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Constitutional and Administrative Law Proceedings2019

RE NGO THI HONG

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Files (2)

[2022] HKCFI 2795-EN-2022-09-16

RE NGO THI HONG

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HCAL 547/2019

[2022] HKCFI 2795

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST

NO 547 OF 2019

____________

RE:NGO THI HONGApplicant

____________

Before:  Deputy High Court Judge To in Chambers

Date of Decision:  16 September 2022

______________

D E C I S I O N

______________

Introduction

1.  This is the Applicant’s application by summons filed on 8 July 2022 (the “Summons”) for extension of time to appeal the order of this Court dated 12 May 2022 (the “Order”) refusing her leave to apply for judicial review (the “leave application”) of the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board / non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office (the “Board”) dated 3 April 2020 (the “Decision”).

2.  Under Order 53, rule 3(4) of the Rules of the High Court, where an application for leave to apply for judicial review is refused by a judge, the applicant may appeal against the judge’s order to the Court of Appeal within 14 days after such order. In Jagg Singh and Torture Claims Appeal Board / non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office[1], the Court of Appeal held that in considering whether to extend time for appealing a decision refusing leave to apply for judicial review, the court will take into account: (1) the length of delay; (2) the reasons for the delay; (3) the prospect of the intended appeal; and (4) the prejudice to the respondent if an extension of time were granted.

Length of delay and reasons for the delay

3.  By 8 July 2022 when the Summons was filed, 57 days had lapsed since the date of the Order. The application is 43 days out of time. The delay is substantial in the context of a fourteen-day period of appeal.  In her supporting affirmation, the Applicant gave an address in Temple Street which is different from that given by her in her Form 86. She alleged that she never received the Order and claimed that she was advised by the Immigration Department to appeal the Order, suggesting that she was informed about the Order by the Immigration Department, presumably upon her routine reporting to that department. Possibly, she did not receive the Order because she had moved without updating her new address with the Court. To assist her in presenting a proper case for extension of time, this Court gave them directions by letter dated 27 July 2022 to file a statement within 14 days of the letter setting out the date and circumstances when the Order was brought to her attention and the grounds of her intended appeal. The Order was sent to her address as stated in her Summons. As at the date of this decision, she has not responded.

4.  In the absence of any response from her, the only irresistible inference from the circumstances is that the Applicant did not receive the Order because she had moved without updating her new address with the Court. In Re Karamjit Singh[2] and Re Hasmi Rizwan Imran[3], the Court of Appeal held that it is the applicant’s duty to report his change of address to the Court. If he did not, he has to bear the consequence of his neglect. Hence, there is no valid explanation for the substantial delay.

Prospect of success of the intended appeal

5.  Despite the Court’s specific request for the grounds of her intended appeal, the Applicant did not respond. The inference is that she has no arguable grounds of appeal. Without even knowing what her grounds of appeal are, it is very difficult to assess the prospect of success of the intended appeal.

6.  The role of the court in judicial review is not to re-assess the non-refoulement claims afresh. The primary decision-makers in a non-refoulement claim are the Director and the Board. They alone assess the evidence and find facts including those relating to the matters allegedly giving rise to the non-refoulement claim, risk of harm, availability of state protection and viability of internal relocation. In a judicial review of that decision, the court will scrutinize the Board’s decision, and intervene by way of judicial review, only for errors of law, procedural unfairness or irrationality: see Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration[4]. Thus, in the absence of any specific grounds challenging the Court’s decision in refusing leave to apply for judicial review and in an application to appeal that decision out of time, the best the court can do is to re-assess the decision focusing on the above vitiating elements.

7.  I have rigorously re-examined the Form Call-1, the Decision, the papers and the evidence with anxious scrutiny. I am satisfied that the Board had correctly set out the law and key legal principles relating to the four applicable grounds under the USM; the issues; the burden of proof and standard of proof; and observed a very high standard of fairness. I am satisfied that the Board’s Decision has not been so vitiated. On the material now available, the Applicant’s intended appeal has no prospect of success at all.

