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Civil Action2019

DADRA INC 對 CHAN CHOI HAR IVY

Related cases with same parties

  • CACV74/2023DADRA INC. v. CHAN CHOI HAR IVY
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  • FAMV23/2025CHAN CHOI HAR IVY v. DADRA INC.

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[2023] HKCFI 651-CH-2023-03-10

DADRA INC 對 CHAN CHOI HAR IVY

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HCA 1756/2019

[2023] HKCFI 651

香港特別行政區

高等法院

原訟法庭

民事訴訟案件編號2019年第1756號

____________________

 DADRA INC原告人(判定債權人)
 及 
 CHAN CHOI HAR IVY被告人(判定債務人)

____________________

主審聆案官 : 高等法院聆案官萬可宜法庭聆訊
聆訊日期 :2023年2月27日
判案書日期 : 2023年3月10日

____________________

判案書

____________________

背景

1.  法庭在2021年3月31日頒下判決 (下稱 「該判決」) ,判令被告人/判定債務人(下稱「陳女士」)需向原告人/判定債權人(下稱「債權人」),支付 港幣$90,000,000.00及其附上之利息和經簡易評定為港幣$392,400.00的訟費(共稱「判決數額」)。

2.  陳女士沒有按照該判決向債權人支付判決數額 ,債權人向法庭提出申請,要求法庭根據《高等法院規則》第49B號命令,頒令陳女士接受訊問。法庭接納上述申請,於2021年7月2日頒令陳女士作爲債務人於2021年9月13日接受訊問 ,並在訊問中披露有關其資產負債的文件。

3.  法庭在2021年9月13日押後訊問聆訊 ,並就文件的披露作出命令(下稱「第一個文件披露命令」),要求陳女士作爲判定債務人,須於押後聆訊帶備以下文件呈堂:

a.  判定債務人在本港及外地開立的個人銀行戶口(包括以個人名義單獨開立的戶口、與他人聯名開立的戶口及判定債務人獨資經營或與他人合夥經營的商號或業務的戶口)在過去4年的所有銀行存摺及月結單;

b.  判定債務人作為獨資經營者、合夥人或私人公司股東所經營的業務於過去4年的會計賬目;

c.  過去4年的報稅表及評稅通知書;

d.  判定債務人名下所有的股票證書;

e.  判定債務人名下或其所實益擁有的所有物業的契約或於土地註冊處的登記記項;

f.  判定債務人所擁有及名下的所有車輛的登記文件;

g.  所有顯示判定債務人的支出及詳情的文件,包括任何法庭針對判定債務人所登錄判決的副本;

h.  若判定債務人為僱員,其僱主於過去4年內所發出的薪金單據。

4.  在2021年10月12日和2021年10月21日 ,陳女士先後兩次透過其當時的代表律師 ,向債權人提供了若干銀行月結單 。這些銀行月結單並不完整,並非陳女士「在過去4年的所有銀行存摺及月結單」,也只屬於第一個文件披露命令第2(a)段的部份文件。

5.  押後之訊問聆訊原定於2022年3月14日進行。因疫情影響,該聆訊再次押後至2022年5月13日進行。在2022年5月13日聆訊中,除了之前2021年10月12日和2021年10月21日披露的部份銀行月結單 ,陳女士沒有按照第一個文件披露命令提供更多文件 。由於陳女士當時承認她能取得更多有關文件,並要求更多時間履行披露責任,法庭再次將訊問聆訊押後至2022年10月14日,並作出命令(下稱「第二個文件披露命令」):

「2.陳女士須於2022年8月12日中午12時前(下稱「該限期」),送達至債權人代表律師行以下文件:

a.  判定債務人在本港及外地開立的個人銀行戶口(包括以個人名義單獨開立的戶口、與他人聯名開立的戶口及判定債務人獨資經營或與他人合夥經營的商號或業務的戶口)在過去4年的所有銀行存摺及月結單;其中必須包括Dutfield Estates Limited在2017年9月起計4年內於匯豐銀行或其他銀行開設之戶口的所有銀行存摺及月結單;

b.  判定債務人作為獨資經營者、合夥人或私人公司股東所經營的業務於過去4年的會計帳目;

c.  過去4年的報稅表及評稅通知書;

d.  判定債務人名下所有的股票證書;

e.  判定債務人名下或其所實益擁有的所有物業的契約或於土地註冊處的登記記項;

f.  判定債務人所擁有及名下的所有車輛的登記文件;

g.  所有顯示判定債務人的支出及詳情的文件,包括任何法庭針對判定債務人所登錄判決的副本;

h.  債務人在加拿大Scotia Bank開立的個人名義單獨開立的戶口,與他人聯名開立的戶口。

3.  債務人在匯豐銀行戶口433-000080-888內過去4年內所有達到或超過港幣100,000元的交易的交易詳情(其中包括但不限於支款人的名字,收款人的名字及交易本身的原因目的),以上交易詳情須在2022年8月12日中午12時前以誓章並附上相關證明文件,存檔法庭及提供予債權人代表律師。

4.  就一筆港幣620,000,000元佣金(由債務人或其所控制的公司於大約2018年收取),提供該筆資金去向及交易詳情(其中包括但不限於支款人的名字,收款人的名字及交易本身的原因目的)。以上該筆資金去向及交易詳情須在2022年8月12日中午12時前以誓章並附上相關證明文件,存檔法庭及提供予債權人代表律師。」

