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2019

RE GHOUS NIAZ

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[2019] HKCA 1412-EN-2019-12-18

RE GHOUS NIAZ

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CACV 72/2019

[2019] HKCA 1412

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF APPEAL

CIVIL APPEAL NO 72 OF 2019

(ON APPEAL FROM HCAL NO 810 OF 2018)

___________________________

RE:GHOUS NIAZApplicant

___________________________

Before: Hon Barma JA, Au JA and Bharwaney J in Court

Date of Judgment: 18 December 2019

________________

J U D G M E N T

________________


Hon Bharwaney J (giving the Judgment of the Court):

1.  On 17 June 2019, this court (Barma JA and Bharwaney J) handed down a judgment dismissing the applicant’s appeal against the decision of Deputy High Court Judge Josiah Lam (“the judge”) on 1 February 2019 refusing leave to the applicant to apply for judicial review. The applicant had sought to review the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“the Board”) dismissing his appeal from the decision of the Director of Immigration rejecting his non‑refoulement claim.

2.  The facts and issues in the appeal, as well as the court’s reasons for dismissing it, are set out in our judgment.[1] We will not repeat them here.

3.  The applicant subsequently applied, by a Notice of Motion dated 26 June 2019, for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal.  The applicant stated in the Notice of Motion that:

(1)  The judges erred in determining that the judge had not failed to appreciate the significance of his claim.  The lack of assistance is an error of law or procedure, evidence of procedural unfairness or failure to adhere to a high standard of fairness;

(2)  The judges have not addressed the issues regarding (4) to (7) in his skeleton submission for the appeal before this court;

(3)  There was a “lack of evidential consideration of issues raised in Court”;

(4)  The judge was wrong to conclude that the applicant had access to language assistance. Interpretation service should have been made available to him;

(5)  The judges should have more understanding of a self-represented claimant and not dismiss his appeal for lack of draft ground of appeal;

(6)  The applicant claimed that “if a litigant has not been informed fully of his rights and be given the opportunity to be heard with such assistance, then it cannot be said that the assistance cannot be of any use as it was not even granted in the first place”.

4.  The applicant lodged a written submission in support of the application on 10 July 2019.  In the written submission, the applicant reiterated the matters raised in the Notice of Motion.  He also submitted that there was a lack of language and legal assistance and that the lack of a hearing for his claim based on BOR 2 risk was unfair.  He asked to have his claim based on BOR 2 risk remitted to the Director for consideration and that he be given legal and language assistance.

5.  Having considered the applicant’s Notice of Motion and written submission, we see no reason to depart from the usual practice of determining an application of this kind on the papers.  We have, therefore, determined the applicant’s application on the basis of the Notice of Motion and written submission.

6.  The matters stated by the applicant in the notice of motion and written submission do not constitute grounds for granting leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal.  The applicant has failed to identify any question of great general or public importance for the Court of Final Appeal to determine, as required by section 22(1)(b) of the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal Ordinance, Cap 484.  Nor is any such question apparent to us from the matters he has raised in the Notice of Motion and written submission.

7.  At [13] – [15] of our judgment, we have already addressed the issue concerning the alleged lack of language assistance (which the applicant advanced in paragraphs 4-7 of his skeleton submission for the appeal before this court).  As for the ground based on the lack of “evidential consideration of issues raised in court”, this ground is vague and lacked particulars.  In our view, these grounds are not reasonably arguable before the Court of Final Appeal.

8.  We note that, hitherto, the applicant has not raised any complaint of the lack of a hearing before the Director for his claim based on BOR 2 risk.  As we have explained before, it is not the practice of the Court of Appeal to grant leave to appeal on new points that were not canvassed in the hearing before it;[2]  nor generally is it the practice of the Court of Final Appeal to grant leave on new fact-sensitive points not argued in the Court of Appeal.[3]

9.  We also do not see any basis for granting leave on the “otherwise” limb under section 22(1)(b).

10.  For these reasons, the Notice of Motion dated 26 June 2019 is dismissed.

(Aarif Barma)
Justice of Appeal
(Thomas Au)
Justice of Appeal
(Mohan Bharwaney)
Judge of the Court of First Instance

The applicant acting in person



[1] See [2019] HKCA 679

[2] See Ageas Insurance Co (Asia) Ltd v Lam Hau Wah Inneo, CACV 65/2014, unreported, 19 May 2015, at [7] to [9]; and The Law Society of Hong Kong v A Solicitor, CACV 78/2014, unreported, 10 July 2015, at [4] to [7].

[3] See Flywin Co Ltd v Strong & Associates Ltd (2002) 5 HKCFAR 356 at [39].

