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2019

龐孟婷 v. 華人廟宇委員會

Related cases with same parties

  • CACV283/2022龐孟婷 v. 華人廟宇委員會
  • HCAL506/2018龐孟婷 v. 華人廟宇委員會及另一人

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[2021] HKCA 661-EN-2021-05-11

龐孟婷 v. 華人廟宇委員會

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CACV 263/2019

[2021] HKCA 661

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF APPEAL

CIVIL APPEAL NO 263 OF 2019

(ON APPEAL FROM HCAL 506/2018)

_______________________________

BETWEEN  
龐孟婷Applicant
and
華人廟宇委員會Intended Respondent
竹林襌院(曼華堂)Interested Party

_______________________________

Before: Hon Lam VP, Chu and Au JJA in Court

Date of Hearing: 16 March 2021

Date of Judgment: 11 May 2021

________________________

JUDGMENT

________________________

Hon Lam VP (giving the Judgment of the Court):

1.  By a Form 86 of 28 March 2018 as amended on 26 September 2018, the Applicant sought leave to apply for judicial review. The subject decision or other proceedings in respect of the relief was sought was stated to be as follows:

“ 1. Declaration that the Respondent’s confirmation of the change of membership of Man Wa Tong on the basis of the materials provided by Man Wa Tong received on 31 December 2017 was unlawful and invalid.

2. Declaration that the Respondent is required to comply with the Abridged Regulations of Man Wa Tong in confirming the membership of Man Wa Tong and dealing with Man Wa Tong’s management of the temple named Chuk Lam Sim Yuen.

3. Mandamus ordering the Respondent to perform its public duty imposed upon it by the Chinese Temples Ordinance and take all necessary action to ensure that the change of membership of Man Wa Tong and the management of Chuk Lam Sim Yuen complies with the Abridged Regulations of Man Wa Tong.”

2.  The Applicant’s concerns are in respect of the affairs of a Tong (a Chinese customary unincorporated association recognized under Section 15 of the New Territories Ordinance, Cap 97) called Man Wa Tong (“MWT”) which manages a Buddhist temple called Chuk Lam Sim Yuen (“CLSY”) at Fu Yung Shan in Tsuen Wan.  CLSY was founded in 1928 by the Venerable Yung Chau building on land purchased with financial contributions from his 6 disciples.  Before he became a monk, Venerable Yung Chau was called Pong Yat Tung.  The Applicant is the grand-daughter of Pong Yat Tung.  The 6 disciples founded MWT with two further disciples joined in to become the 8 founders.

3.  It is the Applicant’s case that the affairs of MWT have been run in contravention of its own Regulations as set out in the Abridged Regulations of 1985.  For present purposes, it is not necessary for us to go into the details.  It suffices to highlight that one of the main complaints of the Applicant is that there were people who should not be members according to the Abridged Regulations being nominated and accepted office as members of MWT and have been participating in the management of MWT.

4.  The intended respondent was the Chinese Temples Committees (“the CTC”) which is a statutory body established under the Chinese Temples Ordinance (“the CTO”), Cap 153.  The CTC is the respondent in this appeal.

5.  According to the Applicant, MWT falls within the purview of the CTO as a Chinese Temple and CTC as the statutory body overseeing the affairs of Chinese Temple should intervene.  There is substantial public interest because MWT held a substantial public asset: it owns land of 400,000 square feet and holds substantial fund as a public charity.

6.  After a hearing on 9 May 2019, Lok J (“the Judge”) gave a judgment on 5 June 2019 refusing to grant leave to the Applicant to apply for judicial review.  The Judge held that there was no “decision” amenable to judicial review.  He also held that there were other channels providing for redress which had not been exhausted.

7.  From that decision, the Applicant appeals to this Court.  After hearing submissions of the parties in the appeal on 16 March 2021, we reserved our judgment. 

