HKSAR v. TAI YIU TING AND OTHERS
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HKSAR v. TAI YIU TING AND OTHERS
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HKSAR v. TAI YIU TING
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CACC 128 /2019
[2019] HKCA 1144
IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
COURT OF APPEAL
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO 128 OF 2019
(ON APPEAL FROM DCCC NO 480 OF 2017)
________________________
BETWEEN
| HKSAR | Respondent | |
| and | ||
| TAI YIU TING (戴耀廷) (D1) | Applicant |
________________________
| Before: | Hon Macrae VP in Court |
| Date of Hearing: | 11 October 2019 |
| Date of Decision: | 11 October 2019 |
________________________
D E C I S I O N
________________________
1. On 15 August 2019, I granted bail pending appeal to the applicant on condition that he:
(1) provide cash bail in the sum of $100,000;
(2) surrender all of his travel documents, except his Identity Card, and be prohibited from leaving Hong Kong without the prior permission of the Court; and
(3) reside at the address reported to both the Court and the respondent.
2. The applicant now seeks a variation of the second term (and necessarily the third term during the currency of the variation of the second term), so as to leave Hong Kong in order to visit Seoul National University in South Korea and Tokyo University in Japan for what were described in his 2nd affidavit as “academic purposes”. Those purposes, as can be gleaned from the invitation letters to the applicant from the respective universities are to give speeches and attend seminars at conferences being conducted by each institution. The necessity for the applicant to attend such conferences as part of the contractual duties of his employment, and the importance of these particular conferences to the research currently being conducted by the applicant, have been explained in a 3rd affidavit received by the Court yesterday and elaborated upon by Mr Chan SC, with him Mr Cheung on behalf of the applicant, in submissions before me this morning.
The applicant’s submissions
3. Mr Chan made three succinct points in support of the application. First, there can be no risk of absconding when the applicant’s family, work and life are all bound up with Hong Kong. He made the point that the applicant’s actions, however they may be regarded by the courts, were the product of high moral principle, the sort of principle which is rather inconsistent with, and unlikely to be undermined by, any desire to abscond from the jurisdiction. Secondly, the applicant is an academic of some 25 years’ standing and a tenured associate professor of law at Hong Kong University, whose professional duties require him to continue with the development of his studies and research. Bail pending appeal should so far as possible allow him to “get on with his life”. Thirdly, the conferences which he has been invited to attend involve the discussion of genuine issues of scholastic concern within his particular remit as an academic: they are not concerned with political issues or events. Mr Chan urged the Court to vary the terms of bail so as to allow the applicant to continue so far as possible with what he has been successfully doing for the past 25 years.
The respondent’s submissions
4. The application is opposed by Mr Lui, with him Mr Lau, on behalf of the respondent. Mr Lui accepted that the applicant had a genuine interest in the subject-matter of the conferences concerned and that the invitations from the two institutions were genuine. He also confirmed that the respondent had accepted, in conceding that the applicant should be admitted to bail pending appeal, that there was no real risk of him absconding. However, he made the obvious, and perhaps sensible, observation that bail pending appeal is permitted for applicants to remain in the jurisdiction: once they leave the jurisdiction, the dynamics of an applicant’s predicament change. Mr Lui further took issue with the necessity of the applicant attending these two particular conferences and submitted that any impact on his future career would be limited. Ultimately, the applicant’s reasons for seeking to vary his bail conditions must yield to wider, more important considerations of public policy concerning the due administration of justice and the way the public see the administration of justice.
Consideration
5. The principles involved, wherever a convicted applicant or appellant applies for permission to leave the jurisdiction pending the hearing of his appeal, have been recently set out by the Court of Appeal with such comprehensive clarity and common sense that I will be forgiven for quoting from the judgment extensively.
6. The Court in Secretary for Justice v Wong Chi Fung[1] was dealing with an applicant who was likewise seeking to travel overseas, in his case to Europe and Asia, in order to attend various conferences and workshops, as well as to receive awards at two ceremonies in Europe and the United States; the applicant having been convicted of criminal contempt and sentenced to 3 months’ imprisonment, for which he was admitted to bail pending appeal. The Court, in setting out the general principles attending such applications, held:
“6. We first state the general principles which guide us in determining the respondent’s application. Although these principles are derived from the law on bail in general criminal proceedings, they are, for obvious reasons, equally apposite to the question of bail in criminal contempt. In the following statements of principle, the references to “a person convicted and sentenced” or “an appellant” mean a person who has been found to be in criminal contempt of court and has been so sentenced.
