HK CourtDB
HomeDirectoryMCP
Hong Kong CourtDB
Back to directory
Civil Action2019

TO KIT SHEUNG, the sole administrator of the estate of TO SHAK also known as TO SHEK WAN and also known as SHICK DOO, deceased AND ANOTHER v. CHAN SHOOK FUNG NANCY AND ANOTHER

Files (2)

[2023] HKCFI 134-EN-2023-01-27

TO KIT SHEUNG, the sole administrator of the estate of TO SHAK also known as TO SHEK WAN and also known as SHICK DOO, deceased AND ANOTHER v. CHAN SHOOK FUNG NANCY AND ANOTHER

HTML content

HCA 2340/2019

[2023] HKCFI 134

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO 2340 OF 2019

________________________

BETWEEN  
TO KIT SHEUNG(杜傑相), the sole administrator
of the estate of TO SHAK(杜石)also known as
TO SHEK WAN(杜石穩)and also known as SHICK DOO(杜石穩), deceased
1st Plaintiff
 TO KIT SHEUNG(杜傑相)2nd Plaintiff

and

 CHAN SHOOK FUNG NANCY(陳淑芬)
and CHAN SHOOK YIM SALLY(陳淑艷),
the executrices of the estate of CHAN TO YUK LIN(陳杜玉蓮), deceased
Defendants

________________________

Before:  Deputy High Court Judge Kenneth Wong in Chambers (On paper disposal)

Closing Date for Written Submissions:  29 April 2022

Date of Decision:  27 January 2023

_________________

DECISION

_________________

A. The Defendants’ Application

1.  Section 21 of the Evidence Ordinance, Cap 8 of the Laws of Hong Kong SAR is invoked by the Defendants in this application.  It reads as follows:

21.(1)  On the application of any party to any proceedings, the court or a judge may order that such party be at liberty to inspect and take copies of any entries in a banker's record for any of the purposes of such proceedings.
  
 (2)  An order under this section may be made either with or without summoning the bank or any other party, and shall be served on the bank 3 clear days before the same is to be obeyed, unless the court or judge otherwise directs.
  
 (3)  The costs of any application to the court or judge under or for the purposes of this section, and the costs of anything done or to be done under an order of the court or judge made under or for the purposes of this section, shall be in the discretion of the court or judge, who may order the same or any part thereof to be paid to any party by the bank, where the same have been occasioned by default or delay on the part of the bank.
  
 (4)  Any such order against a bank may be enforced as if the bank were a party to the proceeding.

2.  By their summons issued on 22 February 2022 (the “Summons”), the Defendants ask for an order that Hang Seng Bank Limited (the “Bank”) do produce to their solicitors copies of (a) its record of the account opening form signed by the 2nd Plaintiff and Madam Chan To Yuk Lin, deceased[1] (the “Deceased”) for their joint account No. 285-7-095950 with the Bank (the “Joint Account”) and (b) entries in its record, corresponding to the following entries in the customers’ bank book for the Joint Account:

 
Date

Withdrawal

Deposit

Bank's Reference

(i)        

7.3.2012

2,004.00
 
18E4AW/D

(ii)      

19.7.2012

1,400.00
 
18E3AW/D

(iii)    

10.10.2012

1,600.00
 
18E3AW/D

(iv)    

4.1.2013

1,400.00
 
18E3AW/D

(v)      

8.6.2013

5,000.00
 
18E3AW/D

(vi)    

27.8.2013

7,000.00
 
1DD4AW/D

(vii) 

28.8.2013
 
814,750.00

16D5ACQ

(viii)   

18.11.2013

400,000.00
 
1DD2JTRW

(ix)    

12.12.2013

400,000.00

C.ORDER

1DD6JNTW

(x)      

14.4.2014

10,000.00
 
18E3AW/D

(xi)    

30.9.2014

1,500.00
 
18E4AW/D

(collectively, the “documents sought”)

It should be noted that according to the Grant of Probate issued by the Court of First Instance on 28 April 2016 (Grant No. HCAG005724/2016), the Deceased died on 21 February 2015.  As can be seen from the above table, all of the documents sought are documents or records of transactions which came into place before the death of the Deceased.

B. The Action

3.  In a nutshell, in this action, the Plaintiffs seek (1) an account by the Defendants as to the Deceased’s dealings with the estate of Mr To Shak, the late father of the Deceased and the Plaintiffs, and in relation to certain landed properties of the late father, the proceeds of sale and resumption money received by the Deceased and rental income and (2) an order for payment of all sums found due and payable by the Defendants to the Plaintiffs.

4.  Allegedly, the proceeds of sale, resumption money and rental income in relation to some of the landed properties under complaint were deposited into certain bank accounts held under the names of the 2nd Plaintiff and the Deceased, one of which is the Joint Account.