8.  We now give our judgment in the appeal.

9.  From the reasons set out in judgment of 5 June 2019, the main reason of the Judge in refusing leave is that he could not discern any decision of the CTC which is amenable to judicial review.  Firstly, the Judge explained that the letter of 26 February 2018 from the CTC could not be a decision on the membership of MWT, see [17] to [20] of the judgment. Secondly, the Judge took the view that the CTC is ill-equipped to resolve the dispute concerning membership of MWT and the matter should be addressed by court in civil litigation, see [21] to [25] of the judgment.

10.  We agree that the letter itself could not be read as a decision as such.  However, we are of the view that the significance of CTC’s reply to inquiries from others who have dealings with MWT concerning its membership should be viewed in the context of the role of CTC under the CTO and the overall context of the applicant’s complaint of failure on the part of CTC to act.  The reply of CTC to inquiries included reply to bank at which accounts of MWT are maintained.  It is at least reasonably arguable that the reply from CTC did have an impact on the actual operation of MWT as far as access to the funds in those accounts.  It is also reasonably arguable that the stance taken by CTC might affect the proceedings in HCA 2256/2017 as alleged in paragraphs 24 to 27 of the Form 86.

11.  This brings us to the applicant’s complaint of failure to act which on our reading of the Form 86 was actually her main complaint.  See in particular paragraphs 34, 38, 42 and 43 of the Form 86.

12.  As canvassed at the appeal hearing, in some circumstances a failure to act can be amenable to judicial review.  This is accepted by Mr Ma (appearing with Mr Tam) for the CTC.  The crucial question is whether the circumstances in the present case called for some actions on the part of CTC.

13.  We have gone through some of the provisions of the CTO with counsel at the hearing.  It is a statute enacted in 1928 and the style of drafting is rather out-dated.  It is plain that there are some underlying assumptions regarding the power of CTC incidental to the due performance of its statutory role under the CTO.

14.  In the overall statutory regime of CTO, it is reasonably arguable (and we put it no higher than that since the present appeal is only concerned with leave to apply for judicial review) that, having regard to the statutory objective set out in the preamble of the CTO and the respective roles and functions of the CTC and the Secretary for Home Affairs, the CTC is a statutory body tasked with the overseeing of the proper management, control and finance of Chinese Temples.  One of the means to achieve that is to make regulations on these matters under Section 3(1) of the CTO.  But it is not the only means (as the only regulations that have been made are the Chinese Temple Fund Regulations, Cap 153A and the General Chinese Charities Fund Directions, Cap 153B). 

15.  It is also clear to us that it is reasonably arguable the CTC plays the role of exercising control over the finance of Chinese Temples (see Sections 7(1) and (6) to (8), 8(2) and 9 of the CTO).  It is also reasonably arguable that either the CTC or the Secretary for Home Affairs acts as the registrar for keeping the register provided under Section 5 of the CTO.  Though registration is to be effected at the office of the Secretary for Home Affairs (see Section 5(2) of the CTO), the evidence is that the actual handling of registration, requisitions on registration and dealing with inquiries are done by the CTC.  Reading Sections 5, 6, 10, 11 and 12 together, it is reasonably arguable that the CTC should intervene in cases where there is serious issue over the proper management of a Chinese Temple.  

16.  Whilst the powers set out in the CTO are quite extreme, it is reasonably debatable that CTC has some implied powers to carry out the necessary functions to fulfil its statutory role, including the power to conduct inquiries with the Chinese Temple in question for determining if such explicit powers should be exercised. 

17.  Though the Judge is correct in holding that the CTC does not have the adjudicative power of the court to make a judicial determination on the application of the Abridged Regulations to MWT, it does not mean that CTC can abdicate its administrative role prescribed under the CTO.  In that regard, we respectfully disagree with the Judge that CTC should only play a passive role and his analysis at [25] of the judgment.  For all sorts of reasons, the other legal proceedings may take time to reach a finding (assuming that such proceedings would come to trial) but in the meantime the public interest which the CTO entrusted the CTC to safeguard should not be ignored.

18.  On the materials before the court, we are of the view that there are serious issues to be looked into and the Applicant’s challenge against CTC’s failure to act is reasonably arguable.

