TANG QIONG v. ZHANG TINGTNIG

HCA 452/2018

[2026] HKCFI 2499

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO 452 OF 2018

_________________

BETWEEN

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DECISION

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1.  By Judgment dated 26 March 2026 ([2026] HKCFI 1843), I gave judgment in favour of the Plaintiff against the Defendant for the sum of RMB 4 million together with accrued interest up to judgment date in the sum of RMB 16,300,645.16 and thereafter at judgment rate until full payment. I made a costs order nisi that the Plaintiff shall have the costs of the action (including all costs reserved, if any), to be taxed if not agreed.

2.  The Plaintiff now applies to vary my costs order nisi on the basis that she has outperformed her Calderbank offer made on 18 November 2022 to the Defendant’s then solicitors on record proposing: (1) a global settlement sum of RMB 14 million inclusive of interest plus costs to be taxed if not agreed; and (2) the Plaintiff, the Defendant and Mr Zheng to sign a joint declaration to the effect that the advancements set out in [2] of the Judgment were loans by the Plaintiff to the Defendant, and not by Mr Zheng to the Defendant. The offer lapsed on 2 December 2022. There was no acceptance of the offer, not any counter-offer, from the Defendant. The Plaintiff asks for costs of the entire action to be taxed on an indemnity basis, or alternatively indemnity costs from 3 December 2022 onwards.

3.  The Plaintiff’s offer was not a sanctioned offer and therefore does not attract the default sanctions under Order 22, rule 24 of the Rules of the High Court including indemnity costs. The offer could not be made as a sanctioned offer because of the Plaintiff’s request for execution of a joint declaration as set out above. That said, a Calderbank offer may still be considered in the Court’s exercise of discretion on costs, as provided for under Order 62, rule 5(1)(d).

4.  There is no dispute that indemnity costs should only be ordered if the case has some “special or unusual feature” in the case. The discretion to award indemnity costs is unfettered, and the guiding consideration is whether such an order is “appropriate” in the circumstances: Town Planning Board v Society for Protection of Harbour (No 2) (2004) 7 HKCFAR 114 at [15]-[17].

5.  Ms Angel Wong for the Plaintiff submitted that an order for indemnity costs is justified for the following reasons:

(1) The Plaintiff’s offer was a reasonable one. The total indebtedness by the Defendant to the Plaintiff (loan principal of RMB 4 million together with interest at 3% per month) measured up to RMB 15,520,000 at the time of the offer. The settlement sum of RMB 14 million was not of an insubstantial discount. The Defendant did not engage in any constructive dialogue on settlement discussion with the Plaintiff, despite indication from Au-Yeung J at a hearing on 1 August 2022 on the desirability of settlement between the parties.

(2) It was also reasonable for the Plaintiff to propose the joint declaration, when the Defendant contended in her Defence that it was Mr Zheng, not the Plaintiff, who advanced the loans to her. Whilst the Plaintiff did not seek such a relief against the Defendant in the Statement of Claim, the Court found in the Judgment that it was the Plaintiff who advanced the loans to the Defendant. The Defendant therefore also failed to beat the offer in this respect.

(3) There were deliberate attempts by the Defendant to delay the proceedings. She filed a Notice to Act in Person only shortly before trial, and she did not comply with the Court’s direction for lodging her opening submissions. She made a last-minute, unjustified application to adjourn the trial, which the Court refused: see [6]-[7] of the Judgment.

(4) The Defendant’s case was wholly unmeritorious. She did not allude to any loan agreement between Mr Zheng and herself when she challenged the Court’s jurisdiction on forum non conveniens grounds in 2019. She produced audio recordings of her conversations with Mr Zheng which did not in fact support her case: see [21] of the Judgment. Her defence was directly contradicted by the IOU Note. The Plaintiff should therefore get indemnity costs for the whole action.

6.  I have taken into consideration the above points raised by Ms Wong. At the same time, I have also not lost sight of the unsatisfactory way in which the Plaintiff’s case evolved in the pleadings: see [15] of the Judgment. Whilst eventually I accepted the Plaintiff’s explanation, this only came about at trial when she gave evidence and answered questions from the Court. The Plaintiff’s conduct before and during the proceedings, including the way in which she advanced her case against the Defendant, is a relevant consideration on the issue of costs, as provided for under Order 62, rule 5(1)(e) and rule 5(2)(d). Although the Defendant’s case was rejected, this is a case where the defence failed on merits. The Plaintiff’s request for execution of a joint declaration was also not a pleaded relief against the Defendant. I do not see how it could be said to be reasonable for the Plaintiff to request its execution in her Calderbank offer.

7.  In my view, there are no special features in this case which warrants an order for indemnity costs against the Defendant. I therefore dismissed the Plaintiff’s costs variation application and make the costs order nisi in the Judgment absolute. I make no order as to costs of this application including the hearing on 22 April 2026.

Ms Angel H Y Wong, instructed by Zhang Lawyers, for the Plaintiff

The Defendant was unrepresented and did not appear

HCA 452/2018

[2026] HKCFI 1843

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO 452 OF 2018

________________________

________________________

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J U D G M E N T

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1.  By this action, the Plaintiff seeks to recover a loan in the total sum of RMB 4 million from the Defendant.

2.  It is the Plaintiff’s case that the loan was advanced pursuant to an oral agreement made in May 2014 between the Plaintiff and the Defendant through an intermediary, Mr Zheng Qing Yuan (鄭清源) (“Mr Zheng”), who is their mutual friend. The loan would carry an interest rate of 3% per month, and was repayable on demand. The Plaintiff advanced the loan to the Defendant in the following manner:

(1)  On 14 May 2014:

(a)  the Plaintiff transferred RMB 1,930,000 from her Bank of Quanzhou account to the bank account of the Defendant’s daughter maintained at the Qingyang Branch of the Fujian Jinjiang Rural Commercial Bank (“Daughter’s Account”);

(b)  the Plaintiff transferred RMB 50,000 from her ICBC account to the Daughter’s Account; and

(c)  the Plaintiff directed Madam 鄭秀好 (“Ms Zheng”) who is the elder sister of Mr Zheng to transfer RMB 20,000 from Ms Zheng’s Bank of Quanzhou account to the Daughter’s Account.

(2)  On 27 May 2014, the Plaintiff transferred RMB 2 million from her ICBC account to the Daughter’s Account.