6.  在該限期前,或在2023年2月24日前(見以下第10 (iv)段)其他任何時間,陳女士沒有按照第二個文件披露命令提供其他有關文件。

7.  陳女士於2022年8月15日被法庭頒下破產令。在破產管理署署長同意下,訊問聆訊繼續。

8.  於2022年10月14日的押後訊問聆訊中,由於陳女士沒有提供更多其他有關文件 ,債權人決定結束訊問 ,並表示會作出申請,要求法庭將陳女士判處監禁。

9.  債權人於2022年10月31日以傳票(下稱「該傳票」)提出申請,要求法庭依據《高等法院條例》(第4A章)第49B號命令第 1B條規則,將陳女士監禁。

10.  就該傳票:

i)     債權人代表於2022年10月31日存檔了支持誓詞;

ii)    陳女士於2022年12月20日存檔了反對誓詞;

iii)   債權人代表於2023年1月17日存檔了回應誓詞。

iv)   陳女士在沒有法庭事前許可下,於2023年2月24日下午4時30分(即2023年2月27日聆訊前最後一個工作天完結前)存檔了第四份誓詞。

11.  法庭於2023年2月6日就該傳票進行指示聆訊,將該傳票的實質聆訊,押後到2月27日早上10時進行。

法律原則

12.  債權人是根據《高等法院規則》第49B號命令第1B(1)條第 (c) 段,提出該傳票申請。

13.  《高等法院規則》第49B號命令,第1B(1)條第 (c) 段,有如下規定:

“(1) 凡在根據第1A條規則或根據第48號命令進行的訊問後,法庭信納判定債務人——

(a) … …;或

(b) …;或

(c) 故意不作出根據第1A(2)條規則規定須作出的全面披露,或故意不在根據第48號命令進行的訊問中作出全面披露,或故意不回答根據該條規則或該命令規定須回答的任何問題,

則有酌情決定權,可命令將判定債務人監禁,為期不超逾3 個月。”

14.  《高等法院規則》第49B號命令,第1A(2)條有如下規定:

“(2) 在接受訊問時,判定債務人須將其所有資產、負債、收入及支出和對任何資產或收入所作出的處置全面披露,並除法庭另有指示外,須回答所有向其提出的問題。”

15.  在決定債務人是否有觸犯《高等法院規則》第49B號命令第1B(1)條第(c)段的規定,法庭需要考慮的,不單止是債務人有否遵照該命令披露文件,亦須考慮在接受訊問時,債務人是否已回答了債權人提出的,所有與其資產相關的問題。

16.  在Ontone Finance Company Limited v Leung Siu Kee and Others (unrep, HCA 408/2011 and HCA 433/2011, 30 April 2015) 案,法庭指出:

“12. However, the jurisdiction to imprison a judgment debtor should be exercised with care and circumspection. An imprisonment order can only be made if the judgment creditor (who bears the burden of proof) proves beyond reasonable doubt that one or more of the grounds in Order 49B, rule 1B(1) is established. The jurisdiction is analogous to proceedings for contempt, which have been recognised as criminal in nature and must be proved to the criminal standard of proof (see Bank of India v Murjani & Others, CACV 12/1991, 1 May 1991; Honour Finance Co Ltd v Chan Mang, CACV 63/1989, 5 January 1990; Timekeeping Systems Inc v Stephen John Oberlander & Another, HCA 612/2007, 7 August 2009; and Citibank v Chow Tat Sang, HCA 9175/1983, 1 February 1984).

13. It has been emphasised by the courts that even good grounds for suspicion are insufficient to justify an imprisonment order (see Ferryhill International Ltd v Mahmoud Aziz [1997] HKLRD 482; Citibank v Chow Tat Sang, supra).

14. As the criminal standard is applicable, the Court may only draw an inference if: (i) it is grounded on clear findings of primary fact; (ii) it is a logical consequence of those facts; and (iii) it is the only inference that can reasonably be drawn on the basis of those facts (see Winnie Lo v HKSAR (2012) 15 HKCFAR 16).

15. … …

16. In order to invoke the ground under Order 49B, rule 1B(1)(c), non-disclosure must be judged as a whole following the examination rather than on disobedience of any specific order, and the failure to make a full disclosure must be deliberate and intentional, as opposed to accidental or negligent (see Timekeeper Systems, supra; Ferryhill, supra; and Luen Hing Fat Textile Ltd v Lam Shing-chin t/a New Cotton Trading Company [1990] 1 HKLRD 737).”

17.  但在考慮是否作出監禁命令時 ,法庭無需裁定債務人有隱藏資產。LamChi Bin Stanley v OSK Asia FuturesLimited (FAMV 1/2004, 1 April 2004) 。

18.  在考慮是否根據《高等法院規則》第49B號命令第1B(1)條第 (c) 段作出監禁命令時,本席會應用以上法律原則 。

故意不作全面披露的指責

19.  在刻意不披露有關文件方面,陳女士只在2021年10月12日和2021年10月21日先後兩次透過其當時的代表律師,向債權人提供了屬於第一個文件披露命令第2(a)段的部分文件。即使在債權人代表律師發信催促後,陳女士依然沒有披露其他所需文件。

20.  本案與其他一般同類申請不同之處 ,在於陳女士不止一次在聆訊中(包括2022年5月13日及2022年10月14日的訊問聆訊,及2023年2月6日的指示聆訊)承認除了上述已披露文件,她沒有遵從兩個文件披露命令。因此,法庭下一步須裁定陳女士是否故意不作出全面披露。