7. A person who has been convicted and sentenced to a term of imprisonment does not have a right to be admitted to bail pending appeal against conviction or sentence. Whether or not an appellant should be admitted to bail pending appeal and, if so, on what conditions are at the discretion of the court. Where bail is granted, even when there is no risk of absconding, the court will ordinarily impose conditions requiring the appellant to stay in Hong Kong and as a corollary, not to leave the jurisdiction; to reside at a reported address, which is usually his normal place of residence; to inform the police of any change in that address; and to report to a specified police station on a regular basis. Being subject to those conditions, the appellant does not enjoy the same extent of liberty and movement as others. He must accept such restrictions on his liberty and movement when bail is granted to him.
8. The reporting condition and the two conditions on residence provide the court with an alternative way of keeping a check on the appellant, short of detaining him. Any non‑compliance of those conditions is a serious concern. The police will take immediate action to locate the appellant or to ascertain his whereabouts. If necessary, it will also be brought to the attention of the court to see if it needs to revisit the question of bail or vary the bail conditions.
9. To some extent, prohibiting the appellant from leaving Hong Kong helps to ensure that he would appear at the appeal hearing or that he would surrender to custody when so ordered. Such a utility aside, two more fundamental policy considerations are at play.
(1) While his appeal is pending, the appellant remains a person who has been duly convicted and sentenced. That is his status. His conviction and sentence are valid and subsisting unless overturned by the appellate court. That is his legal position. Both his status and legal position do not change upon the appellant being granted bail. In the circumstances, it is in the interest of due administration of justice to require the appellant to stay within the jurisdiction for so long as his appeal is pending. Allowing the appellant unrestricted freedom to leave the jurisdiction as he sees fit and to return if he so desires, when he is no longer an innocent person in the eyes of the law, will clearly undermine the public confidence in the due administration of justice. To the extent that the appellant is not allowed to travel abroad pending appeal, it is a restriction on his liberty and movement. But it is a necessary restriction so as to ensure that, in accordance with the interest of due administration of justice, he is not away from the jurisdiction while his appeal is undergoing the judicial process.
(2) When it is said that there is no absconding risk, it is necessarily an assessment based on the circumstances that were made known to the court at the time of the bail. However, circumstances may change after bail is granted and if the change is material, the risk of absconding may require a different assessment. Leaving the jurisdiction is self-evidently a material change of circumstances. The appellant will then be beyond the immediate reach of the Hong Kong judicial system. The notion of not returning to Hong Kong to face the possible prospect of an unsuccessful appeal may become tempting. By prohibiting the appellant from leaving Hong Kong, such a possible increase in flight risk is prevented.
10. With these policy considerations in mind, the court would only allow the appellant overseas travel by varying the very condition which prohibits his so doing in highly exceptional circumstances. The burden rests squarely with the appellant to persuade the court that the variation sought is well justified. The court will closely examine the justification advanced by the appellant to see if the burden is discharged satisfactorily.”
7. In that application, it was accepted that the risk of absconding once the applicant was out of the jurisdiction was low. Nevertheless, the Court held:
“19. However, even accepting that there is a lack of risk of absconding and that it will remain to be so if the respondent is allowed to travel, that alone is not sufficient to displace the policy consideration that is based on the interest of due administration of justice, and which prohibits the respondent from leaving Hong Kong while his appeal is pending. The respondent must satisfy us that there are good reasons for him to attend those overseas events: reasons that are so demonstrably strong or special that the policy consideration should take second place.”
8. It follows that the onus is upon an applicant who has been convicted and is pending his appeal to show that there are highly exceptional circumstances justifying his travelling overseas.
9. The difficulties which beset professional men and women who have been convicted of criminal offences and sentenced to imprisonment are surely not in any way unusual in our courts. And much as the courts would generally want to reduce extrajudicial difficulties in the path of a defendant facing trial as far as may be possible and prudent, his or her position necessarily becomes very different once he or she is convicted and sentenced to imprisonment. At that stage more fundamental public policy considerations come into play. As explained by the Court in Wong Chi Fung, to allow convicted appellants to leave the jurisdiction for reasons of professional convenience, or indeed necessity, not only places the due administration of justice at risk but undermines public confidence in the due and proper, and I might add, fair administration of justice.