3.  The Defendant executed an IOU note dated 15 July 2014 (“IOU Note”) to acknowledge her receipt of the loan from the Plaintiff, on the following terms:

                             借条

兹向唐琼借到人民币现金

（大写）：肆百万元正（小写）4000000.00

本人声明此笔款已全额收到，特立此据为凭！

借款人 张婷婷            身份证 __________

日期：2014年7月15日

4.  It is the Plaintiff’s case that between June and November 2014, the Defendant paid interest on the loan in the total sum of RMB 720,000 to the Plaintiff via Mr Zheng. Since December 2014, despite continuous demands from the Plaintiff and Mr Zheng, the Defendant failed to repay any part of the loan and ceased to make interest payments to the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff through her former solicitors issued a demand letter to the Defendant on 21 February 2018 (“Demand Letter”), and commenced the present proceedings in the same month.

5.  In her Defence, the Defendant did not dispute having received the total sum of RMB 3,980,000 from the Plaintiff and RMB 20,000 from Ms Zheng. She claimed that those were loans advanced to her from Mr Zheng, not the Plaintiff whom she claimed only to know for the first time in around October to November 2014. In respect of the IOU Note, she averred that she signed her name as borrower and put her fingerprint thereon at Mr Zheng’s request as proof of the loan from him. She was uncertain whether she put down the Plaintiff’s name as the lender as directed by Mr Zheng or she had left it blank. As for the payments made between June and November 2014, she claimed that those were repayments made to Mr Zheng, not interest payments to the Plaintiff.

6.  The Defendant was all along legally represented. She filed a Notice to Act in Person on 10 February 2026, two weeks before trial was scheduled to commence on 24 February 2026. In the afternoon of the day before trial (23 February 2026), the Court received a fax letter under the name of the Defendant. The letter stated that the Defendant was currently in the Mainland. During Chinese New Year (which was the week before trial), she fainted due to a chronic heart problem and injured her knee. She had not yet recovered and was under medical supervision on the advice of doctor. She asked to adjourn the trial for three months (or to a date to be fixed by the Court). The letter enclosed what appeared to be a photograph of a bandaged knee, and two pages of what appeared to be medical examination records.

7.  A trial date is a milestone date which the Court should not vary unless there are exceptional circumstances justifying the variation: Order 25, rule 1B(3) of the Rules of the High Court (Cap 4A). None has been shown by the Defendant. The purported medical records fall far short of showing that the Defendant was unfit to travel to Hong Kong to attend trial. It is unfair to the Plaintiff to delay the trial. I therefore declined the request for adjournment and proceeded in the Defendant’s absence. The Defendant’s witness statements and affirmations filed in these proceedings were accordingly ignored.

8.  The Plaintiff and Mr Zheng gave evidence. I accept their evidence which was unchallenged. I also had the benefit of written and oral submissions from Ms Angel Wong, counsel for the Plaintiff. I agree with her legal and factual analysis. On the basis of the above, I come to the following findings and conclusions.

9.  The Plaintiff came to know Mr Zheng since 1998.

10.  In 2014, Mr Zheng recommended the Plaintiff to advance short-term loans to third parties with the money in her bank accounts so that she could earn more interest than keeping the money in the bank.

11.  In April 2014, on the suggestion of Mr Zheng, the Plaintiff provided short-term loans to the Defendant. The Plaintiff did not know the Defendant, and they communicated through Mr Zheng. The duration of the loans usually lasted for one day to a week. By May 2014, the Defendant had repaid the short-term loans in full. Part of the interest on the short-term loans was paid to the Plaintiff, and part was deposited by the Defendant into Ms Zheng’s bank account.

12.  In about early May 2014, the Defendant through Mr Zheng requested for a loan of RMB 2 million from the Plaintiff. She claimed that she needed a “bridging loan” (過橋貸款) to facilitate short‑term cash flow. As the request was made urgently, the Plaintiff agreed to advance the loan at a relatively higher interest rate of 3% per month. As directed by the Defendant, the Plaintiff advanced the loan amount to the Daughter’s Account. At the time, the Plaintiff only had RMB 1,930,000 in her Bank of Quanzhou account. She made up the shortfall through RMB 50,000 in her ICBC account, and RMB 20,000 which Ms Zheng had earlier received from the Defendant (as interest on the April short-term loans) on the Plaintiff’s behalf and had yet transferred back to the Plaintiff.

13.  In the latter half of May 2014, the Defendant asked for a further urgent loan of RMB 2 million from the Plaintiff, which the Plaintiff advanced on 27 May 2014 on the same terms as the initial loan.

14.  On 24 June 2014, a sum of RMB 1 million was transferred from the Daughter to the Plaintiff’s Bank of Quanzhou Account. On 27 June 2014, a sum of RMB 1 million was transferred from the Plaintiff’s Bank of Quanzhou Account to one Madam 陳美容 who was designed by the Defendant to receive the funds. I accept the Plaintiff’s evidence that the first RMB 1 million was part repayment by the Defendant because at that time the Plaintiff was urgently in need of money and her funds were placed in bank fixed deposits. Three days later the Defendant through Mr Zheng asked the Plaintiff if the RMB 1 million could be lent back to her, which the Plaintiff did. This episode did not alter the fact that the total loan amount to the Defendant was RMB 4 million.

15.  In this regard, I have not lost sight that different versions of the terms of the oral loan agreement were pleaded by the Plaintiff:

(1)  In the Statement of Claim dated 23 February 2018, it was pleaded that the Plaintiff advanced RMB 1,930,000 on 14 May 2014 and RMB 2 million on 27 May 2014. The remaining sum of RMB 70,000 was said to be deducted from the first monthly interest payment by the Defendant to the Plaintiff. Therefore, the Defendant only paid RMB 50,000 to the Plaintiff as interest for the first month. This was also the version put forward in the Demand Letter. It was further pleaded that after 6 months have lapsed, the Plaintiff “can ask” the Defendant for repayment of the loan principal.

(2)  In the Re-Amended Statement of Claim dated 29 October 2019, it was again pleaded that the Plaintiff advanced two sums of RMB 1,930,000 and RMB 2 million each to the Defendant. The remaining RMB 70,000 was said to constitute the interest accumulated from the first month of repayment and outstanding interest accrued on the loans previously lent to the Defendant in April 2014, and was deducted from the first RMB 2 million loan advanced to the Defendant. It was further pleaded that after 6 months have lapsed, the Defendant “will repay” the principal amount and all accrued interest in full.