[2019] HKCA 679-EN-2019-06-17

RE GHOUS NIAZ

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CACV 72/2019

[2019] HKCA 679

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF APPEAL

CIVIL APPEAL NO 72 OF 2019

(ON APPEAL FROM HCAL NO 810 OF 2018)

___________________________

RE:GHOUS NIAZApplicant

___________________________

Before: Hon Barma JA and Hon Bharwaney J in Court

Date of Hearing: 10 June 2019

Date of Judgment: 17 June 2019

____________________

J U D G M E N T

____________________


Hon Bharwaney J (giving the Judgment of the Court):

1.  This is an appeal against the decision of Deputy High Court Judge Josiah Lam given on 1 February 2019 refusing leave to apply for judicial review. The intended judicial review was against the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board/adjudicator of the Non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office dated 30 April 2018 dismissing the applicant’s appeal against the decision of the Director of Immigration dated 7 September 2017 rejecting the applicant’s non-refoulement claim.

Background

2.  The applicant is a national of Pakistan.  He entered Hong Kong on 13 September 2012 illegally and was arrested by the police on 15 September 2012.  He lodged a torture claim on 17 September 2012 which was refused on 24 January 2013.  His appeal against the refusal for his torture claim was dismissed on 11 April 2013.  He lodged a non-refoulement claim on 21 November 2013 and 16 December 2013.

3.  The applicant’s claim was based on threats from 3 cricket players who were jealous of the applicant’s achievement in the cricket team.  They kidnapped the applicant and asked him to leave his cricket team.  The details of the applicant’s claim have been summarised by the judge at [2] to [5] of the CALL-1 Form.

4.  By a Notice of Decision dated 7 September 2017 (“the Director’s Decision”), the Director decided against the applicant’s claim.  The Director’s Decision covered the BOR 2 risk[1], BOR 3 risk[2] and the persecution risk[3].

5.  The applicant appealed to the Torture Claims Appeal Board.  After a hearing on 8 March 2018, the Board dismissed the appeal on 30 April 2018 (“Board’s Decision”).

6.  At [28] of the Board’s Decision, the Board accepted that the applicant’s case was credible.  However, the Board held at [32] that because the applicant has stopped playing cricket, there is no ground for the three cricket players to be jealous of him anymore.  The Board was also satisfied at [37] that state protection would be available for the applicant and at [39] that internal relocation would be viable.

The deputy judge’s decision

7.  The applicant filed a form 86 on 9 May 2018 which contained no ground for seeking relief.

8.  In the affirmation in support of the leave application dated 9 May 2018, the applicant advanced the following grounds for judicial review which are summarised below:

(1)   Lack of legal representation in his appeal to the Board and the judicial review application;

(2)   Lack of language assistance in his appeal to the Board;

(3)   The applicant was not informed of any decision concerning him.  This is because there was no one to interpret the content of the decision to him after the Director’s Decision; and

(4)   The appeal bundle was served on the applicant only shortly before the Board hearing and there was a lack of translation and interpretation.  He did not understand the document.

9.  After summarizing the facts and background of the case and giving due consideration to the decisions of the Director and the Board, the judge refused to give leave for judicial review.  The judge gave the following reasons in refusing leave to apply for judicial review at [28] to [38] of the CALL-1 Form:

“28. Judicial review is concerned with the reasonableness, lawfulness and fairness of the decisions and the process of reaching such decisions by the authorities.

29. A non-refoulement claim involves ‘life and limb’; any decision will bear significant consequences on an applicant. Therefore, high standards of fairness must be achieved. The court should look at an applicant’s case under ‘rigorous examination and anxious scrutiny’. Nevertheless, it is said in Re Islam Rafiqul: –

   “The role of the Court in a judicial review is not to provide a further avenue of appeal. The primary decision-makers are the Director and the Board. Though in non-refoulement cases the Court will adopt an enhanced standard in scrutinising the decision of the Board due to the seriousness of issue at hand, the Court should not usurp the role of the Board. Assessment of evidence and COI materials and risk of harm, state protection and viability of internal relocation are primarily within the province of the Board (and the Director). The Court will not intervene by way of judicial review unless there are errors of law or procedural unfairness or irrationality in the decision of the Board”

30. The Applicant complained there was a lack of legal representation for his appeal to the Board.

31. The Court of Appeal has repeatedly stated that an applicant of non-refoulement claim does not have an absolute right to free legal representation at all stages of the proceedings. The Applicant failed to show how his case would be undermined or prejudiced by the lack of legal representation only in the later stages of the screening process.

