unlikely that Madam Man would have agreed to sign the document to help his reconstruction application if there was any default in rental payment;

(c) There seems no dispute that the two families enjoyed very good relationship in the past. There are photos showing P1 and Madam Lam attending the wedding of Ka Bo. It was Madam Lam’s evidence that they were also invited to attend the wedding of one of Lam Senior’s daughters in Fanling. I agree with Mr Lee that this is more consistent with Ps’ case that Lam Senior had been paying rent to Tsoi family; and

(d) The rent of Lot 1919 was just a few thousands per year at the most. This amount was insignificant when compared with the money spent by Lam Senior and his family on the Land throughout the years. Unless Tsoi family ceased collecting rents, it is unlikely that Lam Senior would stop paying rents on his own violation.

71.  There was suggestion that P1 had abandoned the Land after Madam Man’s death in 1982 because he was in the Netherlands and he only picked up the interest in the Land in around 2009. It was also suggested that the reason why P1 suddenly asked Lam family to sign a written tenancy in 2009 was because he realized that the Land might have been adversely possessed by Lam family.

72.  In my view, these suggestions are not supported by any evidence. On the contrary, evidence shows that the Land was transferred to P1 and his brother Choy Hon Wai on 20 December 1983, not long after the death of Madam Man in 1982. The Land was further transferred to P1 on 17 October 1990 as a result of division of family assets. I find it difficult to believe that P1 would have taken all the troubles to divide the family assets with his brother and arrange to transfer the Land to himself if he had abandoned it as suggested.

73.  Further, there was no serious challenge to Madam Lam’s evidence that the 2009 Draft Tenancy was prepared by Ka Bo. According to Madam Lam, Ka Bo brought the said document to their residence and asked them to sign it immediately. It was P1 and Madam Lam who wanted more time to consider the terms. If P1 was really concerned with the possible adverse possession of the Land by Lam family in 2009 as alleged, it was only logical for him to immediately sign the 2009 Draft Tenancy when being requested by Ka Bo regardless of the terms contained therein in order to protect his interests in the Land. On any view, a long lease of 16 years with a fixed rent of $3,000 per year was still better than losing the title to the Land.

H2. D’s evidence

74.  On the other hand, I have serious reservation on D’s evidence that his family had never paid rent in respect of Lot 1919.

75.  Firstly, D’s evidence does not sit well with the 2009 Draft Tenancy. There was no serious dispute that the 2009 Draft Tenancy was prepared by Ka Bo when P1 requested Lam family to sign a written tenancy in 2009. If Lam family had never paid rent in respect of Lot 1919 since 1960s as alleged, they must have found P1’s request to be unreasonable and offensive. One would naturally expect members of Lam family to have either ignored P1 or flatly refused the request. There was no reason why Ka Bo would need to prepare the 2009 Draft Tenancy and gave it to P1 for consideration. It is also clear from the amendments on 2009 Draft Tenancy that Ka Bo’s concern at that time was on the tenure of the tenancy, rather than whether Lam family should sign a written tenancy.

76.  Secondly, D’s explanation on the Two Payments is highly unsatisfactory. The evidence in relation to the Two Payments comes as follows:-

(a) In P2’s witness statement filed on 28 May 2020, he listed out the rents allegedly received from Lam family through Madam Lam’s Account from 2009 to 2015. P2 produced letters from Hang Seng Bank confirming that the Two Payments were transferred from a HSBC Account no 036-668-713-833;

(b) To find out the account holder of the said HSBC account, P2 asked his nephew Raymond Kong to input the said account number into an ATM machine and the screen showed the name “Lum K* L***”. P2 produced the photo showing the screen of the ATM machine and said that he verily believed that account holder was Ka Lung;

(c) In the supplemental witness statement filed on 7 February 2022, D did not address the issue relating to the Two Payments and P2’s suggestion that the Two Payments were made by Ka Lung; and

(d) It was not until one week before the trial that D took out an application for leave to adduce his 2nd supplemental witness statement to adduce evidence on the Two Payments (see paragraph 33 above). Upon Ps’ consent, I granted leave to D to file the 2nd supplemental witness statement.

77.  In his 2nd supplemental witness statement, D said that:-

(a) Ka Lung had been based in Japan since in or around 1997;

(b) D “recently” discussed this action with Ka Lung. Ka Lung informed D that he was the holder of the HSBC Account no 036-668-713-833 (i.e. Ka Lung’s Account);

(c) Ka Lung confirmed that the Two Payments were made by him to Madam Lam by ATM transfer. Ka Lung said that they were “payment for meals which he had had with, amongst other people, [Madam Lam]”. Ka Lung also said they were not payment of rent; and

(d) Because Ka Lung was based in Japan, he told D that “it would be inconvenient to fly back to Hong Kong to give evidence”.

78.  Under cross-examination, D said that Ka Lung went to Japan in 1997. Since then, Ka Lung had only come back occasionally and spent very little time in Hong Kong. He confirmed that he had no difficulty in contacting Ka Lung. However, save for repeating that the Two Payments were for meals, D was unable to provide any further information. There is no evidence on who were those “other people” at the meals, the purpose of the meals, whose share was the $3,000 covered, etc. When D was asked why he had not asked the details, his answer was that it was unnecessary to do so and he only needed to know that the Two Payments were not for payment of rent. When D was asked whether he had met Ka Lung when he came back in 2009 and 2010, his answer was that Ka Lung did not need to see him and D would approach Ka Lung when necessary. Further, D was unable to give any reason as to why it was “inconvenient” for Ka Lung to come back to Hong Kong to give evidence.

79.  Mr Lee submitted that whether the Two Payments were rent is clearly a key issue and Ka Lung is the only person who had direct personal knowledge on this issue. D’s explanation of “inconvenience” is hardly sufficient. In any event, D made no attempt to arrange Ka Lung to give evidence through other means, such as video-link. Mr Lee invited the Court to draw an adverse inference against D on the issue of the Two Payments.

80.  The legal principles are well settled and were helpfully summarized by Deputy Judge Lam (as he then was) in Ip Man Shan Henry v Ching Hing Construction Co Ltd (No 2) [2003] 1 HKC 256, 307C as follows:-

(a) If a prima facie case is made out, and if there is evidence available to the party against whom the case is established which could displace the prima facie case, and he omits to call such evidence, an inference could be drawn;

(b) However, the inference could be rebutted by a plausible explanation by the party who elected not to call the evidence;

(c) If an inference is to be drawn, it would be an inference that such available evidence, even if adduced, would not displace the prima facie case; and

(d) It is also open to a tribunal of fact, upon the drawing of such an inference, to take it into account in respect of a matter with respect to which the person not called as a witness could have spoken, (i) in deciding whether to accept any particular evidence, which has in fact been given, either for or against that party; and (ii) in deciding whether to draw inferences of fact, which are open to them upon evidence which has been given.

81.  The evidence in relation to the Two Payments was revealed by Ps in 2020 but there is no explanation why D only asked Ka Lung about it “recently”. Being the one who made the Two Payments, Ka Lung was naturally the person whom D was expected to call to give evidence. I do not accept D’s explanation that it was “inconvenient” for Ka Lung to come back to Hong Kong to give evidence at the trial as D was unable to say what had caused the alleged inconvenience. Was it due to work engagement, family reason, health reason or other personal reasons? As rightly pointed out by Mr Lee, D had not made any effort to arrange Ka Lung to give evidence through other means.