(3)  In the Re-Re-Amended Statement of Claim dated 1 March 2021, after pleading the two sums of RMB 1,930,000 and RMB 2 million advanced to the Defendant, the remaining RMB 70,000 was pleaded as a “one-off payment from the Defendant of all the outstanding accrued interests of the short‑term loans in April 2014” and was deducted from the first RMB 2 million loan to the Defendant. It was also pleaded that the Defendant shall repay the loan amount and all accrued interest to the Plaintiff on demand. Reference to the lapse of 6 months was deleted.

(4)  In the Re-Re-Re-Amended Statement of Claim dated 25 January 2022, which was the latest version, reference to the deduction of RMB 70,000 was removed. In its place, it was pleaded that the first RMB 2 million loan advanced to the Defendant was made up of the three sums of RMB 1,930,000, RMB 50,000 and RMB 20,000 set out in [12] above.

16.  The evolution of the Plaintiff’s case in the pleadings – all verified by Statements of Truth vouching for their accuracy – is no doubt highly unsatisfactory and, absent a good explanation, may impact on the overall credibility of the Plaintiff’s case. That said, I accept Ms Wong’s submissions that whilst the Statement of Claim underwent several rounds of amendments, the amendments focused on the treatment of the sum of RMB 70,000 out of the total loan sum, and whether the Plaintiff could demand repayment at any time or only after 6 months of the advancement of the total loan sum. The parties to the loan agreement, the agreed total loan sum, and the agreed monthly interest rate, were not subject to changes. The Plaintiff’s case was thus all in all consistent.

17.  The Plaintiff explained that when the Demand Letter was issued (and shortly afterwards, when the Statement of Claim was filed), it was four years after the transfer of the first RMB 2 million loan, and she could not remember all the details off her mind. At that time, she framed her case based on the transmission slip recording the transfer of RMB 1,930,000 from her Bank of Quanzhou account to the Daughter’s Account. She did not recall independently that a further sum of RMB 50,000 was advanced from her ICBC account to the Daughter’s Account, nor the RMB 20,000 advanced through Ms Zheng. She could not recall why there was a shortfall of RMB 70,000. By mistake, she associated that sum as interest payment. It was only subsequently when the bank records of the Daughter’s Account were disclosed in these proceedings that she noticed the RMB 20,000 transferred on 14 May 2014 through Ms Zheng. This led her to correct her pleaded case to the present form. On this issue, faced with the Court’s questions, the Plaintiff was candid in admitting her mistakes and gave her explanation in a straightforward manner. I find her credible and accept her explanation.

18.  The pleaded 6-month period before the Defendant had to make repayment to the Plaintiff could well be explained by the fact that the Plaintiff first demanded the Defendant for repayment in October 2014, and the Defendant did pay interest up to November 2014. Viewed in such context, it could not be said to be entirely inconsistent with the Plaintiff’s case that the Defendant had to make repayment after 6 months from the advancement of the loan. In any event, the Plaintiff commenced these proceedings in 2018, which was much later than the 6-month period as originally pleaded. I therefore agree with Ms Wong that the removal of the 6-month period does not undermine the Plaintiff’s case.

19.  The Plaintiff’s case was corroborated by Mr Zheng. Whilst he admitted that he could not recall the details of how the RMB 4 million was advanced to the Defendant given he did not possess the relevant bank records, as the person witnessing the execution of the IOU Note by the Defendant, he gave the following details regarding the same:

(1)  The IOU Note was executed by the Defendant on the date it records (15 July 2014) at the Defendant’s home.

(2)  The Defendant prepared the IOU Note at the request of the Plaintiff (conveyed through Mr Zheng). She inserted all the handwritten entries (underlined in [3] above).

(3)  At the time of the execution of the IOU Note, the Defendant did not dispute the identity of the lender, i.e. the Plaintiff. Nor did she dispute the amount of the loan.

20.  Mr Zheng denied that he was the one who lent the RMB 4 million to the Defendant. There is no logical reason for him to collude with the Plaintiff. Had he been the true lender and the Defendant acknowledged this fact, there is no reason for him to give up on his loan and not to sue for recovery from the Defendant. The IOU Note plainly contradicted the Defendant’s case that Mr Zheng was the lender.

21.  In support of her case that Mr Zheng rather than the Plaintiff was the lender of the loan, the Defendant produced five audio recordings of her conversations with Mr Zheng. Mr Zheng confirmed his voice in the recordings, but he could not recall the date when the conversations took place due to time lapse. I accept Mr Zheng’s evidence that none of the recordings supported the Defendant’s case:

(1)  Recording No.1: I accept Mr Zheng’s evidence that the loan discussed was one borrowed by the Defendant from another person named 陳世裕, not the subject loan in this action.

(2)  Recording No.2: The Defendant asked Mr Zheng to tell the Plaintiff that he would repay her (你跟他说，你一定会还你). Mr Zheng responded that he did convey that message to the Plaintiff, but he had sensed that the Plaintiff saw no hope (of payment) from him (我有跟他说一定会还你，就是说这种事情，他的意思就是说，我说我会还他，但是他在我身上看不到希望，我自己猜测的). This is acknowledgment by the Defendant that the Plaintiff was the lender of the loan. I accept Mr Zheng’s explanation that he never really agreed to repay the loan for the Defendant, and had said the words to the Defendant only to pacify her.

(3)  Recording No.3: There was mention that the Plaintiff had asked Mr Zheng to come up with RMB 3 million to repay her, and she could also assign the debt to him (他说事情要解决的话，叫我拿300万给他，叫他那个亲戚来跟我解决，我说我哪有钱 … 他说这个债务就变成我跟你的事情 … 他说去公证，比如公证说债权转给我，但是我哪有钱). This supported rather than undermined the Plaintiff’s case that she was the lender of the loan to the Defendant.

(4)  Recording No.4: The Defendant asked when did the Plaintiff get the IOU Note from Mr Zheng (当时唐琼是什么时候去找你拿我写给你的那张欠条呢). Mr Zheng replied that the Plaintiff did so in the same year (当年就给他了). This was clear acceptance by the Defendant that the Plaintiff was the lender of the loan and was entitled to retrieve the IOU Note from Mr Zheng. Mr Zheng also said that it was agreed that the Plaintiff would be fully repaid by November and it was delayed to end of year (是说11月份要给他完，然后拖到了年底，还记得吗). The Defendant did not deny this but said that she could not recall. Again this was clear acceptance by the Defendant that the Plaintiff was the lender of the loan who was therefore entitled to repayment.