陳女士的解釋

21.  儘管陳女士第4份誓詞在沒有法庭許可下在最後一刻存檔,由於本申請會影響到陳女士的人身自由,加上債權人表示他們不需要對其内容存檔回覆證據,而本聆訊不受影響,因此本席批准陳女士第4份誓詞存檔,法庭亦會考慮其内容。

22.  在2022年5月13日訊問過程中,當陳女士被法庭問及是否有盡力索取銀行的文件,以履行有關披露的責任的時候,陳女士先是承認自己沒有跟進銀行的文件事宜,然後更說自己「冇得解釋」及後承認自己即使被原告人一直追問,也沒有跟進。

23.  雖然陳女士在她的各反對誓詞中,強調她已 「盡力回答問題」,但基於以下各點,本席認爲完全沒有任何理據支持陳女士有作出任何努力去取得文件:

a)  雖然陳女士在2022年5月13日訊問聆訊中指稱有關文件在自己的公司多次搬遷後已經遺失 ,但她承認可以從銀行索取月結單 。因此法庭才於當天再給予她三個月的時間索取和提供相關文件。直到於2022年10月14日的聆訊 ,陳女士仍然未能提供相關文件 ,亦不能提供任何合理解釋。

b)  陳女士不斷口頭上指稱會反告原告人 、原告人沒有理據執行判決 、或已於内地準備反告原告人等,這些指稱不但沒有任何詳情,亦沒有任何證據支持。最重要的,是陳女士從沒有就該判決提出上訴。因此 ,這些指稱不能成爲不作出文件披露的藉口。

c)  在反對誓詞當中,陳女士聲稱有關港幣$620,000,000元佣金,自己只是收取佣金程序的中間人 ,她不能動用佣金 ,亦由於牽涉商業機密,不能透露 ,而佣金亦不存在戶口中。這些指稱均沒有任何詳細解釋或文件、理據支持。就這解釋,法庭之前已清楚提醒陳女士要索取法律意見 ,陳女士亦表示同意,並於及後表示已尋找法律意見 。但最後 ,陳女士仍不能提供任何合約 、協議或文件支持其指稱。在此情況下,法庭不會接受這些指稱而容許陳女士不用按照法庭命令披露佣金去向和交易詳情。

d)  陳女士又指稱已經將「佣金程序及手續詳情」解釋予破產受托人 。但如以上指出,陳女士提供的文件只提供第一個文件披露命令第(a)至(h)段一共八個段落當中的第(a)段的部份文件,並沒有提供有關港幣$620,000,000元佣金的資料。

e)  再者,破產受托人已於2023年2月13日的信件表示,陳女士於2022年11月29日的會面,並不願意就該筆佣金的去向提供有關資訊 。這清楚顯示陳女士的指稱不盡不實。

f)  無論如何 ,本申請是有關陳女士於訊問中有否遵照法庭命令披露文件 ;法庭並非要求陳女士向破產受托人作出披露 ,因此 ,就算陳女士之後將有關文件交予破產受托人(而事實並非如此),都不代表陳女士已經於訊問中遵照法庭命令披露文件。

g)  在陳女士第4份誓詞中聲稱,由於她以爲在破產後,破產受托人可以自行向銀行要求戶口文件,所以不需她的參與 。但是 ,第二個文件披露命令的限期在陳女士破產令頒佈前3天已經届滿 ,陳女士根本沒有藉口以破產令爲由,而不披露文件。

h)  另一方面,陳女士在第4份誓詞中指,由於她在2022年11月21日停任Dutfield Estates Limited 的董事,因此亦再沒有商業機密及道德考量,而可以在2023年2月24日的第4份誓詞中披露有關港幣$620,000,000元佣金的資料。首先 ,如這解釋屬實 ,法庭不明白爲何陳女士在由2022年11月21日到2023年2月23日的3個月内,沒有作任何披露。

i)  再者,陳女士在第4份誓詞中的所謂披露,只有該筆佣金的支票,一份半頁紙的「分配簡要」,該筆佣金轉帳記錄副本及Dutfield Estates Limited 2018年5月至8月的銀行月結單副本 、2022年周年報表 、ND2A表格 、股票轉讓文件及董事會議記錄。從該「分配簡要」,可見陳女士對披露要求采取的態度:

「有關6.2億的分配

一、  1.5億港元:還款予FDC(有借款協議)

二、  2.2億港元:新兆亞洲有限公司的佣金

- 1.2億港元存入吳總個人戶口

- 5000萬存入李新個人戶口

- 5000萬存入余小玉個人戶口

三、  2.5億港元:陳小姐」

j)  就此6.2億的分配陳女士在第4份誓詞中的補充解釋為 :

收款人 金額 用途
FDC Group Limited 港幣1.5億 還款
Wu Chuangju 港幣1.2億 介紹生意的佣金
李新 港幣5000萬 介紹生意的佣金
余小玉 港幣5000萬 介紹生意的佣金
陳小姐(即陳女士) 港幣2.5億 物業代理的佣金

k)  從以上可見,陳女士清楚擁有該等文件及資料 ,只是不願披露 。再者,直到如今,陳女士仍然沒有提供任何佣金去向的證明文件,或指稱之交易詳情。值得留意的,是陳女士就自己獲得的港幣$2.5億佣金,從開始到現在都未提供任何資料 。而之前指稱基於商業機密或道德考量而不作披露的理由 ,起碼就陳女士本人獲取的港幣$2.5億而言,是不適用的。

