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Constitutional and Administrative Law Proceedings2019

RE NGUYEN THI THUY HA

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[2022] HKCFI 2348-EN-2022-08-05

RE NGUYEN THI THUY HA

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HCAL 151/2019

[2022] HKCFI 2348

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST

NO 151 OF 2019

____________

RE:NGUYEN THI THUY HAApplicant

____________

Before:Deputy High Court Judge To in Chambers
Date of Decision:5 August 2022

______________

D E C I S I O N

______________

Introduction

1.  This is the Applicant’s application by summons filed on 3 May 2022 (the “Summons”) for extension of time to appeal the order of this Court dated 7 January 2022 (the “Order”) refusing to grant her leave to apply for judicial review of the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board/ the Non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office (the “Board”) dated 28 December 2018 (the “leave application”).

2.  In her affirmation filed in support of her application, the Applicant advanced two explanations for the delay. First, she claimed she engaged in self-isolation as she had been in contact with a lot of confirmed Covid-19 patients. It was not clear if she herself had contracted the virus or not. Second, she said she did not speak or understand English and had to depend on her friends to assist her in filing her appeal. Her ground of appeal is that the decision of this Court was reached unfairly without allowing her an opportunity to clarify her case and situation in her home country.

3.  To assist her in presenting a proper explanation of self-isolation and on the assumption that she had contracted the virus, this Court gave her directions by letter dated 24 May 2022 to file a statement within 14 days of the letter stating the date when she contracted Covid-19 and the date when she recovered. She was also informed that her application for extension of time will be determined on paper without a hearing whether she has complied with the above directions or not.

4.  As at the date of this decision, the Applicant has not responded. The letter was posted to her at her address given by her 21 days ago in her Summons. It has not been returned through the post. The delivery service of Hong Kong Post is usually very reliable. There was nothing to suggest the Applicant had moved within those 21 days or had not received the letter. She is deemed to have declined providing better particulars of her explanation for her delay in filing the notice of appeal. The Court could only consider her application on the basis of the evidence in her supporting affirmation.

The Law

5.  In Jagg Singh v Torture Claims Appeal Board / Non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office[1], the Court of Appeal held that what may constitute a good reason for extending time cannot be defined. In most cases, this would be a “multi-faceted question” the answer to which would depend on the circumstances of each case. The following factors, which are not exhaustive, are likely to be of significance in determining whether to grant extension of time:

(1) length of delay;

(2) reasons for the delay;

(3) prospect of success of the intended appeal;

(4) prejudice to the respondent if extension of time was granted.

Length of delay and reasons for the delay

6.  Any person aggrieved by an order of the court may appeal within 14 days after the date of the order. By 3 May 2022 when the Summons was filed, 116 days had lapsed since the date of the Order. The application is 102 days out of time, which is very substantial in the context of a fourteen-day appeal period. The Applicant’s explanation for the delay is just a bare assertion of self-isolation without particulars as to when and whether she had contracted the virus as to require isolation. The delivery service of Hong Kong Post is usually very reliable. The Applicant is deemed to have waived her right to give better particulars of her explanation for the delay in appealing. It is open to the Court to assess the credibility of her explanation solely on the basis of the available evidence.

7.  The Applicant did not actually claim she had contracted the virus and required mandatory isolation imposed by the government. She only engaged in voluntary self-isolation because she had been in contact with my confirmed Covid-19 patients. She gave no particulars as to when she contracted the virus, if she had; or when she engaged in self-isolation, if she had not. The delay is a very substantial period of 102 days. In view of the long delay and her ambiguous explanation, it is difficult to accept her first explanation as credible.

8.  As for her second explanation based on her inability to read and understand English, it should be noted that not until she lodged her present Summons in English, all along her non-refoulement claim was processed in the Chinese language. The Notice of Decision by the Director of Immigration, the Decision of the Board and the Form Call-1 and Order of this Court are all written in Chinese. It is not her claim that she could not communicate in Chinese or could not understand the above documents written in Chinese. It was her choice to switch to the English language in her Summons. The directions of this Court were given in English only to respond to her Summons in English. Hence, her explanation that she need time to find assistance in the English language to read and understand the letter and to file her appeal cannot be a valid explanation. In any event, in view of the very long delay, her second explanation is not credible.

9.  For the above reasons, I do not accept she has a reasonable explanation for the very substantial delay.

Prospect of the intended appeal

10.  The Applicant’s sole ground of appeal as stated in her supporting affirmation is that the Order was reached unfairly without allowing her an opportunity to clarify her case and situation in her country.