(5)  Recording No.5: The Defendant said that she had praised Mr Zheng before her husband for promising the Plaintiff that even if the Defendant did not make repayment, he would repay for her and shoulder the responsbility (我说清源人多好，还打电话跟他说，说就算婷婷没有还你，我有会还你，我都会担). This showed that the Defendant was aware that she was liable to repay to the Plaintiff, but was hoping that Mr Zheng would shoulder the liability in the event of her non-payment.

22.  For the above reasons, I find that the Plaintiff has established her contractual claim for breach of the oral loan agreement against the Defendant. It is unnecessary for me to consider the Plaintiff’s alternative claim based on unjust enrichment. Accordingly, there will be judgment in favour of the Plaintiff against the Defendant on the loan principal in the sum of RMB 4 million, together with accrued interest at the rate of 3% per month from 1 December 2014 (when the Defendant ceased paying interest) up to the date of Judgment (26 March 2026) in the total sum of RMB 16,300,645.16, and thereafter at judgment rate until full payment.

23.  Costs should follow the event. I make a costs order nisi that the Defendant shall pay the Plaintiff’s costs of the action, including all costs reserved (if any), to be taxed if not agreed. The costs order will become absolute in the absence of any application for variation by way of inter partes summons within 14 days from the date of Judgment.

24.  I thank Ms Wong for her helpful assistance.

Ms Angel H Y Wong, instructed by Zhang Lawyers, for the Plaintiff

The Defendant was unrepresented and did not appear

HCA 452/2018

[2025] HKCFI 2714

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO 452 OF 2018

_____________

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D E C I S I O N

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A.  Introduction

1.  Upon the Plaintiff’s ex parte application, on 31 January 2022, Keith Yeung J granted a Mareva injunction restraining the Defendant from:-

(1)  removing assets up to the value of RMB14,320,000;

(2)  disposing of Unit A, 30/F, Diva, No. 135 Electric Road, Hong Kong (the “Diva Property”) or the net sale proceeds thereof; and

(3)  disposing of Flat G, 9^th Floor, Lime Habitat, No.38 Ming Yuen Western Street, Hong Kong (the “Lime Habitat Property”) or the net sale proceeds thereof.

2.  This is the substantive hearing of the Plaintiff’s summons dated 7 February 2022 seeking to continue the said Mareva injunction.

B.  Material Background

B1.  The Underlying Dispute

The Plaintiff’s Case

3.  Zheng Qing Yuan (“Mr Zheng”) is a mutual friend of the Plaintiff and the Defendant.

4.  Through Mr Zheng, the Plaintiff became acquainted with the Defendant.

5.  In May 2014, the Plaintiff orally agreed to provide a loan of RMB4,000,000 to the Defendant, and the interest thereon was 3% per month.

6.  From June 2014 to November 2014, the Defendant, via Mr Zheng, made 6 payments of RMB120,000 (ie total RMB720,000) to pay off the monthly interest accrued on the principal indebtedness of RMB4,000,000.

7.  However, the Defendant has not made any payment after November 2014.

8.  In the premises, the Plaintiff commenced the present action on 26 February 2018. Pursuant to the said loan agreement, she sues the Defendant for RMB14,320,000 (being the outstanding principal indebtedness and the outstanding interest). In the alternative, she seeks restitution against the Defendant in the amount of RMB3,280,000 (ie RMB4,000,000 less RMB720,000).

The Defendant’s Case

9.  The Defendant does not dispute the fact that she received an aggregate sum of RMB4,000,000; nor does she dispute the fact that Mr Zheng was her friend.

10.  However, the Defendant denies that the loan came from the Plaintiff.

11.  The Defendant alleges that:-

(1)  She and Mr Zheng “have been in a partnership that involves a series of borrowing and lending loans between them in the nature of revolving loan”[1].

(2)  Against this background, Mr Zheng was the one who lent her the sum of RMB4,000,000.

(3)  The Plaintiff was not privy to the loan arrangement between herself and Mr Zheng at all[2].

12.  Put simply, it is the Defendant’s case that Mr Zheng (not the Plaintiff) is the person who is entitled to sue her for recovery of the loan of RMB4,000,000.

B2.  Events leading to the Application for Mareva Injunction

13.  As a matter of public records:-

(1)  The Defendant was a 90% registered owner of the Diva Property[3].

(2)  The Defendant was the sole registered owner of the Lime Habitat Property.

The Plaintiff’s Case

14.  On 28 January 2022, the Plaintiff’s solicitors, upon checking the records maintained with the Land Registry, discovered that:-

(1)  Pursuant to a purported sale and purchase agreement dated 5 July 2021, the entirety of the interest (including the Defendant’s 90% interest) in the Diva Property was purportedly sold to a Zhang Yamin for HK$17 million.

(2)  Pursuant to another purported sale and purchase agreement dated 9 December 2021, the Defendant’s interest in the Lime Habitat Property was sold to a Zhang Xusheng for HK$13 million.

15.  Whilst the transaction in respect of the Diva Property had completed already, the transaction in respect of the Lime Habitat Property had not yet completed.

16.  The Plaintiff says that:-

(1)  Zhang Yamin is the Defendant’s daughter. She is a student with no financial means.

(2)  Zhang Xusheng is the Defendant’s son. He is a young man with limited financial means and has been declared “a dishonest person subject to enforcement (失信被執行人)” in the Mainland.

17.  In the premises, the Plaintiff contends that:-

(1)  Neither Zhang Yamin nor Zhang Xusheng was financially capable of purchasing the Defendant’s interest in the Diva Property and the Lime Habitat Property.

(2)  The purported transactions under the sale and purchase agreements dated 5 July 2021 and 9 December 2021 (collectively the “Purported Transactions”) were not genuine. The same were orchestrated for the purpose of dissipating the Defendant’s assets and evading the court’s judgment in the present action.

The Defendant’s Case

18.  The Defendant admits that Zhang Yamin is her daughter (hereinafter the “Defendant’s Daughter”), whereas Zhang Xusheng is her son (hereinafter the “Defendant’s Son”).