24.  因此本席不接納陳女士已盡力作出披露。

25.  基於以下原因,本席亦同意債權人的陳詞,指陳女士清楚明瞭該兩個文件披露命令的內容及其於訊問期間不作披露的法律後果:

a)  在2021年9月13日的口頭訊問排期聆訊當中,聆案官何展鵬已經向陳女士詳細解釋 ,不按照法庭命令於押後聆訊提供文件的嚴重後果,包括但不限於作出監禁命令。

b)  在2022年5月13日的口頭訊問正式聆訊當中,本席曾詢問及確認陳女士是否明白第一個文件披露命令的內容和其中的「警告」,及向陳女士解釋第二個文件披露命令的意思,及不遵從該命令的嚴重性 ,本席亦特別提到監禁的可能性。陳女士當時表示明白。

c)  2023年2月6日的該傳票的指示聆訊,本席再次解釋不遵從第一、二個文件披露命令的後果。

26.  第一個文件披露命令於2021年9月13日發出,當時的披露期限為2022年2月21日。換言之,當時法庭已經給予陳女士超過5個月的時間索取及提供有關文件。至2022年5月13日,已有整整8個月的時間。

27.  在2022年5月13日口頭訊問正式聆訊當天,陳女士沒有準備或提交任何文件。當時她多次向法庭表達 ,倘若給予她更多時間,她便可以通過銀行或核數師獲得該些需要補充的文件,本席亦因此按照了陳女士的要求,給予她三個月的時間索取和提供相關文件,並頒下第二個文件披露命令。

28.  陳女士在本年2月6日的指示聆訊中,也清楚承認她是沒有向債權人披露所需文件,但指稱已向有關破產管理署提供 。可是 ,經過債權人律師向破產受托人作出查詢後 ,破產受托人已在2023年2月13日回覆,指陳女士並沒有披露所需文件。

29.  在訊問聆訊中,債權人多次就一筆港幣$620,000,000 佣金的去向作出詢問 ,因此陳女士必然知道提供該筆佣金有關的銀行文件的重要性。然而,陳女士對Dutfield Estates Limited 在2017年9月起計4年內於匯豐銀行或其他銀行開設之戶口的所有銀行存摺及月結單; 特別是針對港幣$620,000,000佣金收入 ,在2023年2月24日前完全沒有作任何披露,亦並沒有提供該筆款項去向的任何資料。而之後的少部分披露亦明顯只爲暫時應付聆訊而作出。

30.  綜合上述 ,本席認爲債權人在沒有合理疑點的情況下,證明陳女士觸犯了《高等法院規則》第49B號命令第1B(1) 條第 (c)段: 即陳女士在接受訊問時故意不作出全面披露。

酌情權的運用

31.  就是否運用酌情權,本席考慮了以下因素:

a)  判定數額為港幣$90,000,000.00 ;連同利息及訟費,至今已超過港幣$一億元。

b)  陳女士至今仍沒有作出完整披露 ,亦沒有提供合理解釋不作出披露。

c)  陳女士沒有任何合理解釋爲何於訊問聆訊中,就她本人所收的港幣$2.5億佣金,她並沒有作出任何披露。

d)  儘管陳女士在聆訊中聲稱會在21天内提供所有文件,要求法庭再次給予時間她履行命令,但法庭之前已多次給予時間陳女士,在面對監禁之申請,陳女士仍選擇不作披露。在此情況下並沒有任何實質證據能説服法庭她會在21天内遵從披露命令的要求。因此,陳女士完全沒有理據在反對誓詞當中要求法庭無限期押後該傳票 ,或給予她時間把有關文件披露予破產受托人或債權人。

e)  陳女士至今仍嘗試推説沒有遵從命令乃因爲對破產程序及法律原則誤解,但法庭已多次向陳女士指出命令的要求及違反的後果,陳女士亦承認有向朋友(御用大律師)索取法律意見;在此情況下法庭不接納此等解釋 。

f)  陳女士指她本人及丈夫有長期病患,此等並非法庭免除披露責任的理由。

32.  綜合上述,本席認爲應該行使酌情權,將陳女士監禁。

33.  在考慮監禁期限,法庭應考慮債務人的行爲的嚴重性,3個月的監禁上限應留予最嚴重的情況。

34.  就監禁期限,本席考慮了之前案例,包括:

a.  在OSK Asia Futures Limited v Lam Chin Bin Stanley (未經彙集,HCA 10335/2000,2002年7月13日) 一案,法庭裁定判定債務人沒有就自己的資產和投資狀況作出全面披露,判處他一個月監禁;

b.  在Ip Suk Ching v Luk Kam Heung (未經彙集,HCA 1215/2006,2008年12月10日) 一案,法庭裁定判定債務人沒有披露同意命令內的一些文件,判處他一個月監禁。

c.  V Capital Ltd v Margaret Chiu(未經彙編,HCA 1431/2017,2021年10月27日) 一案法庭裁定判定債務人沒有披露同意命令內的一些文件,判處她一個月監禁。

35.  本席認爲,陳女士的行爲,及她處理本申請的態度比以上案件中債務人的行爲更甚 :她明顯在法庭多次提示下,並在清楚明白不遵從第一個及第二個文件披露命令的情況下,選擇不作出披露 。更甚的是,直至本申請聆訊當天,陳女士仍沒有表現她有盡力彌補之前不披露的過失,提供所有文件。本席認爲應以一較長監禁期限反映陳女士行爲的嚴重性及法庭對此等行爲的不滿。