11.  Her leave application was determined on paper without an oral hearing and she had no opportunity to make any oral submission. As stated in paragraph 1 of the Form Call-1, that decision was made after having considered the nature of the application, her grounds of application, the decision of the Board and all the papers. Paper determination is usually appropriate for such leave applications, particularly as in here where the Applicant had given detailed grounds of application consisting of three pages.

12.  As stated in paragraph 18 of the Form Call-1, the role of the court in judicial review is not to re-assess the non-refoulement claims afresh. The primary decision-makers in a claim for non-refoulement are the Director and the Board. They alone assess the evidence and find facts including those relating to the matters allegedly giving rise to the non-refoulement claim, risk of harm, availability of state protection and viability of internal relocation. The function of the court in a judicial review is to scrutinize the Board’s decision and intervene only for errors of law, procedural unfairness or irrationality in the decision: see Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration[2]. This Court has no fact finding functions in a judicial review. Even allowing the Applicant to address this Court and to recite her evidence could not assist her, if this Court was unable to find any errors of law, procedural unfairness and irrationality in the Board’s decision. All her grounds of judicial review had been considered in paragraphs 16 to 24 of the Form Call-1. The decision to refuse her leave application was made after rigorous examination of the Board’s decision with anxious scrutiny for errors of law, procedural unfairness and irrationality. Given the limited scope in which an applicant may challenge the finding of the Board in a judicial review, I was not satisfied that there was any prospect of success in the Applicant’s intended judicial review. Despite full reasons having been given in the Form Call-1, the Applicant could not come up with any proper challenge of the Board’s decision or this Court’s decision. She has no arguable grounds of appeal. Her intended appeal has no prospect of success.

Prejudice to the respondent

13.  The prejudice to the proposed respondent and to public administration if a challenge is allowed to proceed is obvious. The delay is by itself an abuse of the process of the court and the non-refoulement protection arrangement. To allow the challenge to proceed would encourage other claimants to indulge in such abuse. It would cause unnecessary waste of judicial and public resources and delay the genuine non-refoulement claimants’ access to the court. It would render it difficult for the Director to perform her duty of maintaining immigration control. Above all, it would make it difficult or unduly burdensome for Hong Kong to honour its international obligations under the various conventions to protect people from persecution, torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. Granting her leave under the circumstances may subject the whole system of non-refoulement protection to serious abuse to the prejudice of Hong Kong.

Conclusion

14.  The Applicant has no valid explanation for the very substantial delay. She has no arguable grounds of appeal and her intended appeal has no prospect of success. To allow such an un-meritorious challenge to proceed would be prejudicial to the intended respondent and the administration. Accordingly, her application for extension of time to appeal is refused.

 ( Anthony To )
 Deputy High Court Judge

The applicant is not represented



[1]   CAMP 64/2020; [2020] HKCA 844

[2]   [2018] HKCA 524 at para 14(1)

[2022] HKCFI 28-CH-2022-01-07

NGUYEN THI THUY HA 對 酷刑聲請上訴委員會/免遣返聲請呈請辦事處 [Decision on Leave Application]

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HCAL 151/2019

[2022] HKCFI 28

香港特別行政區

高等法院

原訟法庭

憲法及行政訴訟2019年第151號

申請人NGUYEN Thi Thuy Ha
對
建議答辯人 酷刑聲請上訴委員會/免遣返聲請呈請辦事處
建議有利害關係的一方 入境事務處處長

申請許可以申請司法覆核

法官決定通知書(第53號命令第3條規則)

經;

  考慮相關文件; 或
  經考慮文件和口頭陳述,由申請人代表(       )大律師或申請人親自出庭/申請人缺席;

高等法院暫委法官杜溎峰命令: 

拒絕司法覆核的許可申請

本庭的觀察:

背景

1.  申請人於2019年1月16日以表格86發出通知書,針對酷刑聲請上訴委員會/免遣返聲請呈請辦事處(以下簡稱「上訴委員會」)2018年12月28日的決定,申請司法覆核許可。她沒有要求出席口頭聆訊。經考慮到申請的性質、理據、有關的文件和證據及所有的情況,法庭認為她的申請可以用文件方式處理。

2.  申請人於2015年12月7日在香港被警方拘捕。其後,她被檢控未經入境事務處處長准許入境香港及逗留和使用偽造身份證罪名,判處監禁15個月。服刑期間,她以書面陳述方式提出免遣返聲請。於2016年10月5日,她刑滿出獄。之後,於2017年2月28日,她存檔免遣返聲請表格提出正式申請。

