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Constitutional and Administrative Law Proceedings2018

RE LILI LESTARI AND ANOTHER

Related cases with same parties

  • CAMP249/2020LILI LESTARI AND ANOTHER v. MR WILLIAM LAM, ESQ., TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD
  • HCAL240/2016LILI LESTARI AND ANOTHER v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD AND ANOTHER [Decision on Leave Application]

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[2020] HKCFI 2898-EN-2020-12-01

RE LILI LESTARI AND ANOTHER

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HCAL 545/2018

[2020] HKCFI 2898

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST

NO 545 OF 2018

_________________

RE:LILI LESTARI1st Applicant
 EDI SUBAGIO MEILANI SUBAGIO2nd Applicant

_________________

Before:Deputy High Court Judge Bruno Chan in Chambers
Date of Hearing:22 October 2020
Date of Decision:1 December 2020

________________

DECISION

________________

1.  On 30 June 2020 I struck out and dismissed the application of the Applicants (mother and daughter) for leave to apply for judicial review of the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“the Board”) in dismissing their appeal regarding their non-refoulement claim upon finding that it was their second such application after their earlier one against the same decision of the Board had been refused by another court, that the principle of res judicata applied to their second such application, and that it was an abuse of process for them to re-litigate their case by bringing a second judicial review in respect of the same decision of the Board after they failed to obtain leave from the court in their first application.

2.  The Applicants now by a summons issued on 27 July 2020 seek extension of time to appeal against that decision, as the 14-day period for them to file their appeal under Order 53 rule 3(4) of the Rules of High Court, Cap 4A ended on 14 July 2020, and hence they were late by 13 days with their intended appeal. 

3.  In considering whether to extend time for appealing against a decision refusing leave to apply for judicial review, the court shall have regard to (i) the length of the delay; (ii) the reason for the delay; (iii) the prospect of the intended appeal; and (iv) the prejudice to the respondent if an extension of time were granted: see Re MK HCMP 2609/2016, 10 January 2017; Chu On Fong Winter v The Appeal Panel (Housing) HCMP 982/2017, 20 July 2017; Islam Raja Rais v Director of Immigration HCMP 881/2017, 26 June 2017; Re Gurung Min Bahadur[2018] HKCA 226; and Re Saqlain Muhammad[2018] HKCA 346.

4.  In the Applicants’ case, a delay of 13 days may not be considered as insignificant, for which the 1st Applicant explained at the hearing of their summons that they received the decision late when by then they were already out of time, but she was unable to remember exactly when the decision arrived in the mail, nor did she produce any documentary evidence such as the envelop which contained the decision with the post mark showing the date when it was dispatched, and as the court record shows that the decision was actually sent out on the same day by post to the Applicants’ last reported address, I am not satisfied that the Applicants have shown any good reason for their delay.    

5.  More importantly, nor did they put forward any proper or valid draft or proposed grounds of appeal, or any particulars of any error in the decision, or why it may be reasonably argued that the decision was unfair or unreasonable either in their summons or affirmation, and at the hearing the 1st Applicant merely repeated their claim that they cannot return to their home country as their problem is there.  As such and in the absence of any error in the decision being clearly and properly identified by the Applicants, I do not see any prospect of success in their intended appeal.     

6.  In the premises, it would be futile to extend time for what appears to be a hopeless appeal.  Accordingly, I refuse their application for extension of time to appeal, and dismiss their summons.

( Bruno Chan )
Deputy High Court Judge

  

The applicants appeared in person

[2020] HKCFI 1323-EN-2020-06-30

LILI LESTARI AND ANOTHER v. MR WILLIAM LAM, ESQ., TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD [Decision on Leave Application]

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HCAL 545/2018

[2020] HKCFI 1323

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LISTNo. 545 of 2018

BETWEEN

Lili Lestari1st Applicant
Edi Subagio Meilani Subagio2nd Applicant
and
Mr William Lam, ESQ.,
Torture Claims Appeal Board
Putative Respondent
and
The Director of ImmigrationPutative Interested Party

     Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review

NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Ord. 53 r. 3)

Following:

   consideration of the documents only;     or
   consideration of the documents and oral submissions by the Applicants in open court;

Order by Deputy High Court Judge Bruno Chan:

The application for leave to apply for judicial review be struck out and dismissed.

Observations for the Applicants:

1.  The 1st Applicant (“A1”) is a 37-year-old national of Indonesia who last arrived in Hong Kong on 5 March 2013 with permission to work as a foreign domestic helper until the expiration of her employment contract on 5 March 2015 or within 14 days of its early termination.  On 5 May 2013 her employment contract was prematurely terminated, but she did not depart and instead overstayed in Hong Kong until she was arrested by police on 18August 2013.  After she was referred to the Immigration Department for investigation, she raised a non-refoulement claim on the basis that if she returned to Indonesia she would be harmed or killed by a money-lender for failing to repay her loan.  She was subsequently released on recognizance pending the determination of her claim, during which she gave birth to the 2nd Applicant (“A2”) and for whom she also made a non-refoulement claim on the same basis and which was assessed jointly with her own claim.     

2.  By a Notice of Decision dated 17 April 2015 the Director of Immigration (“the Director”) rejected the Applicants’ claim on all then applicable grounds including risk of torture under Part VIIC of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap 115 (“torture risk”),risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment under Article 3 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights (“HKBOR”) (“BOR 3 risk”), and risk of persecution with reference to the non-refoulement principle under Article 33 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (“persecution risk”).

