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Matrimonial Causes2019

KCMA v. ABC AND OTHERS

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[2024] HKCFI 2374-EN-2024-08-07

KCMA v. ABC AND OTHERS

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HCMC 1/2019

[2024] HKCFI 2374

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

MATRIMONIAL CAUSES NO 1 OF 2019

(TRANSFERRED FROM FCMC 15106 OF 2016)

________________________

BETWEEN

 KCMAPetitioner
 and 
 ABC1st Respondent
 PBB in his capacity as the trustee of
the Family Trust
2nd Respondent
 PBB in his capacity as the trustee of
the Education Foundation
3rd Respondent
 K4th Respondent
 LGA also known as GLA5th Respondent
 MJRB also known as MJRA6th Respondent

________________________

Before: Hon Winnie Tsui J in Chambers (Not Open to the Public)
Date of Hearing: 7 August 2024
Date of Decision: 7 August 2024

________________

D E C I S I O N

________________

The application

1.  Before me is an application to vary an order for periodical payments for the three children of the petitioner and the 1st respondent, pursuant to section 11 of the Matrimonial Proceedings and Property Ordinance, Cap 192. In this decision, I shall refer to the petitioner and the 1st respondent as “the mother” and “the father” respectively.

2.  The ancillary relief trial took place in May and June 2021. Madam Justice B Chu handed down her judgment in November of the same year: see [2021] HKCFI 3392. Following the handing down of the judgment, there was a further contested hearing which resulted in a further order made on 24 January 2022 (“the Order”).

3.  We are today concerned with para 6 of the Order which read:

“The 1st Respondent shall personally and directly pay to the Petitioner periodical payments for the support of the Children HKD20,000 per month for each of the Children with the first payment to be made on 1 March 2022, thereafter on the 1st day of each succeeding month until the Children each complete full-time education or further order”

4.  By summons dated 8 February 2024, the father now seeks changes to that paragraph such that instead of making the payments via the mother, he would pay the monthly sum of $20,000 directly to each of the children when he or she turns 18 years old and has his or her own bank account.

5.  I note that in the summons, the father asked for the variation to take effect after the date when the order is made. However, in his written submissions, Mr Harprabdeep Singh, counsel for the father, states that the father would now ask for the variation to take effect commencing from after the date of the summons.

The outstanding issues

6.  What immediately stands out in this variation application is that the variation sought does not concern the quantum of the periodical payments. The variation concerns only the mode in which those payments should be made.

7.  The core difference between the parties is that the father would want the payments to be made directly to the children, whereas the mother wants to stick to the original arrangement under the Order and have those payments made to her in the first instance.

8.  At a hearing before me in May this year when I dealt with the mother’s time extension application for the filing of her opposing affirmation, I urged parties to settle the matter because on its face, the application appeared to me to be a straightforward one and it is certainly not worth the time, efforts and trouble for the parties to engage in a full-blown argument.

9.  Since then, there has been proposal and counter-proposal made by each side. But they have not been able to settle the matter fully. As things stand now, there are three issues remaining which, once decided, will resolve the application fully.

10.  The first issue is whether there has been any material change of circumstances between the date of the Order and now which justifies a departure from the arrangement made under the original order. The mother’s position is that there has been no such material change. If I am with her on this point, I should dismiss the father’s summons. But if I am not with her, then the mother’s position (as made clear by Ms Bonnie Cheng, her counsel, this morning) is that I may then order that the periodical payments be made directly to the children subject to the second and third issues.

11.  Under the second issue, the mother’s position is that the direct payments to the children should only commence at the age of 21 as opposed to 18 which is contended for by the father. So it is an issue of “18 versus 21”.

12.  Under the third issue, the mother’s position is that the direct payment to each child should be subject to a deduction of $3,333. That sum was specifically provided for in the ancillary relief judgment as representing each child’s share of the rental for the mother’s flat in Hong Kong. The mother and the three children have been residing in that flat since 2017.

Legal principles

13.  There is no dispute between the parties as to the general principles which I should follow in determining this variation application. Both counsel refer me to the Court of Appeal decision in AEM v VFM [2008] 3 HKLRD 36. I consider that paras 14.4, 14.6 and 14.8 are of particular relevance to the present application. The principles are as follows.

14.  The approach that the court should adopt, as required by section 11(7), is to consider all the circumstances of the case (para 14.4). Almost invariably, an application to vary an earlier periodical payment order will be brought “on the basis that there has been some changes in the circumstances since the original order was made” (para 14.6). The basis and intended effect of the original order are relevant factors that should be taken into account (para 14.8).

The first issue

15.  Both counsel have crafted the issue to be whether there has been a material change of circumstances since the date of the original order. I note, however, that in authorities such as AEM, the word “material” was not used. As I have just read out, in AEM (para 14.6), Mr Justice Cheung referred to “some changes in the circumstances”. In fact, in the ancillary relief judgment, her Ladyship said at para 592:

“… As the Parties have joint custody of the Children, any future education plans have to be agreed by them and there will be change of circumstances and they may need to apply for variation for Children’s periodical payments when the time comes.” (underline added)

16.  Similarly, Madam Justice Chu also simply referred to “change of circumstances” rather than “a material change of circumstances”.

17.  In these references to “change of circumstances”, I think it is clear that the phrase does not cover any change of circumstances. The change must be of a sufficient degree that would warrant the court revisiting the original order.

18.  Analysed that way, it may not be very different from the phrase or the concept encapsulated in the phrase “material change of circumstances”. Given counsel’s formulation in this application, I will proceed to apply the test of “material change of circumstances”.

19.  I accept the father’s submission that there has been a material change in the children’s circumstances.

20.  At the time of the ancillary relief trial in 2021 and when the Order was made in January 2022, R had just turned 18, attending the final year of high school in Hong Kong. S and A were about 16 and 12 at the time.

21.  Now R is 20 years old, about to turn 21 in the coming October. He attends [name omitted] University in the US. He lives in campus housing. He has his own bank account. Since he left for college in the US in July 2022, he has only returned to Hong Kong for a few weeks in the summer of 2023. He did not come back to Hong Kong during the following school year. For this summer, he is only staying here for about two weeks. It is therefore a good time to consider whether he should be given the opportunity to manage his finances.

22.  As for S, she recently turned 18. She is going to attend college in the US. For the majority of the coming school year, she will no longer reside in the mother’s flat in Hong Kong.

23.  As for A, there has not been any significant change in her circumstances.

24.  Given the above, objectively speaking, there is plainly a change in the circumstances of R and S in that they are now or will soon be leading an independent life outside of Hong Kong, away from home and without the day-to-day care of the parents. This is a milestone stage of their lives and this, in my view, warrants the court looking into how the periodical payments should be made to serve the best interests of the children.

25.  On this point, the mother takes an opposite view. Ms Cheng argues that there has been no material change of circumstances because it has always been in the contemplation of the parties that the children would pursue their university studies in the US.

26.  Ms Cheng refers me to the Form E filed by the father in January 2021 in which he set out his proposed arrangements for the three children to attend university or boarding school overseas. Ms Cheng also refers me to some passages in the ancillary relief judgment, in particular para 588, where her Ladyship stated that the parties’ agreement had been for R to attend university in the US and that S had also expressed her wishes to attend boarding school there.

27.  On that factual basis, Ms Cheng submits that the agreement of the parents and their knowledge formed the basis upon which her Ladyship ordered the periodical payments to be paid by the father directly to the mother for the support of each of the children until he or she completes full-time education or further order.

28.  In the ancillary relief judgment, the judge dealt with the needs of the children at paras 585 to 592. Based on an objective reading of those paragraphs, it is plain to me that the judge’s focus was on the amount of the periodical payments but not the mode in which these payments should be made. Those paragraphs are grouped under the section which is entitled “The Children’s reasonable needs – Issue 3”. At the end of the judgment, in para 611(2), the judge directed that the father should pay to the mother the children’s periodical payments. But I think it is fair to say that while it was fully anticipated or contemplated by the parties and the court that the children would be studying at some point in the future in the US, the issue of mode of payment was not at the forefront of the court’s mind. It was anticipated, but it was not dealt with or addressed in any level of detail.

29.  I am given to understand at this morning’s hearing from both sides that in fact the mode of payment was not discussed or ventilated at all either at the trial or at the subsequent contested hearing in January 2022. That is perhaps not surprising because if we cast our mind back to that timeframe, R was just barely 18 and the two daughters were in their teens. In such cases, it is not surprising that the court would order the periodical payments to be made to the mother and then for the mother to deal with the expenses of the children as the children were all very young.

30.  As I understand it, Ms Cheng’s opposition is as follows. If the plan to study overseas was expressly contemplated and if that factor had been taken into account by the court when it made the order of periodical payments, then it would not be right for any of the parties to come back later to challenge or vary that order when that plan materialised. I can understand that argument. In those circumstances, there is much to be said that there should be finality to an order.

31.  However, that is not the case here. In the present case, at the trial in 2021 and at the contested hearing in January 2022, this point regarding the mode of payment was never discussed and the ultimate order, as I understand it, was not made based on any argument on this issue. Hence, the objection does not apply here.

32.  In the circumstances of the present case and for the purpose of this variation application, I therefore hold that there has been a material change of circumstances which justifies the court revisiting the issue of the mode of payment.

33.  Ms Cheng refers to the Family Court decision in Z, G v PZ, N nee P, N[2022] HKFC 234. I do not consider that the decision is directly on point here. As Mr Singh points out, the judge’s refusal to make a variation is based on a number of reasons which do not apply in the present case: for instance, see para 1 (the order in that case being a consent order), para 58 (the variation application being concerned with the issue of quantum), and para 65 (the judge’s view that the father there was simply “re-writing almost each and every paragraph of the 2019 Consent Order and proposing fresh undertakings as he wishes”). These considerations do not feature at all in the present application.

34.  I should add that in the ancillary relief judgment, Madam Justice Chu specifically and expressly said at para 592 (quoted in para 15 above) that as regards any future education plans, they would have to be agreed by the parties and “there will be change of circumstances”, and she expected the parties might need to come back to the court when the time comes.

35.  To conclude, there has been a material change of circumstances in relation to R and S. It is therefore open to the father to come to the court to revisit the mode of payment of the periodical payments to cater for the changing needs of the children. That would warrant the court considering exercising the power to vary the previous order and considering how to exercise that power.

The second issue

36.  I would accede to the father’s request that the direct payments to the children commence from when each child turns 18 rather than 21. In my view, the short point here is that at 18, the children are young adults and they should be treated as such. I accept that at this age, they should bear the responsibility, or they should be given the opportunity to bear the responsibility, of managing their financial affairs.

37.  I also accept the father’s submission that it is a chance for the children to build up their personal creditworthiness in the US and this would be conducive to their later on obtaining, for instance, credit cards, mortgages and other potential employment opportunities in the States.

38.  It is the mother’s evidence that the children are not mature enough to handle the payments by themselves. She is of the opinion that we should wait till they turn 21. By then, they will have obtained a higher maturity level. She has also adduced evidence suggesting her concerns that there might be issues of overspending in the case of S.

39.  I have reviewed the evidence. I conclude that there is nothing in the evidence which suggests to me that it is undesirable for the children to be given the opportunity to start handling their own finances at the age of 18. Of course I would accept that if we wait till 21, they will be more mature, given the time lapse and given the fact that they will be studying in university in those intervening years. But I am satisfied that it is suitable to give them a chance to handle their own financial affairs at the age of 18.

The third issue

40.  I would allow the deduction of $3,333, as suggested by the mother. This sum was expressly provided for in the ancillary relief judgment as each child’s share of the rental for the mother’s flat in Hong Kong. It was expressly contemplated that that sum should come out from the monthly payment of $20,000. In other words, that share was to be borne by each of the children and should come out from the pot of $20,000 each month.

41.  It is correct that for R and S, they will be spending the majority of their time outside of Hong Kong because they are studying in the US. But while they remain full-time students, I think it is reasonable for the mother to maintain the rooms for them in her flat in case they want to come back to Hong Kong, say for instance during holidays.

42.  In fact, in today’s hearing, Mr Singh accepts that the children should be given a choice to stay at the mother’s place should they so wish. In this regard, I therefore reject any assertion in the father’s affidavit evidence that R has permanently left Hong Kong. In fact, the situation for S may be different. She is only starting this August in the US. It is not certain how often she will come back to Hong Kong during her holidays.

43.  The judgment expressly provided for a budget of $70,000 for the mother to rent a flat on the south side of Hong Kong Island. Within this sum, $60,000 was to be borne by the mother and $10,000 to be shared by the three children. Given my view that it is reasonable for the mother to provide rooms for the three children even though they may not reside for a long period of time in Hong Kong, it is only fair for the mother to keep the sum of $3,333 as each child’s share of the rental.

44.  It would then be a matter between the mother and the three children as to how to deal with the contention or suggestion that the children should not bear the full share given that they spend most of the time outside of Hong Kong. But it is not a matter that I would concern myself with in the present application.

45.  I should add that the father did offer an undertaking to allow the children to stay at his place of residence when they do come back to Hong Kong. But I do not think that is a replacement of the option for the children to stay at the mother’s flat. The mother and the three children have been staying in the flat since 2017. I think we should keep the status quo to the extent that we can.

46.  I have now dealt with the three outstanding issues. I would just add one more point. There are many factual disputes revealed by the affirmations filed by both sides. I do not find it necessary to deal with these factual disputes because in my view, they are not relevant to the issue of variation. Some of those factual disputes concern the conduct or the behaviour of the father and the mother in terms of the access issues. I do not need to resolve them in order to deal with the present variation application. I would say no more about these factual disputes.

Conclusion

47.  I am of the view that the periodical payments should be made directly to the children when they turn 18, when they study in university and when they have their own bank accounts, but the payments should be subject to a monthly deduction representing each child’s share of the rental paid for the mother’s flat in Hong Kong.

48.  I reject the father’s suggestion that the variation should take effect immediately after the date of the summons. That is not what was asked for in the summons. From an enforcement point of view, if I acceded to the father’s suggestion, I would need to know precisely how much, if at all, the mother had withheld the monthly sum from the children.

49.  That has not been asked for in the summons and the mother did not have the chance to address these issues in her opposing affirmation. Therefore I do not think that it is proper for me to make an order with the variation taking effect from after the date of the summons.

50.  Parties have handed up a draft order. I would make an order in terms of paras 1, 2 and 3 of that draft, namely:

(1)  Para 6 of the Order be varied as follows with effect from 1 September 2024:

The 1st respondent shall personally pay periodical payments for child support in the sum of $20,000 per month for each of the children as set out in sub-paras (a) and (b) below until the earlier of (i) that child completing his or her full first full-time undergraduate degree or (ii) that child commences full-time employment:

(a)  $3,333 per month to the petitioner, for the child’s share of rental accommodation at the petitioner’s residence; and

(b)  the balance of $16,667 (or USD equivalent) for (i) R and S by way of a direct transfer of funds to the child’s bank account [details omitted]; (ii) A, to the petitioner on behalf of A until she turns 18 and attends college with her own bank account, upon which the 1st respondent can pay A by way of a direct transfer of funds to A’s bank account;

(2)  Penal notice be endorsed and personal service be dispensed with; and

(3)  Liberty to apply.

(Submissions re costs)

51.  I am going to take a broad view on the issue of costs. In my view, the main crux of the variation application had been, until May 2024, whether the periodical payments should be made directly to the children. The father has succeeded on this core issue. On the other hand, he has failed on the issue of rental deduction.

52.  Furthermore, parties have engaged in producing evidence on factual matters which are not directly relevant to the present variation application. That type of practice should be discouraged. Hence, a deduction should be made from the father’s costs even when I consider that he is in effect the overall winner as far as the substance of the application is concerned.

53.  These are my costs orders:

(1)  The father do have 80% of the costs of the summons, including costs of today’s hearing and all costs reserved, to be summarily assessed on a party-and-party basis if not agreed;

(2)  The father has just handed up a statement of costs. The mother should on or before 14 August 2024 lodge her list of objections, if any, not exceeding three pages; and

(3)  The summary assessment will be conducted on paper after the deadline.

  ( Winnie Tsui )
Judge of the Court of First Instance
High Court

Ms Bonnie YK Cheng, instructed by Stevenson, Wong & Co, for the petitioner

Mr Harprabdeep Singh, instructed by YTL LLP, for the 1st respondent

[2022] HKCFI 3164-EN-2022-10-18

KCMA v. ABC AND OTHERS

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HCMC 1/2019

[2022] HKCFI 3164

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

MATRIMONIAL CAUSES NO 1 OF 2019

________________________

BETWEEN

 KCMAPetitioner
 and 
 ABC1st Respondent
 PBB in his capacity as the Trustee of the Family Trust2nd Respondent
 PBB in his capacity as the Trustee of the Education Trust3rd Respondent
 K4th Respondent
 LGA also known as GLA5th Respondent
 MJRB also known as MJRA6th Respondent

________________________

Before:  Hon B Chu J in Chambers (Not Open to Public)

Date of Hearing:  29 August 2022

Date of Decision:  18 October 2022

________________________

DECISION

(Variation of Costs Order Nisi)

________________________


INTRODUCTION

1.  Before the Court are applications by the Official Solicitor (on behalf of the Children), the petitioner W, and the 1st respondent H for variation of a costs order nisi.

2.  This Court handed down a judgment on 12 November 2021 (“Judgment”)  after an ancillary relief trial in the divorce proceedings between W and H (collectively referred to herein as “Parties”). The nomenclature and abbreviations in the Judgment will be followed in this decision, unless otherwise indicated.  Pursuant to the Judgment, an order for ancillary relief was made on the same day (“AR Order”).  

3.  The AR Order contains a costs order nisi (“Costs Order Nisi”), which provides that:

(1)  H to pay W’s costs, to be taxed on party and party basis if not agreed, inclusive of all reserved costs and costs of the BVI proceedings, with certificate for two counsel, save for costs of W’s 2nd Summons (ie her summons for litigation funding filed on 12 August 2019)[1], and costs of 3 May 2021;

(2)  there be no order as to costs of the 2nd Summons and as between the parties on 3 May 2021;

(3)  the OS’s costs shall be paid by H, to be taxed on party and party basis, if not agreed, with credit being given to H for the HKD 2.6m advanced to the OS for litigation funding.

4.  After the Judgment, OS, W, and H have respectively issued a summons for variation of the Costs Order Nisi (respectively referred to as “OS’s Variation Summons”, “W’s Variation Summons”, and “H’s Variation Summons” and collectively “Variation Summonses”).

5.  In OS’s Variation Summons, OS seeks an order that the Costs Order Nisi be varied to the extent that the Children’s costs as ordered by the Court be paid by H on an indemnity basis.

6.  In W’s Variation Summons, she seeks an order that the Costs Order Nisi be varied to the effect that that her costs as ordered by the Court be paid by H on an indemnity basis.

7.  In H’s Variation Summons, he seeks that the Costs Order Nisi be varied to the following:

(1)  W to pay H’s costs of the ancillary relief proceedings incurred after 10 May 2019, to be taxed on a party and party basis with certificate for two counsel, including all costs reserved;

(2)  H to pay W’s costs of the ancillary relief proceedings incurred prior to 10 May 2019 to be taxed on party and party basis, including all costs reserved, save that there shall be no order as to the costs of the BVI proceedings and the W’s application for litigation funding contained in her 1st Summons (ie her summons dated 22 March 2017 but issued on 27 March 2017)[2]; and

(3)  50% of the OS’s costs be paid by W, to be taxed on a party and party basis, with credit given for the HKD 2.6m advanced to the OS for litigation funding.

8.  As seen in paragraph 612 of the Judgment and paragraph 5 of the AR Order, the payment schedule of the lump sum ordered to be made by H to W and the exact structure of the final order were outstanding matters to be determined further by the Court (“Outstanding Matters”).

9.  The Outstanding Matters were eventually dealt with on 24 January 2022 (“Further AR Order”), and that the costs of (1)  the hearing of 24 January 2022, (2)  the latest PwC Report, and (3)  withdrawal of the BVI stop notices were directed to be dealt with at the hearing of the Variation Summonses.

THE ERRORS IN THE JUDGMENT

TYPOGRAPHICAL ERRORS

10.  On re-reading the Judgment, this Court noticed that there were typing errors in relation to the valuation of the family assets, as follows:

(1)  The valuation for the 3 parcels of land in ________ held by Bremen in paragraph 401(2)  of the Judgment, should read USD1.29m instead of USD 12.9m[3];

(2)  Mr Choy’s valuation for Intero in paragraph 500 of the Judgment should read HKD 79.68m instead of USD 79.68m[4];

(3)  the figure for the value of Intero in paragraph 502 should read HKD122.70m instead of HKD 122.42m[5]. It follows that the figure for H’s share/interest in Intero in paragraph 533 and paragraph 541 should also read HKD122.70m, instead of HKD 122.42m. 

(4)  The total assets under H’s personal name in paragraph 541 and paragraph 542 should thus be HKD 156,443,444.

(5)  The total assets held by W and H and/or their financial resources in paragraph 542 and paragraphs 549 should thus be HKD156,491,003, instead of HKD 156,211,003[6].

11.  This Court intends to issue a corrigendum regarding the above typographical errors subject to any further comments from the Parties and/or OS within 21 days of this decision.

DOUBLE COUNTING

12.  The valuation date for Intero was agreed to be at 30 September 2020 (“Valuation Date”).  The valuations for 3 items of assets of Intero, namely the balances in the DBS and Deutsche Bank accounts and the balance in the CL securities account were agreed to be a total of HKD 60.13m as at the Valuation Date. 

13.  As set out in paragraph 544 of the Judgment[7], an amount of HKD 14.5m was stated in the Scott Schedule to have been paid out of the US Trusts after the Valuation Date, being HKD 6.6m to W, HKD 5.3m to H, and HKD 2.6m to OS.  It is set out in paragraph 545 of the Judgment that[8], according to the PwC supplemental report on US tax liability (which was produced by H), the total amount withdrawn from the US Trusts after the Valuation Date for litigation funding for H and W was HKD 6.6m each, However, at the present hearing, H clarified that he did not receive the sum of HKD 1.3m in December 2020, and that the figure of HKD 14.5m (including HKD 2.6m to OS)  set out in the Scott Schedule being the total amount paid out of the US Trusts after the Valuation Date should be correct.

14.  As seen in the table in paragraph 545 in the Judgment, the amount received by W for her litigation funding prior to the Valuation Date should be HKD 4,875,000.  In paragraph 547, the approach of the Court was that H was assumed to have obtained or withdrawn more or less the same amount, ie HKD 4,875,000 from the Family Pot for his own litigation funding/costs prior to the Valuation Date.  Thus, the total amount to be notionally added back to the Family Pot at Valuation Date for computation for the total amount for division should be HKD 9,750,000, being the total amount of litigation funding/costs withdrawn by the Parties from the Family Pot prior to the Valuation Date.

15.  The amount of litigation funding withdrawn from the US Trusts/the Family Pot after the Valuation Date, ie HKD 14.5m should not have been added back before division.

16.  Upon adding back the amount of HKD 9,750,000, in paragraph 549 of the Judgment, the total Family Pot at the Valuation Date should be in the region of HKD 166,241,003, being HKD 156,491,003[9]+ HKD 9,750,000.  50% of the Family Pot as at Valuation Date should therefore be HKD 83,120,501.50.

17.  At the present hearing, the Court had said that the amount of HKD 6.6m received by W post Valuation Date should be deducted from HKD 83,470,501.50, making a total of HKD 76,870,501.50.

18.  On reflection, as W had also received HKD 5,875,000 prior to the Valuation Date, thus for paragraph 550, the correct amount of litigation funding received by W from the Family Pot, prior to the Valuation Date and after the Valuation Date, should still be HKD 11,475,000 and that this amount should be deducted from her share of the family assets.

19.  As a result, the final award paid by H to W should be HKD 71,597,942.50, being HKD 83,120,510.50 less HKD 11,475,000, and also less W’s own assets of HKD 47,559. 

20.  In paragraph 607 of the Judgment, I rounded up the figure for the lump sum to the nearest hundred thousand. Adopting the same approach, the amount of the lump sum to be paid by H to W should be HKD 71.6m, instead of HKD 79.4m.

21.  As I have said at the hearing, I understand that the Parties, in particular W may need time to consider what was indicated above and to obtain proper advice as to their respective options.  They are to inform this Court of their agreement, if any, within 21 days of this decision.

COSTS AS BETWEEN H AND W

H’S VARIATION SUMMONS IN RELATION TO COSTS BETWEEN H AND W

22.  H seeks a variation on the following grounds:

(1)  The final award for W was worse than the offer he made to W in a letter dated 10 May 2019 marked “Without Prejudice Save as to Costs” sent from his former solicitors to W’s solicitors (“Calderbank Letter”)[10]

(2)  W was unreasonable in her failure to negotiate

(3)  Costs were included in W’s lump sum award

(4)  W’s unreasonable litigation conduct

H’s Calderbank Letter

23.  First, the total family assets set out by H/his solicitors in the Calderbank Letter on a broad brush approach were as follows:

W’s Assets H’s Assets Trusts Total
HKD 1,267,923 HKD 6,992,696 HKD 93,724,691 HKD 101,985,310

24.  H’s proposals for W in the Calderbank Letter were amongst other things that (i)  H and W to request the Trustee that in consideration of the transfer of assets set out, they to agree to the partial early settlement of half of the outstanding Promissory Note; (ii)  H and W to request the Trustee of the Education Trust of 1 share in Bremen to be transferred to W free of debt and encumbrances and valued at HKD 43,145,700; (iii)  upon transfer of 100% ownership of Bremen in consideration of 50% redemption of the Promissory Note, W to cease to be a beneficiary of the Family Trust; (iv)  H to pay W a lump sum of HKD 8m; and (v)  each to retain their personal effects and chattels.

25.  H’s proposals for the maintenance of the Children in the Calderbank Letter were, in addition to his undertakings regarding payment of school fees and payment/reimbursement of their medical expenses subject to certain conditions, (i)  HKD 10,000 per month per child for their maintenance and so long as they reside with W for over 50% of the time in Hong Kong; (ii)  HKD18,500 per month per child for their respective share of accommodation costs in Hong Kong so long as they reside with W in Hong Kong.

26.  As for costs, H’s proposal was that there be no order as to costs including all costs reserved.

27.  According to H’s counsel Mr Marwah, H’s offer of Bremen, which holds all the US Trust assets, means the land in _____  ___ and Intero[11], plus HKD 8 m less half of the Promissory Note.  This offer based on the values of the assets found by this Court of about HKD156m[12] would provide W with HKD 89m, ie 57% of the total assets and that H would receive about HKD 67.13m, ie 43% of the total assets.

28.  However, H’s proposals in the Calderbank Letter were clearly based on a value of the total assets estimated by him to be only HKD 101,985,310 or about HKD102m and not based on the Court’s ultimate finding at the trial of the value of the Family Pot of about HKD 156m. 

29.  The main disputes in these ancillary relief proceedings, apart from whether the H’s dispositions should be set aside, concerned the identification and valuation of the assets of the Family Pot.

30.  According to H’s 1st From E filed on 1 February 2017, his assets were only HKD 46,379,244, of which HKD40,950,000 were his interests in the Family Trust, the Education Trust, the ________ Insurance Trust and what H described as the “________ investment land trust”[13].  In Part 5.1 of his 1st Form E, H did make disclosure of the US Trusts and the M_______ Apartment of USD 2.3m.  He had annexed a copy of the List of Assets of Intero and their valuations totalling about HKD 50.65 m without any value for the GP Shares[14], and also a copy of the List of Assets of Bremen and their valuations totalling about HKD 42.38m[15]. 

31.  According to his 2nd Form E filed on 9 April 2018, his assets were only HKD1,703,425 and his liabilities were HKD11,731,159[16].  In his 1st answers of 28 July 2017 to W’s 1st questionnaire (“1st Answers”), he again set out a list of assets of Intero which were valued to be HKD 50.65m, or about HKD 51m with an unknown value for the GP Shares[17] and he further set out Bremen’s list of assets (ie the 3 parcels of land in _______ less liabilities of HKD195,000)  which he valued to be HKD42,481,300.  H maintained that Bremen’s assets were to be HKD 42,481,300 in his 2nd answers of 9 April 2018 to W’s 2nd questionnaire (“2nd Answers”). 

32.  Anyway, according to the Calderbank Letter, his assets were HKD 6,992,969 (or about HKD 7m)  and the assets of the Trusts were HKD 93,724,691 (or about HKD 94m)  namely a total of about HKD 101m.  Bremen was stated in the Calderbank Letter to be valued at HKD 43,145,700, which was slightly different from the figures in his 1st Form E or his 1st and 2nd Answers, but say HKD 43m.

33.  First, in the valuation of the total assets held by H, W and by the Trusts of about HKD 102m in the Calderbank Letter, H did not seem to have included the M_______ Apartment.  When W’s solicitors pointed this out in their reply letter of 9 July 2019 to the Calderbank Letter (“Reply Letter”)[18], in H’s solicitors’ letter of 22 July 2019[19] (“Further Letter”), H claimed that the M_______ Property was included in the draft asset schedule set out in the Calderbank Letter.  However, the M_______ Apartment was valued in H’s Form E to be USD 2.3m , or about HKD 18m @7.8[20].  Since according to the Calderbank Letter, H’s assets were stated to be only HKD 7m, the M______ Apartment could not have been included under H’s assets.  If the M_______ Apartment was included under the assets of the “Trusts”, then the assets under the US Trusts would be only about HKD 76m (ie HKD 94m less about HKD 18m), but according to H’s then valuations in his 1st Form E and his 1st and 2nd Answers, the assets of Intero and Bremen had alone come to a total of about HKD 94m.  All this showed that M_______ Apartment had not been included in the asset schedule in the Calderbank Letter, otherwise there would be obvious problems regarding H’s own valuations of the assets.  H’s response in the Further Letter that he had included the M_______ Apartment in his Trusts assets in the Calderbank Letter did not make sense.

34.  Second, it was not clear how H arrived at his valuation in the Calderbank Letter of about HKD 43m for Bremen.  In any event, contrary to his present argument, he had clearly not included Intero or Intero’s assets in Bremen’s valuation in the Calderbank Letter, or again there were problems regarding H’s own valuations of the assets held by the US Trusts.  

35.  Third, pursuant to Clause 1.5 of the Promissory Note, the share(s)  in Intero had been transferred to the Trustee/the Family Trust as collateral, and thus the share in Intero was held in the name of the Trustee.  It was not clear in the Calderbank Letter as to whether the share was to be transferred back to Bremen and to be offered to W.

36.  Fourth, H proposed that the share in Bremen be transferred to W free of debt and encumbrances in consideration of a 50% redemption of the Promissory Note.  It was not clear whether H’s proposal was that the Promissory Note was to be reduced by 50%, ie by USD 5.25m, but the remaining 50% or HKD 5.25m would still payable by Bremen to the Family Trust. 

37.  Further, as pointed out by W’s counsel Ms Cheng, even assuming that W did not need to pay for the redemption and that the valuation of about HKD 43m was adopted for Bremen, H’s offer would only have provided W with a total value of HKD51,145,700 (HKD43,145,700 + HKD8m), or about HKD 51m.  This did not beat the ultimate award to W.

38.  Mr Marwah tried to argue that what H was offering W was 50% of the total assets.  However, one of the main disputes was over the valuation of the assets, in particular over the valuation of the GP Shares.  It was not H’s proposal in the Calderbank Letter, nor his position then, that he was prepared to personally pay W 50% of the valuations of the total assets (including all assets of the US Trusts and the M_______ Apartment)  as eventually found by the Court.  As pointed out by this Court at the present hearing, had this been H’s then proposal in the Calderbank Letter, the main disputes between H and W which needed to go to trial would be over the valuations of the various assets in the Family Pot and this would have much shortened the length of the trial.

39.  Even though H’s proposal in the Calderbank Letter for the periodical payments for the Children was a total of HKD 28,500 per month per child, which appeared to be higher than the Court’s ultimate award of HKD 20,000 per month per child, in fact what H had proposed was only HKD10,000 per month per child for general maintenance, and this was lower than the Court’s award.  H’s proposal of HKD 18,500 per month for each child’s respective share of accommodation was based on 1/4 of W’s then rental and was subject to H’s condition that they reside with W in Hong Kong.  For reasons set out in paragraphs 567 and 568 of the Judgment, the Court found that the apportionment of each child’s share of rental being 1/4, or in total 3/4 for the Children’s share was arbitrary and not reasonable.  W could not therefore be criticised for not accepting H’s proposal for the Children in the Calderbank Letter.

40.  In the Further Letter, H seemed to have missed W’s point that without proper valuations, she and/or her legal advisors could not give due consideration to his proposals, and that her complaints were that H’s estimates of valuations were never substantiated and had changed at times, and that the lack of disclosure alleged by W was that H had failed to make any meaningful disclosure to support his estimated valuations.  

41.  As for H’s disclosure, although H disclosed the major items of assets of Bremen and Intero, the valuations were based on his own estimates/best knowledge.  In particular, H did not place any value on the GP Shares in his Form Es and 1st and 2nd Answers until his own expert Mr Choy produced a valuation on those GP Shares at HKD 13.24m.  As pointed out in paragraph 411 of the Judgment, the most significant difference between the experts was the value of the GP Shares, with H’s expert’s valuation of HKD 13.24m and W’s expert’s of HKD50.72m-52.24m initially.  The Court found that the valuation to be at least HKD46.98m. Further, the Court found in paragraph 433 that the lack of financial information had clearly hampered the experts in carrying out their valuations. 

42.  As set out by this Court in paragraphs 415- 417 of the Judgment, there were Transfer Restrictions and Purchase Rights by the Group regarding the GP Shares in the Employee Shareholder Agreement including that the employee could only transfer the GP Shares to a third party subject to certain terms therein.  Further, in paragraph 439, this Court pointed out that section 2.6(b)  of the Employee Shareholder Agreement provided for the event of divorce of the employee shareholder, a method for calculating the price per share in accordance with the most recent audited financial statements.  H was asked by W to provide value of the GP Shares with supporting documents, all he said in his 2nd Answers was that in the event his employment was terminated voluntarily prior to him reaching 55 years old, the Group would have the right to purchase all the shares for USD 1 and upon his reaching 55 years, the aggregate purchase price for the GP Shares would be the “Fair Market Value” to be determined by the Board[21] and he then asked W to seek from the Trustee any underlying documentation. 

43.  No audited financial statements were ever produced by H.  H’s evidence was, so far as this Court can understand, he had requested his employer but his request was declined and that he was not entitled to the audited financial statements as he was not a director.  It was not clear whether H had referred his employer to those relevant provisions in the Employee Shareholder Agreement.  In any event, there was no reason why he could not have obtained at least an indication from his employer as to the “Fair Market Value” for the price per share for the GP Shares upon his reaching 55 years of age which could at least provide a basis for negotiation/mediation.  It would appear that the first time that there was any valuation for the GP Shares was in the H’s expert Mr Choy’s 1st Sirius Report of 21 January 2021.  

44.  As mentioned earlier, W’s solicitors had made it clear in the Reply Letter that for W to be properly advised on H’s proposals, she and her legal advisors needed to be satisfied as to a proper valuation of the assets.  W could not be criticized, nor was she being unreasonable for not accepting H’s proposal in the Calderbank Letter or for not making any counter-proposal, because without proper valuations, she was simply not in a position to do so at that time.  Indeed, in the Reply Letter, W’s solicitors had proposed the parties to engage single joint expert (“SJE”)  to value each disputed item of the family assets to which H and his legal advisors had not responded at all.

