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Bankruptcy Proceedings2018

有關 LIN YAN JENNY 的事宜

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[2024] HKCFI 320-CH-2024-02-02

有關 LIN YAN JENNY 的事宜

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HCB 5516/2018

[2024] HKCFI 320

香港特別行政區

高等法院

原訟法庭

破產案件編號2018年第5516號

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Re:LIN YAN JENNY, the Bankrupt

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主審聆案官:黎達祥聆案官法庭聆訊
聆訊日期:2023年12月4日
判決書日期:2024年2月2日

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判決書

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引言

1.  在本判決書中,括號內的頁碼,除非特別標明,是指聆訊文件冊A至H的頁碼。文件冊編號會顯示於頁碼之前。

2.  在本案中,破產人,林焱女士〔〝林女士〞〕,是在2019年6月26日,被法庭頒令破產。

3.  本次是林女士第一次被法庭頒令破產,根據《破產條例》〔香港法例第6章〕第30A(1)條及第30A(2)(a)條,林女士的破產本來會於2023年6月26日獲自動解除。但《破產條例》第30A(3)條有如下規定:

“(3) 凡法院因應受託人的申請或破產人的其中一名債權人的申請,信納有一項基於第(4)款所列出的一項或多於一項的理由的有效反對已提出,則法院可命令有關期間在該命令中指明的且不超過以下期限的期間內終止計算 ––

(a) 就以前從未被判定破產的人而言,4年期;或

(b) 就以前曾被判定破產的人而言,3年期。”

4.  本次申請是由林女士的破產產業受託人〔〝受託人〞〕提出,要求法庭頒令暫停計算林女士獲自動解除破產的時間。換言之,是要求法庭延長林女士的破產期。

5.  根據受託人在2023年5月12日提出的申請傳票,受託人是基於《破產條例》第30A(4)(c)及(d)條提出本申請。《破產條例》第30A(4)(c)及(d)條有如下規定:

“(4) 除第(4A)款另有規定外,根據本條對破產人的破產解除提出反對時可基於的理由如下 ––

… …

(c) 在對破產人的產業的管理方面,破產人並不合作;

(d) 破產人就破產開始前的期間或破產開始後的期間的行為操守並不令人感到滿意;… …。”

6.  本案並不涉及《破產條例》第30A條第(4A)款所規定之事項。

7.  法庭曾在2023年6月8日頒下中期命令,下令暫緩解除林女士的破產,直至本申請有判決或法庭另有其他命令為止。故此,在本判決書頒佈前,林女士的破產仍未解除。

8.  受託人分別在2023年5月12日及2023年9月12日,存檔了1st Affirmation of Osman Mohammed Arab (“Arab 1”)及3rd Affirmation of Osman Mohammed Arab兩份誓章,支持本申請。

9.  林女士則在2023年6月30日存檔了一份誓章,反對本申請。〔A 36〕林女士在其反對誓章中,只是反覆重申,她沒有欠任何人有法院判決的精確金額。在其反對誓章中,林女士並沒有回應受託人對她在破產期內的行為的指責。在聆訊時,她亦重複了她上述的陳述。她亦指稱,她有回應受託人的提問,亦已向受託人提供了所需的資料。

10.  受託人對林女士的指責,都是與一間名為〝世界通資本有限公司〞 (Gold Valley Limited)〔下稱〝該公司〞〕有關。

11.  林女士曾是該公司的唯一股東。林女士在2018年9月17日將該公司的全部股權,以HK$1.00的代價,轉名給她的母親,黃玉蘭女士〔〝黃女士〞〕。〔B 187〕林女士稱,她只是以其舅父,黃升武先生〔〝黃先生〞〕,的託管人的身分,持有該公司的股權,她亦只是按黃先生的指示,將該公司的股權轉名給黃女士。

12.  該公司曾在香港擁有一個物業〔下稱〝該物業〞〕。該公司在2020年10月30日以 HK$3,980,000.00的代價售出該物業。(B 247-252)

13.  林女士的債權人是在2018年9月27日,提出針對林女士的破產呈請。受託人懷疑林女士透過上述安排抽逃資產,令債權人蒙受損失,遂對上述交易展開調查。

14.  受託人指責林女士,沒有配合受託人的調查,行為操守不令人感到滿意。

反對解除破產適用的法律原則

15.  在Re Wong Hing Wah Michael (unrep, HCB 26018/2002, 12 October 2007) 一案,Barma J (當時官階) 在其判案書的第14段指出:

“… … there are two stages involved when the court is considering the exercise of its powers under section 30A(3) [of the BO]. It is first necessary to determine whether one or more of the grounds mentioned in section 30A(4) has been established. If this is done, the court then moves on to consider whether or not, in the exercise of its discretion, a suspension of the automatic discharge that would otherwise have been available to the bankrupt should be ordered. It will not be in every case where a ground for suspension is made out that a suspension will be called for or imposed. In determining whether or not a suspension should be ordered, the court will have regard to all the circumstances of the case, including the nature of the acts complained of and the post-bankruptcy conduct of the bankrupt.”

16.  在Fred Lee v Lau Chi Kam [2008] 3 HKLRD 627一案,上訴法庭在判案書的第10段指出,法庭在行使酌情權延後解除破產時,法庭需考慮以下解除破產的目的,即:

(1) 給予破產人更新機會,讓破產人在破產期完結後,能夠正常地生活;及

(2) 需確保破產人重新投入商業社會,不會對其他可能與破產人產生商業關係的人,造成不可接受的風險,並保持社會的商業道德。

17.  上訴法庭在Re Lee Raymond Cho Min and Re Lee Priscilla Hwang (unrep, CACV 112/2014 and CACV 113/2014, 30 July 2014) 案中,再次確認上述的法律原則。

18.  《破產條例》第26(3) 條有如下規定:

〝該債務人須竭盡所能,協助將其財產變現及將收益在其債權人間分發。〞

19.  受託人指責,林女士對破產產業的管理不合作。在受託人管理破產產業的過程中,何謂〝合作〞?

