HK CourtDB
HomeDirectoryMCP
Hong Kong CourtDB
Back to directory
Miscellaneous Proceedings2019

黃世雄 對 王茹

Related cases with same parties

  • DCMP1709/2022WONG SAI HUNG v. WONG YU
  • HCMA242/2017香港特別行政區 訴 黃世雄
  • HCMA62/2010香港特別行政區 訴 黃世雄
  • LDBM374/2000碧蘭大樓業主立案法團 訴 黃世雄

Files (2)

[2020] HKDC 1079-CH-2020-11-23

黃世雄 對 王茹

HTML content

DCMP 4039/2019

[2020] HKDC 1079

香港特別行政區

區域法院

雜項案件2019年第4039宗

________________________

原告人WONG SAI HUNG(黃世雄) 

及

被告人WONG YU(王茹) 

________________________

主審法官:區域法院法官梁俊文內庭聆訊(公開)
聆訊及判決日期:2020年11月17日
判決理由書日期:2020年11月23日

----------------------

判決理由書

----------------------

1.  就本訴訟原告人的申請,本法庭經聆訊後於2020年9月14日頒布判案書(「該判案書」),並作出針對被告人的命令,當中包括訟費的命令,以及原告人訟費金額作出了暫時簡易評估[1]。其後雙方針對該訟費命令分別提出申請。經本聆訊後,本法庭批准原告人的申請,和撤銷了被告人的申請。本法庭現在解釋當時判決的理由。

背景

2.  原告人提出本訴訟,根據《分劃條例》要求法庭頒布售樓令,以解除其與被告人作為涉案物業的共同擁有人的狀況。有關訴訟的背景、雙方的立場和理據、以及當時本法庭的判決理由,已在該判案書詳述,本法庭不會在此重複。

原告人的申請

3.  本法庭頒布售樓令的同時也頒布了訟費命令。該訟費命令是根據當時代表原告人的大律師提交法庭的草擬命令當中第6段所載相關條款作出的,其內容是:—

“The proceeds of sale be applied in the following priority:-

a. in payment of …

b. in payment of …

c. in payment of …

d. in payment of the Plaintiff’s costs in these proceedings, summarily assessed at the sum of HK$120,000;

e. in payment of all costs and expenses incurred by the plaintiff in taking enforcement for recovery of possession of the Property, if necessary;

f. the balance to be paid to the plaintiff and the defendant in equal shares;

g. …”

4.  換言之,賣出相關物業的收益會在先扣減原告人的訟費(經簡易程序被評定為港幣120,000元),和原告人為了執行取回物業管有權的程序所衍生的一切費用和開支後,才經由原告人與被告人平均攤分。

5.  針對上述訟費命令部份,原告人於2020年10月7日提出傳票申請要求法庭修改。

6.  法庭在作出該命令時大致上採納了原告人呈交的草擬命令,雖然該命令實際上有處理訟費的問題,但是由於段落次序先後的問題,現時該命令的效果是雙方共同承擔原告人的訟費和原告人的開支。原告人指這並未有準確反映法庭就訟費方面的裁決。原告人提出的理據當中,本法庭接納下述的部份。

7.  在被告人選擇為案件提出抗辯的情況下,訟費會視乎訴訟結果而定(costs to follow the event),即落敗一方應承擔勝訴一方的訟費,此做法在與《分劃條例》(第352章)相關的案件中亦適用:見Re Inland Lot No 476(未經彚編,案件編號:HCMP 1273/2009,判決日期:2010年3月12日)(第21段)、Tsang Wai Fun v Hui Siu Kwong(未經彚編,案件編號:HCMP 1505/2014,判決日期:2016年1月26日)(第42段)、Yeung Yiu Fai v Tam Yun King(未經彚編,案件編號:DCMP 1280/2015,判決日期:2016年3月1日)(見第70段)。在本案中,不存在任何特殊情況使法庭應該在本案中下達不同的訟費命令,唯因接納原告人的草擬命令文本而出現了錯誤。

8.  《區域法院規則》(第336H章)第20號命令第11條規則容許法庭批准原告人的申請,去更改法庭命令以準確地彰顯法庭的意願。原告人認為,原告人的律師代表在早前呈交草擬命令和在法庭採納此草擬命令時,因段落先後次序的問題而使訟費的實則分配與原告人應得的訟費有分歧,應可被歸類為「意外失誤」(accidental slip)並受上述第20號命令第11條覆蓋。有關與修訂訟費命令相關的案例,可見Adam & Harvey Ltd v International Maritime Supplies Co Ltd [1967] 1 WLR 445(見第448頁C-G段)。

