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Construction and Arbitration Proceedings2019

CHEUNG KEE FUNG CHEUNG CONSTRUCTION CO., LTD. v. PERMANENT INVESTMENT CO., LTD.

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[2020] HKCFI 385-EN-2020-03-12

CHEUNG KEE FUNG CHEUNG CONSTRUCTION CO., LTD. v. PERMANENT INVESTMENT CO., LTD.

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HCCT 26/2019

[2020] HKCFI 385

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTRUCTION AND ARBITRATION PROCEEDINGS
NO 26 OF 2019

________________________

 IN THE MATTER of section 84 of the Arbitration Ordinance, Cap 609 and Order 73, rule 10 of the Rules of the High Court, Cap 4A
 and
 IN THE MATTER of an Interim Award dated 6 March 2019 (as corrected on 10 April 2019) by Paul Barrett

________________________

BETWEEN

 CHEUNG KEE FUNG CHEUNG CONSTRUCTION CO., LTD.Applicant / Claimant
in the Arbitration
 and 
 PERMANENT INVESTMENT CO., LTD.Respondent / Respondent
in the Arbitration

________________________

Before: Deputy High Court Judge Hall-Jones in Chambers
Date of Respondent’s Written Submissions: 4 December 2019
Date of Applicant’s Written Submissions in Reply: 18 December 2019
Date of Respondent’s Written Submissions in Reply: 20 January 2020
Date of Decision on costs: 12 March 2020

________________________

DECISION ON COSTS

________________________

1.  There are two sets of proceedings that have been before the court between the applicant and the respondent. The first was the respondent’s application to set aside an enforcement order dated 10 May 2019 made by Madam Justice Mimmie Chan (“the Enforcement Order”). These were the proceedings in HCCT 26/2019. Additionally, the respondent sought leave to appeal against the underlying award of an arbitrator, Mr Paul Barrett, dated 6 March 2019, as corrected on 10 April 2019 (“the Award”). These were the proceedings in HCCT 27/2019. The status of these two sets of proceedings is summarized below.

Setting aside proceedings

2.  In its decision dated 25 October 2019 (“the Decision”), the court dismissed the respondent’s setting aside application.  In the Decision, the court varied the terms of the Enforcement Order; and since the respondent had failed in its application to set aside the Enforcement Order, the court made an order nisi that the respondent shall pay the costs of the setting aside application.  

3.  By its summons dated 8 November 2019, the respondent seeks to vary the court’s order nisi such that the applicant shall pay the respondent the costs of the setting aside application.  There was no application at that time by the applicant to vary the order nisi.

4.  After submissions from the parties, the court set out a timeline for written costs submissions which resulted in one round of submissions from the respondent and applicant dated 4 and 18 December 2019, respectively.  With leave, further submissions were filed by the respondent on 20 January 2020.

Application for leave to appeal

5.  Subsequent to the Decision, the respondent’s application for leave to appeal in proceedings HCCT 27/2019 was dismissed, with an order nisi that the costs of the application were to be paid by the plaintiff in those proceedings to the defendant, with certificate for counsel.

6.  In effect, the respondent has failed in both of the proceedings described above.

Respondent’s submissions

7.  While the respondent accepts the general principle that costs in this case should follow the event, it argues that there are special matters that need to be taken into account that suggest that a different order should be made.  The respondent relies inter alia, upon Order 1A, Order 62 rule 3(2) and Order 62 rules 5(1) and (2) and some related authorities.

8.  In particular, the matters from the respondent’s written submissions that appear relevant are as follows:

a)  The applicant was not altogether successful in its defence of the Enforcement Order, in that paragraph 1(iii) of the Enforcement Order was deleted in the Decision.

b)  The respondent’s compromise proposals (as set out in paragraph 10 of the Decision) should have been accepted and that this ought to be taken into account in relation to costs. 

Applicant’s submissions

9.  As to the first of these points, the applicant says that the deletion of paragraph 1(iii) of the Enforcement Order took up minimal or no time at the hearing and that this is not a point that should lead the court to depart from the usual costs order.