82.  Without calling Ka Lung, the only evidence concerning the purpose of the Two Payments came from D, which was by way of hearsay. However, his hearsay evidence was extremely vague and lack of particulars. One would expect D to find out more about the alleged meals from Ka Lung when he knew that Ka Lung was unable to come to Hong Kong to give evidence (for whatever reason). It is rather surprising that D was satisfied with the bare assertions that the Two Payments were for meals and did not find it necessary to ask for the details.

83.  Furthermore, I am of the view that D’s allegation that the Two Payments were for meals does not sit well with the circumstantial evidence. There was no suggestion from D that Ka Lung was particularly close to Madam Lam. On the other hand, according to D, Ka Lung had helped him handle communication with government departments in relation to the Land from 2003 to 2004. Coupled with the fact that D could still contact Ka Lung shortly before the trial, one can infer that they must have maintained a good relationship. In such circumstances, it is difficult to believe that Ka Lung would take the trouble to have meals with Madam Lam, not just for one year but two consecutive years, during his very limited time in Hong Kong, but chose not to meet his own brother. Also, it is too much of a coincidence that the two alleged meals occurred around the same time of the year and Ka Lung’s shares of the meals happened to the same $3,000 in both years. In my view, the fact that the Two Payments were made around the same time of the year and were of the same amount is more consistent with Ps’ case that they were payments of rent.

84.  It is further noted that the rent proposed in the 2009 Draft Tenancy was also $3,000. In my view, this was not a mere coincidence. There must be some basis for Ka Bo to propose the rent at $3,000 and the most probable reference was the prevailing rent of the Land at the time of the negotiation in 2009. This provides a further reason for concluding that the Two Payments were for rent.

85.  By reasons of the aforesaid, I would draw adverse inference against D on the issue of the Two Payments and find on balance that the Two Payments were for the rent of Lot 1919.

86.  Thirdly, D’s evidence that their family had been a squatter on Lot 1919 since 1960s is inconsistent with what he said at the Two Meetings.

87.  The Two Meetings were recorded in secret by Ps without D’s knowledge. The legal principles concerning secret recordings are set out by Deputy Judge To (as he then was) in Cheer Sky Ltd v Chan Yuet Sheung[2019] HKCFI 606 as follows:-

“48. … I am always sceptical about the probative value of such evidence. Such recording is certainly reliable evidence of what was said during the conversations, but not necessarily of its truth. The party taping the conversation must have certain purposes to achieve, including to induce the other party to say things which are advantageous to him or prejudicial to the other side. The other party who does not know that the conversation was being taped, may have unwarily adopted what was put to him without much thought. In assessing the reliability of the conversation, I would adopt the following approach. Anything said by the party taping the conversation which is against his interest would be given more weight. Anything that he said which is to his interest is self-serving and will be given no weight. Anything prejudicial said by the party being recorded would have to be tested against the totality of the evidence before weight is given to that piece of evidence.”

88.  Mr Lee did not disagree with the above principles but he submitted that a person was more likely to express his genuine belief and thoughts if he was not aware that what he said was being recorded. In my view, it depends on how the conversation goes and its content.

89.  I note the learned Deputy Judge’s comment at paragraph 49 of Cheer Sky that “In assessing weight to be given to a piece of conversation, it is always desirable to listen to the recording than to read the transcript. The intonation and tone of the speaker may give an impression which is very much different from that given by reading a transcript”. Although neither Mr Lee nor Ms So invited the Court to listen to the recordings, I took the liberty to do so. After listening the recordings, my impression was that the intonation and tone of D in the recordings did not give a different impression from reading the transcript.

90.  It was also my observation that Ps did not say anything to induce and trap D to make admission that was against his interest. The conversation went smoothly and the parties freely expressed their views on how the matter in relation to Land should be resolved.

91.  In the 9/10/2017 Meeting, D repeatedly said that he had no intention to trespass Lot 1919 and had no problem in signing a written tenancy. D simply worried that, if P1 increased the rent drastically or refused to renew the lease when it expired, he would lose the structures on the Land and he was looking for “protection” in the form of a long lease with compensation for the structures when the lease was not renewed. This is actually consistent with what Ka Bo said in 2009 when he negotiated the lease of the Land with P1.

92.  The significant parts of the 9/10/2017 are quoted as follows (emphasis added):-

D:收地呀,又話住左咁多年,咁你都知架喇,由細都大,都係你,爸爸一路照顧住我地,其實一路咁多年都
P1:我宜家係繼續租俾你,你唔肯,你係繼續想租,但係唔肯簽約就麻煩
D:你明唔明有一個問題出現左係到,佳叔。我其實簽約真係無問題,但係問題上,保障唔到我哋上蓋,上蓋嘅意思係乜嘢呢,上蓋如果有乜嘢呢,我哋得唔到保障,咁我簡單啦,我簽約冇問題,好啦,兩年後呢?三年後呢?約滿啦,咁點呢?
P1:咁而家我就係,咪就係傾啲條件咯
 
D:問題就係出現咗喺呢度之嘛,佳叔你叫我簽約有咩問題啫,係咪先,簽囉,我簽咗啦,兩年後,十萬蚊一個月啦,你唔得呀,你走啦,合約寫明㗎喎,咁想改點樣呢?
P1:咁你驚呢啲嘢嘅,咁而家咪諗你想咩條件?
D:依一樣嘢,係無條件俾我去簽,你依家調返轉,你有個門檻比我簽咗,已有保障到我嘅,或上蓋,得到我應該嘅嘢嘅,好簡單之嘛,你話兩年後要走嘅,十萬唔啱傾嘅,咪唔傾,係咪先?但問題上,喂,如果而家咁樣,撻地好明顯係你嘅,我係冇可能會攞到。
D:佳叔,你由頭到尾個目的係咩樣呢,都係想清晰個業權係咪
P1:業權清楚啲同埋調整下啲租金
D:但其實我地係租地唔係租屋,你咁樣釐定,我地係租田,上蓋其實係一塊爛田,一塊種野嘅田。唔係屋嚟。要咁樣計。
P1:咁都好,就算,租金調整下,你上次講得太過,租唔俾我哋家,約唔俾我哋簽,嘩!我根本就迫到我哋要做呢一步啫,係咪先,咁而家
D:當我講錯啦上次,我嘅意思
D:佳叔你都知喇,咁多年以嚟,我地有無話去,侵占你嘅土地,你老友塊地被人踩過嚟,無呢啲野,
P1:咁又係,以租客嚟講,則係維護左好多
D:我一路以來都維護佳叔,從來都唔會話因為呢撻地唔係我,而人地有利益,行埋嚟,我會俾佢
P1:咁唔係,咁唔係,
D:問心呀,依撻地咁大咁計吖,我要嚟做咩,我要嚟住之嘛,你其他地方真係無用,你俾我都無用
D:你無乜所謂架,撻地係你嘅,有無係到,始終都存在左係到,唔會話我霸左你架…更何況,喂,我都唔會有咁嘅心囉
D:咁唔係,你自己睇得到我係無咁嘅心。我唔知點解誤會我,話今時唔同往日,我點樣諗,你律師信都有寫喇,81年都宜家,幾多年呀,81, 91, 01, 11,三十幾年,有無違背左,我地租你田嘅承諾。租有交俾你,霸無霸過你,人地埋黎,無埋黎過,30幾年,無合約訂明左,你租俾我喎,我地一路係咁樣住,一路咁樣交租,從來無違背過任何承諾。無去做任何野,你好似人地咁,整左佢,搵人返嚟租呀,各樣呀,搵錢呀,我地係唔會做架喎,則係純粹自己買咗間屋喺度,你有事,阿哥家姐返嚟住,得閒返嚟,唔返嚟,走下走,得閒返嚟,住呀住,一路都係咁,擺喺度之嘛,只不過流落嚟,得返我喺度,就係咁解。我就唔知點解, 你係咪真係想逼我走。真係走投無路
P1:唔係逼你走,講咗囉,我都話,租係俾你租,租金調整一下,簽過約,咁,就係咁簡單,講條件,個租點樣寫?
D:冇門檻俾我去簽,冇保障變咗
D:我都話落,唯一而家問題上就係個上蓋之嘛,你話調整租金,而家加到五千五百蚊一年,同比附近呀,全部都二三千咋,成個白田村
D:唔駛講喇,如果我做得出呢啲呀,不得好死,唔駛講喇,絕對唔會有呢樣野出現。你唔駛諗我下一代會爭呢撻地,我而家問題上係保留,叫做我而家仲在生,我係度住咁解嘅啫,你話下一代去爭呢撻地,唔駛諗