36.  故此,本席認爲監禁的期限應定為6星期。

37.  訟費方面,基於本席上述的理由,及陳女士的行爲 ,判定債務人陳女士應以彌償基準支付債權人就該傳票衍生的訟費。

命令

38.  本席頒下以下命令:

(1)  將判定債務人陳彩霞(Chan Choi Har Ivy)監禁,爲期6星期。執達主任須將陳彩霞(Chan Choi Har Ivy)交付懲教署署長。

(2)  判定債務人的生活及給養的每天津貼定爲$725。

(3)  暫准訟費命令為 :債務人以彌償基準支付債權人就該傳票申請所產生的訟費 。倘若與訟雙方未能就相關訟費的數額達成協議,則有關訟費的數額交由法庭評定。除非與訟任何一方,在本暫准訟費命令作出後14天內,向法庭申請更改本暫准訟費命令,本暫准訟費命令將在14天後 ,變為絕對命令。

(萬可宜)
高等法院聆案官

債權人:由張炳強律師行轉聘文漢釗大律師代表

債務人: 無律師代表, 親自出庭應訊

  

[2022] HKCFI 568-EN-2022-02-28

DADRA INC v. CHAN CHOI HAR IVY

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HCA 1756/2019

[2022] HKCFI 568

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO 1756 OF 2019

_________________

BETWEEN  
 DADRA INCPlaintiff

and

 CHAN CHOI HAR IVYDefendant

_________________

Before:Hon Ng J in Chambers (Open to public)
Date of Hearing:4 August 2021
Date of Judgment:28 February 2022

________________

JUDGMENT

________________

Introduction

1.  Upon the Plaintiff’s application by summons dated 1 December 2020 pursuant to RHC O 14 r 1 (“Summons”), Master K W Wong entered final judgment in favour of the Plaintiff on 31 March 2021 in the sum of HK$90 million together with interest and costs (“Judgment”). 

2.  There is before this court the Defendant’s appeal by Notice of Appeal filed herein on 14 April 2021 (“Appeal”) seeking to set aside the Judgment and for an Order dismissing the Summons alternatively for unconditional leave to defend the Action. 

3.  In this Action, the Plaintiff’s claim is for the sum of HK$90 million being the amount of a cheque no. 736858 dated 3 November 2017 (“Cheque”) drawn by the Defendant in favour of the Plaintiff.  The Cheque was presented for payment on or around 27 March 2018 but was dishonoured and returned unpaid with the remark “Refer to drawer”.

The Applicable Principles

4.  It is trite law that in a RHC O 14 application, the defendant bears the burden of satisfying the Court, in respect of the claim or part of the claim, that there is an issue or question in dispute which ought to be tried or that there ought for some other reason to be a trial of that claim or part.  If the defendant fails to do so, the court may give judgment for the plaintiff.

5.  In Re Safe Rich Industries Ltd unrep, CACV 81 of 1994, 3 November 1994 at [13], Bokhary JA (as he then was) observed that:

“ The test at the summary stage is indeed as simple as whether the defendant’s assertions are believable. But it must be recognized — because failure to recognize it would create a debt‑dodger’s charter — that whether the defendant’s assertions are believable is a question to be answered not by taking those assertions in isolation but rather by taking them in the context of so much of the background as is either undisputed or beyond reasonable dispute.”

6.  Similarly, in Paul Y Management Ltd v Eternal Unity Development Ltd & Ors unrep, CACV 16 of 2008, 12 August 2008, at [19] Cheung JA observed:

“ … In considering whether there are triable issues the Court will, of course, not take the alleged defence on its face value but test it against the evidence disclosed in the affidavit including matters such as contemporaneous documents, whether the alleged defence is inconsistent with the defence previously put forward or whether the defence is only recently raised despite opportunity being given to the defendant to respond earlier. The Court will also consider the inherent probability of the defence. …”

7.  Section 3 of the Bills of Exchange Ordinance, Cap 19 (“BOE”) defines a bill of exchange in the following terms:

“(1) A bill of exchange is an unconditional order in writing, addressed by one person to another, signed by the person giving it, requiring the person to whom it is addressed to pay on demand or at a fixed or determinable future time a sum certain in money to, or to the order of, a specified person or to bearer.

…

(4) A bill is not invalid by reason -

(a) that it is not dated; …”.

8.  Under section 73 of BOE, a cheque is a bill of exchange drawn on a banker payable on demand. 

9.  In Po Yuen (To’s) Machine FTY Ltd v Chan Siu King unrep, CACV 209 of 2002, 19 November 2002 at [7] and [8], Rogers VP observed that:

“7. Unfortunately, the judge’s approach failed to appreciate that evidence which seeks to vary or contradict the agreement contained in the bill of exchange, namely the cheque, is inadmissible. Section 3 of the Bills of Exchange Ordinance, Cap. 19 defines a bill of exchange in the following terms:-

‘(1) A bill of exchange is an unconditional order in writing, addressed by one person to another, signed by the person giving it, requiring the person to whom it is addressed to pay on demand or at a fixed or determinable future time a sum certain in money to, or to the order of, a specified person or to bearer.

(2) An instrument which does not comply with these conditions, or which orders any act to be done in addition to the payment of money, is not a bill of exchange.’