3.  In his decision the Director took into account all the relevant circumstances of the Applicants’ claim and assessed the level of risk of harm from the money-lender to the Applicants upon their return to Indonesia as low due to the absence of or low intensity and frequency of past ill-treatment from the money-lender, that it was a private monetary dispute without any official involvement that state or police protection would be available to the Applicants if resorted to, and that reliable and objective Country of Origin Information (“COI”) show that reasonable internal relocation alternatives are available in Indonesia with a large population of 200 million people spread across a vast territory of more than 1.9 million square kilometers that it would not be unduly harsh for A1 as an able-bodied adult with work experience to move with A2 to other part of Indonesia away from her home district in large cities such as Jakarta where it would be difficult if not impossible for the money-lender to locate them.

4.  On 29 April 2015 the Applicants lodged an appeal to the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“the Board”) against the Director’s decision, and for which they attended an oral hearing on 28 April 2016 before the Board during which A1 declined to give any evidence or to answer questions raised of her claim by the adjudicator for the Board.  On 14 December 2016 their appeal was dismissed by the Board which also confirmed the Director’s decision.

5.  By a Notice of Further Decision dated 13 April 2017 the Director again rejected the Applicants’ claim after receiving and considering additional submissions from them relevant to their non-refoulement claim on all applicable grounds for non-refoulement protection including any other absolute or non-derogable rights under HKBOR including right to life under Article 2 (“BOR 2 risk”).

6.  Meanwhile on 22 December 2016 the Applicants filed their Form 86 under HCAL 240/2016 for leave to apply for judicial review of the Board’s decision, and in A1’s supporting affirmation of the same date she put forward the following grounds for their intended challenge:

     (1)     procedural impropriety/unfairness in the adjudicator’s failure to carry out sufficient research and inquiry into COI and for failing to have regard to relevant and up-to-date COI in the consideration of his claim;

     (2)     irrationality in the adjudicator’s failure to take into account or putting proper weight on relevant COI and for cherry-picking and putting weight on irrelevant COI in the consideration of his claim;

     (3)     irrationality in the adjudicator’s failure to evaluate and make finding of fact as to whether a consistent pattern of gross and mass violation of human rights in Indonesia;

     (4)     irrationality in the adjudicator’s failure to analyze and assess whether state protection exists in Indonesia and misdirected himself as to the extended meaning of state protection;

     (5)     irrationality in the Board’s decision in taking into account and putting weight in irrelevant consideration or based on incorrect or inaccurate facts;

     (6)     procedural impropriety for failure to call for psychological and psychiatric evaluations and reports on the Applicants;

     (7)     procedural impropriety/unfairness in the adjudicator applying the incorrect standard of proof in his decision; and

     (8)     procedural impropriety/unfairness due to lack of or insufficient representation from the assigned duty lawyer for the Applicants resulting in unfair procedure.  

7.  On 23 March 2018 their application was refused by Hon Yau J upon finding none of their grounds reasonably arguable for their intended challenge, that there was no error of law or procedural unfairness in their process before the Board or in its decision, and that there was no prospect of success in their intended application.

8.  The Applicants did not lodge any appeal against the court’s decision, but instead on 3 April 2018 filed another Form 86 in these proceedings for leave to apply for judicial review again of the Board’s decision, and put forward essentially the same or similar grounds as before for their intended application but none of which was found to be reasonably arguable by the court in their previous application.

9.  Clearly the principle of res judicata applies, and it is an abuse of process for the Applicants to re-litigate their case by bringing a second judicial review in respect of the samedecision of the Board after they failed to obtain leave from the court under HCAL240/2016 against which they never lodged any appeal, and also for failing to inform the Registry of the same when they filed their second Form 86 and issued their ex parte application in theseproceedings, resulting in much judicial and public resources in processing these proceedings.

10.  In the premises and for these reasons, this second application by the Applicants for judicial review of the Board’s decision is hereby struck out and dismissed.

Dated the 30th day of June 2020.

(NG Hang-yin)
for Registrar, High Court  

Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence




Notesfor the Applicants:

If leave has been granted, the Applicants or their solicitors must: 
    
a) serve on the respondent and such interested parties as may be directed by the Court the order granting leave and any directions given within 14 days after the leave was granted (Order 53, rule 4A);

b) issue the originating summons within 14 days after the grant of leave and serve it in accordance with Order 53, rule 5; and

c) supply to every other party copies of every affidavit which the Applicants propose to use at the hearing, including the affidavit in support of the application for leave (Order 53, rule 6(5)).
 Sent to the Applicants on 30th June 2020

1st Applicant:
    Lili Lestari

2nd Applicant:
    Edi Subagio
    Meilani Subagio


Applicants’ ref. no.:
Nil. 
 Sent to the Putative Respondent / the Putative Respondent’s solicitors / such Putative Interested Parties as may be directed by the Court / the Putative Interested Parties’ solicitors on 30th June 2020
 
Mr William Lam, ESQ.,
Torture Claims Appeal Board
Putative Respondent’s ref. nos.:
USM 1453/15/4/145/I58
USM 1454/15/4/146/I59

The Director of Immigration
Putative Interested Party’s ref. no.:
RBCZ/9000807–8/17
(QA T/C 1346–7/14 
formerly RBCZ/3000537/14 & RBCZ/3227/14)

Department of Justice,
Senior Assistant Law Office
(Civil Law)
(Civil Litigation Unit 2) 



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