19.  In her oral submissions before us, the Applicant mentioned many instances of the monks and supporters of MWT appealing in vain to the CTC to take positive steps.  These instances were not referred to in the Form 86 (as they should be) and they should be set out in the evidence. Likewise, the complaints that the current management of MWT had used the resources of the Temple in a manner inconsistent with the intention of the founders and the Abridged Regulations (insofar as they had been put to the CTC) are not currently within the scope of the judicial review.

20.  We would not rely on these un-pleaded matters in the determination of this appeal.  In light of our decision in this appeal, it is up to the Applicant to consider whether she would seek leave to add these matters by re-amending her Form 86 and to file additional evidence in that regard.

21.  In the premises, the Judge erred in his first reason for refusing to grant leave.

22.  As regards the second reason of the Judge, the Judge seemed to take the view that the only thing that can be done to address the concerns of the Applicant over the affairs of MWT was a determination by the court on the membership of MWT.

23.  With respect, such focus is misplaced.  As mentioned above, it is reasonably arguable that CTC has a statutory role to play in overseeing the management of a Chinese Temple and such a role is an administrative one which should function in tandem with judicial redress over the dispute on membership.  In the judicial review, the Applicant is seeking to compel the CTC to play its administrative role as opposed to the seeking of a judicial determination of the membership by the CTC.

24.  Whilst the CTC cannot function as a court in making judicial determination, likewise the court cannot take up the administrative role of the CTC in overseeing the management and administration of Chinese Temple.

25.  It is reasonably arguable that pending the judicial determination, the CTC should act administratively to safeguard the public interest as required under the CTO.

26.  We therefore respectfully disagree with the Judge in his second reason for refusing leave.

27.  By a Respondent’s Notice of 4 July 2019, the CTC contended that the Applicant has no standing to bring the present judicial review.  It is said that the Applicant has insufficient connection with MWT and the Temple and she has not shown any impingement of her own rights in public law.  Further, she has not shown an interest materially greater than or different from that possessed by ordinary members of the public which may qualify her to bring this application.

28.  The law on standing has recently been reviewed by this Court in Kwok Cheuk Kin v President of Legislative Council[2021] HKCA 169.  As held therein, the issue of standing involved a multi-facet consideration in the particular context of a case.  Whilst there are cases where the standing of an applicant is founded upon his or her personal right or interest being directly engaged, there are other cases where the standing is founded on the applicant acting as a representative of wider public interest. The overarching question is whether the preservation of the rule of law requires standing be given to this applicant to ventilate the issue in question in light of his or her interest. 

29.  The relationship between the Applicant and MWT is not confined to her being the grand-daughter of the founding monk.  Her mother had been the seal-keeper of MWT and, with the delegated authority from the then members, ran the affairs of the Temple like a de facto manageress.  Her mother resided and still resides at a house which situated within the land controlled by the Temple.  The Applicant also actively and regularly assisted her mother though her assistance was provided on a voluntary basis.  She was familiar with the history and affairs of MWT.  She brought these proceedings on her own resources as well as some supporting monks and followers of the founding members.

30.  In our judgment, the Applicant is not a busy-body and she has raised reasonably arguable public law issues for the court to consider.

31.  The principal issue to be considered in the judicial review is the role of CTC in overseeing the management of MWT in light of, according to the Applicant, repeated complaints from those having genuine and sufficient interest in the affairs of MWT.  The determination of the issue would have public law significance for CTC in the proper performance of its role management and administration of Chinese Temple in Hong Kong under the CTO.

32.  We conclude that the safeguard of the rule of law requires standing to be given the Applicant to bring this judicial review.

33.  Another issue raised by the Respondent’s Notice is that the reliefs sought in the Form 86 are inappropriate in that they are uncertain and infeasible and serve no practical purpose.

