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Civil Action2019

陳淦輝 v. 楊忠 AND OTHERS

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Files (4)

[2024] HKCFI 1840-CH-2024-07-22

陳淦輝 對 楊忠及另二人

HTML content

HCA 1122/2019

[2024] HKCFI 1840

香港特別行政區

高等法院原訟法庭

民事訴訟2019年第1122號

________________________

原告人  陳淦輝 
 對 
第一被告人楊忠 
第二被告人郭素月 
第三被告人劉靜 

(By Original Action)

及

原告人郭素月 
 對 
第一被告人劉靜 
第二被告人陳淦輝 
第三被告人楊忠 

(By Counterclaim)

________________________

主審法官: 高等法院原訟法庭特委法官王鳴峰內庭聆訊(公開)
聆訊日期: 2024年6月28日
判決日期: 2024年7月22日

判決書


1.  上訴人陳先生在2024年3月7日發出傳票 (“傳票”)。根據該傳票,陳先生申請擱置執行本席於2024年2月20日在本案作出的命令(該“命令”),當中命令:

(1)  陳先生須即時歸還位於香港新界馬鞍山恒明街2號聽濤雅苑第6 座30樓E室、現於郭女士名下的物業(該“物業”)的空置管有權予郭女士;

(2)  陳先生及劉靜須共同及各別向郭女士繳交自2018年12 月6日起直至陳先生歸還該物業的空置管有權予郭女士期間的中間收益;以及

(3)  陳先生須支付郭女士就本案訴訟所招致的訟費。

2.  本席在聽取陳先生的陳詞後,認為陳先生提出的擱置執行申請應予駁回。

3.  首先,陳先生的傳票是根據《高等法院規則》(第4A章)(“《規則》”)第45號命令第11條規則及/或第47號命令第1條規則而提出的。然而,此兩項規則在本案中均不適用。

4.  《規則》第45號命令第11條規則容許訴訟一方因判決後發生的特殊情況,申請擱置執行法庭的判決或命令。該規則規定如下:

“11. 判決後發生的事宜:擱置執行等(第45號命令第11條規則)

在不損害第47號命令第1條規則的原則下,凡有任何判決或命令針對任何一方作出,該一方可以該判決或命令的日期後所發生的任何事宜為理由,向法庭申請擱置執行該判決或命令或申請其他濟助,而法庭可藉命令批予該濟助,並可施加其認為公正的條款。” (強調後加)

5.  就本案而言,從該傳票、陳先生的誓章(附有其上訴理由)和其補充上訴理由可見,陳先生並非依賴任何在本庭作出該命令及頒佈判決書後才發生的特殊情況而提出擱置執行該命令的申請。反之,陳先生的申請似乎是因應其上訴理由而提出的。在此情況下,《規則》第45號命令第11條規則並不適用。

6.  陳先生另引用的《規則》第47號命令第1條規則同樣並不適用。該規則可被節錄如下:

“1. 藉扣押債務人財產令狀而擱置執行的權力(第47號命令第1條規則)

(1)  凡有判決或命令作出,判令某人須支付一筆款項,而在判定債務人或另一方(執行可針對該另一方作出的)於該判決或命令作出時或其後任何時間提出申請後,法庭信納 ——

(a)  有特殊情況不宜強制執行該判決或命令,或

(b)  申請人由於任何因由不能支付該筆款項,

則儘管第3條規則已有規定,法庭仍可藉命令無條件擱置以扣押債務人財產令狀的方式而執行該判決或命令,或命令該判決或命令須在法庭認為適合的期間,按法庭認為適合的條件而擱置如此執行。” (強調後加)

7.  然而,此項規則只適用於以扣押債務人財產令狀的方式而執行的判決或命令。就本案而言,儘管該命令的第2段(即有關陳先生和劉靜須向郭女士支付中間收益的命令)和訟費命令均為「判令某人須支付一筆款項」的命令 ,這些並非有關以扣押債務人財產令狀的方式而執行的判決或命令。因此,這項規則並不適用:Hong Kong Civil Procedure 2024 第47/1/1段。

8.  總而言之,陳先生在傳票中提出的規則,在本案中均不能作為依據。

擱置執行命令的申請應被撤銷

9.  就根據《規則》第59 號命令第 13條規則提出的暫緩執行命令申請而言,適用的法律原則如下:

(1)  根據該規則,除下級法庭或上訴法庭或單一名法官另有指示外,上訴本身不具有將根據下級法庭的決定作出的執行或進行的法律程序擱置的效力,也不會令任何中期行動或法律程序失效。

(2)  因此,除非敗訴方能提出理據支持其擱置執行判決命令的申請,否則法庭不會作出擱置執行的命令。就此而言,高等法院原訟法庭法官馬道立(當時官階)在Star Play Development Ltd v Bess Fashion Management Co Ltd [2007] 5 HKC 84一案中就相關法律原則作出了詳細闡述(見判決書第6-10段)。簡而言之:

(a)  法庭應時刻謹記勝訴方有權享有判決的成果,並應考慮准許擱置執行判決命令對勝訴方所造成的損害。

(b)  敗訴方如欲提出擱置執行判決命令的申請,(1)  必須至少提出可供爭辯(arguable),即有合理機會得直 (reasonable prospects of success)  的上訴理據;並提出 (2)  其他支持法庭行使其絕對酌情權命令擱置執行的原因,例如上訴的判決會在法庭不擱置或暫緩執行判決的情況下變得沒有實質意義:另見Hong Kong Civil Procedure 2024第59/13/1段。

(3)  在考量敗訴方的上訴理據是否有合理機會得直時,法庭僅會以概況的形式和整體性的角度作出初步判斷,而不會鉅細無遺地考慮上訴理據的優劣:Bright Gold Ltd v Mega Well Development Ltd[2019] HKCA 1440第13(c)段。

陳先生的上訴申請並無合理機會得直

10.  陳先生在其上訴通知書和其後存檔的補充上訴理由書中提出了數項上訴理由,可大致歸納如下:

(1)  理由一: 原審法官因陳先生未能呈交任何文件證據,便錯誤拒納他曾為該物業作出財務承擔(包括支付首期、按揭及贖回物業)的說法,尤其是另外一方沒有提出任何證據反證陳先生的說法,而陳先生亦有解釋他未能呈交文件證據的原因(上訴通知書理由1、補充上訴理由2、3);

(2)  理由二:原審法官在考慮陳先生與楊忠簽立租約一事,及陳先生在土地審裁案件作出的聲明時,沒有考慮其他相關事項(包括陳先生對「實益擁有權」欠缺法律認知),以致錯誤得出陳先生就該物業沒有實益擁有權的裁決(上訴通知書理由2 、補充上訴理由4 );

(3)  理由三:原審法官錯誤採納洪思榮的證供,並錯誤裁定郭女士毋須就有否其他人居住在該物業向楊忠或劉靜進行查詢。反之,郭女士本來便知悉陳先生居於該物業,因此她就該物業的權益應受制於陳先生在該物業擁有的實益擁有權(上訴通知書理由3、補充上訴理由5)。

11.  在考慮陳先生的上訴申請是否有合理機會得直時,法庭應考慮以下法律原則:

(1)  根據確立已久的法律原則,在處理涉及事實爭議的裁決時,上訴一方必須提出足夠論據,證明原審法官就該事實的裁決是明顯錯誤的 (plainly wrong),例如原審法官忽略考慮關鍵性的證據、誤解證據、作出沒有證據支持的事實裁定、或作出任何一位法官在理性判斷下都不可能作出的裁決,否則上訴法庭不會推翻該裁決。這是一個相當高的門檻 –– 上訴人不可以單單因為原審法官不接納他的證據或說法,便指該裁決是明顯錯誤的。

(2)  同樣地,上訴法庭不會輕易干預原審法官對證人證詞及其他證據的評估,包括是否信納某位證人的證詞,也不會輕易推翻原審法官對事實的裁斷。這是因為原審法官聽取雙方證人的口頭證供,評估證人在盤問下的表現,享有耳聞目睹的優勢。

(3)  上訴有異於重審。因此,倘若上訴一方只是再次提出及重複其曾經提出但已被原審法官拒納的論點作為上訴理據,而沒有針對原審法官否決的理由提出反駁的理據,這些「理據」並不能構成有效的上訴理據。

(見: Lam Ming Ying (林文英)對So Wah Kwan (蘇華坤). The Administrator of the estate of Chiu Lai Ching, Deceased[2024] HKCA 502第 18-19段;Zhang Rong對Po Shing Construction Ltd及另一人[2024] HKCA 461第25-26段;)

(4)  此外,上訴人在上訴時一般來說不能提出一些在審訊時沒有提出的論點,和/或在原審時沒有提出支持這些議題的證據,尤其是關乎事實、及極為倚重證據的論點,以免對另一方造成不公:許國彬對許國培及另一人 (民事上訴案件2010年第186號,2012年7月4日)第28段(引用終審法院於 Flywin Co Ltd v Strong & Associates Ltd (2002)  5 HKCFAR 356的判決)。

12.  本席已經詳閱了汪大律師非常詳盡的陳詞,並認同她的說法。這裡沒有必要重複。從陳先生的角度而言,他必須理解作為申請人舉證責任在他身上。他不能反過來說被告人郭女士並沒有舉證證明他沒有支付與該物業相關費用的責任。陳先生亦不可以說因為他一直有給錢他前妻,所以他的錢必定與該物業的供款有關。法庭看重的是證據。法庭對物業權益的處理尤其慎重。

13.  其次,陳先生認為本席沒有處理好證據包括郭女士是與他的前妻合謀以低價出售他的物業。必須指出的是。在審訊期間陳先生是有大律師代表的,但陳先生並沒有提出上述嚴重的指控。

14.  綜上,本席認為陳先生並沒有合理的上訴理據。

陳先生並無理據支持其擱置執行的申請

15.  汪大律師亦指出:

(1)  作為申請一方,陳先生有責任提出(除有關其上訴理據以外)支持擱置執行該命令的理據,例如上訴法就該命令提出的上訴判決會否因為法庭不擱置或暫緩執行該命令而變得沒有實質意義(見Star Play Development (同上)第7, 9(1)-(2)段)。