19.  However, the Defendant alleges that the Purported Transactions were genuine.

20.  The Defendant says that in light of her financial difficulty, she decided to sell the interests in the said Properties to her Daughter and her Son, such that mortgagee banks and money lenders would not foreclose the Properties.

21.  As to the financial means of her Daughter and her Son, the Defendant alleges that:-

(1)  Her Son obtained (i) some loans from friend(s); and (ii) a mortgage loan[4]. Thus, he repaid the indebtedness of HK$7,500,000 owed to JIT Finance Co Ltd under a legal charge over the Diva Property as well as a sum of HK$875,652 owed to United Asia Finance Ltd. These sums would be set off against the purchase price in respect of the Lime Habitat Property.

(2)  As regards the sale and purchase of the Diva Property, her Daughter obtained (i) some loans from friend(s); and (ii) a mortgage loan from CMB Wing Lung Bank Ltd[5]. The Defendant appeared to suggest that her Daughter managed to repay the pre-existing mortgage loans in the amounts of HK$7,634,948[6] owed to JIT Finance Co Ltd and HK$6,590,220.42[7] owed to CMB Wing Lung Bank.

C.  Legal Principles

22.  The legal principles relating to Mareva injunctions are well-established. The applicant has to show: (i) he has a good arguable case; (ii) there are assets within the jurisdiction; (iii) the balance of convenience lies in favour of granting a Mareva injunction; and (iv) there is a real risk of dissipation.

23.  As Lam VP (as Lam PJ then was) pointed out in Convoy Collateral Ltd v Cho Kwai Chee [2020] 6 HKC 81 at paras 39 to 40, the question of whether there is a real risk of dissipation involves predictive and evaluative judgment. The court will holistically consider all the circumstantial materials that are indicative of risk, including matters which point against such risk. Matters like the nature of the assets held by the defendant, the financial standing of the defendant, his/her past or existing credit history, and the defendant’s behavior in respect of the claim can be indicative of the risk of dissipation.

D.  Deliberation

D1.  Good Arguable Case

24.  The Defendant seeks to discredit the Plaintiff’s case by pointing out that she has amended her statement of claim a few times.

25.  For the following reasons, I am not of the view that there is substance in this line of attack:-

(1)  The amendments to the statement of claim mainly concern (i) the background relating to the loan agreement; (ii) how the loan proceeds were made available to the Defendant; and (iii) the persons through whom the loan proceeds were made available to the Defendant.

(2)  Bearing in mind the crux of the Defendant’s defence is that the loan agreement was between herself and Mr Zheng, it appears to me that the amendments to the statement of claim merely concern some peripheral matters.

(3)  All along, it has been the Plaintiff’s case that she was the one who was privy to the loan agreement and who made available the loan of RMB4,000,000 to the Defendant. In this regard, the Plaintiff’s has not undergone any changes at all.

26.  Meanwhile, the Plaintiff’s case is corroborated by:-

(1)  a written acknowledgement signed by the Defendant on 15 July 2014, wherein the Defendant unequivocally acknowledged that (i) she borrowed RMB4,000,000 from the Plaintiff; and (ii) the loan proceeds had been received[8].

(2)  the evidence of Mr Zheng[9], who was adamant that (i) he was never involved in any business with the Defendant; (ii) he did not borrow any money from the Plaintiff; and (iii) he did not lend the sum of RMB4,000,000 to the Defendant.

27.  It is not this court’s function to conduct a mini-trial on affidavit. As such, I do not propose to embark on a forensic analysis of the evidence.

28.  For present purposes, it suffices to say that the Plaintiff’s case is supported by (i) a piece of contemporaneous document; and (ii) the testimony of a neutral witness, ie Mr Zheng who used to be a friend of the Defendant.

29.  On the evidence, I am satisfied that the Plaintiff has made out a good arguable case against the Defendant.

D2.  Assets within the jurisdiction

30.  The Defendant is a permanent resident in Hong Kong.

31.  As mentioned, the Defendant was the owner of the Diva Property and the Lime Habitat Property, which were purportedly sold to her Daughter and her Son.

32.  In the circumstances, I am satisfied that the Defendant must have assets within the jurisdiction.

D3.  Risk of Dissipation and Balance of Convenience

33.  For the reasons elaborated in this sub-section, I am not of the view that the purported sale and purchase of the Diva Property and the Lime Habitat Property were genuine.

34.  Insofar as the Purported Transaction in respect of the Lime Habitat Property is concerned[10]:-

(1)  The consideration was HK$13 million.

(2)  According to the Defendant, her Son’s purported purchase was financed by some mortgage loan(s) and some loan(s) from friend(s). This was why the Defendant’s Son was able to repay (i) HK$7,500,000 owed to JIT Finance Co Ltd; and (ii) HK$875,652 owed to United Asia Finance Ltd.

(3)  Despite the Plaintiff expressly takes issue as to the financial means and creditworthiness of the Defendant’s Son, the Defendant has chosen not to provide any information as to:-

(a)  the identity of the alleged “friend(s)” who was/were willing to provide loan(s) to the Defendant’s Son for purchasing the Lime Habitat Property;

(b)  the details of the loan arrangement between the Defendant’s Son and his “friend(s)”;

(c)  when and how the alleged loan(s) from the alleged friend(s) was/were made available to the Defendant’s Son; and

(d)  the occupation of the Defendant’s Son and his financial abilities in making repayment.

(4)  There is simply not a shred of evidence showing that the loan arrangement between the Defendant’s Son and his unidentified friend(s) existed at all; nor is there any evidence showing that the Defendant’s Son was a creditworthy person with adequate financial means.

(5)  On the evidence, it is doubtful as to whether the funds for repaying the indebtedness owed to JIT Finance Co Ltd and United Asia Finance Ltd came from the Defendant’s Son as alleged. There is not a shred of objective or documentary evidence showing that this was the case.

(6)  For reasons best known to the Defendant, she has chosen not to adduce any evidence from her Son. No explanation has been provided.

(7)  In the premises, the Defendant’s case is completely hollow. Her allegations raise more questions than answers. The huge evidential gap is plainly inexplicable.

(8)  I do not believe that the alleged “friend(s)” existed at all. I do not believe that the Defendant’s Son is a creditworthy person with adequate financial means. I also do not believe that the Defendant’s Son provided the funds for repaying the indebtedness owed to JIT Finance Co Ltd and United Asia Finance Ltd.

