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Miscellaneous Proceedings2019

RE NAHID MOHAMMAD

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[2021] HKCA 798-EN-2021-06-04

RE NAHID MOHAMMAD

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CAMP 309/2019

[2021] HKCA 798

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF APPEAL

MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS NO 309 OF 2019

(ON AN INTENDED APPEAL FROM HCAL NO 1006 OF 2017)

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RE:   NAHID MOHAMMADApplicant

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Before: Hon Cheung, Barma and Au JJA in Court

Date of Judgment:  4 June 2021

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J U D G M E N T

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Hon Au JA (giving the Judgment of the Court):

1.  On 2 September 2020, this Court (Cheung and Au JJA) handed down our judgment (“the Judgment”) [2020] HKCA 735, refusing to extend time to the applicant to appeal against the decision of Deputy High Court Bruno Chan (“the Deputy Judge”) given on 28 June 2019 ([2019] HKCFI 1069) (“the Deputy Judge’s Decision”).

2.  We dismissed the applicant’s summons on the basis that the applicant’s failure to disclose a previous unsuccessful judicial review application before the Deputy Judge amounted to an abuse of process and thus his intended appeal ought to be struck out.  In any event, the applicant failed to advance any viable grounds of appeal against the Deputy Judge’s Decision.

3.  The applicant filed the Notice of Motion and a supporting affirmation on 7 December 2020 to apply for leave to appeal against the Judgment to the Court of Final Appeal.  He failed to lodge his written submissions as directed by the Registrar of Civil Appeals on 8 December 2020.  Pursuant to section 24(2) of the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal Ordinance (Cap 484) (“the HKCFAO”), the application should be made within 28 days from the date of the judgment to be appealed from.  Thus, the deadline for filing the present application expired on 30 September 2020.  The applicant is therefore more than two months out of time.

4.  The facts and issues in the appeal, as well as the Court’s reasons for dismissing it, are set out in the Judgment.  We will not repeat them here.  After reviewing the Notice of Motion, we see no reason to deviate from the usual practice to consider this application on papers pursuant to paragraph 3 of Practice Direction 2.1.

5.  Under section 22(1)(b) of the HKCFAO, leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal will only be granted if the question involved in the appeal is one which, by reason of its great general or public importance, or otherwise, ought to be submitted to the Court of Final Appeal for decision.

6.  Further, as the applicant did not apply for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal within time, the court has a discretion to extend time under section 24(5) of the HKCFAO only if good and sufficient grounds are shown by the applicant.  In deciding whether there are such good grounds, the court is entitled to take into account (a) the length of the delay; (b) the reasons for the delay; (c) the chances of the appeal succeeding if an extension of time is granted; and (d) the degree of prejudice to the respondent if the application is granted.  See: Re Villano Maricar Tabita[2020] HKCA 998; Full Wisdom Holdings Ltd v Traffic Stream Infrastructure Co Ltd CACV 266/2003, 27 July 2004; Bowlstar (HK) Ltd v Ho Kwai Po CACV 156/2006, 10 July 2007; Elijah Saatori v Raffles Medical Group CACV 109/2008, 11 March 2009; and Tsit Wing (Hong Kong) Company Limited & Others v TWG Tea Company Pte Ltd & Another (unreported) CACV 191/2013, 29 January 2015.

7.  For the following reasons, the applicant has failed to show good grounds for an extension of time to be granted.

8.  The delay of more than two months is significant and the applicant failed to provide any explanations.  Further, we are of the view that the proposed grounds of appeal are without merits.

9.  In the Notice of Motion, the applicant advanced the following grounds of appeal:

“THE HIGH COURT AND THE COURT OF APPEAL REFUSED MY JUDICIAL REVIEW. I HAVE NO WAY EXCEPT GOING TO COURT OF FINAL APPEAL. I HAVE NO WAN TO RETURN BANGLADESH. IF I RETURN MY ENEMY WILL KILL ME. MAY BE THE COURT OF FINAL APPEAL WILL GRANT ME LEAVE” [sic]

10.  Neither the Notice of Motion nor the supporting affirmation pinpointed any specific errors of the Judgment.  Plainly, there are no viable grounds of appeal against the Judgment, and the intended appeal has no prospect of success.  It would be futile to extend time.

11.  In any event, the applicant has failed to identify any question of great general or public importance that ought to be submitted to the Court of Final Appeal for decision.  Nor do we see any basis to grant leave on the “otherwise” limb. The statutory requirements under section 22(b) of the HKCFAO are not met.

12.  Accordingly, we refuse to extend the time for the applicant to apply for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal, and dismiss the Notice of Motion.