8. Under section 73, a cheque is a bill of exchange drawn on a banker payable on demand. A line of cases, for example, New London Credit Syndicate, Limited v Neale [1898] 2 QB 487, Hitchings and Coulthurst Company v Northern Leather Company of America and Doushkess [1914] 3 KB 907, Great Sincere Trading Co., Ltd. v Swee Hong & Co. [1968] HKLR 660 and Suen Hoi Sun v Kamenar International Limited [1989] 1 HKC 135 demonstrate that attempts to alter the terms of payment are inconsistent with the written instrument and are not inadmissible [sic] in evidence.” (emphasis added)

10.  Similar observations were made by Rogers VP in Lam Tai Kwan v Lo Wai Kit [2007] 1 HKLRD 367 at [10]. 

11.   In SY Chan Ltd v Choy Wai Bor [2001] 3 HKLRD 145 at [8] to [9], Recorder Kwok SC observed that:

“Action on a dishonoured cheque and the parol evidence rule

8. It has been said time and again that bills of exchange are treated as cash, Hong Kong Civil Procedure 2001, paragraph 14/4/19. In view of the formal nature of negotiable instruments, to admit extrinsic evidence would undermine the certainty and finality which ought to attach to each party’s promise on the instrument,Chalmers and Guest on Bills of Exchange, Cheques and Promissory Notes, 15th edition, paragraph 385.

9. A cheque is an unconditional order in writing, drawn and signed by the drawer, requiring the banker to pay on demand a sum certain in money to, or to the order of, a specified person or to bearer, sections 3 and 73 of the Bills of Exchange Ordinance, Cap. 19. The drawer of a cheque, by drawing it, engages that, on due presentment, it shall be paid according to its tenor, and that if it is dishonoured he will compensate the holder, provided that the requisite proceedings on dishonour are duly taken, section 55(1)(a). Extrinsic evidence is, in general, inadmissible to prove that the terms of the contract differed from those expressed in writing on the cheque, Chalmers, paragraph 384.” (emphasis added)

12.  In SY Chan Ltd v Choy Wai Bor, the defendant’s case was that he issued the undated subject cheque to the plaintiff so that the plaintiff could show it to his wife and that he never expected it to be presented at all.  The learned Recorder held that what the defendant was attempting to do was to contradict by oral evidence his written engagement that, on due presentment, the cheque would be paid according to its tenor ie unconditionally and on demand, and that was not permissible.

Deliberation

13.  The Plaintiff’s case is straightforward and fully supported by contemporaneous documents.

14.  Mr Chan Ping Che (“Chan”) is the sole director and shareholder of the Plaintiff.  In his first affirmation dated 26 November 2020 (“Chan 1”), he described the Defendant as an experienced and successful business agent who had been his business acquaintance for many years.

15.  In or about early July 2009, the Defendant and a Ms Keung Wai Fun (“Keung”)approached Chan for a loan of HK$80 million (“Loan”).  Chan agreed and the Plaintiff issued a cheque dated 9 July 2009 in the sum of HK$80 million made payable to the Defendant and Keung (“80 million cheque”).  Both the Defendant and Keung signed an acknowledgement of receipt of the cheque (“Acknowledgment”).

16.  The Loan was secured by a promissory note dated 9 July 2009 (“PN”) signed by the Defendant and Keung.  Under the PN, both the Defendant and Keung promised to repay the sum of HK$80 million on or before 8 February 2010 (“Repayment Date”) for value received.  Until full repayment, the principal sum shall be subject to an additional sum of HK$10 million payable in arrears on the Repayment Date.  The Defendant and Keung failed to repay the HK$80 million or the HK$10 million on the Repayment Date. 

17.  Thereafter, the Defendant and Keung requested the Plaintiff for a total of 8 extensions to the Repayment Date.  The extensions were agreed by Chan on behalf of the Plaintiff.  Each extension of the Repayment Date was secured by a post-dated cheque payable to the Plaintiff in the sum of HK$90 million issued by the Defendant and Keung, and for the last 3 extensions issued by the Defendant alone. 

18.  In about early May 2017, the Defendant was still in financial difficulties and proposed to replace the 7th post-dated cheque with a new one.  Chan agreed.  The Defendant then issued the Cheque payable to the Plaintiff which was already dated 3 November 2017 for the 8th and last extension of the Repayment Date.  It was dishonoured when presented for payment on 28 March 2018.

19.  The Plaintiff’s case is supported by contemporaneous documents including inter alia the 80 million cheque, the Acknowledgment, the PN, the 8 post-dated cheques referred to above, as well as a written Assignment of Proceeds dated 9 July 2009 executed by the Defendant, Keung and the Plaintiff.  The Assignment of Proceeds expressly referred to the PN and the Loan and described Keung and the Defendant as borrowers and the Plaintiff as lender at recital A thereof. 

20.  The Defendant’s case was first pleaded in her 2-page Defence filed herein on 21 October 2019 as follows:

“2. In or about late 2017, merely out of goodwill and gratitude to the Plaintiff and acting in good faith, the Defendant voluntarily and gratuitously acceded to the Plaintiff’s oral request to compensate the Plaintiff for the estimated losses arising from the Plaintiff’s payment of the share of the land premium on behalf of the Defendant in connection with certain land development in珠海市西湖首期工業小區, precise amount to be assessed upon the relevant Chinese government authority approving the change of the land use and demanding payment of land premium in writing.