45.  Having considered all the above, I find H’s proposals in the Calderbank Letter were far from clear nor sufficient, and his response to W’s Reply Letter was not constructive nor conducive to any settlement.  In any event, H’s proposal of about HKD 51m was much less than this Court’s ultimate award for W.

46.  I do not find the Calderbank Letter would assist H in his present application.

W’s unreasonable failure to negotiate

47.  H complained that W took an obdurate approach to mediation throughout these proceedings, and that she unreasonably refused over a dozen offers of mediation/private FDR from H.

48.  Mr Marwah has attached an Annex A setting out the chronology of mediation/negotiation attempts made by H.

49.  To have a meaningful or constructive mediation, there must be full disclosure and proper valuations of the family assets.  I do not find that W was unreasonable to refuse mediation until after Form Es had been filed and exchanged.  Further, it was W’s case that she did not know that H had set up the US Trusts until H had disclosed it in his 1st Form E and the Court found this in her favour in paragraph 232 of the Judgment.  As also seen in a letter dated 24 April 2017 from W’s solicitors to H’s solicitors, W was at that time trying to obtain H’s proposals on the move and the summer vacation and also W had sought an undertaking from H on the trust matters, and W’s solicitors had said that disclosure aside, if the more pressing side matters could not be resolved between the Parties, they were concerned whether mediation would be constructive[22].

50.  W then raised her 1st questionnaire on H’s Form E, and H’s answers were not filed until 28 July 2017.  Thereafter, H continued to propose mediation and complained that there was no response from W.  That W would need time to consider H’s answers would not be unreasonable and in any event, there was a hearing coming up before Judge Melloy on 29 August 2017.  It appeared that a private FDR was raised during that hearing, and on 1 September 2017, W did follow up and propose a private FDR.  Suffice to say, there were issues over who should be appointed to conduct the private FDR and litigation funding and after a series of correspondence, eventually it was only on 14 December 2017, they agreed to Mr Pilbrow to conduct the private FDR, but thereafter there arose a dispute over the payment of the fees, in the midst of which W then raised her 2nd questionnaire.  H eventually filed his 2nd answers on 6 April 2018.

51.  This was followed by issues over litigation funding and W’s application for maintenance pending suit, which led to the MPS Order on 11 December 2018 when on the same day, Judge Melloy transferred the ancillary relief applications up to this Court.

52.  Thereafter, W indicated she would agree to participate in private FDR without valuation reports if H was to pay and further asked H to make an offer, and this led H to send the Calderbank Letter mentioned earlier on 10 May 2019.  As set out earlier, H’s estimated valuations of the total assets in the Calderbank Letter were problematic.  On 24 June 2019, the Court directed H and W to use their best endeavours to attend mediation or private FDR and further that W was to lodge an agreed schedule of assets by way of a Scott Schedule with estimated valuation. 

53.  As mentioned, in the Reply Letter, W had suggested that there be SJEs to prepare valuations but there was no response from H.  On 24 September 2019, this Court gave directions for valuation of the family assets set out in the Scott Schedule, namely SJEs be appointed and failing agreement on the SJEs, the parties were to submit to the Court one name each for the Court to decide.  The Court also ordered H and W to attend mediation as soon as possible.  However, the issue of costs of mediation and litigation funding continued to be matters of disagreement between H and W.  They were also not able to agree to the SJEs, nor was W able to submit names of her expert.  The matter dragged on until 19 June 2020 when this Court finally decided that failing further agreement by the deadline, they were to each file their respective valuation report and this Court gave directions for filing of expert evidence.  The Court also directed, subject to OS’s consent, that OS be appointed for the Children in respect of W’s 1st s17 Application, and that a PTR be fixed on the earliest possible date after the FDR hearing.

54.  As seen later in this decision, the parties did at one stage agree to a SJE, namely Borelli Walsh, for valuing Intero, but then H reneged on his agreement as he found the SJE too costly, and later he also found there was a conflict of interest on the part of Borelli Walsh and he then proceeded to instruct his own expert.

55.  The FDR eventually took place on 2 February 2021. I note that the valuations of the 3 parcels of land held by Bremen by H’s expert were made available on 18 and 21 January 2021. H’s valuations of the M______ Apartment and K_____ M____ were only available on 1 February 2021.  As said, H’s expert Mr Choy provided his 1st Sirius Report on the valuation of Intero on 27 January 2021.  In short, most of the expert reports from H were only made available around end of January 2021.  Having said this, W’s expert reports were not available and it was thus not surprising that the FDR on 2 February 2021 was unsuccessful.

56.  Suffice to say, having considered the chronology in Annex A, it appears that why mediation or a private FDR did not take place prior to 19 June 2020 was mainly due to the parties’ disagreement over litigation funding or costs for the mediation/private FDR, and also the valuations of the major assets had not been agreed.  It cannot be said that W was unreasonable in failing to mediate or to participate in a private FDR.  I will deal with the costs of the FDR separately later in this decision.

Costs included in W’s lump sum award

57.  This ground is in connection with whether the amount of litigation funding withdrawn from the US Trusts after the Valuation Date should have been added back by the Court to the Family Pot before division.

58.  As stated earlier, this Court accepts that it should not have been added back.  This is not a ground for variation of the Costs Order Nisi.

W’s unreasonable litigation Conduct

K_______ M_____

59.  What H seems to be arguing is that because W insisted on pursuing her case that H had a beneficial interest in K__ __ M___, time and costs were unnecessarily incurred on valuing this property, and as W failed on this issue, her litigation conduct was unreasonable.

60.  In fact, W also did not succeed on her claim that her needs included the purchase of a property in Hong Kong for her residence. 

61.  Even though W did not succeed on all the issues, the time and costs spent on the above issues were relatively minimal compared to all the other issues.  As said by this Court, W was the overall successful party.  I do not find W should be deprived of her overall costs by reason of her failure on those two issues.  

W’s Injunction Application

62.  H complained that W had misled the Court in her Injunction Application in her allegation that H was in breach of his 1st Undertaking by charging the LP Investments held by Intero under a Deed of Charge on 1 September 2017 for a loan of USD 200,000[23] (“Charge Deed”)  when in fact H charged his personal LP Shares.

63.  H did disclose Intero’s LP Investments in his 1st Form E, but there was no proper disclosure of his personal holding of the LP Shares under Part 2 “Assets”.  Under Part 3.1 of his 1st Form E in relation to “Income”, all H disclosed was his basic monthly income plus a bonus of value “unknown”[24].  H then produced a bundle of documents in Annexure 3.1 including his employment agreements and tax returns, among which there was a letter dated 28 February 2014 from his employer summarising for the year ended 2013, the value of the cash and the value LP Shares (calculated at the NAV at time of issuance)  awarded to H, and a “holdback” value[25].  Without any proper explanation from H, his remuneration package was unclear, and he did not disclose under Part 2 “Assets” the number of LP Shares held in his personal name or their value as at the date of his 1st Form E.  H’s disclosure in relation to his income and assets was simply not satisfactory.

64.  It was thus unsurprising that W had asked him to explain his employer’s letter dated 28 February 2013.  H’s answers were brief, and in relation to the LP Shares, all he said was that this was the bonus portion that were paid as unit shares in the Group’s land or fund units[26].  He then produced in Annexure 57.2 annual summaries for 2014, 2015 and 2016 from his employer indicating the amount of LP Shares awarded to him[27], again with no explanations.  All those summaries stated was that his employer would hold those LP Shares on H’s behalf. 

65.  It was only in his 2nd Answers filed on 9 April 2018 that H stated that those LP Shares were award shares given to H as compensation and those were not held by Intero, and that the LP Investments held by Intero were made directly by Intero itself[28].  Then, in H’s 5th affirmation filed on 4 July 2018, he suddenly disclosed a copy of the Charge Deed[29] (the copy produced did not bear his employer’s signature).  The “Charged Interest” in the Charge Deed was defined as H’s indirect beneficial interest in PAAOF held by PTL (said to be a trading company).  Although the Charge Deed was dated 1 September 2017, the transfer of H’s interest was on 18 December 2017.  There was no disclosure of this in H’s 2nd Answers, nor of any statements from PTL. 

66.  At the present hearing, it was submitted on behalf of H that as none of Intero’s LP Investments included any units/shares in PAAOF, W should have been in no doubt that H charged his own shares and not Intero’s.   

67.  At the hearing for the Injunction Application, Mr Todd had in his written submissions referred to, amongst other things, H’s conduct in borrowing with property held by the US Trusts, namely the Charge Deed.  This Court did not recall that this was corrected by H’s then counsel.  At that hearing, H had opposed the Injunction based on simply that Judge Melloy had found W had not made out a prima facie case for an interim injunction, and that Judge Melloy had accepted H’s 2nd Undertaking.

68.  Suffice to say, as seen above, H’s own disclosure in relation to his personal LP Shares was piecemeal and vague.  Even in his 2nd Answers, it was not spelt out clearly as to where exactly, or in which account, the LP Shares awarded to H were held, the total number of units and the updated value thereof.  It was not surprising that W and/or her counsel appeared to be confused as to what shares H had charged under the Charge Deed.

69.  In any event, as seen in paragraph 28 of the Court’s Injunction Decision, there were some 6 items of W’s complaints about H’s breach of his 1st Undertaking[30]. In paragraph 43 thereof, this Court found that there was non-compliance of the 1st Undertaking, whether in actual terms or in spirit, and in paragraph 44, this Court had pointed out that the M_______ Apartment was settled into the I_______ Trust after the 1st Undertaking and that for reasons set out in that decision, this Court found that there remained a real risk of dissipation of assets by H of the assets and funds of the US Trusts and of the I_____ Trust and/or the M______ Apartment if H was not restrained.  This Court also found that H’s 2nd Undertaking was not sufficient.

70.  H’s complaints about W misleading this Court about him charging the US Trust assets had been made in H’s narrative affirmation prior to the trial[31]. As pointed out by Ms Cheng, W was not really cross examined on this issue during the trial. 

71.  There was no appeal from this Court’s decision on the Injunction Application nor was there any application by H to set aside the Injunction on the ground that W had misled the Court.  As this Court had pointed out, in paragraph 51 of the Injunction Decision, if there was any need for H to make any request for distributions or withdrawals from the US Trusts and if W’s consent was unreasonably withheld, he could always seek leave from the Court.  There was never such an application made by H after the granting of the Injunction.

72.  I do not find that this is now a valid ground for variation of the Costs Order Nisi.

The BVI Proceedings

73.  H said he had made full disclosure of the “US tax structure” and the assets of the US Trusts in his 1st Form E on 1 February 2017 and that he had not taken any steps to transfer Intero or Bremen, and that W knew that Intero’s shares were held by Bremen and that Bremen’s shares were held by the Trustee.  It was unnecessary for W to issue the BVI proceedings.

74.  Originally, H was the sole director and shareholder of both Intero and Bremen.  In November 2015 H had disposed of his one share in Intero into the Family Trust and in July 2016, H had disposed of his one share in Bremen into the Education Trust.  Then, one month prior to his 1st Form E filed on 1 February 2017, the Family Trust was moved from New Hampshire to Nevada and there was also a new trustee appointed for both US Trusts.  The Family Trust then purportedly sold its one share in Intero to the Education Trust and there was then the Promissory Note executed.  Thereafter, as set out in the Judgment, there had been further revisions and amendments of the trust deeds and “Investment Director” of the Education Trust which were not properly disclosed by H.   

75.  Even though H had made disclosure of the setting up of the US Trusts in his 1st Form E, when W raised her 1st questionnaire and sought various further information and documents, H’s answer was invariably that he had requested the information/documents from the Trustee.  Further, when asked the basis of the Promissory Note being the amount of USD10.5m, all H said this was a value advised by the previous trustee.  When H was asked about the basis of the valuation he placed on each item of Intero’s asset, he said it was based on his best knowledge.  Similarly, in H’s 2nd Answers, again, for various information/documents W sought on the US Trusts, his answer was invariably that the request should be made to the Trustee.  H’s answers were clearly evasive and unsatisfactory.  In fact, the Trustee’s position was that the financial information of the US Trusts should be with the Investment Director/Investment Advisor who was H initially. 

76.  As said in the Injunction Decision, the then evidence indicated that H had been dealing with the funds of the US Trusts freely as he liked, being initially the sole “Investment Director”, and that in light of H’s lack of full and frank disclosure of his finances, there remained a real risk of dissipation by H of the assets and funds of the US Trusts.  Such assets were held through Intero and Bremen and H was the sole signatory of the banks accounts.

77.  Ms Cheng submitted that W’s commencement of the BVI Proceedings for Stop Notices was entirely necessitated by H’s conduct and the need to preserve family assets.  In light of H’s unsatisfactory disclosure, I agree.  In my view, this is not a valid ground for varying the Costs Order Nisi.

W’s applications for litigation funding

78.  As set out in this Court’s decision on litigation funding of 21 May 2019, W made two applications for litigation funding, namely by way of the 1st Summons dated 22 March 2017 but issued on 27 March 2017 and then the 2nd Summons issued on 12 August 2019.  It was submitted by Mr Marwah on behalf of H that the costs of both those summons were entirely avoidable and incurred due to W’s intransigence on the issue of litigation funding.  H sought no order as to costs for these summonses.

79.  As pointed out by Ms Cheng, this Court had already made no order as to costs of W’s 2nd Summons under the Costs Order Nisi.

80.  The 1st Summons was dismissed on 11 December 2018 by Judge Melloy with costs reserved[32]. Ms Cheng submitted that Judge Melloy dismissed W’s application for litigation funding on the basis that H and W were beneficiaries of the Family Trust. However, in relation to W’s 1st Summons regarding litigation funding, Judge Melloy had said that it was hard to see how the matter could otherwise be resolved, other than by W accepting the money offered by H, and consequently, although there were question marks handing over the trust, W should accept the sum of HKD 975,000 offered on the basis of “without prejudice to her right to argue about this at a later date”[33].  As seen in paragraph 1 of the Melloy Judgment, at the hearing of 26 October 2018, agreement had largely been reached with respect to W’s application for maintenance pending suit and only the issue of litigation funding was then outstanding and hotly contested[34].

81.  Having considered the Melloy Judgment and that W’s application for litigation funding was dismissed, I agree that W’s refusal to accept the sum of HKD 975,000 offered was unreasonable and I am prepared to vary the Costs Order Nisi to the extent that there should be no order as to costs of W’s 1st Summons in relation to litigation funding, including no order as to costs of the hearing on 26 October 2018 and the hearing on 3 December 2018.

W’s late instruction of experts and the FDR

82.  On 24 June 2019, this Court fixed trial dates, gave case management directions and imposed deadlines for the agreement of the valuations and appointment of SJEs, and that failing agreement of the SJEs, H and W were to each submit name of one SJE to the Court for decision on appointment.  This Court further set a deadline of 3 May 2020 for the submission of expert reports, ie 12 months before the commencement of the trial.  The availability of expert valuation reports would have assisted the Parties in negotiating for a settlement.

83.  However, the Court’s directions were not complied with.  By 19 June 2020, a year down the road, H and W were still not able to agree on the valuations and/or the appointment of SJEs, and on that day, this Court set a final deadline of 14 days for H and W to agree failing which they were directed to each instruct their own expert.  It was also on the same day that this Court appointed OS to represent the Children as guardian ad litem in respect of W’s 1st s17 Application.  The deadline for the valuations and/or the SJEs to be agreed expired on about 3 July 2020, ie 14 days from 19 June 2020.

84.  The FDR hearing was originally fixed on 4 November 2020.  Prior thereto, on 21 July 2020, the FDR judge, Lisa Wong J (“FDR Judge”)  had also directed that (i)  H and W were to agree on an updated Scott Schedule of assets and liabilities and the values of the same, failing which they should identify the matters of disagreement and to state their respective positions on such matters and (ii)  they should lodge and exchange their respective offers and proposals and position papers for the FDR hearing[35] (“FDR Directions”).

85.  As seen in the solicitors’ correspondence, by 16 July 2020, H and W did in fact agree to (i)  the SJE proposed by H for Intero, namely Borelli Walsh (ii)  the SJE for the I_______ properties, and (iii)  the SJE for Duxbury calculations[36] and H’s solicitors had also prepared draft letters of instructions for W’s comments.  While comments on the draft letters were being exchanged by the Parties’ respective solicitors, H’s solicitors suddenly wrote on 28 September 2020[37] to propose an alternative for the SJE for the valuation of Intero on the basis that the fee quotations of Borelli Walsh were highly excessive, and further later on 5 October 2020[38], H’s solicitors wrote again to say there was a conflict of interest on the part of Borelli Walsh. 

86.  In W’s solicitors’ reply letter of 29 September 2020[39], W indicated that she would not agree to the alternative SJE proposed by H, nor the SJE proposed by H for the properties in _______.  As for H’s suggestion for the SJE for Duxbury calculations, W said she was still considering this.  As for the SJE on US tax, W asked H to disclose his relationship with the SJE proposed by him.  As for the proposed valuations for M_______ Apartment and K_____ M_____, W said she saw no point in engaging a SJE.  What is clear is that by end of September 2020, the appointment of the SJEs, in particular for Intero, had not been agreed.  This was long past the deadline of 3 July 2020 imposed by this Court.

87.  Eventually, on 8 October 2020[40], H’s solicitors wrote to W’s and urged W to agree H’s proposals on the SJEs and if W failed to reply by 12 October 2020, H would proceed to instruct his own remaining outstanding experts to prepare for the FDR.  Thereafter, there was no response.  W’s solicitors only responded on 21 December 2020[41] to say she would appoint Borelli Walsh whether jointly with H or otherwise, and also proposed an alternative for the SJE on US Tax.  However, by then, H had already instructed his own expert for Intero and on US tax and H again pointed out to W in relation to the conflict of interest of Borelli Walsh.  H’s solicitors wrote again on 11 January 2021, pointing to W that as she did not respond to his letter of 12 October 2020 until late December 2020, it was no longer possible to change to SJEs as he had already appointed his own experts for Intero and US tax by then.  

88.  As mentioned earlier, H’s expert valuations were subsequently made available to the FDR Judge shortly before the FDR, whereas W failed to produce any of her own expert valuations at all, nor did she comply with the FDR Directions imposed by the FDR Judge, and/or failed to provide a written offer to H.

89.  W should be fully aware that the Court had imposed a deadline for SJEs to be agreed by 3 July 2020.  Although H had reneged on his initial proposed appointment of Borelli Walsh over the charges, it turned out that there was also a conflict issue.  W’s response in the letter of 29 September 2020 indicated that she did not agree to H’s proposed change of SJE for Intero.  By that time, if W did not agree to any of H’s proposals on the SJEs, she really ought to have got on to instruct her own experts, rather than continue to send letters to comment on H’s proposals.  In any event, H had made it clear that W was to reply by 12 October 2020 on the appointment of the SJEs failing which he would instruct his own experts.  There was no response from W. Latest, after 12 October 2020, W should have proceeded to instruct her own experts immediately.  W did receive HKD 1.5m for litigation funding on 21 July 2020.  Although there was a deficit after paying her solicitors’ then outstanding bill, her solicitors were prepared to continue to carry out work for W and had produced 6 bills for their work done between August and December 2020.  There was no reasonable explanation from W as to why some of the work could not have been directed towards instructing W’s own experts, knowing full well that the deadline imposed by the Court had expired and that the FDR was approaching.  It was further not clear why in W’s solicitors letter of 30 December 2020, she was still referring to appointment of SJEs and making proposals thereon.  It was obviously far too late.

90.  W clearly failed to instruct her own experts to prepare valuations in time for the FDR, in particular in relation to the valuation of Intero.  W failed to comply with this Court’s directions that the Parties should instruct their own experts in the event of there being no agreement by 3 July 2020, nor did she comply with the FDR Directions given by the FDR Judge. 

91.  It was H’s evidence that W failed to make any offer of settlement in advance of or during the FDR hearing[42].  There was no evidence in W’s 16th affirmation to contradict what H had said.  All W pointed out was that in H’s then counsel’s note of 26 October 2018 prior to a hearing before Judge Melloy, H had invited the Court to dispense with a FDR[43].  It would appear from that note the reason why H had sought the dispensation was because he was disappointed that a private FDR had not taken place by then.

92.  The Parties were represented by well known matrimonial firms and they should be well aware of PD 15.11 and that it was mandatory for the Judge to direct a FDR unless that there was a direction that a FDR would not be appropriate.  Obviously, if the Parties attended a private FDR which was not successful, then it might be said that there was no point in them participating in a further FDR conducted by a judge, but when no private FDR had taken place for whatever reasons, W being the petitioner and applicant should herself have sought directions from the Court for a FDR before a judge under PD 15.11.  It would appear that this was only raised by this Court after the matter had been transferred up and as said earlier, this Court then directed a FDR.  Under Order 1A rule 1 of RHC, Cap 4A, the parties to any proceedings and their legal representatives are under a duty to assist the Court to further the underlying objectives set out therein which include helping the parties to settle the whole or part of the case.  In exercising its discretion as to costs, under Order 62 rule 5 of the RHC, this Court may take into account the underlying objectives set out in Order 1A rule 1.

93.  Having considered all the above said, I have come to the view that W’s delay in preparing her own expert reports and her failure in complying with the FDR Directions was not reasonable and such must have contributed to the FDR being unsuccessful.  Time and costs were unnecessarily wasted by her unreasonable conduct.  I am prepared to vary the Costs Order Nisi and to order W to pay H’s costs of and incidental to the FDR as from 12 October 2020 onwards including the costs of the Order of 18 February 2021 of the FDR Judge.  In light of this and what will be set out later in this decision in relation to OS’s costs, it follows that OS’s costs of and incidental to the FDR should be paid and indemnified by W.

Conclusion on H’s Variation Summons as between H and W

94.  To summarise, I have found the Calderbank Letter did not assist H, nor were there any other valid grounds to support H’s application for W to pay his costs of the ancillary relief proceedings after 10 May 2019, save that having considered the circumstances of this case including W’s unreasonable conduct towards litigation funding and her late instruction of her own experts for valuations of assets for the FDR, this Court is prepared to vary the Costs Order Nisi to the extent that:

(1)  there be no order as to costs of W’s application for litigation funding in her 1st Summons (dated 22 March 2017 but issued on 27 March 2017), including the costs of the hearing on 26 October 2018 and the hearing on 3 December 2018;

(2)  W is to pay H’s costs of and incidental to the FDR as from 12 October 2020 onwards including all costs reserved by the FDR Judge on 18 February 2021;

(3)  OS’s costs of and incidental to the FDR shall be paid and indemnified by W.

95.  As for the scale of costs in (2)  above, H’s costs, if not agreed, are to be taxed on party and party basis.  I see no reason why two counsel would be necessary for the FDR, and I only allow certificate for one counsel for H.

96.  As for H’s Variation Summons in relation to OS’s costs, I propose to deal with this part of H’s Variation Summons later in this decision when considering OS’s costs.

W’S VARIATION SUMMONS 

97.  The main grounds for W’s application for the Costs Order Nisi to be varied to H to pay her costs on indemnity basis was based on (i)  lack of disclosure on H’s part and (ii)  H’s evidence.

98.  It was submitted by Mr Marwah on behalf of H that W had made a series of unfair allegations against H in support of her application for indemnity costs and that:

(1)  H had disclosed all his assets.  There was no undisclosed assets alleged at trial, nor was there any such finding of fact;

(2)  H had never taken any steps to breach his 1st Undertaking, ie not to change the status of the US Trusts.  The status of the US Trusts remained the same throughout.  H had reasonably considered that the 2018 distributions of HKD 975,000 to H and W towards their respect legal fees did not amount to a change in status;

(3)  H had not breached the Injunction made against him on 22 November 2019.  He was simply removed as investment director of Intero and Bremen as an inevitable result of the injunction.  He did not cause any distributions, and only made distribution requests jointly with W.  

99.  In relation to (2)  above, this Court had pointed out in the Injunction Decision that H and W apparently had a different understanding as to the words “then status” in the 1st Undertaking. In any event, as said earlier and in the Injunction Decision, the Court found there had been non compliance of the 1st Undertaking on the part of H, and for this and other reasons the Court had granted the Injunction sought by W.

100.  As for (3), I do not quite understand H’s argument that his removal as the “Investment Director” of the US Trusts, or of Intero and Bremen, was an “inevitable result” of the Injunction.  In fact, it would appear that H’s removal was to circumvent the Injunction.  In any event, so far as the Education Trust was concerned, H’s evidence was the Trustee had removed him as the “Investment Director” from 1 August 2017[44].  This was in fact prior to H giving his 1st Undertaking, although there was no proper disclosure by H of this at the time nor was there any supporting documentation.

101.  Ms Cheng had referred the Court to L v C [2007] 3 HKLRD 819.  In that case, the trial judge had held the wife therein guilty of material non-disclosure of her assets.  On appeal, Stock JA, as he then was had endorsed the following passage quoted by him from Rayden and Jackson on Divorce and Family Matters, 18th ed:

“69. The effect of the authorities has been summarised thus:

The importance of the duty of both husband and wife to make disclosure of their assets which is full, frank and clear cannot be over emphasised. Unless a court is provided with correct, complete and up-to-date information on the matters to which … it is required to have regard, it cannot lawfully or properly exercise its discretion in the manner ordained by [the statute].  The duty of each party is absolute, and it must be discharged regardless of whether the application for ancillary relief is adjudicated upon by the court after full evidence has been heard, or settled after an exchange of financial information between the parties leading to a consent order.  The duty is also a continuing one; a party must not mislead the other party and the court into assuming that his financial situation is unchanged if it [in] fact has changed. … A party who seeks to negotiate and secure a settlement without informing the other party about a material change in his or her financial circumstances runs the risk that, if a settlement is reached and a consent order is made, the consent order will be set aside by the failure to provide full, frank and timely disclosure.  Shortcomings in disclosure will be visited by orders for costs against the offending party, often on the indemnity basis.  Furthermore, deviation from the standard of disclosure required may be visited by the court drawing adverse inferences against the party in default.”

Rayden and Jackson on Divorce and Family Matters, 18th ed, para 17.28”

(underline added)

102.  Ms Cheng also referred this Court to ML v YJ (No 2) [2008] 6 HKC 313.  In his judgment, Lam J, as he then was, found that the husband had embarked on the concealment of his assets on a massive scale, and that assets of substantial work were put under the names of his nominees to facilitate his scheme of misleading the court, and that the tactics he deployed to frustrate proceedings in Hong Kong and his subsequent absence from the trial were also relevant conduct for the purpose of costs[45].  Lam J then said[46]:

“21. It is time for the court to take a firm stance to discourage such litigation misconduct. Whilst I recognize indemnity costs should not be ordered unless there are exceptional circumstances, and if it is to be awarded on the ground of unreasonable conduct, the conduct has to be unreasonable to a high degree (see Liam v MGN Ltd (No 2) [2002] 1 WLR 2810 at para 12), I am of the view that H’s conduct in the present case warrants such an award”.

103.  What can be seen above is that shortcomings in disclosure may attract adverse costs order on indemnity basis.   

104.  In relation to W’s 1st s17 Application, insofar as the dispositions into the US Trusts, this Court accepted W’s evidence and found that that there was no sufficient evidence that there had been consent or agreement from W to the setting up of the US Trusts, and that the transfers of assets to the US Trusts would have the consequence of defeating W’s claim for financial provision.  As for the M_______ Apartment, the Court found that H’s case was like a moveable feast and that his disposition of the M______ Apartment into his father’s name would have the consequence of defeating W’s claim for financial provision.

105.  Upon the above findings, the burden would then fall upon H to displace the Presumption and the Court found that H was not able to discharge the burden on him. 

106.  Mr Marwah submitted that there was no finding in the Judgment by this Court of any undisclosed items of assets and that H had disclosed all the major items of assets including those of Intero and Bremen, and that H had complied with his duty of full and frank disclosure. 

107.  The major problems with H’s disclosure lie in his manner of disclosure and his own valuations of his assets with lack of supporting documentation.  For example, as set out earlier, in his 1st and 2nd Answers, in response to W’s requests for financial information of the US Trusts he referred W to the Trustee, but the Trustee then said the financial information was with the “Investment Director”.  H was clearly evasive and piecemeal in his disclosures.  Further, as mentioned earlier, in his 1st Form E, in relation to his income, all he stated in the actual form was his present income and disclosed bonus of “unknown value”.  He then attached annexures without a proper explanation of his remuneration package and as a result, W then had to plough through those documents to try to understand his remuneration package.  As described by OS, H’s disclosure was “exceptionally undesirable”.  Although H had set out the major items of the assets of the US Trusts, as said earlier, there was a lack of documentations and information as to how he arrived at his valuations of the various items.  

108.  One of the major issues was the valuations of the assets of Intero, among which was the GP Shares which all along H had stated was of “unknown value”.  His attitude in maintaining his stance that the GP Shares were of unknown value as they were not vested was in my view highly unsatisfactory and unreasonable.   

109.  H’s 1st Sirius Report of 27 January 2021 was the first time that an independent valuation of Intero was provided by H, and this was some 5 years since W commenced the divorce proceedings in 2016 and 4 years after H’s 1st Form E.  Even in the 1st Sirius Report, his expert Mr Choy had stated that the schedule of assets and liabilities of Intero was provided by the “Investment Director”.  There was no independent verification by Mr Choy who had assumed the information provided to him was accurate or correct.  Further, Mr Choy had also pointed out that no financial statements of the Group were provided to him and that his opinion was that had those statements been provided to him, his opinion might be different.  What was clear was that even H’s own expert had to make quite a number of assumptions based on whatever information provided by H.  In particular, for the LP Investments held by Intero, H had failed to provide the underlying investments of the funds, and this again had handicapped the experts and this Court had in the Judgment agreed with W’s expert Mr Yeo that it was surprising that H was not even able to provide information of the underlying investments of the funds he had invested.

110.  It was the finding of this Court in the Judgment that the experts carrying out valuations of Intero were hampered over H’s deficient disclosure, and the Court had to draw adverse inferences against H. 

111.  As set out in the Judgment, the Court had also found H’s evidence lack of reliability and credibility on almost all the disputed issues, and often contradicted by contemporaneous documents.  Also, as pointed out by Ms Cheng, H was also producing documents suddenly during the trial.   

Conclusion on W’s Variation Summons

112.  In my view, H’s litigation conduct in particular his manner of disclosure and failure to provide proper valuations of his assets with supporting documentations was highly unreasonable.  I am of the view that for those costs ordered to be paid by him to W, such should be on indemnity basis.

OS’S COSTS

H’S VARIATION SUMMONS IN RELATION TO THE OS’S COSTS

113.  In H’s Variation Summons, he has applied to vary the Costs Order Nisi such that 50% of OS’s costs be paid by W, on party and party basis, taking into account the litigation funding.   

114.  H’s case is that OS should only be awarded not more than half of his costs (to be paid by W)[47]. It was submitted on behalf of H that[48]:

(1)  OS was appointed by the Court on its own motion, not on application by the parties;

(2)  OS had consented to act without seeking any indemnity on costs from the parties;

(3)  OS did receive HKD 2.6m from the US Trusts which should have been more than sufficient given the limited scope of his role;

(4)  OS did not interview the Children to obtain their views, performed no investigation itself, and did not cross examine W;

(5)  OS played a very limited role in the proceedings and his presence was unnecessary;

(6)  The OS’s own position meant that his attendance at the trial was not necessary to protect the Children’s interests.  He did not advocate retaining the trusts, and he took the view that the Children had only very limited, if any, benefit from them.

(7)  On setting aside each of the trusts, OS’s position in the List of Issues was “Not object to it, if so found ”.  In his opening submissions OS considered that the prospect of any benefit to the Children’s from the Family Trust was “at best theoretical, if not illusory” and that their monetary interest in the Education Trust “would most likely represent only a small part of the trust funds”.

(8)  The OS’s concerns at the outset that the Children’s interests “will inevitably be affected ” were clearly no longer present.

(9)  In the circumstances, the OS should have sought to be excused from attendance at the AR Trial.

OS’s appointment

115.  In relation to OS’s appointment, Mr Marwah had referred to Re LB (Wardship: Costs) [2012] HKLRD 266, HCMP 813 of 2011, 21.10.11 to support his argument that as OS was appointed by the Court’s own motion, OS should not be awarded more than half of his costs.  Re LB was a wardship proceeding.  In that case, Poon J, as he then was, had appointed the OS on his own motion as guardian ad litem of the child in question to protect and represent the child’s interest when the mother’s case was based on the alleged abuse of the child by her primary carer, the father’s then partner.  Poon J’s comment that the OS was appointed guardian ad litem on the judge’s own motion might well persuade the court to make no order as to the OS’s costs, was thus clearly made in the context of wardship proceedings or children proceedings. 

116.  In the present case, this Court had pointed out in paragraph 51 of the Joinder Decision[49], that under rule 72(1)  of MCR, this Court had to direct that the Children be separately represented unless it was satisfied that the proposed variation would not adversely affect the rights or interests of any of the Children and further under rule 72(2)  of MCR, the Court may give the same direction in an application for an avoidance of disposition order which may affect the rights or interest of the Children.

117.  The present proceedings are not wardship proceedings, nor children proceedings.  The provisions of rule 72 of the MCR are clear and in particular under rule 72(1), it is mandatory for the Court to direct the Children be separately represented in an application for a variation of settlement order unless this Court is satisfied that the proposed variation does not adversely affect the rights or interests of the Children.  The burden was clearly on the Parties to persuade the Court otherwise.

118.  By her 1st s17 Application, W sought to set aside the dispositions made by H of Interto and Bremen into the US Trusts and also the disposition of the M______ Apartment to his father R4, and alternatively to the setting aside applications, W also sought a variation of settlement order.  Yet, as mentioned in the Joinder Decision, neither H nor W had sought any directions from the Court under rule 72 of Matrimonial Causes Rules (“MCR”).  It was under such circumstances that this Court then directed the Parties to seek the relevant directions.  

119.  On 21 February 2020, in an endeavour to avoid involving Children in the ancillary relief trial, W’s solicitors did send an open letter to H’s solicitors inviting H to agree to all assets subject to W’s 1st s17 Application be treated as held and owned by H and ownership of all other assets to follow the legal titles.  This in my view was a sensible approach to which H should have agreed.  As seen in his solicitors reply on 27 March 2020, H rejected this proposal.

120.  The hearing for directions eventually took place before this Court on 19 June 2020.  It was open for H to persuade this Court at this hearing that any setting aside orders and/or variation of settlement sought by W in her 1st s17 Application would not adversely affect the rights or interests of the Children and that the Children did not need to be separately represented.  It was further open to H to submit that another fit person other than the OS should be appointed as guardian ad litem for the Children.  However, H did not put forward any such argument or proposal.  

121.  It was in light of the statutory provision of rule 72(1)  of the MCR that this Court made the order on 19 June 2020 that OS be appointed, subject to his consent, to represent the Children.  I am therefore the view that the present case can be distinguished from Re LB.

122.  W’s solicitors wrote to OS on 13 July 2020 and on 20 July 2020 OS replied  (“OS 1st Letter”)[50] It was stated therein that having perused and considered the documents sent to them by W’s solicitors, OS understood that the financial interests of the Children would inevitably be affected/disturbed by W’s application for ancillary relief, and as such it was necessary and appropriate to appoint a separate representative for them in order to safeguard their interests, and that OS was in principle agreeable to act as guardian ad litem for the Children in respect of W’s 1st s17 Application on condition that his costs to be incurred including the fees of his legal team to be engaged are properly provided (“Condition”)  and had sought W’s proposal to provide for the OS’s costs for the OS’s deliberation. 

123.  W’s solicitors replied to say W was financially dependent on H, and that the costs of the Children’s separate representation should be met either by H or the trusts in question in the first instance (if appropriate)  and to remain as an issue to be determined by the Court, pending the outcome of the relevant applications and considering all circumstances.