93.  In his witness statement, D said that, at the Two Meetings, he did not admit that Ps were the owners as they failed to produce any proof of title. Ps made several proposals but the parties were unable to reach any agreements. He also said that there were many people from Ps’ side and he was on his own and the situation was very chaotic. Therefore, he might have said something which was inconsistent with his knowledge and did not represent the truth.

94.  According to D, he felt compelled to have discussions with Ps about how to resolve the issue concerning the Land and he was very stressed with the threat of legal proceedings after having received several letters from Leung Kin. D also said that his approach at the Two Meeting was to “pick up” on topics mentioned by Ps and referred to Ps’ assertions. For instance, he mentioned the rent of $5,500 because it was the amount referred to in Leung Kin’s letters.

95.  Ms So submitted that the Court should give limited weight to the recordings of the Two Meetings because the recordings produced were incomplete and did not cover the whole meetings. On the other hand, Ms So submitted that the Court should give full weight to P1’s admission that he wanted to “clarify the title” (業權清楚啲) which means that there was uncertainty about the title.

96.  Despite Ms So’s admirable effort, I am unable to accept her submissions:-

(a) I note P2’s admission that the recordings did not cover the whole of the Two Meetings. According to P2, he used his mobile phone to record the Two Meetings and the recording stopped when the audio file became too big in size. More importantly, there was no suggestion from D that he had said something important to his case at the Two Meeting but they were not recorded. D’s case is that he had said something which was incorrect or untrue;

(b) D’s evidence in his witness statement was that there were many people from Ps’ side at the Two Meetings but, under cross-examination, he admitted that only P1 and P2 attended the Two Meetings. His evidence that the situation at the Two Meetings was chaotic is also inconsistent with the photo showing D walking with P1 with his right hand on P1’s shoulder;

(c) P1’s assertion about “clarifying the title” at the 9/10/207 Meeting should be understood in the context of Madam Lam’s evidence. According to Madam Lam, they wanted to “clarify the title” because there was no written record of the yearly tenancy and they did not want to leave the matters to the next generation. P1’s assertion about “clarifying the title” and “adjusting the rent” (業權清楚啲同埋調整下啲租金) is not inconsistent with Madam Lam’s evidence;

(d) More importantly, I have great difficulty to accept D’s evidence that he simply “picked up” what Ps had said and referred to Ps’ assertions at the Two Meetings. I do not see any sensible reason why D needed to say something which, according to his knowledge, was not true at the Two Meetings. He could have made the same proposal of purchasing part of the Land without admitting that his family had been a tenant and paying rent for many years. If Lam family had never paid rent, why was it necessary for D to specifically make the point at the 9/10/2017 Meeting that the rent of $5,500 was too high when other lands in the vicinity were let at $2,000 to $3,000 only?

97.  By reasons of the aforesaid, I do not accept D’s evidence that he had said something which was inconsistent with his knowledge or untrue at the Two Meetings. I find on balance that what D said at the Two Meetings truly represented his knowledge and understandings of the situation in relation to the Land, i.e. his family had been a tenant of the Land and paying rent for more than 30 years.

98.  For the sake of completeness, I would deal with other points raised by Ms So.

99.  Firstly, Ms So took issue on the fact that P1 did not testify at the trial and invited the Court to draw an adverse inference against Ps.

100.  There is no strict rule that a plaintiff must give evidence at the trial. Insofar as Ps’ case is concerned, Madam Lam’s evidence has already covered most of the issues, such as collecting rent and the meeting with Ka Bo in 2009. Although she passed the leasing of the Land to P1 in 2009, the rent was continuously paid through Madam Lam’s Account and Ps had produced the relevant bank statements. The Two Meetings were recorded and there was no dispute on what had been said thereat. I do not see any basis for drawing adverse inference against Ps by reason of P1 electing not to give evidence at the trial.

101.  Secondly, Ms So submitted that Ps had failed to produce other bank statements to sufficiently demonstrate the payments of rent and, once again, she invited the Court to draw adverse inference against Ps.

102.  It is Ps’ case that the rent was paid once per year into Madam Lam’s Account and they had already produced the bank statements of the months where rent was paid. I fail to see how the bank statements of other months were relevant to the issues in dispute.

103.  Thirdly, D alleged that he had never authorized Ka Bo to negotiate for tenancy in 2009 or authorized Ka Lung to make the Two Payments (assuming that they were rent).

104.  D’s evidence was that the Land belonged to him after Lam Senior’s death. This was not challenged by Ps.

105.  There is no serious dispute that it was Ka Bo who prepared the 2009 Draft Tenancy and negotiated with P1 on the tenancy of the Land. According to D, Ka Bo had already moved out from the Land in 1994. If Ka Bo had moved out and the Land belonged to D, why would Ka Bo bother to negotiate with P1 and even prepared the 2009 Draft Tenancy? Similarly, if Ka Lung had moved to Japan in 1997 and the Land belonged to D, why would Ka Lung need to make the Two Payment in 2009 and 2010? The only logical explanation was that they were asked by someone to do so and, based on D’s evidence that the Land belonged to him after Lam Senior’s death, that person could only be D.

106.  Lastly, Ms So argued that there was an uncertainty on the identity of the tenant as Ps had failed to identify who was the tenant after Lam Senior’s death and simply generalized the situation by referring to “Lam family”.