3. The Defendant also agreed to draw an undated ‘cheque’ (‘the Cheque’) in favour of the Plaintiff and passed it to the Plaintiff in escrow, for the sole purpose of giving comfort to the Plaintiff that the Defendant would honour her commitment for the compensation as pleaded in Paragraph 2, against the mutual agreement that the Cheque shall be returned to the Defendant upon the relevant Chinese government refusing or failing to approve the change of the land use.

4. It has subsequently come to the knowledge of the Defendant that the Plaintiff has failed all the administrate appeals against the Chinese government’s decision of not approving the change of the land use and has wilfully withheld or suppressed such information from the Defendant.

5. Without prejudice to the rights of the Defendant to rely on further or other particulars and arguments:-

(a) There has been no delivery. The Cheque was passed to the Plaintiff for the sole purpose of giving comfort to the Plaintiff that the Defendant would compensate the Plaintiff as pleaded in Paragraph 2. The Plaintiff and the Defendant intended that the undated ‘Cheque’ to be held in escrow by the Plaintiff such that the document did not in fact have the qualities of a cheque.

(b) Further and/or alternatively, there has been no absolute or unconditional delivery.

(c) In any event, the Cheque was undated, and has not been filled up with the Defendant’s permission or authority within a reasonable time as provided in s.20(2) of the Bills of Exchange Ordinance (Cap. 19).

(d) Still further, presentment has not been made within a reasonable time as provided in s.45 of the Bills of Exchange Ordinance (Cap. 19).” (emphasis added).

21.  The Defendant did not deny having issued the Cheque in favour of the Plaintiff as such.  Rather, her contention was that the sole purpose of issuing the Cheque was merely to give comfort to the Plaintiff that the Defendant would honour her voluntary and gratuitous commitment regarding the payment of compensation for the Plaintiff’s estimated losses in relation to certain land development in Zhuhai. 

22.  It can be seen that the Defendant had completely failed to condescend upon particulars of her case. 

23.  There was no explanation as to what the land development in Zhuhai was about, the roles of the Plaintiff and the Defendant, if any, in relation to the development, under what circumstances did the Plaintiff make payment of the share of land premium on behalf of the Defendant and on what terms, what estimated losses the Plaintiff had suffered or expected to suffer as a result of the payment, whether or not the Plaintiff was entitled to request for compensation from the Defendant and if not, why not, if the Plaintiff was not so entitled, why did the Defendant voluntarily and gratuitously accede to the Plaintiff’s request for compensation, why would the Plaintiff agree to return to the Defendant the Cheque given to it for comfort before the Defendant had actually compensated it for its estimated losses, and what exactly was the comfort to the Plaintiff if it had already agreed to return the Cheque to the Defendant when the Cheque was issued to it. 

24.  The matters raised in the Defence are merely bare assertions by the Defendant.  They were full of gaps and raised more questions than answered them.  In this court’s view, the matters so raised are so inherently improbable that they can hardly raise a triable issue for the purpose of resisting the Plaintiff’s Order 14 application or supporting this Appeal.

25.  Moreover, the Defendant’s case as pleaded is that the Cheque was merely issued for the sole purpose of giving comfort to the Plaintiff and should be returned to her if certain events occurred or rather did not occur.  As this court sees it, what the Defendant is really saying is that the Cheque was not to be presented for payment according to its tenor at all ie unconditional and on demand.  This is made even clearer by paragraph 5 of the Defence at which the Defendant made another bare assertion that the Cheque did not even have the qualities of a cheque.  If the Cheque did not have the qualities of a cheque, obviously it was not intended to be presented for payment. 

26.  It seems to this court that, like the defendant in SY Chan Ltd v Choy Wai Bor, what the Defendant is trying to plead in the Defence is a blatant attempt to contradict the agreement contained in the Cheque in a way which would render the issue of the Cheque to the Plaintiff meaningless: cf Atom Xquare Limited v Arist Home Limited & Anor unrep, HCA 1511 of 2017, 9 October 2019, Coleman J at [29].  In these circumstances, even if the Defence were actually supported by evidence from the Defendant, which it was not, this court would have no hesitation in ruling such evidence inadmissible. 

27.  The Defendant’s case has since then changed. 

28.  On 26 February 2021, the Defendant filed her 1st affirmation in opposition to the Plaintiff’s Order 14 application (“Defendant 1”).  Instead of supporting the case raised in her Defence, the Defendant has put forward a very different case as follows. 

29.  As far as the Loan, the 80 million cheque and the PN are concerned, the Defendant’s response is this.

30.  In around 2009, there was an opportunity to acquire the land use rights of two pieces of land (“Land Use Rights”) in Zhuhai.  The Defendant, Chan and Keung thought the two pieces of land had great development potential and agreed to acquire the Land Use Rights (“Agreement”). According to the Agreement, Chan would contribute HK$80 million whereas Keung and the Defendant would each contribute HK$30 million.  For the sake of convenience, Chan’s HK$80 million would first be transferred to Keung and the Defendant who would transfer the same as well as their respective contributions to acquire the Land Use Rights.

31.  Solely as security for Chan’s HK$80 million, Keung and the Defendant agreed to execute a promissory note in favour of Chan for the HK$80 million together with interest in the sum of HK$10 million.  Once the HK$80 million were used to acquire the Land Use Rights, there would be no debt under the promissory note. 