35.  As regards the Purported Transaction in respect of the Diva Property:-

(1)  The purported consideration was HK$17 million.

(2)  According to the Defendant, her Daughter’s purported purchase was financed by (i) loan(s) from some friend(s); and (ii) a new mortgage loan provided by CMB Wing Lung Bank. The Defendant appears to suggest that the funds from her Daughter were used to discharge the pre-existing indebtedness of HK$7,634,948 under a mortgage created in favour of JIT Finance Co Ltd as well as the pre-existing indebtedness of HK$6,590,220.42 under a mortgage in favour of CMB Wing Lung Bank.

(3)  As pointed out by Ms Angel Wong (for the Plaintiff), assuming that the pre-existing indebtedness of HK$7,634,948 and HK$6,590,220.42 was indeed repaid, there should be a balance in favour of the Defendant in the amount of HK$2,497,348.42[11]. However, the Defendant has failed to adduce a shred of evidence showing that the balance of the sale proceeds had been paid to and/or received by herself.

(4)  Moreover, the Defendant is not in a position to dispute the fact her Daughter was a student at all material times. It is simply inconceivable as to why a student would wish to purchase a substantial property that was worth HK$17 million.

(5)  Unsurprisingly, the Defendant cannot provide any information as to:-

(a)  the identity of the alleged “friend(s)” who was/were willing to provide loan(s) to the Defendant’s Daughter;

(b)  the details of the loan arrangement between the Defendant’s Daughter and her “friend(s)”;

(c)  when and how the alleged loan(s) from the alleged friend(s) was/were made available to the Defendant’s Daughter; and

(d)  the financial position of the Defendant’s Daughter and her abilities in making repayment.

(6)  In short, there is simply not a shred of evidence showing that the loan arrangement between the Defendant’s Daughter and her unidentified friend(s) existed at all.

(7)  In this connection, Ms Rachel Chiu (for the Defendant) emphasized that Wing Lung Bank granted a mortgage in favour of the Defendant’s Daughter[12]. However, the court knows very little about the mortgage arrangement, and the Defendant has kept the matter opaque. For instance, the Defendant has been silent as to whether herself and/or some other person with adequate financial means acted as guarantor(s) in respect of the Daughter’s indebtedness under the mortgage arrangement. In the circumstances, I am unable to conclude that the Defendant’s Daughter is a person with financial means simply because Wing Lung Bank granted a mortgage in her favour.

(8)  Furthermore, for reasons best known to herself, the Defendant has chosen not to adduce any evidence from her Daughter. No explanation has been provided.

(9)  Again, the Defendant’s case is completely hollow. Her allegations raise more questions than answers. The huge evidential gap is plainly inexplicable.

(10)  I do not believe that the alleged “friend(s)” of the Defendant’s Daughter existed at all. I do not believe that the Defendant’s Daughter is a person with financial means. I also do not believe that the Defendant has received any consideration from her Daughter.

36.  For the above reasons, I am of the view that the matters relating to the Purported Transactions were commercially inexplicable in multiple respects. On the available evidence, the most likely explanation was that these Purported Transactions were orchestrated for the purposes of evading the Plaintiff’s claims in this action. I am not of the view that the Purported Transactions were genuine and/or bona fide.

37.  The aforesaid matters show that the Defendant was prepared to orchestrate sham transactions for the purposes of rendering herself “judgment-proof”.

38.  I do not lose sight of the fact that on the Defendant’s admissions, she was in financial difficulty. This was why she did not propose to make any repayment to Mr Zheng (who was, on the Defendant’s case, the creditor in respect of the loan of RMB4,000,000).

39.  Taking all the circumstances into account, I am satisfied the Plaintiff has discharged the evidential burden of showing that there is a real risk of unjustified dissipation of assets.

40.  Thus, if no Mareva injunction were granted, there is a real risk that the Plaintiff may only obtain an empty judgment at the end of the day. This will be unfair to the Plaintiff.

41.  Insofar as the balance of convenience is concerned, Ms Rachel Chiu (for the Defendant) submitted that the Plaintiff failed to prosecute the present proceedings diligently, which caused prejudice to the Defendant.

42.  I do not accept Ms Chiu’s submissions:-

(1)  First of all, I am unable to conclude that the Plaintiff did not prosecute these proceedings with diligence after Keith Yeung J granted the Mareva injunction on 31 January 2022. As pointed out by Ms Angel Wong (for the Plaintiff), both parties have taken interlocutory applications for discovery and adducing supplemental witness statements (which took time to resolve).

(2)  Second, in any event, it was open to the Defendant to prosecute the present proceedings. I cannot see how the Defendant might shift the blame to the Plaintiff completely.

D4.  Alleged Material Non-Disclosure

43.  In her affirmation in opposition[13], the Defendant suggests that the reason why the Plaintiff lent her RMB4,000,000 was that she owned properties in Hong Kong. However, when the Plaintiff made the ex parte application before Keith Yeung J, she failed to inform the court about this matter.

44.  There is no substance in the Defendant’s complaint:-

(1)  I disagree that the Plaintiff’s commercial judgment would be relevant to the court’s exercise of discretion. This is nothing but a red herring.

(2)  In any event, it is not in dispute that the loan of RMB4,000,000 was unsecured. Whilst the same was not secured against the Diva Property and the Lime Habitat Property, the Plaintiff was content with the arrangement. This matter could not have escaped the attention of Keith Yeung J.

45.  I reject the Defendant’s suggestion that the Plaintiff was guilty of material non-disclosure.

D5.  The Court’s Charba Jurisdiction

46.  In Hui Chi Ming v Koon Wing Yee [2010] 4 HKC 86 at paras 26 to 33, Fok J (as Fok PJ then was) stated:-

“26. However, it is established that the Mareva jurisdiction may be exercised against non-parties.

27. In S.C.F. Finance Co v Masri [1985] 1 WLR 876 Lloyd LJ (as he then was) summarised the principles in relation to third party interests sought to be included within a Mareva injunction as follows (at 884B-E):-

‘(i) Where a plaintiff invites the court to include within the scope of a Mareva injunction assets which appear on their face to belong to a third party, e.g. a bank account in the name of a third party, the court should not accede to the invitation without good reason for supposing that the assets are in truth the assets of the defendant. (ii) Where the defendant asserts that the assets belong to a third party, the court is not obliged to accept that assertion without inquiry, but may do so depending on the circumstances. The same applies where it is the third party who makes the assertion, on an application to intervene. (iii) In deciding whether to accept the assertion of a defendant or a third party, without further inquiry, the court will be guided by what is just and convenient, not only between the plaintiff and the defendant, but also between the plaintiff, the defendant and the third party. (iv) Where the court decides not to accept the assertion without further inquiry, it may order an issue to be tried between the plaintiff and the third party in advance of the main action, or it may order that the issue await the outcome of the main action, again depending in each case on what is just and convenient.’