107.  As mentioned above, it was D’s own evidence that the Land belonged to him after Lam Senior’s death. In other words, if the Land was subject to yearly tenancy from 1980s onwards, the tenant after Lam Senior’s death in 1994 could only be D. The uncertainty on the identity of the tenant, if any, has been removed by D’s own evidence.

108.  Having considered all the evidence available (including the evidence of P2 and Ms Lam Tim Mui) and submissions from Counsel from both sides, I would accept Madam Lam’s evidence and reject D’s evidence insofar as it conflicts with Madam Lam’s evidence.

109.  I find on balance that:-

(a) Lot 1919 was subject to tenancy from late 1961 until 29 December 2017, first on a fixed term under the Two Tenancies and thereafter on a yearly term;

(b) During this period, Lam Senior was the tenant until his death in 1994 and thereafter D was the tenant;

(c) Rent was paid to Tsoi family pursuant to the terms of the tenancies up to 29 December 2016;

(d) The possession of the Land (or the Green Part) by Lam Senior and D was under a lawful title as tenant up to 29 December 2017;

(e) During his lifetime, Lam Senior did not have the requisite intention to possess the Land. Insofar as D is concerned, he did not have the requisite intention at the time of the Two Meetings;

110.  Even assuming that D started to have the requisite intention to possess the Land after his offer to purpose part of the Land was rejected by P2 on 11 October 2017, the 12-year limitation period had not expired at the time when Ps commenced the present proceedings on 13 February 2018. It follows that D’s counterclaim for adverse possession must fail.

111.  In light of my above findings, I do not find it necessary to consider the expert evidence of Mr Tang Sze Kin Eric. In any event, given that it is Ps’ case that Lam Senior and his family was tenant, I do not think Ps can seriously dispute the factual occupation of the Land by them.

I. DISPOSITION

112.  To prepare for different outcomes, I asked Ms So at the closing how much time D required to surrender the Green Part if Ps succeeded in their claim. Ms So replied that D would need four months. I agree that a period of four months is reasonable having regard to the fact that D and his family have been living therein for so many years.

113.  I would therefore make the following orders:-

(a) D do deliver vacant possession of the Green Part within 4 months from the date of the judgment;

(b) D do pay Ps the arrears of rent in the sum of $5,500 covering the period from 30 December 2016 to 29 December 2017;

(c) D do pay Ps mesne profit at the rate of $5,500 per year from 30th December 2017 until the delivery of vacant possession;

(d) D’s counterclaim be dismissed.

114.  Costs should follow the event and I would make an order nisi that D do pay Ps’ costs of these proceedings (including all costs reserved, if any), with Certificate for Counsel, to be taxed if not agreed.  The order nisi will become absolute unless an application is made by a party to vary the same within 14 days from the date of the judgment.

115.  Lastly, it remains for me to thank Mr Lee and Ms So for the helpful assistance rendered to the Court.

 ( Damian Wong )
 Deputy District Judge

Mr Lee Chun Hei, Ivan, instructed by Leung Kin & Co, for the 1st and 2nd Plaintiffs

Ms Natalie So, instructed by Cheung, Yeung & Lee, for the Defendant



[1]   Madam Man had left 7 pieces of land on her death of which 3 pieces (including Lot 1919) were inherited by P1 and other 4 pieces by Choy Hon Wai.

[2]   [2023] HKDC 1408

[3]   Ps’ Agreement Book at [C/341-348]; D’s Agreement Book at [D/596-601]

[4]   §20(c)

[5]   [D/602]

[6]   [D/603]

[7]   [D/621]

[8]   [D/611-615]

[9]   [C/312]

[10]   [D/623]

[2023] HKDC 1408-EN-2023-10-11

CHOY HON KI AND ANOTHER v. 林家強

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DCCJ 631/2018

[2023] HKDC 1408

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

CIVIL ACTION NO 631 OF 2018

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BETWEEN

 CHOY HON KI (蔡漢佳)1st Plaintiff
 CHOY SHING CHAU (蔡成就)2nd Plaintiff

and

 林家強Defendant

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Before:Deputy District Judge Alexander Tang in Chambers (Paper Disposal)
Date of Written Submissions:8 September 2023, 15 September 2023 and 21 September 2023
Date of Decision:11 October 2023

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DECISION

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A. Introduction

1.  By way of Summons dated 10 July 2023, the defendant (D) applies to exclude all records of communications, call records, WhatsApp chat records, and records of meetings between the 1st and 2nd plaintiffs (Ps) and D from 2016 to 2020.

2.  The broad ground relied upon is without prejudice privilege (WPP).

3.  Evidence had been filed as follows:-

(a) D filed林家強的非宗教式誓言dated 10 July 2023 in support of the Summons (D Aff).

(b) Ps filed蔡成就的非宗教式誓詞dated 18 September 2023, the draft of which was initially exhibited to the Affirmation of Wong Yee Ling dated 30 August 2023, in opposition to the Summons, but eventually filed on 18 September 2023 (Ps Aff).

(c) D filed 林家強的非宗教形式誓章dated 7 September 2023 (D Reply Aff) in reply to Ps Aff and in support of the Summons.

4.  Both the Summons and D Aff in support did not identify precisely what evidence was sought to be expunged. Having perused the parties’ submissions, however, it appears that the admissibility of the following pieces of evidence is being disputed (the Disputed Evidence):-

(a) 蔡成就的證人陳述書dated 11 May 2020 (P2 WS) at §§21-29;

(b) 蔡成就的補充證人陳述書dated 12 April 2021 (P2 Supp WS) §37;

(c) Exhibit “CSC-14” as exhibited to P2 WS, being:-

(i) The recordings of the conversations which took place on 9 October 2017 (9 Oct Recording) and 10 October 2017 (10 Oct Recording, together the Recordings); and

(ii) Transcripts of the recordings prepared by Ps’ legal representatives of the two conversations (the 9 Oct Transcript and the 10 Oct Transcript, together, the Transcripts):

(d) Exhibit “CSC-15” as exhibited to P2 WS, being screenshots of WhatsApp messages between P2 and D from 15 December 2016 to 7 February 2019 (WhatsApp Messages); and

(e) Exhibit “CSC-20” as exhibited to P2 WS, being the photograph taken at one of the meetings between the Ps and D in 2017 (the Photograph).

5.  The Action is due to be tried shortly – with trial fixed for 7 days beginning on 18 October 2023. Unfortunately, D only took out the Summons shortly before the PTR. At the PTR, this court suggested that the Summons be determined via paper disposal on an expedited basis and gave directions accordingly, a procedure to which both parties did not object.

B. The Underlying Case

6.  The underlying case, as per the pleadings, is as follows.

7.  Ps, being the registered owners of Lot No 1919 in Demarcation District No 76 (the Lot), commenced this Action seeking to recover vacant possession on the basis that D has been wrongly occupying the Lot upon the termination of a yearly tenancy.

8.  In gist, Ps’ case is that:-

(a) By way of a Chinese written tenancy agreement sometime in 1961 of the Chinese Lunar Calendar between蔡祖勝 (their predecessor in title) as landlord and林超and沈根as tenants, the said Lot was leased out for 10 years from 1961 to 1970 of the Chinese Lunar Calendar [SoC §2].