34.  With respect, we do not agree with the submission of Mr Ma that the determination of the issue in this judicial review serves no utility.  It could at least clarify the role and power of the CTC under the CTO.  Whilst the exact form of relief may have to be considered in the substantive application, we are not satisfied at this stage that leave for the bringing of this judicial review should be refused by reason of lack of proper relief being sought.

35.  For these reasons, we allow the appeal and set aside the order of the Judge (both in terms of refusal of leave and the order as to costs).

36.  Exercising the discretion afresh, we grant leave to the Applicant to bring the judicial review and order that the costs of the application below be in the cause.

37.  As regards the costs of this appeal, we shall make a costs order nisi that the Applicant’s costs in the appeal be in the cause of the judicial review application.  The Respondent should bear its own costs in any event.

38.  This judgment is delivered in English.  If the Applicant needs interpretation assistance she can contact the clerk to Lam VP to arrange for oral interpretation by appointment at the High Court Building.

(M H Lam)
Vice President
(Carlye Chu)
Justice of Appeal
(Thomas Au)
Justice of Appeal

The applicant appearing in person

Mr Jimmy Ma and Mr Keith Tam, instructed by F Zimmern & Co, for the intended respondent

[2020] HKCA 254-CH-2020-04-29

龐孟婷 對 華人廟宇委員會

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CACV 263/2019

[2020] HKCA 254

香港特別行政區

高等法院上訴法庭

民事上訴案件2019年第263號

(原本案件編號:高等法院憲法及行政訴訟2018年第506號)

________________________

申請人 龐孟婷 
 及 
擬答辯人 華人廟宇委員會 
有利害關係的一方 竹林禪院(曼華堂) 

________________________

主審法官:高等法院上訴法庭副庭長林文瀚
 高等法院上訴法庭法官朱芬齡
書面陳詞日期:2019年11月13日2019年11月13日
判案書日期:2020年4月29日

判 案 書

上訴法庭副庭長林文瀚頒發上訴法庭判案書:

前言

1.  2019年6月5日,高等法院原訟法庭法官陸啟康(「原審法官」)頒下判案書,拒絕給予申請人司法覆核許可。根據申請人於2018年9月26日修改的表格86,申請人的司法覆核許可申請是針對擬答辯人在未有核實有利害關係的一方的成員變動是合法的情況下,確認相關成員變動的資料。

2.  申請人不服原審法官的裁決,於2019年6月17日向上訴庭提出上訴。

3.  2019年10月15日,擬答辯人提出傳票,要求申請人向法庭繳存港幣200,000元作為其上訴訟費的保證金。本庭現處理這項訟費保證金申請。

4.  擬答辯人存檔一份2019年10月15日「殷凱輝之非宗教式誓詞」以支持本申請;而擬答辯人的代表大律師亦於2019年11月13日提交其陳詞大綱。申請人亦存檔一份2019年10月29日「龐孟婷之非宗教式誓詞」,以作回應。

5.  考慮過雙方存檔及提交的文件後,本庭認為本訟費保證金申請毋須進行口頭聆訊,可以按照《高等法院規則》第59號命令第14A條規則以書面形式處理。

背景

6.  申請人是高等法院案件HCA 2256/2017的被告人,而有利害關係的一方則為該宗案件的原告人。

7.  有利害關係的一方於2017年10月通過全體成員大會刪除4名成員的身份,並通過委任3位社會知名人士為新成員。在回覆相關人士的查詢時,擬答辯人確認有利害關係的一方成員變動的資料。申請人認為相關委任與刪除成員與有利害關係的一方的簡章不符;而且該變動對申請人在HCA 2256/2017一案中的利益有嚴重影響。因此,申請人提出申請司法覆核許可,要求法庭:

(1)  宣告擬答辯人在未有核實相關成員變動是否符合簡章的情況下而作出的確定是違法及無效的;

(2)  宣告擬答辯人必須核實相關成員變動是符合及根據有利害關係的一方的簡章;及

(3)  命令擬答辯人要採取一切必須行動,以確保有相關成員變動是符合有利害關係的一方的簡章。

原審判決

8.  申請人的申請於2019年5月9日在原審法官席前進行聆訊,當時除有利害關係的一方缺席外,申請人及擬答辯人均委派大律師代表出席。正如上文提及,原審法官拒絕給予申請人司法覆核許可。根據2019年6月5日的判案書,原審法官拒絕申請人的申請是基於:

(1)  擬答辯人並沒有作出任何可以被司法覆核的決定;及

(2)  申請人可以循其他司法覆核以外的途徑尋求民事訴訟的濟助。

申請人的上訴

9.  正如上文指出,申請人不服原審法官的判決,於2019年6月17日向上訴庭提出上訴。根據2019年7月10日經修訂的上訴通知書,申請人提出以下的上訴理由:

(1)  法官犯下法律上的錯誤,錯誤理解及判斷擬答辯人沒有作出可經司法覆核的決定;

(2)  法官錯誤理解及判斷在作出司法覆核前,上訴人尚有其他途徑可作出糾正的事實;及

(3)  法官錯誤理解及沒有依從終審法院對《華人廟宇條例》的立法原意的解釋及擬答辯人在《華人廟宇條例》的法定職能和可行[使]之權力。

本訟費保證金申請

10.  根據2019年10月15日的傳票,擬答辯人的申請是因為申請人很有可能沒有足夠的財政資源遵從法庭針對申請人在敗訴後所作出的訟費命令。其依據是申請人在來往書信及誓詞中多次自稱「一貧如洗」或「清貧如洗的小蟻民」。

11.  在申請人的回應誓詞中,她指出她將會經眾籌港幣200,000元作為訟費保證金,並希望相關人士告知流程及付款支票的收款人名字。

12.  申請人亦於2019年12月15日致函擬答辯人的代表律師,希望安排繳交港幣200,000元的訟費保證金。同時,她在信中指出,她認為擬被告人就本申請所要求的港幣55,000元訟費,並不合理。

法律原則

13.  《高等法院規則》第59號命令第10(5)條訂明,上訴法庭在特殊情況下,可命令就上訴的訟費提供公正的保證。

14.  即使雙方同意,法庭仍有酌情權釐訂保證金的金額,以確保其金額是公正的保證:見Macau First Universal International Limited v Ding Xiao Hong & Ors CACV 190/2014,2014年12月11日,第[8]段,引述上訴庭Hunter法官在Re Cirtex Co Ltd CACV 133/1987,第[8]段中的判詞。

討論

保費保證金命令

15.  首先,本庭認為在本案中頒發訟費保證金是一項合適及公正的命令。在申請人致擬答辯人的信件中,申請人確認雖然她曾任職跨國時裝公司的部門主管,但已辭職多時。她亦承認她已把積蓄捐獻作慈善用途,沒有預留餘款。最重要的是,在回應誓詞中,她並沒有就擬答辯人的申請提出反對。

16.  因此,本庭有理由相信,如果申請人的上訴敗訴,擬答辯人在執行訟費命令時可能會遇到延誤和困難。本庭認為這情況符合《高等法院規則》第59號命令第10(5)條中所指的「特殊情況」。

17.  在審閱申請人的上訴理據後,本庭亦看不到申請人可以以其上訴的勝算機會作為抗衡因素,足以令本庭行使酌情權破例地拒絕頒下訟費保證金命令。

訟費保證金的金額

18.  在本申請中,擬答辯人並沒有按照慣例[1],在支持誓詞中詳細列明在本上訴中各訟費項目中所預算的費用。擬答辯人只在《殷凱輝之非宗教式誓詞》第[13]段中簡單指出:

「 本人估計本律師事務所在申請人上訴申請、後續處理上訴及是次提供保證事宜所產生的訟費,為數約港幣100,000元。本人估計延聘大律師的費用另需約港幣100,000元。」(重點後加)