(2)  然而,陳先生並無作出任何相關主張,例如指出繼續執行該命名將對他可能構成的損害。事實上,陳先生的誓章僅僅附上了他擬在上訴申請提出的上訴理由。

(3)  此外,鑑於陳先生的上訴申請欠缺理據,因此上訴判決會因為法庭是次沒有命令擱置執行該命令而變得沒有實質意義的可能性也相應大大減低。

16.  事實上,擱置執行該命令反而會對郭女士造成明顯損害。誠如本席在判決書中第44段所言,已年屆70多歲的郭女士早於五年前動用接近一輩子的積蓄購買該物業作為她和丈夫的退休居所,但二人遺憾地因陳先生的行徑及本案的訴訟而遲遲未能享用該物業。在此情況下,郭女士蒙受的損害並非單單金錢(例如收取中間收益)所能彌補的。有關該命令的執行不應被一再延遲。

更換法官

17.  最後本人亦要指出陳先生申請更換法官處理這次申請理由是本席對他存有偏見。但是他的理據只是本席判了陳先生敗訴。本席認為這並不構成更換法官的理據。而且陳先生亦可以直接向上訴庭再申請。本席認為臨時更換法官並不合適。

總結

18.  綜上所述,郭女士懇請法庭駁回陳先生的擱置執行命令申請,並命令陳先生支付郭女士因是此申請招致的訟費。本席循簡易程序評估該訟費為港幣六萬元。

(王鳴峰)
高等法院原訟法庭特委法官

第二被告人(by original action) 及 原告人(by counterclaim): 由葉謝鄧律師行轉聘汪嘉寶大律師代表

原告人(by original action) 及 第二被告人(by counterclaim): 無律師代表,親自應訊

第一被告人(by original action) 及 第三被告人(by counterclaim):無律師代表,缺席應訊

第三被告人(by original action) 及 第一被告人(by counterclaim):無律師代表,缺席應訊

[2024] HKCFI 357-EN-2024-02-20

陳淦輝 v. 楊忠 AND OTHERS

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HCA 1122/2019

[2024] HKCFI 357

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO 1122 OF 2019

_____________

BETWEEN

陳淦輝Plaintiff
and
楊忠1st Defendant
郭素月2nd Defendant
劉靜3rd Defendant

(By Original Action)

AND

BETWEEN

郭素月Plaintiff
and
劉靜1st Defendant
陳淦輝2nd Defendant
楊忠3rd Defendant

(By Counterclaim)

_____________

Before:Mr Recorder William Wong SC in Court
Dates of Hearing:18 - 20 December 2023
Date of Judgment:20 February 2024

_____________

JUDGMENT

_____________

A. INTRODUCTION

1.  The present action concerns a dispute over the beneficial ownership of Flat E on L30/F of Tower 6, Vista Paradiso, No.2 Hang Ming Street, New Territories (the “Property”). Kwok So Yuet, the Plaintiff in the Counterclaim (“Madam Kwok’) purchased the Property from its registered owner, Mr Yang Zhong (“Mr Yang”), and became the legal owner of the same upon completion on 10 October 2018.

2.  Mr Yang and Madam Kwok signed a provisional sale and purchase agreement on 24 June 2018.

3.  陳淦輝(“Mr Chan”) was and is still an occupant of the Property. He lived in the Property with his ex-wife, Madam Liu Jing (“Madam Liu”). Mr Yang is the husband of Madam Liu’s sister.

4.  Mr Chan claims that he is the beneficial owner of the Property as he contributed RMB300,000 to the down payments of the Property. He also claims that he paid off all the mortgage payments of the Property at around HK$11,000 per month through his wife. The main difficulty faced by Mr Chan is that he adduces no documentary evidence to support his financial contributions to the Property which is the entire basis of his case.

B. ANALYSIS AND DETERMINATION

5.  I am of the view that the key factual issue in this case is whether Mr Chan can discharge the burden of proof that on a balance of probabilities, he indeed made the financial contributions to the Property as he claims. If the answer is in the negative, there is no need for this Court to embark on an inquiry as to whether Madam Kwok is a bona fide purchaser of the Property without notice of Mr Chan’s equitable interest in the Property.

6.  Mr Yeon for Mr Chan was only instructed shortly before the pre-trial review of the present action. He has done his very best but is inevitably handicapped by the lack of evidence to support Mr Chan’s case.

7.  Having considered the evidence, including both documentary evidence and the oral testimony of Mr Chan and Madam Kwok respectively, I have no hesitation to come to the view that there is simply no evidence, other than Mr Chan’s bare allegation, in support of Mr Chan’s case.

8.  First, whilst Mr Chan’s case is that when his ex-wife left him, she took away with all the documents such that he could not have obtained any documents to prove his case, it is surprising that he could not even obtain or produce copies of his own bank statements which could have shown a pattern of withdrawal from his bank account to support his case.