(b) Upon expiry, another Chinese written tenancy agreement was signed between the same predecessor in title as landlord and林超as tenant, by virtue of which part of the Lot (ie, the Property) was leased out for another 10-year period from 30 December 1970 to 29 December 1980 [SoC §3].

(c) According to Ps, after the expiry of this second agreement, no written tenancy agreement was signed. However, 林超continued to occupy the said Property and became the yearly tenant thereof by making rental payments to Ps’ predecessors on a yearly basis [SoC §4].

(d) There is no dispute that D is the son of林超 [Def §6]. According to Ps, after the death of林超, D continued to occupy the said Property and took up a yearly tenancy by making rent payments on yearly basis in respect of the said Property in his father’s place [SoC §6].

(e) On 12 October 2016, Ps’ solicitors, Messrs Leung Kin & Co (LKCO), sent a letter on their behalf to D, giving notice that the yearly tenancy shall be terminated on 29 December 2017 (First Letter). This was followed by a Second Letter dated 10 May 2017 (the Second Letter).

(f) Despite so, D refused to hand over possession. Ps therefore commenced this Action [SoC §9].

9.  D’s case, on the other hand, denies the existence of any tenancy – D claims adverse possession of the whole Lot D’s case is that, ever since 1962, his father was a squatter over the Lot [Defence §1], something D continued after his father’s death [Defence §6].

C. The Disputed Evidence

10.  The Disputed Evidence can be conveniently described as follows.

11.  As noted above, on 12 October 2016, Ps’ solicitors, LKCO, sent a letter to D, notifying him of the termination of the yearly tenancy on 29 December 2017 (ie, the First Letter). There is no dispute that the First Letter was in fact received by D and that D put forward no response.

12.  After the issuance of the First Letter, on 15 December 2016 P2 sent a WhatsApp messages to D, asking whether D would be free for a chat:-

“林家強你好,我是蔡成就。你何時有空大家在鄧根年傾一傾?”

13.  On 18 April 2017, P2 sent a further WhatsApp to D along a similar vein:-

“林家強你好,我是蔡成就。上次電話上,傾了一傾。我現在港,你何時有空大家出來再傾一傾?”

14.  On 20 April 2017, it appears that a meeting was in fact held. In P2 WS §21, Ps explained that in the afternoon of 20 April 2017, their father, P2, and D met in a restaurant in Tai Po to discuss tenancy matters (商討租約的事宜) (20 April 2017 Meeting). Ps’ case is that, at that meeting, Ps asked D to sign a written tenancy agreement; D, in response, asks for “保障和賠償” arising out of the fact that he has constructed on the Lot. Ps’ case is that no consensus was reached.

15.  On 10 May 2017, another letter was sent to D, reiterating and giving further notice that the yearly tenancy shall be terminated on 29 December 2017 (ie, the Second Letter). Again, there is no dispute that the Second Letter was received by D.

16.  On 4 October 2017, P2 sent another WhatsApp message to D, again inviting D to have a chat.

“林家強你好,我是蔡成就。你打過電話給我們想傾一傾。我現在香港,你何時有空大家出來再傾一傾?”

17.  In P WS §§22-23, Ps explained that in the afternoon of 9 October 2017, their father, P2, and D again met in a restaurant in Tai Po to discuss the tenancy matters (商討租約的事宜) (the 9 October 2017 Meeting). Among others, Ps suggested that in the 9 October 2017 Meeting:-

(a) D acknowledged that he and his family had been paying rent to Ps, and that the then rent was HK$5,500;

(b) D expressed the wish to purchase part of the Lot, to which Ps were willing to sell at HK$500 per sq ft.

18.  For this meeting, the 9 Oct Recording and the 9 Oct Transcript is available.

19.  Following the meeting, on the same day on 9 October 2017, P2 sent another WhatsApp message to D, asking whether he would be free to meet at the office of Messrs Leung Kin & Co for a chat:-

“明天,十月十日下午 你有空大家一起到聯和墟梁堅律師行再傾嗎?”

20.  According to P2 WS §23, he did so because he had thought D agreed to the sale and purchase, and wished to formalize the deal at his lawyers; but, according to P2, D called him later that day and told him he was not yet ready for a deal; instead, D wanted another meeting with Ps on the next day.

21.  According to P2 WS §24, the parties did eventually meet on the next day (10 October 2017) in a restaurant (the 10 October 2017 Meeting). P2’s case is that the sale and purchase of part of the Lot was discussed – D offered a lower price and wished to pay by way of instalments. Ps suggested that this amounted to an acknowledgement of their title by D.

22.  For this, the 10 Oct Recording and the 10 Oct Transcript is available.

23.   P2 WS §25 then referred to Ps’ case that they decided to reject D’s offer by way of a WhatsApp on the next day, ie, 11 Oct 2017:-

“林家強,你好,我是蔡成就。昨天(十月十日)下午,你在茶樓講的,不合心意,無可能。”

24.  It should be noted that, at the witness statement stage, D had not filed evidence to specifically confirm or deny the meetings[1]. Instead, what he said was rather vague and general:-

“我根據原告人要求,在2017年期間會面,討論和解方案。在會面時,第一和第二原告人沒有提供身份證明文件等核實其聲稱業主身份。我不承認第一和第二原告人是爭議地段的合法業主。原告人提出多個和解方案,雙方沒有達成和解。會面當時情況非常混亂,原告人人多勢眾,我只有一人,我或說出與我認知事實不符的言論,該等言論並不代表全部事實…”[D WS §33]

25.  In P2 Supp WS §37, in response to D’s description of the meetings, Ps further explained that the meetings between their father, P2, and D in 2017 concerning the signing of tenancy agreements were peaceful and harmonious. To that end, P exhibited a Photograph said to be showing D speaking to Ps’ father.

26.  The meetings were followed by further communications, as narrated in P2 WS §§26-27. This correlates with WhatsApp messages dated 11 October 2017to 5 February 2018 whereby parties invited each another to further discuss matters, in particular to the idea that there be a sale and purchase of part of the Lot. When no deal was reached, the Writ herein was taken out on 13 February 2018.

27.  As further narrated at P2 WS §28, even after the Writ, there were further discussions by way of WhatsApp messages on 24 May 2018, 21-27 January 2019, and 3-7 February 2019.

28.  Finally, P2 WS §29 is a conclusory paragraph.

D. D Reply Aff

29.  At this juncture, I would also like to deal with the issue of D Reply Aff. The reason is as follows.

30.  As noted above, in the witness statements, D had not set out with specificity his case in relation to the communications for which WPP is claimed. This may well be understandable, given D’s position that these are all covered by WPP.

31.  However, what is not understandable is why, even in D Aff in support of his Summons, D did not put forward his case in this regard. D Aff is a 2-page affair which does not put forward D’s positive case in relation to the communications.

32.  Instead, what D did was to file a reply affirmation (D Reply Aff) to do so. In this regard, I think there is considerable force in Ps’ point that an approach of leaving matters in affirmation in reply without affording Ps the opportunity to respond is unfair: Re Estate of Joachim Thomas [2011] 5 HKLRD 538 at §45 per Recorder Jat Sew Tong SC.

