康繼興 對 康夢

HCA 782/2018

[2018] HKCFI 1888

香港特別行政區

高等法院原訟法庭

民事司法管轄權

案件編號2018年第782號

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HCAP 15/2018

[2018] HKCFI 1888

香港特別行政區

高等法院原訟法庭

遺囑認證訴訟2018年第15號

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(一併處理)

裁定書

1.  原告人康繼興先生要求法庭在HCA 782/2018號案，對被告人康夢女士頒布臨時禁制令，並在HCAP 15/2018號案，委任康先生本人為趙立蓉女士的遺產的「訴訟代決期間的遺產管理人」（下稱“臨時管理人”）。

2.  康女士是康先生和趙立蓉女士（下稱“趙女士”）的獨生女。趙女士已在2017年8月15日離世，她的遺產有些現金和兩個單位，一個單位是銅鑼灣高威樓5C（下稱“高威樓5C”），這單位是她與康先生以聯權共有方式擁有，康先生現居於這單位。另一個單位是銅鑼灣灣景樓13A3（下稱“灣景樓13A3”），這單位是趙女士個人名下的，現時是出租了給租客。

3.  康女士出示了一份趙女士在2013年9月28日立的遺囑（下稱“遺囑”）。趙女士在遺囑說把上述兩單位都留給康女士，她在遺囑更說兩個單位都是她百份之一百擁有，康先生未就這兩單位付過分文。

4.  康女士在2017年9月14日委託律師樓辦理這遺囑的認證。康先生更在2017年12月5日在康女士陪同下到該律師樓簽訂了「放棄遺產認證權契約」（下稱“放棄的契約”），但康先生後來說，他是在被康女士誤導下才簽訂這契約，他更指遺囑並非趙女士做的，而是康女士偽造的。

5.  因為康先生的投訴，該律師樓已不再為康女士辦理這遺囑的認證，康女士在2018年2月21日由一位大律師方也方女士陪同下，親自到高等法院的遺產承辦處辦理遺囑認證（方大律師後來曾在這些訴訟代表康先生）。

HCAP 15/2018和HCA 782/2018訴訟及康先生在這兩案的非正審申請

6.  康先生在2018年4月6日向康女士開展編號HCAP 15/2018的遺產認證訴訟，要求法庭宣判遺囑並非趙女士的遺囑，並要求法庭頒給他趙女士遺產的「遺產管理書」，他同時還要求法庭宣布他是灣景樓13A3的全權實益擁有者。

7.  康先生又在2018年4月9日在這案向康女士發出非正審傳票，要求法庭在這案的正審前，頒發一系列臨時命令，但他在2018年7月18日存檔另一份非正審傳票，要求法庭批準他修改前一張傳票，將所申請的多項命令減為三項。本席在2018年7月24日的聆訊接受了第二張傳票的要求，將第一張傳票申請的命令減為三項。這三項申請的命令是：

(1)  法庭按《遺囑認證及遺產管理條例》（下稱“遺囑認證條例”）第40條，委任康先生或其他合適人士，作為趙女士遺產的臨時管理人；

(2)  任何其他法庭認為合適的命令和指示，以保存趙女士的遺產和給趙女士遺產管理提供保障；和

(3)  這非正審申請的訟費。

8.  康先生在2018年4月6日更向康女士開展編號HCA 782/2018的高等法院民事訴訟案，向法庭申請一系列針對康女士及其代理人和家人的禁制令。

9.  康先生又在2018年4月9日在這案向康女士發出非正審傳票，要求法庭在這案正審前，以臨時命令方式頒發他在這案申請的所有禁制令，但曾經代表他的方也方大律師，在2018年7月18日發了一封電郵給代表康女士的律師，說康先生在7月24日的聆訊時，只會向法庭要求三項臨時禁制令。康先生在7月24日的聆訊時也向本席確認他只要求非正審傳票中的三項命令，該三項命令是：