124.  As there was no consensus between H and W over the meeting of OS’s costs, OS then wrote direct to H’s solicitors on 27 July 2020 to seek the views of H on W’s proposal that the OS’s costs be met by H or the trusts in the first instance.  H’s solicitors however replied on 10 August 2020 that OS should contact the Trustee direct.  OS did not agree to this suggestion and wrote on 17 August 2020 to remind H’s solicitors that it should be the duty of the parties to make proper provision of OS’s costs for separate representation for the Children to facilitate fair and just disposal of the disputes between the parties[51].  In response to this, H’s solicitors then replied and asked for OS’s estimate of costs up to and including the FDR hearing which was initially scheduled on 4 November 2020, and OS provided an estimate of HKD 400,000.  Thereafter, H’s solicitors wrote on 23 September 2020 and said that H did not personally have the funds requested by OS and proposed again that OS should seek litigation funding from the Education Trust as the Children are beneficiaries of that trust[52].

125.  OS eventually wrote to the Court on 24 September 2020[53].  It was stated that OS in principle was prepared to give consent to act as guardian ad litem for the Children but reiterated the Condition.  OS had pointed out in his letter that this case did not concern custody and welfare of minors but was purely a private property dispute, in which the OS being a public officer was duty bound to seek costs as appropriate.  OS further stated that as no consensus was reached between H and W regarding OS’s costs, OS had no alternative but to withhold his consent to act and sought directions from the Court.  Subsequently, on 6 October 2020, H and W undertook before the FDR Judge to agree to enter into and to lodge before this Court a consent summons for litigation funding for OS to be released from the US Trusts[54].

126.  As pointed out by Poon J in Re LB[55], OS can only be appointed if he has given his consent to act and this enables the OS, where he thinks fit, to ask the party seeking to appoint him for a full or partial indemnity for his costs.  Mr Lau Ca Chun of the OS had made two affirmations in support of the OS’s Variation Summons.  In paragraph 4 of his 1st affirmation, he had referred to the Condition and stated that this reflected OS’s request to be indemnified for costs properly incurred by him as permitted under section 4 (2)(a)  of the Official Solicitor Ordinance Cap 416 and that he believed that the Condition, namely that the OS’s costs were to be indemnified, was made clear.

127.  In the present case, although OS did not expressly seek a written indemnity from the Parties regarding his costs, as found later in this decision, this Court accepts OS’s intention by imposing the Condition was to impose terms for his costs to be fully indemnified by the Parties and this was made clear in his letters.  What is clear is that the Parties did on 6 October 2020 undertake before the FDR Judge to agree to $400,000 being released from the US Trusts to OS for his litigation funding for OS to attend the FDR.  Further, subsequent to that, the Parties also agreed to further litigation funding be released from the US Trusts for OS to participate in the trial.  H also indicated no objection to OS to approach the Trustee direct to obtain litigation funding.  I find that by providing such undertaking and payment of the litigation funding, the Parties had by conduct accepted and agreed to OS acting for the Children on the terms imposed by OS.

128.  In any event, OS’s failure to expressly seek a written indemnity on costs from the Parties is not a valid ground for H to now argue that OS should not be awarded more than half of his costs.

129.  Further, the total amount of HKD 2.6m paid to OS as litigation funding was paid on account of OS’s costs.  Whether the amount was sufficient or not is a matter for taxation, if there is no agreement.  The fact that OS had already received HKD 2.6m for litigation funding is not a valid ground for the variation sought by H.  

OS’s failure to interview the Children

130.  H also complained that OS did not interview the Children to obtain their views.  Although section 3(1)  of the Guardianship of Minors Ordinance, Cap 13 would apply to “administration of any property belong to or held in trust for a minor of the application of the income of any such property”, there had been no submissions that the s17 Applications were “administration applications” or section 3(1)  would be applicable to a setting aside application and/or variation of a settlement application.  In any event, there was no sufficient evidence that the Children who were about 17, 15 and 11 years old at the time of the trial would be able to understand the terms of the trust deeds and the effect of W’s 1st s17 Application and/or to know whether there would be an adverse effect to their rights or interests if any setting aside orders/variation of settlement orders were made.  H was represented by a team of well known matrimonial counsel and solicitors, and if he was of the view that the Children should be interviewed by the OS, he could have himself sought direction for the Children to be interviewed by OS, rather than complaining about it now.

131.  I do not find OS’s failure to interview the Children is a valid ground for depriving OS of his costs, whether in part or in whole.

OS’s presence at the trial

132.  As for OS’s presence at the trial, OS’s position was made clear in their Opening Submissions.  H argued that by then, OS’s concerns in the OS 1st Letter that the Children’s interests would inevitably be affected were clearly no longer present, and that his attendance at the trial was not necessary and that OS should have sought to be excused. 

133.  OS’s position in his Opening Submissions was that, subject to the oral evidence given in the trial, OS took the provisional view that he (on behalf of the Children)  had genuine difficulties in supporting H’s case under W’s 1st s17 Application for reasons set out.  In their Closing Submissions, OS confirmed that they would not object to the setting aside of the US Trusts, or the varying of the US Trusts save that in the event of any variation of settlement orders, OS had put forward certain provisions.  As for the M_______ Apartment, OS’s view was that the Children’s interests would vary materially according to the factual cases put forward by H at different times in relation to the M_______ Apartment.

134.  H himself had instructed Senior Counsel for the trial, and when OS’s provisional views were made known in the List of Issues or in their Opening Submissions, H could himself have sought directions from this Court as to whether OS’s presence or attendance was necessary for the entire duration of the trial.  This was not raised at the time.  In any event, OS had also made his position clear that his final view would have to depend on the oral evidence given at the trial, in light of, in particular, H’s unsatisfactory evidence over M_______ Apartment.  As OS was there to represent the Children’s interests, it is not for H to now argue that OS had played only a very limited role, and in any event, there was no sufficient evidence to support what he said.  This is not a valid reason as to why OS should be deprived of all or part of his costs.

135.  Having considered the above, I do not find H has established any valid grounds for OS to be only awarded not more than half of OS’s costs. 

W to pay 50% of OS’s costs

136.  It was submitted on behalf of H that W should pay for OS’s costs.  As stated earlier, OS’s appointment was as a result of W’s 1st s17 Application and W’s applications were necessitated by H’s dispositions of family assets.  W succeeded in her 1st s17 Application and was the overall successful party in the ancillary relief trial.  There was no reason why H should not be ordered to pay all costs of and occasioned by the 1st s17 Application including OS’s costs, save for the costs of W’s litigation funding applications and of the FDR, as ordered earlier in this decision.

Conclusion on H’s Variation Summons in relation to OS’s Costs

137.  Having considered all above, H’s application to vary the Costs Order Nisi in respect of OS’s costs is in my view without any valid grounds.  

OS’S VARIATION SUMMONS

138.  OS seeks a variation of the Costs Order Nisi for his costs be paid on indemnity basis.  

139.  OS’s submissions are essentially based on the following:

(1)  As a matter of statute, the OS is entitled to act as guardian ad litem only if his costs are to be indemnified, which is precisely the Condition OS attached to his appointment in these proceedings. (Ground (1))

(2)  As a matter of common law, the OS as guardian ad litem should not be discouraged to act for a protected party.  The OS is entitled to take part in a litigation with a confident expectation that his costs will be indemnified (Ground (2))

(3)  As a matter of H’s conduct in these proceedings, insofar as OS is aware, it is wholly unreasonable (Ground (3)) 

Ground (1)

140.  Section 4 and Schedule 1 of the Official Solicitor Ordinance Cap 416 (“OSO”)  provide respectively as follows:

“4. Duties of Official Solicitor

(1)  The duties of the Official Solicitor are –

(a)  to act, where so appointed by the Court, as provided in Parts 1 and 2 of Schedule 1;

(b)  in his discretion, to act as provided in Parts 1 and 3 of Schedule 1 where his is satisfied that the interests of justice so require and where there is no other person fit and willing so to act;

(c)  to act as directed by the Court in the exercise of its power under any Ordinance providing for the appointment of the Official Solicitor; and

(d)  to act in any particular matter where so directed by the Chief Justice.

(2)  In exercising his discretion under subsection (1)(b)  to act in a particular matter, the Official Solicitor may –

(a)  act on such terms, including terms as to indemnity for costs properly incurred by him, as are appropriate in the circumstances; and

(b)  have regard to the funds available to meet his expenses.

(3)  In this section and in Schedule 1 the Court (法院)  means the High Court or the District Court.

…

Schedule 1

Duties of the Official Solicitor

Part 1

1. To act as guardian ad litem or next friend to any person under a disability of age or mental capacity, in proceedings before any court.

2. . …..

(emphasis underlined)

141.  The circumstances leading to the appointment of OS by this Court have been set out earlier.  First, as the appointment was expressly stated to be subject to OS’s consent, OS had a discretion whether to give his consent or not and under section 4(2)  of the OSO, OS was entitled to impose terms before giving his consent to act. 

142.  Second, as set out earlier, H had suggested that OS to contact the Trustee of the Education Trust direct, as OS was acting as guardian ad litem for the Children.  This however was rejected by OS in their letter of 17 August 2020.  OS had pointed out that the OS had no power to control, manage or otherwise to deal with the Children’s finance and that in the circumstances, OS did not consider it appropriate to make request to the Trustee direct even if the Children were beneficiaries of the Education Trust. OS then reiterated that it should be the duty of the Parties to make provision for the OS’s costs.

143.  Third, when on 23 September 2020, H’s solicitors wrote to say H did not consider there was anything inappropriate about requesting litigation funding from the Trustee of the Education Trust and again invited OS to approach the Trustee, OS’s response was to write to the Court on 24 September 2020 stating the Condition and indicating that in the absence of any concrete arrangement for his costs to be properly provided, OS had no alternative but to withhold his consent to act as the guardian ad litem for the Children.

144.  Mr To submitted that the wording of the Condition closely follows those of section 4(2)(a)  of the OSO, namely the words “properly provided ” in the Condition follows those words in section 4(2)(a), and although the Condition does not expressly refer to “indemnity”, it must refer to the entirety of the costs or all the costs by referring to “costs to be incurred ”.

145.  In my view, the Condition could have been better worded to state clearly that OS would only give his consent to act for the Children provided his costs were indemnified in full by the Parties either solely or jointly.  Notwithstanding this, having considered the letters between OS and the Parties, I find that the OS’s intention for his costs to be fully indemnified by the Parties is clear in his letters. In particular, he had stated given the private nature of the property dispute, OS was duty bound to seek costs.  There was no reason why the OS would see fit to spend the public funds on a “private property dispute” if the OS did not also intend to recover the full costs or indemnity costs.  Further, OS had also made it clear in his letters that it was the duty of the Parties to make provision of OS’s costs and had clearly rejected H’s proposal that he was to approach the Trustee of the Education Trust directly for his costs.

146.  I am thus prepared to accept that OS’s intention by imposing the Condition was to impose a term under section 4(2)  of the OSO that he be fully indemnified by the Parties for his costs and such intention was made clear to the Parties in OS’s letters.  There were no reasons for the Parties to expect that OS’s costs should be met from public funds, whether in part or in whole.  In any event, as found earlier, H and W had by conduct accepted and agreed to OS to be indemnified by the Parties for his costs. 

Ground (2)

147.  OS had refereed the Court to the case of B v B [2010] EWHC 543 (Fam)  in which the Official Solicitor in England sought to be indemnified for his costs from a husband whom he acted for as guardian ad litem in the husband’s divorce proceedings.  

148.  Mr Justice Bennett had in his judgment in B v B cited passages from 3 earlier authorities:

“16. … The first is Steeden v Waldon [1910] 2 Ch 393. … In the course of giving his judgment Mr Justice Eve, at page 397, referred to a passage in the judgment of Lord Brougham in Nalder v Hawkins [1833] 2 My & K 243, 247. Mr Justice Eve said:

‘The general attitude of the Court towards the next friends of infants is stated by Lord Brougham in Nalder v Hawkins (1)  in the following terms: — “It is undeniable that the habit of the Court has been to encourage persons to come forward as next friends, for the purpose of obtaining its aid on behalf of parties incapacitated to sue for themselves. The language of the books is frequently, that next friends should not be discouraged; but there are cases which go much further, both in their language and in their tendency; cases which, both by the words used, and the things done, give great encouragement to undertake the office. In Whittaker v Marlar (2)  Lord Thurlow says, that ‘Whoever will stand forward in that character, is to be encouraged to every possible extent, while he can be supposed to intend the infant's benefit.” This seems to go as far as possible; it is as much as to say, that any one may do what he pleases as next friend, until he does something which cannot by any possibility be supposed to be done bona fide for the infant's advantage. …’

17. Eve J then goes on to consider other authorities … continues as follows:

‘In the present case, as I have already stated, proceedings were commenced under the advice of counsel properly instructed, and although they proved unsuccessful and the infant has derived no benefit thereby, the ultimate event, depending mainly as it did on the extent to which the title of the defendant mortgagees was affected by the fraudulent conduct of the infant's father, remained a matter of uncertainty until all the evidence had been produced at the trial.

Had I been administering the estate of the infant, and had an application been made to me to sanction the institution of the action and its prosecution to a hearing, I should have acceded to the application, and might even have gone so far as to authorise the raising of money to provide for the costs on the security of the infant's property outside the subject of the action.

I think, therefore, this is eminently a case to which I ought to apply the principles underlying the decisions I have referred to, and I propose to make an order declaring that the defendant is bound to indemnify the plaintiff against the costs and damages which he was ordered to pay by the judgment…’

18. The next authority referred to … is Wallersteiner v Moir (No 2) [1975] 1 QB 373. …

‘But there are circumstances in which a party can embark on litigation with a confident expectation that he will be indemnified in some measure against costs … The next friend of an infant plaintiff is prima facie entitled to be indemnified against costs out of the infant’s estate: Steeden v Walden [1910] 2 Ch 393.’

19. The final authority is a decision of Sir Robert Megarry V-C in Re E (mental health patient) [1984] 1 All ER 309…

20. In the course of his judgment at page 312 Sir Robert Megarry said as follows:

‘…The main function of a next friend appears to be to carry on the litigation on behalf of the plaintiff and in his best interests.  For this purpose the next friend must make all the decisions that the plaintiff would have made, had he been able.  The next friend may, on behalf of the plaintiff, do anything which the Rules of the Supreme Court require or authorise the plaintiff to do, though the next friend must act by a solicitor: see Ord 80, r 2.  It is the next friend who is responsible to the court for the propriety and the progress of the proceedings.  The next friend does not, however, become a litigant himself: his functions are essentially vicarious.  Nevertheless, it is an important part of his functions that by acting he makes himself personally liable to the other party to the litigation for the costs of unsuccessful proceedings, and also for any damages under an undertaking in damages.  On the other hand, if it was proper to institute the proceedings, and they have been conducted with propriety, the next friend will be entitled to be indemnified in respect of the costs by the plaintiff, or at least out of the plaintiff's estate: see eg Steeden v Walden [1910] 2 Ch 393, and the books that I have already mentioned.’ ”

(underline added)

149.  As seen B v B, the issue was whether the Official Solicitor should be indemnified by Mr B for acting on his behalf as his guardian ad litem.  What is clear from what was cited from earlier authorities and what was held by Mr Justice Bennett himself is that a next friend or a guardian ad litem should not be discouraged to act for a protected party and should prima facie be indemnified as to costs unless the next friend/guardian ad litem has not been conducting the proceedings with propriety.  As seen in paragraph 41 of B v B, OS’s position can be said to be analogous to that of a trustee.  In the present case, I have earlier rejected all H’s complaints about OS.  W had made no complaint over OS’s conduct in these proceedings.  There was simply no evidence that OS had conducted these proceedings other than with propriety. 

150.  Having considered the above, I accept that OS should be indemnified for his costs.

151.  As seen in B v B, the costs of a next friend/guardian ad litem acting for a protected person in a litigation should prima facie be indemnified by the protected person (or his/her estate)  for whom the next friend/guardian ad litem acts.

152.  However, as in any contentious litigation, a next friend/guardian ad litem acting for a protected person is entitled to seek costs on behalf of the that person from the unsuccessful party in the litigation.

Ground (3)

153.  In the present case, OS acts for the Children. The Children are innocent parties herein and they were involved in the ancillary relief proceedings as a result of W’s 1st s17 Application, which was necessitated by H’s dispositions of family assets.  There was no reason why the Children should be liable for costs.  As W was successful in setting aside H’s dispositions, and was overall the successful party in the ancillary relief proceedings, save for those costs of the litigation funding applications and the FDR mentioned earlier, this Court had ordered H to pay W’s costs, and such costs should include the OS/the Children’s costs.  Earlier, I have found that H’s litigation conduct in particular his manner of disclosure and failure to provide proper valuations of his assets with supporting documentations was highly unreasonable and have ordered that the costs payable by him to W to be on indemnity basis.  It follows that H should also pay the Children’s costs, ie OS’s costs, on indemnity basis.

Conclusion of OS’s Variation Summons

154.  OS had not sought any order of costs against W. However, as said earlier, I have found W’s litigation conduct in delaying to instruct her experts in valuing the assets in time for the FDR and failing to comply with the FDR Directions unreasonable.  I have ordered W to pay for the costs of the FDR, including OS’s costs.  In line of what was said under Ground (1)  and (2), I am of the view OS’s costs of and incidental to the FDR should be indemnified by W.

155.  Having considered all the above, I am prepared to vary the Costs Order Nisi to the effect that OS’s costs ordered against H should be on indemnity basis save that, as said earlier, OS’s costs of and incidental to the FDR shall be paid and indemnified by W.   

OTHER COSTS

156.  At the hearing on 24 January 2022, this Court also directed that the costs of (i)  that hearing, (ii)  the latest PwC report, and (iii)  withdrawal of the BVI stop notices be dealt with at the present hearing.

157.  The hearing on 24 January 2022 was in relation to the Outstanding Matters.  These matters were largely resolved at the hearing for the benefit of both the Parties.  In my view there should be no order as to costs.

158.  As for the updated PwC report dated 20 January 2022, although this was foreshadowed in paragraph 610 of the Judgment, the report was essentially for W’s own benefit to minimise her US tax if any is payable.  I will not order any reimbursement by H.

159.  As for the withdrawal of the BVI Stop Notices, in line with the costs order for the BVI proceedings, the costs of withdrawal of USD 1,854.25 should be borne by H.

160.  As for costs of H’s Variation Summons as between H and W, and W’s Variation Summons, neither of them has been entirely successful and I make no order as to costs.  As for H’s Variation Summons in respect of OS’s costs and OS’s Variation Summons, OS is the successful party, and H should pay OS’s costs on indemnity basis.

( Bebe Pui Ying Chu )
Judge of the Court of First Instance
High Court

Ms Bonnie YK Cheng, instructed by Stevenson, Wong & Co., for the Petitioner

Mr Shaphan Marwah, instructed by Bowers, for the 1st Respondent

The 2nd Respondent, absent

The 3rd Respondent, absent

Oldham, Li & Nie, for the 4th Respondent, absent

The 5th Respondent, absent

The 6th Respondent, absent

Mr Ken To, instructed by the Official Solicitor, for the Children



[1]  This was the 2nd Summon defined in this Court’s decision on litigation funding of 21 May 2020, see para 3(8), A1:99

[2]  So defined in the Court’s decision on litigation funding of 21 May 2020, at para 3(3), A1:98

[3]  Last line, at S, A2:326

[4]  Last line, at P, A2:354

[5]  Between K and L, A2:355

[6]  At A2:198

[7]  A2:367

[8]  A2:368; the supplemental report was dated 23 April 2021, see para 51 of the Judgment, A2:193

[9]  As amended earlier to be HKD 156,491,003 instead of HKD 156,211,003

[10]  B6:2049-2051

[11]  At para 12 of H’s Costs Submissions

[12]  Paras 541,542, A2:366-367

[13]  A3:461

[14]  B1:937 – Annexure B, H’s 1st Form E

[15]  B1:938 – Annexure C, H’s 1st Form E

[16]  A3:586

[17]  A3:504

[18]  B6:2052-2054

[19]  B6:2055-2056

[20]  Part 5.1(2), A3:467

[21]  See Answer 96, A3:543

[22]  B6:2119-2120

[23]  B1:969-987

[24]  A3:462

[25]  B1:958

[26]  A3:521

[27]  B1:960-962

[28]  Answer 263, A3:568

[29]  The copy produced by H had not been signed by his employer

[30]  A1:76

[31]  At para 163, A4:679

[32]  A2:402-404

[33]  At para 16, Melloy Judgment dated 11 December 2018, A1:18

[34]  At A1:13

[35]  B6:2061

[36]  B8:2651

[37]  B8:2675

[38]  B8:2688

[39]  B8:2677

[40]  B8:2691

[41]  B8:2693

[42]  Para 11, H’s 16th affirmation, A4:885

[43]  See para 8, A4:904 and B8:2802

[44] At para 74, A4:647; see also para 126, Judgment, A2:224

[45]  At paras 19-20 of his judgment

[46]  At para 21, supra

[47]  See para 62, H’s Costs Submissions

[48]  Para 66, H’s Costs Submissions

[49]  A1:36

[50]  B7:2505

[51]  B7:2515

[52]  B7:2518

[53]  B7:2503

[54]  See recital, A2:420

[55]  At para 30, Re LB, per Poon J

[2021] HKCFI 3392-EN-2021-11-12

KCMA v. ABC AND OTHERS

HTML content

HCMC 1/2019

[2021] HKCFI 3392

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

MATRIMONIAL CAUSES NO 1 OF 2019

_______________________

BETWEEN

KCMAPetitioner
and
ABC1st Respondent
PBB in his capacity as the trustee of the Family Trust2nd Respondent
PBB in his capacity as the Trustee of the Education Trust3rd Respondent
K4th Respondent
LGA also known as GLA5th Respondent
MJRB also known as MJRA6th Respondent

______________________

Before:Hon B Chu J in Chambers (Not Open to Public)
Dates of Hearing:4 – 13 May 2021
Date of Closing Submissions:15 June 2021
Date of Reply to Closing Submissions:29 June 2021
Date of Judgment:12 November 2021

__________________

JUDGMENT

__________________


__________________

Table of Contents

__________________

 Page
A. INTRODUCTION6
B. BRIEF BACKGROUND8
C. GENERAL LEGAL PRINCIPLES12
D. THE DISPUTED ISSUES14
E. THE WITNESSES AND EVIDENCE16
(I) The factual witnesses16
(II) The expert evidence18
(1) On Duxbury calculations18
(2) On valuations of land in _______18
(3) On valuations of the 3 parcels of land in ______  _ held by Bremen19
(4) On valuations of the M______ Apartment and K____ M___ in ____19
(5) On valuation of Intero20
(6) On French law on forced heirship21
(7) On US tax liability21
F. STEP (1): IDENTIFICATION OF THE ASSETS (ISSUES 4,5,6,7,8,11,1,12)22
(I) The section 17 Applications: Issue 422
(1) The relevant sections of section 17 of MPPO22
(2) The state of the Parties’ marriage at the time when H made the dispositions which are subject of W’s s17 Applications23
(3) W’s 1st s17 Application37
(i) Generally37
(ii) The structure, nature and effect of the US Trusts40
(iii) Whether W had knowledge of H setting up of the US Trusts64
Between 2009 and 201564
October 201582
(iv) The M______ Apartment94
(v) The OS’s position in relation to W’s 1st s 17 Application106
(vi) Conclusion on W’s 1st s 17 Application107
(4) W’s 2nd s 17 Application - Issue 5108
(i) The K___ Accounts110
(ii) The SC _______ Account118
(II) S____ Land – Issue 6120
(1) The parties’ respective case120
(2) The background120
(3) The evidence130
(i) Whether W’s father and cousin had an option to buy the S____ Land130
(ii) The amounts paid by the Parties out of matrimonial funds in relation to the S____ Land132
(iii) The compensation to R5 and A____135
(iv) Whether W had beneficial interests in the S____ Land137
(III) The V___ Land – Issue 7144
(1) Background144
(2) The Parties’ respective case145
(3) The evidence145
(IV) Potential Inheritance K____ M___ – Issue 11152
(V) Value of the Parties’ assets – Issue 1155
(1) The agreed valuations155
(2) Intero Valuation155
(1) The agreed valuations155
(i) Intero – generally156
(ii) Intero – GP Shares158
Article II of the Employee Shareholder Agreement158
Whether the Group will still exist after 15 years (or 14 years from now)160
Whether H is likely to leave the Group before he is 55 years of age161
The annual dividend payment164
The ROE/COE rate165
(iii) Intero – LP Investments167
(iv) Intero – FP Equity169
Whether FP was engaging in a similar business as F Capital(iv) Intero – FP Equity170
Whether the results for the financial period between January and December 2020 should be used172
Whether a P/E multiple of 13.8x should be used174
The remaining disputed areas (iv), (v) and (vi)175
Value of the FP Equity176
(v) Intero – JD Investment176
(vi) Intero – Equity in Singaporean brokerage firm176
(vii) Intero – IP Loan177
(viii) Intero – IP Warrant178
(ix) Intero – Project King179
(x) Intero – Bremen Intercompany loan180
(xi) Intero – GP Shares Loan180
(xii) Conclusion on the Intero valuation182
(3) S____ Land184
(4) AV 391188
(5) Other 3 plots of the V___ Land190
(VI) Computation of the assets: the Family Pot190
(1) Generally190
(2) Assets held by/available for W191
(3) Assets held by H/available for H192
(4) Litigation Funding – Issue 8196
(VII) The Parties’ income and earning capacity – Issue 12199
(1) W’s income earning capacity199
(2) H’s income and earning capacity200
G. STEP (2): THE PARTIES’ RESPECTIVE NEEDS – ISSUE 2 AND THE CHILDREN’S NEEDS – ISSUE 3201
(I) W’s reasonable needs – Issue 2201
(1) W’s housing needs and utilities expenses203
(2) Car insurance expense206
(3) Club replacement expense206
(4) Clothing/Shoes expenses207
(5) Medical/Dental (uninsured) expense207
(6) Meals out of home, personal grooming and holiday expenses208
(7) W’s reasonable needs209
(II) H’s reasonable needs – Issue 2210
(III) The Children’s reasonable needs – Issue 3211
(IV) Duxbury Calculations214
H. STEP (3) DECIDING WHETHER TO APPLY THE SHARING PRINCIPLE AND STEP (4) WHETHER DEPARTURE FROM EQUAL DIVISION217
I. STEP (5) DECIDING THE OUTCOME219
(I) Overpayment of MPS – Issue 9220
(II) US Tax implications – Issue 10220
J. ORDER220
K. COSTS221

A. INTRODUCTION

1.  The 8 day trial herein concerned ancillary relief applications arising out of matrimonial proceedings between the petitioner wife (“W”) and the respondent husband (“H”). Prior to the trial, this Court had handed down various decisions in these proceedings and for ease of reference, I shall continue to use the nomenclature therein unless otherwise indicated in this judgment.

2.  One of the major disputes between the parties is whether dispositions made by H to two US Trusts, presently governed by the law of Nevada in USA, and a disposition made by H to his father of an apartment in ________ in _______, I____ (“M______ Apartment”) and later settled in an I____ Trust, should be set aside. The US Trusts have been referred to respectively as the Family Trust and the Education Trust in this Court’s decision of 21 November 2019 in relation to W’s application for joinder (“Joinder Decision”). Pursuant to the Joinder Decision, the trustee PBB in his capacity as the trustee respectively for the Family Trust and the Education Trust have been joined respectively as the 2nd respondent (“R2”) and 3rd respondent (“R3”). H’s father (“R4”) has also been joined as a party in these proceedings. Subsequently, under rule 72 (1) of the Matrimonial Causes Rules, the Official Solicitor was directed to separately represent the three children of the family (“Children”) who are beneficiaries under the Family Trust and the Education Trust.

3.  Upon application by H, W’s father and mother have been joined respectively as the 5th and 6th respondents (“R5” and “R6”) herein in relation to issues raised by H over certain parcels of land in ________________________________ (“________”), namely (i) 2 parcels of land situate at AR 117 & AR 169 in ___________ (“S____ Land”) and (ii) 4 parcels of land situate at AV 391, AV 266, AX 331 and AX 329 in V___(“ V__ Land”) which are presently held by either singly and/or jointly in the names of W’s parents and in which W is said to have interests through resulting and/or constructive trusts (in respect of the S___ Land) and/or forced heirship laws of __________________ (in respect of the V___ Land).

4.  Apart from opposing the joinder, and after the Joinder Decision, R2 and R3 have not participated in these proceedings and were absent at the trial. R5 and R6 have not acknowledged service of H’s applications upon them and have not participated in these proceedings. As for R4, he was legally represented by H’s team of legal representatives and although he was scheduled to give evidence through video link, it eventually did not take place.

5.  The main protagonists are H and W, and for ease of reference, I shall refer to them collectively as the Parties.

6.  Counsel Mr Richard Todd and Ms Bonnie Cheng appeared for W at the trial. Counsel Mr John Scott SC and Mr Sharphan Marwah appeared for H, and Mr Ken To appeared for the Official Solicitor (“OS”) on behalf of the Children.

B. BRIEF BACKGROUND

7.  H was born in _____ in 1970 and is now 51 years old. He is an ______ citizen and holds an ______ passport. His father R4 is now about 87 years old and H’s mother is about 80 years old. H has 2 elder siblings, a brother who lives in _____ and a sister who lives in _________. H left _____ when he was 18 to attend university in the United States and after graduation, he was able to secure a good job __________________ from 1989 to 2000. In early 2000, he obtained a MBA from ______________.

8.  W was born in ______ in the ______________ in June 1971 and is now 50 years old. W holds dual US and French citizenship.

9.  W’s parents were born in ________. Her father R5 is now about 81 years old and her mother R6 is now about 72 years old. They live in ______ but have a house in ________. They have 4 children. W’s older sister lives in ________, and her brother is with US Navy. Her younger sister and her boyfriend live with W’s parents in ______ .

10.  According to W, her father R5 retired about 19 years ago in 2002 at the age of 62 and her mother R was and has continued to be a homemaker since her marriage to R5 in 1969. According to W, they are both in good health[1].

11.  H and W met in ___________________, in August 1999 and soon thereafter started their romantic relationship. In July 2000 they moved to Hong Kong together as a couple when H started to work ______ here. They were married in Hong Kong in October 2001. The Parties have a son R, who is now 18 years old, and two daughters S and A, respectively 16 and 12 years old. W has been a homemaker since she came to Hong Kong in 2000.

12.  In 2009, H _______________________________­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­ joined an investment management company which is a member of an investment group (“Group”). The letter of employment was dated 30 April 2009 with a commencement date of 1 August 2009 (“Letter of Employment”)[2]. As a result of a general corporate restructure of the Group, H’s employment was transferred to another related entity/member of the Group in Hong Kong as of 1 November 2012, for which he has been working until the present. In this judgment, unless otherwise indicated, reference to the Group will include an entity/member/subsidiary/associated company of the Group. As part of his employment benefits, H is entitled to equity participation of the Group (“GP Shares”) subject to a shareholding agreement dated 4 November 2010 (“Employee Shareholder Agreement”)[3]. Further, H is entitled to participate in the performance of certain investment funds of the Group (“LP Investments”)[4] and other performance fees.

13.  According to H, the years between 2009 and 2014 were very difficult years for him and he was focusing on his career during that time. Problems started to emerge in the Parties’ marital relationship which led to H and W attended marital counselling between September 2015 and March 2016. They later took a vacation to Sri Lanka over Easter 2016 to save their marriage but their efforts were not successful. H moved out of the former matrimonial home on 16 October 2016, although he said this was only “temporary”. W issued a petition for divorce on 21 November 2016.

14.  By a consent order dated 6 February 2017, H and W were granted joint custody of the Children with care and control to W and reasonable access. Decree Nisi was granted on 18 April 2017. Their marriage lasted about 15 years.

15.  The Parties exchanged their 1st Form Es on about 1 February 2017 and W alleged that she only learnt for the first time of the existence of the US Trusts from H’s 1st Form E. Thereafter, H alleged that W had involved the Children in the parties’ dispute over financial matters and this had affected H’s relationship with the Children.

16.  As said, W has been a homemaker since 2000 after she moved to Hong Kong with H. Pursuant to an order made by Judge Melloy on 11 December 2018 (“MPS Order”), H is to pay to W maintenance pending suit for her at HKD 26,450 per month, and interim maintenance for each of the Children, at HKD 26,450 per month, totalling HKD 105,800 plus various undertakings totalling about HKD 149,978 per month at the time (“Undertakings”). In total, the amount would be about HKD 255,778 per month.

17.  On 11 December 2018, Judge Melloy ordered that W’s application for ancillary relief, and all related applications, be transferred to the High Court. The issues relating to the Children have remained in the Family Court.

18.  On 19 March 2019, H took out a summons seeking a downward variation of the MPS Order. Pursuant to a decision handed down on 8 June 2020, this Court dismissed H’s application (“Variation Decision”).

19.  At the time of the trial, the Children were residing with W in an apartment in ________ while H was residing in an apartment in ______.

C. GENERAL LEGAL PRINCIPLES

20.  Section 7 of the Matrimonial Proceedings and Property Ordinance (MPPO) lays down what the court must have regard to when making orders for ancillary relief:

“(1) It shall be the duty of the court in deciding whether to exercise its powers under section 4, 6 or 6A in relation to a party to the marriage and, if so, in what manner, to have regard to the conduct of the parties and all the circumstances of the case including the following matters, that is to say-

(a) the income, earning capacity, property and other financial resources which each of the parties to the marriage has or is likely to have in the foreseeable future;

(b) the financial needs, obligations and responsibilities which each of the parties to the marriage has or is likely to have in the foreseeable future;

(c) the standard of living enjoyed by the family before the breakdown of the marriage;

(d) the age of each party to the marriage and the duration of the marriage;

(e) any physical or mental disability of either of the parties to the marriage;

(f) the contributions made by each of the parties to the welfare of the family, including any contribution made by looking after the home or caring for the family;

(g) in the case of proceedings for divorce or nullity of marriage, the value to either of the parties to the marriage of any benefit (for example, a pension) which, by reason of the dissolution or annulment of the marriage, that party will lose the chance of acquiring.

(2) Without prejudice to subsection (3), it shall be the duty of the court in deciding whether to exercise its powers under section 5, 6 or 6A in relation to a child of the family and, if so, in what manner, to have regard to all the circumstances of the case including the following matters, that is to say—

(a) the financial needs of the child;

(b) the income, earning capacity (if any), property and other financial resources of the child;

(c) any physical or mental disability of the child;

(d) the standard of living enjoyed by the family before the breakdown of the marriage;

(e) the manner in which he was being and in which the parties to the marriage expected him to be educated;

and so to exercise those powers as to place the child, so far as it is practicable and, having regard to the considerations mentioned in relation to the parties to the marriage in paragraphs (a) and (b) of subsection (1), just to do so, in the financial position in which the child would have been if the marriage had not broken down and each of those parties had properly discharged his or her financial obligations and responsibilities towards him.”

21.  The court’s powers under sections 4, 6 and 6A referred to in section 7 above are powers to make orders for a party to a marriage, for financial provision (by way of periodical payments and lump sums) and for property adjustment upon and after granting, amongst others, a decree of divorce. The court’s powers under section 5 are powers to make orders for financial provision for a child of the family in cases of, amongst others, a divorce.