33.  As such, while I have considered D Reply Aff, as noted below, insofar as it raises new points for which Ps were deprived of an opportunity to respond, I would not afford it any weight.

E. Legal Principles

34.  There is no serious dispute between the parties as to the applicable legal principles.

35.  According to Wilson Chan J in Poon Loi Tak v Poon Loi Cheung Desmond [2020] 1 HKLRD 511 at §13, the principles applicable to the determination as to what constitutes WPP negotiations for settlement are as follows:-

(a) A party claiming WPP on communication would have to show that the communication was made:-

(i) at a time when there was an existing dispute between the parties;

(ii) legal proceedings in relation to the dispute had commenced or were contemplated;

(iii) the communication was made in a genuine attempt to further negotiations to settle the dispute; and

(iv) the communication was made with the intention that, if negotiations failed, it could not be disclosed without the consent of the parties.

(b) It was not necessary for a “without prejudice” stamp to be expressly applied to the negotiations if it was clear from the surrounding circumstances that the parties were genuinely seeking to compromise the dispute.

(c) Whether a particular communication was indeed an attempt to resolve a dispute, is to be determined objectively (the subjective intention of the party in question being irrelevant) having regard to all the circumstances. It does not matter that litigation has not begun: the relevant question (to be decided objectively) is whether the parties “contemplated or might reasonably have contemplated that litigation would follow if they could not agree”: Poon Loi Tak (supra) at §16.

(d) WPP applies to all communications which form part of the negotiations, whether they are themselves offers. It has also been made clear that the protection of the privilege is not limited to admissions. A party will not be allowed to engage in an exercise of dissecting technical admissions from the overall body of without prejudice negotiations. Instead, the discussions as a whole will be protected, as a general freedom to negotiate is part of the same package: Poon Loi Tak (supra) at §22.

36.  As to what constitutes a relevant existing dispute, in Yu Man Fung Alice v Chiau Sing Chi Stephen[2019] HKCFI 1549, Keith Yeung J at §§21 had this to say:-

“21. Not all disagreements, no matter what their natures are, qualify as a “dispute” for the purpose of the without prejudice principle…where a mortgagor in default wrote to his unpaid mortgagee, not seeking to dispute liability (nor even the amounts payable), but only seeking time to pay the shortfall…the without prejudice rule did not apply…”

37.  This point was further discussed in Secretary for Justice v Wong Lai Yin[2021] HKCFI 162; affirmed by the Court of Appeal in [2022] 1 HKLRD 258. In that case, the Government claimed for possession of certain unleased government land occupied by an extended portion of a house situated in the subject lot that was in the 1st defendant’s possession. The 1st defendant’s defence is based on adverse possession.

38.  In this context:-

(a) On 7 Nov 2014, the District Lands Office (DLO) requested inter alia the 1st defendant to set back from occupying government lands [CFI §20].

(b) On 18 Nov 2015, issued a further letter to the 1st defendant, demanding him to rectify the aforesaid irregularities by setting back the occupied areas from Government land and threatening prosecution action [CFI §23].

(c) In response, the 1st defendant through his solicitors sent a “without prejudice” letter to the DLO (the First Letter), asking the relevant department to suspend any prosecution procedure and to consider granting a short-term or long-term tenancy of the relevant land to the 1st defendant, so as to alleviate the trouble brought to all parties by litigation [CFI §25].

(d) About one month later, the DLO responded with a letter not marked “without prejudice” (the Second Letter). It simply asked the 1st defendant to take note of a notice requiring him to cease the unlawful occupation of the unleased land, and rejecting the 1st defendant’s application for a short-term tenancy.

39.  At issue was whether the First and Second Letters constituted without prejudice communications. DHCJ Winnie Tsui held that WPP did not apply. Her Ladyship’s reasoning as follows.

(a) For there to be WPP, a core question was whether, at the relevant time the communications took place, there was in existence “a dispute in respect of which legal proceedings had commenced or were contemplated” [CFI §32].

(b) “…not every dispute between the parties would attract the without prejudice privilege. If in the course of the factual enquiry to ascertain the parties’ intention, the court finds that there is no dispute as to liability but only a dispute as to how to satisfy the admitted liability, that dispute may not trigger the without prejudice rule. The underlying public policy of the rule is to encourage parties to compromise a dispute without resort to litigation. Where liability is in fact admitted, that policy is not engaged.” [CFI §44]

(c) “…it is therefore important for the court to recognize that where there was an attempt to negotiate, that may only be half the story. The court must proceed to ascertain what exactly was being negotiated. The mere fact of negotiation does not by itself mean that here was a relevant dispute for without prejudice purposes.” [CFI §50]

(d) “…the mere assertion of one’s right without more does not amount to a dispute. It takes two to form a dispute. One must look at what the 1st defendant did or say (and equally important, did not do or say) in the face of the DLO’s demand” [CFI §55]:

(e) On the facts of the case:-

(i) Until the 1st defendant responded, there was no basis for a reasonable observe in the position of the DLO would have formed the view that the 1st defendant disputed the Government’s title [CFI §§53-58].

(ii) The letters sent by the 1st defendant does not change this analysis. The letters did not include any mention of adverse possession. The suggestion for a short term tenancy actually contradicts such. A reasonable person would conclude that the 1st defendant was seeking for indulgence from the DLO [CFI §§59-78].

40.  Her Ladyship’s decision was upheld by the Court of Appeal. G Lam JA confirmed, inter alia, that:-

(a) “As the authorities show, whether or not there was an extant dispute at the time is to be determined on an objective basis. The subjective thinking of the 1st defendant or his solicitors is irrelevant.” [CA §24]

(b) Weight is given to the fact that, by asking for a short term tenancy, the 1st defendant would appear not to be disputing the Government’s title – and therefore objectively there was no dispute [CA §28].

F. Analysis

41.  Applying these principles, an important issue that I have to determine is whether D has shown that the Disputed Evidence arose at a time when there was a relevant dispute for without prejudice purposes which, in the present context, means a dispute over the title of the Lot as between the paper owner (Ps) and the claimed adverse possessor (D). If there was, viewed objectively, a true dispute over such title of the Lot, there is basis for claiming WPP; if, however, there is no such dispute but instead, all there was is an acknowledgment of liability and suggestions of accommodation and/or indulgence, no WPP can be claimed.

F.1 D’s Arguments

42.  In this regard, D’s case is that, since at least 12 October 2016, there has been a dispute over the title of the Lot [D Skel §14]. D’s case runs as follows.