Prejudice to the respondent

8.  The prejudice to the proposed respondent and to public administration is obvious, if her application is allowed. It is a clear abuse of legal process to challenge a decision without proper and good grounds of appeal and which is bound to fail. Despite having been given a last opportunity to furnish her grounds of appeal, the Applicant has failed to do so. To allow such a challenge to proceed when it is already out of time would encourage other claimants to indulge in such abuse and create prejudice to the intended respondent and to the administration. It would cause unnecessary waste of judicial and public resources and delay the genuine non-refoulement claimants’ access to the court. It would render it difficult for the Director to perform his duty of maintaining immigration control. Above all, it would make it difficult or unduly burdensome for Hong Kong to honour its international obligations under the various conventions to protect people from persecution, torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. Allowing her application may subject the whole system of non-refoulement protection to serious abuse to the prejudice of Hong Kong.

Conclusion

9.  For the above reasons, the application for extension of time to appeal is refused.

  ( Anthony To )
Deputy High Court Judge

The applicant is not represented



[1]  CAMP 64/2020; [2020] HKCA 844

[2]  CACV 78/2018; [2018] HKCA 460

[3]  [2018] HKCA 439 at paragraph 15

[4]  [2018] HKCA 524 at paragraph 14(1)

[2022] HKCFI 1353-CH-2022-05-12

NGO THI HONG 對 酷刑聲請上訴委員會 / 免遣返聲請呈請辦事處 [Decision on Leave Application]

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HCAL 547/2019

[2022] HKCFI 1353

香港特別行政區

高等法院

原訟法庭

憲法及行政訴訟2019年第547號

申請人NGO THI HONG 
 對  
建議答辯人酷刑聲請上訴委員會/ 免遣返聲請呈請辦事處  
建議有利害關係的一方入境事務處處長 

申請許可以申請司法覆核

法官決定通知書(第53號命令第3條規則)

經;

   考慮相關文件; 或
   經考慮文件和口頭陳述,由申請人代表(               )大律師或申請人親自出庭/申請人缺席;

高等法院暫委法官杜溎峰命令:

1.  准予申請人修正「對申請司法覆核的許可的申請的通知書 」(「表格86」);及

2.  拒絕司法覆核的許可申請

本庭的觀察:

背景

1.   申請人於2019年2月26日以表格86發出通知書,針對酷刑聲請上訴委員會/免遣返聲請呈請辦事處(以下簡稱「上訴委員會」)於2017年11月6日作出的決定(以下簡稱「上訴委員會的決定」)申請司法覆核許可。她在同日存檔的誓章把「香港入境署署長」(法庭理解為入境事務處處長,以下簡稱「處長」) 列為本申請的另一名建議答辯人;但卻沒有就處長的決定尋求濟助。處長在其日期為 2017 年 11 月 6 日的決定通知書(以下簡稱「決定通知書」),正是上訴委員會的決定所處理的標的物。其實,上訴委員會的決定書發出的日期是2020 年 4月 3日,申請人在表格86所寫的日期是處長發出決定通知書的日期。因此,法庭准予以上的修正。

2.  雖然上訴委員會的決定可以通過司法程序進行覆核,但處長的決定通知書卻不可,因為法律有既定針對處長的通知書向上訴委員會提出上訴的程序,而申請人亦已援引了這些程序向上訴委員會提出上訴。

3.  申請人沒有要求出席口頭聆訊。經考慮到申請的性質、理據、有關的文件和證據及所有的情況,法庭認為她的申請可以用文件方式處理。

4.  申請人稱於2015年7月12日從國內偷渡到香港。翌日,她向入境事務處自首並以書面陳述方式提出免遣返聲請。她的聲請理據是她無法償還她欠下債主2億越南盾債款,遭債主以武力方式討債,致使她的生命受到威脅。所以她逃到香港尋求保護。

5.  入境事務處按照統一審核機制就所有適用的理由審理她的申請。這些理由包括:

(一)香港法例第115章《入境條例》第VIIC部所指的酷刑風險(以下簡稱「酷刑風險」);

(二)香港法例第383章《香港人權法案條例》第8條下的第三款所指的酷刑或殘忍、不人道或侮辱之處遇或懲罰的風險(以下簡稱「《人權法案》第三款的風險」);

(三)《香港人權法案條例》第8條下的第二款所指無理剝奪生命的風險(以下稱「《人權法案》第二款的風險」)及

(四)參照1951年《關於難民地位的公約》內的免遣返原則所指的遭受迫害風險(以下簡稱「受迫害的風險」)。

6.  經詳細審理後,入境事務處於2017年11月6日發出決定通知書,駁回她的免遣返聲請。申請人遂針對該通知書向上訴委員會提出上訴。於2020年4月3日,上訴委員會發出決定書駁回她的上訴。