(1)  禁止康女士及其代理人和家人進入高威樓5C或任何康先生擁有、居住或停留的物業；

(2)  禁止康女士及其代理人和家人出現在康先生所在的地方的三十米範圍內，或以任何方式騷擾康先生；和

(3)  禁止康女士及其代理人和家人向任何人披露，說康先生是年邁、精神不健全、有自殺傾向或任何可損及康先生的病患。

10.  康先生就這兩項申請，存檔了12份他自己做的誓章和7份中英文的陳詞。康女士和她的多位證人也存檔了14份誓章，但有多份誓章只是採納其他誓章的內容。

HCA 782/2018號訴訟的非正審申請的討論和裁定

11.  康先生的第一項申請，是要求法庭頒發臨時禁制令，禁止康女士及其代理人和家人進入高威樓5C或其他康先生擁有、居住或停留的物業。康女士在2018年4月28日存檔的誓章第84段，說趙女士自從購入該單位後，便已把鑰匙及信箱鎖匙交了給她，她從前回港也是住在該單位，並一向可自由出入該單位，她的香港銀行月結單，也是寄到這個地址，而她也是負責繳付這單位的費用，和從這單位的信箱收信的。但自從康先生在2018年3月24日說不准她進入該單位，然後在該單位的鐵閘鎖上了鐵鏈，她便沒有再進入該單位。

12.  康先生在2018年4月26日後存檔了多份誓章，但都沒有說康女士或她的代理人或家人有進入過該單位。

13.  至於灣景樓13A3，這單位從契約上看是趙女士個人擁有的，所以不算是康先生的物業，但就算按康先生所稱說他是這單位的實益擁有者，這單位也是由租客居住，康女士不能進入。除了這兩個單位，康先生沒有指稱他在香港還擁有其他物業。

14.  基於康女士在誓章所述，和康先生沒有說康女士在2018年3月24再後有再進入高威樓5C，本席認為沒有需要頒發這一項臨時禁制令。

15.  康先生的第二項申請有兩部份。第一部份，是要法庭禁止康女士和她的代理人和家人，出現在康先生所在地方的三十米範圍內；第二部份，是要禁止他們以任何方式騷擾康先生。

16.  本席不能頒給康先生這申請的第一部份，因為康先生是可以自由走動到香港各處，他的所在地的三十米範圍，也是隨著他的走動而變更，但康女士和她的代理人和家人，是不可能隨著康先生的走動而迴避他，所以本席不會接受康先生的第二項申請的第一部份。

17.  至於這申請的第二部份，是要禁止康女士和她的代理人和家人騷擾康先生。康先生在2018年4月26日後存檔的誓章，唯一的指控是說康女士曾指示送飲用水到高威樓5C的公司，要得到康女士或她的丈夫的指示，才可送飲用水到5C。康女士解釋說，因康先生整個5月都不在5C單位，但飲用水公司卻跟往常一樣送水到5C門外，導致盛了水的水桶堆積門外，被管理處投訴，所以康女士才要求送水公司要收到她的指示才好送水。本席認為這是因誤會而起的爭端，若康先生不願意經由康女士來聯絡飲用水公司，他自己大可以在該公司以自己的名字開設戶口。

18.  至於之前裝置於高威樓5C的攝錄機，已被康女士拆除了，所以本席不認為有需要接受這部份的申請。

19.  至於康先生的第三項申請，是要求法庭禁止康女士及其代理人和家人，向任何人披露說康先生是精神不健全和有自殺傾向等。康先生在誓章中指康女士曾向律敦治醫院的醫護人員，說他神經不正常和有自殺傾向。但他呈堂的醫療報告，只說康女士曾告訴醫護人員，說康先生在知道趙女士在遺囑內把兩個單位都留了給康女士後，便變得激動，而在趙女士離世後，他變得更情緒化和易怒，而康女士也寧願康先生可以在精神科接受醫治。經醫護人員初部診斷康先生後，認為他可能有適應障礙和模糊的自殺構想，因此他可能有妄想症，所以建議要他接受精神問題的處理。但這些都只是醫務人員曾經有的初部印象，並非康女士對醫務人員說的。既然康女士沒有說過康先生精神有問題或有自殺傾向，所以康先生對康女士提出這指控是沒有證據為基礎，因此，本席不接受康先生這第三項的申請。

HCAP 15/2018號訴訟的非正審申請的討論和裁定

20.  康先生在這案的申請，主要是要求法庭委任他或他建議的會計師，作為臨時管理人，並頒發法庭認為合適的命令，以保存趙女士的遺產。

21.  代表康女士的陳大律師陳詞說委任康先生作為臨時管理人是不合適。首先，康先生是在HCAP 15/2018號案，要求法庭宣報遺囑無效，又在HCA 1238/2018號案，要求法庭宣報趙女士個人名下的灣景樓13A3是他個人實權擁有的，所以他的利益與趙女士遺產的利益是對立的，因此，不應讓他做這遺產的臨時管理人。