20.  在 Re Li Tat Kong [2000] 3 HKC 360 一案,Le Pichon J (當時官階) 在 377C-D段指出:

“What does co-operation mean? In Totterdell v Nelson (1990) 97 ALR 341, the Full Court of Australia observed (at 346):

Nor is it really right to say, because no evidence was led of specified requests ignored by the bankrupt, that there was lacking any evidence of non-cooperation. Co-operation is a positive concept.

I would respectfully agree. In my judgment, it is incumbent on the bankrupt to make a full and frank disclosure and to proffer all pertinent information regarding his assets and financial dealings to the trustee,”

21.  破產人是有責任,主動地協助受託人,對破產產業的調查,並主動向受託人提供,破產人全面的財務狀況。

22.  在前述Fred Lee v Lau Chi Kam 一案中,法庭指出,在決定破產人在破產令頒佈前的行為,是否屬於《破產條例》第30A(4)條所指的不令人感到滿意的行為,法庭會考慮該等行為是否屬於我們的社會不會容忍,並會予以譴責的行為。本席認為,同一準則亦適用於衡量破產人,在破產期內的行為,是否不令人感到滿意。〔見Re Qin Jun[2021] HKCFI 114 at §20〕

23.  若法庭接納受託人的申請,同意延長林女士的破產期,實際的延長時間,亦應根據林女士被投訴的不當行為的嚴重性而決定。根據《破產條例》第30A(3)條的規則,對於首次被法庭頒令破產的人,法庭可以將其破產期延長最多4年。〔見Re Lok Wing Sang (unrep, HCB 1721/1997, 29 October 2002) 〕

24.  在處理本申請時,本席會先考慮,受託人指責林女士的各項不當行為是否成立。再根據本席裁定成立的指責,考慮應否行使本席的酌情權,延長林女士的破產期。若本席同意延長林女士的破產期,本席需考慮,就本案而言,恰當的延長時間是多久。

受託人對破產人的指責

25.  受託人在Arab 1中指責林女士不合作,沒有完全回答及/或向受託人提供足夠的資料,回應受託人的提問。受託人在2022年1月26日,根據《破產條例》第29條,向法庭提出申請,要求法庭頒令林女士向受託人提供文件,及接受受託人的盤問〔〝第29條申請〞〕。〔見Arab 1第13段〕

26.  受託人在第29條申請中,要求林女士提供的文件和資料,都是圍繞著:該公司的股權及會計帳目;林女士聲稱的股權信託安排;購買該物業的資金;及出售該物業的款項。〔B 133 - 138〕

27.  法庭在2022年10月18日,下令林女士向受託人提供所需文件,並接受受託人的盤問。〔〝第29條命令〞〕在2023年4月28日及5月3日,林女士接受了受託人聘任的律師的盤問。

28.  受託人認為,林女士在接受上述盤問時所披露的資料仍不足夠。〔見Arab 1第18段〕

29.  受託人對林女士的行為提出下述指責:

(1) 林女士未有向受託人提供,所有與該公司股權轉名的相關資料;

(2) 林女士未有向受託人提供,該公司出售該物業所得的款項用途;及

(3) 林女士在破產期內依然出任該公司的董事。

(1) 有關該公司的股權的轉名

30.  林女士稱,她是替黃先生持有該公司的股權。她亦是根據黃先生的指示,將該公司的股權轉名給黃女士。

31.  受託人指責林女士,沒有提供令受託人滿意的資料,證明她是代黃先生持有該公司的股權。

32.  雙方並無爭議,林女士曾向受託人提供一份,日期為2013年1月17日,由黃先生簽署名為「股權委託協議」的文件 (B 189)。〔〝該協議〞〕該協議的內容為黃先生〝全權委託 [林女士] 代表股東處理公司日常業務,委託期限5年。〔從2013年1月 - 2018年1月〕期限屆滿后,雙方另行協商。〞〔粗體字由本席加註〕

33.  受託人指,該協議並非股權信託聲明,亦沒有繳付印花稅。故此,受託人並不接納其足以證明林女士是替黃先生持有該公司的股權。

34.  林女士確認,除了該協議外,她再沒有其他文件,證明她替黃先生持有該公司的股權。

35.  本席同意,該協議並非股權信託聲明。既然該協議並非股權信託聲明,自然無需繳納印花稅。但本席注意到,黃先生是〝代表股東〞簽署該協議,〝全權委託〞林女士處理該公司的日常業務。如果該公司的股權不屬於黃先生,他何來權力〝全權委託 [林女士] 代表股東〞處理該公司日常業務?本席認為,縱使該協議並非股權信託聲明,亦可以被視為旁證,證明林女士是替黃先生持有該公司的股權。

36.  受託人並沒有質疑該協議的真確性,但受託人指責黃女士沒有提供黃先生的聯絡資料,讓受託人查證相關的安排。

37.  林女士指出,她早已向受託人提供了,黃先生的身分證號碼及地址〔B 854〕,只是受託人沒有跟進聯絡黃先生。受託人於庭上撤回對林女士的上述指責。

38.  若有關該公司的股權的信託聲明根本不存在,林女士未能向受託人提供相關的信託聲明,並不構成指責林女士不和受託人合作或行為不令人感到滿意的理據。受託人不能要求林女士提供一份不存在的文件。

