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Civil Action2018

CHEUNG KIN CHUNG v. 王景偉 AND OTHERS

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Files (2)

[2021] HKCFI 3842-EN-2021-11-29

CHEUNG KIN CHUNG v. 王景偉 AND OTHERS

HTML content

HCA 1569/2018

[2021] HKCFI 3842

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO 1569 OF 2018

________________________

BETWEEN  
 CHEUNG KIN-CHUNGPlaintiff

and

 王景偉1st Defendant
 PIONEER MANAGEMENT LTD.2nd Defendant
 TSANG, CHAN & WOO3rd Defendant
 DIRECTOR OF HOUSING4th Defendant
 COMMISSIONER OF POLICE5th Defendant

________________________

Before:  Deputy High Court Judge Leung in Chambers

Date of Hearing:  29 November 2021

Date of Decision:  29 November 2021

____________________

DECISION

____________________

1.  This is the plaintiff’s application for leave to appeal against this court’s decision dated 23 July 2021. This stems from the plaintiff’s own appeal against the master’s decision on 14 May 2021 whereby the plaintiff’s claim against the 3rd defendant was struck out and such action dismissed, with costs. The master proceeded with the hearing and came to the above decision when the plaintiff was absent.

2.  By notice of appeal filed on 7 June 2021, the plaintiff appealed against the master’s decision, which was heard on 23 July 2021. Once again the plaintiff was absent from the hearing.  This court proceeded in the plaintiff’s absence.  It should be noted that this court, though entitled to do so, did not dismiss the appeal solely on the ground of his absence.  This court proceeded to consider the merits of the plaintiff’s appeal in any event. The reasons for this court’s decision to dismiss the plaintiff’s appeal was delivered in court and subsequently reduced into writing.

3.  The present application was filed on 30 September 2021.  The 3rd defendant points out that pursuant to O59, r21(2)(b) of the Rules of the High Court, Cap 4A, leave to appeal in case of this nature is unnecessary,but the intended appeal is out of time pursuant to r4.  As such, whether or not leave to appeal would have been necessary, extension of time would be necessary in any event before the plaintiff’s appeal may be heard.  This court has discretion to extend the time for application for leave to appeal pursuant to r2B(6) and for lodging an appeal as of right pursuant to r15.  In either case, whether or not time extension will be granted depends on the explanation for and the extent of the delay, the prejudice to the other side as well as the merits of the intended appeal.

4.  By his affirmation filed on 30 September 2021 for the purpose of the present application, the plaintiff did not explain at all why he allowed the time for appealing to elapse.

5.  As to the merits, the plaintiff deposed that this court was biased against him in that this court did not analyse the fact that he has had “the relevant audio clip incriminating the 3rd defendant’s partner Chan Kin Wo by misrepresenting that there being no vicarious liability for Pioneer Management Ltd” as stated in his affirmation filed on 28 June 2018 for his “re-application for leave to commence fresh proceedings”.

6.  As explained at the end of the hearing on 23 July 2021, whilst the appeal before this court was liable to be dismissed for the sole reason that the plaintiff did not attend the hearing to pursue his appeal, this court nevertheless proceeded to consider the merits of his appeal on the basis of the affirmation evidence before this court.

7.  The affirmation filed on 28 June 2018 that the plaintiff refers to must predate the commencement of this action, which was commenced by writ of summons issued on 9 July 2018.  The matter that came before the master, in respect of which the appeal was last heard before this court, was the 3rd defendant’s summons filed on 4 May 2021 to strike out the plaintiff’s claim against it. In his affirmation in opposition, the plaintiff indeed referred to his affirmation filed on 28 June 2018, which was however not actually exhibited or incorporated by his affirmation.

8.  More importantly, by referring to such affirmation filed on 28 June 2018, what the plaintiff was then trying to do was to explain that he did not know how to withdraw his action against the 3rd defendant. As to that, this court provided its understanding and analysis, which was recorded in the written decision dated 23 July 2021.  This court will not repeat that here.  Suffice to say that the 3rd defendant was entitled in the circumstances to an order to strike out the claim against it and to dismiss such action.