22.  此外，本席也需指出康先生現年已85歲，他的聽力也有問題，在法庭聆訊他的申請時，他是需要用助聽器，才能參與聆訊。

23.  再者，本席在呈堂的文件中，覺察到康先生有可能是被方也方大律師在幕後影響的。康女士也把方大律師與康先生在2018年3月11日對話錄音的謄本呈堂，謄本顯示康先生曾說遺囑「絕對是唯一的遺囑 他們可以拿去做檢驗」，但方大律師卻對康先生說「不敢做 沒有人敢做 誰敢說是真的？你不反對就是真的 你反對就是假的 明白了吧 就看你反不反對…」(C1-194頁)。方大律師也是康先生新近訂立的遺囑的唯一受益人。

24.  再者，雖然方大律師已在2018年7月18日以電郵通知了代表康女士的律師行，說康先生在2018年7月24日的聆訊，會親自行事，而康先生在2018年7月24日也把「擬親自行事通知書」親自交給了本席。但在2018月7月24日和7月31日的聆訊中，康先生對本席所有的提問，都是在得到方大律師的指示後才回答，而康先生是沒有透過事務律師聘請方大律師來協助他的，當時也沒有任何被康先生聘請的事務律師在場，這顯示康先生當時是獲得方大律師以違規方式提供協助，這是很不理想的。

25.  雖然康先生在7月24日親自交了「擬親自行事通知書」給本席，而報稱的地址是高威樓5C，但他在7月30日又存檔另一份「擬親自行事通知書」，但報稱的地址，卻是方大律師的辦事處。本席在7月31日的聆訊曾作出指示，要所有送給康先生的文件，都要寄到高威樓5C給他，直至他有律師樓存檔通知書入法庭，正式在本案代表他為止，但他後來還寄英文信函給法庭，投訴代表康女士的律師樓，沒有把送給他的文件寄到方大律師的地址。而且方大律師的秘書，也是現在協助康先生的秘書或助理。

26.  方大律師也曾對醫管局的醫護人員說，她非常懷疑康女士出示的遺囑是偽造的 (C1-39頁)。這立場與康先生的立場一致，但康先生除了在誓章和書面陳詞指遺囑是偽造，沒有提出任何證據，以質疑遺囑的真確性。他在書面陳詞說他已請了專家做鑒定，而初步已鑒定這遺囑是偽造，但他沒有把初步鑒定報告呈堂，也沒有透露他聘請的專家是誰。

27.  上述種種跡象，都顯示康大律師是直接指導康先生怎樣處理這案件，而指導的程度，似乎已超出了大律師據案程來給予法律意見的界限。

28.  另一點，就是本席在上文提到康先生曾簽訂一份放棄契約，雖然康先生指這契約是無效，但他的說法尚未被法庭認可，而這契約也未按《遺囑認證條例》第31條以法院命令取消。雖然陳大律師說康女士在反對這申請時，是不會引用放棄契約的效力，但本席不能忽視這契約表面上是仍然有效的。

29.  在另一方面，康女士存檔了馬楠先生的誓章，馬先生是趙女士訂立遺囑時的人證，他在誓章更指出當趙女士立這遺囑時，方大律師是在場的。

30.  康女士更提出馬先生在2013年10月29日以電郵把遺囑傳送給她的證據，和國內的筆跡專家的意見書，以證明遺囑是真確的。

31.  康先生在2018年5月25日存檔的第四份誓章第28段回應說馬先生是騙子，是壞人，他更說大概在2017年底，他聽到康女士在電話跟別人承認在趙女士離世後，她需支付HK$20萬給先生，以拿取一份馬先生做的假遺囑，若馬先生之後要做証人，她就要把所得的遺產的30%給馬先生。

32.  康先生這指控的性質非常嚴重，若確有其事，他應該在2018年4月6日存檔的申索陳述書，4月9日存檔的經修正的申索陳述書，和4月6日的誓章提出這事，以支持他在本案的申索，但他沒有這樣做，而只是在康女士存檔了馬先生的誓章，他才做出這指控，所以這指控是被質疑的。再者，馬先生的誓章是有2013年10月29日的電郵作支持。