39.  受託人亦指責林女士,未有提供黃先生注資該公司的證據。

40.  林女士稱,她早已向受託人提供了,黃先生自2013年透過林女士家人的銀行帳戶,注資到該公司的詳情〔E 897-913〕,只是受託人沒有跟進調查。

41.  本席認為,既然林女士已向受託人提供了黃先生注資該公司的資料,亦提供了黃先生的聯絡資料,受託人沒有跟進調查,這不能構成指責林女士不和受託人合作,或行為不令人感到滿意的理據。

42.  受託人亦指責,林女士沒有向受託人交代,股權轉名的代價是如何計算。林女士亦沒有提交該公司經核數師審核的會計帳目,及該公司最新的管理會計帳目,延誤了受託人調查該公司的股權轉名事宜。〔見Arab 1第22段〕

43.  如果林女士是代黃先生持有該公司的股權,並按照黃先生的指示將股權轉名給黃女士,那麼,轉名代價定為HK$1.00,是合理的。在這種情況下將股權轉名,該公司的實際資產價值一般不會反映在股權轉名的代價中。

44.  林女士稱,該公司從沒聘請核數師審核公司的會計帳目。該公司只有未經審核的會計帳目,而她亦已向受託人提交了,該公司2014年度、2017年度、及2021年度的報稅表〔E 931-939〕,和2014年度至2021年度,未經核數師審核的資產負債表〔E 930及941-957〕。

45.  受託人並不爭議,林女士已向受託人提供了,該公司未經審核的會計帳目。雖然根據香港法例第622章《公司條例》第394條及第405條的規定,在香港註冊成立的有限公司,是須要聘請核數師,審核公司的會計帳目。但本席不能排除,有公司沒有完全按照法例的規定運作。林女士的證供是,該公司從沒聘請核數師審核公司的會計帳目。

46.  受託人並沒有提出反證,顯示該公司曾聘請核數師,審核該公司的會計帳目,並出具核數報告,而林女士刻意不向受託人提供,相關的經核數師審核的會計帳目。

47.  如果該公司事實上沒有聘請核數師,審核公司的會計帳目,並出具經審核的會計帳目,林女士又如何向受託人提交不存在的文件?受託人對林女士這一項指責,並不成立。

48.  但在受託人調查該公司的股權轉名事宜期間,林女士不予合作,受託人需透過第29條申請,以取得所需的資料。法庭基於受託人的申請,在考慮了受託人和林女士提供的證據資料後,向林女士頒下第29條命令,可見林女士在受託人管理其資產的過程中,確有不合作的情況。詳情已載於法庭的判案書 [2022] HKCFI 3210,本席不在此贅述。

49.  本席裁定,林女士在受託人調查該公司股權轉名的過程中,沒有和受託人充分合作,妨礙了受託人的調查工作。

(2) 有關該公司出售該物業所得的款項用途

50.  受託人指責林女士,未有向受託人提供該公司出售該物業後,所得款項的用途。

51.  林女士稱,該公司只是代表黃先生持有該物業,她亦有向受託人提供,黃先生和林女士及該公司就該物業簽署的「房屋代持協議」〔E 849-852〕。

52.  林女士亦稱,她已告知受託人,出售該物業的款項是用於償還該物業的按揭貸款,及按黃先生的指示償還黃先生對他人的欠款。林女士指,她已向受託人提供了,出售該物業時該公司收到的付款支票,標明款項的受款人。其中 HK$918,748.04 是支付給恒生銀行,償還該公司欠恒生銀行的貸款。〔E 921〕餘下的 HK$2,652,440.73的支票是支付給該公司。〔E 920〕林女士稱,相關款項用於償還給一位名為「楊堅」的人士的欠款。

53.  第29條申請的傳票第一附表的第10段〔B 137〕顯示,林女士在受託人提出第29條申請前,曾向受託人解釋,出售該物業的部分款項,是用於償還黃先生欠「楊堅」的款項。林女士亦向受託人提供了,黃先生簽署的相關「借條」。〔E 848〕

54.  林女士並沒有交代,有關款項是如何支付給「楊堅」。出售該物業的付款支票是將款項支付給該公司,無論該公司是以支票或轉賬形式將款項支付給「楊堅」,都會有文件證據。但林女士並沒有提供相關的文件證據。受託人無從查證,上述的 HK$2,652,440.73是否如林女士所稱,支付了給「楊堅」。

55.  本席並不接納,林女士聲稱她在2018年6月26日,辭任該公司的董事後,便沒有權力獲取該公司的文件。〔E 854 - 855〕本席會在下文「林女士在破產期內出任該公司的董事」一節中分析,本席認為,林女士一直有參與該公司的管理和運作。事實上,林女士亦有向受託人提供,該公司直至2021年未經審核的資產負債表。〔見上文第44段〕

56.  本席裁定,就受託人調查出售該物業的款項的用途上,林女士並沒有和受託人合作,妨礙了受託人的調查工作。林女士的相關行為,亦是不令人感到滿意。

(3) 林女士在破產期內出任該公司的董事

57.  受託人指責林女士,在破產期內繼續出任該公司的董事,並以董事身分,代表該公司簽署出售該物業的文件,違反《公司條例》第480(1)條的規定。受託人已向破產管理署匯報相關事項。受託人認為,林女士這一行為,構成在破產期內不令人感到滿意的行為。