10.  As to the second point, the applicant’s position is simple.  It says that the applicant had made a setting aside application. This application failed, such that the court’s order nisi is correct and should stand.  The applicant refutes that the respondent’s compromise proposals change this position.  This is because the compromise proposals were not directed towards an application to stay the execution of the Enforcement Order pending the outcome of the leave to appeal application.  The respondent’s application in proceedings HCCT 26/2019 was always an application to set aside, which ultimately failed.    

11.  The applicant also submits that the court should recognise, in deciding costs, that the respondent’s application for leave to appeal in proceedings HCCT 27/2019 also failed.   The applicant goes further and says that the costs order against the respondent should be for indemnity costs.

Decision on costs

12.  I am inclined to the position that costs should follow the event in this case and I am not persuaded that the circumstances of this case suggest a different order. 

13.  At the root of the present proceedings, is the Award, which awarded sums to the applicant.  Dissatisfied with the Award, the respondent proceeded on two fronts.  It sought to set aside the resulting Enforcement Order.  Additionally, it sought leave to appeal against the Award. Both applications having failed, this leads me to the view that costs in the Decision ought to follow the event.

14.  In reaching this view, I have considered the respondent’s costs submissions and would observe as follows regarding the respondent’s two principal arguments:

a)  I concur with the applicant’s submission that the deletion of paragraph 1(iii) of the Enforcement Order took up minimal time at the hearing and that this is not a point that should lead the court to depart from the usual costs order;

b)  I also accept the applicant’s submission that the respondent, in proceedings HCCT 26/2019 had mounted a setting aside application, not a stay of execution.  The setting aside application did not succeed and with the application for leave to appeal in HCCT 27/2019 having failed, the Enforcement Order is no longer stayed pursuant to the terms of §16(b) of the Decision.

15.  In terms of the different factors that this court must consider pursuant to Order 62 rule 5 (and Order 1A), I have weighed the respondent’s settlement proposals against the fact that the respondent ultimately failed in two separate proceedings designed to undo the Award.  I give greater weight to the latter. 

16.  Finally, I have considered the written submissions of the applicant proposing an indemnity costs order against the respondent.  The applicant relies upon the decisions of A v R [2010] 3 HKC 67 and Wing Hong Construction v Tin Wo Engineering Company (unreported) HCCT 13/2010. 

17.  From A v R, I have taken note of §69 and 70, which are in these terms. 

“Further, given the recent introduction of Civil Justice Reform (CJR), the Court ought not normally to be troubled by such type of application. A party unmeritoriously seeking to challenge an award would not be complying with its obligation to the Court under Order 1A Rule 3 to further the underlying objectives of CJR, in particular the duty to assist the Court in the just, cost-effective and efficient resolution of a dispute.

If the losing party is only made to pay costs on a conventional party-and-party basis, the winning party would in effect be subsidising the losing party's abortive attempt to frustrate enforcement of a valid award. The winning party would only be able to recover about two-thirds of its costs of the challenge and would be out of pocket as to one-third. This is despite the winning party already having successfully gone through an arbitration and obtained an award in its favour. The losing party, in contrast, would not be bearing the full consequences of its abortive application”.

18.  The decision in Wing Hong Construction v Tin Wo Engineering Company is to a similar effect. See paragraph 11;

“The nature of arbitration is such that, having regard to the underlying objectives in the RHC, an unsuccessful application to challenge an arbitrators award will normally attract indemnity costs against the applicant”.

19.  On the question of indemnity costs, the respondent observes that no application was made by the applicant to vary the costs order within the time prescribed by Order 42 rule 5B(6) and that in any event, the respondent’s settlement offer militates against indemnity costs.

20.  In my assessment, an indemnity costs order is appropriate in this case. I return again to the fact that the respondent has failed in both of the proceedings described above. Applying the authorities cited above, the respondent’s unmeritorious challenge to the Award has led to the applicant having to incur further legal costs. The applicant in this case should not have to subsidise the respondent’s abortive attempt to frustrate enforcement of the Award.