C. The Plaintiffs’ Position

5.  The Plaintiffs do not dispute the relevancy of the documents sought and do not contest the application.  In fact, they have been cooperative in assisting the Defendants in obtaining the documents sought from the Bank[2]. As early as in 30 August 2021, the 2nd Plaintiff, who resides in Belgium, has signed[3] an authorization letter confirming his consent for the Bank to provide the Joint Account’s information to the Defendants’ solicitors and authorize the Defendants’ solicitors to collect all relevant documents and account information from the Bank (the “2nd Plaintiff’s authorization letter”).

D. The Bank’s Position

6.  The resistance came from the Bank.

7.  However, the Bank does not take any issue that the documents sought are not necessary or relevant to the purposes of the present proceedings under section 21 of the Evidence Ordinance.  The only point that they appear to take is that the signature of the 2nd Plaintiff supplied to them is different from the 2nd Plaintiff’s specimen signature in their record.

8.  The following is a chronology of the communication between the Defendants’ solicitors and the Bank:

(1)  On 3 March 2020, the Defendants’ solicitors wrote to the Bank (a) stating that they act for the Defendants being the executrices of the estate of the Deceased, one of the Joint Account’s holders and enclosing a copy of the grant of probate, (b) asking for the documents sought and (c) agreeing to bear the Bank’s cost in relation to this enquiry if no application to the Court under section 21 of the Evidence Ordinance was necessary.

(2)  On 31 March 2020, the Bank replied to the Defendants’ solicitors refusing the request.  The Bank pointed out that they owed a duty of confidentiality towards their customers, and that due to the documents sought involved a third party, they were not in a position to accede to the request without the third party’s consent.

(3)  On 6 September 2021, the Defendants’ solicitors enclosed the 2nd Plaintiff’s authorization letter to the Bank and asked the Bank to provide the documents sought.

(4)  On 6 October 2021, the Bank replied by letter to the Defendants’ solicitors.  In the letter, the Bank stated the following:

“We observe that the Authorization Letter dated 30 August 2021 duly signed by To Kit Sheung the survivor holder of the Joint account, the said document is copy and the signature is differ from the record keep with our bank. Please sign the signature again and provide the original Authorization Letter to us.”

(5)  On 8 October 2021, the Defendants’ solicitors replied.  They explained to the Bank that the Joint Account was opened many years ago, that it was not uncommon for the account holder to adopt a slightly different signature now as against the signature adopted years ago, and that moreover, the Bank had no reasons to doubt the signatory of the authorization letter was not the same person given the situation that it was obtained from the solicitors acting for him. The solicitors further enclosed for the Bank’s consideration and retention a copy of the covering letter dated 8 September 2021 issued by the 2nd Plaintiff’s solicitors, Messrs Kenneth C.C. Man & Co. enclosing therewith the original of the 2nd Plaintiff’s authorization letter.  The Defendants’ solicitors warned that should the Bank still refuse their request, they had no alternative but to apply to court for the necessary order to compel it to produce the documents sought and they would seek costs against the Bank.

(6)  On 29 October 2021, the Bank replied.  Again, it refused the request. The only explanation it gave was as follows:

“We wish to inform you that the survivor holder, Mr To Kit Sheung’s (“Mr To”) signature is fully different with our record, please inform Mr To sign the signature again.  If Mr To forget his signature, he can in person to branch for help and apply document.”

(7)  In response to the Bank’s comment, the Defendants’ solicitors had indeed made various efforts to resolve the matter.  They had asked the Plaintiffs’ solicitors to invite the 2nd Plaintiff to resign the authorization letter.  The 2nd Plaintiff had done so but as pointed out by the Plaintiffs’ solicitors in their letter dated 21 December 2021, their client (the 2nd Plaintiff) has adopted no other signatures apart from those as shown in the 2nd Plaintiff’s authorization letter, which were unfortunately rejected by the Bank, on the ground that they were different from the 2nd Plaintiff’s specimen signature kept by the Bank, there was no useful point of sending to the bank with a fresh authorization letter bearing the same signature of the 2nd Plaintiff.  Also, the Plaintiffs’ solicitors indicated that because of the pandemic, the likelihood of the 2nd Plaintiff coming to Hong Kong to personally deal with the Bank’s queries was extremely slim.

(8)  As mentioned by the Defendants’ solicitors to the Plaintiffs’ solicitors, their client had also directly approached the relevant department of the Bank.  The bank staff attending their client suggested the 2nd Plaintiff to sign the authorization before a staff of the Chinese Embassy in Belgium.   However, the Plaintiffs’ solicitors replied that it was not possible because the 2nd Plaintiff was not a passport holder of People’s Republic of China or People’s Republic of China (Hong Kong).