9.  由於該命令尚未根據《區域法院規則》第42號命令第5條規則被蓋章(sealed),故法庭亦可行使其司法管轄權以更改其命令:見HKSAR v Tin’s Label Factory Ltd (2008) 11 HKCFAR 637(見第16段)。

10.  若由被告人承擔原告人的訟費一直是法庭的意圖和/或若法庭未就訟費作出裁決而需要作出此裁決,基於被告人已於訴訟中落敗而案件未有特別原因以致訟費不應跟隨訴訟結果處理的情況下,批准修改命令不應視為對被告人不公平。

11.  因此,本法庭同意批准原告人的申請,即刪除該命令第6段d至f項,並以下述條款取代:—

“d. the balance be split between the plaintiff and the defendant in equal shares;

e. in payment of the plaintiff’s costs of these proceedings as summarily assessed at the sum of HK$120,000, the said sum be paid from the defendant’s share mentioned in paragraph 6d hereinabove;

f. if necessary, in payment of all costs and expenses incurred by the plaintiff in taking enforcement of recovery of possession of the property from the defendant’s share mentioned in paragraph 6d hereinabove;”

被告人的申請

12.  本法庭頒布售樓令同時作出的訟費命令,當中簡易評估原告人訟費金額的部份屬暫時性質,雙方可於該命令所定限期前提出申請要求更改。被告人於2020年9月28日提出傳票申請,表示她「反對目前訴訟要求之金額及要求訴訟費減免」。

13.  在其非宗教式誓章中,被告人指自己沒有收入並須借貸還款。在本聆訊中,被告人除了重申自已沒有收入外,她只顧重申其反對原告人提出本訴訟。被告人完全沒有針對原告人提交的訟費陳述書內容或訟費金額作出有效的陳詞。另外,不論上述原告人的申請是否成功,該命令的效果同樣是訟費將於賣出相關樓宇的得益中扣除。換言之,並不存在被告人需要支付訟費的實際困難。本席同意原告人大律師所指,被告人的申請沒有理據。

結論

14.  鑑於以上所述,本法庭批准原告人的申請。本法庭撤銷了被告人的申請,即簡易評估訟費金額作實。

15.  本法庭認為原告人理應自行為其今次申請負責,原告人大律師沒有反對。因此本法庭命令,就原告人今次的申請不作訟費命令。至於原告人因被告人的申請引致的訟費,包括聆訊一半的訟費,則須由被告人支付。經考慮原告人的訟費陳述書,有關訟費簡易評為港幣6,000元;被告人須於21天內支付。

 ( 梁俊文 )
  區域法院法官

原告人: 由王婕好律師事務所延聘Miss Angel H Y Wong大律師代表

被告人: 沒有律師代表,並親自應訊


[1] 該判案書以英文撰寫,並經法庭傳譯主任向被告翻譯。

[2020] HKDC 747-EN-2020-09-14

WONG SAI HUNG v. WONG YU

HTML content

DCMP 4039/2019

[2020] HKDC 747

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS NO 4039 OF 2019

-------------------------

BETWEEN  
 WONG SAI HUNG(黃世雄)Plaintiff

and

 WONG YU(王茹)Defendant

-------------------------

Before: His Honour Judge Leung in Court

Date of Hearing: 31 August 2020

Date of Judgment: 14 September 2020

--------------------

JUDGMENT

--------------------

1.  By purchase, the plaintiff became the co-owner of the property in question with the defendant. The former now applies for an order for sale of the property, which the defendant resists.

Background

2.  The property in question is Flat A, 7/F Pak Lok Building, Nos 322-326A Nathan Road, Kowloon (“the Property”).  The defendant and her mother (“the Mother”) used to the registered owners of the Property as tenants in common in equal shares since 1989.  The Mother passed away in 2007.  Pursuant to the Mother’s will, her interest in the Property was bequeathed to her husband, the defendant’s father (“the Father”), who was also the executor of the will.  The Father has obtained probate.  By way of assent dated 12 July 2017, the Property became vested in the Father and the defendant as tenants in common in equal shares.

3.  The common allegation of the parties is that the Property had been let out, and carved by the tenant into various units for further subletting.  There is dispute as to whether it was the Father or the defendant who was in charge of such tenancy and took the rental income.