9.  Mr Lee for Madam Kwok is right that in terms of the RMB300,000, there is not a single document whatsoever evidencing the same whether in the form of a loan to Mr Yang and/or a repayment of the loan.

10.  Mr Lee for Madam Kwok also submitted that Mr Chan himself appears to be uncertain whether the RMB300,000 paid by Mr Yang would constitute repayment of his loan. At one point during cross-examination, he denied that the RMB300,000 constituted re-payment and said that it was simply Mr Yang contributing (夾錢) RMB300,000 together with other family members of Madam Liu. At another juncture, he agreed that the RMB300,000 did constitute repayment and that his relationship with Mr Yang was one that was “有借有還”. However, the key is there is no evidence to support his payment of RMB300,000 towards the down payment of the Property.

11.  As for the mortgage repayments, the only relevant documents produced by Mr Chan to support his contribution to the purchase price are: (a) a statement of Mr Chan’s BEA bank account and (b) a 1-page copy of the passbook of Mr Chan’s BEA bank account. The statement shows the transactions in Mr Chan’s account from 3 January 2017 to 14 February 2017. It indicates that, save for a sum of HK$800,000 deposited on 13 February 2017 which was withdrawn the next day on 14 February 2017, the account balance was ranged from HK$0 to HK$601.44. The passbook shows a similar picture. Save for 2 sums totalling HK$322,985.67 deposited on 4 December 2010 which was almost entirely withdrawn on the same day, the account had a balance ranging from HK$0 to HK$8,000.01 from 4 December 2010 to 3 July 2014.

12.  I agree that on the evidence, Mr Chan has not shown that he had the financial means to pay for the mortgage repayments of about HK$11,000 per month.

13.  Further, the documents do not support any pattern of transfer or withdrawal of cash of around HK$11,000 per month.

14.  Under cross-examination, Mr Chan, for the first time, suggests that he kept all his cash derived from his trading business as a parallel goods trader (水貨客) at home, and he paid Madam Liu around HK$30,000 each month in cash.

15.  I agree with Mr Lee for Madam Kwok that, on balance, this is not credible. First, Mr Chan himself admitted that he used a bank account to finance his previous purchase of a property under the Home Ownership Scheme (居屋). He was unable to give any explanation of why he would (as is commonplace) use a bank account in that previous purchase, but would only use cash stored at home for this purchase. Secondly, there is no evidence for his operation of a parallel goods business. He is unable to provide the Court with even the business registration certificate or any tax filings to support his alleged business. Apparently, he operated such business without any business registration certificate and did not pay any taxes for his business. Thirdly, I agree that it is inherently improbable that a person conducting a trade would keep virtually all his income as cash at home, leaving his bank account with virtually no or negligible amounts at all times. Mr Chan produced no documentary records of his purchases or sales of either parallel goods and/or antiques.

16.  Further, Mr Lee is right that under cross-examination, Mr Chan acknowledged that whilst he gave around HK$30,000 in cash to Madam Liu each month, he did not have direct knowledge of whether Madam Liu in fact gave that money (or any part thereof) to Mr Yang for the purpose of making mortgage repayments, since he did not follow Madam Liu to the bank to deposit the sums into Mr Yang’s bank account.

17.  Still further, Mr Chan also said during cross-examination that the sum of HK$800,000 appearing in his bank statement is a sum lent by his friend and used by him for the purpose of redeeming the Property (贖返層樓).

18.  I find that there is no evidence to support such claim. First, this was raised for the first time during cross-examination. HK$800,000 is not a small amount to Mr Chan. If he had indeed paid the said sum, it is inexplicable as to why he did not set that out in his witness statement even if he was then acting in person. Secondly, there is no evidence that the sum was in fact used by Mr Chan to “redeem” the Property. If he were to pay the sum to Mr Yang for the purpose of redeeming the Property, there should at least be a receipt of the said sum. Thirdly, there is no documentary evidence of him having, or transferring or withdrawing, the missing HK$700,000.

19.  Mr Chan’s explanation for his lack of documentary proof is that Madam Liu took away relevant documentary evidence. Mr Chan said under cross-examination that Madam Liu took away documents such as his passport, and invoices or receipts for payment of management fees, rates, etc.. The former is wholly irrelevant. As to the latter, he accepted that the documents would not show whether he paid for those expenses.

20.  Mr Lee for Madam Kwok is also correct in submitting that under cross-examination, Mr Chan acknowledges that in fact no relevant documentation exists, because he purportedly paid for everything in cash, and (even assuming Madam Liu deposited that cash into Mr Yang’s bank account) he does not know whether the deposit slips from the bank would indicate the cash originated from him.

21.  Secondly, in my view, the tenancy agreement reached between Mr Chan and Mr Yang in relation to the Property (the “Tenancy Agreement”) is fatal to Mr Chan’s case. The Tenancy Agreement executed by Mr Chan was for a term of 3 years only, from 18 December 2010 to 17 December 2013. If indeed Mr Chan had any beneficial interest in the Property, it is difficult to fathom as to why he entered into the Tenancy Agreement with Mr Yang, the legal and registered owner of the Property. Mr Chan said in cross-examination that he thought that a tenancy agreement would give him some protection as to his occupation rights. However, the Tenancy Agreement is the anti-thesis of Mr Chan’s asserted beneficial ownership. It makes no sense for a beneficial owner to “let” his own property to himself.