28. The test of “good reason” in principle (i) above is a higher standard of proof or threshold than the test of a serious issue to be tried as to the ownership of the assets. The purpose of requiring the higher standard of proof or threshold is to protect the rights of innocent third parties: Allied Arab Bank v. Taj El Arefin Hajjar and others, unrep., The Times, 11 January 1988.

29. The above principles were not controversial between the parties. Where there was some disagreement, however, was in respect of whether it was necessary for the party seeking injunctive relief to show that the assets held by the third party were the defendant’s assets and that they were assets available to satisfy a judgment by way of execution. This was the submission of Mr John Yan SC, leading counsel for the 1^st Defendant, which submission was adopted by Mr Horace Wong SC, leading counsel for Madam Lui.

30. However, I agree with the submission of Mr Johnny Mok SC, leading counsel for the plaintiff, that it is not necessary for the applicant to demonstrate, at the injunction stage, that the assets sought to be frozen belong to the defendant. In this regard, Mr Mok SC relied on Dadourian Group International Inc v. Azuri Ltd [2005] EWHC 1768 (Ch) (Westlaw Transcript 2005 WL 1686886), where Deputy Judge Edward Bartley Jones QC, held (at p.6 of the transcript):-

‘For my part, I do not believe it is necessary to establish beneficial ownership in a strict trust law sense. Clearly, if assets are held on a bare trust then the Chabra jurisdiction can be exercised. But, in my judgment, even if the relevant defendant to the substantive claim has no legal or equitable right to the assets in question (in the strict trust law sense) the Chabra jurisdiction can still be exercised if the defendant has some right in respect of, or control over, or other rights of access to, the assets. The important issue, to my mind, is substantive control. The view expressed in Gee on Commercial Injunctions 5^th Edition 2004 at 13.007 is that if a network of trusts and companies has been set up by a defendant to hold assets over which that defendant has control and that this has, apparently, been done to make himself judgment-proof, then such would be an appropriate case for the granting of freezing relief against a relevant non-party. I agree. What needs to be considered is the substantive reality of control, not a strict trust law analysis as to whether the third party is a bare trustee. Thus, in my judgment, placing assets in a discretionary trust would not prevent the Chabra jurisdiction being exercised against that discretionary trust if the substantive reality were that the relevant defendant controlled the exercise of the discretionary trust. Any other analysis would entirely defeat the ability of the English courts to take drastic action and would allow the court’s orders to be evaded by manipulations, entirely contrary to the court’s powers and duties as identified by Robert Walker J in International Credit and Investment Co (Overseas) Limited v Adham (above). Whether this be described as identifying the discretionary trust as a ‘sham’, as piercing the corporate veil, or as seeking to identify a controlled discretionary trust as a bare trust does not, to my mind, particularly matter. Certainly, at the interim stage, all that matters is to ascertain whether there is good reason to suppose that the relevant defendant controlled the assets in the discretionary trust.’ (Emphasis added)

31. So, a Mareva injunction may be granted over assets where it is shown that there is good reason to suppose as against a non-party that the assets of or held by the non-party would be susceptible to a procedure which would lead to satisfaction of a judgment. Whether that ultimately proves to be the case, for example on the basis that a trust is to be disregarded as a sham, or by reason of a lifting of the corporate veil, or as a bare trust for the benefit of the defendant, is a separate issue to be determined at a later stage, either on a preliminary issue or at trial or in the process of execution.

32. For present purposes, therefore, I approach the plaintiff’s application by asking whether he has shown that there is good reason to suppose the assets of the Trust are assets which would be susceptible to a procedure which would lead to satisfaction of a judgment in his favour.

33. In this regard, however, where the grant of a Mareva injunction is sought to restrain the disposal or removal of assets held by third parties it must be shown that the person against whom judgment may be obtained has some right in respect of, or control over, or other access, direct or indirect, to the relevant assets so that they or the proceeds of their sale or other disposition could be required to be applied in discharge of the judgment debt. It is not sufficient to show that the person sought to be enjoined might be persuaded to make the assets available: Winter v. Marac Australia Ltd (1986) 6 NSWLR 11 at 12G-13B.”

(emphasis added)

47.  For the reasons set out in Section D3 above, I am satisfied the Plaintiff has a good arguable case that although the Diva Property has been registered under the name of the Defendant’s daughter, the transaction under the purported sale and purchase agreement dated 5 July 2021 and the assignment dated 17 August 2021 was merely a sham, and thus the beneficial ownership of the Diva Property is still vested in the Defendant.

48.  Accordingly, the interest in the Diva Property should be subject to the Mareva injunction granted by the court.

E.  Conclusion and Disposition

49.  For all the above reasons, I order that Mareva injunction granted by Keith Yeung J on 31 January 2022 be continued until trial or further order.

50.  As regards costs, I order that:-

(1)  the costs in respect of the Plaintiff’s application for the Mareva injunction be to the Plaintiff in the cause; and

(2)  the costs arising from the Defendant’s opposition to the Plaintiff’s application for continuing the Mareva injunction (including the costs in respect of the present hearing, the Defendant’s affirmation in opposition and the Plaintiff’s affirmation in reply) be paid by the Defendant to the Plaintiff, to be summarily assessed by this court on paper.

51.  The Plaintiff should file her statement of costs within 7 days, and the Defendant should file her statement in opposition within 7 days thereafter.

52.  I thank Ms Angel Wong and Ms Rachel Chiu for their helpful assistance.

Dated 10 June 2025

Ms Angel H Y Wong, instructed by M/s Zhang Lawyers, for the Plaintiff

Ms Rachel Chiu, instructed by M/s Patrick Mak & Tse, for the 1^st and 2^nd Defendants

HCA 452/2018

[2020] HKCFI 1388

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO 452 OF 2018

________________________

________________________

_________________________________

DECISION

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INTRODUCTION

1.  By her summons filed on 9 December 2019, the Defendant applies to stay the present action on the ground of forum non conveniens. 