58.  林女士並不否認她代表該公司,簽署出售該物業的文件,但辯稱由於疫情關係,該公司的董事無法來港簽署文件,故授權她簽署相關文件,她只是該公司的授權代表,見證文件簽署,而非以董事身分代表該公司行事。〔E 835,855,916 - 917及965 - 966〕若相關文件標示她是該公司的董事,只是出於負責的律師的錯誤。〔E 855,965-966及1021〕

59.  出售該物業的文件清楚標明,林女士是作為該公司的董事的身分簽署。該公司在2020年3月3日,呈交給公司註冊處的2020年週年報表,申報林女士在2020年1月23日是該公司的備任董事。當時,林女士已被法庭頒令破產超過半年。

60.  林女士聲稱,她在2018年6月26日辭任該公司的董事後,便再沒有參與該公司的事務,她並不知道自己是該公司的備任董事。〔E 916〕但上述這份2020年的週年報表,是由林女士代表該公司,向公司註冊處呈交的。〔見B 209〕本席不接納林女士的上述辯解。

61.  林女士聲稱,她在2018年6月26日,已辭任該公司的董事。但林女士是在超過一年後,即2019年7月24日,才向公司註冊處,呈交相關的更改公司董事通知書。〔見B 227〕當時,林女士已被法庭頒令破產,可見該更改公司董事通知書,是在林女士被法庭頒令破產約一個月後,才向公司註冊處呈交的。該通知書亦是由林女士代表該公司呈交的。

62.  《公司條例》第480(1) 條有下述規定:

〝身為未獲解除破產的破產人的人,不得擔任任何公司的董事,或直接或間接參與或關涉任何公司的管理,但如該人獲裁定他破產的原訟法庭許可,則屬例外。〞

63.  林女士在破產期內,曾擔任該公司的備任董事。根據《公司條例》第455(1) 條的規定,備任董事只能在公司的唯一董事去世後,才能代替該唯一董事行事。

64.  但林女士無視《公司條例》的規定,在沒有取得原訟法庭的許可下,參與該公司的管理,包括在2020年8月22日,以董事身分簽署董事決議,授權該公司出售該物業〔B 254〕,更以該公司董事的身分,代表該公司,簽署出售及轉讓該物業業權的文件〔B 231 - 252〕。

65.  林女士辯稱,她的英文水平不足,對曾簽署的英文文件的內容不完全理解,而錯誤地以董事身分簽署相關文件。林女士將責任推給處理物業買賣的律師。〔E 830〕

66.  林女士擁有在加拿大取得的碩士學歷〔C 351〕,她亦是加拿大公民〔B 194〕。她與本破產案的呈請人,英國籍的Mr Paul Gavin Jenkins ,曾是同居情侶關係〔C 351〕。她與 Mr Jenkins 亦是以英文溝通〔E 864 - 865〕。林女士對英文有合理的理解能力。本席並不接納林女士的上述辯解。

67.  本席不接納,在該公司出售該物業的文件上,林女士是被錯誤標示為該公司的董事。本席裁定,林女士在破產期內,違反《公司條例》的規定,參與該公司的管理,並以公司董事身分,代表該公司,簽署出售該物業的文件。本席同意,林女士在破產期內的這些行為,確是不令人感到滿意。

事實的裁定

68.  根據上述的討論,本席裁定,林女士在受託人調查該公司股權轉名,及出售物業的款項的過程中,不配合其調查工作,妨礙了受託人的的調查工作。這等行為,是不令人感到滿意的行為。

69.  本席裁定,就上述事項,受託人根據《破產條例》第30A(3)(c) 及(d) 條,對林女士提出的指責成立。

70.  林女士在破產期內,違反《公司條例》的規定,出任該公司的董事,並以公司董事身分,代表該公司,簽署出售該物業的文件。林女士在破產期內的上述行為,亦是不令人感到滿意的行為。

71.  本席裁定,受託人根據《破產條例》第30A(3)(d) 條,對林女士的這一項指責亦成立。

其他事項

72.  在Arab 1中,受託人指,林女士在破產令頒佈前,曾在HCSD 6/2018一案中,嘗試推翻向她送達了的法定償債通知書,亦曾對本案的破產呈請提出抗辯,但都不成功。〔見 [2018] HKCFI 2084 及 [2019] HKCFI 1793〕

73.  在破產期間,林女士曾提出廢止破產令的申請,但亦不成功。〔見 [2020] HKCFI 1227〕

74.  她亦曾根據《破產條例》第83條及第130(3) 條,提出傳票申請,有關申請亦被法庭撤銷。〔見 [2022] HKCFI 2757 及 [2023] HKCFI 1275〕

75.  受託人指責林女士,濫用法庭程序。林女士亦將相關申請的文件傳真給受託人,浪費受託人的時間作出處理。

76.  林女士錯誤理解她在法律上的權利,導致她向法庭提出不恰當的申請。這種情況,固然是極不理想。但本席認為,除非這些行為,妨礙了受託人管理破產產業的工作,否則,不應構成延長林女士的破產期的理據。

77.  受託人指,林女士亦向香港會計師公會,投訴受託人及其代表。本席相信,香港會計師公會必定會恰當地處理相關投訴。同樣地,除非相關的行為是不恰當,並妨礙受託人管理破產產業的工作,法庭在處理延長破產期的申請時,不會考慮相關事項。

78.  根據受託人在Arab 1陳述的資料〔見Arab 1 第30至37段〕,本席認為林女士的相關行為,雖然並不理想,但亦不至於妨礙受託人管理破產產業的工作。本席認為,在處理本申請時,本席不應考慮林女士的相關行為。