10. Although it is not suggested that there is a perceptible risk that the applicant might not return to Hong Kong if permitted to leave, no one can say what the influences might be on anyone, even of the utmost probity and character, when free from the jurisdiction whose courts have convicted him and sentenced him to a term of imprisonment. That risk must inevitably be greater, which is why such applications must give way to more important considerations of public policy, unless the circumstances are highly exceptional. I regret to say, notwithstanding the persuasive submissions of Mr Chan, I do not accept that the circumstances advanced in this application are in any way exceptional, let alone highly exceptional. I am unable to find that the reasons advanced for the variation are so demonstrably strong or special that the policy considerations to which I have referred should take second place.
11. In the circumstances, I am not prepared to vary the terms of the applicant’s bail so as to allow him to travel overseas to attend the proposed engagements. The application is accordingly refused.
| (Andrew Macrae) | |
| Vice President |
Mr Ira Lui ADPP and Mr Derek Lau SPP, of the Department of Justice, for the Respondent
Mr Johannes Chan SC and Mr Eric TM Cheung, solicitor advocate, instructed by Ho, Tse, Wai & Partners, for the Applicant
[1] Secretary for Justice v Wong Chi Fung (unrep., CACV 14/2018, 28 September 2018) Judgment (Variation of Bail Conditions).
HKSAR v. TAI YIU TING
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CACC 128 /2019
[2019] HKCA 938
IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
COURT OF APPEAL
CRIMININAL APPEAL NO 128 OF 2019
(ON APPEAL FROM DCCC NO 480 OF 2017)
________________________
| BETWEEN | ||
| HKSAR | Respondent | |
| and | ||
| TAI YIU TING (戴耀廷) | Applicant | |
________________________
Before: Hon Macrae VP in Court
Date of Hearing: 15 August 2019
Date of Decision: 15 August 2019
________________________
D E C I S I O N
________________________
Introduction
1. In 2013, the applicant (D1) (Tai Yiu Ting), together with D2 (Chan Kin Man) and D3 (Chu Yiu Ming), launched and subsequently participated in the “Occupy Central with Love and Peace” or “Let Love and Peace Occupy Central” campaign, which has come to be more commonly known as the Occupy Central Movement. The three of them were jointly charged with an offence of conspiracy to commit public nuisance[1] (Charge 1). They, together with D4 (Chan Tanya), D5 (Shiu Ka Chun), D6 (Cheung Sau Yin) and D7 (Chung Yiu Wa), were also jointly charged with an offence of incitement to commit public nuisance[2] (Charge 2), and a further offence of incitement to incite public nuisance[3] (Charge 3). D8 (Wong Ho Ming, Raphael) alone faced a charge of incitement to commit public nuisance (Charge 4) and a charge of incitement to incite public nuisance (Charge 5). D9 (Lee Wing Tat) alone faced a charge of incitement to commit public nuisance (Charge 6).
2. The nine defendants pleaded not guilty to the charges against them and stood trial before HH Judge Chan (“the judge”) in the District Court. On 9 April 2019, following a trial which lasted 18 days, the defendants were convicted of the charges which they respectively faced; save that D3 was acquitted of Charge 2, and D1, D2 and D3 were acquitted of Charge 3. On 24 April 2019, D1, D2 and D3 were sentenced to 16 months’ imprisonment, although the sentence imposed on D3 was suspended for 2 years. D5, D7, D8 and D9 were sentenced to 8 months’ imprisonment, the sentences on D7 and D9 being suspended for 2 years. D6 was given a Community Services Order for 200 hours. Owing to her medical condition, the sentencing of D4 was adjourned and, on 10 June 2019, she was sentenced to 8 months’ imprisonment suspended for 2 years.
The procedural history
3. Between 30 April 2019 and 2 July 2019, the defendants all filed Form XI Notices applying for leave to appeal (D1’s Notice being filed on 3 May 2019). Whilst all of them are seeking to appeal against conviction, only D1, D2, D5 and D8 have sought leave to appeal against sentence.