21.  As to the respondent’s response to the applicant’s submission that costs should be on an indemnity basis, I observe as follows:

a)  I do not construe Order 42 rule 5B(6) in the manner contended for by the respondent.  The effect of this rule is that once an application is made to vary an order nisi (as here), the order nisi does not take effect.  Even if the applicant’s application for indemnity costs were defective procedurally, that does not nullify the application (Order 2 rule 1(1)). Further, the applicant has made clear and coherent submissions on the question of indemnity costs and I am satisfied that the respondent has had the opportunity to respond to those submissions. 

b)  As set out herein, I have given greater weight to the fact that the respondent ultimately failed in two separate proceedings designed to undo the Award than to the respondent’s settlement proposals. 

22.  In these circumstances, I hereby order that the respondent shall pay the costs of the setting aside application, inclusive of the costs of the written costs submissions herein, such costs to be paid on an indemnity basis.     

 (David Hall-Jones)
 Deputy High Court Judge

Written submissions of Norton Rose Fulbright Hong Kong, for the applicant / claimant in the arbitration

Written submissions by Mr Eric Chung, instructed by Deacons, for the respondent / respondent in the arbitration

[2019] HKCFI 2595-EN-2019-10-25

CHEUNG KEE FUNG CHEUNG CONSTRUCTION CO., LTD v. PERMANENT INVESTMENT CO., LTD

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HCCT 26/2019

[2019] HKCFI 2595

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTRUCTION AND ARBITRATION PROCEEDINGS

NO 26 OF 2019

________________________

 IN THE MATTER of section 84 of the Arbitration Ordinance, Cap 609 and Order 73, rule 10 of the Rules of the High Court, Cap 4A
 and
 IN THE MATTER of an Interim Award dated 6 March 2019 (as corrected on 10 April 2019) by Paul Barrett

________________________

BETWEEN

 CHEUNG KEE FUNG CHEUNG CONSTRUCTION CO., LTD.Applicant / Claimant
in the Arbitration
 and 
 PERMANENT INVESTMENT CO., LTD.Respondent / Respondent
in the Arbitration

________________________

Before: Deputy High Court Judge Hall-Jones in Chambers
Date of Hearing: 16 October 2019
Date of Decision: 25 October 2019

________________________

D E C I S I O N

________________________


1.  By her order dated 10 May 2019, Madam Justice Mimmie Chan made provision for the enforcement of an interim award made by a sole arbitrator, Mr Paul Barrett. (The interim award was dated 6 March 2019, as corrected on 10 April 2019).

2.  The relief (given under section 84 of the Arbitration Ordinance (Cap. 609) (the “AO”)) and RHC Order 73, rule 10 included an order as to the payment of HK$5,038,264.40 from the respondent to the applicant.  There were also some orders relating to the date of substantial completion of the works in question and to a surety bond given for those works.  I shall refer to the order dated 10 May 2019 as the “Enforcement Order”.

Setting aside application

3.  By a summons dated 29 May 2019, the respondent seeks to set aside the Enforcement Order on two grounds, namely:

(a)  Failure by the applicant to make full and frank disclosure in its affidavit made in support of the ex parte application which led to the Enforcement Order. 

(b)  Other grounds as set out in the respondent’s supporting affidavit.

4.  At the hearing of this summons, Mr Eric Chung, appeared for the respondent.  Mr Simon Westbrook SC appeared for the applicant.

Application for leave to appeal (HCCT 27/2019)

5.  I was advised that in separate proceedings, the respondent has sought leave to appeal against the above award (pursuant to AO, Schedule 2, section 6).  That application was made in HCCT 27/2019, filed on 9 May 2029, the day prior to the date of the Enforcement Order.  I shall refer to this application as the “Appeal Application”. 

Order 73, rules 10(6) and 10A

6.  The relevant rules for the setting aside application that is before me are set out below.

7.  Order 73, rule 10(6) provides as follows:

“ Within 14 days after service of the order made under paragraph (4) or, if the order made under paragraph (4) is to be served out of the jurisdiction, within such other period as the Court may fix, the debtor may apply to set aside that order, and the settlement agreement, award, order, direction or emergency relief shall not be enforced until after the expiration of that period or, if the debtor applies within that period to set aside the order made under paragraph (4), until after the application is finally disposed of.”

8.  The timelines in Order 73, rule 10(6) have been followed in this case.

9.  We then come to Order 73, rule 10A, which is in these terms:

“ Where a debtor has applied under rule 10(6) to set aside an order made under rule 10(4), the Court may, either of its own motion or on an application made by the creditor, and if, having regard to all the circumstances of the case it thinks it just to do so, impose such terms, as to giving security or otherwise, as a condition of the further conduct of the application, as it thinks fit.”

Inter partes correspondence

10.  Quite sensibly, the parties tried to reach a compromise concerning the Enforcement Order, in light of the Appeal Application. There was some “to and fro” between the parties’ solicitors (in open correspondence) in May of this year.  It reached the point where the respondent’s solicitors, by a letter dated 24 May 2019, proposed the following terms:

(a)  The respondent shall pay a sum of HK$5,038,264.40 into court within 28 days from the date of the order to be made herein.

(b)  There be a stay of execution of the Enforcement Order until after the final disposal of the respondent’s appeal against the corrected interim award dated 10 April 2019 made by Mr Paul Barrett.

(c)  The time for the respondent to apply to the court to set aside the Enforcement Order be extended for 14 days from the date of the final disposal of the respondent’s appeal referred to in paragraph (b) above.

(d)  Costs of and incidental to this application be in the cause.

11.  These terms were agreeable to the applicant in principle but the applicant proposed an additional term, relating to the related surety bond.  That additional term was not accepted by the respondent and the efforts to avoid the need for a hearing foundered at that point.

Discussion

12.  As I see the position, the starting point here is AO, section 84(1).  The claimant was entitled to and did commence enforcement proceedings. Leave of the court being required, the matter went before Madam Justice Mimmie Chan, as noted above. 

13.  Acting in her discretion, the judge made the Enforcement Order the terms of which, to me, are unobjectionable.   Paragraph 1(i) of the Enforcement Order is drawn from paragraph 827(1) of the arbitrator’s interim award.   Paragraphs 1(ii) and (iv) of the Enforcement Order are drawn from paragraph 788 of the award (I accept Mr Westbrook’s submission that it is material that paragraph 788 of the award is said to set out declaratory relief and that it is appropriate that these declarations were included in the Enforcement Order).

14.  There was a minor issue as to whether paragraph 1(iii) of the Enforcement Order was properly drawn from the award but to avoid that dispute (which in any event does not appear material), Mr Westbrook helpfully proposed that this paragraph could simply be removed from the Enforcement Order.  

15.  I have considered the arguments set out in the parties’ affidavits and affirmations filed in advance of this hearing, together with Mr Chung’s written submissions.  And I have noted Mr Chung’s reliance on the English decision of Middlemiss and Gould (a firm) v Hartlepool Corp [1972] 1 WLR 1643.  However, in the face of what is plainly a conventional Enforcement Order, I have seen nothing in these materials that would lead me to think otherwise than as set out in §12 and 13 herein.  Nor have I seen anything that concerns me regarding the alleged failure by the applicant to make full and frank disclosure.  These allegations have no substance.  

16.  This being so, and noting what the parties explored (albeit unsuccessfully) in inter partes correspondence, I shall order as follows:

(a)  The sum of HK$5,038,264.40 be paid into court by the respondent within 21 days of the date hereof, to be held pending final determination of the respondent’s application for leave to appeal in HCCT 27/2019.

(b)  There shall be a stay of execution of paragraph 1 of the Enforcement Order pending final determination of the respondent’s application for leave to appeal in HCCT 27/2019.

(c)  By consent, paragraph 1(iii) of the Enforcement Order dated 10 May 2019 shall be deleted.

17.  Given these orders, it is appropriate that I dismiss the respondent’s summons to set aside the Enforcement Order. 

Costs

18.  Since the respondent has failed in its application to set aside the Enforcement Order, and given that security has been ordered, I make a costs order nisi that the respondent shall pay the costs of the setting aside application.  

 (David Hall-Jones)
 Deputy High Court Judge

Mr Simon Westbrook SC, instructed by Norton Rose Fulbright Hong Kong, for the applicant / claimant in the arbitration

Mr Eric Chung, instructed by Deacons, for the respondent / respondent in the arbitration