79.  接下來,本席需考慮,根據本案的情況,本席應否行使本席的酌情權,延長林女士的破產期。若要延長的話,恰當的延長時間是多久。

對本申請的裁決

80.  在Re Hui Hing Kwok [1999] 3 HKC 683一案中,Le Pichon J (當時官階) 指出,《破產條例》第30A(1) 及(2) 條旨在給予破產人更新的機會。法官在判詞中指出:

“Rehabilitation in the sense of enabling the bankrupt to resume a normal life in society is a key, if not the key, consideration. It should only be delayed by a bankrupt’s own failings.” (original emphasis)

81.  Barma J (當時官階) 亦在前述Re Wong Hing Wah Michael一案中指出:

“14. … … In determining whether or not a suspension should be ordered, the court will have regard to all the circumstances of the case, including the nature of the acts complained of and the post-bankruptcy conduct of the bankrupt.”

“17. If it is concluded that the conduct complained of is unsatisfactory, the court moves on to the second stage of considering whether or not it should exercise its discretion to order a suspension of the automatic discharge of the bankrupt, and if so, what length of suspension is called for. At this stage, it will be appropriate to consider not only the conduct complained of, but also other factors such as the post-bankruptcy behaviour of the bankrupt.”

“19. … … Whether a suspension is merited will, I think, depend in part on the nature of the conduct in question and in part on such factors as whether or not the bankrupt has been cooperative with his trustee, whether or not he has complied with his obligation under the [Bankruptcy] Ordinance, and his general conduct of his affairs during his bankruptcy. … …”

“20. That said, bearing in mind the policy of rehabilitation, I would accept that save in very serious cases, a suspension of automatic discharge in respect of unsatisfactory pre-bankruptcy conduct is likely to be for a shorter period than might be ordered in a case in which a bankrupt had been guilty of other, post-bankruptcy ground for suspension, where a longer period of suspension may well be called for so as to ensure that the bankrupt properly complies with his obligations.”

82.  破產人若希望獲得破產制度賦予的更新機會,破產人在其破產期內,需要充分履行其作為破產人應履行的責任。否則,我們的破產制度便不能有效運作。

83.  在前述Fred Lee vLau Chi Kam一案中,上訴法庭指出,法庭在行使延長破產期的酌情權時,需考慮前述第16段所提到的兩項目標。

84.  在前述Re Lee Raymond Cho-Min and Re Lee Priscilla Hwang 案件中, Yuen JA 確認,當法庭考慮是否延長破產人的破產期時,法庭應審視全案的所有情況,包括破產人的不當行為的性質,及破產人在破產令頒佈後的行為,並考慮在前述Fred Lee v Lau Chi Kam一案中所提到的兩項目標。

85.  受託人需要透過第29條申請,以獲取所需資料,進行資產管理的調查。可見林女士在受託人管理其產業的過程,是有不合作的情況。林女士亦沒有向受託人提供,該公司出售該物業後款項用途的所有資料。

86.  林女士在破產令頒佈後,無視《公司條例》的規定,繼續擔任該公司的董事,並代表該公司出售該公司的主要〔如非唯一的〕資產。本席相信,該物業的買家,必然沒有想過,他的交易對手,是由在破產期內的破產人代表。

87.  林女士在破產期內的行為,是無視商業社會的商業道德。本席認為我們的社會對這等行為,不會視如不見,是會作出適度的譴責。故此,在行使本席的酌情權時,本席會下令延長林女士的破產期。

88.  本席考慮了林女士是首次被法庭頒令破產,亦考慮了林女士在破產期內,有履行其他作為破產人應履行的責任,及相關不當行為的性質,本席認為,於本案的情況,將林女士的破產期延長一年是恰當的。

89.  故此,本席下令,計算林女士解除破產的時間,由2023年6月25日起暫停計算一年。換言之,本席將林女士的破產期延長一年。

訟費

90.  訟費方面,本席會以簡易評估方式處理。相關訟費如果由破產產業支付,等同由林女士的債權人分擔。本申請是由林女士的不當行為導致,要林女士的債權人承擔訟費,對債權人並不公允。相關訟費應由林女士承擔。

91.  受託人提出本申請,是履行受託人的職責,所產生的費用,屬於管理破產產業的費用,應先由破產產業支付,但林女士在破產期完結後,需向其破產產業償還相關訟費。

92.  本席頒下訟費暫准命令,本申請的訟費,由林女士支付。受託人提出本申請所產生的費用,歸於管理破產產業的費用,先由破產產業支付,林女士在其破產期完結後,需向其破產產業償還相關訟費。

93.  除非任何一方在上述訟費暫准命令作出後14內,向法庭提出申請更改訟費暫准命令,上述訟費暫准命令會在14天後成為絕對命令。

94.  本席指示,受託人需在上述訟費命令,轉成絕對命令後7天內,向法庭呈交訟費陳述書,並將副本抄送林女士。如林女士對受託人提供的訟費數額有異議,需於其後7天內,以書面向法庭提出,並將副本抄送給受託人。在收到上述資料後,法庭會以文書處理方式,對相關訟費,進行簡易評估。

 (黎達祥)
 高等法院原訟法庭聆案官

申請人由其中一位受託人,Mr Osman Mohammed Arab,代表出席聆訊

破產人無律師代表,親自出庭應訊

破產管理處處長獲法庭免除出席聆訊

[2023] HKCFI 1275-CH-2023-04-18

有關 LIN YAN JENNY 的事宜

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HCB 5516/2018

[2023] HKCFI 1275

香港特別行政區

高等法院原訟法庭

破產案件編號2018年第5516號

____________________

破產人LIN YAN JENNY 

____________________

主審法官:高等法院原訟法庭暫委法官徐韻華內庭聆訊
聆訊日期:2023年4月18日
判決書日期:2023年4月18日

判決書

1.  破產人林炎女士於2023年3月3日,以傳票提出申請,並於當天存檔支持誓詞。

2.  傳票包括四個段落:

(a)  第1段援引香港法例第6章《破產條例》第130(3) 條。條文內容列明,如在債權證明中作出虛假陳述,即屬犯罪。

(b)  第2段中,破產人指自己被騙2,500,000元的費用。她援引《破產條例》第83條,要求更改受託人,由破產管理署署長擔任受託人。

(c)  第3段質疑呈請債權人的債權憑證。破產人指,受託人裁定770,000元的債項,屬明顯造假。

(d)  第4段重申受託人和呈請債權人敲詐她2,500,000元,破產人要求法庭嚴查以上事項及作出解釋。

3.  於今天的聆訊中,破產人向法庭指稱,已將傳票以及支持誓詞送達予受託人、破產管理署署長以及呈請債權人。但沒有任何一方出席今天的聆訊。債權人、破產管理署署長及受託人的法律代表亦從無向法庭發出信件,表示會缺席於今天的聆訊。

4.  有見及此,法庭並不肯定破產人有否將傳票及支持誓詞送予以上人士。

5.  無論如何,法庭已給予破產人機會,作出口頭陳詞,就她的申請向法庭闡述她的理據。

6.  法庭考慮了傳票以及支持誓詞的內容,以及破產人的口頭陳詞。此外,法庭亦參閱了本破產程序中的文件。

7.  破產人以上的指稱,已於本破產程序中多次向法庭提出,相關的申請已被法庭撤銷。參閱以下判決書:

(a)  2019年6月26日的判決書:[2019] HKCFI 1793;

(b)  2020年6月18日的判決書:[2020] HKCFI 1227;及

(c)  2022年9月13日的判決書:[2022] HKCFI 2757。

8.  雖然於過往數年,同樣的指稱及申請已被法庭撤銷,破產人仍於現在階段重複以往的指稱及申請。這行為屬於浪費法庭資源以及濫用法庭程序,傳票必須被撤銷。

9.  現命令撤銷破產人提出的傳票。

 ( 徐韻華 )
 高等法院原訟法庭暫委法官

破產人:無律師代表,親自出庭應訊

  

[2022] HKCFI 2757-EN-2022-09-13

RE LIN YAN JENNY

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HCB 5516/2018

[2022] HKCFI 2757

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

BANKRUPTCY PROCEEDINGS NO 5516 OF 2018

____________

RE :LIN YAN JENNYDebtor
EX PARTE :PAUL GAVIN JENKINSPetitioner

____________

Before: Madam Recorder Rachel Lam SC in Chambers

Date of Hearing: 5 September 2022

Date of Decision: 13 September 2022

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D E C I S I O N

_______________


1.  The bankruptcy order in this matter was made on 26 June 2019 after a contested hearing between the Petitioner and Ms Lin Yan Jenny (“the Bankrupt”), who was then legally represented: see [2019] HKCFI 1793.

2.  The background to this matter may be found in the above-mentioned decision, alongside the decisions of the Honourable Mr Justice G Lam (as he then was) in [2018] HKCFI 2084 and [2020] HKCFI 1227. I shall not repeat the same herein and gratefully adopt the summary of facts as appears in those decisions.

3.  On 23 May 2022, the Bankrupt, acting in person, issued a summons wherein:

(a) She cited S.83 of the Bankruptcy Ordinance (Cap 6), which provides that a bankrupt may apply to the court in relation to any act or decision of the trustee, and the court may confirm, reverse or modify the act or decisions complained of, and make such order in the premises as it thinks just.

(b) She further cited S.36 of the Crimes Ordinance (Cap 200), which provides that any person who knowingly and wilfully makes (otherwise than on oath) a statement false in a material particular, false statutory declarations and other false statements without oath, shall be guilty of an offence.

(c) She alleged that the proof of debt by the Petitioner was a false assertion, and that she is willing to settle with him, and therefore the bankruptcy should be annulled.

(d) She complained that the Trustees have been taking excessive time and overcharging for their adjudication of claims and other duties, and that they should not be entitled to charge such sums.

4.  At the hearing before this Court on 5 September 2022, the Bankrupt repeated the above and reiterated her request for annulment essentially on the basis that the proof of debt was false and/or that she was willing to settle with the Petitioner. She further asked that the Court should find that the Petitioner and the Trustees were guilty of making false statements and false assertion of debts. She further alleged that the Petitioner and the Trustees had colluded so that the Trustees could continue to earn a substantial level of fees.

5.  I have reviewed the prior decisions and the papers filed to date in the matter. I consider the present application is plainly misconceived and seeks to rehash various points already dealt with in the prior decisions.

6.  Insofar as the various allegations about the Petitioner’s proof of debt are concerned, there is no new material of substance before the Court. Whilst the Bankrupt had taken various steps since the last decision (i.e. [2020] HKCFI 1227), such as by filing a police complaint, these essentially repeated a version or versions of the allegations she had previously put forward. Such allegations have been dealt with in the prior decisions, referenced above. There is nothing to suggest that the Trustees’ handling or consideration of the matter to date has been improper or contrary to the available evidence. There is no basis to suggest that their handling of the proofs of debt should be reversed or modified.