4.  By a Chinese written provisional agreement dated 11 April 2019, the Father agreed to sell and the plaintiff agreed to purchase the former’s half share of interest in the Property subject to tenancy at the consideration of HK$1,440,000.  The English written formal sale and purchase agreement between the Father as the vendor and the plaintiff as the purchaser was dated 25 April 2019.

5.  Since late August 2019, the plaintiff has through solicitors made offers to the defendant to sell the former’s half share to the defendant or alternatively for the parties to sell the Property at the prevailing market price.

6.  The valuation report obtained by the plaintiff suggests that the fair market price of the Property should now be in the region of HK$6,300,000, if sold by private treaty, and HK$5,040,000, if sold by public auction.

7.  Failing to secure the agreement of the defendant one way or the other, the plaintiff commenced the present action in December 2019.

8.  Pursuant to section 3(2), the Director of Lands has been served with these proceedings.

9.  Whilst indicating intention to defend by her acknowledgement of service, the defendant had not filed any evidence in opposition by the time the application first came before this court on 25 May 2020.  Notwithstanding that, this court gave leave to the defendant to do so together with other consequential directions.  Amongst others, there should be no further affidavit evidence after the plaintiff’s reply without leave of the court.

10.  Immediately after the hearing in May 2020, the defendant applied for legal aid, which was refused in June 2020.  The defendant apparently applied for legal aid again in August 2020.  As explained by this court in the direction dated 18 August 2020, this court takes the view that the further proceedings of this action ought not to be deferred because of the automatic stay of proceedings pursuant to section 15 of the Legal Aid Ordinance, Cap 91 triggered by the repeated application by the defendant for legal aid.  Hence the lifting of the stay and direction to proceed by the power of this court under that section.

11.  The matter returned to this court on 31 August 2020.  Besides her affirmation in opposition, the defendant lodged a further letter dated 28 August 2020 making further assertions and enclosing further documentary evidence.  These were introduced other than by way of affirmation, and in any event without leave of the court.

The law

12.  Section 2 of the Partition Ordinance, Cap 352 provides that where a property is held by two or more persons as joint tenants or tenants in common, the court may make an order for the partition of the property pursuant to section 4 or for the sale of the property pursuant to section 6 or refuse to make an order.  Section 3(1) provides that any person interested in such property may institute proceedings in the court by way of an action for partition or sale.

13.  Section 3(4) provides that at the hearing, the court may direct such inquiries as to the nature of the property, the persons interested therein and such other matters as it thinks necessary and proper.

14.  Section 6 provides:-

“(1) In any proceedings under the Ordinance, where it appears to the Court that a partition of the property would not be beneficial to all the persons interested by reason of-

(a) the nature of the land to which the proceedings relate;

(b) the number of the persons interested or presumptively interested;

(c) the absence or disability of some of the persons interested; or

(d) any other circumstances,

the Court may make an order for the sale of the property.

(2) The Court may exercise its powers under subsection (1), notwithstanding the dissent or disability of any person interested.

(3) (a) Without prejudice to subsection (1), if any person interested in the property applies to the Court to make an order for the sale of the property instead of an order for partition, then, unless the other persons interested undertake to purchase the interest of the party applying for an order for sale, the Court may, if it thinks fit, make an order for the sale of the property.

(b) …

(4) On making an order under subsection (1) or subsection (3), the Court may direct a distribution of the proceeds of the sale and give all other necessary or proper consequential directions.

(5) On a sale under this section the Court may allow any of the persons interested in the property to bid at the sale, on such terms as the Court deems reasonable…”

15.  In the present case, the plaintiff consciously became the co-owner of the Property with the defendant.  That said, he is not therefore deprived of the right to extricate himself from the co-ownership and to realise his interest in the Property.  The court in Wong Chun Kei v Poon Vai Ching [2007] 1 HKLRD 825 had this to say:-

“18. These passages from the cases cited above were relied upon … to support the following propositions, namely:

(a) A co-owner has a basic right to rid himself of the shackles of co-ownership and ask for an order for partition or sale.

(b) When it is impracticable to make an order for partition, the court should make an order for sale unless it is persuaded (the burden being on the opposing c-owner(s)) that such an order will not be beneficial to all the co-owners.

(c) Whether an order for sale is beneficial to all the co-owners is not determined by the dissent of the opposing co-owners or the assertion by them that it is not beneficial. It has to be determined by the court objectively.