33.  基於上述的種種事實，本席認為康先生尚未能證明他的偽造遺囑指控，是一個需審訊的認真問題，而在上述的種種情況下，本席認為委任康先生作為趙女士遺產的臨時管理人，並非合理或恰當做法。

34.  雖然康先生尚未能證明偽造遺囑的指控，是一個需審訊的認真問題，但按《無遺囑者遺產條例》第4條（3）款規定，他仍享有趙女士遺產內的非土地實產的絕對權益，並且在剩餘遺產扣除死亡稅和費用後，可先取得HK$500,000淨款額和其利息，及餘下遺產的一半。

35.  至於康先生指法庭可以委任收費的會計師，作臨時管理人。陳大律師陳詞說，趙女士的遺產在支付趙女士的部份殮葬費後，現金只餘約HK$395,000，若聘用時薪HK$2,000的會計師作臨時管理人，是不成比例。

36.  本席認為現時需要臨時管理人處理的事情，是要向林財能追討HK$395,000的欠款和利息，並處理康先生在HCAP 15/2018和HCA 1238/2018兩宗案件就灣景樓13A3的申索。至於向灣景樓13A3租客收租的事宜，已按暫委法官楊家雄資深大律師在2018年6月29日頒的命令，由代表康女士的律師事務所處理。鑒於要由臨時管理人處理的事情不多，而訴訟的工作主要都是由律師代為處理，所以沒有足夠理據要委任時薪HK$2,000的會計師，作為臨時管理人。

37.  陳大律師又指康女士也是趙女士遺產的受益人，她的利益與遺產的利益是一致的，所以若由她作為遺產的代表人，她是會不偏不倚地執行代表人的權利和責任。

38.  但康先生反對由康女士做臨時管理人。他指康女士已從趙女士的遺產盜取了百萬元以上，但他沒有提出任何證據以支持這指控。康女士則在申領遺囑認證時，在誓章說明趙女士各個銀行戶口的存款額，這些數額會由遺產承辦人核實。康先生還質疑康女士在2017年9月後處理遺產認證時，從遺產中支付了一萬多元律師費。但本席同意遺產認證所需費用，最終是可以從遺產中支付的。

39.  再者，康女士現時只從趙女士的銀行戶口提取了HK$40,000，但用作趙女士殮葬的費用，應多於HK$40,000，雖然，康女士沒有按《遺囑認證條例》第60B條，向民政事務局局長申請從趙女士的戶口提取這HK$40,000，但當時雙方未有糾紛，康女士也未有聘請律師，所以單憑這一點，不足以顯示康女士是缺乏誠信。

40.  康先生又指康女士侵吞了灣景樓的租金，但按趙女士的遺囑，灣景樓13A3是留給康女士的，所以租金也應屬她所有，不過因康先生提出訴訟，所以從2018年5月起的租金，便會存入法庭。

41.  康先生又指已存入法庭的租金到8月2日為止，尚欠HK$30,015，但代表康女士的律師，在致法庭的信函指出，欠款是因租客未有付足3個月的租金，而當租客從外地回港後，便會補足欠數，本席接受這解釋。

42.  康先生又指康女士曾盜取趙女士保險箱的物品，但他只是提出口頭指控，沒有提出任何證據。而康女士也指出所有趙女士遺產的資產，已填報在遺產認證申請表格內，這表格也是由後來協助康先生處理這些訴訟的方大律師代她填寫的。

43.  康先生在誓章和陳詞指康女士曾偷他的東西，並被警方拘捕。但康女士否認這些指控，並說她沒有被警方拘捕，本席不會懷疑康女士這說法，因被警方拘捕，是有警方記錄的。

44.  康女士原本任職於美國一家Dimo Corporation為高級項目經理，該公司是經營航空用的材料和組件(C1-246頁)，她是因為趙女士離世，要回港照顧康先生，所以離開這職位。雖然現在康先生與康女士不和，康先生不願意被康女士照顧，但以康女士曾擔任的職位，她應該有能力承擔臨時管理人的責任。