7.  As to the complaint about the fees of the Trustees, that is not a basis for annulment.

8.  As to the complaint about false statements levelled by the Bankrupt against the Petitioner, the Trustees, as well as another creditor, that is not a matter which this Court can deal with in the context of the summons. In any event, I do not consider the Bankrupt has put forward any evidence of cogency to support such serious allegations.

9.  In the premises, the summons is dismissed.

 ( Rachel Lam SC )
 Recorder of the High Court

The Debtor was not represented and appeared in person

Messrs. Bird & Bird, for the Petitioner, did not appear

Attendance of the Official Receiver and the Trustee be excused

[2020] HKCFI 1227-ET-2020-06-18

RE LIN YAN JENNY

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HCB 5516/2018

[2020] HKCFI 1227

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

BANKRUPTCY PROCEEDINGS NO 5516 OF 2018

____________

RE:  LIN YAN JENNY Debtor
EX PARTE: PAUL GAVIN JENKINSPetitioner

____________

Before: Hon G Lam J in Court
Date of Hearing:4 June 2020
Date of Decision:18 June 2020

________________

D E C I S I O N

________________

1.  The bankruptcy order in this matter was made on 26 June 2019 after a contested hearing between the petitioner and the bankrupt, who was then legally represented: see [2019] HKCFI 1793.

2.  On 15 May 2020, the bankrupt, acting in person, issued a summons for:

(1)  an order to annul the bankruptcy on the ground that she had repaid $150,000 to the petitioner;

(2)  an order that the trustees in bankruptcy do return $170,000 held by them to the bankrupt; and

(3)  an order to impose a fine or a term of imprisonment on the petitioner, Bright Nation Ltd and the trustees in relation to the false assertion of debts.

3.  The application is in my view plainly misconceived.

4.  The petitioner has put in a proof for over $774,000, including the petition debt of $450,000.  Credit has been given for $150,000 but there is still a large amount outstanding.  The bankrupt has raised assertions disputing the petitioner’s debt, saying that the petitioner could not possibly have lent money to her after knowing her only for a few days; that he should pay her rent and living expenses every month; that the sums due from him could be deducted from the sum of $450,000 held by her, and so on.  It seems to me the substance of what she has said on this application has already been dealt with by the court, against her, both in her application to set aside the petitioner’s statutory demand (see the Reasons for Judgment in HCSD 6/2018 dated 13 September 2018) and on the bankruptcy petition (see the Judgment in HCB 5516/2018 dated 26 June 2019), the papers of which I have reviewed.  In any event, a bankruptcy order will not be annulled simply because the bankrupt asserts she has repaid everything she considers she owes the petitioner.

5.  Another creditor, Bright Nation Ltd, has lodged a proof of debt in the amount of approximately $285,000.  The debtor denies the debt but, again, the bankruptcy order cannot be annulled simply because she denies it.  The proof of debt is for the trustees to adjudicate upon.

6.  In addition, there are fees of the trustees (estimated to be in the region of $500,000) that need to be paid or provided for before any annulment can be considered in these circumstances.  The bankrupt complains about the level of the fees incurred but the existence of that complaint is not a ground for annulment.

7.  Accordingly, the application for annulment is rejected.  It follows that there is no basis to order the trustees to return any funds to the bankrupt.

8.  As for the order sought for a fine or a term of imprisonment to be imposed, the bankrupt asserts that the petitioner and Bright Nation Ltd have made false statements in their proofs of debt and the trustees have failed to reject their proofs, and that they are all therefore liable to a fine or imprisonment under s 130(3) of the Bankruptcy Ordinance (Cap 6), which provides:

“ A person who knowingly makes a false statement when proving a debt in bankruptcy or knowingly makes a false statement in an affidavit required under this Ordinance is guilty of an offence and is liable to a fine at level 5 [i.e. $50,000] and to imprisonment for 6 months.”

This of course only arises if someone is charged, prosecuted and convicted in relation to the offence in question.  It is not a matter that this court can deal with on a summons taken out by the bankrupt.

9.  The summons is therefore dismissed.

 (Godfrey Lam)
 Judge of the Court of First Instance
 High Court

The Debtor was not represented and appeared in person

Bird & Bird, for the Petitioner, be excused

Attendance of the Official Receiver be excused

[2019] HKCFI 1793-EN-2019-06-26

PAUL GAVIN JENKINS v. LIN YAN JENNY

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HCB 5516/2018

[2019] HKCFI 1793

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

BANKRUPTCY PROCEEDINGS NO 5516 OF 2018

____________

BETWEEN
 PAUL GAVIN JENKINSPetitioner
and
 LIN YAN JENNYRespondent

____________

Before:Hon Coleman J in Court
Date of Hearing:26 June 2019
Date of Judgment:26 June 2019

___________________

J U D G M E N T

___________________

1.  By a petition dated 27 September 2018, the petitioner seeks a bankruptcy order against the respondent on the basis of a debt in the sum of $450,000 said to have arisen as a result of the provision of that sum to the respondent for the purposes of a purchase of a property in mainland China, which purpose fell through.

2.  Relevantly, for today’s purposes, the debt was first pursued by the making of a statutory demand which the respondent challenged at a hearing dealt with by Mr Justice Godfrey Lam.  The challenge was unsuccessful.  The challenge is relevant because the opposition to the petition now put forward by the respondent is essentially on the same basis as was put forward to challenge the demand, at a time when the respondent was advised by and represented by solicitors and counsel.

3.  The principles applicable on an application such as this are well settled and are not substantially in dispute between Mr Lai, who acts for the petitioner, and Mr Chu who acts for the respondent at this hearing.  Essentially, in order successfully to oppose a petition, a debtor has to show a bona fide dispute on substantial grounds by sufficiently precise evidence which is believable and must establish that he or she actually has a defence of substance, not just a fair probability of one.

