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2019

RE ISMAIL SHIAK DAWOOD

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[2020] HKCA 26-EN-2020-01-08

ISMAIL SHIAK DAWOOD v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD / NON REFOULEMENT CLAIMS PETITION OFFICE AND ANOTHER

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CACV 27 /2019

[2020] HKCA 26

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF APPEAL

CIVIL APPEAL NO 27 OF 2019

(ON APPEAL FROM HCAL NO 648 OF 2018)

___________________

BETWEEN

 ISMAIL SHIAK DAWOODApplicant
(Appellant)
 and 
 TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD / NON-REFOULEMENT CLAIMS PETITION OFFICE1st Putative Respondent
   
 DIRECTOR OF IMMIGRATION2nd Putative Respondent

___________________

Before: Hon Cheung, Zervos JJA and S T Poon J in Court

Date of Judgment: 8 January 2020

________________________

J U D G M E N T

________________________


Hon S T Poon J (giving the Judgment of the Court):

Background

1.  By a judgment dated 10 May 2019 ([2019] HKCA 520) (“the Judgment”), this Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal against the decision of Deputy High Court Judge Josiah Lam (“the Deputy Judge”) given on 9 January 2019 in which he refused to grant leave to the applicant to apply for judicial review.  The intended judicial review is against the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board dismissing the applicant’s appeal against the decision of the Director of Immigration rejecting the applicant’s non‑refoulement claim.

2.  The facts and issues in the appeal, as well as the Court’s reasons for dismissing it, are set out in the Judgment.  We will not repeat them here.

Notice of Motion

3.  By a Notice of Motion dated 16 May 2019, the applicant applied for leave to appeal against the Judgment to the Court of Final Appeal.

4.  In the Notice of Motion, the applicant set out the following grounds [sic]:

“I would like to inform to court that there is some small error in law in my decision and I like to tell something to adjudicator regarding my case. its not an implausible features I am telling true about my situation. my loan problem is true and I am belong to Muslim religion and money tender belong to Hindu religion. and I like to say that not only Sri Lanka and Myanmar killing the minority even in India too many Muslim killed by BJP supporters for money and for other thing too. but the government never taken action against them beside few incident. my humble request from you give me the time to find the solution to protect my life and I also like to live with my family too”

5.  On 20 May 2019, Master Au-Yeung directed the applicant to lodge with the court his written submission on or before 30 May 2019.  The applicant lodged his written submission as directed.  In his written submission, the applicant basically repeated what he set out in the Notice of Motion.

6.  Pursuant to paragraph 3 of Practice Direction 2.1, we proceeded to consider this application on papers without any oral hearing.

Discussion

7.  Under section 22(1)(b) of the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal Ordinance, Cap 484, leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal may be granted if the question involved in the appeal is one which, by reason of its great general or public importance, or otherwise, ought to be submitted to the Court of Final Appeal for decision.

8.  None of the grounds raised by the applicant identified any errors in the Judgment.  These are not viable grounds. 

9.  Nor do we find any basis to grant leave on the “otherwise” limb. For the reasons that we gave in the Judgment, we did not see any prospect of success in the applicant’s intended appeal against the Judgment.  The statutory criteria for granting leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal under section 22(1)(b) of the Court of Final Appeal Ordinance are not met.

Disposition

10.  Accordingly, we refuse to give the applicant leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal and dismiss his Notice of Motion.

(Peter Cheung)
Justice of Appeal
(Kevin Zervos)
Justice of Appeal
(S T Poon)
Judge of the Court of First Instance

The applicant acting in person

[2019] HKCA 520-EN-2019-05-10

RE ISMAIL SHIAK DAWOOD

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CACV 27 /2019

[2019] HKCA 520

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF APPEAL

CIVIL APPEAL NO 27 OF 2019

(ON APPEAL FROM HCAL NO 648 OF 2018)

___________________

RE:ISMAIL SHIAK DAWOODApplicant

___________________

Before: Hon Cheung, Zevos JJA and S T Poon J in Court

Date of Hearing: 7 May 2019

Date of Judgment: 10 May 2019

___________________

J U D G M E N T

___________________


Hon S T Poon J (giving the Judgment of the Court):

1)   The appeal

1.   This is an appeal by the Applicant against the decision of Deputy High Court Judge Josiah Lam (‘Judge’) given on 9 January 2019 in which he refused to grant leave to the Applicant to apply for judicial review against the decisions of the Director of Immigration and the Torture Claims Appeal Board.