(Peter Cheung)
Justice of Appeal
(Aarif Barma)
Justice of Appeal
(Thomas Au)
Justice of Appeal

The applicant acting in person

[2020] HKCA 735-EN-2020-09-02

RE NAHID MOHAMMAD

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CAMP 309/2019

[2020] HKCA 735

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF APPEAL

MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS NO. 309 OF 2019

(ON AN INTENDED APPEAL FROM HCAL NO. 1006 OF 2017)

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RE: NAHID MOHAMMAD Applicant

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Before: Hon Cheung and Au JJA in Court
Date of Judgment: 2 September 2020

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J U D G M E N T

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Hon Au JA (giving the Judgment of the Court):

1.  By way of a decision set out in Form CALL-1 by Deputy Judge Bruno Chan (“DHCJ Chan”) dated 28 June 2019 [2019] HKCFI 1069 (“DHCJ Chan’s Decision”), DHCJ Chan dismissed the applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review of the decision the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“the Board”) dated 7 April 2017 (“the Board’s Decision”).

2.  In the Board’s Decision, the Board upheld decisions of the Director of Immigration (“the Director”) dated respectively 21 March 2016 (“the Director’s First Decision”) and 9 March 2017 (“the Director’s Second Decision”) dismissing the applicant’s non-refoulement protection claim.

3.  The Director’s First Decision and the Director’s Second Decision will be referred to collectively as “Director’s Decisions”.

4.  On 18 April 2017, the applicant filed a Form 86 to challenge the Board’s Decision by way of judicial review under HCAL 142/2017.  On 25 August 2017, DHCJ Woodcock refused to grant leave to the applicant.

5.  On 4 December 2017, without appealing against DHCJ Woodcock’s decision, the applicant filed another Form 86 to challenge the Board’s Decision by way of a new application for leave to apply for judicial review under HCAL 1006/2017.

6.  By way of DHCJ Chan’s Decision, DHCJ Chan refused to grant leave to the applicant.

7.  On 8 August 2019, the applicant took out a summons under HCAL 1006/2017 seeking to appeal DHCJ Chan’s Decision out of time.  Under Order 53, rule 3(4) of the Rules of the High Court (“the RHC”), the deadline for the applicant to appeal DHCJ Chan’s Decision expired on 12 July 2019.  He was thus around three weeks out of time.

8.  On 25 November 2019, DHCJ Chan refused the applicant’s application to appeal out of time (“DHCJ Chan’s Extension of Time Decision”) [2019] HKCFI 2733.

9.  On 10 December 2019, the applicant renewed his application for extension of time to appeal before this Court.

Background

10.  The applicant is a national of Bangladesh.  He entered Hong Kong illegally on 24 September 2013 and was arrested by the police on the 27 September 2013.  He lodged a claim for non-refoulement protection on the ground of risk of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment on 29 September 2013.  His claim was later taken as a non‑refoulement claim upon the implementation of unified screening mechanism.

11.  The factual background was set out comprehensively at paragraph 6 of the Director’s First Decision and paragraphs 24 - 64 of the Board’s Decision. In particular, paragraph 24 of the Board’s Decision provides an overview of the events that caused the applicant’s fear.

12.  Briefly stated, the applicant’s non-refoulement claim was made on the basis that he would be harmed or killed by members of Awami League (“AL”).  The applicant claimed that the AL was in power in his home country.  The members of AL constantly oppressed the members of Bangladesh Nationalist Party (“BNP”), to which the applicant belonged.  The AL and its affiliated student organization kept harassing and threatening the applicant for his support of the BNP.  They attacked his father, destroyed his father’s shop, tortured him on two occasions and burnt down his family house in 2009.  His father and brother had since then gone missing.  The police refused to investigate these matters as AL was in power and for the same reason, the applicant was unable to fled to other areas.  Out of fear, he left for Hong Kong.

The Director’s Decisions and the Board’s Decision

13.  By way of the Director’s Decisions, the Director assessed and dismissed the applicant’s claim.  The Director’s First Decision assessed the BOR 3 risk[1], persecution risk[2] and torture risk[3].  The Director’s Second Decision covered the assessment of his claim on BOR 2 risk[4].

14.  The applicant lodged an appeal to the Board against the Director’s Decisions.  An oral hearing was held on 1 March 2017.  After considering the documents and the applicant’s oral evidence, the Board found that the applicant’s claim failed to satisfy the requisite elements of establishing a non-refoulement claim.  The Board found that the applicant’s credibility was questionable in relation to his evidence on the key events (paragraphs 65 - 83 of the Board’s Decision).  The Board also concluded that there was no reasonable likelihood of the applicant being persecuted upon refoulement to his home country (paragraph 85 of the Board’s Decision).  As a result, the Board dismissed his appeal.

The first leave application – HCAL 142/2017

15.  As mentioned before, on 18 April 2017, the applicant filed an application for leave to apply for judicial review against the Board’s Decision under HCAL 142/2017.  The leave application was refused by DHCJ Woodcock on 25 August 2017.  She was satisfied that there was no evidence of procedural unfairness, error of law or a failure to adhere to a high standard of fairness on the part of the Board.

The second leave application – HCAL 1006/2017

16.  The applicant did not first appeal against the decision of DHCJ Woodcock but took out a second application for leave to apply for judicial review against the Board’s Decision on 4 December 2017 under HCAL 1006/2017[5].

17.  His eight grounds for judicial review on procedural impropriety / unfairness and irrationalityare substantially the same as the ones he relied on in his first leave application before DHCJ Woodcock.