45.  本席在考慮過雙方提出的理據和論點後，認為有需要委任臨時管理人，因為要追討林財能欠趙女士的HK$395,000和利息，追收這欠款對康先生的利益有很大的影響。臨時管理人也要處理康先生對灣景樓13A3的申索。本席在上文已解釋過為何不應委任康先生或收費的會計師，作為臨時管理人。本席認為康女士是臨時管理人的適當人選，所以現在委任她為趙女士遺產的臨時管理人。

46.  為要行使法庭在《遺產認證條例》第40(3)條對臨時管理人的管轄權，本席現指示康女士要在2018年11月15日或之前存檔一份報告，說明康女士從現在至撰寫該報告時，以臨時管理人身份為趙女士的遺產所做的事項，並需在報告中呈遞各銀行在緊接著2017年8月15日趙女士離世後，就趙女士的戶口所發出的一期的月結單。若康女士在趙女士離世後曾在趙女士的戶口提取過款項，也需在這報告內交代。

47.  本席理解本案雙方對高威樓5C的業權和實益擁有權也有爭議，本席建議雙方應將這爭議與灣景樓13A3的爭議，一併解決。

臨時訟費令

48.  最後，本席就這兩項非正審申請所涉的訟費責任，作出臨時訟費令，就是把這訟費責任留待將來處理。

HCA 782/2018 &

HCAP 15/2018

[2018] HKCFI 1643

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

HIGH COURT ACTION NO 782 OF 2018

____________

____________

AND

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

PROBATE ACTION NO 15 OF 2018

____________

____________

(Heard Together)

______________________________________

R E A S O N S   F O R   D E C I S I O N

______________________________________

Introduction

1.  The deceased passed away in August 2017 (“the deceased”).  The plaintiff in both HCA 782/2018 (“A782”) and HCAP 15/2018 (“AP15”) (collectively “the succession actions”) is the deceased’s husband whereas the defendant in the succession actions is her daughter.

2.  For present purposes, the most valuable assets in the deceased’s estate are:

(a)  a residential unit at Causeway Tower, Causeway Bay (“the Causeway Tower unit”);

(b)  a residential unit at Bayview Mansion, Causeway Bay (“the Bayview unit”);

(c)  a residential unit in Beijing (“the Beijing unit”).

3.  The succession actions were commenced on 6 April 2018.  According to the amended statement of claim:

(1)  A782 is in essence a complaint that the defendant has tortuously (a) trespassed upon the plaintiff’s personal properties and the ownership certificate of the Beijing unit (by depriving him of access to the Causeway Tower unit), (b) caused nuisance to the plaintiff (by putting him under video surveillance, recording his conversation, redirecting his telephone, acting rudely against him, causing him to be detained by the hospital and making false accusations to the police against him);

(2)  AP15 is in essence a complaint that, by using a forged, or invalid, will purportedly dated 28 September 2013, the defendant intended to deprive the plaintiff of the Bayview unit and Causeway Tower unit (both of which the plaintiff is the sole beneficial owner).

The applications for interim order

4.  Further, in each of the succession actions, the plaintiff has taken out an application for various interlocutory relief (collectively “the interlocutory applications”).

5.  In summary, in A782, the plaintiff sought an interlocutory injunction preventing the defendant from (a) entering or dealing with the Causeway Tower unit, (b) continuing the wrongful acts summarized in para 3(1) above, (c) harassing the plaintiff, or being close to him for less than 30 meters, (d) applying for the plaintiff’s guardianship, and (e) harassing the plaintiff’s agent or lawyer.

6.  In relation to AP15, the plaintiff sought an interlocutory injunction (1) preventing the defendant from collecting rent from the tenant of the Bayview unit (together with related interlocutory relief), (2) compelling the defendant to disclose various matters such as the items in the deceased’s safe deposit box, funds from the deceased’s bank accounts (together with related interlocutory relief), and (3) compelling the defendant to disclose files and documents (very likely to be referring to law firm files and documents) relating to (a) her application for a grant of representation and (b) the deceased’s estate.

7.  Shortly into the hearing of the interlocutory applications, the plaintiff also sought interim orders (pending the determination of the interlocutory applications) and clarified that the application for interim relief was limited to several aspects only.  For this purpose, the plaintiff has helpfully provided a draft order for use in the interim order application in A782.  In addition, the plaintiff also said that the interim order sought was limited to the following parts of the draft interim order; namely, para (a) (interim injunction relating to the Causeway Tower unit), (d) (interim injunction against personal harassment), (e) (interim injunction order against disseminating false information about the plaintiff’s mental state), (i) (interim injunction compelling the defendant to deliver up documents concerning the Beijing unit) and (j) (interim injunction against the defendant dealing with the plaintiff’s properties) thereof only.