43.  First, D relies on D Reply Aff. Particular focus is placed on §§7-8 [D Skel §§14-15]. In gist, D had this to say:-

“7. …但本人必須強調, 討論並非按本人或父親是租客,或原告人是爭議地段業主的身份為基礎,而討論的內容也並非…關於續約(或購買爭議地段)的事項…

8. …

(1) 本人在爭議地段已經居住了超過40多年,從來沒有聽聞本人父親曾就爭議地段定下任何租約或口頭承諾,未有聽過爭議地段有任何租約或口頭承諾…,亦沒有向任何所謂業主交過租金。由始至終,本人一直貫徹以上的立場,亦在以下提及的討論中多次重申;

…

(4) 因此,我們討論的基礎,並非因為本人是租客,簽約只是對方開出的和解方案。本人一直以來願意和原告人討論,是以嘗試達成和解,避免打官司及其衍生費用為目標,並非因為本人接受原告人的立場;

(5) 這個基礎,亦一直延續至於本人和原告人及後的一切討論。”

44.  Second, D relies on P2’s Witness Statement at §18, whereby P2 said that, in Oct 2015, there was a meeting amongst P2, Ps’ father and D. P2 asked D to sign a tenancy agreement; D refused and also said he would not accept any increase in rent, but said that he was willing to continue to pay the existing rent. Against this background, it was P2’s case that “在2016年,我思前想後,又到律師樓查詢租客不肯就租用該物業簽租約的事宜。我得知被告人使用該物業又不肯確立他自己租客的身份,對我們的業權或有所影響 。”[P2 WS §20; D Skel §§16-17] D’s argument is that this is clear reference to the existence of a title dispute.

45.  Third, D argues that one should not scrutinize the Disputed Evidence itself to ascertain if WPP applies – to do so, according to D, is to put the cart before the horse – “it is objectionable to try to rely on cherry-picked statements or purported admissions – and more so to work backwards on the basis of what was said during the impugned discussions to purportedly explains the bases of such discussions ex post facto”. [D Skel §§19-20; D Reply Skel §12]. D says that the court should only consider the nature of the dispute “at the time when the parties embarked on those communications”.

46.  Fourth, even if this court decides to look into the Disputed Evidence, D points to a particular part of the 9 Oct Transcript, which D says point towards there being a title dispute [D Skel §§26-27]:-

“D: …你由頭到尾個目的係咩樣呢,都係想清晰個業權係咪

P2: 業權清楚啲同埋調整下租金”

F.2 Ps’ Arguments

47.  In response, Ps’ case is simple – properly read in context, there was clearly no title dispute. Ps’ argument goes like this.

48.  First, whether there was a dispute is to be viewed objectively. The beginning of the analysis is the First Letter. There, Ps through their solicitors LKCO first referred to the previous tenancy agreements between Ps’ predecessor in title and D. It was then suggested that D has taken up the yearly tenancy of the relevant portion of the Lot. Afterwards, notice of termination was given to D as follows:-

“We are instructed by our clients to give you notice that your aforesaid tenancy shall be terminated on 29th December 2017 and you are required to quit and deliver up vacant possession of the said portion to our clients on or before 29th December 2017, failing which we have instructions to commence legal proceedings against you with further notice, in which event you shall be liable to pay all costs and expenses incurred thereby”.

49.  The Second Letter was couched in very similar terms.

50.  In relation to these two letters, the undisputed evidence is that P did not respond. A reasonable person observing the events would not be able to detect the existence of a dispute – D’s subjective thoughts and beliefs are irrelevant [Ps Skel §§28-43].

51.  Second, Ps rely on the contents of the Disputed Evidence, in particular, the Transcripts, whereby D repeatedly acknowledged Ps’ status as owner and confirmed his status as a tenant [Ps Skel §59-70]. The following are of particular relevance:-

(a) “我其實簽約真係無問題”;

(b) “佳叔你都知喇,咁多年以嚟,我地有無話去,侵占你嘅土地”;

(c) “我一路以來都係維護佳叔,從來都唔會話因為呢撻地唔係我,而人地有利益,行埋嚟,我會俾佢”;

(d) “我地租你田嘅承諾。租有交俾你,霸無霸過你,人地埋黎,無埋黎過,30幾年,無合約訂明左,你租俾我喎,我地一路係咁樣住,一路咁樣交租,從來無遣背過任何承諾。”

52.  The rhetorical question is this – if there had been a genuine dispute over title, why would D repeatedly acknowledge his own status as a tenant? The ineluctable conclusion is that the discussion was not aimed at dealing with a title dispute – instead, the discussion was about “reducing the tenancy into writing, the adjustment of monthly rent, or even a potential sale of the Property from Ps to D”.

53.  Third, analogous to the short term tenancy in Wong Lai Yin case, it is not disputed that there was a discussion whereby Ps would apparently sale the Property to D. This, it is said, is a factor that suggests there is no true dispute as to title (at least based on adverse possession). As G Lam JA noted in Wong Lai Yin at §28:-

“There is no answer from the 1st defendant to the point that by requesting for a tenancy from the Government, the 1st defendant would appear not to be disputing the Government’s title. As provided in s.17 of the Limitation Ordinance, the effect of adverse possession is the extinction of the paper owner’s title…”

F.3 D’s Reply Arguments

54.  In his reply skeleton, D made the following additional points.

55.  First, insofar as D’s silence following the First and Second Letters is concerned, D submit that:-

(a) This should be viewed against the fact that there were other protracted discussions at the time [D Reply Skel §4]. It is said that this makes the present case distinguishable from Wong Lai Yin (supra), where there was no suggestion that the 1st defendant and the Government were in any sort of negotiations or discussions.

(b) This should be considered against the context that D was acting in person at the material time, and thus the fact that D did not write back could hardly be taken against him [D Reply Skel §§5-7].

56.  Second, it is argued that the Recordings and Transcripts are incomplete [D Reply Skel §12(7)].

57.  Third, D also provided a further analyses of the Disputed Evidence [D Reply Skel §§11-19], whereby D seeks to explain away the paragraphs which Ps say indicate D’s acknowledgment of his status as a tenant. In particular, D referred to a statement in the Transcript that “間屋,理民府到已經出左我地個名,1981年批左我老豆名” as support that D was thinking that he had interest in the land.

F.4Analysis

58.  In my view, Ps’ arguments are more compelling that D’s.

59.  The starting point is this. I do not accept D’s argument that, in discerning whether or not there is a relevant dispute, I am somehow limited to evidence at the time when the parties embarked on those communications – and that somehow I should ignore the Transcripts and evidence that followed. This flies in the face of Wong Lai Yin (CFI) at §16; (CA) at §39. I am of the view I can take into account all the evidence as a whole.

60.  Taking a wholistic view of all the evidence, in particular:-

(a) D’s failure to respond to a clearly asserted case of tenancy as per the First and Second Letters;

(b) D’s repeated affirmations in the Transcripts that Ps have good title and that he has no intention adversely possessing the land in question;

(c) D’s considering the suggestion to purchase the Property from Ps, which implies that he accepts Ps have good title,

I find that it is more likely than not that, at least up to the time of the Meetings, there was simply no extant dispute over the title of the Lot. Had there been such a dispute, it would be inconceivable that D would have said the things he did in the Recordings/Transcripts. Instead, I accept Ps’ argument that, at the time, the nub of the dispute is the conclusion of a written tenancy agreement, the rent thereon, and the terms upon which Ps may sell, and D purchase, the Property.

61.  In doing so, I have not lost sight of the arguments put forward by D, and have taken them into account in a wholistic balancing exercise prior to arriving at my findings. Focusing on the main points raised by D:-

(a) As to the contents of D’s Reply Aff, I do not find them particularly useful. As noted in §§29-33 above, I have doubts over whether I should afford it any weight at all. In any event, its contents are again extremely vague – it is unclear whether, and to what extent, D’s thoughts/beliefs had been communicated to Ps, and on which occasion. A general reference that his position “在以下提及的討論中多次重申” rings hollow, especially when some of those occasions had been recorded.