9.  It is one thing to argue that the court erred in its consideration of the evidence and its decision.  It is an entirely different thing to criticise the court for being biased.  Where the plaintiff did not attend the last hearing before this court, and there is no suggestion that he has had any previous experience in attending this court for founding his view about bias, his criticism was based entirely on the outcome of the last hearing that was not in his favour.  Making such allegation against the court in the circumstances is regrettable and must be rejected.

10.  All matters considered, the intended appeal is devoid of merits.  Insofar as the application for leave (out of time) is concerned, it must be dismissed with costs.

(The 3rd defendant submits the statement of costs)

11.  On the one hand, this court can understand the sentiment of the 3rd defendant for having been repeatedly brought to court by the plaintiff in the manner like this.  On the other hand, there was indeed not much in terms of substance and preparation.  All considered, a sum of HK$7,500 should be reasonable as costs of this application summarily assessed to payable by the plaintiff to the 3rd defendant in 14 days.

 ( Simon Leung )
 Deputy High Court Judge

The plaintiff was not represented and did not appear

Mr Stanley Lam, of Tsang Chan & Woo, the 3rd defendant

[2021] HKCFI 2847-EN-2021-07-23

CHEUNG KIN CHUNG v. 王景偉 AND OTHERS

HTML content

HCA 1569/2018

[2021] HKCFI 2847

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO 1569 OF 2018

________________________

BETWEEN

 CHEUNG KIN-CHUNGPlaintiff
 and 
 王景偉1st Defendant
 PIONEER MANAGEMENT LTD.2nd Defendant
 TSANG, CHAN & WOO3rd Defendant
 DIRECTOR OF HOUSING4th Defendant
 COMMISSIONER OF POLICE5th Defendant

________________________

Before:  Deputy High Court Judge Leung in Chambers

Date of Hearing:  23 July 2021

Date of Decision:  23 July 2021

________________________

DECISION

________________________


1.  This is the hearing of the plaintiff’s notice of appeal against the master’s decision pursuant to Order 58 rule 1 of the Rules of the High Court, Cap 4A.

2.  The plaintiff is absent today to pursue the appeal.  For that reason alone, the appeal ought to be dismissed.  But for completeness and for the record, the court would deal with the substance of the appeal in any event. 

3.  The targeted master’s decision was that of Master Rita So dated 14 May 2021.  At the hearing of the 3rd defendant’s application to strike out, the master proceeded with the hearing notwithstanding the absence of the plaintiff.  The master struck out the statement of claim of the plaintiff and dismissed the action against the 3rd defendant with costs, and such costs were summarily assessed and payable in 14 days of the service of that order.

4.  By the notice of appeal returned before this court, the plaintiff seeks, according to the notice, that this action be withdrawn against the 3rd defendant.  Obviously, upon dismissal of the action by the master, there is no longer an action on foot to be withdrawn by the plaintiff as such.  But taking the matter as an appeal against the master’s decision to strike out, the appeal itself is out of time. According to Order 58 rule 1(3), the notice of appeal must be lodged within 14 days of the making of the master’s order being appealed.  So the plaintiff was slightly more than a week late.

5.  The rules provide for the discretion of the court to order otherwise and, hence, extension of time for appeal.  In this respect, the solicitors for the 3rd defendant pointed out the essential factors that the court would consider in considering whether extension of time should be given.  That said, they are sensible enough in acknowledging that perhaps a neutral stance should be taken given the fact that the plaintiff nevertheless lodged the notice of appeal within 14 days after the service of the master’s order.

6.  The appeal, if entertained, is a rehearing of the matter before the master.  In other words, this court is supposed to rehear the 3rd defendant’s application to strike out.  The principles for striking out are trite.  It is only in clear and obvious case that the court will strike out proceedings.