8.  The plaintiff disclosed during the hearing he was residing either with his friends or with plaintiff’s counsel.  Such being the case, he was not totally deprived of a place to stay; there was thus insufficient urgency to justify an interim order concerning para (a) of the draft order.

9.  The defendant was willing to, and did, offer an undertaking to the court along the lines of para (d) and (j) of the draft order.  Such being the case, I did not consider it necessary for an order to be made.

10.  In relation to para (e) and (i) of the draft order, the defendant denied (in an affirmation filed on 26 April 2018) having disseminated false information, or having taken any of the documents.  The denial has not been refuted by the plaintiff’s evidence.  Such being the case, no order could properly be made at a stage where the defendant’s affirmation could not be rejected outright (especially where there was no proper evidence the plaintiff would suffer irreparable prejudice as a result).  I refused this part of the draft order.

11.  In relation to the interim application in AP15, the plaintiff sought the following relief:

(a)  appointing an administrator for collecting rent from the tenant of the Bayview unit;

(b)  alternatively, the defendant was to pay into court the rent she collected from the said tenant.

12.  The urgency which allegedly should justify an interim order was said to be a risk of the defendant dissipating the rent she had collected from the said tenant.  There is, however, no evidence in support of such allegation.  All that the plaintiff could put forth was that the defendant had earlier been arrested by the police.  But as the defence correctly pointed out, the defendant had not even been charged with any offence.

13.  After considered the above, I concluded that there was insufficient urgency to warrant an interim order to be made; the application for the same was accordingly declined.

14.  Subsequent events seem to lend support to the conclusion that there was insufficient evidence the rents collected would be dissipated.  The interim application in AP15 was later heard:

(1)  on 21 June 2018;

(2)  on 29 June 2018.

I understand from the court records that the parties reached agreement on 29 June 2018 that the rents collected were to be paid into court, and a consent order to such effect was made accordingly.

15.  In a letter dated 9 May 2018 from plaintiff counsel to the court, plaintiff counsel asserted (among other things) in effect that the court had misunderstood (or had been misled into thinking) that a personal representative had already been appointed to represent the deceased’s estate.

16.  No reason has been given for the above assertion.  Brief extemporary reasons (along the line summarized in para 13 above) have been given for declining the application for an interim order.  In view of the respective arguments put forth by the parties (summarized in para 12 above), there could not have been any misunderstanding (or misleading submissions).  There is simply no merit in the assertion.

Background

17.  As will be made clearer under “Other matters” (especially para 25 to 27 below), there is a need to mention briefly the history which leads to the succession actions.

18.  Bearing in mind defence counsel was only briefed to appear in the interlocutory applications on very short notice, the defence has, with admirable speed, prepared and filed a relatively detailed affirmation which sets out the parties’ relationship.  The gist of the relevant background is based on the affirmations, and is set out below.  For convenience, the plaintiff, the deceased and the defendant will be referred to as “the family” below.

19.  The family moved from Beijing to Hong Kong in 1981.  Since then, the defendant became a piano tuition teacher, and a freelance piano player.

20.  It does not appear to be disputed that, after the family moved to Hong Kong, the deceased succeeded in adapting to what must have been quite a dramatic change; she became a practising dentist.

21.  The plaintiff’s position is in dispute.  The defendant deposed that he seemed not well suited to life outside of the Mainland, and had not been able to find satisfactory employment; he became irritable and indulged in gambling and speculation.

22.  The plaintiff, on the other hand, deposed that he had been gainfully employed (although he also deposed that he was already in his fifties when he moved to Hong Kong and he retired when he was about 60 years old).  He also deposed that he paid for most (if not all) of the purchase money for acquiring the properties.