(9)  On 22 February 2022, the Bank was served with the Summons and the Affirmation of Chan Shook Fung Nancy in support.

(10)  In response to the Summons, on 10 March 2022, the Bank sent a letter to the Defendants’ solicitors and stated as follows:

“Having considered the documents you served on our Bank together with the Summons in relation to the Application in the Action as far as our Bank is concerned, we would like to point out that, since the copies of entries in the Bank's record, corresponding to entries in the customers' bank book for the Account as set out in the Schedule to the Summons as stipulated in paragraph 1 (b) of the Summons are beyond the retention period of 7 years of our Bank, these records have already been destroyed and therefore not within our Bank's power, custody and control.

In view of the foregoing, please advise us whether you will continue the Application. If your answer is in affirmative, we would like to inform that we will adopt a neutral stance with regards to the Application and will leave it to your client to establish the merits of the Application before the Court.”

(11)  This was the first time that the Bank mentioned to the Defendants’ solicitors that the documents sought in paragraph 1(b) of the Summons had in fact already been destroyed.

(12)  On 15 March 2022, at the Defendants’ solicitors’ request, the Bank sent another letter.  However, it only repeated the same position:

“As per your request by Your Letter, we copied this letter to the Court (together with a copy of Our Letter) for consideration.

As mentioned in Our Letter and as a matter of fact, we would like to reiterate and confirm that, since the copies of entries in the Bank's record, corresponding to entries in the customers' bank book for the Account as set out in the Schedule to the Summons as stipulated in paragraph 1(b) of the Summons are beyond the retention period of 7 years of our Bank, these records have already been destroyed and therefore not within our Bank's power, custody and control.

As indicated in Our Letter, if you will continue the Application despite the foregoing, we would like to inform that we will adopt a neutral stance with regards to the Application and will leave it to your client to establish the merits of the Application before the Court.”

(13)  In their last letter dated 22 April 2022, the Bank again just repeated the same position:

“As mentioned in our letters dated 10 March 2022 and 15 March 2022 and as a matter of fact, we would like to reiterate and re-confirm that, since the copies of entries in the Bank's record, corresponding to entries in the customers' bank book for the Account as set out in the Schedule to the Summons as stipulated in paragraph 1(b) of the Summons are beyond the retention period of 7 years of our Bank, these records have already been destroyed and therefore not within our Bank's power, custody and control.

We humbly pray for the Court that the Court would be of the view that the said confirmation is sufficient to clarify the Bank’s position with regards to records under paragraph 1(b) of the Summons and, in order to save costs, no further affirmation/affidavit as suggested in paragraphs 43 to 46 of D's Submission is required.

As per the facts as stated in paragraphs 27 to 33 of D's Submission, no duly signed/executed instruction or consent of the Plaintiff is given to our Bank allowing us to provide the information in question to the Defendant before the Summons (and up to date). As such, we are of the view that our Bank's duty of confidentiality does not fall away as mentioned in paragraph 56 of D's Submission without a valid Court Order and would like to inform that the alleged default or delay of the part of our Bank as discussed in paragraphs 53 to 57 of D's Submission are not admitted.

In view of the circumstances and as our Bank is not a party to the proceedings of Action and the Summons is not taken by our Bank, we do not agree that the costs of the application (and any legal costs incurred for such application) shall be borne by our Bank.”

9.  I should add that the Bank’s position is in sharp contrast with the position taken by The Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation Limited (“HSBC”) in respect of similar documents sought under another joint account held by the Deceased and the 2nd Plaintiff with HSBC.  In response to the Defendants’ solicitors’ requests for documents, on 2 April 2020, HSBC by letter stated as follows:

“To enable us to provide the account information / statement of the above customer's account, we would require the following documents:

• Original of the Probate under Grant no. HCAG005724/2016 for the deceased.

• A written instruction from the executors, Chan Shook Fung Nancy and Chan Shook Yim Sally with the signature thereon attested before a solicitor regarding to provide the account information to your firm.

• Certified true copy of the identification document of the executors.

Please be advised that it is our normal practice not to provide customer account information / statement beyond 7 years period.

As the account no. 002-0-434023 is in joint names of To Kit Sheung and the deceased, by virtue of the Joint Account Mandate and Conditions governing the joint account, the balances thereof vest in the survivor, To Kit Sheung. Under this circumstance, we are unable to accede your request to provide the requisite account information after the date of death of the deceased.

Please let us have a cheque for HKD500.00 payable to "HSBC" being our service charges.