PLAINTIFF’S CLAIM

2.  According to the Plaintiff, she has at all material times been a permanent resident of Hong Kong.  The Defendant is a participant in the Capital Investment Entrant Scheme in Hong Kong since 2013.  The Defendant was introduced to the Plaintiff by a mutual friend named Zheng Qing Yuan in Fujian. 

3.  The Plaintiff claims that in early May 2014, the Defendant orally requested the Plaintiff to advance a sum of RMB2,000,000.00 and in the latter half of that month, the Defendant requested RMB2,000,000.00 more from the Plaintiff.  The two sums, in the total amount of RMB4,000,000, shall be referred to as the “Loan Amount” here. According to the Plaintiff, eventually they orally agreed to the following terms (the “Loan Agreement”): -

(1)  RMB3,930,000.00 of the Loan Amount would be transferred to the Plaintiff’s bank account(s) to the Defendant’s daughter (Zhang Lingya)’s bank account maintained with the Qingyan branch of Fujian Jinjiang Rural Commercial Bank (“Zhang Lingya’s Account”). 

(2)  The remaining balance of RMB70,000.00 would be deducted from the interests accumulated from the first month of repayment. 

(3)  The Defendant was to pay to the Plaintiff’s a monthly interest at a rate of 3%, that is, RMB120,000 per month. 

(4)  After the expiry of 6 months, the Plaintiff can demand the Defendant to begin repayment of the principal amount of the Loan Amount. 

4.  On 14 and 27 May 2014, the Plaintiff transferred RMB1,930,000.00 and RMB2,000,000 respectively to Zhang Lingya’s Account, evidenced by the transmission slips exhibited to the Plaintiff’s affirmation in opposition to the Defendant’s summons.  Further, while the interest for the first month should be RMB120,000, only RMB50,000 was paid, because RMB70,000 was deducted as the remaining balance of the Loan Amount.

5.  On 15 July 2014, the Defendant signed an acknowledgement of receipt of the loan which contained the Defendant’s finger prints.  This acknowledgment of receipt is also exhibited to the Plaintiff’s affirmation in opposition. 

6.  According to the Plaintiff, the Defendant did make monthly deposits to the Plaintiff from May 2014 until December 2014.  Around December 2014, the Plaintiff met the Defendant at the Plaintiff’s office in Fujian, and orally requested the Defendant to begin repayment of the principal amount of the Loan Amount. However, from January 2015 onwards, the Defendant defaulted in repayment. Despite the Plaintiff’s repeated demands, the Defendant has still failed to repay.

7.  Thus, the Plaintiff issued and served the Writ of Summons herein on or around 26 February 2018 on the Defendant in Hong Kong.  In other words, the present action is brought in Hong Kong as of right and the Court’s jurisdiction should not be disturbed lightly: see Hong Kong Civil Procedure 2020 Vol 1 at paragraph 11/1/10A.

DEFENDANT’S CASE

8.  The Defendant’s defence, as appears from the evidence, is a bare denial.  The Defendant has not explained the transmission slips evidencing the transfers of RMB3,930,000 from the Plaintiff to Zhang Lingya’s Account and the acknowledgement receipt dated 15 July 2014 with the Defendant’s fingerprint thereon.  At the hearing, the Defendant’s Counsel accepted that there were indeed such transfers of money, but she denied the existence of the Loan Agreement.  While I am not to examine the merits of the defence, it is trite that I have to know the nature of the defence so as to determine the issues as between the parties and with reference to the issues, whether the Hong Kong forum or the foreign forum is more appropriate. 

FORUM NON CONVENIENS

9.  The Defendant’s submissions are in essence that because according to the Plaintiff, the Plaintiff and the Defendant and the witnesses (notably Zheng Qing Yuan and Zhang Lingya) who may have the knowledge of the existence or non-existence of the Loan Agreement are resident in Fujian, the Loan Amount was in RMB, the Loan Amount was transferred in Fujian, and the demands for repayments were made in Fujian, Fujian Quanzhou Intermediate People’s Court or any Fujian People’s Court is clearly and distinctly more appropriate than Hong Kong. 

10.  First, I note that the Defendant’s Summons for the present application does not state which alternative forum to be the more appropriate forum.  This per se may be a ground for dismissing the application: see for example Wong Chi Hung v郭國基, DCPI 1897/2012, 2 May 2013 at paragraph 5.  That said, in her reply affirmation (unsworn due to the quarantine measures to contain COVID-19) exhibited to a reply affirmation sworn by the Defendant’s solicitor filed on 16 March 2020, the Defendant identified Fujian Quanzhou Intermediate People’s Court or any other appropriate People’s Court in Fujian as the alternative forum.  As the Plaintiff only raises that it is doubtful whether the defect in the summons could be remedied by stating the alternative forum in the reply affirmation but does not press for striking out the summons in limine, I am prepared to proceed to consider the application itself.

11.  As mentioned above, the Defendant’s main contention is that all the subject matters and the witnesses are in Fujian.  There is, however, no suggestion for any inconvenience to adduce the documentary evidence (like the transmissions slips and the acknowledgment receipt) in Hong Kong.  The Defendant alleges inconvenience in relation to the witnesses all of whom are resident in Fujian.  This, in my view, is unreal.  I only need to refer to Hong Kong Civil Procedure 2020 Vol 1 paragraph 11/1/11, citing all those cases where the Court has consistently held in essence that in general, that the witnesses are in mainland China itself cannot be a good reason in support of an application to stay on forum non conveniens.  Even if the COVID-19 measures currently in place would continue to prevent the relevant witnesses from coming to Hong Kong to attend the trial, taking evidence by video-conferencing facilities is not uncommon now and there is no suggestion before me that taking evidence this way would cause any inconvenience. 

CONCLUSION

12.  In the circumstances, I am not satisfied that Fujian Quanzhou Intermediate People’s Court or any Fujian People’s Court is clearly and distinctly more appropriate than Hong Kong.  I thus dismiss the Defendant’s Summons. 

[submissions on costs]

13.  Having heard counsel’s submissions, I order that costs of this application be to the Plaintiff with certificate for counsel, to be summarily assessed. 

Ms Angel H Y Wong, instructed by Zhang Lawyers, for the plaintiff

Ms Rachel Chiu, instructed by Patrick Mak & Tse, for the defendant