23.  What has not been disputed by way of evidence (or indeed during the hearing) was the lengthy period of plaintiff counsel’s involvement in the family’s affairs:

(1)  plaintiff counsel became acquainted with the family since 2013 (about 4 years before the deceased passed away);

(2)  towards the end of 2015, plaintiff counsel and the deceased had a row over the defendant’s children;

(3)  there has been frequent communication between plaintiff counsel and the defendant since December 2017 about the grant of representation;

(4)  the defendant sought, and obtained, advice from plaintiff counsel in February 2018.  Plaintiff counsel arranged the defendant to consult a law firm in February 2018;

(5)  plaintiff counsel was involved in a meeting in March 2018 for discussing the deceased’s estate.  The defendant alleged that plaintiff counsel were in disagreement with her about this matter;

(6)  the defendant found out there had been frequent communication in March 2018 between the plaintiff and plaintiff counsel about the plaintiff’s personal matters.

There was (at the very least) a hint in the defendant’s affirmation that plaintiff counsel might have been behind the plaintiff in the parties’ dispute concerning the deceased’s estate, even before the commencement of the succession actions.

Conclusion

24.  The interim order applications were refused.

Other matters

25.  The relevant parts of the Code of Conduct of the Hong Kong Bar Association provide:

“A practising barrister must not accept any instructions if to do so would cause him to be professionally embarrassed. For this purpose, a barrister will be professionally embarrassed :-

…

(d) if the matter is one in which he knows or has reasonable grounds to believe that there is a real possibility that he may cease to be a solely disinterested advocate by becoming also a witness in the case;

(e) if the matter is one in which by reason of any connection with the client it will be difficult for him to maintain professional independence …;

…

(g) if there is or appears to be a conflict or risk of conflict either between the interests of the barrister and some other person or between the interests of any one or more clients …;

(h) if he has material information which was entrusted to him in confidence by or on behalf of another client or former client or there is a significant risk that information confidential to another client or former client might be communicated to or used for the benefit of anyone other than that client or former client … ”

(para 6.2 thereof) (emphasis supplied)

26.  According to the defence affirmation (see para 23 above);

(a)  plaintiff counsel has been acquainted with the family for quite some time before the commencement of the succession actions;

(b)  plaintiff counsel has had information regarding the affairs of the family (personal and/or financial) which normally would not be available (or known) to ordinary acquaintances;

(c)  plaintiff counsel has at some stage been assisting the defendant as regards the deceased’s estate (such as introducing the defendant to a law firm, and accompanying the defendant to go to the probate registry);

(d)  parts of the defence affirmation can be understood to hint at the plaintiff’s mind being easily swayed by some of the people around him (including plaintiff counsel) due to his old age.

27.  By virtue of the above matters, one or more of the sub-paragraphs in para 6.2, Code of Conduct may be applicable (see also para 23, “Bar Free Legal Services Scheme”).  Because a barrister allocated by the “Bar Free Legal Services Scheme” does not need to act through solicitors (or other qualified professionals) (para 21, “Bar Fee Legal Service Scheme” website; letter dated 20 April 2018 from the Hong Kong Bar Association), para 6.2, Code of Conduct should be applied with even more vigour.

28.  Plaintiff counsel is of considerable seniority (having been admitted to practise in 1994) and should be well aware of the matters mentioned in para 25 to 27 above.  In case the above matters might somehow have escaped her earlier attention, hopefully the above paragraphs would serve as a reminder for her to reconsider her position.

29.  Working on the assumption that plaintiff counsel has already done so, the court does not see an immediate need to alert the Coordinator of the “Bar Free Legal Services Scheme” of plaintiff counsel’s peculiar position (summarized in para 26 and 27 above).  If plaintiff counsel has in fact already drawn the Coordinator’s attention to the same, the court expects to be informed of this (at least by plaintiff counsel, with copy to the Coordinator; a written confirmation from the Coordinator is of course preferred) in good time (in any event, not less than 3 days before the hearing scheduled for 24 July 2018).

30.  There was also a memorandum of notification of an application for legal aid dated 31 May 2018 filed in the succession actions.

31.  It is at present unknown if the plaintiff would be given assistance by the Director of Legal Aid (and if so, if plaintiff counsel will still be retained thereafter).  If in fact legal assistance is so given, the same expectation as para 29 above will equally apply.

32.  The parties’ written submissions also mentioned various other points.  These have not been expressly set out or dealt with above.  This is so only because of the need to balance between the length of the reasons for decision and its easier comprehension.  It does not mean those other points are thought to be irrelevant (or have been overlooked).  To avoid doubt, those other points have also been considered.