22.  As set out in LKW v DD, (2010) 13 HKCFAR 537, FACV 16/2008 , there are 5 steps in carrying out the section 7 exercise in relation to a party to a marriage[5], and briefly they are:

(1) Step (1) – Identification of the assets

(2) Step (2) – Assessing the parties’ financial needs

(3) Step (3) – Deciding to apply the sharing principle

(4) Step (4) – Considering whether there are good reasons for departing from equal division

(5) Step (5) – Deciding the outcome

23.  This judgment is arranged in accordance with the above 5 Steps.

D. THE DISPUTED ISSUES

24.  There are altogether 12 issues set out in the agreed schedule of list of disputed issues setting out W’s position, H’s position and the OS’s position (“List of Issues”).

25.  As stated in paragraph 71 of LKW v DD

“The first step in the exercise is to ascertain the financial resources of each of the parties calculated as at the date of the hearing. In particular, under section 7(1)(a), the court must have regard to “the income, earning capacity, property and other financial resources” which each of the parties “has or is likely to have in the foreseeable future”. The object will of course be to compute the net financial resources, taking account of all material liabilities. At this stage, the court need not attempt to distinguish between matrimonial and non-matrimonial property, that being an exercise best undertaken (if necessary) when considering distribution of the assets”.

26.  Essentially, Issues 1, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 11 and 12 of the List of Issues are all under Step (1) or section 7(1)(a) of the MPPO, as they are in relation to identifying the assets and financial resources of H and W in the family pot (“Family Pot”) and the Parties’ respective income and earning capacity.

27.  Issue 1 concerns the valuation of the Parties’ assets and financial resources in the Family Pot, which should in fact come after the assets have been identified. Issues 4 and 5 concern dispositions by H into the US Trusts and H’s disposition of the M______ Apartment to his father R4, and H’s dispositions into the joint accounts of H and R4 held at K__________ Bank and from an account at Standard Chartered Bank in _______. W sought to set aside all such dispositions pursuant to two notices of applications (respectively the “1st s17 Application” and the “2nd s17 Application”) and for the assets disposed of be brought back to the Family Pot.

28.  Issue 6 concerns whether the S____ Land in ________ is held by W’s parents, ie R5 and R6, on constructive trust for the benefit of W and should be part of the Family Pot, or otherwise be part of W’s financial resources. Issue 7 concerns whether W has any expected interests under the French forced heirship law in the V___ Land in ________ held in the names of R5 and/or R6. Issue 8 is in relation to how the litigation funding is to be taken into account. Issue 11 concerns H’s potential inheritance of his mother’s half share in a house in _____ (“K______ M___”) as stated in H’s will of 15 May 2011 (“H’s 2011 Will”) and his mother’s will of 29 September 2011(“Mother’s 2011 Will”). Issue 12 concerns the parties’ respective income and earning capacity.

29.  Issues 2 and 3 concern the financial needs of W and the Children and are part of Step (2) and section 7(1)(b) of MPPO.

30.  Issue 9 concerns how overpayments under the MPS Order, if any, should be dealt with. Issue 10 concerns US tax implications from the divorce settlement.

E. THE WITNESSES AND EVIDENCE

(I) The factual witnesses

31.  The Parties have each filed 3 Form Es, their 1st one in about January/February 2017 (“1st Form E”), their 2nd one which has been referred to as a truncated Form E (as such only contained the Parties’ updated income and expenses for the purpose of the MPS hearing) (“Truncated Form E”) on 16 October 2018, and their 3rd one in January 2021 is their final one before the trial (“Updated Form E”). The Parties have also filed answers to each other’s questionnaires and have also provided voluntary answers.

32.  The Parties have each filed an affirmation on 1 April 2021 containing their evidence in chief for the trial (“Trial Affirmation”), and thereafter have each filed a reply affirmation to the other’s Trial Affirmation (“Reply Affirmation”).

33.  W also relied on her 3rd and 6th Affirmations in relation to her 1st s 17 Application and her 2nd Affirmation in relation to her 2nd s17 Application and her 4th Affirmation in relation to her application for joinder, which have been included in the trial bundles. H’s 3rd Affirmation in opposition to W’s 1st s17 Application has also been included in the trial bundles.

34.  The trustee PBB has filed an affidavit on 16 August 2019 in connection with W’s joinder application, and so did H’s father R4.

35.  In the end, only H and W attended the trial to give oral evidence. R4 was unable to travel to Hong Kong to attend trial physically due to the Covid-19 pandemic. Arrangements had initially been made for R4 to give evidence through video link, but on 11 May 2021, just before R4 was due to give evidence, he was diagnosed to have hypertension and chronic bronchial asthma and had a fever and was advised to rest for two weeks[6]. He did not give evidence in the end.

(II) The expert evidence

(1) On Duxbury calculations

36.  H instructed Mr Steven James Apedaile, the Managing Director of Sirius Corporate Services (“Sirius”) to prepare a report dated 8 October 2020 on Duxbury calculations[7]. W instructed Mr Kenneth Yeo of BDO Financial Services Limited (“BDO”) to prepare a report dated 29 April 2021[8]. The joint expert statement on Duxbury calculation was filed on 10 May 2021[9] (“Joint Duxbury Statement”).

37.  Mr Apedaile attended trial to give oral evidence through video link from Australia. Mr Yeo attended trial physically to give oral evidence.

(2) On valuations of land in ________

38.  W instructed Ms Johanna Morvan of ______ Real Estate to prepare 3 valuation reports filed on 3 , 5, and 11 May 2021[10].

39.  H instructed Dr Michele Robin-Clerc to prepare various valuation reports filed on 21 January 2021 and 30 April 2021[11].

40.  The two experts signed a Joint Expert Statement for valuation of the S____ Land and the V___ Land in ________ dated 11 May 2021[12] (“Joint ________ Statement”).

41.  Ms Morvan gave evidence during the trial from ________ through video link. Dr Robin-Clerc gave evidence during the trial from Paris in France through video link.

(3) On valuations of the 3 parcels of land in ______ held by Bremen

42.  Dr Michele Robin Clerc also prepared valuations of the 3 parcels of land in ______ held by Bremen respectively on 18 and 21 January 2021[13].

43.  These valuations were agreed by W.

(4) On valuations of the M______ Apartment and K____ M___ in ____

44.  The parties agreed to appoint CBRE South Asia Private Limited (“CBRE”) to be the single joint expert for the valuations of the properties in ____. CBRE submitted 2 reports on 1 February 2021, one in relation to the valuation of the M______ Apartment[14] and the other one on the valuation of another property in K__ __ M___ (as defined later)[15].

45.  There was no dispute to the valuations.

(5) On valuation of Intero

46.  H’s expert Mr Ferry Choy of Sirius Corporate Service prepared a valuation report on Intero of 27 January 2021[16] (“1st Sirius Report”). W’s expert Mr Kenneth Yeo of BDO submitted his “Note of Advice” dated 21 April 2021[17] (“1st BDO Report”). Mr Choy then submitted a reply valuation report on 7 May 2021 but filed on 12 May 2021[18] (“2nd Sirius Report”).

47.  At the time of the trial, there was only a draft expert joint statement dated 7 May 2021 with Mr Yeo’s input only[19]. Mr Choy was medically unwell and was not able to complete the joint statement. Mr Choy was also not well enough to attend the trial to give oral evidence[20]. In the end, only Mr Yeo attended the trial to give oral evidence and was cross examined.

48.  It was only after the trial that the two experts were able to complete their joint statement which was eventually filed on 7 June 2021 (“Joint Intero Statement”).

(6) On French law on forced heirship

49.  H’s expert Mr Luc Godefroy prepared an expert report dated 21 January 2021on the relevant French laws as to forced heirship in relation to the land of ________[21]. W’s expert Ms Sarah-Jane Tasteyre of JC Legal prepared a legal advice on behalf of W on 22 April 2021 on the inheritance laws, ownership laws and trusts under French law[22].

50.  Although Mr Luc Godefroy was scheduled to give evidence through video link from _________________________, he failed to do so due to connection problems. In the end, as there was no dispute in relation to the French law, W decided there was no need to call Ms Tasteyre, who was originally scheduled to give evidence through video link from United Kingdom.

(7) On US tax liability

51.  H instructed PwC Hong Kong (“PWC”) to prepare a report on the US Federal Tax Implications on distributions of assets from the Family Trust in settlement of divorce proceedings. PWC prepared a report dated 27 January 2021[23] and a supplemental report on 23 April 2021[24].

F. STEP (1): IDENTIFICATION OF THE ASSETS (ISSUES 4,5,6,7,8,11,1,12)

(I) The section 17 Applications: Issue 4

(1) The relevant sections of section 17 of MPPO

52.  Under section 17(1)(b) of the MPPO, where an application for financial provision is brought by an applicant against the other party, the Court, if it is satisfied that the other party is, with the intention of defeating the claim for financial provision (“Intention”), made a disposition to which section 17 applies and that if the disposition were set aside financial provision or different financial provision would be granted to the applicant, make an order setting aside the disposition and give such consequential directions as it thinks fit for giving effect to the order (including directions requiring the making of any payment or the disposal of any property).

53.  Under section 17(2), section 17(1)(b) applies to any disposition made by the other party (whether before or after the commencement of the proceedings for financial provision), not being a disposition made for valuable consideration (other than marriage) to a person who, at the time of the disposition, acted in relation to it in good faith and without notice of any such Intention on the part of the other party.

54.  Further, under section 17(3), where an application is made with respect to a disposition which took place less than 3 years before the date of the application and the court is satisfied that the disposition would have the consequence of defeating the applicant’s claim for financial provision, it shall be presumed, unless the contrary is shown, that the other party disposed of the property with the Intention (“Presumption”).

55.  Any reference to “defeating an applicant’s claim for financial provision” under section 17 of the MPPO is a reference to preventing financial provision from being granted to the applicant, or to the applicant for the benefit of a child of the family, or reducing the amount of any financial provision which might be so granted, or frustrating or impeding the enforcement of any order which might be or has been made at the instance of the applicant under the relevant provisions of the MPPO.

(2) The state of the Parties’ marriage at the time when H made the dispositions which are subject of W’s s17 Applications

56.  H’s evidence was that he believed W started to have affairs shortly after the birth of their youngest child A in 2009. H alleged in his Trial Affirmation that W took the Children away from him for long periods to the US and the ________ and indulged in “lewd, inappropriate and adulterous behaviours”[25]. It was further H’s allegation in his Trial Affirmation that W had even took the Children to her adulterous partners’ homes while she was over there having an affair with them and that he had tolerated W’s behaviour throughout the marriage in order to keep their family unit intact. H had described W as a “troubled person” but claimed that he grew up with traditional values when one would try to fix what was broken rather than “throw it out” and replace it[26]. H then gave examples of W’s unreasonable behaviour during the marriage[27].

57.  In W’s Trial Affirmation, her evidence was that the marriage was in difficulties in around July 2013, as follows:

(1) In July 2013, W and the children were on their vacation in the ________ and W shared with H that she was invited on stage in a concert performed by a ________ band called ___ (“___ Concert Incident”) upon which H became belligerent with her accusing her of being foolish and not having any concern about his career;

(2) H then started to investigate W by logging into her personal email accounts at hotmail.com and yahoo.com which were set up in her maiden name (collectively “Personal Email Accounts”) with passwords that W had given H years before. Having gained access to W’s personal hotmail account, H was then able to change W’s password to her Facebook account and to continue his investigations unknown to W[28].

(3) After hacking into W’s Facebook account H then found a few photographs taken in W’s teens and her early 20s in an album of a male friend of W’s whom W had known for 28 years. This started another dispute.

(4) Upon W’s return from ___________ in the summer of 2013, H had requested W to take a herpes test which she found humiliating.

58.  Then, on 2 May 2014, W’s best friend J______ was murdered by her husband in ______ and according to W, she then reflected on her and H’s mortality and about her financial security. According to W, notwithstanding she objected to H’s proposal to remove her from their joint HSBC account in May 2013, H went ahead to do it and that H’s unilateral actions caused her considerable unease and insecurity. In November 2014, W had approached H about adding her name to the M______ Apartment but H rejected her request and repeated what he told W in 2006 at the time of the purchase, that it was impossible to add her name as the M______ Apartment was mortgaged and only people with salaried jobs could have their names on the deed[29]. W said H’s refusal put another strain on their relationship and W had contacted H’s father R4 direct on the phone to try and understand why H’s mother’s name could be on the deed of his parent’s house which had a mortgage and yet W’s could not be added to the M______ Apartment. According to W, H became belligerent when he found out that W had contacted R4 direct.

59.  Thereafter, in 2015, W said H’s desire to control extended to demanding that he could check her mobile phone whenever he wanted. W said she refused and H then invaded her privacy by downloading all her messages from her phone onto his laptop computer without her knowledge after getting her password from their son R.

60.  On the other hand, H had made various allegations against W and he gave as examples of W’s unreasonable behaviour in that she was in contact with her ex-lovers on Facebook, email and texts and W would be in regular contact with her past lovers and would meet up with them during family vacations with the Children[30].

61.  When asked about the herpes test under cross examination, H had said that W had disclosed to him that she had had unprotected sex prior to the marriage with a person who had herpes. H said he did some research and that one could still get it after 20 years and that as he also took the test himself, and he did not think W would find his request for her to take the test humiliating or offensive.

62.  H’s evidence was that W’s behaviour during the ___ Concert Incident which was posted on Youtube was lewd and inappropriate. It was put to H during cross examination that he was so troubled by the ___ Concert Incident and by his suspicions of W that he started his “deceitful” behaviour by gaining access into W’s Facebook account and that H was violating W’s privacy, H denied this. He then tried to explain that he and W both had access to each other’s email account. However, H’s evidence was inconsistent with his own emails to W, e.g. the Trust ______ Email of 27 August 2015 and the Accountability Email of 15 February 2016 referred to below in which that H had admitted invading into W’s privacy and had apologised for his behaviour.

63.  As for invading W’s privacy again in 2015 by gaining access to W’s iPhone, according to H, while he was putting W’s iPhone into a new iPhone case which he got her, he noticed an unusual “bonjour mon amour” text from a long-time family friend T_____ who lives in ___________ and H had described this a “definite red flag” , and he said that was why he asked their son R for W’s password the next morning just to see if there was anything more to this overly friendly text from T_____ and that what he then saw shook him to his core, and “Trust was indefinitely broken”. H said he felt totally betrayed and devastated[31].

64.  It was H’s evidence that when he clicked into the conversation between W and T_____, he realized that “they were having an adulterous relationship with each other, with very graphic sexting conversations between them”. It was further H’s evidence that W later admitted to him to her being in a 1.5 year adulterous relationship with T_____[32].

65.  H had not produced what he described as “sexting conversations” or “sexting messages” between W and T_____. Further, when it was put to H during cross examination that W had never said or admitted that she had an adulterous relationship with T_____, H agreed with Mr Todd that W did not use the word “adultery” and that H further said his definition of “adultery” meant “in love” and “sexting about”. H then claimed W told him that she and T_____ had kissed and that they had an “emotional relationship”.

66.  However, even taking H’s evidence to the highest, there was no sufficient evidence that W had an adulterous relationship with T_____. This was further confirmed by the reply email sent by T_____ as seen below.

67.  W had alleged that H sent T_____ an email on 16 August 2015 from an email account pretending to be W and telling T_____ that if H were to call him, not to confirm that he and W had sex in ________ (“T_____ Email”).

68.  In her Trial Affirmation, W had referred to the email account as an “alias email account” which H created himself and to which she did not have access and that H would target her friends by sending them emails from this account pretending to be W[33].

69.  H had explained in his Reply Affirmation that the “alias email account” referred to by W was set up by him in 2011, using W’s married name, and was a sub account (“Yahoo Sub Account”) linked to his own account (“H’s Yahoo Email Account”). According to H, the reason why he set up the Yahoo Sub Account for W, because W used to send emails from H’s Yahoo Email Account. H had further said during the trial that even after July 2013, W had continued to have access to H’s Yahoo Email Account and/or the Yahoo Sub Account. It was H’s evidence that W had used the Yahoo Sub Account to book Airbnb rooms, make travel arrangements and to send other communications to his family and to businesses[34].

70.  During the trial, W’s evidence was that after the ___ Concert Incident, or after August/summer 2013, and after H hacking into her Personal Email Accounts and Facebook account, she changed the password to W’s Personal Email Accounts and she did not have access to the Yahoo Sub Account. It was W’s evidence that H had sent emails out from the Yahoo Sub Account in her name. On the other hand, H had again said during the trial that W was often sending emails to his family pretending to be him from H’s Yahoo Email Account address. H had told W not to and that was why he then set up the Yahoo Sub Account for W under H’s Yahoo Email Account so that she could send emails in her own name from the Yahoo Sub Account. What seems clear from their evidence is that the Yahoo Sub Account was set up by H in W’s name, and that both of them had the password to that account as well as H’s Yahoo Email Account.

71.  During the trial, H had said that W had access to the Yahoo Sub Account and/or H’s Yahoo Email Account until his moving out of the former matrimonial home in October 2016. However, if according to H, his moving out was only temporary, then there was no reason why he would have stopped W’s access to the Yahoo Sub Account/H’s Yahoo Email Account after he moved out.

72.  Anyway, H alleged that W used to send emails in his name from H’s Yahoo Email Account and W alleged it was H who sent emails from the Yahoo Sub Account in her name. I find that it is impossible for this Court to decide whether the email/s were sent by W in H’s name or sent by H in W’s name, simply by looking at the email account/address (ie whether the Yahoo Sub Account or H’s Yahoo Email Account) from which it was sent, or the name of the sender of the email.

73.  So far as W was concerned, it would seem unlikely that after H accessed her Personal Email Accounts and Facebook account in the summer 2013, she would use the Yahoo Sub Account for her personal communications even if she could still access the account. Anyway, after the T_____ Email was sent, T_____ had responded by asking W what she was talking about and that he never had sex with her[35].

74.  When H was cross examined about the T_____ Email, H denied he was the one who sent the T_____ Email and alleged that it was W who had sent the email. When asked why W would send such an email, he said the H’s Yahoo Email Account address was opened on the screen and that W had sent the T_____ Email mistakenly or inadvertently.

75.  What H had said did not seem to make sense. If according to H’s case in his Reply Affirmation that W had admitted to H about her being in a 1.5 year adulterous relationship with T____[36], then there was no need for W to send the T_____ Email as she had already admitted the relationship to H. If W did not make such an admission and had indeed wanted to send the T_____ Email to alert T_____ in case H were to call/contact him, one would expect W to take care not to let H know, and W would have sent the T_____ Email from one of her Personal Email Accounts or to alert T_____ in another manner. There was no reason why W would want to send it from the Yahoo Sub Account to which H had access. It was not clear as to how W could have mistakenly or inadvertently sent the T_____ Email as alleged by H. In fact, in H’s Reply Affirmation, he did not specifically deny W’s allegation that it was H who sent the T____ Email. I do not find H’s evidence that it was W who mistakenly/inadvertently sent the T_____ Email from H’s Yahoo Email Account probable or credible.

76.  W had produced 4 emails sent by H to W between 22 August 2015 and 27 August 2015 which she had described as “bizarre and confusing”[37] (“Bizarre Emails”). The 1st of these Bizarre Emails was sent by H on 22 August 2015 with the subject matter “ED and other thoughts” (ED Email) in which H referred to various intimate issues between him and W. H had said had said amongst other things that the Parties were at the cross roads then and he needed W to be more constructive if she wanted reconciliation, and that they both had to be motivated to fix their failing relationship, and this could only be done exclusively by the two of them, maybe with the help a professional counsellor[38].

77.  The 2nd of the Bizarre Emails was sent by H to W on 26 August 2015 with the subject matter “[W’s] Perspective according to [H]” (Perspective Email) he had suggested amongst other things that in order to fix their relationship issues and failings, they must understand each other’s narratives and perspective and he then set out his own perspective ( negatives and positives)[39].

78.  The 3rd and the 4th of the Bizarre Emails were both sent by H to W on 27 August 2016:

(1) the 1st one with the subject matter “COMMUNICATION AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION”[40] (Communications Email), in which H had said there were major differences in the way they communicated and then set out his communication style and W’s. H had said to W that: “Your communication style in my opinion has been a major contributing factor to why we are at this failed stage today”. H had also referred to his own hurtful comments and put downs of W and had referred to “the last ten day emotional roller-coaster ride” they took together[41].

(2) the 2nd one with the subject matter “TRUST ISSUES & THE SUMMER OF ___”[42] (Trust _____ Email), in which H had mentioned the ___ Concert Incident again and admitted he started reading all W’s emails and that that was a grave mistake because from that day on, he permanently lost her trust. H admitted that his jealousy and concerns were unfounded and said he was sincerely apologetic. W then changed her passwords back and he swore never to go back into her personal space again. However, he then referred to his gaining access to W’s iPhone and read the text messages from T_____ and that after what he saw, “Trust was indefinitely broken ….”.

79.  Although H claimed under cross examination that by August 2016, the ___ Concert was “water under the bridge completely”, it was clear that it was not, as H was still referring to the ___ Concert Incident in the Trust _____ Email, which was over two years after the event.

80.  After the above mentioned Bizarre Emails, on 17 September 2015, H sent W an email on “Divorce 101 HK”[43] (“Divorce Email”). H had said the email was cut short. In this email, although H started off by saying he sincerely hoped it would not come to that, he then provided W with information on divorce in Hong Kong.

81.  There was another an email later on 17 September 2015 in which it H stated he seeking help from a therapist to cope with his own issues and he asked W also to consider seeing a therapist[44]. According to W, the Parties had another heated argument on 29 September 2015 when H admitted to W that he had been downloading messages from her phone onto his computer for months[45].

82.  As mentioned earlier, the parties attended counselling between September 2015 and March 2016.

83.  Later, in an email which H sent to W on 15 February 2016 with the subject matter “Accountability”[46] (Accountability Email) H had admitted it was wrong of him to go into W’s email account to investigate and to break into W’s Facebook account in 2013 and he had said that all those things seemed rather trivial in comparison to the “ sh*t storm” they had dealt with for past 7 months. The 7 month period would be between about 15 August 2015 and 15 February 2016.

84.  H was asked during cross examination when he thought the marriage was over, H’s answer was “not even when W filed a petition. I do not want a divorce. I have always tried to reconcile and when the petition was served on me, I was shakened.” H then reiterated that in October 2016, when he moved out of the matrimonial home, it was only “temporary”, and it was for him to concentrate on his work. When it was put to him that there were great difficulties by 2015 and the marriage was really over by 2015, he disagreed. H claimed that he thought he was making progress during marriage counselling. When pointed out that he had sent the Divorce Email, H then replied that the email related to a friend who was going through divorce. However, that was not the impression one would get when reading the Divorce Email, and I do not find his answer credible. His oral evidence did not accord with what he had written in his own emails.

85.  Whether W did have any exchange of “sexting messages” or any “emotional relationship” with T_____ or not, and whether W had any adulterous relationship with any one or not, what was clear from the emails was that the Parties appeared to have ceased their physical relationship after the birth of their youngest child A and that by end of August 2015, after the ___ Concert Incident and the T_____ Email and H’s invasion into W’s privacy, as H himself had said in his emails, trust was indefinitely broken. The marriage was clearly in serious difficulties. Whatever H may now say, in my view, divorce was very much in the mind of H and that of W, and it was under those circumstances that H sent the Divorce Email to W. Even if as H now maintains, he himself does not believe in divorce because of his Asian culture and attitudes, he must have realised in September 2015 that it was very likely that W would file for divorce.

86.  As mentioned earlier, in November 2014, W had asked H to put the M______ Property in her name and she was concerned over her financial security and control. H’s evidence was that W had expressly agreed to the family assets from date of marriage not to be held in her name except for joint accounts but H admitted during the trial that when they closed down their joint accounts W had objected and that after J______’s murder (which was in May 2014), W had wanted substantial assets to be put in her name. It was H’s written evidence that after J______’s murder, W had projected all her insecurities and misguided fears onto him. Suffice to say, H’s own evidence showed that by 2014, W had wanted financial security and there was a lack of trust of H on W’s part.

87.  Having considered all the evidence before this Court, I find the marriage was indeed mortally wounded (as described by Mr Todd) sometime between 2013 (the ___ Concert Incident) and September 2015, and thereafter, lingered on until October 2016 when H moved out of the matrimonial home, followed by W filing her divorce petition. The dispositions which were subject of W’s s17 Applications were made by H between November 2015 and January 2017 and such dispositions have to be viewed against the Parties’ then relationship.

(3) W’s 1st s17 Application

(i) Generally

88.  It was not disputed that in 2009, at around the time H began to work for the Group, he set up a BVI company (“Intero”) for the purpose of holding the GP Shares. According to its certificate of incumbency[47], Intero was incorporated on 2 July 2009 and on 30 September 2009, H was registered as the sole director and shareholder. According to H, he transferred a portion of his personal assets into Intero in 2009[48]. Intero has been described as H’s “Estate Planning Vehicle” or “Controlled Company” in the Employee Shareholder Agreement[49].

89.  It was also not disputed that later in 2012, H set up another BVI company (“Bremen”). According to its certificate of incumbency[50], Bremen was incorporated on 3 July 2012. On 13 September 2012, H was registered as the sole director and shareholder. According to H, Bremen was incorporated to hold real estate investments, ie to hold land acquisitions in ______ and the S____ Land in _______.

90.  On 1 November 2015, H’s share in Intero was settled into the Family Trust. According to H, his share in Bremen was also settled into the Education Trust on 1 November 2015, but as seen later, the Education Trust was only set up on 1 July 2016.

91.  According to W, H bought the M______ Apartment out of their family funds. What is not disputed is that on 28 October 2005, H signed a loan agreement (“Home Loan Agreement”)[51] as borrower for the purchase of the M______ Apartment[52]. The purchase price was INR27,412,500 and the loan was INR 22,875,210. Upon the loan being paid off, the title of the M______ Apartment was registered in the name of H’s father R4 on 12 September 2016. The M______ Apartment was later settled into the I_____ Trust on 30 August 2017.

92.  W’s case is that the M______ Apartment, the shares of Intero and the shares of Bremen are all part of the Family Pot.

93.  By her 1st s17 Application issued on 29 August 2017, W seeks to set aside the following dispositions made by H[53]:

In relation to the US Trusts –

(1) the disposition of the shares in Intero into the Family Trust on 1 November 2015;

(2) the disposition of the shares in Bremen to the Education Trust on 1 November 2015 or in about July 2016;

(3) the disposition of the shares in Intero from the Family Trust to Bremen on 1 July 2016;

(4) the transfer of the Family Trust from the jurisdiction of New Hampshire to that of the jurisdiction of Nevada in about January 2017;

In relation of the M______ Apartment –

(1) the disposition of the M______ Apartment to his father R4 in August 2016 and all transfers thereafter;

94.  Alternatively to the above setting aside applications, W seeks a variation of nuptial settlement under sections 6(1)(c) and (d) of the MPPO, namely:

(1) the US Trusts and the I_____ Trust be dissolved and assets held by the trusts be distributed to W and/or H; or alternatively,

(2) The US Trusts and the I_____ Trust be varied to enable W and/or H to benefit from one or all of the trusts.

95.  The above dispositions were all made by H within 3 years prior to W’s 1st s17 Application, and in the circumstances if the Court is satisfied that the dispositions would have the consequence of defeating W’s claim for financial provision, the Presumption applies. The burden will be on H to satisfy this Court that the dispositions were not made with the Intention.

(ii) The structure, nature and effect of the US Trusts

96.  The Family Trust was initially set up by H as the settlor pursuant to a trust deed dated 1 November 2015 (“2015 Family Trust Deed”)[54] under the law of the State of New Hampshire in United States. Mr T___ B_____ (“Mr B_____”) was the original trustee and under Part 4 of the Schedule to 2015 Family Trust Deed, the beneficiaries were H the settlor, W the settlor’s spouse and the issue of both the settlor and the settlor’s spouse[55]. The excluded persons were the trustee, the protector and the beneficiary’s spouse save the Parties. Under Part 7 of the Schedule, a committee was appointed its “Protector”, comprising of H’s father, brother, and two friends said to be of H and W, one of whom will be referred hereinafter as simply I_____; and the committee, by majority vote had the power to add one more individual as a member of the committee among individuals named therein including W’s brother. However, under Part 9, the settlor, ie H had the power to remove a “Protector” with or without cause.

97.  H, being the settlor was the “Investment Director” whose investment powers were set out in Part 1.1.1 of the Schedule[56]. Under Part 1, paragraphs 6.5 and 6.6[57], the settlor may appoint the Investment Director during his lifetime, and in default, H’s brother and I______ are to be Investment Directors to exercise the powers of a successor to the settlor.

98.  On 1 November 2015, by a letter of wishes[58] (“2015 Family Trust Wishes”), H had expressed his wish, amongst other things, that during his lifetime, he and W should be treated as the primary beneficiaries and the Children should be treated as secondary beneficiaries and they be treated as primary beneficiaries after both he and W have died.

99.  On 1 November 2015, in consideration of the sum of USD 1, H transferred his one share in Intero to Mr B____ as trustee of the Family Trust.

100.  Then, on 1 July 2016, the following events took place:

(1) The Education Trust was set up;

(2) By a deed of gift (“Deed of Gift”)[59], H gifted the assets in the Schedule A (“Schedule A”) to the Education Trust. However, no Schedule A was attached in the copy produced by H to W, and this was only produced by H during the trial (Exhibit R2) after he obtained a copy from Mr B____, and in Schedule A, the asset set out was one share of the sole issued share of Bremen;

(3) The Family Trust and Bremen entered into a sale and purchase agreement pursuant to which the Family Trust sold its shares in Intero to Bremen for an aggregate consideration (which amount was not actually filled in on the copy produced by H in the trial bundles[60]);

(4) Bremen as borrower executed a promissory note dated 1 July 2016 in the sum of USD 10,500,000 in favour of the Family Trust as lender (“Promissory Note”)[61], and Bremen’s share(s) in Intero was/were the collateral.

101.  As a result of the above series of transactions, the one share in Intero has become the asset of Bremen, and the Family Trust only holds the Promissory Note as its asset.

102.  The Family Trust was thereafter moved to the State of Nevada and was amended and restated by a trust deed dated 1 January 2017 (“2017 Family Trust Deed”)[62]. PBB (R2) was appointed its new trustee and he has remained the trustee since. H is identified by name as the Investment Director/Investment Advisor, and the Protector[63]. H has the power to appoint any additional or successor trust Protector provided in default of such appointment, there shall be a committee of 5 persons including the settlor’s father, brother and two of his friends including I______, and the “settlor’s spouse” and the committee may by majority add one or more persons as a member of the committee with preference among 4 persons including the settlor’s spouse and W’s brother.

103.  Section 5.1 of the 2017 Family Trust Deed then sets out the beneficiaries, being, H, W, the descendants of H and W, certain charitable organisations as contingent beneficiaries and any person whom the trustee adds as a beneficiary by exercising his power under section 5.4. Under section 5.4, the trustee has the power to exclude irrevocably any person as beneficiary other than H and W.

104.  By a letter of wishes dated 6 January 2017[64] (“2017 Family Trust Wishes”), again H and W are stated to be the primary beneficiaries and the Children are secondary beneficiaries and are only the primary beneficiaries after H and W have both died.

105.  As for the Education Trust, notwithstanding H’s evidence that this was set up by H at the same time as the Family Trust, the documentation clearly showed that it was in fact set up by H as settlor pursuant to a trust deed dated 1 July 2016 (“2016 Education Trust Deed”)[65] under the law of the State of Nevada right from the beginning. Mr B___ _ was appointed its original trustee. H was the initial Protector, and the successor Protector was a committee comprising of H’s father, H’s brother and H’s friend I______. H was the Investment Director, being the settlor. The beneficiaries were stated to be “the issue of both the settlor and the settlor’s spouse”.

106.  By a letter of wishes dated 1 July 2016 for the Education Trust[66] (“2016 Education Trust Wishes”), under clause 4 thereof, the initial primary beneficiaries of the trust are the class composed of H’s children, each of whom is living at the date of the letter of wishes. The class of class of beneficiaries also includes all issue of H and W, and these unborn issue constitute the current class of remainder beneficiaries.

107.  The Education Trust was revised and restated by a trust deed dated 1 January 2017 (“ 2017 Education Trust Deed”)[67], on the same day as the Family Trust. The trustee was changed to PBB (R3) and H had remained the initial Protector. In default of H exercising his power to appoint additional or successor protectors, the successor shall be a committee comprised of H’s father, H’s brother, I______ and the settlor’s spouse. The beneficiaries are stated to be (i) the settlor’s descendants; (ii) the descendants of the settlor’s spouse, W, including her descendants born after any divorce from the settlor but not including any descendants of any future spouse of the settlor unless such persons are also descendants of the settlor; (iii) certain charitable organizations as contingent beneficiaries. H was also named as the Investment Director/Investment Advisor.

108.  Thereafter, the Education Trust was further revised and restated by a trust deed dated 1 January 2019 (“2019 Education Trust Deed”)[68]. This was only found by W among documents provided by H to his US tax expert PWC earlier this year. There was no proper disclosure by H to W, and the deed was executed after W had issued her 1st s17 Application and her summons on 21 November 2018 seeking orders including injunctive relief. In fact, there was also no proper disclosure to the Court about the 2019 Education Trust Deed at the time of the hearing before this Court in September 2019 in relation to W’s joinder application, injunction application and discovery application.

109.  The 2019 Education Trust Deed is said to supersede the 2016 Education Trust Deed as amended (presumably this included the amendment by the 2017 Education Trust Deed). R3 continues to be its trustee, and the governing law remains the law of the State of Nevada, and the definition of beneficiaries appear to have remained the same. However, H’s brother, identified by name, has since been appointed as the “Investment Trustee”[69] and the Investment Trustee appears to have replaced the “Investment Director”, as there is no mention of an “Investment Director” in the 2019 Education Trust Deed. The Protector has also since been a committee of H’s brother and H’s friend I______, instead of H.

110.  Notwithstanding the Education Trust having been amended and restated by first the 2017 Education Trust Deed and then by the 2019 Education Trust Deed, the only letters of wishes which H had produced were the 2016 Education Trust Wishes.

111.  The Education Trust holds a substantial part of the family assets (through holding the shares of Intero and Bremen).

112.  It was not quite clear as to why the Family Trust was moved to Nevada or why the terms of the US Trusts were amended and re-stated on 1 January 2017. H’s explanation in his Trial Affirmation[70] was that the action was taken by the prior trustee (namely Mr B____) to primarily take advantage of a more robust trust administration infrastructure provided by a dedicated licensed trustee, namely PBB, based in Nevada. H had also advanced the case that the change was for costs saving by appointing a new trustee in Nevada who would charge a fixed rate, as opposed to Mr B____ who charged an hourly rate.

113.  As pointed out by Mr To, the cost-saving effect did not appear to be borne out by evidence, and notwithstanding PBB being appointed as the new trustee, Mr B____ had continued to advise H on matters relating to the Family Trust. In fact, Mr B____ was also the trustee’s counsel, at least for the Family Trust[71].

114.  Having considered the evidence, I do not find H’s explanation for the reasons why the Family Trust was moved to Nevada, and/or why both the Family Trust and the Education Trust were then amended and restated, satisfactory.

115.  As this Court understands, the US Trusts are irrevocable discretionary trusts. H had described that the Family Trust as a “Foreign, non-grantor irrevocable trust”[72]. H’s expert PWC on US tax described the Family Trust and the Education Trust, as “foreign non grantor trusts for US income tax purposes”[73]. In the 2017 Family Trust Deed and the 2017 Education Trust Deed, the trusts are stated to be “Foreign Trusts” and “Non-Grantor Trusts”[74]. As stated in section 9.2 of the 2017 Family Trust Deed, a “grantor trust” means a trust or a portion of a trust of which under sections 671 through 679 of the Internal Revenue Code the trust’s settlor or another person is treated as the owner. A “non-grantor trust” means any trust or a portion of a trust which is not a grantor trust.