申請人的案情

7.  申請人於1982年10月22日在越南同奈省出生,現齡39歲,京族人,已婚,曾接受八年正式教育。她的工作經驗包括務農及養蝦。她和丈夫於2000年結婚並育有一名兒子。於2002年,她向一名叫Hung的債主借下2億越南盾,每億越南盾月息一百萬越南盾,以經營養蝦業務。債主是一名黑社會人物。於2003年,為了擴充生意,她再向債主多借2億越南盾。她在上訴委員會的口供補充指借款人只有她一人,因為債主較為相信女性。

8.  在2007年初,申請人飼養的蝦全部死於疫症,唯有結業。她和丈夫在外打工勉強維持生計和償還利息,但到了2015年3或4月,她的丈夫不再工作,所以只有申請人獨力償還債務。

9.  在2015年4月,申請人無力償還4億越南盾本金及逾期利息4百萬越南盾。債主便帶同4名手下到她的家追債,申請人表示無法償還債項,但債主聲稱如果她不還款便會殺死她。債主給予她三天寬限期。申請人在該事件中沒有受到傷害。

10.  在2015年5月,債主又帶同手下到她的家追債,用木棍恐嚇她,並要求她於兩天內還款。申請人這次也沒有受到傷害。

11.  兩天後,債主又派人到她的家中,打毀她的傢俱。債主用木棍打了她一下,她擋避的時傷及左手拇指。她立即逃到鄰居家中躲避,債主及手下也沒追打她。她的父母替她報案。公安只到場看了一下便離開,沒有作進一步調查。申請人懷疑這是因為債主賄賂了公安。

12.  申請人恐怕債主終有一天會傷害她,便逃到富平社友人家中暫避。2015年6月,她逃到芒街,偷渡到中國東興市,然後經由深圳偷渡到香港。她承認債主從沒有向她的丈夫討債或騷擾他。

上訴委員會的決定

13.  經考慮過申請人提出的文件及在聆訊時所作的證供,上訴委員會認為申請人的證供多處前後矛盾,有違邏輯及不合情理,因此不相信她。上訴委員會在決定書第46段列出5點矛盾之處:

(1)  申請人在免遣返聲請表格指她曾簽下借據,在聆訊時卻說沒有任何借據,但在考慮後又改稱應該是有簽訂借據;

(2)  申請人在免遣返聲請表格指第一次借貸月息為200萬越南盾,在聆訊時卻指月息為1000萬越南盾,她認為1000萬才是正確的金額;

(3)  申請人在免遣返聲請表格指第二次借貸本金2億越南盾,利息400萬越南盾,但在聆訊時卻指本金為3億越南盾,利息為3000萬越南盾;

(4)  申請人在免遣返聲請表格指她在2007年結束養蝦經營,但在聆訊時卻指是2015年;

(5)  申請人在免遣返聲請表格稱鄰居代她報警,在聆訊時卻指是父母代為報警。當被問及她遠在2-3公里外的父母如何知道她的狀況並代她報警,她便改稱她記錯了父母離她的距離,而事實上他們的距離只有2-3呎。

14.  上訴委員會又指申請人在免遣返聲請表格中稱她在第三次被討債事件中沒有受到傷害,但在不足兩個月之後與入境處會面中卻稱她的手指受傷。上訴委員會認為假如她真的受過傷害,她不可能在免遣返聲請表格忽略此項重要事實。

15.  雖然申請人所需負的舉證標準不高,由於她證供有很多差異及不合理之處,上訴委員會不信納她曾被討債及受到威嚇。因此,上訴委員會認為她未能成功證明支持免遣返聲請所需的事實基礎,而裁定她的上訴失敗。