22.  This is particularly so when the tenor of the Tenancy Agreement was only for a period of 3 years. He could not have any protection after the 3-year period. He had to rely on an oral promise from Mr Yang.

23.  In Mr Chan’s affirmation filed in the Lands Tribunal proceedings dated 24 December 2018 pursuant to which Madam Kwok sought vacant possession of the Property, he, on oath, said that:-

“本人陳淦輝於2010年12月18日用港幣叄仟伍佰元租用聽濤雅苑六座30樓E室,為期三年,約滿後業主楊忠對本人講不用合約,你每月交租就得了,一直租用上址到現在。”

24.  This evidence directly contradicts Mr Chan’s case. In cross-examination, he further confirmed that there was never any agreement to rent the Property forever. This seriously affects Mr Chan’s credibility. He was willing to give false sworn evidence in solemn form in order to resist an order of vacant possession.

25.  His case all along before the Lands Tribunal was that pursuant to the Tenancy Agreement, he has the right to remain in the Property rather than he has any beneficial interest in the Property. One would have expected that if one had really paid substantially for the Property including settling all the mortgage payments, one’s first natural reaction would be that he has acquired interest of some sort in the Property rather than to assert his rights qua tenant.

26.  Thirdly, in fact during cross-examination, Mr Chan said that had Madam Kwok allowed him to stay in the Property for a few more months after the completion of the sale and purchase of the Property, he would have moved out of the Property peacefully. This again does not sit well with someone who thought that he has beneficial interest in the Property.

27.  Fourthly, I agree that an agreement to live in the Property forever is contradicted by Mr Chan’s own acceptance later on under cross-examination that the alleged agreement was simply that Mr Chan could live in the Property only on the basis that Mr Yang himself remained the legal owner and could let the Property to him. As and when Mr Yang ceases to be the legal owner then Mr Chan’s right to live in the Property is also terminated. Hence, I do not accept Mr Chan’s evidence that there is an oral agreement for him to rent or live in the Property forever.

28.  Fifthly, I find Mr Chan’s evidence at times confusing. At one stage during the cross-examination he said that since Madam Liu’s sister had acquired a property, his mother-in-law also said that Madam Liu should also acquire a property. Further, when asked on why Mr Yang and his mother-in-law would effectively gift US$200,000 (which amounted to nearly half of the purchase price for the Property) to Mr Chan, Mr Chan’s response was that this was because Mr Chan’s mother-in-law wanted to finance the purchase of the Property for Madam Liu (“外母意思…要買樓比女”). Mr Chan confirmed that it was only his own unilateral understanding that whatever belonged to Madam Liu was shared with him since they were a married couple. If that be the case, the intention might have been that it is Madam Liu rather than Mr Chan should have beneficial interest in the Property.

29.  Sixthly, there is also merits in Mr Lee’s submission that Mr Chan admitted under cross-examination that the alleged agreement was in fact not an agreement between himself and Mr Yang at all, but was merely a unilateral decision made and “announced” (宣布) by Mr Chan’s mother-in-law (i.e. Madam Liu’s mother). Under cross-examination, Mr Chan said that the decision or announcement was made in mid-2010, in the presence of Madam Liu, Mr Chan and his mother-in-law. He did not know whether Mr Yang was present. He also said that he does not recall whether he confirmed with Mr Yang whether the announcement by his mother-in-law represented Mr Yang’s wishes. Hence, there is no evidence that Mr Yang agreed to what his mother-in-law announced. Accordingly, there is no basis to suggest that Mr Yang had made any agreement with Mr Chan.

30.  Seventhly, under cross-examination Mr Chan’s evidence is that after he discovered that the Property had been sold by Mr Yang to Madam Kwok, he never even contemplated claiming the proceeds from Mr Yang and/or Madam Liu. In particular, he did not contemplate enquiring with Madam Liu (during his encounter with her at the Marriage Registry whilst handling the procedures for their divorce in or about 2021) about the sale proceeds or demanding from her that he be entitled to the proceeds of the sale. I agree that this does not sit well with someone claiming to have a beneficial interest in the Property.

31.  Eighthly, Mr Chan also acknowledges under cross-examination that he did not enquire how much mortgage repayments he had to make in total at the time when the alleged agreement was made. I agree that it is inherently improbable that an intending debtor would agree to take up a debt the amount of which he does not know.

32.  Ninthly, Mr Chan said under cross-examination that the bargain was for the Property to be transferred to him only after he had completed all of the mortgage repayments (expected to be around 20 years after purchase). He thus took the risk with his eyes wide open that unless and until he completes all payments in 20 years, he would not have any proprietary interest in the Property (save, perhaps, as tenant). This negates any suggestion that the agreement was for Chan to have a beneficial interest in the Property from the outset, from 2010 onwards.