7.  The 3rd defendant was amongst five defendants in this action commenced by the plaintiff in 2018.  According to the 3rd defendant, the writ actually expired in July 2019, prior to service on the 3rd defendant. 

8.  In the statement of claim, the plaintiff claims against the 3rd defendant for, literally, misrepresentation by them as his solicitor.  Briefly, the 3rd defendant was assigned in March 2017 by the Director of Legal Aid to act for the plaintiff in his intended claim for alleged injury sustained in an assault involving the other defendants back in 2015.  Upon taking instructions, the 3rd defendant gathered from the plaintiff that he intended to claim against the 2nd and the 4th defendants for vicarious liability for the negligence of their employees.  He also intended to claim against the 5th defendant for misfeasance and another person under the employ of the 2nd defendant at the time.

9.  Regarding this person primarily responsible (according to the plaintiff)  for the assault, the record shows that the plaintiff had applied to the magistrate for the issuance of a private summons but that was refused, and, upon appeal, was dismissed by the Court of First Instance in April 2017.

10.  What the 3rd defendant did as the assigned solicitors was to give advice at that stage to the plaintiff as to the merit of his intended claim.  The advice given, according to the 3rd defendant, was that the claim would be unsustainable because of the lack of reasonable cause of action and evidence, save and except the intended claim against the 1st defendant, ie the party allegedly primarily liable for the actual assault.  However, according to the 3rd defendant, they received no further instructions from the plaintiff upon such advice.

11.  Eventually, the Director of Legal Aid discharged the legal aid certificate in March 2018.  Since then, the 3rd defendant received no further contact from the plaintiff until, of course, the commencement of this action in 2018.

12.  As to the claim for so-called misrepresentation by the 3rd defendant, the statement of claim endorsed with the writ actually contains no particular background fact or description of the remedy sought by the plaintiff against the 3rd defendant.  Considering the statement of claim alone, pursuant to Order 18 rule 19(1)(a), it could be said that the claim actually discloses no reasonable cause of action against the 3rd defendant.  Under rule 19(1)(b), it could also be said that there is no practical way for the 3rd defendant to actually know the case that they have to answer when the claim is put that way. 

13.  In his affirmation filed in support of today’s appeal, the plaintiff explained that he did not know how to proceed.  He did not know how to withdraw the action against the 3rd defendant. Yet the fact remains that he did not discontinue the action again the 3rd defendant, and that caused the 3rd defendant to eventually take out the summons to strike out.

14.  I see from the plaintiff’s affirmation for today’s purpose that he emphasises that he complains about the alleged wrongdoing of the other parties to the incident that gave rise to his intended claim, presumably concerning the 1st and the 2nd defendant. He also set out his dependence on social welfare assistance and thus his financial inability to meet the costs order, presumably the order made by the master.

15.  Considering the appeal as a rehearing of the matter before the master, and therefore considering the pleading and the affirmation evidence before the master as well as the written submission of the 3rd defendant, I have no doubt that I would reach a similar conclusion as that of the master in striking out the statement of claim and, hence, dismissing the action against the 3rd defendant. 

16.  I would also reach the same conclusion of the master in respect of the incidence of the costs liability.  As to the amount of costs, this of course is a matter of the discretion of the master.  For the purpose of the appeal, I am not satisfied that there is any basis for questioning if such discretion of the master was exercised wrongly in breach of the applicable principle in the circumstances of this case. 

17.  For all these reasons, on top of the absence of the plaintiff to pursue the appeal, even assuming that the extension of time for appeal is allowed, I would still dismiss the appeal.  I do dismiss the appeal.

(Discussion re costs)

18.  I summarily assess the costs of and occasioned by this appeal to be in the sum of HK$6,000, payable in 14 days by the plaintiff.

 (Simon Leung)
 Deputy High Court Judge

The plaintiff was not represented and did not appear

Mr Lam Cheuk Kan Stanley of Tsang Chan & Woo, the 3rd defendant