Please send the above documents and cheque to our office address : Deceased Account BOS, 8/F, Tower 2, HSBC Centre, No. 1 Sham Mong Road, Kowloon. Upon receipt of the aforesaid documents, we shall be pleased to proceed accordingly.”

10.  Upon provision of the documents and payment of service charges that it required by the Defendants’ solicitors, HSBC provided the information and documents requested without any hindrance and in a very cooperative and helpful manner.

E. Discussion

11.  It is apparently clear that the documents sought are relevant to the Plaintiffs’ claim as to the dealings with those proceeds of sale, resumption money and rental income in relation to those landed properties in dispute which had been deposited into the Joint Account.  Section 21 of the Evidence Ordinance is applicable.  The Plaintiffs do not oppose this application.  The 2nd Plaintiff has indeed assisted the Defendants to obtain the documents sought by producing a signed consent and authorization letter to the Bank.  But for the Bank’s refusal, the Defendants should have obtained the documents sought without need to resort to incurring costs to take out the Summons.

12.  The Bank’s attitude was uncooperative and unhelpful, and the arguments that it raised are obviously wrong.  This has caused delay, and more devastatingly, the irretrievability of the documents sought in paragraph 1(b) of the Summons which was destructed.

13.  First, there is no question of confidentiality as alleged by the Bank. The Deceased was one of the holder of the Joint Account with the 2nd Plaintiff.  When she lived, of course she was entitled to receive all information of the Joint Account.  Upon her passing away, as rightly pointed out by HSBC in its letter dated 2 April 2020 (referred to in paragraph 9 above)[4], by the terms of the Joint Account, the balances of the Joint Account would have vested in the surviving account holder, i.e. the 2nd Plaintiff.  From this point onward, the Deceased (or her estate) was no longer the Bank’s customer in relation to the Joint Account.  Therefore, the Defendants would not be entitled to obtain the account information after the date of the death of the Deceased.  However, at any time before the death of the Deceased, the Deceased was the Bank’s customer in relation to the Joint Account.  As the executrix of the Deceased’s estate, the Defendants, like the Deceased herself when she lived, are entitled to all information of the Joint Account prior to her death.  As mentioned in paragraph 2 above, the documents sought are documents or records of transactions which came into place before the death of the Deceased.  Therefore, the Defendants are entitled to the documents sought as of right.

14.  Second, the Bank’s concern of “confidentiality” is all the more misplaced, as the only so-called “third party” involved is the 2nd Plaintiff, being the other holder of the Joint Account, and his solicitors on the Court’s record have already confirmed his agreement of disclosure of the documents sought.

15.  Third, the Defendants’ solicitors first wrote to the Bank on 3 March 2020 requesting the documents sought.  Unlike HSBC, which had expressly stated in its first reply that customer account information / statement beyond 7-year period may not be provided, the Bank never made such indication to the Defendants’ solicitors.  Particularly when it bluntly rejected the Defendants’ solicitors’ request, it never saw fit to indicate that the 7-year deadline was imminent in relation to the documents sought.  It was only, after all the blunt refusals, until 10 March 2022, and after service of the Summons on them, that they informed the Defendants’ solicitors for first time that since the entries in the Bank's record, corresponding to entries in the customers' bank book for the Joint Account as set out in the Schedule to the Summons as stipulated in paragraph 1 (b) of the Summons are beyond the retention period of 7 years of the Bank, these records have already been destroyed.  With all due respect to the Bank, this attitude towards its customer is most unhelpful, to say the least.

16.  Fourth, the unforthcoming conduct of the Bank is further made even more prominent by the fact that when the request was first made to the Bank on 3 March 2020, the entries corresponding to items (v)-(xi) in the Schedule to the Summons (i.e. entries between 8 June 2013 to 30 September 2014) was still within the 7-year period.  If the Bank did not raise, fallaciously, the “confidentiality” argument, or if the Bank saw the good sense of keeping the documents pending resolution of the (fallacious as it was) “confidentiality” issue or the “signature” issue thereby arising, or if it, more straightforwardly, told the Defendants’ solicitors that the 7-year period was imminently approaching and it would destroy the documents absent a court order, the documents sought which now the Court is preparing to grant production under section 21 of the Evidence Ordinance would not have been destroyed or this application would not have been necessitated.

17.  Fifth, in paragraph 44 of his written submissions and paragraphs 5-13 of his written submissions in reply, the Defendants’ counsel raised the concern as to whether the paper documents, albeit destroyed, would have also been stored electronically or by microfilm; and if so their whereabouts.  This question, in my view, is not unreasonable, given that the information is relevant to the issues in question in the Action.  The Bank has been taciturn.  It did not say a word in response.