33.  Finally, for the sake of completeness, I do not consider the evidence of Mr Chan Wah (陳華) helpful. Under cross-examination, Mr Chan Wah confirmed that he has no knowledge of the property rights to the Property, nor does he know whether Mr Chan entered the estate qua legal owner, beneficial owner, tenant, or guest. He simply knew that Mr Chan from time to time entered and exited Vista Paradiso, the estate in which the Property was situated. That fact is neither here nor there.

34.  For all the above reasons, I find as a matter of fact that Mr Chan does not have any beneficial interest in the Property. That should be the end of analysis.

Bona Fide Purchaser Without Notice

35.  Strictly speaking, there is no need to deal with this issue. However, for the sake of completeness, even if this Court is wrong about the analysis above, I find that Madam Kwok is a bona fide purchaser without notice of Mr Chan’s beneficial interest. During cross-examination, there was no challenge to Madam Kwok’s or Mr Hung’s evidence that, during their inspection of the Property, there was nothing to suggest that Mr Chan occupied the Property. The fact that there were two pillows on a bad is neither here nor there. Hotel beds have two (sometimes many) pillows. This fact alone is insufficient to attribute any notice to Madam Kwok.

36.  It was put to Mr Hung, Madam Kwok’s son, that, at the time of inspection of the Property in June 2018, he did not know whether the father of Madam Liu’s daughter lived in the Property or not (to which he agreed).

37.  It was also explored with Mr Hung whether Madam Liu introduced herself as the tenant of the Property when Mr Hung visited the Property. Mr Hung’s answer was that Madam Liu said she represented the landlord to allow prospective purchasers to inspect the Property, and that Madam Liu did also introduce herself as the tenant at the time. This is an additional factor as to why Mr Chan’s case is unbelievable. If indeed, they had been paying the mortgage payments, there was no reason for Madam Liu to inform Mr Hung that she was a tenant. I find Mr Hung’s evidence to be credible.

38.  I also agree that Madam Liu’s statement that she represented the landlord and/or that she was a tenant could not reasonably have alerted Madam Kwok to the existence of another person (such as Mr Chan) having a beneficial interest in the Property.

39.  Further, in relation to Madam Liu’s authority to represent Mr Yang, a written authorisation letter as well as a power of attorney proving Madam Liu’s authority to act on behalf of Mr Yang was obtained prior to completion. There is no suggestion that these documents are invalid, not authentic, or in any way suspicious. I agree that all reasonable steps to answer any query on Madam Liu’s authority to act on behalf of Mr Yang have been taken.

40.  In fact, the very fact that Madam Liu acted for Mr Yang as the legal and registered owner to sell the Property further shows that Madam Liu did not consider she has any beneficial interest in the Property as asserted by Mr Chan.

41.  I also find it nothing unusual that Mr Hung did not ask for the tenancy agreement between Mr Yang and Madam Liu. It was not a sale subject to tenancy agreement. Mr Lee is correct that by doing the best one can, one could muse that Mr Hung would have been told by Madam Liu that as in June 2018 there was no written tenancy agreement. In other words, Mr Hung would only have discovered that Madam Liu was a tenant under an oral tenancy. He would not have been able to discover Mr Chan’s beneficial interest from such answer. The casual link is thus broken.

42.  I shall also say that on the whole, I find Madam Kwok to be a very credible witness. Although she was confused and might be a bit slow in answering the question as to whether she had signed the Provisional Sale and Purchase Agreement herself, I do not find this aspect of the evidence material. There is no dispute that Madam Kwok in fact signed on the formal sale and purchase agreement and, crucially, the Assignment. It is the Assignment that operates to grant Madam Kwok the legal estate of the Property.

43.  Accordingly, I find as a matter of fact that Madam Kwok purchased the Property and became the legal owner of the Property from the completion date of 10 October 2018.

44.  I share with Mr Lee’s submission and sentiment that the regrettable and undisputed reality is that Madam Kwok, who is elderly and not in good health, purchased the Property using virtually all her lifetime savings some 5 years ago as her retirement home; yet, she has to date due to Mr Chan’s actions not been able to enjoy the use of the Property at all. In the meantime, Madam Kwok continues to have to walk up and down the stairs to access her flat in a “tong lou” (唐樓) in Kowloon City each day. This state of affairs cannot be right and should not be prolonged any further.

AMENDMENT APPLICATION

45.  On 19 December 2023, after close of viva voce evidence, Mr Chan took out an application for amendment of his Amended Statement of Claim per the draft Re-Amended Statement of Claim. By reason of the factual findings make by this Court above, I do not accede to the amendment application. In any event, the proposed amendments come very late and cause prejudice to Madam Kwok.

46.  The amendments seek to introduce Mr Chan’s evidence mentioned for the first time in the trial, principally, the “family financing arrangement” allegedly common in the Mainland (“家庭成員夾資模式”). I agree that this idea was only first raised in cross-examination, in respect of which Madam Kwok had no prior opportunity to response to.

47.  In any event, even with such evidence, there is still no factual basis for this Court to find for Mr Chan. For the avoidance of doubt, this Court has taken all the proposed amended facts into account in the consideration of the merits of Mr Chan’s case.