116.  PBB had described in his affidavit of 16 August 2019 filed in relation to W’s joinder application, the Family Trust is a “Nevada self-settled spendthrift trust” settled by H in accordance with the Spendthrift Trust Act of Nevada (Chapter 166 of the Nevada Revised Statutes) and he had produced a copy of the act[75].

117.  In particular, NRS 166.110 of the Spendthrift Trust Act of Nevada under “Discretion of trustee”, provides that the discretionary power of payment of sums to the beneficiary thereunder shall be absolute and such discretion shall never be interfered with for any consideration of the needs, station in life or mode of life of the beneficiary, or for uncertainty, or on any pretext whatever[76]. Further, NRS 166.120 sets out the restraints on alienation, and the exclusive jurisdiction of the court over any proceedings pursuant to this section.

118.  As seen in the Joinder Decision, PBB had obtained an order of the Nevada Court on 10 July 2019 that, amongst other things, the Nevada Court takes in rem jurisdiction over the Family Trust to the exclusion of all other courts and tribunals including exclusive jurisdiction over all of the Family Trust’s administration and internal affairs[77].

119.  PBB had pointed out in his affidavit that the Family Trust is a directed trust meaning that he, as trustee, does not make investment decisions for the Family Trust and that H, as Investment Director has the exclusive duty and power to invest and to maintain control over investment matters, and otherwise manage all of the trust property, and further that H in his capacity as the Investment Director shall have the duty to provide information of investment of the trust property to the trustee[78]. The trustee’s duty is primarily limited to administering the trust in Nevada and to making discretionary distributions of some or all of the trust property to or for the benefit of the beneficiaries.

120.  PBB’s affidavit was essentially in relation to the Family Trust and so was the legal opinion of Mr R______ produced by H[79]. For some reasons, neither PBB nor R______ had referred to the Education Trust. This was pointed out by this Court in the Joinder Decision, and as stated therein, for the purpose of the joinder application, W’s case was that the information provided by PBB for the Family Trust should also apply to the Education Trust[80].

121.  There was also no evidence as to what the law on trusts is under the law of New Hampshire, as the Family Trust was first set up under the law of that state. However, there were the two spendthrift restrictions set out in clause 30 of the 2015 Family Trust Deed[81], which would seem to make the Family Trust a spendthrift trust from the date of it being set up under the law of New Hampshire. In any event, there seemed to be no challenge from H that both the Family Trust and the Education Trust are self-settled spendthrift trusts.

122.  Mr To had referred this Court to a commentary paper Developing Trust in the Self-Settled Spendthrift Trust by Kellsie J. Nienhuser published in the Wyoming Law Review, Vol 15, 2015, Number 2,551. As pointed out by the author, a self-settled spendthrift trust, also known as an “asset protection trust” is a trust created by the settlor for his or her own benefit[82]. As further stated by the author:

“One of the most settlor-friendly states for creating an asset protection trust is Nevada. Nevada’s statute allows a self-settle spendthrift trust to shelter trust assets against child support obligations, alimony claims, tort actions and property division upon divorce.”

123.  Mr To had also referred the Court to an article Domestic Assets Protection Trusts in Divorce Litigation by Amy J Amundsen in Vol 29, 2016, Journal of the American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers, 1, in relation to US domestic asset protection trusts (“DAPTs”) and their problems. Ms Amundsen had pointed out as follows[83]:

“DAPTs are trust created by the settlor who can designate himself (called ‘self-settled trusts’ or others, as beneficiaries. … People generally use DAPTs to protect their assets from potential creditors and taxation. They are created prior to marriages to protect one spouse from another in the event of a divorce as a spouse in that instance would be a future creditor. However most concerning of all, DAPTs are sometimes created during the marriage with marital property, and without proper protection, such a DAPT would allow the self-settling spouse to effectively pillage the rightful property of the other on his or her way out of the marriage.” (pp 3-4)

(emphasis underlined)

124.  Mr To further referred to Protect Assets Held in a Spendthrift Trust from Divorce by Breitstone & Breitstone (Trusts & Estates; New York (Sep 2019): 18), where it is highlighted that:

“Only 17 states currently permit DAPTS: … Nevada and Alaska have adopted legislation that shields against marital and child support claims.”

(emphasis underlined)

125.  Mr To submitted that the terms of the US Trusts and the letters of wishes showed a high level of direct or indirect control retained by H, whether through himself, his family members and his friends, or the trustee as someone who may be removed by H with or without reasons. Mr To pointed out that[84]:

(1) H or his family members or friends was/were appointed the Protector of the US Trusts, with the candidates of successor Protector being predominantly H’s family members or friends;

(2) Under Part 9 of the Schedule to the 2015 Family Trust Deed, H as settlor had the power to remove a Protector of the Family Trust with or without cause[85]; Under section 12.8 of the 2016 Education Trust Deed, the initial trust Protector is H who had the power to remove a trust Protector with or without cause (where the removed trust protector was appointed after the trust protector, or where a majority of trust protectors acts against the removed trust protector regardless of date of appointment)[86].

(3) H, as the trust Protector under the 2017 Family Trust Deed, has the power to remove the trustee of the Family Trust with or without cause[87]; Similarly, H, as the trust Protector under the 2016 Education Trust Deed and 2017 Education Trust Deed (until the 2019 Education Trust Deed) had the power to remove the trustee of the Education Trust with or without cause[88];

(4) H had reserved an overwhelming power as an Investment Director to deal with the assets of the Family Trust and Education Trust “as if an absolute owner”[89]. H’s investment power was one of personal (as opposed to fiduciary) and the trustee has to comply with any written investment directions given by him. Upon amendments in the 2017 Family Trust Deed and the 2017 Education Trust Deed (until the 2019 Education Trust Deed), H had remained to be the Investment Director, and had extensive investment power although his investment power then became a fiduciary one[90];

(5) whilst the Family Trust is stated to be irrevocable by the settlor or any beneficiary under clause 33 of the 2015 Family Trust Deed, it may be terminated by the trustee and upon termination, the trustee shall hold the trust fund and income upon trust for the settlor, ie H whilst alive[91]; As for the Education Trust, upon termination by the trustee, the trustee shall hold the trust fund and income for the beneficiaries then living or in existence[92];

(6) the trustee may appoint new trusts powers or revoke all or any of the trust powers under the two US Trusts, giving a free hand to the trustee to change the very nature and form of the trust (including discretionary trust powers)[93];

(7) under the Education Trust, during lifetime of H as settlor, H shall have the right to alter the manner in which the trust fund will be divided among the beneficiaries at his death[94]. This is repeated in the 2016 Education Trust Wishes[95].

126.  In his Trial Affirmation, H said R3 had removed him as the Investment Director of the Education Trust with effect from 1 August 2017 and an Investment Committee was formed[96]. There were no documents provided by H to support what he said, nor was this disclosed at the hearing of the joinder application.

127.  Mr To and/or Mr Todd also highlighted certain provisions in the trust deeds and letters of wishes. There are three relevant provisions in the 2017 Family Trust Deed and/or the letters of wishes dated 6 January 2017. The 1st relevant provision is section 24.2 of the 2017 Family Trust Deed which provides that a beneficiary’s interest is a “mere expectancy” and that “A beneficiary’s interest in any trust created under the trust agreement shall be free from any interference or claim that may be made by the beneficiary’s spouse or any other party pursuant to any separation, divorce, or related proceedings” (“Spousal/Other Party Claim Provision”)[97]. It is further stated therein that “This provision is a material purpose of the trust”.

128.  The 2nd relevant provision is the “No-Contest Provision” set out under section 29 of the 2017 Family Trust Deed[98] (“No Contest Provision”). In particular, section 29.1 of the 2017 Family Trust Deed for provides that upon contesting the trust, a person’s interest in the trust shall terminate, except as otherwise provided in sections 29.2 (power of suspension of interest), 29.3 (section 29 does not apply to the trust protector who under section 4.3 of the 2017 Family Trust Deed was H) and 29.5. Under section 29.5, a person contests the trust if he/she directly or indirectly initiates or otherwise pursues any of the actions stated therein, including any action to (a) contest the validity of the trust or the terms of the trust ;(b) any action to set aside or vary the terms of the trust.

129.  The Spousal/Other Party Claim Provision and the No Contest Provision only appeared in the 2017 Family Trust Deed. The Family Trust was moved to Nevada and the 2017 Family Trust Deed came into effect on 1 January 2017, after W issued the divorce petition against H on 21 November 2016.

130.  Under the Spousal/Other Party Claim Provision, the interest of H, being a beneficiary, in the Family Trust, shall be free from any interference or claim that may be made by W pursuant to any divorce or related proceedings, or vice versa.

131.  When asked by Mr To during his cross examination of H that the material purpose of the Spouse/Other Party Claim Provision was to defeat spousal claim, H disagreed and he then claimed his understanding was that the Spousal/Other Party Claim Provision relates to a claim by a future spouse of H or W and that this was clear in the original 2015 Family Trust Deed, and that W could not be excluded or removed as a beneficiary. H maintained his intention that section 24.2 was referring to a future spouse and that he wanted his children to know that he did not believe in divorce.

132.  H’s answer did not make sense. As pointed out by Mr To, section 24.2 is not about removal or excluding a beneficiary.

133.  When H was asked by Mr To in relation to section 29.1, H then claimed that he had nothing to do with the deed or words to that effect, and that his intention was the 2015 Family Trust Deed was that W could not be removed as a beneficiary. Again, H’s answer did not seem to make sense.

134.  In light of W’s 1st s17 Application seeking the setting aside of dispositions into the Family Trust and in the alternative, seeking varying of the terms of the Family Trust, she would be caught by the No Contest Provision, and her interest in the Family Trust shall terminate permanently or be suspended.

135.  The 3rd relevant provision is H’s wish expressed in paragraph 9 of 2017 Family Trust Wishes[99] (“Troubled Beneficiary Provision”) and the 2017 Family Trust Wishes were expressly stated to be deemed effective as of 1 August 2016[100].

136.  Unlike the Spousal/Other Party Claim Provision and the No Contest Provision which only appeared in the 2017 Family Trust Deed, the Trouble Beneficiary Provision had also appeared in the 2015 Family Trust Wishes[101].

137.  Under the Troubled Beneficiary Provision, it is H’s wish that in the event that there are any imminent, potential or actual claims or proceedings of any kind whatsoever, including but not limited to matrimonial or other spousal-related disputes(including disputed concerning civil or common-law partners, palimony-related claims and child support claim), bankruptcy proceedings, or other contractual or tort disputes (“disputes”), by any creditor, claimant or other person against the “troubled beneficiary, H’s strong wish is that , amongst other things, until such time as such disputes have been resolved or completed, the trustee is to ignore or reject any requests made by the “troubled beneficiary” for any payments or distributions and for any existing payments or distributions to be suspended provided that the trustee may make payments to provide for the reasonable living and any emergency needs of the “troubled beneficiary”.

138.  On my reading of the provision, as the “disputes” include matrimonial or spousal-related disputes, “creditor, claimant, or other person” is wide enough to include either H or W. The effect of this would appear to be that if W makes a claim against H, H then becomes a “troubled beneficiary” and upon the trustee’s suspension of payments to H, there could be nothing available for W to claim. The reverse is if H makes a claim against W, W then becomes a “troubled beneficiary”, and she may be only entitled to reasonable living expenses and emergency needs under the Troubled Beneficiary Provision. I do not agree with Mr Scott that the Troubled Beneficiary Provision is only limited to claims against the beneficiaries by third parties, or that W and OS had misunderstood the meaning and the effect of the Troubled Beneficiary Provision.

139.  As for the Education Trust, although at the outset, the proper law of the trust is the Nevada law, the 2016 Education Trust Deed was of a similar format as the 2015 Family Trust Deed. There was no Spousal/Other Party Claim Provision, nor the No Contest Provision in the 2016 Education Trust Deed.

140.  Both these provisions appeared in the 2017 Education Trust Deed, namely the Spousal/Other Party Claim Provision in section 23.2 and the No Contest Provision in section 29 thereof.

141.  Under section 23.2 (Spousal /Other Party Claim Provision), the Children’s “mere expectancy” interests will be free from any interference or claim that may be made by any other party (ie including H or W) pursuant to any divorce or related proceedings. Under section 29 (No Contest Provision), the Children (through the OS) do not oppose the setting aside of the US Trusts. Although there may be concern on the part of OS, in my view, the Children cannot be said to have directly or indirectly initiated or otherwise pursued any actions contesting the Education Trust under section 29.5, and in my view, the No Contest Provision should not affect the Children’s “mere expectancy” interests. Section 29 is stated not to apply to the settlor or the settlor’s spouse.

142.  The Troubled Beneficiary Provision also appears in the 2016 Education Trust Wishes, and the Children will be protected under this provision if any person (including H and W) makes any claim against them.

143.  Mr Scott had submitted that OS’s contention that the US Trusts do not benefit the Children was plainly wrong. However, this was not OS’s contention.

144.  What Mr To submitted for the Family Trust was that under Part 4 of the Schedule of the 2015 Family Trust Deed, the Children were only one out of three beneficiaries, the other two being H and W. H and W were stated to be “primary” beneficiaries, and the Children and the Parties’ future grandchildren were stated to be “secondary” beneficiaries in paragraph 4 and 6(i) of the letter of wishes dated 1 November 2015. Under section 5.1 (a) of the 2017 Family Trust Deed, the Children, as descendants of H and W, were only one out of five beneficiaries. Under section 24.2 of the 2017 Family Trust Deed, a beneficiary ’s interests is stated to be a “mere expectancy”. In H’s 2017 Family Trust Wishes, H has expressed that he and W should be treated as “primary” beneficiaries and that the Children should be treated as “primary” beneficiaries after both H and W have passed away, but it is H’s strong wish that after H and W have passed away, the trustee should transfer all or as much of the trust property of the Family Trust to the Education Trust and to be held and administrated under the terms of the Education Trust. Mr To thus submitted that at best it seemed theoretical, if not illusory, to suggest that the Children have or will derive any monetary benefit under the Family Trust. I agree.

145.  As for the Education Trust, it was Mr To’s submission that by operation of the 2016 Education Trust Deed, W ceased to be the “settlor’s spouse” under clause 1.1 thereof and the Children fall outside the definition of beneficiaries being “issue of both the settlor and the settlor’s spouse” whether from either 16 October 2016 (date of H moving out from the former matrimonial home) or from 16 November 2016 (date of divorce petition).

146.  It was clearly stated under clause 1.1 under the definition “settlor’s spouse”, that as of the date of the 2016 Education Trust Deed, the settlor’s spouse was W. However, it seems that under the definition, the relevant time was “at the time in question”. In my view, there was ambiguity in the definition.

147.  Anyway, under section 5.1 of the 2017 Education Trust Deed, the beneficiaries have been redefined to be descendants of H (whether with W or not) and descendants of W, being named as the settlor’s spouse, including her descendants born after any divorce from the settlor but not including any descendants of any future spouse of the settlor unless such persons are also descendants of the settlor. Further under section 5.1(b), there are no primary beneficiaries or other classes of beneficiaries.

148.  As said earlier, H did not seem to have produced any other letter of wishes save the 2016 Education Trust Wishes which still refers to the Children being initial “primary beneficiaries” and which appears to be inconsistent with section 5.1(b) of the 2017 Education Trust Deed. Further, it is stated in the 2016 Education Trust Wishes that while education is not the sole purpose of the trust, it is the primary purpose for which the trust was created and funded, and that the primary purpose is to support education for not only the initial class of primary beneficiaries but for the potentially larger class of remainder beneficiaries and that the fund may last for 350 years, ie preserved for the use of “multiple generations”. There are conditions imposed in the 2016 Education Trust Wishes for distributions for tuition and fees and related education expenses for a beneficiary including that for the secondary education, college/university education, and doctorate-level education, the beneficiary has to meet a “grade point average”.

149.  Under the 2019 Education Trust Deed, the definition of the beneficiaries remains the same and so does the extent of the Children’s interest under it. In light of the provisions in the Education Trust Trust Deeds and the 2016 Education Trust Wishes, OS took the view that the monetary interest of the Children under the Education Trust would most likely represent only a small part of the trust fund. I agree.

150.  Mr Scott had argued that there was nothing untoward about H’s investment powers in the trust deeds. However, those powers showed that H was the one who has continued to have all the control in the investment of the funds and assets of Intero and Bremen notwithstanding the setting up of the US Trusts. As seen PBB’s affidavit in the joinder application, H was the one who held all the financial and investment information and that H was the one who had the duty to provide such information to the trustee.

151.  As mentioned earlier, it is H’s present case that he was removed as the Investment Director of the Education Trust as from 1 August 2017 and that an Investment Committee was appointed. Further, under the 2019 Education Trust Deed, H’s brother has been appointed the Investment Trustee and a person DM has been appointed as the Investment Manager or Advisor to the Education Trust and that according to H, his role as director of Intero and Bremen is mostly administrative, and that he has since 1 August 2017 only followed investment decisions and directions from the Trust Investment Committee.[102] However, in the same Trial Affirmation, he had also mentioned a number of investments recommended by the “Investment Manager”. H did not say those investments were recommended to the Investment Committee/Investment Trustee or what they thought of the investments. H was blaming W for causing Intero the loss of some USD 5m in profit due to the injunction order made by this Court against H on 22 November 2019[103]. H had further mentioned that it was impossible for R2 and R3 to find a new replacement “Investment Director” and “Investment Manager”. It is not exactly clear which “Investment Director” or “Investment Manager” R2 and R3 were trying to replace, and in any event, it is clear from what H said he had remained the sole signatory to the bank accounts of Intero and Bremen. In my view, H is clearly still the one in charge of investment decisions.

152.  Mr Scott had pointed out that H was not the Protector under the 2015 Family Trust Deed. This is correct as the then Protector was a committee comprised of H’s father and brother and I______ and another friend. However, this was amended as upon moving to Nevada, H was appointed the sole trust Protector under the 2017 Family Trust Deed. As for the Education Trust, all along H was the Protector until under the 2019 Education Trust Deed, the Protector was changed to a committee of H’s brother and I______.

153.  In any event, those amendments and restatements of the Trust Deeds, and changes made in relation to the Protector, the Investment Director and/or the Investment Trustee demonstrate the ease for the Protector and/or the Investment Director/Investment Trustee to be changed from H to his family member(s) and/or friend, or vice versa, without consent and knowledge of W.

154.  Under clause 26 of the 2015 Family Trust Deed, subject to prior written notice to the Protector, the trustee has power to change the proper law and forum of administration of the Family Trust to any part of the world, which the trustee did, as seen in the move and change to the Nevada law. This was clearly done with H’s knowledge and consent. Under clause 26 of the 2016 Family Trust Deed, the trustee has similar powers. The trustee again has such powers under sections 21 and 22 of the 2017 Family Trust Deed and sections 20 and 21 of the 2017 Education Trust Deed, subject to a 30 day notice to the protector and exceptions/provisions stated in the relevant sections.

155.  Further , under section 27 of the 2017 Family Trust Deed and section 26 of the 2017 Education Trust Deed, the trustee has the power to decant subject to a 30 day notice to the Protector, and provisions thereunder[104].

156.  To summarise, I agree with Mr To that the terms of the US Trusts and the letters of wishes showed a high level of direct and/or indirect control retained by H, whether through himself, his family members or his friends. Even though H had said the friends named by him in the additional/successor Protector committee are carefully selected by H as they are the Parties’ friends, I accept W’s evidence that they are really H’s friends, since there was no sufficient evidence that H’s named friends, in particular I______, had ever informed W of his appointment as a member of the Protector committee.

157.  The effect of the H setting up US Trusts and H injecting of the majority of assets held by H into the US Trusts is that W has no control over the assets held under the US Trusts and such assets can be moved from one jurisdiction to another without her knowledge or consent and she would only be provided with whatever financial information that the trustee would be provided with by H/Investor Director/Investment Trustee.

(iii) Whether W had knowledge of H setting up of the US Trusts

Between 2009 and 2015

158.  It was not disputed that US citizens could be at risk of onerous worldwide income, capital gains, estate tax and other tax reporting obligations. W and the Children hold US passports and US citizenship, although W also holds a French passport.

159.  H’s evidence in his Trial Affirmation was that after setting up Intero in 2009, he began to explore estate and financial planning options with regards to the setup of efficient financial structures for the family as the family assets began to grow. H said he had concerns in relation to W’s and the Children’s US tax reporting obligations and liabilities and the Children’s potential USA liabilities on their inheritance and that from 2009 to 2015, he had various discussions with W regarding the setting up of family trusts, estate planning options and W’s own US tax liability risks[105].

160.  It was also H’s case that W was in charge of filing all important documents and incoming mail in their home filing cabinet and that he would pass various trust brochures to W for filing and that she had read them all and had filed them in the home filing cabinet.

161.  Hence, it was H’s case that W was fully aware of his concerns and that W had the knowledge of his intention of setting up of family trusts. H relied on evidence including the following, as set out and defined later, (i) the Withers Letter; (ii) the R_________ Emails; (iii) the C_____ 2012 Emails; (iv) the L____ Email; (v) the setting up of the ______ Insurance Trust; (vi) the SBH Emails.

162.  H’s allegations were denied by W who said it was only in October 2015 that she became aware that H was pushing for the setting up of a family trust.

163.  In H’s Trial Affirmation, H’s evidence was that in or around October 2012, he had asked W to join him at a meeting at Withers, solicitors, for estate planning and tax advice especially as the V___ Land was undergoing a conveyance to W from her parents and that based on W’s and the Children’s US status, Withers advised the Parties to set up a trust and to place the investment portfolio into a US tax compliant trust[106].

164.  According to H, following the Parties’ meeting with Withers, Withers had sent them a letter on 26 October 2012 setting out their advice in relation to US tax and their scope of engagement in respect of estate planning including the settlement of family trusts (“Withers Letter”)[107]. He then said as the fees quoted by Withers were high, he tried to consult other firms such as Butler Snow which was referred to him by Nerine Trust Company and in his Trial Affirmation, H had produced emails between him and ____ R_______________________ between 9-19 October 2012[108] (“R_________ Emails”).

165.  However, the R_________ Emails were in fact earlier than the Withers Letter. The R_________ Emails were sent to H’s Yahoo Email Account. There was no evidence that they were copied to W or forwarded to W. There was no sufficient evidence that W was aware of H having consulted Nerine Trust Company and/or ____ R____________________, or that W was aware of what was discussed between H and ____ R________.

166.  It was W’s case that she never attended any meeting at Withers and she never saw the Withers Letter until H produced it in these proceedings. The Withers Letter was sent to H’s Yahoo Email Account. The Withers Letter had also mentioned to matters discussed in the “initial meeting”.

167.  When W was cross examined over the meeting with Withers, she claimed that all three of the Children had pneumonia at the time and she was taking them to and from hospital and H would not have invited her to the meeting. Mr Scott pointed out that the first time W had mentioned about the Children being ill at that time was during the trial.

168.  The Withers Letter indicated that there had been at least two meetings with H. H had not made it clear in his Trial Affirmation that there had been two meetings[109]. When H was cross examined over the meetings with Withers, he admitted that W was not present at what he called the “firstintake meeting” with a Mr Erik Wallace at Withers but he then claimed that he would have sat down with W and he would have explained about that first intake meeting with Withers.

169.  H then said he attended a further meeting with Mr Wallace at Withers. Under cross examination, and when put that W was not asked to join the meeting, H then became somewhat equivocal and said that he could not remember whether W was physically present at the meeting or she had just dialled into the meeting or that he had called her. However, H said that the reason why W was dialled in was because it was W’s US/US Virgin Island tax issue that was a key subject of the meeting. H’s evidence that he had raised with Mr Wallace the question of whether a “_________ naturalised citizen” had any special US tax treatment (which apparently was advice received by W). Anyway, H again claimed that even if W was not physically present at that meeting, he would have sat down with W afterwards to explain what was discussed with Withers and maintained that he had left a copy of the Withers’ Letter in a box in the study at home and that W would file it.

170.  W admitted that she was responsible for filing of some documents in their cabinet at home, such as bank statements, but only those documents which H brought home for her to file. She maintained that she had never seen the Withers Letter until it was produced by H.

171.  It appeared that H first produced a copy of the Withers Letter in his 10th affirmation of 12 August 2020.

172.  H’s written evidence in his Trial Affirmation gave the impression he and W were both at a meeting with Withers during which Withers had advised both of them to set up a trust and to place the investment portfolio into a US tax compliant trust. H had not produced any attendance notes from Withers of the two meetings. The 1st Form Es were exchanged in 2017, and upon discovery of the setting up the US Trusts, W’s allegation was essentially this was done behind her back. As this issue arose as early as 2017, which was only about 5 years after the Withers’ meetings, there was no reason as to why H could not have tried to obtain attendance notes or written confirmation from Withers to support his case, as to the dates of the two meetings and whether W was present or was dialled in.

173.  What H said was the reason he went to consult Withers was also rather confusing. He had said it was for estate planning and tax advice and H mentioned about the V___ Land. There was however no sufficient evidence that the V___ Land was undergoing a conveyance to W form her parents at that time. Further, there was nothing stated in the Withers Letter in relation to advice as to whether W was subject to US Tax by reason of her being a “naturalised ______ citizen”. Withers had set out quite clearly the basis of their services for providing advice regarding US tax in 3 areas, namely (i) Estate Plans; (ii) W’s US Tax Compliance; (iii) Other Planning.

174.  Under (iii) Other Planning, the Withers Letters stated that they discussed with [H] the possibility of establishing a foreign grantor trust. It did not state “…..discussed with H and W”.

175.  In any event, having considered the evidence, I find there was no sufficient evidence that W had attended or was dialled into H’s meeting/s with Withers. As for the Withers Letter, as said earlier, it was sent by email only to H’s Yahoo Email Account. As the letter was addressed to both H and W, there was no reason why H could not have given Withers W’s email address or H could have forwarded a copy to W by email. I find there was no sufficient evidence that H had given W a copy at the time to file at the file, or that he had discussed with her and/or explained to her in full the advice of Withers at the time.

176.  In his Reply Trial Affirmation, about two weeks before the commencement of the trial, H had produced purported emails between W and one C_____________________________ between 6 October 2012 and 22 November 2012: “Re: Estate Planing and Property Purchase in _______”[110] (“C_____ 2012 Emails”). It was W’s case that H was the author of those emails and he had sent them in her name to C_____ from the Yahoo Sub Account mentioned earlier. W said she only met C_____ in December 2015[111] and never spoke to C_____ nor met her before December 2015 and that it was H who gave C_____’s email address to her. H denied this and claimed that W used the Yahoo Sub Account to communicate with C_____. It was H’s evidence that W was seeking C_____’s advice in 2012 while he was having a parallel discussion with Withers, and that W dealt with “________ conversations” while he dealt with “Hong Kong conversations.”

177.  H had also produced an email dated 17 September 2013 sent from H’s Yahoo Email Account with the same subject matter “Re: Estate Planing (sic) and Property Purchase in ________” informing C_____ that that he was in the process of buying a land parcel in ________ and stated that he had a couple of BVI companies already set out which would be his preferred ownership route and but not want to “trip up” any French wealth tax issues and was seeking advice from C_____ in relation to ownership structure. H admitted that this email was sent by him to C_____.

178.  As pointed out by Mr Todd, the reply email from C_____ on 7 October 2012 to the one purportedly sent by W on 6 October 2012 did not show the full email address of the recipient and was sent addressed simply to the H’s surname/W’s married surname. There was no salutation, and there were a number of “chevron signs” and blank space/gaps, and this was same as the one sent by C_____ on 22 November 2012. H had forwarded the C_____ 2012 Emails to his solicitors and had typed in “Subject: C____________ emails from 2012 sent [by W] from my yahoo account”[112]. It seemed that H was referred to H’s Yahoo Email Account.

179.  I also note that the email of 17 September 2013 which was admittedly sent by H to C_____ had the same subject matter and same typing error in the word “Planing”, which seemed to suggest that it was part of a chain of emails which followed on from the earlier C_____ 2012 Emails which H produced and purportedly sent by W.

180.  C_____ had passed away and was not able to give evidence as to whether she had a telephone meeting with W or with H in 2012, and whether it was H or W who first contacted her. However, the email from C_____ of 7 October 2012 was copied to one M____ L___________. There was no reason why she or someone in C_____’s office could not have been contacted by H to obtain attendance notes or record which would shed light whether it was H or W who communicated with C_____ and/or spoke to C_____ on the telephone in 2012.

181.  As mentioned earlier, H had alleged W had sent emails in his name from H’s Yahoo Email Account and W had alleged H had sent emails in her name from the Yahoo Sub Account. Having considered the C_____ 2012 Emails, notwithstanding the email of 6 October 2012 was purportedly sent by W, it is not possible to say whether those emails were sent by W, or sent by H in W’s name.

182.  In any event, in C_____’s reply email of 22 November 2012, she had recommended a notaire in ________, ie _____ C____ (“MrC_____”) to assist[113]. Subsequently, it appeared to be H who liaised with Mr C_____ in relation to the acquisition of the S____ Land, as set out later in this judgment.

183.  H’s own evidence in H’s Trial Affirmation was that W never expressed to him any opposition to estate planning and wanted him to be responsible for their family finances. H had said in his Trial Affirmation that he notified W of all major financial decisions but did not necessarily seek her consent and that she never had an opinion either way and would usually just look at him blankly or change the topic by saying that this was his area of expertise[114]. H had also said that he had shared with W various trust structure brochures which he obtained from bankers, trustee companies and advisors, but W was dismissive and disengaged at the best of times, and had asserted that this was really H’s area of expertise and that H should take care of all family financial planning. In fact, it was also H’s evidence that the meeting in December 2015 between W and C_____ was arranged by him[115]. H said during the trial he arranged the meeting by email, but he had not produced these email exchanges with C_____.

184.  Based on H’s own written evidence of W’s attitude of being “dismissive and disengaged”, it seemed rather unlikely that he would have worked as a “team” with W or that W was to deal with “________ conversations” while he was to deal with “Hong Kong conversations” in relation to financial planning. I do not find H’s oral evidence was consistent with his written evidence. In any event, the C_____ 2012 Emails and also H’s own email in 2013 were only in relation to obtaining advice from C_____ on how best to take transfer of parcels of land in ________ from an estate planning and tax efficiency perspective. There was no mention of the setting up of any trust structure in the C_____ 2012 Emails.

185.  H had produced an email of 25 February 2013 sent by a _______ L________________________ to H (“L___ Email”), with copies of two charts together with a draft of H’s will with a date of 18 April 2013[116]. In the L____ Email, Mr L____ had said he knew H consulted Withers and that no doubt Withers had suggested building in various trusts into the wills to make them as tax efficient as possible.

186.  The L____ Email was sent to H at his work email address and copied to H’s Yahoo Email Account. W admitted that in 2013, H began to engage in estate planning and said H once showed her in April 2013 a copy of a draft will. When W was asked about the L____ Email, her answer was that there were never any signed wills, and that H had refused to pay Professional Wills Ltd and was later taken to the Small Claims Tribunal. W maintained that she did not know whether H was advised by Withers over trusts and that although H had discussed wills with her, he had never discussed trusts with her.

187.  Even if W was forwarded a copy of the L____ Email and could have known about H having consulted Withers had she read the L___ Email, there was nothing to show that she was aware of the details of any discussion H had with Withers.

188.  On about 13 July 2013, H applied to purchase a life insurance policy from AIA and subsequently, a life insurance policy “Wealth Preserver 3 – Infinity” was issued /effected on 4 September 2013 (“AIA Policy”)[117]. The beneficiary stated in H’s application form was his “Own Estate”. H then settled a trust called the ______ Insurance Trust on 10 October 2013 with original trustee Standard Chartered Trust (Guernsey) Limited for holding the AIA Policy (“______ Insurance Trust”)[118]. According to H, the insurance premium of USD 1,500,000 was partially funded by Intero (USD450,000) and partially funded by a loan from the Standard Chartered Bank (USD 1,050,000) and the loan plus interest was payable by Intero and guaranteed by H.

189.  H said he and W jointly attended a meeting in 2013 at the offices of Standard Chartered Bank to understand the settling of the of this trust[119]. In W’s 6th affirmation filed in support of her 1st s17 Application, she had said that the ______ Insurance Trust was the only trust set up within her knowledge. In her Trial Affirmation, W had also said she attended a meeting at Standard Chartered Bank with H in setting up the ______ Insurance Trust[120]. However, during cross examination, W clarified that she was mistaken as to when she attended the meeting and that it was only in October 2014 that she attended a meeting, to discuss the AIA Policy and how she and the Children would benefit from it, and not for setting up any trust, as the ______ Insurance Trust had already been set up earlier. It was further her evidence that when she attended the meeting, to her mind, it was in relation to the AIA Policy and that she only found out about the ______ Insurance Trust after it was set up. In this respect, W’s evidence was not consistent with her written evidence. However, whether she found out in 2013 or 2014, she clearly had knowledge of the ______ Insurance Trust and this was not denied by her. Having said this, the only asset of the ______ Insurance Trust was the AIA Policy and the trust was governed by the laws of ________[121] and the trust was a revocable trust. Further, although H had said that W and the Children were the beneficiaries, in fact there are 5 named beneficiaries of the ______ Insurance Trust, namely H, W and the Children[122]. The fact that W knew about the setting up of the ______ Insurance Trust did not mean that she had knowledge that H was intending to set up the US Trusts into which he would inject the majority of the Parties’ marital assets.

190.  W was also asked about an email which H had with a Mr _______ B___ of a New York firm of attorneys _________ ____ ____________ of 7-12 January 2015 on subject matter “VI Estate Taxes”[123], which were copied to W at one of W’s Personal Email Accounts(“SBH Emails”). In H’s email of 7 January 2015 initially to a Mr R______, H had said that he needed some estate planning advice for W and he mentioned the S____ Land had finally been transferred to W’s father to avoid a right of first refusal which the local townhall/collectivite had on all transfers of property in _______ to non-residents (“ROFR”) and that the local notaire in ________ had advised that subsequent gifts from a resident father to his non-resident daughter would not trigger any ROFR. H then asked how W should take the S____ Land from her father, whether it should be in her name or in a tax structure as the ultimate plan was to develop the land and leave the asset/rental yield to their children upon their death.

191.  Mr _______ B___’s initial advice on 8 January 2015 was that there would be no US tax impediment for W’s father to transfer the S____ Land to W by gift. After H’s email with some factual corrections/clarifications which on 9 January 2015, Mr B___ then believed that a trust would be essential to achieve H’s goals of minimizing US taxes while being able to control the S____ Land and most likely the trust should be the direct donee of a gift transfer from W’s father. Mr B___ further pointed out that there needed to be discussions on what provisions would need to be in the trust especially with beneficiaries and trustees to avoid the ROFR problem. H replied on 12 January 2015 to say he would get some answers from the notaire on what provisions a trust would require to be viewed as the same as a transfer from a ________ resident directly to his daughter. H had then said that the notaire had mentioned to him that if his BVI holding company was 51% owned by W, her father could gift the property to that entity and it would not trigger a ROFR. H had mentioned that their ________ Notaire was Mr C____.

192.  W was cross examined over the SBH Emails that she knew what was being discussed was setting up of a trust. W’s response was H did not discuss with her and he only copied her in the SBH Emails. In any event, it appeared that the SBH Emails were mainly in relation to the specific purpose of how the S____ Land could be transferred without triggering off ROFR.