32. The Applicant raised his language problem. In the current application, a friend helped him to prepare Form 86 and the affirmation. Apparently, the Applicant could find someone to assist him with interpretation/translation and dealing with English documents at all material times. Furthermore, the Applicant was assisted by qualified interpreters while he was still represented by the Duty Lawyer Service and during the screening process before the Director and the Adjudicator. The Applicant had much exaggerated his language problem.

33. The Applicant complained the appeal bundle was served on him only shortly before the Board hearing.

34. According to para. 9.6 of the ‘Principles, Procedures and Practice Directions of the Torture Claims Appeal Board’ and para. 12.6 of the ‘Practice and Procedural Guide of the Administrative Non-refoulement Claims Petition Scheme’, the Director shall send copies of the hearing bundle to the Board and to the Applicant no later than 5 working days prior to the date of the hearing. There was no evidence that the rules had been breached.

35. The appeal bundle would consist mostly of documents that had been seen or submitted by the Applicant during the first-tier screening of his claim. The Applicant's case was not difficult. There was no evidence to show the bundle was difficult or voluminous.

36. The Applicant had not complained to the Adjudicator or asked for adjournment during the Board hearing. He failed to show he really needed more time to prepare for his appeal. On the contrary, it was evident from the Adjudicator’s report that the Applicant had prepared himself for the Board hearing, where he adopted all the information he had submitted and also gave evidence before the Adjudicator.

37. I have reviewed the Adjudicator’s decision under ‘rigorous examination and anxious scrutiny’. The Adjudicator had proper basis for his finding, conclusion and decision which were not Wednesbury unreasonable. He made no errors of law and there was no procedural unfairness. The Adjudicator had engaged in joint endeavour with the Applicant in the screening process. The Applicant had been given reasonable and sufficient opportunities to state and elaborate his case. The Adjudicator was acquainted with the facts and applied the law correctly. He considered the Applicant's claim carefully. The Adjudicator had adhered to the high standards of fairness required of the Applicant’s non-refoulement claim. None of the Applicant's complaints can stand.

Conclusion

38. The Applicant’s complaints are not reasonably arguable. He has no realistic prospects of success in the sought judicial review. I therefore refuse to grant him leave for judicial review.”

Grounds for appeal

10.  In the Notice of Appeal dated 15 February 2019 the applicant advanced the following grounds of appeal:

(1)   The judge’s failure to acknowledge his language incapability is unfair to him.  The CALL-1 Form was not read back to him.  This means that the judge did not even give weight to his handicap;

(2)   The hearing bundle should have been translated to him because his memory had faded;

(3)   The applicant did not have language assistance at all material times;

(4)   The applicant requests translation and language assistance for the better understanding of his case.  He also requests an oral hearing with an interpreter.

11.  In his skeleton submissions dated 10 May 2019, the applicant repeated the matters raised in his Notice of Appeal.  He asked that his case be remitted to the lower court.

12.  The applicant agreed by a letter of 15 February 2019 that the appeal could be heard by two judges. We heard the appeal on 10 June 2019.

Discussion

13.  All of the grounds of appeal are concerned with language assistance.  Even if he is not reasonably proficient in English, it is clear that the applicant had access to language assistance.  As the judge rightly noted in [32] of CALL-1 Form, a friend helped him to prepare Form 86 and the affirmation. The applicant had also been assisted by qualified interpreters while he was still represented by the Duty Lawyer Service and during the screening process before the Director and the Board. He was also able to file his Notice of Appeal and his Skeleton Submissions in the English language in which he identified the alleged errors committed by the judge and made submissions on those alleged errors.

14.  In our view, the applicant cannot credibly make any complaint, even in relation to the rejection of the claim in respect of “BOR 2” risk, without actually identifying what, if any, relevant additional information he could have provided to the Director and the Board had he been assisted by an interpreter at the times when he alleged he did not have such assistance. We are not satisfied that the applicant suffered any real prejudice from the alleged lack of language assistance.

15.  Further, the applicant alleged that the judge did not give weight to his language limitation.  This ground is unfounded. The judge has dealt with this issue at [32] of CALL-1 Form.

16.  In conclusion, the applicant did not in the notice of appeal or his skeleton submissions identify any error of law by the judge, any relevant matter that he failed to consider, or any other reason why the refusal of leave for judicial review was plainly wrong. Nor can we discern any.

17.  There is no merit in the appeal and we dismiss the appeal accordingly.

(Aarif Barma)(Mohan Bharwaney)
Justice of AppealJudge of the Court
of First Instance

The applicant acting in person



[1] This refers to the risk of violation of the right to life under article 2 of section 8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap.383.

[2] This refers to the risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment under article 3 of section 8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap.383

[3] This refers to the risk of persecution with reference to the non-refoulement principle under article 33 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol.