CHANTHARASIRI SINGHA v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD / NON-REFOULEMENT CLAIMS PETITION OFFICE
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CHANTHARASIRI SINGHA v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD / NON-REFOULEMENT CLAIMS PETITION OFFICE
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CHANTHARASIRI SINGHA v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD / NON-REFOULEMENT CLAIMS PETITION OFFICE
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HCAL 717/2019
[2024] HKCFI 1300
IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST
NO 717 OF 2019
_____________
BETWEEN
| Chantharasiri Singha | Applicant | |
| and | ||
| Torture Claims Appeal Board / Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office | Putative Respondent | |
| and | ||
| Director of Immigration | Putative Interested Party |
_____________
| Before: | Deputy High Court Judge K.W. Lung in Chambers |
| Date of Decision: | 31 May 2024 |
_____________
D E C I S I O N
_____________
The application
1. The applicant is an illegal immigrant by staying in Hong Kong without permission and he lodged a non-refoulement claim with the Director of Immigration (“the Director”). The Director rejected his claim. He appealed to the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“the Board”). By Decision dated 3 February 2017 (“the Board’s Decision”), the Board dismissed his appeal.
2. Pursuant to Order 53, rule 3(2) of the Rules of the High Court (“RHC”), the applicant filed Form No. 86 to apply for leave to apply for judicial review of the Board’s Decision.
3. By Order dated 13 January 2023 (“the Court’s decision”), the Court dismissed his application for the reason that there is no realistic prospect of success in his intended application. The Court’s decision was, by order of the Court, re-sent to the applicant on 27 March 2023 and 20 December 2023 respectively. The effective date for service of the Court’s decision is therefore deemed to have served on the applicant on 21 December 2023, which is not a specified day, pursuant to Order 65, rules 5 and 7 of the RHC[1]. The deadline for appeal is on 5 January 2024.
4. By summons filed on 5 February 2024, the applicant applied for appeal against the Court’s decision out of time. His application is late for one month.
5. In his affirmation in support of his application, the applicant said that the Court’s decision was reached without his attendance.
Discussion
6. Relying on Ogbozor Tochukwu Eugene v Torture Claims Appeal Board/Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office and Director of Immigration[2022] HKCA 607, Hon Kwan VP and G Lam JA, 6 May 2022, I decide to determine this application on paper without an oral hearing.
7. The Court shall consider the factors as set out in AW v. Director of Immigration and William Lam [2016] 2 HKC 393 at para. 27(3) in considering if extension of time should be extended: (1) the length of delay; (2) the reasons for the delay; (3) the prospect of the intended appeal; and (4) the prejudice to the putative respondent if extension of time was granted.
8. In Re Adumekwe Rowland Ejike[2019] HKCA 702, the Court of Appeal held:
“19. The prospect of success of the intended appeal is important: the court will not grant extension for a hopeless appeal to be pursued, see Re Rahman Wasif[2019] HKCA 299 at [13]; Re Kpamou Gbotoi Bernard[2019] HKCA 168; and Re Irshad Muhammad[2018] HKCA 864 at [16].”
9. The applicant said that if refouled, he would be harmed or killed by an unknown killer and the followers because he witnessed their criminal act of murdering a person.
10. The Director rejected his claim because it was not substantiated. He appealed to the Board.
11. His application for appeal to the Board was late. The Board had considered his explanation but refused to accept it. However, the Board did not consider the merits of his case. It dismissed his appeal solely for the reason he did not file his notice of appeal within time without justifiable reason.
12. On the face of it, the applicant has an arguable case in view of the Court of Appeal’s decision in Re Khan Kamal Ahmed[2019] HKCA 377, 2 April 2019, §§18 & 20.
13. However, he was also late for his application for judicial review of the Board’s Decision. The delay is more than 1 year and 10 months. See paragraph 14 of the Court’s decision. In his affirmation in support of his application, he said that he still had problem in his country. He did not give any explanation for his delay. I therefore found that the applicant had given no acceptable explanation for his delay. On this basis, the Court refused to extend time for him to make his application for leave for judicial review of the Board’s Decision. My decision was based upon the decision of the Court of Appeal in AW v Director of Immigation and William Lam CACV 63/2015, Hon Lam VP, Kwan and Poon JA (as they then were), 3 November 2015, in which the Court of Appeal held:
“27. In Re Thomas Lai [2014] 6 HKC 1, G Lam J considered the relevant authorities and stated the principles to be applied in an application to extend time for judicial review in §§43 to 45. I take the following summary of these principles from the submission of Ms Sara Tong, who appeared for the Director:
(3) What may constitute a good reason for extending time cannot be defined. In most cases, this would be a “multi-faceted question” the answer to which would depend on the circumstances of each case. The following factors, which are not exhaustive, are likely to be of significance:
(i) Length of the delay: Obviously the longer the delay, the more cogent the reason has to be for extending time.
(ii) Explanation for the delay: While Order 53 rule 4(1) requires a good reason for extending time, rather than a good excuse for the delay, it is common sense that the presence of a credibly valid explanation for the delay will strengthen, and conversely the absence of any acceptable explanation will weaken, the applicant’s request for what is after all an indulgence to be granted to him in the court’s discretion.
(iii)Merits of the substantive application: Although merits of the challenge of the administrative decision are a significant matter to be taken into account, it is by no means the sole criterion. Where an applicant is many months out of time, leave may be refused “however strong the complaint might otherwise be” (Po Fun Chan v Winnie Cheung (2007) 10 HKCFAR 676 at 693B to C, per Litton NPJ). An applicant who sleeps upon his rights may be barred from pursuing them in judicial review even though he may have a meritorious case (Law Chun Loy v Secretary for Justice, HCAL 13/2005, 26 October 2006, at §13, per Hartmann J)….”
14. No doubt, the applicant’s delay for apply for judicial review of the Board’s Decision is serious, by the standard of the AW case. He has given no explanation for his delay. But he has merit in his intended application for judicial review of the Board’s Decision.
15. I consider that the applicant may have an arguable case for this Court’s refusal to extend time for him to apply for judicial review of the Board’s Decision for his serious delay notwithstanding that he had an arguable case against the Board’s Decision.
16. In the circumstances, I extend time for the applicant to appeal against the Court’s decision. The applicant shall file his notice of appeal within 14 days from the date of this Order.
| (K.W. Lung) | |
| Deputy High Court Judge |
The applicant was unrepresented.
[1] Ordinary service: how effected (O. 65, r. 5)
(2) For the purposes of this rule, and of section 8 of the Interpretation and General Clauses Ordinance (Cap. 1), in its application to this rule, the proper address of any person on whom a document is to be served in accordance with this rule shall be the address for service of that person, but if at the time when service is effected that person has no address for service his proper address for the purposes aforesaid shall be-
(b) in the case of an individual, his usual or last known address.
Effect of service at certain time (O. 65, r. 7)
(2) For computing a period of time after service of the document, the document is deemed to be served on the next following day, not being a specified day.
CHANTHARASIRI SINGHA v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD / NON-REFOULEMENT CLAIMS PETITION OFFICE [Decision on Leave Application]
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HCAL 717/2019
[2023] HKCFI 87
IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No. 717 of 2019
BETWEEN | ||
| Chantharasiri Singha | Applicant | |
| and | ||
| Torture Claims Appeal Board/ | Putative | |
| Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office | Respondent | |
| and | ||
| Director of Immigration | Putative | |
| Interested Party | ||
Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review
NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Ord. 53 r. 3)
Following;
consideration of documents only; or consideration of documents and Applicant being absent in open court;
Order by Deputy High Court Judge K.W. Lung:
1. The extension of time for the application for Judicial Review be refused; and
2. The application for Judicial Review be dismissed.
Observations for the Applicant:
THE APPLICATION
1. The applicant applies for leave to apply for judicial review of the Decision dated 3 February 2017 of the Torture Claims Appeal Board/Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office (“the Board’s Decision”). His application filed on 14 March 2019 is late.[1] I shall deal with this issue below.
2. The applicant did not request an oral hearing. Pursuant to Order 53, rule 3(3) of the Rules of the High Court (“RHC”), his application is therefore dealt with on paper.
3. Pursuant to Order 20, rule 8 and Order 53, rule 3(6) of the RHC, Form 86 is amended to the effect that the Board is the proposed respondent and the Director of Immigration (“the Director”) is the interested party.
The applicant
4. The applicant is a national of Thailand. He last entered Hong Kong as a visitor on 17 May 2012 and was permitted to remain until 16 June 2012. His limitation of stay was later extended to 23 June 2012. However, he did not depart and had overstayed since 24 June 2012. On 28 June 2012, he was arrested by the police for overstaying and for trafficking in dangerous drugs, for which, he was convicted and sentenced to 4 months’ imprisonment. On 11 October 2012, he raised a torture claim, which was later taken as a non-refoulement claim upon the commencement of unified screening mechanism. His claim was made on the basis that, if refouled, he would be harmed or killed by an unknown killer and the followers because he witnessed their criminal act of murdering a person.
5. In short, in an early morning on 13 or 14 May 2012, the applicant witnessed a man killing a motorcyclist in a parking lot. He did not know those involved in the incident but the victim was a regular customer in his restaurant. The killer saw the applicant and threatened to kill him if he reported to the police. The applicant called the ambulance for the victim and left for home. Thereafter, the police told the applicant that the victim was dead and asked him to be the witness for the case. While the police offered witness protection, the applicant feared that the protection would not be sufficient. Out of fear, he fled to Hong Kong for protection. Details of his claim are set out at paragraphs 6-21 of the Notice of Decision dated 8 September 2015 by the Director (the “Director’s First Decision”).
The Director’s Decisions
6. The Director considered the applicant’s claim in relation to the following risks:
a. risk of torture under Part VIIC of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap. 115, (“the Ordinance”) (“Torture risk”);
b. risk of violation of the right to life under Article 2 of Section 8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap. 383 (“HKBOR”) (“BOR 2 risk”);
c. risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (“CIDTP”) under Article 3 of Section 8 of the HKBOR (“BOR 3 risk”); and
d. risk of persecution by reference to the non-refoulement principle under Article 33 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol (“Refugee Convention”) (“Persecution risk”).
7. By way of the Director’s First Decision, the Director dismissed the applicant’s claim on Torture risk, BOR 3 risk and Persecution risk for the level of risk of harm upon his refoulement was assessed to be low. In elaboration, the Director found that (i) the absence of physical harm from the killer indicated an unlikelihood of future risk of harm [30]; (ii) his delay in seeking international protection promptly was inconsistent with someone who genuinely feared an immediate risk of harm [31]; (iii) state protection would be available to him [32]-[36]; and (iv) internal relocation was a viable alternative [37].
8. For reasons set out in the Notice of Further Decision dated 19 January 2017 that he was unable to establish that his right to life would be violated if he returned to Thailand, the Director also rejected the applicant’s claim on the ground of BOR2 risk (the “Director’s Second Decision”).
The Board’s Decision
9. On 20 September 2016, the Secretariat of the Board received a notice of appeal/petition dated 13 September 2016 from the applicant to appeal the Director’s First Decision. He was around one year late.
10. The Board considered the applicant’s explanation. In a letter dated 18 August 2016 to the Board, he stated that the Director’s First Decision was sent to his residential address while he was detained in the Castle Peak Bay Immigration Center (“CIC”). The Board rejected this explanation as it was inconsistent with his reasons in the notice of appeal/petition which he said that the delay was due to his lack of legal and language assistances [14]. Nevertheless, the Board, after considering all the circumstances, also rejected this explanation [15]-[24]. In this premise, the Board concluded that there was no special circumstance which would warrant its exercise of discretion to allow the late filing.
11. As a result, the Board rejected the applicant’s late filing of notice of appeal/petition against the Director’s First Decision.
Application for leave to apply for judicial review of the Board’s Decision
12. The applicant has filed Form 86 dated 14 March 2019 for leave to apply for judicial review of the Board’s Decision.
13. In his affirmation in support of his application, he said that he still has problems in his country.
DISCUSSION
14. As mentioned in paragraph 1, this application is late. In AW v. Director of Immigration and William Lam CACV 63 of 2015, 3 November 2015, §27 the Court of Appeal held that for extension of time for making the application for leave to apply for judicial review, the Court has to consider (1) the length of delay; (2) the reasons for the delay; (3) the prospect of the intended appeal; and (4) the prejudice to the putative respondent if extension of time was granted. The deadline of his application is on 3 May 2017. The delay is more than 1 year and 10 months, which is, no doubt, serious.
15. He has given no explanation for his delay and there being no other extenuating factor for my consideration, his application should be dismissed on this basis alone.
CONCLUSION
16. I refuse to extend time for the applicant to apply for leave to apply for judicial review of the Board’s Decision. Accordingly, I dismiss his application.
Dated the 13th day of January 2023
| (M.O. WONG)(Ms) for Registrar, High Court |
Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence
| Notes for the Applicant: If leave has been granted, the Applicant or the Applicant’s solicitors must: | ||||
| a) serve on the respondent and such interested parties as may be directed by the Court the order granting leave and any directions given within 14 days after the leave was granted (Order 53, rule 4A); b) issue the originating summons within 14 days after the grant of leave and serve it in accordance with Order 53, rule 5; and c) supply to every other party copies of every affidavit which the Applicant proposes to use at the hearing, including the affidavit in support of the application for leave (Order 53, rule 6(5)). | Sent to the Applicant on 13/1/2023 Chantharasiri Singha Applicant’s ref. no: Nil. | Sent to the Putative Respondent / the Putative Respondent’s solicitors / such Putative Interested Parties as may be directed by the Court / the Putative Interested Parties’ solicitors on 13/1/2023 Torture Claims Appeal Board/Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office Putative Respondent’s ref. no.: USM 4923/16/9/302/TH13 Director of Immigration Putative Interested Party’s ref. no.: QA T/C 1007/15 & RBCZ 9000373/16 (Formerly RBCZ 983/12) Department of Justice, Senior Assistant Law Officer (Civil Law) (Civil Litigation Unit 2) |
Form CALL-1
[1] Delay in applying for relief (O. 53, r. 4)
(1) An application for leave to apply for judicial review shall be made promptly and in any event within three months from the date when grounds for the application first arose unless the Court considers that there is good reason for extending the period within which the application shall be made. (L.N. 356 of 1988)
(2) Where the relief sought is an order of certiorari in respect of any judgment, order, conviction or other proceeding, the date when grounds for the application first arose shall be taken to be the date of that judgment, order, conviction or proceeding.