2)   Factual background

2.1nbsp;  The Applicant is a national of India.  He left India on 2 October 2012.  He arrived in Hong Kong on 4 October 2012 and overstayed since 20 October 2012. He subsequently raised a non-refoulement claim.

2.2   The basis of the Applicants’ claim is that he would be harmed or killed by his creditor Kuppan because he failed to repay the latter.

3)  The Director’s Decision and the Director’s Further Decision

3.1   The Director decided against the Applicants’ torture claim on 25 July 2016.  The decision covered Bill of Rights Article 3 (torture/inhuman treatment) risk (‘BOR 3’), as well as other statutory and convention rights against torture and persecution (‘the Director’s Decision’).  

3.2   By a further decision of the Director dated 28 July 2017, the Director also assessed BOR Article 2 (right to life) risk in respect of the Applicant and decided against the Applicant (‘the Director’s Further Decision’). 

4)  The Board’s Decision

4.1   The Applicant appealed against the Director’s Decision to the Board on 4 August 2016.  After a hearing held on 15 February 2018, the Board dismissed the Applicant’s appeal on 29 March 2018 (‘the Board’s Decision’).

4.2   The Adjudicator found there were inconsistent, exaggerating and implausible features in the Applicant’s allegations.  The centrepiece of the Applicant’s claim was that he borrowed money from Kuppan to run his food business.  The Applicant explained how the money was spent.  The Adjudicator was not satisfied with his explanation.  The Adjudicator found it hard to believe that Kuppan would prevent the Applicant from doing business when he wanted the Applicant to have money to pay him.  The Adjudicator did not find the Applicant’s evidence credible.  The Applicant failed to prove any risk that warranted non-refoulement protection.

4.3   The Adjudicator found that even if the Applicant’s allegations were true, his complained situation still did not involve any torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment or arbitrary deprivation of life or persecution for any Convention reasons (race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion).  There was no torture risk, persecution risk, BOR2 risk or BOR3 risk.

4.4   The Adjudicator did not accept Kuppan would be able to seek the Applicant out in the whole of India.  The Adjudicator studied relevant country-of-origin information (“COI”) and considered that internal relocation was viable in the Applicant’s case.

5)  Decision of the Judge

5.   The Judge assessed the Applicants’ application for leave for judicial review.  He stated the legal position that the Court will not intervene by way of judicial review unless there are errors of law or procedural unfairness or irrationality in the decision of the Board. He stated the following:-

“31. The Adjudicator’s report was clear and comprehensive. The Adjudicator studied the Applicant’s case in detail, including the relevant COI. He understood the Applicant’s claim well and the relevant situation in India.

32. The Adjudicator need not state his mental process of judging and weighing the COI. There was no evidence that the Adjudicator cherry-picked information for his decision.

33. The Adjudicator found the Applicant’s claim incredible, so there was no psychological harm to be considered.  Since the Applicant failed to establish any risk that warranted non-refoulement protection, the Adjudicator also need not discuss reasonable state protection (including extended state acquiescence).”

6)  Grounds of appeal

6.1   The Applicant in the Notice of Appeal filed on 17 January 2019 essentially stated that he still has problems in his home country.  The immigration department was unfair.  He needed justice.  His home country was unsafe.  He needed time to settle matters in his life.

6.2   The Applicant’s skeleton submission dated 20 March 2019 stated essentially that he had no legal representation, he had no money, and his legal aid application was pending.  The skeleton submission was attached with a draft document that appears to be a court document in relation to an application by a Mr Appas for an injunction to restrain the Applicant from trespassing his house and disturbing his family members.  Strange enough, the contents therein seem to suggest that the Applicant is involved in a private dispute where he was threatening Mr Appas’ “life and limb”. Mr Appas also alleged that the police was influenced by the Applicant.  In any event, the draft document cannot in any way assist the Applicant’s appeal. 

7)  Our view

7.1   We are of the view that the Applicants’ appeal is without merits.  The Applicants provided no reasonably arguable grounds for judicial review.  The Applicant provided no specifics or elaboration on what his grounds of appeal were.

7.2   An appeal against refusal of leave for judicial review is not an occasion for the Applicants to regurgitate arguments already advanced.  The Court of Appeal would only reverse the decision of the Judge if it could be demonstrated that there were errors in law, that the Judge failed to take into account relevant matters, or the decision was otherwise plainly wrong: see United Muslim Association of Hong Kong v Yusuf Yu[2018] HKCA 451 at [38] and [39].

7.3   Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.

(Peter Cheung)(Kevin Zervos)(S T Poon)
Justice of Appeal
Justice of Appeal
Judge of the Court of
First Instance

Applicant, unrepresented, appearing in person