193.  W admitted she was aware of H’s estate planning in that it involved preparation of wills, but as she pointed out, notwithstanding the Withers Letter and all H’s subsequent enquiries, no wills had in fact been signed by her or by H, apart from H’s 2011 Will executed by H in ____.

194.  As for W’s US tax reporting compliance, W had not worked since she moved to Hong Kong and had no income. H was fully aware of this, and that W had not filed any US tax returns since her move to Hong Kong in July 2000. According to H, in 2009 after he became a partner of the Group, he commenced estate and financial planning[124], and it would be prudent and reasonable for H to take steps to obtain professional advice about US tax and to act upon it.

195.  H had complained about W’s failure to submit required US tax documents, failure to make FBAR[125] filings and failure to confirm her citizenship status to banks under the FATCA[126] requirements.

196.  It was also H’s evidence that in 2013, he learnt that the US Internal Revenue Services (“IRS”) had sent officers to Hong Kong to investigate US expats non-tax compliance and that he became very concerned about W’s US Tax non compliance and immediately moved to close his joint account with W at HSBC[127]. In April 2014, BNP was seeking information of the Parties’ joint accounts and explained that this was in relation to the US law and the FATCA requirements starting from 1 July 2014, and W’s response to this was to ask BNP to close their joint account[128]. W had said in her Trial Affirmation that it was H who did not want to disclose his income to the US Government. W further explained during the trial that he BNP joint account was opened for the purpose of the house in ________, and that after closing the joint account, H had opened another account in his own name in ________.

197.  However, notwithstanding all the above, there was no sufficient evidence that H had any real concerns or that he had taken any concrete steps to resolve the matter of W’s US Tax Compliance with W. Although it appeared from the Withers Letter that for W’s US Tax Compliance, a US accountant would have to be instructed, there was no sufficient evidence that H had obtained any advice or quotation of fees from any US accountant after receiving the Withers Letter.

198.  In the end, it was W who herself had dealt with the issue and remedied her tax issues after the divorce proceedings had commenced. As set out in her Reply Affirmation, W said she had engaged Mr ______ T___ of US Asia Tax and Business Services Limited to help her with her FBAR filings. She had completed the FBAR amnesty program and had made filings from 2009 to 2014 and from 2016 to present. W had explained that she did not have any tax filings or relevant mandatory returns because since 2000 she has had no income to report[129].

199.  First, those emails produced by H only dated from about October 2012. There was no sufficient evidence that prior thereto, ie between 2009 and 2012 that H had obtained various trust brochures or engaged with discussions with banks, trust companies or law firms to explore estate and financial planning options as alleged by him. Even if he had, there was no sufficient evidence as to what intentions he had regarding setting up of trusts or that W was made aware of such intentions.

200.  Second, as seen in those emails produced by him, the advice H was seeking was piecemeal and from different service providers for different purposes, including how W was to take land from her parents or how H was to acquire land in ________ and to avoid “wealth tax”. Those emails were in my view no more than general or preliminary enquiries. It would appear therein that H had not decided what he wanted to do. In any event, there were no formal letters of engagements/appointments produced by H save the Withers Letter.

201.  Third, as H himself had said, when he discussed estate planning/tax/trusts with W, W was dismissive and disengaged at best of times. This in my view would not be surprising since as I have said above, all those emails only showed that H was making general or preliminary enquiries.

202.  Fourth, notwithstanding that the Withers Letter had set out clearly what their services and charges were, there was no follow up by H, whether with Withers or with any one else, save making further enquiries. As said, nothing concrete was done until October 2015 and even then, as seen below, it was only in connection with setting up the US Trusts. Nothing was done about making wills (so far as W was aware), nor resolving W’s US tax issues.

203.  Fifth, that W knew about the setting up of the __ ____ Insurance Trust in 2013/2014 does not mean that W would have knowledge of H’s intention of setting up a US Foreign Non Grantor Trust/Spendthrift Trusts in the nature of the US Trusts into which he would inject most of the family’s assets.

204.  Having considered the above, I find there was no sufficient evidence that between 2009 and 2015 that W had knowledge that it was H’s intention to set up trusts of the structure, nature and effect of the US Trusts, even if H had mentioned about “trusts” to her and that there was mention of “trusts” in those emails produced by H.

205.  What is clear is that H’s own words indicated W was not interested in the idea of setting up any trust and had viewed such ideas with suspicion. As seen in the H’s ED Email of 22 August 2015, H had complained to W that “The trust planning ideas I wanted you to investigate with K______ in ___ is not important to you, as you would rather believe that I wish to leave you penniless. All because the day you called my father and opened a Pandora’s box with him … You have refused to spend time to understand or independently research any of solutions that I have been proposing to give you the financial security you desire”[130]. In H’s “Perspective Email” to W of 26 August 2015, he had said referring to himself “He has intentionally kept no assets in my name so I will always be dependent on him. The US tax issue is just an excuse; the real reason is he wants to keep me subjugated under his control. I don’t trust him. He will steal everything I have in ________ given half a chance”[131]. In the “Communications Email” of 27 August 2015, in referring to hurtful words he had used with W, H had given an example “if you called my dad about the ______ flat and then accused me of some conspiracy to hide assets from you”[132].

October 2015

206.  It was H’s own evidence in his Trial Affirmation that W had complained about the lack of assets in her name and that he wanted to find a solution “to place assets in W’s beneficial interest”, so he could address and resolve her concerns around independent financial security[133]. He then went on to refer to a meeting on 27 October 2015 which he and W attended with Mr B____ who was at that time with the firm of solicitors DLA Piper in Hong Kong (“27.10.15 Meeting”).

207.  It would appear that H had contacted Mr B____ in early October 2015. H had said it was ____ R_________ who referred him to Mr B_____. When asked by Mr To, H said he could not recall when he first approached Mr B____. H had sent W an email on 6 October 2015 with the telephone number and email address of Mr B____ and that he had asked W to listen to the audio recording of a meeting he had with Mr B____ first before W was to call Mr B____ as there were lots of information in there and H was with Mr B____ for almost an hour[134]. This email was about 3 weeks after H sent W the Divorce Email.

208.  H then sent W a further email on 8 October 2015 forwarding to her an email from Mr B____ providing a quotation of a fixed fee of USD 30,000 for addressing all the planning discussed in relation to the trust, letter of wishes, wills, trust funding, written tax advice and related memoranda, consultation (in person, phone and email) and liaising with the trustee, as well as amnesty for W regarding her past tax issues[135]. H again asked W to listen to the audio recording first before W “fire him any questions”. H had said during the trial that W could not follow the audio recording, and that was why she had requested a meeting with Mr B____.

209.  What was not disputed was that on 13 October 2015, W had sent Mr B____ an email informing him that she had listened to the recorded meeting he had with H. W had asked to meet with Mr B____ briefly for clarification and in particular she had asked Mr B____ if all the assets were in a trust structure, what would happen if she and H were to get divorced (“13.10.15 Email”)[136].

210.  There was no reply email from Mr B____ to W’s 13.10.15 Email. What was not disputed was that W did attend, with H, the 27.10.15 Meeting with Mr B____.

211.  H’s evidence was that at the 27.10.15 Meeting, Mr B____ reiterated the same advice given by Withers in 2012, and that he and W were advised that setting up a family trust would be in the best interest of their family to protect their family assets, especially given their US tax considerations. They contemplated a separate trust fund or educational fund for the Children but they first wanted to get the simpler Family Trust set up as the letter of wishes for the Children’s Trust would be a more involved task. According to H, Mr B____ advised them to settle a trust that would allow for W to be a beneficiary of 50% of the marital assets and at the same time it would mitigate her US tax liabilities and report requirements[137].

212.  According to H, Mr B____ had proposed various solutions to address all of W’s concerns and that Mr B____ drafted the Family Trust deed to specifically allay her concerns, including the addition of W’s brother Alex to the list of Protector[138], and that at the meeting, W did not object to any of Mr B____’s advice. Further, according to H, Mr B____ advised that a two-trust structure was preferable. It was H’s evidence that W did not object to this suggestion and did not make any adverse comments on this advice.

213.  It was also H’s evidence that if W had concerns about the settlement of the US Trusts and her divorce settlement, she was at liberty to contact Mr B____ directly as he had provided her with Mr B____’s contact details and H had said he presumed that Mr B____ had not responded to W’s 13.10.15 Email because he had extensively addressed her divorce concerns at the meeting[139].

214.  On the other hand, it was W’s evidence that it was only in October 2015 that H suddenly became “gung-ho about trusts” and that he started “pushing” for the setting up of trusts. During cross examination, W said there were no discussions about a two-trust structure at the 27.10.15 Meeting, and that there was only one trust proposed for H and W and nothing in relation to a trust for the Children. She said she had told H that it (the trust) was not for her, and that she did not want a trust structure, and thereafter she shut off and later left the meeting. According to W, she only knew that H went ahead without her agreement when he disclosed it in his Form E.

215.  W pointed out that her brother was never named as a Protector in the “Protector list” or “Protector committee” in the 2015 Family Trust Deed and that her brother was only named as one of the 3 “preferred” persons besides H’s two friends whom the then Protector committee could, by majority vote, add to be a member of the Committee already filled by persons chosen by H himself[140]. Nevertheless, according to W, it did come as a shock to her when she first saw her brother’s name in the trust deed after the trust deed was disclosed by H in his Form E, and she had asked her brother as to whether H had ever discussed with him about settling trusts and invited him to be a “Protector”. His brother’s answer was there could have been a “theoretical discussion” but there was no serious proposal[141].

216.  W’s evidence that after the meeting with Mr B____, she went to meet with C_____ over her FBAR filing, streamlined filing compliance procedures and tax advice[142]. It was W’s evidence that she also consulted C_____ to get a second opinion after Mr B__ __’s advice in relation to setting up a trust. It was H who gave her C_____’s email address and W met with C_____ in December 2015. According to W, she was advised against the setting up of a trust by C_____ who reaffirmed that setting up a trust was not in W’s best interests, considering that the marriage was falling apart and C_____ suggested that W should work on her US tax amnesty instead. W said she was also advised by C_____ that H could have gifted money as well as properties to his wife (ie W) without attracting US tax penalty, and according to W, she had told H C_____’s advice.

217.  H had not kept a copy of the audio recording of the meeting he had with Mr B____. Mr B____ had mentioned in his email of 8 October 2015 about sending H a formal engagement letter with more details. There was no evidence that H had sent a copy of this formal engagement letter to W or that the engagement letter was addressed to both H and W or the engagement letter had required W’s signature, unlike the Withers Letter. Withers Letter had mentioned specifically that if conflicts of interests were to arise in case of a dispute between H and W, Withers would have to cease to act for one or both of them. In light of the 13.10.15 Email from W, the possibility of divorce, and thus conflict of interest would not have escaped Mr B____’s mind, or for that matter, H’s mind. Thus, in my view, even though W was present at the 27.10.15 Meeting, the evidence showed that H was in fact the client whom Mr B____ was advising and was acting for in the matter of setup of the trusts. In any event, Mr B____ had not replied directly to W’s 13.10.15 Email and W had not had any contact with Mr B____ since the 27.10.15 Meeting.

218.  The evidence showed that H met with Mr B____ on about 6 October 2015. There was no sufficient evidence that any draft deed was made available to W at the 27.10.15 Meeting. The 2015 Family Trust Deed was executed by H as the Settlor and Mr B_ ___ as the Original Trustee on 1 November 2015 without W being present.

219.  When producing the C____ 2012 Emails, H had also produced what’s app chats which he had with W on 10 December 2015 when W told him about her meeting with C_____[143]. According to those chats, W told H that C_____ had said for W to take the property in her name and no trust. W had asked H what type of trust he wanted to put the assets in and H had replied “Foreign Grantor Trust” and W said she would send the information to C_____.

220.  H had already executed the 2015 Family Trust Deed by then and if, as he said, it was executed with the understanding that there was no objection from W, there would have been no need for W to meet with C_____ to seek further advice. Further, when W asked H what type of trust, it would have been easy for H to send to W a copy of the executed trust deed and asked W to forward to C_____.

221.  There were two emails sent by H to W which would support W’s case that she had not agreed to any tax structure:

(1) H’s email of 31 January 2016 with the subject matter “Journal entry I made in my diary recently”[144]

(2) H’s email of 7 August 2016 with the subject matter “Some clarifications and thoughts”[145]

222.  In email (1) above, H had referred to the parties’ relationship and had said “railroading” seemed to be a big negative relationship theme for W and he reminded W of examples of W “railroading” him, including “no trust structure”. H was cross examined over this email and it was put to him that W had diametrically opposed a trust structure, his response was that the email was sent inadvertently to W and that it was meant for his own journal entry only, and that W’s complaint was after the trust had been set up and that had she had any objection, she should have said so at the 27.10.15 Meeting.

223.  I find H’s evidence that he sent the email to W inadvertently simply not credible, and in any event, the Education Trust was not set up by H until 1 July 2016. When this Court pointed out to him that it was open to him not to go ahead with the Education Trust, H had tried to explain that instructions for Mr B____ to set up both trusts had already been given in October/November 2015 and that he had committed to pay for both trusts and there was a delay due to Mr B____’s own personal issues. He then admitted that he could have stopped Mr B____ in January 2016, but he said he did not as there was no other solution to putting assets in a US citizen’s name.

224.  There was no supporting evidence that H had already committed to pay for both trusts in October/November 2015 and that the delay was due to Mr B____’s personal issues. The evidence showed that the Family Trust was set up within a very short time, and there was no reason why the Education Trust could not have been set up at the same time. H must be aware that whether he had given instructions to Mr B____ or whether he had committed to pay or not, the Education Trust was not set up when he executed the 2015 Family Trust Deed. Further, he clearly could have stopped the setting up of the Education Trust when he found out that W did not agree to the setting up of the Family Trust, yet he went ahead nevertheless to set up another trust.

225.  In email (2), H was complaining to W that even her sister did not understand and the lawyer (Mr B____) was baffled as to why a trust structure which he had been recommending for years and which most of the world of Non-US spouses had put in place for their US spouses would not work for W[146]. When H was cross examined over this email, his response was W was fully aware of the US Trusts being set up and only started to complain afterwards. When it was pointed out to H there was no evidence to support H’s case, H had responded it was only his word and Mr B____’s word (against W’s) and that W had taken a neutral stance and that even though she did bring up some concerns, Mr B__ __ suggested many solutions and W said she would think about them. H said he then went ahead and did what was in the best interests of the family and her.

226.  Mr To, on behalf of the OS, had also put to H that it would not have mattered whether W had objected to no, as he would still set up the trusts and would have transferred the assets into the trusts. H claimed he would take W’s views into consideration but she had no better solution for the family and so he went ahead with the best solution for the family. When it was put to him that even had W objected during the 27.10.15 Meeting, he would still regard that as the best solution and set up the trusts, H’s response was that he firmly believed the two trusts were the best solution possible.

227.  Mr B____ was not called by H to give evidence in this case, nor had H produced any attendance notes of Mr B____ in relation to the 27.10.15 Meeting. It was clarified during the trial that although H seemed to be asserting legal professional privilege at one stage in relation to his communications with Mr B__ __, he was not asserting the same in answering any questions asked of him by Mr To. Anyway, it was submitted on behalf of H that W herself could have called Mr B____ to give evidence. However, Mr B____ now resides in USA, and as said, H was Mr B____’s client in setting up the US Trusts and not W. As mentioned earlier, Mr B____ was the trustee’s counsel, as well as H’s. It is clear that H was the one who has remained in contact with Mr B____ and was able to obtain a copy of the missing Schedule A during the trial from Mr B____.

228.  In any event, the burden was on H to rebut the Presumption.

229.  I find there was no sufficient evidence that there had been any consent or agreement from W to the setting up of the US Trusts. There was also no sufficient evidence that W was fully explained the terms of the draft Family Trust deed before H’s execution. W was meeting up with C_____ in December 2015 to seek a second opinion, by which time H had already executed the 2015 Family Trust Deed. In any event, H’s own evidence clearly indicated whether W had consented or no, H would have gone ahead.

230.  There was no proper explanation by H for the sudden “expedited time line” in setting up the Family Trust.

231.  Instead of placing family assets in W’s beneficial interests and/or directly under her control as W had asked for, H had, without W’s agreement, moved the family assets further away from W and beyond her control by executing the 2015 Family Trust Deed on 1 November 2015 and injecting Intero into the Family Trust on the same day. Later on 1 July 2016, notwithstanding by then on H’s own evidence, he clearly knew of W’s objections to the trust arrangement, H went ahead to set up the Education Trust by executing the 2016 Education Trust Deed and arranged for Intero (through Bremen) to be transferred to the Education Trust. W was not named as a beneficiary of the Education Trust.

232.  As seen earlier, the US Trusts were amended and re-stated in 2017 and the Education Trust further amended and re-stated in 2019, all without W’s prior knowledge or agreement. There was no sufficient evidence that W knew that H had set up the US Trusts until he disclosed it in his Form E. There was also no sufficient evidence that a copy of the 2015 Family Trust Deed was given to W by either H or Mr B____ after execution until sometime in 2017 when R2 sent a copy to W[147].

233.  I also find that there was no sufficient evidence as alleged by H, that there was any agreement in or around 2013 between H and W that none of the family assets which H had generated would be placed in W’s name or their joint names as alleged by H. In fact, as seen earlier, W had clearly asked for her name be added to the M______ Apartment. The setting up of the US Trusts was rushed and it was at a time when the parties had lost their trust in each other and as found earlier, the marriage was in a “mortally wounded” state and they were arranging to see a marriage counsellor as a final attempt to save their marriage.

234.  Mr To had submitted that the setting up of the US Trusts (and also the I_____ Trust) was in the middle of a series of systematic efforts by H in “distancing assets” held by H and/or their information from W.

235.  The various acts of “distancing assets” relied on by Mr To were between July 2013 to September 2016[148], and carried out against the background of the Parties’ then marital state as earlier found by this Court. Although H had suggested to W to close the Parties’ HSBC Joint Account in May 2013, the actual closing was done in July 2014 without W’s knowledge and while she was away. Although the cancelling of W’s credit cards was temporary, as W pointed out, H seemed to think he could do whatever he wanted. There was no sufficient evidence that H had informed W of his other acts in relation to his finances as set out by Mr To.

236.  Anyway having considered all the evidence, I am satisfied that the dispositions made by H into the US Trusts would have the consequence of defeating W’s claim for financial provision. As said earlier, the burden is on H to rebut the Presumption in relation to W’s 1st s 17 Application regarding the US Trusts, and to satisfy this Court that the dispositions he made into the US Trusts were not made with the Intention. Having considered all the evidence, I find H has not been able to discharge the burden.

(iv) The M_______ Apartment

237.  The M______ Apartment is an apartment in a gated community in ____________. As said earlier, it was W’s case that H bought this property out of their family funds.

238.  H’s case in relation to the alleged arrangements between him and R4 regarding the M______ Apartment had been inconsistent and confusing:

(i) H’s initial evidence in his 1st Form E on 1 February 2017 was that the property was transferred by him to his father to be held on trust for asset protection, tax and succession planning for the benefit of the Children and H’s parents[149]. His then case was clearly that R4 was a trustee and appeared to be saying his parents were residing in the property. In H’s 1st Answers on 28 July 2017 to W’s Questionnaire, his position however changed in that his then evidence was that the property was originally purchased by Hwith the intention for his parents to live inbut they had not moved in yet and that the M______ Apartment was at the time leased out and that the rental income was retained by the trust[150]. Nevertheless, H’s case at that stage was clearly that he purchased the property and he transferred title to R4 for R4 to hold it on a trust for the Children and H’s parents.

(ii) After W issued the 1st s17 Application, in H’s 3rd affirmation in opposition filed in October 2017, H’s evidence changed completely in that his case was in 2006, he decided to co-invest in a property in _____ with R4 which would be primarily for his parents’ use and benefit and this would ensure he would meet his legal obligations under the Senior Citizens Act and that he had told W about this[151]. H had also said there was “partial financial contribution” from R4. In his 2nd Answer filed in April 2018 in response to W’s questionnaire, H’s evidence was that he no longer had record of R4’s “partial financial contribution” nor recollection of the exact amount, and that he recalled R4 “put in cash investment and put in sweat equity” and that R4 would have earned approximately 30-40% of the beneficial interest in the property, and that he would ask R4 to collate records[152]. It was only in H’s 2nd Answer that he disclosed the I_____ Trust Deed and other documents in relation to the M______ Apartment. As further seen in this Court’s decision of 22 November 2019 in relation to W’s applications for injunction and discovery[153], H’s arrangement of the transfer by R4 of the M______ Apartment into the I_____ Trust was the day after H had given his 1 Undertaking;

(iii) In H’s Trial Affirmation in April 2021, his evidence changed again in that R4 and he agreed that R4 would have a call option to purchase the M______ Apartment from him by reimbursing the mortgage obtained on his behalf and for any costs incurred by him, and said he paid INR 25,125,310/HKD 2,684,393 and that R4 paid a total of INR 12m /HKD 1,274,388 towards the purchase of the M______ Apartment[154].

239.  A seen above, H’s case in relation to the M______ Apartment was like a moveable feast moving from that he originally purchased the property which was transferred to R4 as trustee, to a co-investment between him and R4, and finally to an agreement between him and R4 with R4 having a “call option”. H’s case was also inconsistent with his father’s evidence in R4’s affirmation of 18 September 2019.

240.  It was R4’s evidence that there were two verbal agreements between him and H in relation to the M______ Apartment, one at the time of the joint purchase by him and H in September 2005 (“1st Agreement”) and the other one at the time when title was transferred to R4 by H on 12 September 2016 (“2nd Agreement”). According to the 1st Agreement, the property was to be purchased in H’s name in order for H to obtain preferential mortgage and that H would assist R4 in paying the down payment on the understanding that the property was to be owned by R4 and his wife (H’s parents) and that H’s parents would make payment towards the down payment , contribute cash towards the finishing of the property etc and based on this understanding, R4 said he had incurred costs of approximately INR 8,000,000/HKD 880,000 to finish the interiors, management fees and other expenses.

241.  Then, according to R4, at the time of the title transfer, he offered to reimburse H for the initial purchase cost less any equity contributions R4 made, but H highlighted his obligation under the Senior Citizens Act and therefore there was the 2nd Agreement in relation that the settling of the property into a trust for the Children and that R4 and his wife had the right to reside in the property and to access any income generated from the property to support themselves during their lifetime. It was also R4’s evidence that he did not feel comfortable moving into the property until legal title was in his name and that they planned to move within the year, namely 2019.

242.  Thus, R4’s evidence indicated that only a sum of about HKD 880,000 was incurred by him for the finishing of the interiors management fees and other expenses. There was no evidence or supporting documents produced by R4 that it was R4 who had paid the down payment, and that on R4’s case, although he had offered to reimburse H at the time of the 2nd Agreement, the effect of the 2nd Agreement appeared to be that instead of R4 reimbursing H, R4 agreed with H to settle the property into the I_____ Trust.

243.  It was not disputed that the M______ Apartment was purchased in September/October 2005. As seen in the letter dated 28 October 2005[155] from the developer, the total costs was INR 27,412,500 of which the sum paid at the time of booking was INR 2,500,000, and after a discount/rebate of INR 2,037,190, the balance payable on 29 October 2005, the date of foreclosure ( or date of completion), was INR 22,875,310.

244.  There was no other deposit/down payment payable apart from the booking fee.

245.  H obtained a loan for non-resident Indians for INR 22,875,310 and the term of repayment was 240 months, or 20 years. H was the only borrower on the loan application form[156] (“Loan Application Form”). Although R4’s name was being stated to be the name of the father of the applicant for the loan and that R4’s name was given to be the “local contact power of attorney (in ____)”, the sole applicant for the loan was H, who had provided the details of his employment including his monthly income. There was no co-applicant, and this again contradicted H’s evidence in his Trial Affirmation that he and his father made a joint loan application[157]. Under cross examination, H then admitted he had been “mistaken” and that he thought R4’s name being stated thereon made R4 a co-applicant. I find H’s evidence simply not credible.

246.  The Home Loan agreement was executed by H on the same day. Under article 5 of the Home Loan Agreement, H covenanted he had absolute, clear and marketable title to the property and that the property was absolutely unencumbered and free from any liability whatsoever.

247.  Further, by a power of attorney dated 15 November 2014, H had appointed R4 as authorized signatory to execute any lease agreements and related documentation as well as the purchase and sale agreements and related documentation in respect of the M______ Apartment[158]. In the power of attorney, it was stated that H was the owner of the M______ Apartment.

248.  Under the transfer deed dated 12 September 2016 pursuant to which H transferred the M______ Apartment to R4 , it was stated that H was “the absolute owner and seized and possessed of full and undivided share” of the property and that the transfer was in consideration of his “natural love and affection” for his father[159].

249.  In H’s Trial Affirmation, H’s evidence was that after paying the initial deposit, R4 made payments amounting to INR 9.5m or HKD 1,180,077 towards various costs, includingthe down payment, leasing fees, management and renovation[160]. H’s evidence was again confusing. As seen earlier, there was only the booking fee of INR 2,500,000 and there was no other initial deposit or down payment payable. Anyway, H’s evidence appeared to be that the total sum of INR 9.5m would include the booking fee/initial deposit/down payment of INR 2.5m as well. H had set out a table of such costs and produced receipts[161]. Apart from 2 receipts from a painter contractor _______ Y____ on his letterhead with address and mobile numbers, the others were all from one _____ K___ and Associates with no letterhead and were stated to be for “Management and Consultancy Fees”, for looking after all work related to the apartment and were issued annually between December 2011 and December 2020. None of those receipts concerned the payment of the initial deposit/booking fee/down payment of INR 2.5m.

250.  On the Loan Application Form, the incidental costs for the purchase eg stamp duty and registration charges were stated to be INR 1,370,625 (“Incidental Costs”) and it was also stated that an amount of INR 2,500,000 was already spent. The loan applied for by H was initially INR 26,283,125, but the actual loan amount in the Loan Agreement was in the end INR 22,875,310, which was the balance of the purchase price as seen earlier in the letter of 28 October 2005.

251.  When H was cross examined over what H said R4 had paid, H came out with a total figure of INR 12m, being INR 2.5m plus INR 9.5m, which meant the total figure had changed again from H’s Trial Affirmation. In any event, there was no evidence as to who paid for the Incidental Costs. There was no receipt produced by R4 or by H as for the payment of INR 2.5m.

252.  It was put to H that any money paid by R4 was from money made available to R4 by H. He denied this and claimed that only the loan repayments were paid by him.

253.  Then, on the 5th day of trial, H suddenly produced a letter dated 16 September 2005 purported to be signed by his father (“Exhibit R-3”) stating among other things that R4 had paid the “booking deposit” of INR 2,500,000 to the developer. H claimed that he had made attempts to look for this letter from his files either in the cabinet or the computer and that his father and his brother looked into the basement of the old house (K______ M___) and found the letter. However, according to H, R4 had moved into the M______ Apartment, I____ was under lockdown and that H’s brother was supposedly unable to even go over to assist R4 with giving evidence through VCF, and further R4 was unwell and was not able to give evidence, not even through VCF.

254.  When asked when R4 and H’s brother found Exhibit R-3, H then said it was prior to his starting to give evidence. If this were true, there was no reason why H made no mention of it when he was being cross examined over R4’s payments on the 4th day of the trial, and then only produced it on the 5th day. Further, there must have been evidence of how the letter was sent to/received by H, whether by fax or by email or by courier etc, but no such evidence was produced by H. I do not find H’s evidence credible at all and I do not attach any weight to this letter. In any event, the letter was not consistent with H’s earlier evidence in his 1st Form E that he paid the purchase price, nor R4’s evidence in his affirmation that H had assisted R4 in paying the deposit of INR 2.5m.

255.  It was submitted on behalf of H that it was hardly surprising that H was named as the owner on the Home Loan Agreement or the mortgage or 2014 power of attorney as the developer and the bank respectively would not have known about H’s and R4’s private family arrangement.

256.  However, there was plenty of documentary evidence which indicated that all along H had himself regarded the M______ Apartment to be his assets. In his email of 9 October 2012 to ____ R_________, H set out a list of his assets of which item 6 referred to a “property in I____ (held under [H’s] individual name)”[162]. It was also stated in Withers Letter that H had property in I____, which H confirmed during the trial that the reference was to the M______ Apartment. In H’s email to Mr B___ of 7 January 2015, he told Mr B___ that he would prepare a list of his assets and he had said most of his assets were held under two BVI companies of which he was the sole shareholder and director and that the only assets he held directly in his own name were some bank accounts, one brokerage account and an apartment in I____[163].

257.  When the above was pointed out to H during the trial, H’s answer was that he had “corrected” or made clear” to the professionals that he was holding the M______ Apartment for his father. There was no supporting evidence produced by him in relation to his “correction”. H had also said he wanted to consult the professionals on the “temporary tax consequences” on him as holder of the property, but as pointed out by Mr Todd, this would mean all the more important why he should have made this clear in the first place when listing out his assets.

258.  Finally in H’s Trial Affirmation, he had produced two charts depicting the structure of the family assets in November 2015 and July 2016 respectively and 100% of the “I____ Apartment” was listed by him under H’s assets in both charts[164].

259.  H had said in his 3rd affirmation in opposition to W’s 1st s17 Application that in December 2015 he decided to prepay the outstanding mortgage loan of USD 200,000 because he did not wish to continue to pay a high fixed interest rate of 8.5% for a mortgage loan on non-income producing property and there was no prepayment penalty[165]. At trial, H then gave another reason, that at that time the rupee had collapsed. In any event, it was put to H that the real reason for paying off the mortgage was that without doing so, he could not transfer the property to his father by reason of Article 5.4 of the Home Loan Agreement, which stipulated that H was not to let out or otherwise part with possession of the property or any part thereof, or sell, mortgage, lease, surrender or otherwise however alienate the property or any part thereof unless with the agreement of the mortgagee[166]. He denied this.

260.  The repayment and the discharge of the mortgage was in December 2015 shortly after the setting up of the US Family Trust by H and prior to the setting up of the Education Trust. The M______ Apartment was transferred to R4 on 12 September 2016, which was about a month before H moved out of the former matrimonial home. On 27 September 2016, R4 entered into a 11 month lease for the property to be rented out.

261.  W’s evidence during the trial was that the M______ Apartment was purchased by her and H together as a “rental investment”. She had said during the trial that the property was chosen because it was near a golf course where H’s sister was a member and that in 2015 it was rented to a “German-Malaysian couple with a child”. H’s evidence was however his sister lived in ________ and was not a member of a nearby golf course and did not play golf and that there were no discussions regarding any rental returns as alleged by W. Whichever, even on H’s own evidence, it was rented out.

262.  W admitted that the interior decoration of the M______ Apartment was carried out by H’s mother although W had also claimed to have been consulted on some interior design decisions.

263.  The fact that H’s parents had received marketing brochures from the developer or they had helped with the interior decoration of the property would not necessarily mean that they then acquired beneficial interest in the property. Even if R4 did pay about INR 12m, according to H’s latest case during the trial, there was no sufficient evidence that the amount had come from R4’s own resources.

264.  There was no evidence that W had ever consented to H placing the title of the M______ Apartment in the name of R4. In fact, on the contrary, she had asked H to add her name to the M______ Apartment in November 2014. Even on H’s own case, from those emails he sent to W at end of August 2015, he knew W had called R4 about the M______ Apartment and had accused H of some conspiracy to hide assets from her, yet after paying off the mortgage loan, H then proceeded to transfer the title of the M______ Apartment to R4. Also, notwithstanding H’s 1st Undertaking to the Court, R4 was arranged to transfer the M______ Apartment to the I_____ Trust.

265.  Having considered all the evidence, I am satisfied H’s disposition of M______ Apartment into R4’s name would have the consequence of defeating W’s claim for financial provision. Again, I find that H had not been able to rebut the Presumption on him, in that he was not able to satisfy this Court that the transfer of the M______ Apartment into R4’s name was not with the Intention.

(v) The OS’s position in relation to W’s 1st s 17 Application

266.  In the OS Opening Submissions, Mr To had made it known that subject to the oral evidence given in the trial, the OS took the provisional view that the Children had genuine difficulties in supporting H’s case under W’s 1st s17 Application, for the reasons set out earlier in this judgment, OS took the view that it is theoretical if not illusory that the Children have or will derive any monetary benefit under the Family Trust, and that under the Education Trust, the Children’s monetary interest would most likely represent only a small part of the trust fund.

267.  In the OS Closing Submissions, Mr To confirmed the OS on behalf of the Children do not object to the setting aside of the US Trusts or alternatively they do not object to the varying of the US trusts, save and except that in the event of variation, (i) not less than HKD 15m to HKD 20m should be retained under the Education Trust; (ii) the Education Trust should be varied to the effect that H shall not have any right to alter how the trust fund will be divided among the beneficiaries, whether at his death or otherwise; (iii) the Family Trust and the Education Trust should be varied by expressly stating that the Children’s participation in these proceedings will not be construed as having contested it in any way.

268.  In so far as the M______ Apartment was concerned, Mr To submitted that the Children’s interest would vary materially according to the factual cases put forward by H at different times in relation to the M______ Apartment.

(vi) Conclusion on W’s 1st s 17 Application

269.  Having considered all the above, as I am of the view that H has not been able to discharge the burden on him or to displace the Presumption in relation to his dispositions into the US Trusts and his disposition of his interests in the M______ Apartment to R4, I have come to the conclusion that the following dispositions, namely (i) the disposition by H of his share(s) in Intero to the Family Trust on 1 November 2015, (ii) the disposition by H of his share(s) in Bremen to the Education Trust on 1 July 2016, and (iii) the transfer of H’s legal and beneficial interests in the M______ Apartment to R4 on 12 September 2016 should be set aside.

270.  In so far as the US Trusts, in light of the dispositions in (i) and (ii) being set aside, it follows that any subsequent disposition/transfer/purported sale by Family Trust of the share(s) in Intero to Bremen will be set aside. There is no need to make any further setting aside orders as sought by W. Similarly, in relation to the M______ Apartment, in light of the disposition in (iii) being set aside, it follows that the subsequent transfer by R4 to the I____ Trust will be set aside.

271.  As the application for variation of the trusts was only an alternative application, in light of my conclusion that the dispositions should be set aside, there is no need to consider any variation of the trusts.

272.  The effect of the setting aside order is that the share(s) in Intero and in Bremen should be re-registered in H’s sole name, and the M______ Apartment should be registered in H’s sole name. In any event, the value of those assets should be included in the Family Pot for division.

(4) W’s 2nd s 17 Application - Issue 5

273.  W’s 2nd s 17 Application was filed on 22 March 2017 and amended and refiled on 22 March 2021 in relation to dispositions/withdrawals made from two sets of bank accounts[167].

274.  The two sets of bank accounts are:

(1) 2 banks accounts (ending “783” and “776” respectively) held in the joint names of H and R4 at the K___ _______ Bank (respectively “_ __ 783 Account” and “_ __ 776 Account”, and collectively “K___ Accounts”)

(2) a bank account held in the sole name of H at the Standard Chartered Bank in ____________ (“SC _______ Account”).

275.  In so far as the K___ Accounts were concerned, there were 5 dispositions/withdrawals totalling INR 16,200,000 (or about HKD 1.8m) which W set out in her 2nd s 17 Application and which she applied to set aside:

(1) The withdrawal of INR 1,200,000 from the accounts to R4 on 24 February 2016;

(2) The withdrawal of INR 500,000 from the accounts to H’s mother on 24 February 2016

(3) The withdrawal of INR 2,500,000 from the accounts to R4 on 24 February 2016;

(4) The withdrawal of INR 10,000,000 from the accounts to H’s mother on 16 August 2016;

(5) the withdrawals of INR 2,000,000 from the accounts to R4 on 16 August 2016.