32.  Thereafter, on or about 9 July 2009, Chan caused the Plaintiff to pay HK$80 million into the joint account of Keung and the Defendant by cheque ie the 80 million cheque.  On the same day, Keung and the Defendant executed a promissory note for HK$80 million with a repayment date of 8 February 2010, being the estimated time necessary for acquiring the Land Use Rights.  Presumably, the Defendant was referred to the PN.  As the PN was executed solely to give security to Chan that his HK$80 million would be (and have subsequently been) duly transferred into the PRC for the acquisition of the Land Use Rights, there was no loan or debt as alleged.  Hence, there was no repayment by 8 February 2010.

33.  As far as the Cheque is concerned, the Defendant’s explanation is this. 

34.  In or around mid-2013, Chan was experiencing losses in his own business and became increasingly frustrated with the delayed acquisition of the Land Use Rights which he deemed to be a failure.  Towards late 2013, Chan proposed to Keung and the Defendant to buy out his share under the Agreement, to which proposal they agreed to pay HK$90 million.  For reasons unexplained, Chan[1] kept requesting Keung and the Defendant to issue new cheques to extend their acquisition of his share.  Out of trust for Chan, Keung and the Defendant agreed to accede to the request and “issued various cheques”.  Although the Defendant has not stated very clearly what those “various cheques” were, it can reasonably be inferred from paragraphs 26 to 28 of Defendant 1 that the last cheque issued by the Defendant to the Plaintiff under this arrangement was the Cheque in question:

“26. The Administrative Judgment [dated 31 August 2017] completely dashed my hopes of acquiring the Land Use Rights. As it became apparent that it was no longer possible to proceed with the acquisition, I informed Mr. Chan that I would not pay him the HK$90 million.

27. To my utter surprise, on 28 March 2018, Mr. Chan caused the last cheque issued by me to him dated 3 November 2017 (the “Last Cheque”) to be deposited for payment without my knowledge.

28. On the same day, HSBC informed me that the Last Cheque was deposited for payment.  I was completely taken by surprise, and immediately informed HSBC to stop payment of the Last Cheque.”

35.  Pausing here, this court would make a number of observations to demonstrate the deficiencies and inherent improbabilities of the Defendant’s case. 

36.  First, the Defendant’s denial of the Loan and her explanation of the PN as merely security to Chan for his HK$80 million fly in the face of the contemporaneous documents adduced by the Plaintiff.  If there were no Loan, the PN would not have contained a repayment date.  Further, if there were no Loan, the Assignment of Proceeds dated 9 July 2009 would not have referred to the Loan and the PN and described Keung and the Defendant as borrowers and the Plaintiff as lender.

37.  Second, the Defendant’s case summarised above is completely unsupported by documents.  In particular, since the parties were said to have agreed on the acquisition of the Land Use Rights worth HK$140 million[2] and then on the acquisition of Chan’s share for HK$90 million, one would have expected seasoned business people like Chan and the Defendant to have reduced their agreements into writing.

38.  Third, what the Defendant has affirmed in Defendant 1 is very different from what she had pleaded in the Defence.  Take the Cheque as an example.  There was no suggestion that it was undated when issued to the Plaintiff, which is contrary to what was pleaded in the Defence. The only explanation for the discrepancy provided in the Defendant’s 2nd affirmation is that the Defence was prepared by her while acting in person and that she was not legally trained.  Legally trained or not, the Defendant should have been able to set out her factual case accurately in her Defence.  Instead, she put forward one set of factual case in her Defence only to be replaced by another set of factual case in her affirmation evidence. 

39.  Fourth, since Chan was said to be experiencing losses in his own business in mid-2013 and deemed the acquisition of the Land Use Rights a failure, it stands to reason that he would have wished Keung and the Defendant to complete the acquisition of his share sooner rather than later so that he could collect his HK$90 million.  Instead, according to the Defendant, Chan kept requesting Keung and the Defendant to extend their acquisition of his share by issuing new cheques to him for no apparent reason.

40.  Fifth, there is no explanation in Defendant 1 as to the full circumstances under which the last cheque ie the Cheque was issued by the Defendant and delivered to the Plaintiff.  In particular, there is no suggestion as to what condition, if any, was agreed upon by the Plaintiff as to when it was or was not permitted to present the Cheque for payment.  The closest to some sort of “explanation” as to why the Defendant says she is not liable on the Cheque is paragraph 26 in Defendant 1 quoted above.  But it is really a non sequitur to say because it was no longer possible to proceed with the acquisition of the Land Use Rights, even if true, the Defendant was entitled to renege on the agreement to acquire Chan’s share and refused to pay him.

41.  In short, the Defendant’s case is simply not believable.  Having considered the Defence and the Defendant’s affirmation evidence, this court is not satisfied that she has raised any triable issues for the purpose of resisting the Plaintiff’s Order 14 application or supporting this Appeal.

Disposition and costs order nisi

42.  The Appeal is hereby dismissed. 

43.  There be an Order nisi that costs of the Appeal be to the Plaintiff to be summarily assessed on paper and paid by the Defendant forthwith, certificate for counsel.  The Plaintiff is directed to submit its statement of costs within 7 days and the Defendant is directed to submit her comment on the statement of costs, if any, within 7 days thereafter.

(Peter Ng)
Judge of the Court of First Instance
High Court

  

Mr Hon-chiu Man, instructed by Peter Cheung & Co, for the Plaintiff

The Defendant appeared in person


[1] And Mr Tony Cheung who worked for Chan. 

[2] At paragraph 8 of Defendant 1, the Defendant claimed the Land in question were valued at around HK$140 million in 2009.