4.  Mr Chu did refer me to a number of authorities, which he confirmed in argument were essentially to identify that there may be some distinction between cases where the demand is predicated upon a prior judgment debt and cases where the demand arises without such a prior judgment.  But the essential principle must be the same.  So the question to be posed in this case is whether the respondent has shown a bona fide dispute on substantial grounds by sufficiently precise evidence which is believable, and has she established that she actually has a defence of substance, not just a fair probability of one, and I might add, not just the possibility of one.

5.  It must also be correct that where an issue has been properly ventilated at the stage of the application to set aside the statutory demand and has been determined by the court at that hearing, there is no reason why the principle of res judicata should not operate to preclude the debtor from raising at the hearing of the petition the same argument which has been determined against him or her, in the absence of any change of circumstances.

6.  I should say I also take into account the wisdom of Godfrey J in the Hutchvison Asia Limited case quoted by Mr Chu which reminds us that frequently cases which appear to be certainties, either to win or to lose, occasionally will result the opposite way when the matter is ventilated on the way to and at a trial.

7.  In this case, it seems to me that whether one applies res judicata in its wider sense, in its full vigour or not, the matters now raised by the respondent are bound to fail insofar as it is suggested that what is being put forward now is different in some way from what was being put forward before Mr Justice Godfrey Lam.  It might be said to be an abuse of process not to have raised the precise complaint in the opposition to the statutory demand.

8.  Mr Chu tells me that the third affidavit in particular of the respondent, if it is not to correct the two previous affidavits, then it is to ventilate her case more clearly and to put it in context.  But, at bottom, the case is really put on the basis that insofar as one of the points is concerned, the court is urged to take those matters into consideration. 

9.  The two main points run on the challenge to the statutory demand were that the debt amount of $450,000 was a gift made by the petitioner to the respondent to cover her rent and all living expenses, and therefore that she was under no obligation to repay that gift; or alternatively, that if the sum was not a gift, then the respondent has a counterclaim because of a promise to pay a monthly allowance to her for various purposes.

10.  It can be pointed out at once that there is no real dispute about the circumstances in which the $450,000 was first provided by the petitioner to the respondent.  I agree with Mr Justice Godfrey Lam that the petitioner’s case about the existence of the debt is supported by various contemporaneous evidence, including banking documents, the transaction documents and WhatsApp exchanges between the parties.

11.  So far as the allegation of gift is concerned, that was fully ventilated before Mr Justice Godfrey Lam and he held that it gave rise to no bona fide dispute on the debt. 

12.  Applying the res judicata principles in rigour or more flexibly, it does not matter, that is the end of the ability for the respondent to put forward that argument to oppose the petition.  But in any event, I would say that I find the allegations relating to gift to be wholly incredible.

13.  As it happens, Mr Chu does not really run that argument with any vigour today, but instead concentrates on the other argument of the supposed counterclaim.  The first problem for the respondent in that respect is that that counterclaim was also run as an argument before Mr Justice Godfrey Lam.  Technically, there was a problem before him because it had not been raised in the original application to set aside the statutory demand but he nevertheless dealt with the point and found that it had no merit, being wholly imprecise and unparticularized, and even if that the alleged promises could be factually established, they would be gratuitous and not supported by consideration.  That point is expressly accepted by the respondent in her third affidavit for the purposes of this hearing where she acknowledges that she has been advised that her counterclaim may be put forward on a basis which is not enforceable as a contract albeit, as I say, she has urged the court to take the various discussions into consideration.

14.  I think the principles of res judicata also bar the respondent from relying on this ground.  But in any event, it is a ground which has shifted and evolved in a way which only points to the lack of believability in the existence of a proper argument.

15.  Therefore, it seems to me that the respondent has failed to satisfy the relevant test of establishing a bona fide dispute on substantial grounds, and there is therefore no reason not to make a bankruptcy order against her.  I should say that I have taken account of Mr Chu’s submissions that in the exercise of my discretion as to whether or not to make a bankruptcy order, should I be satisfied one would otherwise be appropriate, I might take into account that the petitioner may obtain no practical benefit from making the respondent bankrupt, and that she is apparently dividing her time between Hong Kong and the Mainland. 

16.  Neither of those points persuade me that I should not make a bankruptcy order.  Indeed, until trustees are put into place and the relevant inquiries are made, it would seem to me to be premature to proceed on an assumption that making the respondent bankrupt would not be of real or significant benefit to her creditors, including the petitioner.

17.  For those reasons, I therefore make a bankruptcy order in accordance with the petition.

(Discussion re costs)

18.  Taking into account the relatively modest rate charged by Mr Robinson who is quite a senior practitioner in Hong Kong, and that today’s hearing has not lasted as long as it was fixed for, and taking some account of the point made by Mr Chu about the arguments within the statutory demand challenge hearing and the petition proceedings being significantly similar, but noting that that gives rise to the res judicata points which would require some research and presentation, it seems to me that most of the figures that are put forward here are justifiable.  Taking a relatively broad-brush approach, I think that the sum of $150,000 is the appropriate costs sum and I assess costs in that amount payable by the respondent to the petitioner.

 
 

 (Russell Coleman)
 Judge of the Court of First Instance
High Court

  

Mr Lai Chun Ho, instructed by Bird & Bird, for the petitioner

Mr George Chu, instructed by Patrick Mak & Tse, for the respondent

Attendance of the Official Receiver was excused