276.  In W’s Opening, it was W’s case that there were further sums totalling at least INR 17m withdrawn from the K___ Accounts August 2016 to November 2018[168]. Thus, W was seeking a total sum of about INR 33.2m to be set aside or treated as H’s resources. However, in W’s Closing Submissions, the dispositions from the K___ Accounts were set out in a table, and W corrected the final total amount of the dispositions from the K___ Accounts in her 2nd s17 Application to be INR 17,133,000, instead of INR 33.2m.

277.  As for the disposition in relation to the SC _______ Account was concerned, in W’s 2nd s17 Application, W applied to set aside a total sum of USD 3,231,833.55 withdrawn from the SC _______ Account to H’s Personal Standard Chartered Private Bank Account (“SC Private Bank Account”) on 3 January 2017 and from H’s SC Private Bank Account to Intero or other unknown third parties on 18 January 2017. However, in W’s Closing Submissions, it would appear that the total amount of the sum withdrawn from H’s SC Private Bank Account to Intero on 24 January 2017 was only USD 526,107.55[169].

278.  It was also stated in W’s Opening Submissions that W had not formally applied to set aside the dispositions in her 2nd s 17 Application which would interleave another layer of third-party dispute and that W did not need to, as it was sufficient to say that those dispositions/withdrawals were resources of H[170] and that the main issue was whether, as H contended, that he held the two sets of bank accounts on trust for his parents, and it was stated in W’s notice of application that she intended to apply to set aside in the event that H, and/or third parties failed to show, in respect of one of either of the accounts set out, that the beneficial ownership does not follow the legal ownership.

(i) The K___ Accounts

279.  The main issue in relation to the K___ Accounts was whether, as alleged by H, those accounts belonged to H’s parents and were operated by them.

280.  It was H’s evidence that the K___ Accounts belonged to his parents and that all deposits into that accounts were made solely by his parents out of their life savings and that the accounts were opened for the benefit of H’s parents to take advantage of the preferential non-residential deposit rates of 9.4% per annum for one year which H could obtain compared to the 6-7% interest rates available to local residents.

281.  The problem with H’s case is that, like his case in relation to the M______ Apartment, his case moved from one to another:

(1) In his 1st Form E, in “Annex 2.3 “ he had set out a list of his bank accounts but disclosed only the ____ 783 Account which he had indicated that that R4 was the other account holder and the balance as at 30 January 2017 was INR 5,299 and that H’s interest therein was said to be “0”[171]. H had annexed to his 1st Form E (i) a letter dated 16 August 2012 from R4 (“16.08.12 Letter”)[172]; and (ii) copies of the statements of the ____ 783 Account and also the ____ 776 Account from 1 January 2016 to 16 January 2017, also quarterly statements from 1 January 2016 – 31 December 2016 (which were only faintly legible)[173] (collectively “K___ Statements”). In the 16.08.12 Letter headed “SAVINGS ACCOUNT WITH K___ BANK HERE IN YOUR NAME”, R4 stated that he was proposing that H open two savings account in India to which would be credited money R4 remit to H for the purpose of earning a slightly higher rate of interest and that it was clearly understood that H had nothing to do with this money whatsoever and that H would give a mandate in R4’s name so that R4 could operate and close them whenever R4 wanted. The K___ Statements showed H’s name and R4’s name (MANDATE);

(2) When asked in W’s 1st Questionnaire about the source of initial funds, the answer H gave in his 1st Answer was that there were two sums USD 188,136 and USD 125,001 respectively transferred on 27 March 2012 and 30 April 2012 from H’s HSBC HK Premier Account (“HK Premier Account”) into H’s HSBC ____ Premier Account (“_____ Premier Account”) which were then transferred into the ____ 783 Account on 5 May 2012 in order to open an NRE (Non Resident) account[174]. H had stated that the initial funds were deposited by H as support to his parents given he did not provide monthly maintenance to his parents to assist with their living expenses[175]. H then annexed copy of an email from R4 to H dated 25 July 2017 with R4 (“25.07.17 Email”) stating that the attached statement dated 29 May 2012 of H’s HK Premier Account showed that funds came in on 2 and 3 May from which funds were transferred on 5 May to ____ to open an NRE account with them which related to the funds sent to H by H’s mother on 26 April[176]. The K___ Statement indicated two amounts of INR 5,219,182.95 and INR 5,241,946.05 were credited into H’s ____ Premier Account respectively on 2 and 3 May 2012 and on 5 May 2012, INR 10,000,056.18 was transferred into the ____ Account “776” with H’s name thereon and the words “TFR to SELF NRE FD”[177].

(3) In H’s 2nd Answer to W’s further questions, his answer was essentially that the K___ Accounts belonged to R4 and H was simply holding the sums therein on trust to obtain the preferential non-residential rates and that H had/has no interests in these accounts. H’s explanation of the initial funding was that it was merely a pass through of monies provided to H from his parents for placing in the deposit account and referred to “Annexure II”[178]. In “Annexure II”, H produced a copy of his HK Premier Account statement for the month ending 27 April 2012[179]. He identified an amount of USD 188,136.05 credited into H’s HK Premier Account on 27 April 2012 and another amount USD 125,001.53 credited on 30 April 2012 but there were no details from where the amounts were deposited/transferred.

(4) Then suddenly in H’s Trial Affirmation, he said he made a mistake in his answer 8.3 of his 1st Answer in referring to the USD 125,001 which he received on 30 April 2012 as that sum did not relate to any of the K___ Accounts and was a transfer from one of his other accounts or Intero to his HK Premier Account[180].

(5) When H realised that R4’s 16.08.12 Letter in which R4 was proposing to H to open two savings accounts was in fact more than 3 months after the initial two sums were transferred to the K___ Accounts on 5 May 2012, H then suddenly produced another purported letter from R4, this time dated 2 January 2012, but with exactly the same contents as the 16.08.12 Letter (“02.01.12 Letter”)[181].

282.  When H was cross examined about the two identical letters, namely the 16.08.12 Letter and the 02.01.12 Letter which were sent within a fortnight, H said that R4 had inadvertently put his birthday on the 16.08.12 Letter and the 02.01.12 Letter was R4’s “reminder” to H of what he needed to do. I do not find H’s evidence credible. There was also no evidence as to how the 16.08.12 Letter or the 02.01.12 Letter were sent by R4 to H, whether they were sent by R4 by email or by fax or by posting.

283.  Anyway, what one can make out from the faintly legible K___ Statements, under “Account Name (account numbers)”, there were two savings account numbers but only H’s name appears as the “account name” for both savings accounts [182]. Someone had written “NRE” against what appeared to be the ____ 775 Account and “NRO” against what appeared to be the ____ 783 Account. As mentioned earlier, the rest of the statements showed H’s name, and R4’s name only shown as the (MANDATE). In fact, it was also H’s own case that the K___ Accounts were opened in his name to hold on trust for R4[183]. In H’s Trial Affirmation, H produced an email R4 had sent H on 19 April 2012 in which R4 said he had checked with HSBC and that they only offered 8% per annum for 2 year Tax Free FD to NRE and so R4 had asked K___ Bank to tell H how to open an online NRE A/C with Power of Attorney for R4, and they [K___ Bank] offered 9.4% per annum for 1 year from that day so ICICI must have also reduced from today (“19.04.12 Email”)[184]. Further, in the bank statement of H’s ____ Premier Account, the transfer out of INR 10,000,056.18 on 5 May 2012 was stated to be “TFR TO SELF NRE FD”[185]. In the K___ Accounts statement, there was a “CASH WITHDRAWAL BY SELF @4253” of INR 10,000. By comparison, withdrawals by H’s parents were with their full names stated.

284.  Having considered the above, I find that the K___ Accounts were/are in fact not “joint accounts”, nor were they held in the joint names of H and R4 as stated in W’s 2nd s17 Application. In my view, the K___ Accounts were opened in H’s sole name only, with a mandate, or power of attorney to R4.

285.  As the K___ Accounts were opened in H’s sole name and held by him, the burden was on H to satisfy this Court that the beneficial interest in the K___ Accounts belonged/belong to R4 and/or his mother, and not to H.

286.  The 19.04.12 Email from R4 indicated that H would be explained by K___ on how to open an online NRE A/C, and there was no reason as to why H could not have obtained copies of the account opening mandate/instructions he gave to the K___ Bank at the time of opening the K___ Accounts since H was the one who opened the account. There was also no reason as to why H could not have obtained legible bank statements from the bank. There was no reason as to why H could not have obtained transaction advices from the bank. Normally, banks keep bank statements and account transactions for at least 7 years and there was no sufficient evidence that the K___ Bank adopted a different practice. Further, the amount of USD 188,130.05 on 27 April 2012 and the amount of USD 125,001.53 were both stated to be “DEPOSIT” and again H could have obtained transaction advice from HSBC as to the source of those “Deposits”. It was not clear why suddenly H realised he had made a mistake about the deposit of USD 125,001.53. However, the total amounts transferred to H’s _____ Premier Account were USD 200,000, and this was more than the USD 188,130.05 balance in the account, and thus the sum of USD 200,000 could in fact only be transferred out on 3 May 2012, after the deposit of the USD 125,001.53.

287.  More importantly, there was simply no sufficient evidence that the sum of USD 188,130.05 or any subsequent sums credited into the K___ Accounts came from R4 and/or H’s mother. R4 only filed one affirmation, namely his affirmation of 20 September 2019 after he was served with W’s 1st s17 Application. Even though R4 did not appear to have been formally served with W’s 2nd s17 Application, he must have known of W’s allegations in relation to the K___ Accounts, and further H was fully aware of W’s allegations. Yet, there was no further affirmation filed by R4 to support H’s case in relation to the K___ Accounts, including that the date on the 16.08.12 Letter was a mistake.

288.  Looking at the 2016 bank statement of the ____ 783 Account, the opening balance on 15 January 2016 was INR 559,813.75, the total withdrawals were INR 559,813.75 and total deposits were INR 138,723. The deposits were from mainly 2 sources, namely (i) “BY CLG INST 795539 ICICI AT __________”; and (ii) “Int Pd [783]; 31-03-2015 to 21-03-2016”. Thus, the source of the deposits were from interests, and from transfers from/through an ICICI account in __________. If R4 was the holder of the ICICI Account, he could have produced, or H could have arranged for R4 to produce, any bank statement/s or transaction advices as supporting evidence. There was none.

289.  As for the 2016 bank statement of the ____ 776 Account, the opening balance on 11 February 2016 was INR 77,742.98, the total withdrawals were IND 15,200,000 and the total deposits were INR 15,419,239.00. It would appear that 4 fixed deposits of about INR 16,353,915 had matured.

290.  Having considered the evidence, I find H was not able to satisfy this Court that the initial funds for the K___ Accounts did not originate from him, nor was he able to satisfy this Court that those transfers from/through ICICI did not originate from him. There was simply no sufficient evidence that the deposits originated from R4 or H’s parents. Having considered all the evidence, I find H was/is the legal and beneficial owner of the K___ Accounts.

291.  H’s case was that the transfers to his parents were for their living expenses. There was again no sufficient evidence to support H’s allegation.

292.  In my view, those withdrawals totalling INR 17,133,000 would have all fallen within the 3 year period prior to the 2nd s17 Application had it been a formal application, and for which the Presumption would apply. I am satisfied that those withdrawals dispositions would have the consequence of defeating W’s claim for financial provision. On the evidence, H would not be able to displace the Presumption.

293.  The amount of INR 17,133,000 should be added back to the Family Pot.

(ii) The SC _______ Account

294.  In W’s 2nd s17 Application, she sought to set aside a withdrawal of USD 3,231,833.55 from the SC _______ Account to H’s SC Private Bank Account on 3 January 2017 and then from H’s SC Private Bank Account to Intero or third parties on 18 January 2017.

295.  H claimed that he had disclosed in his 1st Form E at Part 5.1 that he had paid from his SC Private Bank Account USD 526,107 into Intero’s Standard Chartered Bank account being the profit made from a fixed income deposit which H invested on behalf of Intero in an _____ structured deposit trade. He explained that he made this foreign currency non-resident deposit on behalf of Intero to take advantage of his non-resident _____ status as the investment was only available to non-resident _____[186].

296.  According to H, the net profit earned was USD 536,107.55 of which he kept USD 10,000 and the balance of USD 526,107 was returned to the bank account of Intero on 24 January 2017 as confirmed in the bank statement provided at Annexure 63.2 of his 1st Form E.

297.  Mr Todd pointed out in W’s Closing Submissions that H had failed to provide any reasonable answer as to why he did not disclose the SC _______ Account in the first place in his 1st Form E or explained the transaction, rather than alleging he held the amount as “constructive trust” for Intero in his 1st Answer to W’s questionnaire.

298.  What is clear is that notwithstanding that by then Intero, having been injected into the Family Trust by H, was sold to Bremen by the Family Trust and then held by the Education Trust, H was clearly freely moving money between his personal account/s and Intero’s bank account and he had referred to the Intero’s bank account as “mycompany account” in his letter of instructions to the SC Private Bank for the transfer of USD 526,107.55[187].

299.  Anyway, in light of my earlier finding that the dispositions by H into the two US Trusts should be set aside and the assets should form part of the Family Pot. It is not necessary to make any separate order over this amount, as the amount of USD 525,107 was credited into the bank account of Intero on 24 January 2017, and that it should be reflected in the books of Intero, and the amount forms part of Intero’s assets and valuation.

(II) S____ Land – Issue 6

(1) The parties’ respective case

300.  H’s case in his Trial Affirmation was that the S____ Land was an investment made by H and W out of family assets during the marriage and was/is only held by W’s parents R5 and R6 as trustees for W and that the S____ Land should form part of the Family Pot.

301.  On the other hand, W’s case was that the understanding at the time was that W’s parents would only give up their right to purchase the S____ Land in exchange for an acre of the Parties’ land in ______ , and that H never upheld his side of the bargain for the “swap”.

(2) The background

302.  The S____ Land consists of two plots of land in _____________________, one on AR117 and one on 169. It can be seen in the two agreements set out later, a Mr JBGQ was the record owner of AR 117 and held a deed in his possession for an additional plot of land on AR 169. After the death of Mr JBGQ, and later his wife, AR117 was under the control of their 3 children (“Qs”). In about 2003, Qs became aware that there was an illegal transfer of AR 169 and there was a dispute over the title of AR 169 which led to a legal action (“Legal Action”).

303.  According to W, since Qs were based in the United States, they needed someone in ________ to handle the Legal Action on their behalf and that Qs had asked W’s father R5 and W’s cousin (“A___”) and also Qs’ own first cousin for assistance. As the Legal Action went on, Qs’ first cousin became unnecessary and that R5 and A___ had single-handedly carried on the Legal Action and on 6 May 2009, Qs then gave a power of attorney to R5 and A___[188] (“2009S____ P/A”).

304.  It was also W’s evidence in her Trial Affirmation[189] that in exchange for the help and assistance provided by R5 and A___ to continue with the Legal Action, Qs agreed to give R5 and A___ the right to purchase the S____ Land when the Legal Action was over.

305.  The Legal Action led to a decision of the Court of Appeal ________________ on 7 September 2009 in Qs’ favour, which was later confirmed by a judgment of the Court of Cassation (the French Supreme Court) delivered on 22 May 2013.

306.  W had said that in around 2012, she and H became interested in purchasing real estate in ______ , and according to H, in about August 2012, R5 identified a number of distressed real estate opportunities in ______ ___________ for the Parties’ investment including the S____ Land. It was not disputed that between 2013 and 2016, the Parties purchased through Bremen over 20 acres of land in ______ .

307.  It was H’s case that in 2012, Qs wanted to find an investor to fund the Legal Action and in exchange, they would agree to give the investor the right to buy the S____ Land if they were successful in the Legal Action[190]. According to H, R5 did not himself have the risk appetite, knowledge or expertise in investments and that H and W then considered this would be a good investment for them.

308.  H and W then started to discuss with R5 and A___ the possibility of buying the S____ Land. W referred to an email on 7 February 2013 with subject matter “[R5] Call notes- version 2” which was sent from the Yahoo Sub Account to W’s Yahoo Personal Account (“07.02.13 Email”)[191]. In my view, this email was clearly sent by H from the W’s Yahoo Sub Account to W providing an analysis of the then situation, as it did not make sense for W to send herself an email.

309.  Anyway, the 07.02.13 Email had set out that Qs wanted one buyer who would take care of probate and money on account as soon as possible, and the buyer had to move fast and to take on unpaid and future Legal Action costs. This email also showed that the S____ Land was put into the “green zone” and that H/W wanted to “buy, fund cleanup, get it out of green zone however long that takes, build some yielding project on the property, and leave the cashflows and property for the kids, never plan to sell”. The 07.12.13 Email concluded with “OUR WIN WIN PROPOSAL”, namely (i) W: buy all 3 parcels and to deal with Green Zone; (ii) R5: M____ acre swap: 2-3 acres, plus cash if required, (iii) A___: hush money - $20k (“Win Win Proposal”).

310.  In H’s Trial Affirmation, H’s evidence was that he and W agreed to compensate R5 for identifying this investment opportunity and they would pay R5 a fixed fee of up to USD 30,000-50,000 in cash or kind, if Bremen was successful in acquiring the S____ Land. As an alternative, he and W had discussed giving R5 a small parcel of land in M____, ______ held by Bremen, if R5 did not want payment in cash. The idea was to give R5 a half-acre of ‘small subdivided parcel of the 22 acres of land in ______ held by Bremen, which was worth approximately USD 200 per acre[192].

311.  H’s evidence in his Trial Affirmation was however not the same as the Win Win Proposal set out in the 07.02.13 Email. In any event, there was also no sufficient evidence that R5 and/or A___ had agreed to the Win Win Proposal or any proposal.

312.  What was not disputed was that about a month after the 07.02.13 Email, Bremen entered into a sale and purchase agreement with Qs in respect of the S____ Land, which was described by H as a “call-option” agreement (“1stS____ Agreement”)[193] which Qs executed on 13 March 2013 as sellers and Bremen executed on 2 April 2013 as purchaser. Bremen agreed to pay total purchase price of USD 150,000 for the S____ Land, USD 15,000 being paid as down payment upon execution of the 1st S____ Agreement and the balance of USD 135,000 at “Closing”, and the “Closing Date” was 1 March 2015. The down payment of USD 15,000 was paid on 15 March 2013. The governing law was stated to be the laws of the State of New York and the attorneys acting for Bremen were SBH.

313.  The 1st S____ Agreement seemed to have reflected at least what Qs wanted as stated in the 07.02.13 Email, namely one buyer (ie Bremen) who would take care of probate (as seen in clause 6(b) and (c) of the 1st S____ Agreement) and money on account as soon as possible (USD 15,000 as down payment pursuant to clause 2(a)), and the buyer had to take on the Legal Action costs (clauses 5 and 6).

314.  It was H’s evidence that he then began funding a “protracted litigation dispute” on behalf of Qs[194]. According to H, W was fully involved in all the Legal Action and correspondence through their lawyer in ________, Ms _____ D_____, who also represented Qs in the litigation in France. It was H ‘s evidence in his Trial Affirmation that he funded all the Legal Action costs and other expenses estimated at over USD 75,000 towards French legal fees and to SBH.

315.  The 1st S____ Agreement was executed in March 2013 and by 31 May 2013, H had received a copy of the judgment from the French Court of Cassation (dated 22 May 2013) in favour of Qs. Thereafter, H sent an email on 31 May 2013 to his attorneys at SBH asking them to help coordinate the acquisition of the land[195].

316.  Thus, the Legal Action did not in fact continue for that long after the execution of the 1st S____ Agreement as portrayed by H, but it would appear that there was another step which needed to be undertaken, namely to apply for demarcation (bornage) between AR 169 and other adjoining lots. It appeared that an application was made by or on behalf of the Qs on about 9 September 2013 to the Tribunal D’Instance de _______, for a request to appoint a surveyor to proceed with the demarcation between AR 169 and other adjoining lots[196] (“Demarcation Application”).

317.  As seen earlier, on 17 September 2013, H sent an email to C_____ informing her that he was in the process of buying a land parcel in ________ and seeking her advice as to ownership structure to mitigate French tax issues[197]. There was no reply email from C_____ produced by H.

318.  It appeared that the Demarcation Application was opposed. Then on 22 January 2014, Ms D____ issued a writ on behalf of the Qs (or in their name) against the owners of adjoining plots over the demarcation issue[198] (“Demarcation Action”).

319.  As mentioned earlier, it was C___________ who had recommended the notaire Mr C_____ to the Parties in her email of 22 November 2012. By a power of attorney of 28 May 2014, H on behalf of Bremen appointed a clerk of the notaire Mr C_____ to execute the sale and purchase agreement on behalf of Bremen pursuant to the terms of the 1st S____ Agreement (“Bremen P/A”)[199].

320.  According to H, just before Bremen was about to exercise the call option over the S____ Land, he was advised by W that the local government in ________ might exercise its ROFR due to the low purchase price option of USD 150,000 plus costs since Bremen was a non resident corporate entity. Thus, the Parties had to identify a resident of ________ to hold the S____ Land as trustee on their behalf. H said all his discussions were with W and the lawyers and he never had any direct communication on this matter with W’s parents as W spoke with her parents who speak poor English and it was W and her relatives dealt with the lawyer Ms D____ who speaks only French.

321.  W’s case was that H had learnt from Mr C_____ about the ROFR. What is clear is that H did have a meeting with Mr C_____ in ________ on 29 July 2014. In an email of 8 August 2014 from H to Mr C_____ (“08.08.14 Email”), H had referred to that meeting and discussion and that pursuant to their discussions, H had said that Bremen had resolved to assign all rights under the 1st S____ Agreement over to R5 and that the valuation of the S____ Land should be USD 300,000, or Euros 223,413 (fx rate: 1.342804582)[200]. H had attached in the 08.08.14 Email (i) a copy of R5’s French passport; (ii) a copy of the agreement to sell the property (10% already been paid to Qs and the balance due was USD 135,000 and all purchase costs to be borne by R5); and (iii) the 1st S____ Agreement.

322.  From a further email of 12 August 2014 which was sent to W (“12.08.14 Email”) containing his draft email to SBH[201], H had set out in his draft email the information/advice which he had received from Mr C_____ that:

(1) There was a more than a 20%-30% risk of the ________ collectivite exercising the ROFR;

(2) The collectivite/land department reclassified the subject land (S_____ Land) from Residential Zone to Green Zone (non-buildable) mid-way through the Legal Action and reclassifying it to Green Zone would serve to discourage buyers.

323.  As a result, a new structure was proposed by Mr C_____ for H (“New Structure”) as follows:

(1) Qs to sell the S____ Land to a ‘resident” of ________, ie W’s father R5;

(2) R5 could gift the land to his child (ie W) in his lifetime or at death with no local tax consequence, and with no subsequent ROFR requirement at time of gifting.

(3) In order to provide R5 with the funds to complete the deal, Bremen to lend him (R5) the purchase consideration and to take a 1st lien charge over the underlying property (S____ Land);

324.  As H had said in the 12.08.14 Email, assuming the 1st lien charge could be registered, he would need the lawyers SBH to draft a secured loan agreement under New York or US __________ law and that this encumbrance should help “ring fence” the underlying land parcels (ie the S____ Land) from the rest of R5’s estate, especially in the unlikely event that something were to happen to R5 between then and the time at which he made the gift to W. It would appear that the Parties were proceeding with the New Structure.

325.  What was not disputed was that subsequently there was another sale agreement executed on 19 December 2014 and on 22 December 2014 pursuant to which Qs sold the S____ Land to W’s parents (“2nd S____ Agreement”) for EUR 109,860[202]. Each of the Qs (two on 14 July 2014 and one on 5 September 2014) had given a power of attorney to a clerk of Mr C_____’s office to (i) complete the probate of their father JBGQ and to (ii) sell the S____ Land for a sum of EUR109,860 (representing as at 22 May 2014 the equivalent of USD 150,000) (“Qs P/As”). The name/s of the purchaser/s were not in fact stated in the Qs P/As, although there was a draft agreement for sale and purchase referred to in the Qs P/As.

326.  It was provided under “Previous Agreements” that the terms of the 2nd S____ Agreement were in full substitution for those contained in “J’avant contract” [203]and in any other document whatsoever settled between the parties prior to the date of the 2nd S____ Agreement[204]. Thus, the 1st S____ Agreement had been superseded by the 2nd S____ Agreement. It was further stated in the 2nd S____ Agreement that the Collectivite ___________ decided not to exercise the statutory ROFR.

327.  The 2nd S____ Agreement was executed by R6 on 22 December 2014 on behalf of both herself and R5. H had produced remittance instructions and advices which indicated that a sum of Euros 117,960 (equivalent to USD 145,505,05) was remitted out of Intero’s Standard Chartered Bank Account to Mr C_____ on about 9 December 2014[205].

328.  H had produced an email dated 4 November 2015 which he sent to W[206] to remind her that it was important for her to get the promissory note referred in that email signed[207]. The promissory note was dated 20 August 2014 in favour of W, for USD 300,000 with compound interest at 15% per annum and a default compound interest at 25% per annum, and that the principal and any accrued but unpaid interest would be due at maturity, which was 31 December 2016 and the maker of the promissory note had the option to pay off the note at any time in kind, by delivering title of the S____ Land in full settlement of the note (payment in kind) , and upon that, all indebtedness would be extinguished if the payment in kind was received (“S____ Note”). The S____ Note was to be signed by W’s parents. It was never signed.

329.  H had also produced a draft deed “Gift Inter Vivos” of the S____ Land between W’s parents as donor and W as donee which seemed to be prepared sometime in 2015 (“Draft Deed of Gift”)[208]. This was not executed by W’s parents. Of note is the S____ Land was stated “depends from the community of assets existing between [R5 and R6][209].

(3) The evidence

(i) Whether W’s father and cousin had an option to buy the S____ Land

330.  Under the 2009 S____ P/A, R5 and A___ only had the power to sell on behalf of Qs and that W’s father and cousin had to discuss any sale with Qs and that any sale would have to be with the agreement of Qs.

331.  There was nothing in the 2009 S____ P/A which indicated that R5 or A___ had been granted any right or option to buy the S____ Land by Qs upon completion of the Legal Action. W had said that after Qs executed the 2009 S____ P/A, everything was then paid for upfront by R5 and A___, but she also said R5 and A___ were reimbursed by Qs.

332.  There were no other documents produced by W to show that R5 or A___ had any right or option to buy the S____ Land. It was thus not quite clear why W had said during the trial that she was co-ordinating the acquisition of the S____ Land for her parents from A___, although it would appear that A___ was very much involved in the S____ Land and/or the Demarcation Application in December 2014[210].

333.  During the trial W had referred to powers of attorney which gave her father and A___ the option to purchase the S____ Land. The only other powers of attorney I could see were the Qs P/As mentioned earlier. As pointed out earlier, the names of the purchasers were not in fact specified in the Qs P/As and the 2nd S____ Agreement was executed with the Qs P/As. A copy of the draft sale and purchase agreement referred to in the Qs P/As was not attached.

334.  It would appear that Mr C_____ should know what actually happened, as to what led to the execution of the 2nd S____ Agreement. However, neither H nor W had approached Mr C_____ for further evidence. On the present evidence, there was no sufficient evidence that R5 and A___ had any option to purchase the S____ Land. However, they were clearly the ones who were in direct contact with Qs and had the full trust of Qs under the 2009 S____ P/A. There was no sufficient evidence whether or when the 2009 S____ P/A had been terminated by Qs under clause 6 on the “CONTINGENCIES” or whether the probate had been carried out. It was also not clear whether there was any breach on the part of Qs or on the part of Bremen of their respective obligations under the 1st S____ Agreement. What is clear is that the 2nd S____ Agreement superseded the 1st S____ Agreement (executed by Qs personally) and the S____ Land was later conveyed to R5 and R6 by Qs under the Qs P/As.

(ii) The amounts paid by the Parties out of matrimonial funds in relation to the S____ Land

335.  In so far this Court can gather, the 1st S____ Agreement was simply an agreement for the sale of the S____ Land between the Qs directly with Bremen with the “Closing Date” postponed until on or before 1 March 2015, presumably to take into account the appeal or the time which the French Supreme Court would take to deliver its judgment. Further, as seen in the 1st S____ Agreement, the estate of Qs’ father JBGQ and the estate of Qs’ mother had not been properly probated[211] and under the “CONTINGENCIES” it would appear that within 6 months from the date of the agreement, Qs as sellers had to terminate the 2009 S____ P/A and to cooperate with the purchaser, ie Bremen, in the purchaser’s attempts to institute and complete the two probate.

336.  The 1st S____ Agreement did not appear to be an option agreement or an agreement for a “call option” as H had described it. In any event, whether it was an option agreement or not, it was set out in Clause 5 “EXPENSES OF SALE “of the 1st S____ Agreement that the purchaser was to pay all costs associated with the transfer and successful recording of good title to the S____ Land and the purchaser was to assume and pay the actual costs of satisfying the “CONTINGENCIES”(as defined therein and set out above) and the continued prosecution of the litigation and to pay all the incidental costs set out therein.

337.  The amount of what the Parties actually paid out of their matrimonial funds in relation to the S____ Land was not in fact clear. H’s evidence in his Trial Affirmation was the litigation costs and other expenses funded by him were estimated at over USD 75,000[212]. Thus, it would appear that the total amount should be USD 225,000 (ie the purchase price of USD 150,000 plus other expenses of USD 75,000). During the trial, under cross examination, H’s evidence was that he paid USD 150,000 to Qs plus another USD 150,000 for litigations costs and other expenses, ie a total of USD 300,000. The amount of USD 300,000 was the amount stated in the draft S____ Note. However, there seemed to be no invoices produced by H as to his total estimate of USD 300,000.

338.  W in her Trial Affirmation had referred to H “seeking to have [W] get, if not trick” her father into signing the S____ Note (which was for a loan amount of USD 300,000) back dated to 20 August 2014[213].

339.  Among those emails between H and W in November 2015[214], there was one which W sent to H at 2:24 pm on 5 November 2015 in which it appeared that W had queried about the figure USD 300,000 in the S____ Note[215]. In response, H then set out that the total amount which the Parties would need to reserve was USD 150,000 to the Qs, USD 100,000 to R5 and A___ as sourcing fee and USD 50,000 for legal and for W’s efforts. He further went on to say that W would want her loan amount to R5 to be “realistically high” so that if a claim was made by her siblings, W would still come out on top as they would need to pay her USD 300,000 plus interest first before they could ask for any upside (“05.11.15 Emails”).

340.  Although H seemed to be referring to on-going commitments, by 5 November 2015, the purchase price of USD 150,000 had already been paid in full to Qs in December 2014 at the time of the execution of the 2nd S____ Agreement, and the H’s estimates for on-going commitments would seem to have included what had already been paid by the Parties Further, the USD 100,000 to R5 and A___ was for their “sourcing fee” or compensation and was a payment which was paid/to be paid by the Parties to R5 and A___. It was not clear how this amount could then be included by H in justifying the sum USD 300,000 for the loan amount to R5 in the S____ Note. In any event, there was no evidence that the USD 100,000 was paid to R5 and A___. Further, it would appear that by backdating the S____ Note to 20 August 2014, the compound interest of 15% per annum would be calculable from that date.

341.  Anyway, it appeared that the actual total amount paid by the Parties for the S____ Land (whether through Bremen or Intero) was the total purchase price of USD 150,000 to Qs plus other expenses of only about USD 50,000 indicated by H in the 05.11.15 Emails, or the most, according to H’s own evidence in his Trial Affirmation, about USD 75,000, which would make the total amount in the region of USD 225,000. If so, the loan amount of USD 300,000 in the S____ Land would seem to be some 30% over what the Parties actually paid or incurred.

(iii) The compensation to R5 and A___

342.  It was H’s own case in his Trial Affirmation was that there was an agreement between H and W to compensate R5 for identifying this investment opportunity if Bremen was successful in acquiring the S____ Land[216]. H did not mention any compensation or payment to A___, even though both in 07.02.13 Email mentioned earlier and in the 05.11.15 Emails, H had mentioned “hush money” or “sourcing fee” for A___. W did not deny that she and H had agreed that R5 and A___ should be compensated. However, as said earlier, there was no sufficient evidence that R5 and A___ had accepted the Parties’ offer or proposal.

343.  There was a period of some 4 months between Mr C____’s advice and the execution of the 2nd S____ Agreement. There seemed to be no written cancellation by the Qs and Bremen of the 1st S____ Agreement, nor was there any written assignment of Bremen’s interests under the 1st S____ Agreement to W’s parents, nor had H requested or insisted on the S____ Note and/or the Deed of Gift be executed by W’s parents prior to the execution of the 2nd S____ Agreement, nor was there any written agreement signed by the Parties with R5 and/or A___ for the compensation.

344.  In fact, the evidence clearly showed there was no concluded agreement reached between R5 and/or A___ on one side and the Parties on the other for the compensation. In the 05.11.15 Emails, H had mentioned USD 100,000 to R5 and A___ as “sourcing fee”, which suggested USD 50,000 for each, but W responded that R5 would not sign the S____ Note and that R5 did not want USD 50,000, and that R5 wanted 1 acre of land in ______ which was USD 200,000[217].

(iv) Whether W had beneficial interests in the S____ Land

345.  H had also produced what’s app messages between him and W during the period May 2015 and August 2016 extracted by him and then grouped by him under 4 subject matters added by H[218], namely (i) S____ Land (EUR 2m value); (ii) How to fix the zoning issue on S____ Land; (iii) W talks about opening a gas station on her S____ Land; (iv) W talks about arguments about splitting the inheritance between siblings.

346.  In particular, H referred to those messages under (iii), at about 6:11 pm on 26 May 2016 about a gas station[219]. As the earlier emails had not been produced, it was not clear under what context was the gas station mentioned. When W was cross examined over this, she had said the gas station was her cousin A___’s idea but only possible if the land was in Green Zone. In the emails, W had asked H what about opening a gas station but clearly stated that it would be at some point when the S____ Land was out of the Green Zone and that she would do some research on this matter.

347.  W’s message to H on 8 July 2016 further indicated that the S____ Land would not be transferred to her that summer because of the Demarcation Action and needed to wait until fall or end of the year. On 10 August 2016, W had sent H a message that she would get her parents to sign to get the S____ Land out of the disputes among W’s siblings over their inheritance land.

348.  The above messages indicated that W was working together with H in trying to get her parents to sign over to W the S____ Land. However, there seemed to be no sufficient evidence that H was in the process of transferring the 1 acre of land in ______ to R5, as requested by R5. It was also not quite clear as to whether A___ had been paid.

349.  W had said during the trial that H had said that the S____ Land would be a gift to R5 if an acre of the ______ land was not transferred by Bremen to her sister by the end of 2016. This however had not been mentioned in any of her previous affirmations and I do not find this part of W’s evidence satisfactory. In any event, what W said was not supported by any documentary evidence and as said earlier those what’s app messages indicated that W was all along working together with H in trying to get R5 and R6 to sign over the S____ Land to W.

350.  The fact is that the S____ Land is held in the names of W’s parents. H’s case in relation to the S____ Land was again confusing. He had first included in his 1st Form E under Part 2.11 regarding any other assets , a “___________ Investment Land Trust” that (i) he was the settlor of a trust holding the S____ Land[220] (no details given by H as to who was the trustee or the beneficiary) and that H “advanced” money to R5 to purchase investment land in ________ (ie the S____ Land) and that it was agreed that ________ property (ie the S____ Land) was to beheld by R5 on constructive trustfor W[221]. Thus, at that time, although the S____ Land was held in the joint names of R5 and R6, H’s case appeared to be only R5 was the trustee and the beneficiary was W.