48.  Mr Yeon for Mr Chan fairly accept that based on the present Amended Statement of Claim, Mr Chan has no case to assert a beneficial interest over the Property.

DISPOSITION

49.  For all the reasons stated above, I make the following orders against Mr Chan:

(1) An order for possession of the Property. Mr Chan is to deliver up vacant possession of the Property forthwith.

(2) An order to pay mesne profits on a joint and several basis with Liu, and the mesne profits be assessed at: (a) HK$18,410/month from 6 December 2018 to 5 December 2020 ; and (b) HK$16,832/month from 6 December 2020 till delivery of vacant possession of the Property.

50.  I also make a costs order nisi that Mr Chan is to pay the costs of and incurred by Madam Kwok in these proceedings, on a party to party basis, to be taxed if not agreed. This costs order nisi will be made absolute within 14 days from the date of this judgment unless an application is taken out to vary the same within the 14 days period.

51.  Finally, it reminds for this Court to thank Mr Yeon for Mr Chan and Mr Lee for Madam Kwok for their helpful assistance.

 (William Wong SC)
 Recorder of the High Court

Mr Thomas Yeon instructed by Messrs Tung, Ng, Tse & Lam for the Plaintiff (by Original Action) and the 2nd Defendant (by Counterclaim)

Mr  Brian Lee instructed by Messrs Tony Kan & Co. for the 2nd Defendant (by Original Action) and the Plaintiff (by Counerclaim)

The 1st Defendant (by Original Action) and the 3rd Defendant (by Counterclaim): 楊忠, acting in person, absent

The 3rd Defendant (by Original Action) and the 1st Defendant (by Counterclaim): 劉靜, acting in person, absent

  

[2023] HKCFI 3168-EN-2023-11-20

陳淦輝 v. 楊忠及另二人

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HCA 1122/2019

[2023] HKCFI 3168

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO 1122 OF 2019

_________________

BETWEEN

 陳淦輝Plaintiff
 and 
 楊忠1st Defendant
 郭素月2nd Defendant
 劉靜3rd Defendant

(By Original Action)

AND

BETWEEN

 郭素月Plaintiff
 and 
 劉靜1st Defendant
 陳淦輝2nd Defendant
 楊忠3rd Defendant

(By Counterclaim)

_________________

Before: Deputy High Court Judge Winnie Tsui in Chambers (Open to the Public)
Date of Hearing: 20 November 2023
Date of Decision: 20 November 2023

_______________

DECISION

_______________

1.  I adjourn sine die the plaintiff’s summons dated 8 February 2021 seeking banker’s records from HSBC in respect of the 1st defendant’s two bank accounts, pursuant to section 21 of the Evidence Ordinance, Cap 8.

2.  I further direct that the plaintiff be debarred from restoring the summons, or fixing any fresh or other application concerning the same subject matter of the summons, to be heard on a date before the trial which is scheduled to commence on 18 December 2023.

3.  There be no order as to costs of today’s hearing.

Reasons for adjournment

4.  The summons was taken out on 9 February 2021. It was adjourned sine die on 25 February of the same year. On 10 May of the same year, I granted the plaintiff liberty to restore the summons upon 10 days’ notice being given. The plaintiff did not restore the summons until 31 October 2023, that is almost 2½ years later.

5.  I refuse to hear the restored summons today because it was not served on the 2nd defendant who should have been served. This restored application is the sixth attempt on the part of the plaintiff over the past four years to seek the 1st defendant’s bank account information. So far, he has not had any success.

6.  The previous five attempts are as follows:

(1)  On 3 October 2019, he took out his first summons for discovery. That summons was dismissed on 16 October 2019.

(2)  On 9 February 2021, he took out his second summons for discovery. That summons was adjourned sine die on 25 February 2021. That is the summons which is being restored in today’s hearing.

(3)  On 1 April 2021, he took out his third summons for discovery. It came before me on 10 May 2021. I dismissed that third summons but granted leave to the plaintiff to restore his second summons upon notice being given.

(4)  Then, on 27 January 2022, the plaintiff took out his fourth summons for discovery. On 10 February 2022, it was adjourned indefinitely.

(5)  After a long gap, on 18 October 2023, the plaintiff took out an ex parte application to seek discovery. The judge declined to entertain this application on 31 October 2023 for want of service. That is his fifth attempt to seek discovery under the Evidence Ordinance.

7.  Most notably, in respect of the recent ex parte application, Deputy High Court Judge Simon Leung observed that by taking out this fresh application, the plaintiff was circumventing the order which I made on 10 May 2021. The judge also remarked that the application ought to have been served on the 1st and 2nd defendants. I share that view.

8.  It is true that under section 21 of the Evidence Ordinance, the court has the power to hear an application even if the other party to the action is not being served with the application. That is expressly provided for in the statutory wording. But here, plainly, the 2nd defendant should be served. And I say so for two reasons.

9.  First, when the summons was originally taken out in February 2021, it was served on the 2nd defendant. She was present at the hearing. There is no reason in my view why she should not be served with the restored application.