DHCJ Chan’s Decision

18.  A hearing for the applicant’s second leave application was fixed on 3 April 2019 but the applicant did not show up.  After considering all the documents available to him, DHCJ Chan dismissed the second leave application on 28 June 2019.  He considered that the principle of resjudicata applied and it was an abuse of process for the applicant to re-litigate his case by bringing a second leave application for judicial review in respect of the same decision of the Board.

Extension of time before DHCJ Chan

19.  On 8 August 2019, the applicant took out a summons seeking to appeal DHCJ Chan’s Decision out of time. In his affirmation filed on the same date, he explained that he did not get the decision on time and he was advised that there was a good ground of appeal. However, he did not provide particulars on the asserted good ground.

20.  By way of DHCJ Chan’s Extension of Time Decision, DHCJ Chan refused to grant extension of time on the basis that the applicant failed to provide a good reason for the delay and that there was no prospect of success in his intended appeal.

Renewed extension of time before this Court

21.  On 10 December 2019, the applicant renewed his application for extension of time before this Court.  He did not provide any explanation for the delay nor did he advance any grounds for the intended appeal.  He also listed DHCJ Chan’s Extension of Time Decision as decision under challenge.

22.  On 13 December 2019, the Registrar of Civil Appeals gave directions to the applicant for the conduct of this summons.  The Registrar pointed out that this application was lodged against DHCJ Chan’s Decision by which the second leave application was struck out as an abuse of process, citing Bepary Shahealom v Torture Claims Appeal Board[2018] HKCA 763.  The Registrar directed that an appeal lodged against the decision made in the second application for leave to apply for judicial review is an abuse of process of the court and such appeal is liable to be struck out.  He further directed that the applicant’s summons was bound to be dismissed and if the applicant did not agree that the summons was bound to be dismissed, he should lodge his written submissions on or before 30 December 2019.  The applicant did not lodge his written submissions as directed.

Legal principles

23.  Whilst it is technically possible to appeal against a lower court’s decision in refusing an extension of time for appealing, it is more straightforward and economical to renew the application for extension of time before the Court of Appeal: see Tang Chai On v Tang Sing Ki [2016] 5 HKLRD 104 at [3] ‑ [8].  Accordingly, we shall treat the applicant’s summons as if it were a renewed application against the substantive decision of the deputy judge, ie, DHCJ Chan’s Decision.

24.  As mentioned, pursuant to Order 53, rule 3(4) of the RHC, an applicant has 14 days to lodge an appeal against a judge’s refusal to grant leave to apply for judicial review.  An applicant who fails to do so cannot appeal unless extension of time to appeal is granted.  In considering whether to extend time for appealing against a decision refusing leave to apply for judicial review, the court will have regard to: (a) the length of delay; (b) the reasons for the delay; (c) the prospect of the intended appeal; and (d) the prejudice to the respondent if an extension of time were granted.

25.  In the absence of a cogent explanation for the delay, extension of time should not be granted unless the applicant has a real prospect of success in the intended appeal, see: Secretary for Justice v Hong Kong & Yaumati Ferry Co Ltd [2001] 1 HKC 125; Re Ansar Muhammad[2018] HKCA 227; Re Gurung Min Bahadur[2018] HKCA 226; and Re Saqlain Muhammad[2018] HKCA 346.

Discussion

26.  In our view, the present application is doomed to fail.

27.  The applicant did not disclose to DHCJ Chan a previous unsuccessful application for leave to judicial review against the same Board’s Decision before DHCJ Woodcock in either his Form 86 or supporting affirmation.  This amounts to an abuse of process and thus the intended appeal should be struck out: Bepary Shahealom, per Lam VP at [22]; Khan Kamran v Torture Claims Appeal Board[2020] HKCA 380; Re Mamun Mohammad Tuhin Al[2018] HKCA 442 at [13]; Sujan Gazi v Torture Claims Appeal Board[2018] HKCA 519 at [4.1].  More so, this also applies to an application to appeal out of time.  On this basis alone, this application should be dismissed.

28.  In any event, the applicant did not provide any explanation for his delay of more than three weeks.  Nor did he satisfy this Court that his intended appeal has real prospect of success as he did not advance any ground of appeal.  There is simply no ground for this Court to intervene DHCJ Chan’s Decision.

29.  In the circumstances, the applicant’s intended appeal has no merits at all and it would be futile to extend time.  Accordingly, we dismiss the applicant’s summons of 10 December 2019.

(Peter Cheung)
Justice of Appeal
(Thomas Au)
Justice of Appeal

The applicant acting in person


[1]   This refers to the risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment under Article 3 of section 8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance (Cap 383).

[2]   This refers to the risk of persecution with reference to the non-refoulement principle under Article 33 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol.

[3]   This refers to the risk of torture under Part VIIC of the Immigration Ordinance (Cap 115).

[4]   This refers to the risk of violation of the right of life under Article 2 of section 8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance.

[5]   It is noted that the applicant did only later take out an application to appeal out of time the decision of DHCJ Woodcock on 23 October 2019, which was refused by DHCJ Woodcock on 25 November 2019.