19.  考慮到本上訴的性質及複雜程度,而且申請人亦沒有就訟費金的金額提出異議,本庭認為擬申請人所要求的金額港幣200,000元屬於合理範圍之內。

本申請的訟費

20.  申請人在她2019年10月29日的回應誓詞中經已表明願意籌集訟費保證金,並要求擬答辯人律師告知繳款流程。儘管如此,擬答辯人沒有就該要求作出回應,並於2019年11月13日提交陳詞大綱,要求法庭繼續處理擬答辯人的申請。

21.  其後,申請人兩次致函擬答辯人的代表律師,作出同樣的要求。在第二封信件(2019年12月15日)中顯示,擬答辯人的代表律師要求申請人繳付港幣55,000元,作為本訟費保證金申請的訟費。申請人認為該訟費的要求並不合理。

22.  本庭同意申請人所指,擬答辯人的訟費要求並不合理。

23.  首先,如前述, 擬答辯人的代表律師沒有在申請文件中詳細列明在本上訴中各訟費項目中所預算的費用。若非申請人同意繳付訟費保證金港幣200,000元,本庭會撤銷訟費保證金的申請。擬答辯人的代表律師不應獲得在提出申請中的支持文件不按規矩行事所涉及的訟費。

24.  其次,雖然她在最初於2019年9月30日拒絕支付訟費保證金,申請人於10月下旬時經已表示她同意繳付訟費保證金的意願。本庭看不到任何理由擬答辯人仍然堅持要求法庭處理本申請,而不以另外(如同意傳票)較符合經濟効益的方式處理。本庭也看不到有任何需要聘請大律師提交陳詞大綱,以繼續本訟費保證金的申請。

25.  因此,本庭祗會給予擬答辯人發出2019年10月15日的傳票(但不包括不符規定的《殷凱輝之非宗教式誓詞》的費用) 及其後按同意傳票方式處理申請的合理費用。本庭在審閱擬答辯人2020年1月20日的訟費陳述書後,以上述基礎並按簡易程序,評估擬答辯人在本申請可獲得的訟費為港幣10,000元。

26.  本庭注意到,根據擬答辯人的支持誓詞,本申請的訟費經已包括在訟費保證金的金額之中。鑑於上文就本申請的訟費之扣減,本庭相應由港幣200,000元中扣減港幣45,000元,以港幣155,000元作為本庭批准訟費保證金的金額。

結論及命令

27.  本庭批准擬答辯人的申請,作出以下的命令:

(1)  申請人須於本命令的日期起計28天內,把港幣155,000元繳存法庭,作為擬答辯人在本上訴的訟費保證金。

(2)  本上訴的所有法律程序擱置,直至上述第(1)段訂明的訟費保證金全數繳存法庭,以及申請人已把有關的通知書,送交民事上訴司法常務官和擬答辯人的律師。上述有關通知書,須於在法庭繳存訟費保證金的同一天內送交。

(3)  倘若申請人在限期前,未有繳存訂明的訟費保證金,經擬答辯人的律師書面通知民事上訴司法常務官,法庭便會隨即撤銷本上訴,毋需另行作出命令或通知。

(4)  本上訴倘若在第(3)段的情況下被撤銷,申請人須支付擬答辯人的上訴訟費,金額如有爭議,交由聆案官評定。

(5)  本申請的訟費,不論最終上訴結果如何,都是由申請人支付給擬答辯人,金額循簡易程序評定為港幣10,000元。這筆訟費於上訴完結後在上述第(1)段訂明的訟費保證金中扣除。

(林文瀚)(朱芬齡)
高等法院
上訴法庭副庭長
高等法院
上訴法庭法官

申請人:無律師代表

擬答辯人:由施文律師行延聘馬耀添大律師及譚智楊大律師代表

有利害關係的一方:無律師代表



[1]  見《香港民事訴訟程序2020》第一冊、第1220頁、第[59/10/34]段:「The application must be made by summons (r.14) and must be supported by an affidavit. In the supporting affidavit, or exhibited to it, there should be a detailed and itemized estimate of the anticipated costs of the appeal, otherwise the court will be reluctant to make an order for security (Bennett v. Digby, The Times, November 21, 1982).」(重點後加)