4. On 4 July 2019, I gave all of the defendants a 42-day deadline (which falls on 15 August 2019, namely today) to file Perfected Grounds of Appeal and to apply for documents and transcripts necessary for the appeal, further directing that the applications for leave to appeal against conviction and/or sentence be heard at the same time as the hearing of the appeals before the full Court. Since none of the applicants had complied with the Court’s order, save for D1 who has filed perfected grounds of appeal against conviction and sentence, and on the application of some of those representing the other applicants, I issued a further direction yesterday that the applicants must file their Perfected Grounds of Appeal against Conviction and/or Sentence, agree on the Appeal Index (which is to be filed by legal representatives for D1), and make application(s) for necessary transcripts within 14 days from 14 August 2019; or from the date of notification of the assignment of solicitors and counsel by the Legal Aid Department (where applicable), whichever is the latest. I also indicated that no further extensions would be given.
5. On 13 August 2019, I invited all parties to indicate their availability for a 3-day appeal between 17 February 2020 and 3 April 2020. As a result of the answers I have received from all parties, including the respondent, I am able to set down the appeal for three days on 24, 25 and 26 February 2020. I am grateful to leading counsel for D1 accommodating those dates, which were not originally agreeable.
6. In respect of the specific application before me today, the legal representatives of D1 applied on his behalf, by way of letter dated and received on 10 July 2019, for bail pending appeal in the present case and an expedited hearing for that application. On the same day, I fixed the hearing for today and directed D1’s legal representatives to file, inter alia, a bail summons and a supporting affidavit, both of which were duly filed on 22 July 2019.
The prosecution case
7. By Charge 1, it was alleged that, between an unspecified date in March 2013 and 2 December 2014, D1, D2 and D3 conspired together and with other persons to cause a public nuisance through the unlawful obstruction of public places and roads in, or in the neighbourhood of, Central, in Hong Kong.
8. Charges 2 and 3 concerned the “Occupy Central with Love and Peace” or “Let Love and Peace Occupy Central” campaign launched by D1, D2 and D3 between 27 and 28 September 2014 at Tim Mei Avenue, Admiralty, in Hong Kong where protests were held and protestors in large numbers assembled. At 1:36 am on 28 September 2014, D1 addressed the crowd and stated, inter alia, that the campaign would begin with occupying the Central Government Offices[4]. Whilst Charge 2 alleged that the defendants incited the people at Tim Mei Avenue to commit a public nuisance, Charge 3 alleged that the defendants incited the people at Tim Mei Avenue to incite other people to follow them.
The defence case
9. D1 elected not to give evidence or to call any witness on his behalf. The lines of defence put forward at trial may be briefly summarised for present purposes as follows:
a. The prosecution had preferred charges against the defendants, which were inappropriate and/or unconstitutional[5].
b. There was no obstruction caused by the words of the defendants, nor was there common injury to the public or a significant section of the public[6].
c. Since the area in question had been cordoned off by the police, it was not possible for the defendants to have committed Charges 2 and 3[7].
d. The extensive and prolonged occupation of roads and public places was the result of the improper use of tear gas by the police[8].
e. The offences in question were committed in pursuance of a civil disobedience movement[9].
The sentence
10. As I have mentioned, D1 was convicted of Charge 1 and Charge 2 only, but acquitted of Charge 3, the judge finding that there was insufficient evidence to prove that charge.
11. In respect of Charge 1, the judge adopted a starting point of 18 months’ imprisonment, which he reduced by 2 months for D1’s positive good character, resulting in a sentence of 16 months’ imprisonment. In respect of Charge 2, the judge considered a starting point of 9 months’ imprisonment. Giving D1 a one-month discount for his positive good character, the judge passed a sentence of 8 months’ imprisonment, ordering that it should run concurrently with the sentence on Charge 1.
12. In the result, the total term of sentence imposed upon D1 was 16 months’ imprisonment.
Grounds of appeal and the present application for bail pending appeal
13. In his Form XI, D1 originally advanced six initial grounds of appeal against conviction and sentence settled by leading and junior counsel. Four of those initial grounds were related to his appeal against conviction: two concerned the appeal against sentence.
14. As indicated, Perfected Grounds of Appeal against both Conviction and Sentence have now been filed on D1’s behalf (dated 14 August 2019) by different leading and junior counsel, namely Mr Johannes Chan SC and Mr Eric Cheung, both of whom appear for D1 in the present application. It is not necessary for me to go into those grounds of appeal in any depth at this stage. Suffice it to say, there are eight grounds of appeal against conviction and one ground of appeal against sentence, all of which are similar in theme but necessarily more elaborate and specific than the initial grounds of appeal.
15. Mr Chan has made clear in his written and oral submissions that the present application is being sought on the time basis alone. He has submitted that, since the earliest date of discharge of D1 is 14 March 2020, it is highly probable that D1 will have completely or substantially served his sentence by the time his appeal is heard. Since I have now fixed the dates of the appeal for late February 2020, he is plainly correct in that submission.
Respondent’s position
16. Mr David Leung SC, DPP, on behalf of the respondent, has informed the Court in his written submissions that:[10]
“Without conceding that any of the issues raised on behalf of the Applicant in his application for leave to appeal is reasonably arguable, the Respondent does not object to the Applicant’s application for bail pending appeal on the ground that if bail is not granted, there is a real possibility that the Applicant may have served all or at least a substantial part of his 16-month sentence by the time the application for leave to appeal is heard.”
Mr Leung further accepts that there is no substantial risk of absconding should D1 be granted bail pending appeal[11].
17. Nevertheless, notwithstanding the entirely proper position adopted by the respondent, the applicant is still a convicted person and it must be a matter for the court as to whether bail pending appeal should be granted in the circumstances of the case.
Consideration
18. D1 was sentenced on 24 April 2019 to an overall term of 16 months’ imprisonment, or 64 weeks’ imprisonment. Assuming the customary reduction for good behaviour (approximately one-third of his sentence), the maximum period of his incarceration would be some 42 to 43 weeks. D1 has, up to today, been in custody for 16 weeks, which accounts for 38% of the sentence to which one may assume he will be subject with remission. Accordingly, the remaining part of his sentence is some 26 to 27 weeks.
19. Bearing in mind the number of defendants, the anticipated length of the appeal and the volume of the appeal papers, amongst which the Reasons for Verdict comprise 268 pages alone, it has not been possible to accommodate this appeal before next year. As I have just indicated, the earliest (and only) dates for the appeal when all parties and the Court are available are 24, 25 and 26 February 2020, by which time D1 will have completed almost all of his current sentence of imprisonment.
20. Nevertheless, Mr Chan recognises that although the fact that a sentence is likely to be substantially served by the time the appeal is heard may be a weighty factor in favour of bail pending appeal being granted, it is by no means conclusive. As Bokhary JA (as he then was) explained in R v Lee Chi Ching[12]:
“… even when the matter is approached essentially on [the time] basis, the appeal’s chances of success still remain for consideration. For if the appeal were hopeless, an application for bail pending the same would, in truth, be tantamount to an abuse of process. And even where the appeal, although not hopeless, is very weak, the danger of the appellant absconding would, in the nature of things, normally fall to be considered very grave”.
21. I have examined D1’s grounds of appeal against conviction and, although argument has not been joined in this application on the question of whether they (or the grounds of appeal against sentence) are reasonably arguable, I would not describe them as hopeless. Moreover, the respondent accepts that there is no substantial risk of absconding on the part of D1.
22. Bearing the above considerations in mind, in particular that D1 will have served most of his existing sentence by the time the appeal comes on for hearing, I am prepared to grant him bail pending appeal on the following terms and conditions:
(1) D1 shall provide cash bail in the sum of $100,000;
(2) He shall surrender all of his travel documents, except his Identity Card, and is prohibited from leaving Hong Kong without the prior permission of the Court; and
(3) He shall reside at the address reported to both the Court and the respondent.
| (Andrew Macrae) | |
| Vice President |
Mr David Leung SC, DPP, Mr Ira Lui SADPP (Ag) and Mr Derek Lau SPP, of the Department of Justice, for the Respondent
Mr Johannes Chan SC, instructed by and Mr Eric TM Cheung, solicitor advocate, of Ho, Tse, Wai & Partners, for the Applicant
[1] Contrary to Common Law and section 159A of the Crimes Ordinance, Cap 200 and punishable under section 159C of the Crimes Ordinance, Cap 200 and section 101I of the Criminal Procedure Ordinance, Cap 221.
[2] Contrary to Common Law and punishable under section 101I of the Criminal Procedure Ordinance, Cap 221.
[3]Ibid.
[4] Reasons for Verdict, para 378.
[5] Reasons for Verdict, para 30.
[6] Reasons for Verdict, para 33.
[7] Reasons for Verdict, para 34.
[8] Reasons for Verdict, para 35.
[9] Reasons for Verdict, para 36.
[10] Respondent’s written submissions, para 1.
[11] Respondent’s written submissions, para 7.
[12]R v Lee Chi Ching (Unrep., Criminal Appeal No 333 of 1993, 12 October 1993), at p 3.