18.  For the above reasons, I agree with the Defendants’ counsel that the Bank owes the Defendants a more detailed explanation as to the status of the documents sought in paragraph 1(b) of the Summons.  The Bank should produce an affirmation as alluded to in paragraphs 5 and 12 of the Defendants’ counsel’s written submissions in reply.

F. Production Order

19.  I therefore make the following order under section 21 of the Evidence Ordinance:

(1)  The Bank do produce to the Solicitors for the Defendants a copy of the Bank’s record of the account opening form, signed by the 2nd Plaintiff and the Deceased, for the Joint Account with the Bank.

(2)  The Bank shall file and serve on the Defendants’ solicitors and the Plaintiffs’ solicitors, within 28 days from the date of this order, an affirmation stating whether the documents sought in paragraph 1(b) of the Summons have been in its possession, custody or power; and if so whether they or any of them have been stored in paper form, electronically and/or microfilm; and if those documents (whether in paper form, electronically or microfilm) are not now in the Bank’s possession, custody or power when it parts with them and what have become of them.

G.  Costs Order

20.  Section 21(3) of the Evidence Ordinance provides that the Court shall have the discretion to order the costs of the application to be paid by the Bank, where the application has been occasioned by default or delay on the part of the Bank.

21.  For the reasons set out in paragraphs 11-17 above, this Court is of the view that the application has been occasioned by the default and delay of the Bank.  Had the Bank not erroneously taken the “confidentiality” argument and provided the documents sought or acted otherwise in a cooperative and constructive manner, this application would not have been necessary, and the documents sought in paragraph 1(b) of the Summons would not have become irretrievable as belatedly submitted by the Bank in its letter to the Court dated 22 April 2022.

22.  In the same letter, the Bank submitted that as it is not a party to the proceedings and the Summons is not taken out by it, it should not bear the costs of the application.  This submission is misconceived.  Section 21(4) of the Evidence Ordinance has stipulated that any order against a bank under section 21 may be enforced as if the bank were a party to the proceeding. Since I have been satisfied that the present application has been occasioned by default as well as delay on the part of the Bank, the Court is justified and entitled to exercise its discretion under section 21(3) to make costs order against the Bank.

23.  I therefore make an order that the Bank do pay the Defendants forthwith costs of the Summons, to be taxed if not agreed.

 ( Kenneth Wong )
 Deputy High Court Judge

Written Submission by Mr. Wallace CHEUNG, instructed by Choi & Liu, for the Defendants

No Written Submission was lodged by the 1st and 2nd Plaintiffs

Written Submission by Hang Seng Bank Limited, in person


[1] The Defendants are the executrices of the estate of the Deceased and are sued in this capacity.

[2] See the Bank’s position described in section D below.

[3]per the Bank’s request as referred to in paragraph 8(2) below.

[4] This is on the assumption that the terms of the HSBC’s joint account have the same effect as the terms of the Joint Account held with the Bank.  It is also regrettable that the Bank has never explained this clearly or made any reference of the relevant terms of the Joint Account, to the Defendants’ solicitors in their communication.

[2021] HKCFI 1156-EN-2021-04-27

TO KIT SHEUNG, the sole administrator of the estate of TO SHAK also known as TO SHEK WAN and also known as SHICK DOO, deceased AND ANOTHER v. CHAN SHOOK FUNG NANCY AND ANOTHER

HTML content

HCA 2340/2019

[2021] HKCFI 1156

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO 2340 OF 2019

________________________

BETWEEN  
 TO KIT SHEUNG (杜傑相),
the sole administrator of the estate of
TO SHAK (杜石) also known as TO SHEK WAN (杜石穩)
and also known as SHICK DOO (杜石穩), deceased
1st Plaintiff
 TO KIT SHEUNG (杜傑相)2nd Plaintiff
 and 
 CHAN SHOOK FUNG NANCY (陳淑芬) and
CHAN SHOOK YIM SALLY (陳淑艷), the executrices of
the estate of CHAN TO YUK LIN (陳杜玉蓮), deceased
Defendants

________________________

Before:  Hon Wilson Chan J in Chambers

Date of Hearing:  6 November 2020

Date of Judgment: 27 April 2021

_______________

J U D G M E N T

_______________

A.      INTRODUCTION

1.  By Summons dated 12 May 2020 (the “Summons”), the 1st and 2nd plaintiffs seek to strike out certain parts of the defendants’ Defence as set out in the Schedule to the Summons, under Order 18, rule 19(1)(a) of the Rules of the High Court on the ground that the same do not constitute a defence at law.

2.  Amongst the grounds for striking out pleadings under Order 18, rule 19(1), the plaintiffs are relying only on (a): “it discloses no reasonable cause of action or defence”.