19. Subject to adding the qualifications, “if he has no other remedy,” before the words “ask for an order for partition or sale” in proposition (1), and “or that it will result in very great hardship to one co-owner” to the end of proposition (2), I am satisfied that these propositions fairly and accurately state the law as regards the court’s jurisdiction when faced with an application for partition or sale under the Ordinance …”

16.  That the co-owners are strangers to each other is a relevant consideration: see for instance, Chan Kit Man v Kwan Lai Hung, DCMP 2766/2016 (17 October 2017).

Order for partition?

17.  It has been held that in the context of a residential unit in a multi-storey building, which is the common form in Hong Kong subject to regulated building control and mutual covenants of all the co-owners of the building, partition of a unit in the building is normally impracticable: see for instance, Liu Chung Hang & Ors v Liu Chung Leung Alfred, HCMP 1255/2007 (19 December 2007).  The Property is no exception.

18.  The Property is a 718 square foot residential flat in a typical multi-storey building.  This court doubts that the division of the Property into units by the tenant for subletting has been duly authorized.  There is in any event no evidence in this respect.  Nor is there suggestion by the defendant that the partitions within the Property could legitimately and ought to remain as they are or that they manage to accurately represent the respective share of interest in the Property of the parties.

19.  All circumstances considered, this court is not convinced that partition of the Property as a way out between the parties is practicable.  The question is whether an order for sale should be granted or refused.

The defendant’s allegations

20.  By way of her affirmation, the defendant raises the following points:-

(1)  It was the Father who was in charge of tenancy of the Property, and had kept most of the rental income.

(2)  Her brother moved into one of the partitioned units in the Property between 2018 and 2019.  She had paid for the management fees, rates, government rent and maintenance since mid-2018.  She moved into one of the partitioned units in the Property in mid-November 2019 after divorce from her husband.  She moved in alone[1].

(3)  She had no prior knowledge about the sale of the Father’s half share of interest in the Property.  She asked the Father in mid-2019 about that.  The Father allegedly gave a single-word response, which she took to be denial of the sale.  She suspects the Father was not aware of the nature of the transaction due to his old age of 92 and alleged physical and mental condition.

(4)  She used to work as restaurant captain and salesperson earning low income.  After an accident at work in 2014, she had to receive medical treatment. She now lives on public assistance and loans.

(5)  Acknowledging that the sale could yield half of the sale proceeds to her, the defendant however complains that she would be deprived of the continuous rental income as her financial support.

(6)  She also refers to her sentiment about the neighbourhood of the Property.

The rental income

21.  The plaintiff deposed to his understanding allegedly obtained from the Father during negotiation with him that it was the defendant who was in charge of the tenancy.  The Father and daughter were not in good terms with each other, and the former had also received no account of rental income from the Property from the defendant.  On behalf of the plaintiff, it is also pointed out that the defendant’s version is not likely, as the Father did not become entitled to anything in the Property until his wife died, and the Property was not vested in him by assent until 2017.

22.  However, the dispute in respect of whether it was the Father or the defendant who was in charge of the tenancy or took the rental income is actually immaterial to the determination of this action.  That would be a matter personal to the Father and the defendant, and the plaintiff did not become involved until after the purchase of the Father’s share of interest in the Property in 2019.  Personally the plaintiff has nothing to do with any rental income from the Property, which, according to the defendant, has also ceased by now.

The defendant’s payment of expenses

23.  The allegation of payment of expenses by the defendant will concern the plaintiff only since the latter became the registered co-owner of the Property in late April 2019.  However, no particular or evidence of such alleged payment has been provided by the defendant.  In any event, whether or not the defendant has a cause of claim against the plaintiff for contribution towards such expenses allegedly paid by her for the Property will be personal between the parties, but not a ground for resisting the application for an order for sale.

Validity of the sale and purchase

24.  He who asserts must prove by evidence with cogency commensurate with the seriousness of the allegation.  In respect of the query about the validity of the sale and purchase between the Father and the plaintiff, the defendant has not come up with any evidence in support from the Father himself.  The fact is that all she managed to raise is suspicion.  She managed to advance her assertion in this respect no further during the hearing.

25.  By her latest letter dated 28 August 2020, the defendant enclosed, amongst other documents, a copy of the snapshot of what appears to be some kind of scan image without description except for her handwritten remark that the Father suffered from brain bleeding and has been hospitalized since 28 July 2020.  The other documents include her appointment slips for outpatient treatment and photographs depicting presumably parts of the interior of the Property.

26.  First, these further assertions and documents were produced other than by way of affirmation, and in any event after the close of affirmation evidence without leave of this court.  The evidence is thus inadmissible.