3.  申請人的免遣返聲請理據是她欠下債主5億越南盾,因無法償還,遭債主及其手下傷害,甚至恐嚇會殺死她與她的兒子。所以她逃到香港尋求保護。

4.  入境事務處按照統一審核機制就所有適用的理由審理她的申請。這些理由包括:

(一)香港法例第115章《入境條例》第VIIC部所指的酷刑風險(以下簡稱「酷刑風險」);

(二)香港法例第383章《香港人權法案條例》第8條下的第三款所指的酷刑或殘忍、不人道或侮辱之處遇或懲罰的風險(以下簡稱「《人權法案》第三款的風險」);

(三)《香港人權法案條例》第8條下的第二款所指無理剝奪生命的風險(以下簡稱「《人權法案》第二款的風險」)及

(四)參照1951年《關於難民地位的公約》內的免遣返原則所指的遭受迫害風險(以下簡稱「受迫害風險」)。

5.  經詳細審理後,入境事務處於2017年3月24日發出決定通知書,駁回她的免遣返聲請。申請人遂於2017年4月10日針對該通知書內的決定向上訴委員會提出上訴。她的主要上訴理由是重申她面對債主傷害的風險。於2018年12月28日,上訴委員會駁回她的上訴。

申請人的案情

6.  申請人於1983年4月2日在越南海防出生,現齡38歲,已婚,育有一名兒子,現齡21歲。申請人接受過四年正式教育,曾當小販十年。申請人的父親已身故。她的母親和妹妹仍現居於越南。

7.  在免遣返申請表格中,申請人稱父親需要做心臟手術,而她的丈夫前赴醫院探望她的父親途中亦遇到車禍受傷。於是她向有黑社會背景的債主借了4億越南盾應急,每月還債1億越南盾,共欠債5億越南盾。雙方沒有訂明本金清還期。之後,她無力償還債項。債主的手下曾在漁市場向她討債,並摑了她幾巴掌。自2014年9月起,他們曾到她的家討債,並恐嚇說:若不還債會打死她,若兩個月內不還清債項會打她的兒子,若她報警更會殺死她。這些事件發生過三、四次,每次均有三、四名持刀的人上門恐嚇她:見裁定書第9段。她指因無力償還欠債,且曾被債主恐嚇和毆打,所以於2015年8月,她逃離越南偷渡到香港。

上訴委員會的決定

8.  在上訴聆訊中,申請人說貸款是5億越南盾,月息1,200萬盾。這說法明顯地與免遣返申請表格所述的有分岐。就這分岐,她提出不同及模稜兩可而混亂的解釋:見裁定書第10(i) 及(ii)段。在第10(iii) 、(iv) 及(v)段,上訴委員會指出申請人在免遣返申請表格的其他不盡不實的證供。在第11 及12段,經分析她的證供後,上訴委員會認為她的證詞不合常理,不接納她的證據。上訴委員會裁定她未能證明她聲請的基礎事實。

9.  申請人負上舉證責任。根據她的案情,她最基本要證明:(一)所欠債的債項、(二)因而被債主討債、(三)討債對她造成的傷害與風險及(四)該傷害與風險合符統一機制內四項適用理由其中一項的資格。上訴委員會裁定申請人不能成功舉證上述第(一)及(二)項的基本事實,更遑論她能否證明討債造成的傷害與風險及她是因害怕追債被殺而必須逃離越南。因此,她的免遣返申請完全欠缺事實基礎,上訴委員會必需駁回她的上訴。

10.  在裁定書第13 及14段,上訴委員會進一步裁定,即使接納申請人的證據,根據她的證據,她僅被打了幾巴掌和遭拳打腳踢;雖然債主曾恐嚇會毆打及殺害她的兒子,不論當時或這幾年間,債主完全沒有對她的兒子採取任何行動。她的丈夫與兒子沒有受到任何干擾。因此,上訴委員會評估債主對她討債造成的傷害為低。

11.  在裁定書第18段至24段,經作出恰當的法律指引後,上訴委員會裁定申請人不能成功證明她返回越南會面對酷刑或被殺害的風險。在第24段,上訴委員會總結裁定,即使完全接納申請人的證據,整件事件不涉及公職人員(不論是直接或間接),而申請人亦不能證明債主的恐嚇行為構成酷刑。所以在任何情況下,申請人不能證明酷刑風險,沒有資格得到免遺返保護。