(b) As to the reference in P2 WS §20 and 9 Oct Transcript to “業權”, I accept that this provides some prima facie support to D’s arguments. However, that sentence must be viewed against the broader context, especially what D himself said in the 9 and 10 October Meetings. The broader context, in my view, quite clearly shows that at the time there was no dispute over the title of the Lot as between paper owner and adverse possessor – the true litmus issue in this Action. In context, therefore, the phrase “業權” was more likely than not being used loosely, such as the form and terms of the tenancy.

(c) Similarly, as to D’s reference to “間屋,理民府到已經出左我地個名,1981年批左我老豆名”, there has been no explanation from D, who bears the burden of proof, on the nature of these documents and their precise relationship with the issue of the title of the Lot as between paper owner and adverse possessor. As such, I am unable to conclude from that mere sentence that there had been a dispute as to title. In any event, I do not think that this selected sentence could alter the overall impression that there was no dispute by the parties on the title of the Lot.

(d) As to the suggestion that one should not put too much weight on D’s failure to answer the First and Second Letters given he is a layman, and that there had been underlying negotiations, my analysis is as follows. First, D’s silence is part of the factual matrix which lends some weight to Ps’ arguments – it is far from determinative. Second, I note Ps’ point that D (acting in person) was more than capable of drafting pleadings and witness statements in this Action – and the objective evidence thus shows that D is capable of understanding his interests. Third, D had simply not put forward a clear case as to what the underlying negotiations exactly were.

(e) As to the suggestion that the Recordings and Transcripts are incomplete, I am not minded to take this point into account. The Recordings and Transcripts had been disclosed very early on – and yet the point was never raised until D Reply Aff. This is a factual point which, had it been raised earlier, Ps would have had a chance to explain. In any case, the burden is on D to show that WPP applies. If D took the view that the Recording and Transcript were incomprehensive, it is incumbent on D to set out what, on his case, were the discussion between the parties, with specificity. In the absence of such evidence, I do not think the allegation that the Recordings/Transcripts were not comprehensive would take D’s case any further.

62.  To conclude:-

(a) I accept the submission that it takes two to form a dispute.

(b) In my view, there is insufficient evidence to show that, objectively, the title of Ps over the Lot was disputed when the First Letter and Second Letter were issued.

(c) Nor is there enough evidence to suggest that there was any such dispute at the time of the Meetings.

(d) As such, a key element of establishing WPP is not made out.

63.  It follows from the above analysis that the Disputed Evidence up to the Meetings should not be expunged. This would cover the Recordings and Transcripts, P2 WS §§21-25, P2 Supp WS §37, the Photograph, and the WhatsApp Messages up to 10 October 2017.

F.5 The Disputed Evidence after the Meetings

64.  What remains is the Disputed Evidence which came to life after the Meetings.

65.  As identified in D Skel, these include certain WhatsApp messages between the parties on 11 October 2017 to 3 February 2019, which were also referred to in P2 WS §§26-29.

66.  In this regard:-

(a) D submits that, in these messages, express reference was made to the discussions and proposals from the meetings and/or earlier negotiations. Further, both sides repeatedly evinced an intention to continue attempting to settle.

(b) By contrast, Ps submit that the messages prior to 8 December 2017 were conversations within the tenancy period. For the messages thereafter, Ps submitted that the parties were looking for a conversation and there was nothing material in substance. Ps submit that there was not a shred of evidence or words to indicate that D was disputing Ps’ right to the Lot or that D was asserting his adverse possession claim.

67.  On balance, I accept Ps’ argument, at least until 18 May 2018 when the D&CC was filed. The Disputed Evidence in this period did not raise any material new points.

68.  However, the D&CC filed on 18 May 2018 altered things. For the first time, it shows clearly that D disputed the title of Ps over the Lot and set out his claim for adverse possession. This is the first point of time when it became clear that the parties had an extant dispute over the title of the Lot.

69.  I further accept D’s submissions that for the WhatsApp messages from 18 May 2018 onwards (the first one of which was on 24 May 2018), there were references to proposal and/or counterproposals with a view to settlement. As such, the intention of both parties to resolve the matter and the litigation is readily apparent from those WhatsApp messages. In the premises, I hold that WPP would apply to such communications.

70.  Accordingly, I direct that the WhatsApp messages from 24 May 2018 onwards (last message on p.3, and p.4 of Exhibit “CSC-15”) and the relevant passages in the P2 WS (P2 WS §§28-29) be expunged. In contradistinction, the earlier WhatsApp messages and P2 §§26-27 can remain.

G. Other Matters

71.  The parties have made a number of subsidiary points. It is strictly speaking not necessary for me to deal with them. However, I will express my brief views as follows.

G.1 Exception to WPP – Unambiguous Impropriety

72.  Exclusion of without prejudice privilege, whether on the basis that it is being used as a cloak for perjury or other unambiguous impropriety, can only be applied in the clearest of cases. Further, it is not the mere inconsistency between an admission and a pleaded case or a stated position that loses the party the protection of privilege; it is the abuse of privilege that does so: Poon Loi Tak (supra) at §§52-55.

73.  Ps did not push this point in their submissions; Ps only went as far as to say that D has made some inconsistent assertions. This does not amount to the exceptional circumstances envisaged by the authorities.

G.2 Waiver

74.  There is an argument by Ps that D has already waived WPP in respect of the content of the Meetings as he has consciously referred to the communications in both his pleadings and witness statements.

75.  This line of argument was not seriously pursued by Ps in submissions. In any case, D expressly reserved his right to dispute the admissibility of such negotiations. Had it been necessary, I would have accepted that objectively, D had not waived WPP, although the delay in making the application was clearly regrettable.

G.3 The Corresponding Parts in the Pleadings

76.  There is also a one-line submission by D that if the Disputed Evidence were to be expunged, the corresponding paragraphs in the pleadings should also be struck out. These corresponding paragraphs only relate to the Disputed Evidence prior to the Meetings – and given my conclusion above that there is no WPP, it is strictly speaking not necessary for me to deal with these submissions.

77.  In any event, I see the force in Ps’ submissions that the Summons makes no reference to the pleadings. Indeed, the Summons referred only to evidence and statements, but not pleadings. There is also no application before me to amend the Summons. This could be contrasted with the case of Yu Man Fung (supra), in which there was a proper application to strike out both the disputed pleadings and the evidence in question.

H. Disposition

78.  For all these reasons, I direct that the last message on page 3, and page 4 of Exhibit “CSC-15” and P2 WS §§28-29 be expunged. The application in relation to the rest of the Disputed Evidence is dismissed.

79.  For costs, D succeeded on a very limited part of the application, but failed in relation to other parts. A suitable order, in my view, would be costs be in the cause. I make an order nisi accordingly.

 ( Alexander Tang )
 Deputy District Judge

Mr Ivan Lee, instructed by Leung Kin & Co, for the 1st and 2nd plaintiffs

Mr Louis Cheng, instructed by Cheung, Yeung & Lee, Solicitors, for the defendant