16.  上訴委員會又認為,縱使信納申請人的證供,她的上訴亦沒有成功機會。根據她的證供,債主有多次機會向她施襲,嚴重傷害她,甚至殺死她,但卻沒有這樣做。上訴委員會認為債主的目的只是向她施壓討債,沒有意圖嚴重傷害或殺害她。因此,上訴委員會評定她返回越南所面對的待遇未達到最低水平的嚴苛程度;及她懼怕受到嚴苛程度的傷害或殺害的風險亦相當低。她的證供也沒有顯示債主的討債行為與越南政府有關連。此外,基於具權威及可信的原居國資料,上訴委員會相信越南政府致力打擊貪污及違法討債行為,並對不法分子進行懲罰。上訴委員會因此裁定,若申請人返回越南,越南政府可向她提供足夠的保護。上訴委員會亦裁定,作為一個健全而擁有多年教育程度與工作經驗的成年人,申請人亦可以選擇內部遷徒至胡志明市或河內,逃避債主的迫害。上訴委員會認為她指稱債主能夠在越南所有地方尋找到她及傷害她的說法,缺乏實質理據支持。將適用於免遣返保護的法律原則施用在上述的事實,上訴委員會裁定,即使信納她的證供,申請人亦未能成功證明她的聲請符合統一審核機制內任何一項適用的聲請理由。

17.  基於上述理由,上訴委員會維持處長在決定通知書內的決定,而駁回申請人的上訴。

司法覆核許可申請

18.  申請人於她的支持誓章,重複她的案情與所恐懼的風險,及展示處長的決定通知書。她不認同上訴委員會的裁決,但沒有指出上訴委員會的決定有任何錯誤,也沒有提供申請司法覆核的理據。申請人投訴的實質是她不同意上訴委員會不信納她的證據,不相信她是因害怕被追債及殺害而逃離越南,並裁定她的免遣返申請欠缺事實基礎,而拒絕她的申請。其實,她是籍司法覆核的名義質疑上訴委員會的事實裁定提出上訴。

19.  法庭在審理司法覆核的責任不是重新評估申請人的免遣返申請。在審理免遣返申請時,主要的決定者是入境事務處處長及上訴委員會。只有他們才有權利評估證據,證人的可信性及作與免遣返相關的事實裁定,例如在統一審核機制下所有適用的理由與所指的風險、原居國家所能提供的保護及在原居國家內搬遷的可行性等。法庭會仔細審查上訴委員會的決定。法庭僅會針對上訴委員會在審理免遣返申請所犯的法律錯誤、程序不公平或不合理的情況,通過司法覆核方式進行干預見Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration[1]。

20.  經認真及仔細審查上訴委員會的裁決書、處長的決定通知書、相關的文件及證據後,法庭確定上訴委員會在法律論點上沒有絲毫錯誤,沒有犯上程序不公平的情況,它的決定亦不存在可被視為程序不公平或「韋恩斯伯里」不合理的情況(即按照Wednesbury一案所訂標準,原審法官只需要審查案中證據,從而決定是否根據這些證據,一個合理的法官,對自己作出恰當的法律指引後,不可能會作出的決定)。申請人在本案沒有合理可爭辯的論據,她的司法覆核申請也沒有合理成功機會。因此, 法庭拒絕申請人的司法覆核許可申請。

結論

21.  基於上述的理由,法庭准予申請人修正表格86所指稱上訴委員會的決定日期,但拒絕申請人經修正的司法覆核許可申請。

 高等法院司法常務官
 (麥兆強 代行)

日期: 二零二二年五月十二日


即使法庭已給予許可,申請人及其法律顧問亦應謹記他們有責任在知道答辯人所提出的證據後,重新考慮他們的申請的成功機會。




申請人須知:

如獲給予許可,申請人或其律師必須:

     
(a)  把給予許可的命令和其他指示於法庭給予許可後14天內送達答辯人及法庭可能指定的有利害關係的各方(第53號命令第4A條規則)。

(b)  於獲得許可後14天內發出原訴傳票並依照第53號命令第5條規則把原訴傳票予以送達。

(c)  向其他每一方提供申請人打算在聆訊中使用的每一份誓章(包括支持覆核許可申請的誓章)的副本(第53號命令第6(5)條規則)。
 已於二零二二年五月十二日 送交/遞交申請人/申請人的律師

NGO  THI  HONG
 
申請人檔號: 沒有
 已於二零二二年五月十二日 送交/遞交答辯人/答辯人的律師/法庭可能指定的有利害關係的各方/有利害關係的各方的律師

酷刑聲請上訴委員會/
免遣返聲請呈請辦事處
建議答辯人檔號:
USM 9204/17/11/215/V1810

入境事務處處長
建議有利害關係的一方檔號:
QA T/C 2938/17
(前為 RBCL/12368/15)

律政司
(民事訴訟組2)



Form CALL-1

 

 



[1][2018] HKCA 524 at [14(1)]