12.  在裁定書第25段至29段,同樣地經作出恰當的法律指引後,上訴委員會裁定由於沒有證據顯示債主確實會殺害申請人,她不能成功證明她返回越南會面對《人權法案》第二款及《人權法案》第三款的風險。

13.  在裁定書第31段33段,同樣地經作出恰當的法律指引後,上訴委員會裁定由於申請人指稱她所畏懼的風險源於私人財務糾紛,不屬於《關於難民地位的公約》內的免遣返原則所指的遭受迫害風險,她沒有資格得到免遺返保護。

14.  在裁定書第15段至17段,基於可信的原居國家資料,包括新聞報導,上訴委員會相信越南政府近年來製定了國家反腐敗策略及打擊高利貸非法放債行為。因此,上訴委員會認為沒有證據顯示越南政府不能及不會對申請人提供洽當的保護。

15.  在裁定書第34段至37段,經參閱原居國家資料後,上訴委員會裁定申請人是一名健全的成年人,以她的能力及經驗可以遷到河內生活,以避免她所聲稱可能會遭受的風險。

司法覆核許可申請

16.  申請人於2019年1月16日作出誓章,支持她的司法覆核許可申請。在誓章內,她列出四個申請理由:

(一)上訴委員會錯誤地採納與她的免遣返申請無關的證據;

(二)上訴委員會錯誤地作出主觀判斷;

(三)上訴委員會錯誤地作出無理推測;及

(四)上訴委員會錯誤地低估申請人會被殺害的風險。

17.  申請人投訴的實質是她不同意上訴委員會不信納她的證據,不相信她是因害怕追債被殺而必須逃離越南,並裁定她的免遣返申請完全欠缺事實基礎,而拒絕她的申請。實質上,她是籍司法覆核的名義質疑上訴委員會的事實裁定提出上訴。

18.  法庭在審理司法覆核的責任不是重新評估申請人的免遣返申請。在審理免遣返申請時,主要的決定者是入境事務處處長及上訴委員會。只是他們才有權利評估證據,證人的可信性及作與免遣返相關的事實裁定,例如在統一審核機制下所有適用的理由與所指的風險、原居國家所能提供的保護及在原居國家內搬遷的可行性等。法庭會認真及仔細審查上訴委員會的決定。法庭僅會針對上訴委員會在審理免遣返申請時所犯的法律錯誤、程序不公平或不合理的況,通過司法覆核方式進行干預。

19.  申請人的第一項申請理由是針對裁定書第9至第14段。她投訴上訴委員會錯誤地只著重考慮她的借貸利息的出入陳述、償還貸款的可能性等無重要的證據,以求達到推斷她的證據不合理的目的,而忽視了她為何要向債主借錢及債主威嚇若她報警的話便會殺死她的兒子等重要因素。她指控上訴委員會避重就輕,對她不公平。

20.  申請人實質是藉不公平的名義挑戰上訴委員會的事實裁定。在作出事實裁定及證人可信性的評估時,法庭最常用的測試是證人所指稱事實的內在可信性,這亦是最可靠的試金石。申請人免遣返申請的基礎是她所欠的債、沒有償還債項的能力、債主的恐嚇、她受傷害的可能性或風險。她所指稱的貸款數額與利息正是她所指稱的欠債的要素,是債主對她施加恐嚇及她可能受到傷害的因由。若她真的曾向債主借款,她沒有可能不能清楚交代。上訴委員會考慮這方面的證據是完全恰當。在裁定書第9段至第12段,上訴委員會已清楚交代不信納申請人的理由。該裁定是上訴委員會獨有權作的事實裁定。申請人的理據不足以構成合理的申請司法覆核理由,申請人基於這理據的申請也沒有成功機會。

21.  申請人的第二項申請理由是針對裁定書第12段。她投訴上訴委員會錯誤地作出主觀判斷。她的指控是基於在該段上訴委員會稱她在關鍵點作出不同說法,但卻沒有說明什麼關鍵點的差異。她投訴這裁定對她不公平。

22.  在裁定書第10(i) 及(ii)段,上訴委員會已經十分清晰地指出,她在免遣返申請表格與上訴聆訊時作出關於貸款額和利息的差異及她所作出不同及模稜兩可而混亂的解釋。很明顯,這些分歧便是上訴委員會在裁定書第12段所指的關鍵點與差異。進一步的理由可見於上文第20段。在裁定書第10(iii) 、(iv) 及(v)段,上訴委員會指出申請人其他不盡不實的證供。在裁定書第11段和第12段,上訴委員會經分析她的證供後,裁定她的證詞不合常理,不接納她的證據。這結論也是上訴委員會獨有權作的事實裁定。申請人的理據不足以構成合理的申請司法覆核理由,基於這理據的申請也沒有成功機會。