27.  Second, the documents, even if admitted, amount to no comprehensible evidence of her assertion in respect of the Father.  If the defendant is in possession of medical documents relating to the condition of the Father at the material time, ie when he concluded the sale and purchase of his interest in the Property, there is no reason why all that she managed to produce was this copy of an apparently odd snapshot.  Further, the alleged condition of the Father relates to a time so long after the conclusion of the sale and purchase of his interest in the Property.

28.  Third, the further evidence, even if admitted, does not change the observation of this court about the lack of evidence from the Father himself in support of her allegation regarding the validity of the sale and purchase ever since this action was commenced at the end of 2019.

29.  The sale and purchase documentations recorded that the Father was legally and separately represented by solicitors.  The provisional sale and purchase agreement was in Chinese.  The Father also signed a Chinese declaration to expressly confirm his condition and ability to understand the terms of the transaction.  He also specifically confirmed the absence of any trust relationship or litigation with the defendant regarding his share of interest in the Property.  Payments by cheques to the Father of the agreed consideration for the sale were documented, of which the Father also acknowledged receipt in writing.

30.  In other words, what the defendant now asserts is nowhere near the threshold of properly raising the issue, while at the same time bluntly contradicted by contemporaneous documents executed by the Father.

Hardship

31.  The other points raised by the defendant may be categorized as allegations of hardship.

32.  There is no real issue between the plaintiff and the defendant, insofar as the price at which the plaintiff acquired the Father’s half share of interest in the Property is concerned.

33.  Whether or not the previous offer of the plaintiff to sell his half share of interest in the Property to the defendant was reasonable does not matter either.  The offer was made through solicitors in the open.  The defendant was quite entitled to reject such offer, and she did.

34.  In the present action, the defendant’s half share of interest will now be quantified by the fair market price at which the Property would be sold.  As to that, the plaintiff has adduced surveyor’s valuation evidence which suggests that the Property, if sold, would yield about HK$2 to 3 million representing the defendant’s share.  There is no contrary valuation evidence.

35.  The defendant’s reference to her reliance on rental income from the Property is misconceived and unmeritorious.

36.  First, even according to the defendant, the Property or the partitioned units in it are not let out and there is no rental income now.  There is no suggestion or evidence of any committed or forthcoming tenancy in respect of any part of the Property, or the amount of rental income.

37.  Second, any rental income from any part of the Property, if not sold, will have to be shared between the parties.  The defendant could not legitimately keep all.

38.  Third, this court is curious about how she could remain entitled to public assistance if she can subsist on the alleged rental income.

39.  Fourth, there is no factual basis for suggesting that keeping the Property for rental income will have an obvious advantage over sale in real terms, be it for the defendant alone or both parties.

40.  The defendant’s allegation of sentimental attachment to the neighbourhood, in my judgment, is exaggeration, if not untrue, in view of the fact that she moved to live in the Property only in November 2019 after divorce from her husband.

41.  For the avoidance of doubt, the defendant mentioned her brother in her affirmation, suggesting that he had moved into one of the partitioned units in the Property in 2018-2019.  The allegation is not corroborated by evidence.  In commencing the present action, the plaintiff has served notice to occupants of the Property in May 2020.  There is no reason why the brother has not come forward or brought into the present application by the defendant in support of her case, if there is any truth in what she says.

Conclusion

42.  All circumstances considered, including those discussed above, I am satisfied that discretion should be exercised in favour of granting the order, and that should be for the sale instead of partition of the Property.

43.  A draft order was submitted together with the plaintiff’s supplemental submissions on 31 August 2020, which is in line with sections 6 and 7 of the Ordinance.  An order is hereby made in those terms, subject to the follows:-

(1)  Under §6(d) of the draft order, the plaintiff’s costs of these proceedings are summarily assessed at the sum of HK$120,000.  Such assessment is nisi, which shall become absolute without further order of the court if there is no application to vary within 14 days after service of this order.

(2)  Under §7 of the draft order, the defendant shall execute the necessary conveyance and assignment in connection with the sale as well as the vesting of the Property in the purchaser(s), failing which the plaintiff’s solicitors be authorized to do so instead.

( Simon Leung )
District Judge

Mr Jeremy Cheung and Miss Angel H Y Wong, instructed by Pauline Wong & Co, for the plaintiff

The defendant was not represented and appear.

[If requested, interpreter will be arranged to assist the defendant in receiving this judgment.]


[1] Though according to her, the defendant has two sons.