3.  In Practice Note 18/19/3 of the Hong Kong Civil Procedure 2021, at page 518, it is stated under “(4) Evidence” that: “O18, 19(2) excludes evidence…on an application under O18, r 19(1)(a).  The court is obliged to look at the indorsement on the writ or the pleading without extrinsic evidence and decide whether on the assumption that the facts as pleaded are true the indorsement or pleading discloses a cause of action or defence in law”.

4.  In Practice Note 18/19/4 of the Hong Kong Civil Procedure 2021, at page 519, it is stated that:

“Exercise of powers under this rule

(1)  Striking out only in plain and obvious cases – It is only in plain and obvious cases that the court should exercise its summary powers to strike out the indorsement on any writ or any pleading under this rule.  There should be no trial upon affidavit.  Disputed facts were to be taken in favour of the party sought to be struck out.  Nor should the court decide difficult points of law in striking out proceedings.  The claim must be obviously unsustainable, the pleadings unarguably bad and it must be impossible, not just improbable, for the claim to succeed before the court will strike it out.”

5.  The question for determination is: where the disputed facts are to be taken in the defendants’ favour, are those paragraphs in the Defence being challenged obviously unsustainable or unarguably bad?  If there is something that is “arguable”, the paragraphs being attacked by the plaintiffs ought not be struck out.

B.      FACTUAL BASIS OF THE PLAINTIFFS’ CLAIM AND THE RELIEF SOUGHT

6.  As has been set out in the plaintiffs’ Chronology of Material Events, the following material facts have been established in the parties’ pleadings:

(1)  To Shak (the “Deceased”), a person wholly of Chinese race, died intestate leaving (i) Hong Kong Property and (ii) New Territories Properties;

(2)  Letters of Administration in respect of the Deceased’s estate were granted to the 1st plaintiff on 3 August 1987;

(3)  the 1st plaintiff, a resident of Belgium, both by Power of Attorney and upon request, conferred power to the 2nd plaintiff’s Sister (Chan To Yuk Lin) to administer the estate of the Deceased;

(4)  in the course of administration of the estate of the Deceased, the 2nd plaintiff’s Sister (i) disposed of the Hong Kong Property; (ii) disposed of substantial part of the New Territories Properties; (iii) let out part of the New Territories Properties and (iv) received compensation money from resumption of part of the New Territories Properties; and

(5)  up to the date of her death, no account has been given by the 2nd plaintiff’s Sister to the 2nd plaintiff.

7.  On the factual basis of their claim as aforesaid, the 1st plaintiff, in his capacity as the sole administrator of the estate of the Deceased, and the 2nd plaintiff, in his capacity as:

(1)  one of the 2 beneficiaries of the Hong Kong Property; and

(2)  the sole beneficiary of the New Territories Properties,

seek as against the defendants, in their capacity as the only executrices of the estate of the 2nd plaintiff’s Sister, for (i) an order for account of the 2nd plaintiff’s Sister’s dealings with the estate of the Deceased; (ii) declaratory relief that the 2nd plaintiff is the sole person entitled to succeed the New Territories Properties; and (iii) registration of the lis pendens of the defendants with the Land Registry against the New Territories Properties be vacated.

C.      CAUSES OF DEFENCE OF THE DEFENDANTS

8.  In their Defence, the defendants pleaded that:

(1)  there had been a “Family Arrangement” between 1984-1987 reached as a result of an oral agreement between the 2nd plaintiff and the 2nd plaintiff’s Sister so that they would have an equal share to the proceeds of disposal of the landed properties of the Deceased’s estate.  Pursuant to the Family Arrangement, 3 joint accounts were opened (§§5 to 7 of Defence);

(2)  in respect of the 3 joint accounts, there was a “pooling arrangement” so that neither party would be obliged to account to the other in relation to any money contributed to or withdrew therefrom and the withdrawals by the 2nd plaintiff’s Sister were pursuant to this part of the Family Arrangement (§9 of Defence), hence, the money paid into the 3 joint accounts was not trust property, nor was the 2nd plaintiff’s Sister liable to account therefor;

(3)  despite the 2nd plaintiff’s sole entitlement to succeed the New Territories Properties, under the Family Arrangement, the 2nd plaintiff’s Sister would be entitled to equal division of the proceeds of sale, and the proceeds of sale and rental income derived from the New Territories Properties were deposited into the 3 joint accounts (§§11 and 13 of Defence);

(4)  the 2nd plaintiff’s Sister did not act as the 1st plaintiff’s agent for administration of the Deceased’s estate in general.  She had only signed the assignments for the 3 landed properties under the 1st plaintiff’s 3 Powers of Attorney (§§7(c), 14, 15(b), 16(c), 19, 22, 29(b), 31, 46(b) and 62(b) of Defence).  The 2nd plaintiff’s Sister is not a fiduciary in relation to the administration of the Deceased ’s estate (§§24 and 31 of Defence); and

(5)  the defendants further rely on the time bar under sections 20(2), 4(1)(a), and 4(2) and (7) of the Limitation Ordinance, Cap 347, and such equitable defences as laches, acquiescence and waiver (§§55 to 60 of Defence).