23.  申請人的第三項申請理由是針對裁定書第13段及第14段。她說既然債主用武力拳打腳踢申請人,她不明白為什麼上訴委員會會推測債主及他的手下不會殺害她的兒子。很明顯,這是一度程度的問題。由於債主及其手下只對申請人使用低程度的武力,且從沒有向她的兒子施襲,上訴委員會可以合理地推斷債主殺害她的兒子風險低。這結論也是上訴委員會獨有權作的事實裁定。申請人的理據不足以構成合理的申請司法覆核理由,基於這理據的申請也沒有成功機會。

24.  申請人的第四項申請理由是上訴委員會錯誤地低估她會被殺害的風險。與上一段相同的理由,上訴委員會可以合理地作出這推斷。這結論也是上訴委員會獨有權作的事實裁定。申請人的理據不足以構成合理的申請司法覆核理由,基於這理據的申請也沒有成功機會。

25.  上訴委員會正確地列出統一審核機制下所有適用的理由包括:酷刑風險、《人權法案》第三款的風險、《人權法案》第二款的風險及受迫害風險。上訴委員會亦正確地引述適用的法律原則,舉證標準,並援引了相關案例支持它的決定。它知悉到在裁決上訴時須重新考慮所有相關事情的始末,而並非只考慮入境事務處處長的決定是否正確。上訴委員會正確地確定申請人的免遣返申請是建基於她指稱欠下債主的債項、債主討債所使用的武力與威嚇、她所受到的傷害、她所遭受迫害的風險、越南政府所能提供的保護、她所面對受傷害的真實機會等。

26.  上訴委員會裁定申請人未能成功證明欠債及她是因害怕追債被殺而必須逃離越南的指稱。因此,她的免遣返申請完全欠缺事實基礎;她不能成功舉證她會面對酷刑風險、《人權法案》第三款的風險、《人權法案》第二款的風險及受迫害風險。此外,基於可信的原居國家資料,上訴委員會認為沒有證據顯示越南政府不能及不會對申請人提供洽當的保護;及認為以她的能力及經驗可以遷到河內生活,以避免她所聲稱可能會遭受的風險。這些全屬事實裁定,是上訴委員會獨有的權利。

27.  經認真及仔細審查上訴委員會的裁決書、相關的文件及證據後,法庭確定上訴委員會的決定完全沒有絲毫錯誤,它的決定不存在可被視為程序不公平或「溫斯伯里」不合理的況(即按照Wednesbury一案[1]所訂標準,原審法官祇須審查案中證據,從而決定是否根據這些證據,一個合理的法官,對自己作出恰當的法律指引後,不可能會作出的決定)。申請人在本案沒有合理可爭辯的論據,她的司法覆核申請也沒有合理成功機會。因此, 法庭拒絕申請人的司法覆核許可申請。

結論

28.  基於上述的理由,法庭拒絕申請人的司法覆核許可申請。

高等法院司法常務官
(李振華 代行)

日期: 2022年1月7日 

即使法庭已給予許可,申請人及其法律顧問亦應謹記他們有責任在知道答辯人所提出的證據後,重新考慮他們的申請的成功機會。




申請人須知:

如獲給予許可,申請人或其律師必須:
(a)  把給予許可的命令和其他指示於法庭給予許可後14天內送達答辯人及法庭可能指定的有利害關係的各方(第53號命令第4A條規則)。

(b)  於獲得許可後14天內發出原訴傳票並依照第53號命令第5條規則把原訴傳票予以送達。

(c)  向其他每一方提供申請人打算在聆訊中使用的每一份誓章(包括支持覆核許可申請的誓章)的副本(第53號命令第6(5)條規則)。
已於 7/1/2022 送交/遞交申請人/申請人的律師

NGUYEN Thi Thuy Ha
 
申請人檔號: 沒有
已於 7/1/2022 送交/遞交答辯人/答辯人的律師/法庭可能指定的有利害關係的各方/有利害關係的各方的律師

酷刑聲請上訴委員會/
免遣返聲請呈請辦事處
建議答辯人檔號:
USM 6792/17/4/68/V1183

入境事務處處長
建議有利害關係的一方檔號:
QA T/C 210/17
(前為 RBCZ 11790/16)

律政司
(民事訴訟組2)



Form CALL-1

 


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