10.  Secondly, more importantly, the documents which the plaintiff now seeks allegedly go to support his contention that he had made financial contributions to the purchase of the Ma On Shan property. And, on that basis, his case is that he was the beneficial owner of the property even though the legal title was vested in the 1st defendant. These documents, if they do reflect what the plaintiff says they do, would be directly relevant to the defence of the 2nd defendant.

11.  The 2nd defendant purchased the property from the 1st defendant in 2018. In this action, she denies that the plaintiff was the beneficial owner of the property.

12.  These documents are sought by the plaintiff so close to the trial. If I do grant the order today and the documents do reveal information in support of the plaintiff’s case, then he will no doubt use and rely on them at the trial next month. This will certainly have a direct impact on the 2nd defendant and on how she would conduct the trial.

13.  Hence, in the circumstances, the 2nd defendant should be informed of today’s restored application and she should be heard as to whether the application should be granted. Given the lateness of the application, I would consider that the 2nd defendant has every right to submit to the court that the application should not be allowed on that ground.

14.  However, the plaintiff did not serve the restored application on the 2nd defendant. The effect of that is to keep the 2nd defendant in the dark until when the plaintiff obtains documents in his favour. If the court grants the order today, that would be procedurally unfair to the 2nd defendant if that happens.

15.  In the circumstances, I will not hear the restored application today because the 2nd defendant has not been served.

Reasons for debarring any hearing for the same application before trial

16.  In my view, the plaintiff should not be allowed to fix any hearing for the same or similar discovery application before the trial commences on 18 December this year.

17.  Since 2019, the plaintiff has made six applications which have all in substance failed. Five judges and masters had been assigned to deal with them.

18.  More recently, over the past three months, the plaintiff has made at least three applications. First, there is the application made on 11 September to amend the amended statement of claim. That was dismissed by Recorder William Wong, SC. Secondly, there is this ex parte application for discovery made on 18 October. That was not entertained by Deputy Judge Leung on 31 October. Thirdly, there is today’s restored application which I have already refused to hear.

19.  All these applications recently taken out have failed in substance. For the ex parte application and today’s restored application, they have not been proceeded with properly procedurally. These are all very last-minute applications.

20.  The justification for the plaintiff to take out these last-minute applications is that he only engaged the lawyers in August this year and he has been operating on a very limited legal budget.

21.  Each time the plaintiff comes to the court, he asks for an immediate date to deal with his application because he says it is urgent in view of the upcoming trial. But all such urgency is self-induced. And even after the court has given him the opportunity for an immediate hearing or immediate disposal of the application, it would turn out that his applications taken out at the last minute were not well thought through or not properly served.

22.  In my view, the court must express its disapproval on such litigation conduct. All these last-minute applications have resulted in wastage of the court’s resources. It had imposed on three judges over the past three months to specifically allocate time to deal with those applications. There is no duty on the part of the court or other parties to the action to bend over backwards to accommodate the plaintiff’s last-minute applications when the urgency has been self-induced. This pattern of taking out last-minute applications must be put to a stop.

23.  In exercise of my case management power, I would disallow the plaintiff to fix any further hearing for the same subject matter to take place prior to the trial. If the plaintiff wishes to pursue further the discovery application, he should carefully consider what next step he should take from now on.

  ( Winnie Tsui )
Deputy High Court Judge

Mr Thomas Yeon, instructed by Tung, Ng, Tse & Lam, for the plaintiff (by original action) and the 2nd defendant (by counterclaim)

The 1st defendant (by original action) and the 3rd defendant (by counterclaim) was not represented and did not appear

[2021] HKCFI 1850-CH-2021-06-29

陳淦輝 對 楊忠及另一人

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HCA 1122/2019

[2021] HKCFI 1850

香港特別行政區

高等法院原訟法庭

民事司法管轄權

民事訴訟案件2019年第1122號

_________________

原告人陳淦輝 
 及 
第一被告人楊忠 
第二被告人郭素月 

_________________

主審法官:高等法院原訟法庭暫委法官王鳴峰內庭聆訊
聆訊日期:2021年6月24日
判決日期:2021年6月24日
判決理由書日期:2021年 6 月 29日

 

判 決 理 由 書

1.  上訴人陳淦輝先生於2021年4月28日就高等法院聆案官謝沈智慧於2021年3月30日作出的命令 (“該命令”) 的第3、4、5、6、7及8段提出上訴。

2.  本席聽畢陳先生的陳詞後,駁回上訴。原因是 (一) 該命令為案件處理的命令,聆案官的命令合理, 且沒有不妥之處;(二) 陳先生主要是想要多一些時間。如果因為情況有變而陳先生需要更長的時間,他可以向法庭申請延期,但必須有充分的理由;(三) 陳先生主要是想多些時間拿大律師意見。但正如郭律師指出,現在還沒有到需要拿大律師意見的階段。

3.  基於上述理由,本席駁回陳先生的上訴,並判陳先生需支付第二被告人港幣一千五百元作為訟費。

(王鳴峰)
高等法院原訟法庭暫委法官

原告人: 無律師代表,親自應訊

第一被告人: 無律師代表,缺席應訊

第二被告人: 由簡松年律師行郭倩如律師代表