D1.    PLAINTIFFS’ GROUND (A) - ORAL AGREEMENT/INFORMAL FAMILY ARRANGEMENT BETWEEN 2ND PLAINTIFF AND SISTER NOT SUSTAINABLE IN LAW (§§5-7, 9, 11,13, 23, 32(B)-(C), 34, 46(A) OF DEFENCE)

PLAINTIFFS’ SUBMISSIONS

9.  The plaintiffs submit that the defendants’ defence being the alleged “Family Arrangement” was allegedly created under an oral agreement made between the 2nd plaintiff and the 2nd plaintiff’s Sister in 1984 to 1987.

10.  Even if this court were to accept the existence of an oral agreement creating the Family Arrangement for equal division of the estate of the Deceased, the plaintiffs submit that both the oral agreement and the Family Arrangement would be void and unenforceable.

11.  First, the oral agreement would constitute disposal of, inter alia, the 2nd plaintiff’s interest in the New Territories Properties which would be void unless the same be evidenced in writing and signed by him, being the person to be charged (see: section 3, Conveyancing and Property Ordinance, Cap 219).

12.  For such purpose, “proceeds of sale” of interest in land constitute land and, in the premises, it would still be caught by the statutory requirement (see: section 2, New Territories Ordinance, Cap 97; Tang Che Tai & Ors v Tang On Kwai & Ors [2007] 5 HKC 277, at §32).

13.  Secondly, the effect of the oral agreement would only benefit the 2nd plaintiff’s Sister and, hence, there was no consideration in support so as would enable it to be enforceable unless by a deed (contract under seal) (see: section 4, Conveyancing and Property Ordinance, Cap 219).

DISCUSSION

14.  Ground (a) is misconceived because the Family Arrangement was concerned about money (proceeds of disposal of landed properties in the Deceased’s estate), not land (§§5(a) and 11(c) of Defence). 

15.  For a family arrangement, where land is not concerned, writing is not necessary (see: Halsbury’s Laws of England, Vol 91, 2019, p 566, §794). 

16.  The Family Arrangement was on “equal division of the proceeds of disposal of the landed properties” in the Deceased’s estate. It did not concern land.  The defendants are not seeking to enforce an oral agreement between the siblings in relation to landed properties.  Hence, section 3(1) of the Conveyancing and Property Ordinance has no application.

17.  Further, the plaintiffs’ reliance on section 2 of the New Territories Ordinance for the definition of “land” is misplaced.

18.  The relevant definition of “land” that should apply in the context of section 3 of the Conveyancing and Property Ordinance should be that contained in section 2 of the same Ordinance, ie:

“‘Land’ includes -

(a) land covered by water;

(b) any estate, right, interest or easement in or over any land;

(bb) the whole or part of an undivided share in land and any estate, right, interest or easement in or over the whole or part of an undivided share in land; and

(c) things attached to land or permanently fastened to anything attached to land;”

19.  Further, even if one considers the definition of “Land” under the New Territories Ordinance, Deputy High Court Judge To in Tang Che Tai v Tang On Kwai, Supra, stated in §33 that “… I am quite unable to find it as the legislature’s intention to apply Part II of the NTO to any other form of property converted from land in the New Territories.  Reading the NTO as a whole, I could by no canon of construction interpret the word ‘land’ to include compensation or proceeds of sale of land”.

20.  Accordingly, I reject the plaintiffs’ submissions based on section 3 of the Conveyancing and Property Ordinance.

21.  Regarding the plaintiffs’ complaint of lack of consideration, it is pleaded in paragraph 5(d) of the Defence that the 2nd plaintiff’s Sister provided consideration for the Family Arrangement in that she would assist the plaintiffs living in Belgium to obtain the grant of Letters of Administration of the Deceased’s estate, and that she would act as the plaintiffs’ attorney without remuneration in signing assignments on the plaintiffs’ behalf for disposing landed properties of the Deceased’s estate.  I cannot say at this stage that such averments are plainly unsustainable or unarguably bad.

D2.    PLAINTIFFS’ GROUND (B) – 2ND PLAINTIFF’S SISTER WAS A TRUSTEE OF THE PROCEEDS OF SALE/RESUMPTION MONEY/RENTAL INCOME OF THE LANDED PROPERTIES (§§17(A), 18, 24, 46, 62(B) OF DEFENCE)

PLAINTIFFS’ SUBMISSIONS

22.  The plaintiffs submit that a person dealing with the estate would become an executor de son tort who would, in the eyes of equity, become a trustee and fiduciary.  

23.  A person who assumes the role of dealing with the property of another (whether in which he also has an interest) would assume the role as a fiduciary and, in such case, he would also be treated, in the eyes of the law, a trustee and fiduciary.  And in either case, he would be obliged to give an account of all his dealings with the estate of the properties of another and this duty is imposed as a matter of law.

DISCUSSION

24.  First of all, as submitted by the defendants, the 1st plaintiff was appointed Administrator of the Deceased’s estate in 1987.  Arguably, an agent for a named executor (or administrator) could never be liable as executor de son tort, since her acts would be taken to be that of her principal and cannot be characterised as unlawful (see: Williams, Mortimer and Sunnucks on Executors, Administrators and Probate, 21st ed, §5-46, p 78 text to n 222 citing Sykes v Sykes (1870) LR 5 CP 113).

25.  Further, it is the defendants’ case that the money paid into the 3 joint accounts was not trust property, nor was the 2nd plaintiff’s Sister liable to account therefor: see paragraph 8(2) above.

26.  As submitted by the defendants, whether the Sister’s acting as agent for the 1st plaintiff is limited in scope (ie for signing assignments on behalf of the 1st plaintiff only, and not in general administration of the Deceased’s estate on behalf of the 1st plaintiff) is a matter of fact to be determined at trial.  The issue involves whether the Sister only did mechanical acts on behalf of the 1st plaintiff (for example, in signing assignments), or was involved in the decision making process for disposing of the landed properties.  For the purpose of the present strike out application, the defendants’ version of fact that the scope of agency was limited should be taken to be true.  In that case, the Sister cannot be assumed to be a fiduciary in relation to the administration of the Deceased’s estate, or a trustee de son tort at this stage.

27.  In my view, the defendants’ defence is not obviously unsustainable or unarguably bad.  Accordingly, the plaintiffs’ application to strike out the same on Ground (b) must fail.

D3.    PLAINTIFFS’ GROUND (C) – NO STATUTORY LIMITATION BECAUSE THE PLAINTIFFS CLAIM FOR AN ACCOUNT AND BECAUSE OF THE STATUTORY EXCEPTIONS UNDER S20(1), LIMITATION ORDINANCE (§§55-57 OF DEFENCE)

PLAINTIFFS’ SUBMISSIONS

28.  When a beneficiary claims to be entitled under a trust, his claim would not be barred by limitation, as the duty of a fiduciary and trustee continue until the same be discharged.  It is especially so when the proceeds of sale were pocketed by the trustee (see: section 20(1), Limitation Ordinance).

DISCUSSION

29.  The proceeds of disposal or rental income were deposited into the 3 joint accounts in the names of the 2nd plaintiff and the 2nd plaintiff’s Sister.  Such money was not held in the 2nd plaintiff’s Sister’s own accounts under her sole name.  In any event, the defendants’ primary case is that there is no true trust because the money in the 3 joint accounts was not trust property held by the 2nd plaintiff’s Sister exclusively for the benefit of the 2nd plaintiff.  The 2nd plaintiff’s Sister had the right to withdraw money as her own from such joint accounts.  The 2nd plaintiff also retained possession and control of the 3 joint accounts throughout.  There arguably being no trust, the plaintiffs can in that case only rely on contractual claims based on agency or employment (namely, as pleaded under paragraph 11(a) of the Statement of Claim).  Hence, the 6-year time bar under section 4(1)(a) of the Limitation Ordinance would be applicable.

E.      CONCLUSION AND DISPOSITION

30.  For the reasons set out above, I agree that the plaintiffs have failed to establish that the paragraphs in the Defence sought to be struck out disclose no reasonable cause of defence.  They cannot be said to be obviously unsustainable or unarguably bad.

31.  Accordingly, the plaintiffs’ Summons is dismissed.

32.  I see no reason why costs should not follow the event.  I order that the costs of the Summons be paid by the plaintiffs to the defendants, such costs are to be taxed if not agreed and paid forthwith.

33.  The above order as to costs is nisi and shall become absolute in the absence of any application within 14 days to vary the same.

34.  Lastly, I express my gratitude to counsel on both sides for their helpful assistance in this matter.

 

 

(Wilson Chan)
Judge of the Court of First Instance
High Court

Mr K M Chong and Ms Vivian Li, instructed by Messrs Kenneth C C Man & Co, for the 1st and 2nd plaintiffs

Mr Wallace Cheung, instructed by Messrs Choi & Liu, for the defendants