351.  Then, in his Updated Form E of 25 January 2021 under the same Part 2.11, H did not mention the “________ Investment Land Trust”[222], and instead under Part 5.2, he stated W had failed to disclose the S____ Land which is held on trust byW’s parents in favour of W[223]. Hence, the trustees became both R5 and R6.

352.  In his Trial Affirmation, H’s most recent case was that the S____ Land was held on constructive trust/resulting trust by W’s parents on behalf of W[224]. He went on to say that (i) it was always intended that W’s parents would hold the S____ Land as W’s trustees until it was conveyed to W and that it was clear that the S____ Land was purchased using matrimonial funds by H through Bremen and Intero, and that W’s parents made no financial contribution nor any contribution towards the purchase of the S____ Land, that there was a common intention that the S____ Land would be beneficially owned by W via her parents holding the S____ Land as trustees of a constructive trust.

353.  As for common intention constructive trust, it is trite that a plaintiff asserting beneficial interest would need to satisfy the court that:

(1) there was a common intention of the parties concerned at the time of the purchase (or exceptionally, thereafter) that the beneficial ownership in fact differed from the legal ownership;

(2) the plaintiff altered his or her position in detrimental reliance upon the common intention; and

(3) it is unconscionable for the property owner to assert ownership in reliance on the legal title.

354.  Here, the date of purchase was the date of the 2nd S____ Agreement. The parties concerned were R5 and R6 on one part and W on the other. There was no evidence from H at all as to how R6 was involved in the transaction. In any event, the allegation of the constructive trust did not appear to be consistent with H’s case of a loan to R5 for the purchase as per the S____ Note and/or that there was an agreement that H and W were to compensate R5 by payment or a swap of land.

355.  At the trial, under cross examination when it was put to H that on 22 December 2014, when R5 and R6 executed the 2nd S____ Agreement, the Qs were then in breach of the 1st S____ Agreement, there would be a cause of action arose in favour of Bremen for breach of contract. What H then replied was that the “breach was waived” by reason of a power of attorney. When asked which power of attorney, H referred to the Bremen P/A, which did not make sense.

356.  H then went on to allege that there was a tripartite agreement between W, R5 and R6 and Bremen on 28 May 2014, which was the date of the Bremen P/A, and that Bremen had authorised R5 and R6 to complete the transaction (“Tripartite Agreement”).

357.  As seen earlier, the Bremen P/A was for a clerk of Mr C_____ to act as signatory of Bremen to execute the sale and purchase agreement in respect of the S____ Land on behalf of Bremen, pursuant to the 1st S____ Agreement, and this was not for Qs waiving the breach, nor a power of attorney authorising R5 and R6 to sign the 2nd S____ Agreement on behalf of Bremen.

358.  In his oral evidence, H alleged the Tripartite Agreement was in May 2014 and this also had to be seen against his own evidence in his Trial Affirmation that after J______’s murder on 2 May 2014, W was going through trauma and grief and was behaving unreasonably. When this was put to H, his evidence then changed again, and said negotiations started regarding the Tripartite Agreement much earlier and that the date of the Tripartite Agreement was reached was on 28 May 2014.

359.  I do not find H’s evidence satisfactory and in any event, I find there was no sufficient evidence that there was the Tripartite Agreement as alleged by H.

360.  What was clear from the emails between H and W in November 2015 and those what’s app messages between H and W that there were hiccups about R5 and R6 transferring or “gifting” to W the S____ Land. Further, the what’s app messages indicated there was disagreement amongst W and her siblings about their inheritance land.

361.  What is also clear is that on H’s own case that there was between him and W an agreement to compensate R5, but there was no evidence that H had taken any steps towards performing the Parties’ obligations in paying any compensation to R5, whether by cash or by swap of land.

362.  It was submitted on behalf of W that there was no constructive trust concept under French law. However, Mr Scott pointed out that H’s expert on French law, Mr Godefroy had explained that the alleged agreement with W’s parents was a “gentlemen’s agreement” under Article 1101 of the French Civil Code and would be recognised. Even if there were a “gentlemen’s agreement” between H and W on one part and R5 and R6 on the other, as mentioned earlier, there was no evidence that H had any taken any steps in meeting his side of the bargain. W’s evidence during the trial was that it was H who was not able to give R5 the one acre of land in ______ , and that all deals were off and that it was H who reneged on the agreement.

363.  Having considered the evidence, I am not satisfied that there was sufficient evidence of any common intention constructive trust or any agreement that R5 and R6 were to hold the S____ Land on trust for W. As for the alleged resulting trust, this only appeared in H’s Trial Affirmation. In light of the S____ Note, whatever amounts paid to R5 and R6 were, on H’s case, in the nature of a loan. H’s allegation of a resulting trust cannot stand.

364.  I find more probable than not that the agreement or understanding between the Parties on one part and W’s parents on the other was that (i) the total sum paid by H (or the Parties and whether through Intero/Bremen) for the acquisition of the S____ Land was to be regarded as a loan to R5 (and/or R6); (ii) R5 was to be transferred one acre of land in ______ from H as compensation or sourcing fee for the S____ Land; (iii) upon being transferred the one acre of land in ______ , R5 and R6 were to transfer the S____ Land to W by way of a gift; and (iv) upon the transfer of the S____ Land to W, the loan and interests due from R5 would be regarded as fully paid.

365.  As to who reneged on the agreement first and whether R5 and R6 should repay the total sum paid by H (and W) is a matter for separate litigation between H (and W) on one part and R5 and R6 on the other. It is also unclear as to whether such claim will be statute barred, whether under the US law or French law. In any event, due to uncertainties in enforcing their claim, if any, against R5 and R6, I do not regard the S____ Land or the amount of funds paid by the Parties out of the matrimonial funds should be regarded as a financial resource of the Parties in the foreseeable future, nor should they be added to the Family Pot for division.

(III) The V___ Land – Issue 7

(1) Background

366.  There are 4 parcels of land in V___, namely, AV 266, AV 329, AV 331 and AV 391, with R5 (and/or R6) being registered legal title owner. According to W, one parcel was gifted to her mother R6, two parcels inherited by her father R5, and AV331 was bought by R5.

367.  The expression “V___ Land” seemed to have been applied by the Parties to sometimes referring to all 4 parcels and sometimes to only one of the 4 parcels, namely AV 391.

368.  According to H, W’s interests or inheritance in the V___ Land should be regarded as her assets/financial resources. The Parties however gave different evidence as to the present health condition of R5 and R6. H alleged that R5 and R6 are respectively 79 and 71 years old, and are currently in poor health, in that R5 is taking anti-depressive and anxiety medications and R6 has major eye issues and is also chronically depressed.

369.  On the other hand, W’s evidence was that R5 is 81 years old and R6 is 72. According to W, her parents are in good health[225].

(2) The Parties’ respective case

370.  H’s case in relation to the V___ Land was again rather confusing. In paragraph 101 of his Trial Affirmation, he had referred to “various parcels of land” in V___ as being the “V___ Land” and he alleged that (i) W would receive the V___ Land based on the French heirship laws in ________[226]; (ii) R5 had told W that if she wanted one of the parcels AV391 she should obtain a building permit for the land in her own name and in December 2015, W had told him that AV391 would be put in her name by R5 during summer of 2016[227]; (iii) the V___ Land is held by R5 and R6 on constructive trust and/or resulting trust for W[228].

371.  Each of the above cases is different. Under (i), W would only receive her share of the V___ Land including AV391 after the death of her parents. Under (ii), it appears that H was alleging that AV391 was promised to W by R5, or was to be a gift inter vivos to W, upon W obtaining a building permit. H’s case under (iii) is completely different from (i) or (ii).

372.  As for W, in her Trial Affirmation, W’s evidence was that in around 1998 before she met H, she started discussing with her parents a building project, which involved building a house on “a parcel of their land” to generate rental income to be then shared between her parents as land owners and W, as “payment” for her work in the project. W said the project was actually discussed with her siblings but none of them was interested. After she and H became a couple, H was keen to put such a plan to work.

373.  During the trial, W had said that when she first discussed the project with her parents in around 1998, it was about AX331. Then after she met H, the project turned to AV391 as AX331 has no view, and AV391 has a better view.

374.  According to W, the project took a long time and it took 5 years just to complete the building plan in December 2015. She applied for a building permit in December 2015, which was issued to W on 29 July 2016 (“Building Permit”)[229]. The Building Permit had referred to 2 plot numbers “AV0744, 743”, which according to W, were sub-division numbers of AV391.

375.  W said that by the time the Building Permit was issued, the marriage was already falling apart, and the project never commenced. The Building Permit was only valid for 2 years and had expired on 28 July 2018[230]. According to W, the project will not happen.

(3) The evidence

376.  As pointed out by Mr Todd, in H’s Closing Submissions, his case appeared to have rested on (1) the concept of forced heirship under French law; and (2) the fact of W having applied for and obtained a building permit in respect of AV391.

377.  In reply, it was submitted on behalf of H that as set out in H’s Closing, that the V___ Land had been “allocated” to W and was a project that H and W had been working on together for a number of years[231]. Thus, it seems that H was referring to only AV 391.

378.  As said earlier, in paragraph 101 of H’s Trial Affirmation, the V___ Land was referred by H to “various parcels” and not merely AV 391. In any event, even if W were to inherit all 4 parcels of V___ Land as part of her inheritance under the forced heirship laws, it does not mean that all 4 parcels of the land would be inherited solely by her.

379.  As for H’s case that AV391 was promised or allocated to W by R5, H had said in his Trial Affirmation that W had told him that the V___ Land/AV 391 was undergoing conveyance to her so that she could commence the building of a villa and that he believed that it was only as a result of these proceedings that W had told her parents not to complete the conveyance so that she did not have those assets in her legal name[232].

380.  At present, there is a house standing on AV391 belonging to W’s parents[233]. According to W, her parents live in the house when they are in ________ although R5 had not been there recently due to his medical issues and also the pandemic. W’s parents’ house occupies only one portion of AV391 and the plan was to allow W to build on the unoccupied portion of AV391. The Parties had instructed architects to prepare architectural drawings/plans for an intended villa to be built and the plans were sent to the Parties in March 2014[234]. The emails which W had with the architect showed that R5 was shown the plans and that R5 wanted his land to be partitioned into two lots before the plans were submitted for a building permit[235]. The Parties then instructed a “geometre-expert” Mr ____ B____ on about 14 April 2015 for the partition/division of the land. Mr B____’s quotation for his fee was EUR 1,680[236]. According to an email dated 3 July 2015 sent by Mr B____ to W, the expert said he had finally received the division from the land registry[237].

381.  It was not really disputed that the costs for the architectural plans and for the expert Mr B____ were paid by H (and W) out of matrimonial/family funds. H had produced a transfer instructions to HSBC for transfer of a sum of EUR 5,000 for the final payment to the architect on 19 December 2015 for the architectural plans[238].

382.  H had also relied on an attestation of a right of way (“Attestation”)[239] in which R5 was described as the owner of plots AV 744 & 743 1017, located in V___ and W was described as “Maitre d’ouvrage”, or owner of the construction project of a single-family house on AV 744. It states that the access to parcel AV 743 will be via an existing passageway and that the land division has just been completed, and it will be necessary to create a right of way at the level of the existing road if the plots change ownership. W had agreed to leave the existing access for the existing building. The Attestation bore W’s signature and the date in 2016 had not been completed presumably because R5 had not yet signed the document.

383.  H had also relied on those what’s app messages mentioned earlier on he had with W, in particular those on 10 August 2016 which had H’s annotation of the subject matter “[W] talks about arguments about splitting the inheritance land between siblings”[240]. However, although W had said she asked R5 15 years ago and that R5 had told everyone that they had a right to all the property and whoever came to him with a desire and willingness to build would get their first choice, it was clear from those messages which started at 8:51am until 9:22am and started again at 12:48pm until 1:24pm, that there was a serious disagreement among the siblings about W getting the land she wanted, and that W was quite upset. She ended up by saying “ 5 fxxxxxx years of working on that plan and it is fxxxxx up”[241].

384.  When W was asked during cross examination why the Building Permit was issued to her, she said she had R5’s permission to apply. She denied that she was entitled to the plot, and maintained that she (and H) were to share with R5 the rental income of the villa when built. However, when asked what was the arrangement of the rental income sharing with R5, W then said it was never discussed as it took such a long time to get it done, as H wanted a lap pool constructed and that they did not know how much it would cost and she got a quotation of about EUR 2.7m to EUR 3.3m to build, and that even if she and H were still together, it was too expensive. W denied that the land was to be hers and it was never registered in her name and that her parents could sell it.

385.  H had also referred to the email of 4 November 2015 sent to W in which he had asked her to get the S____ Note attached to be signed by R5. In this email, H had also asked W to make a list for R5 for him to follow the steps involved in relation to V___. H had said he thought the only steps left were (a) the valuation split between all the inheritance properties and (b) signing over the inheritance gift and title documents to W, saying that it sounded like it could be achieved in one final meeting with Mr C_____ in December[242]. There was no particular mention about AV391 being singled out and transferred to W.

386.  In relation to AV391, H’s expert Mr Godefroy had opined that it seemed obvious that this parcel of land had been donated to W by her parents as a part of an inheritance given in advance[243] and he had set out rights of the heirs according to the French law and that W, as a forced heir out of 4 children, will thus be entitled ¼ of the inheritance.

387.  W’s expert Ms Tasteyre had however pointed out that notwithstanding the rules of forced heirship, under French law, an individual can choose to use up all the assets in his/her estate during his/her lifetime and there is absolutely no obligation to keep assets for one’s issue, but for the protection of children and their descendants, there is the “reserved portion” of the estate that cannot be freely disposed of and which must be divided in equal shares between the protected heirs. For more than 3 children, the “reserve portion” will be ¾ of the estate.

388.  Ms Tasteyre however pointed out that the inheritance laws and the principles attached will only be applied upon death and until then there is no guarantee that there will be anything left in the estate to distribute since there is no obligation to keep anything for the heirs[244].

389.  Having considered all the evidence, although it appears that it was indeed R5’s intention that whoever of his 4 children first came up with a building plan and was willing to pay for the building thereon, that child would have a first choice of a parcel of land, this does not mean that the value of that parcel of land will not be taken into account against that child’s share of his/her “inheritance properties”. What is clear is that the Building Permit has now lapsed and W will have to re-apply and in any event, W will have to invest further sums in building a villa, whether in accordance with the previous architectural plan or otherwise.

390.  Further, even if AV 391 were to be transferred to W, this would have to be accounted for as part of her inheritance under the forced heirship. Finally, there is no guarantee that there will be anything left in the estate of R5 and R6 to distribute since there is no obligation on their part to keep anything for their heirs. Although R5 and R6 had/have some health issues, there was no sufficient evidence that R5 and R6 were in poor health at the time of the trial, or that W’s inheritance would be a resource to her in the foreseeable future.

391.  Having regard to all above said, I am of the view that the V___ Land should not be included as part of the Family Pot.

(IV) Potential Inheritance K__ __ M___ – Issue 11

392.  K__ __ M___ is a house in _______ where H’s parents lived until recently when they were said to have moved into the M______ Apartment. The legal title of K__ __ M___ is held jointly by H’s brother and his mother.

393.  W had produced a copy of the Mother’s 2011 Will, namely the will made by H’s mother on 29 September 2011[245] in which H’s mother bequeathed her half share of K__ __ M___ to H so that H and his brother would be joint owners. According to W, the arrangement arose in 2003/2004 when H’s parents asked H and W for a loan of around USD 120,000 to repay debts, buy 2 cars and build a pool in the backyard of their house, in exchange for which H would receive half of the house in inheritance. It was also W’s case that shortly before Mother’s 2011 Will, H’s mother also had H make a will, namely H’s 2011 Will, which was executed in _____ on 15 May 2011, in which H bequeathed his estate to W and the Children[246].

394.  It was H’s case that the land was purchased by his brother in around 1986, and that his brother added their mother’s name to the title to give her a sense of security should anything ever happen to H’s father, and that H’s mother was merely a nominee.

395.  Then in H’s Trial Affidavit, H suddenly produced for the first time two documents: (i) a document dated 1 November 2017 purported to be a new will made by his mother (“Mother’s 2017 Will”)[247]; and (ii) a letter allegedly from H’s parents (signed by H’s father only) to H of 7 July 2013[248].

396.  In Mother’s 2017 Will, H’s mother bequeathed all her real and personal estate to H’s father and in the event of H’s father predeceasing her, she bequeathed all her estate to H’s brother and further clarified that K______ M___ belongs to H’s brother and that he added her name as a nominee only.

397.  In H’s parents’ purported letter of 7 July 2013, H’s parents stated reasons why they would like to bequeath H’s mother’s share of K______ M___ to H’s brother, including that H’s brother had not been as fortunate as H with his career. Mr Todd pointed out that in a letter dated 11 January 2017 from H’s brother, he was seeking confirmation that as General Manager of JD (as defined later) his annual salary would be USD 200,000. Thus, it did not appear that H’s brother was doing too badly, but I accept H’s brother’s salary was only half of H’s monthly basic income as stated in his 1st Form E in February 2017.

398.  In any event, as pointed out by Mr Todd, H’s case was inconsistent. In my view, it simply did not make sense. If H’s mother was/is holding her 1/2 share for H’s brother as nominee as stated in Mother’s 2017 Will, then there would be no need for her to try to justify why she is bequeathing her 1/2 share to H’s brother. Further, in Mother’s 2017 Will, she is not bequeathing her 1/2 share to H’s brother but to H’s father.

399.  What is clear is that the legal title of K______ M___ is held by H’s mother and brother. On the face of it, they are presumed to be the beneficial owners. There were no affirmations filed by H’s mother or brother in support of H’s case that H’s mother was only holding K______ M___ as a nominee. I find there was no sufficient evidence why the beneficial interest in K______ M___ should not follow the legal title.

400.  Although Mother’s 2017 Will was not notarised, there is nothing to stop H’s mother to make a new will and to bequeath her half share in K______ M___ to any one she wants. There is no sufficient evidence that H’s mother is in poor health. I do not find that the 1/2 share in K_____ M___ is a financial resource for H in the foreseeable future.

(V) Value of the Parties’ assets – Issue 1

(1) The agreed valuations

401.  The parties were able to agree on the value of the following properties:

(1) The M______ Apartment at INR 144m, say @ 0.1, ie HKD 14.4m

(2) The 3 parcels of land in ______ held by Bremen at USD 12.9m

402.  K______ M___ was agreed at INR 107m, @ 0.1, about HKD 14.7m, and 1/2 share is HKD 7.35m. In light of my finding that K______ M___ is not a financial resource for H in the foreseeable future, the valuation is no longer relevant.

403.  The disputed valuations are in respect of Intero, the S___ Land, and the V___ Land. Again, in light of my earlier findings in respect of the S____ Land, and the V___ Land, their present valuations are in my view no longer relevant. The main disputed valuation was over Intero.

(2) Intero Valuation

(i) Intero – generally

404.  In his 1st Sirius Report, Mr Choy concluded that the value of Intero as at 30 September 2020 (“Valuation Date”) was HKD79,696,053.

405.  In the 1st BDO Report , Mr Yeo valued Intero’s assets to be approximately HKD 127.7m and HKD 129.2m subject to change upon provisions of further information[249].

406.  In the 2nd Sirius Report, after correcting the exchange rate, Mr Choy’s valuation of Intero was updated to HKD 79,689,545.

407.  As mentioned earlier, the Joint Intero Statement was only filed after the trial.

408.  In the Joint Intero Statement, Mr Choy’s valuation of Intero was HKD 79.68m and Mr Yeo’s was HKD 122.9m to HKD 151.8m[250].

409.  Mr Scott had complained that Mr Yeo had changed his valuation in the Joint Intero Statement after giving evidence at trial. However, neither side had applied for a further date to be fixed for Mr Choy to be cross examined or to give oral evidence, or for Mr Yeo to be recalled for cross examination and had lodged their Final Submissions based on the reports of their respective experts, and the Joint Intero Statement. Bearing in mind that the experts were only able to meet and to finalize their joint statement after the trial, and as they both owe a duty to the Court in giving expert evidence, I do not find Mr Yeo’s adjustments untoward.

410.  As seen in the 1st BDO Report and Joint Intero Statement, there were a total of 13 items of Intero’s underlying assets and liabilities, and initially the disagreed and/or to be confirmed (TBC) items were as follows:

(1) The GP shares (“GP Shares”)

(2) The LP Investments (“LP Investments”)

(3) The equity interest in FP Limited (“FP Equity”)

(4) The loan to JD FZE (“JD Loan”)

(5) The equity interest in a Singapore brokerage firm (“Equity in Singapore brokerage firm”)

(6) The IP loan (“IP Loan”)

(7) The IP warrant (“IP Warrant”)

(8) The IP RE1 – Project King (“Project King”)

(9) Bremen – intercompany loan (“Bremen Loan”)

(10) The loan owing to the Group for acquisition of the GP Shares (“GP Shares Loan”)

411.  Amongst the above, the most significant difference between the experts was the value of the GP Shares. Mr Choy valued them at HKD 13.24m and Mr Yeo initially valued them at HKD 50.72m to 52.24m[251], which he maintained in his oral evidence. In the Joint Intero Statement, Mr Yeo’s latest value was between HKD 46.98 to HKD 75.86m.

(ii) Intero – GP Shares

Article II of the Employee Shareholder Agreement

412.  Mr Yeo had been criticised for questioning in his 1st BDO Report whether the unsigned Employee Shareholder Agreement should be relied on. In fact, it seemed that both experts were referring to the unsigned copy. H had produced a copy of the signed Employee Shareholder Agreement dated 4 November 2010 in his 2nd Answers of 9 April 2018[252]. It was not clear why the experts were not provided with the signed copy by their instructing solicitors. Anyway, it was clear from paragraph 19(i) of the 1st BDO Report, Mr Yeo had considered section 2.7(d) under Article II “RESTRICTION ON TRANSFER, RIGHTS” (“Article II”). During the trial, when asked, Yeo agreed that Intero would be bound by the restrictions therein (“Transfer Restrictions”).

413.  In the 1st Sirius Report, Mr Choy adopted the dividend discount model (DDM) to be the more appropriate method to value the GP Shares and valued them to be HKD 13.24m. As seen in the 1st BDO Report[253], Mr Yeo pointed out a number of issues in Mr Choy’s method of calculations and concluded that Mr Choy’s valuation of the GP Shares was understated.

414.  As seen in the Joint Intero Statement, the main area of disagreement between the experts is over whether the fair market value of the GP Shares should be excluded after H’s 65th year under the DDM method.

415.  Section 2.1 of the Transfer Restrictions under Article II essentially stipulates that the employee cannot transfer his/her GP Shares without (i) written consent of a majority of the Board (as defined therein) and (ii) satisfying the requirements of sections 2.2, 2.3, 2.6 or 2.7 under Article II , as applicable.

416.  Under section 2.2, the Group has the first right to acquire the shares which the employee offered to transfer to a third party subject to the terms set out therein (“Purchase Rights”).

417.  However, under section 2.7 (d), as pointed out by Mr Yeo, the Group shall have no right to purchase the shares held by the employee shareholder once the employee shareholder has reached the age of 65. In other words, upon H reaching the age of 65, the Group shall no longer have any of the Purchase Rights in respect of the GP Shares held by H through Intero.

418.  In light of section 2.7(d), Mr Yeo is of the view that the market value of the shares after H’s 65th year should be taken into consideration.

419.  On the other hand, Mr Choy was of the view that (i) it would be very difficult to ensure that the Group would still exist after 15 years; (ii) the value of the dividend payments after H’s 65th year would be subject to significant discount when considering the time value of money; (iii) the estimation of long-term dividend payments was always subject to uncertainty; (iv) the valuation of HKD 13.2m would still be within the valuation range even if post 65th year dividends were included.

Whether the Group will still exist after 15 years (or 14 years from now)

420.  So far as (i) was concerned, Mr Yeo however pointed out that a basic valuation assumption in adopting the DDM method, or income approach, is that the business being valued will exist perpetually, and therefore it is not necessary to predict or ensure how long the business will continue to exist, and therefore, ignoring the value of the GP Shares after H’s 65th year is incorrect and contradicts the model Mr Choy adopted[254].

421.  I find that there was no basis, nor was there any sufficient evidence to say that the Group would not continue to exist after 15 years. As had been pointed out by Mr Yeo, according to the Group’s website, it was managing some USD 40b of capital across different assets classes. Further, based on the total dividends declared by the Group of USD 40.0m in 2016 and USD 67.5m in 2020, the compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of the dividends was about 13.98% and the Group’s profits had been improving[255].

Whether H is likely to leave the Group before he is 55 years of age

422.  Under the terms of the Employee Shareholder Agreement, the GP Shares could be repurchased at HKD 1 if H left the Group before his 55th birthday. Mr Choy pointed out that “it is common to see turnover of staff in the job market” and thus, he had assumed and applied a decreasing percentage on the probability of H leaving the Group between the ages of 51 and 55 (starting at 90% and decreasing by 10% each year), and that this probability percentage was then used to reduce the projected annual dividend income during those years up to the 65th year. The discount was over 40% between the 56th and 65th year.

423.  Mr Scott pointed out that Mr Yeo had similarly adopted the starting turnover rate of 10% in Appendix 8 of his 1st BDO Report[256]. However, Mr Yeo had made it clear that this probability percentage was unnecessary [257]. Mr Yeo had also made clear at the outset that he disagreed with Mr Choy’s approach, and what Mr Yeo was setting out in Appendix 8 was merely adopting Mr Choy’s valuation assumptions and inputs and performed a valuation of the GP Shares using the DDM method and the result was that he had arrived at 4 times Mr Choy’s valuation.

424.  In the Joint Intero Statement, Mr Yeo had made it clear that the adoption of 10% was arbitrary[258]. Mr Choy on the other hand said that the 10% assumption was based on the turnover rate of fund managers in Mainland China.

425.  Mr Yeo however pointed out that notwithstanding H had mentioned that it was possible that he might leave the Group before reaching 55 years old and/or his employment might be terminated, it would not be logical for H to leave the Group before he reaches the age of 55 years and to forego the GP Shares which are worth at least HKD 13.24m according to H’s own expert Mr Choy.

426.  On the other hand, Mr Scott submitted that it was obvious that H’s bonuses had collapsed over the last several years, and that H would have good reason to leave the Group if he were offered a higher salary/bonus. H’s own evidence was that chances were low that performance based organization would keep someone like him who had not performed and received very little in the way of performance related bonus.

427.  Mr Scott further pointed out that W had admitted in her evidence that at one stage H felt he was going to lose his job and there was a period of time he was having some issues at work and the Parties had looked into schools for the Children in ______ . However, W’s evidence about looking into schools for the Children in ______ was when the Parties were together as a family and that was some years ago. W had also said clearly that no application for the school had actually been made by her in the end.

428.  During the trial, H suddenly said he was looking for another job and that he had attended interviews with a headhunter a year ago. But he admitted that he had not made any formal application for another job. H had produced no evidence to support that he was looking for another job. I also find his oral evidence inconsistent with his written evidence. As pointed out by Mr Todd, H’s evidence in his own Trial Affirmation was that he hoped that after the conclusion of the present proceedings, he would continue to work for the Group at the same level until his retirement at age 60 or 65 years old[259]. Having considered all the evidence, I find no sufficient evidence that H was planning to leave the Group in the next 4 years (by now, he is 51 years old), nor was there any sufficient evidence that his employment might be terminated.

The annual dividend payment

429.  Mr Choy assumed a constant annual dividend payment of USD 440,000 would be paid to H from 51 years to 65 years old regardless of the business growth of the Group. Mr Choy’s scenarios of the dividend payment period were all based on reduced sums from his initial dividend payment USD 440,000 (up to 65) as he applied different years to arrive at the average annual dividend.

430.  In Appendix 6 of the 1st BDO Report[260], Mr Yeo calculated the CAGR of the dividends received by Intero in the 5 years between 2016 and 2020 and arrived at a CAGR for the dividends of 5.65%.

431.  Mr Choy however pointed out that there was no dividend at all in 2015 and if the years 2017 to 2020 were used, the CAGR would be negative, ie -1.74% and there was also a risk of further dilution of Intero’s shares, which had fallen by over a third from 1.415% to 0.84% between 2016 and 2020, and that Mr Yeo had not taken into account the dilution.

432.  In his 2nd Sirius Report, Mr Choy had also said that he could not be persuaded to accept a long-term growth rate assumption to be applied in the valuation of the GP Shares without detailed financial information and the dividend payment policy information[261].

433.  The lack of detailed financial information is a matter which has clearly hampered the experts. Mr Yeo was of the view that the shareholding held by Intero was not relevant as the DDM valuation was based on the dividends received by Intero over 2016 and 2020. In fact, it would appear to me that as the dilution of the shares mentioned by Mr Choy was between 2016 and 2020, it would make even more sense to look at the dividends between those years. In any event, I find Mr Yeo was entitled to look at the dividends over 5 years between 2016 and 2020 and that in my view, his adoption of 5.65% for CAGR of the dividends of the GP Shares was reasonable.

The ROE/COE rate

434.  Mr Choy had used a return on earnings (ROE) rate of 15.79% to discount the dividends to present value.

435.  In his 1st BDO Report, Yeo had pointed out no supporting documents or research details were provided by Mr Choy to support his ROE rate of 15.79%. Further, Mr Yeo pointed out that Mr Choy should have used the cost of equity (COE) instead of the ROE in computing his discount rate[262]. Mr Yeo then produced a COE of 10.15% as seen in Appendix 7 of his 1st BDO Report.

436.  Mr Choy however considered that Mr Yeo’s comment regarding the difference on ROE and COE was irrelevant as the discount rate Mr Choy used was the ‘required’ return on equity, ie the same as COE. He disagreed with Mr Yeo’s 10.15% as it was an aggressive assumption.

437.  The two experts then set out their respective arguments on the COE. Having considered their evidence, and without hearing oral evidence from Mr Choy, and in view of the lack of financial information available to the two experts, I have come to the view it is reasonable to adopt the average of their rates, ie 12.97%. Mr Yeo had also included a “Sensitivity Analysis 2” based on 12.97% in Appendix 5b of the Joint Intero Statement[263] in which a figure of HKD 46,978,672 was arrived at, or HKD 46.98, which formed the lower figure for his updated valuation.

438.  Having regard to all said above, I find that the value for the GP Shares to be at least HKD 46.98m.

439.  In fact the “Company” under section 2.6(b) of the Employee Shareholder Agreement the Group also has a Purchase Right in the event of the divorce of the employee shareholder if the spouse of the divorced shareholder acquires or obtains the right to acquire any of shares held by the divorced shareholder, at a price per share equal to the Company’s net book value per share as shown in the most recent audited financial statement[264].

440.  Thus, there was no reason why audited financial statements of the Company could not made available for W to consider this option or obtained by H for the experts for their valuation.

(iii) Intero – LP Investments

441.  The LP Investments represented H’s/Intero’s investments different funds managed by the Group. As at the Valuation Date, there were 4 funds and regularly updated account statements of those funds had been provided by H. Mr Choy relied on the net asset value of those funds in arriving at his valuation was HKD 2.79m, namely by adding up the net asset values of the individual underlying funds and their respective pre-funded capital and then applied a 30% DLOM (discount for lack of marketability).

442.  The main dispute between the experts is the DLOM. Mr Yeo’s valuation of the LP Investments was HKD 3.99m, without the 30% DLOM. Mr Yeo disagreed that a DLOM should be applied to the investment capital as these were cash balances, instead of fair value.

443.  Mr Choy admitted that the details of the underlying investments of the funds are important for the fund valuation, and without such information, the valuation could not be completed. However Mr Choy considered that a limited partner, ie the fund investor, always has difficulties obtaining information regarding the underlying investments of a fund due to confidentiality issues and thus the investors will be provided with funds statements to show the values of their current investments.

444.  As for the 30% DLOM, Mr Choy was of the view that this type of fund investments was long term and illiquid and usually subject to transfer restrictions. Mr Choy was also of the view that it would be difficult to seek investors to replace the positions of existing investors and any transfer would usually incur high administration costs and other restrictive expenses and he explained that the 30% DLOM was a reduction from the 40% set out in a research document titled “2020 Edition of Stout Restricted Stock Companion Guide” published by Stout Risius Ross, llC (“Stout’s Research”) given that the fund investments would commonly have a defined investment period.

445.  Mr Yeo disagreed with Mr Choy’s view that a small limited partner might not be able to obtain information of the underlying investments of fund and Mr Yeo was of the view that any limited partner, small or big, should be receiving the regular (eg annual, half-yearly or even quarterly) reports of the underlying investments of the fund they have invested and that Mr Yeo cited the example of Project King (as set out later), the quarterly and annual reports of the fund were obtained by Intero even though Intero was only a minority shareholder of Project King.

446.  What is clear that H’s failure to provide the underlying investments of the funds has again handicapped the experts. I agree with Mr Yeo and I find it surprising that H was not able to information of the underlying investments of the funds he had invested. Further, Mr Yeo had referred to a quarterly report of another of the Group’s own funds provided by W as an illustration, which report demonstrated that the Group does prepare and issue quarterly reports of their proprietary funds to the investors of funds[265].

447.  Having considered the above, I find there was no reasonable explanation provided by H as to why similar reports could not have been provided for the LP Investments. I am prepared to draw the adverse inference against H and adopt Mr Yeo’s valuation of HKD 3.99m for the LP Investments.

(iv) Intero – FP Equity

448.  Intero held 1,000 ordinary shares or 2.2% equity interest in FP Limited(FP) as at Valuation Date. In his 1st Sirius Report, Mr Choy valued the FP Equity to be HKD 1.2m. On the other hand, in his 1st BDO Report, Mr Yeo valued it to be HKD 5.37m and in the Joint Intero Statement, Mr Yeo’s final valuation was HKD 4.49m.

449.  As set out in the Joint Intero Statement, the areas of dispute between the experts were: (i) whether FP was engaging in a similar business as F Capital; (ii) whether the results for the financial period between January and December 2020 should be used; (iii) whether a P/E multiple of 13.8x should be used; (iv) whether the fair value of non-operating assets should be assessed and added back to the valuation result; (v) whether the DLOM should be applied before adding back non-operating assets; (vi) what DLOM rate should be applied.

Whether FP was engaging in a similar business as F Capital

450.  Mr Yeo pointed out that from the latest financial statements, FP Limited held long-term receivables due by (i) F ____ Growth Fund Advisors, (ii) FG Limited and (iii) held investments of 100 class B shares in FB Limited, membership interest in FB (US) LLC, and 500 class A shares in F Capital. These loan receivables and investments were identified as “non-operating assets”.

451.  As the details of the business operations of FP were not provided by H, Mr Yeo assumed that FP was engaging in a similar business as F Capital, a UK-based principal investment firm investing in various assets classes, and based on this, Mr Yeo had selected a set of comparable companies.

452.  In fact, in the 1st Sirius Report, Mr Choy had also referred to the website F Capital and F Capital’s business as stated on the website[266].

453.  However, in the 2nd Sirius Report, Mr Choy said he was advised that FP and F Capital are not doing the same businesses, and that F Capital is an asset management company while FP Limited is an advisory firm. Further, although as at Valuation Date, FP Limited held 500 class A shares, these were sold on 22 October 2020 and that those shares were “bought back at par”, and thus FP and F Capital are now two independent companies. The sale of the 500 class A shares in F Capital was only disclosed in the 2nd Sirius Report.

454.  Mr Choy pointed out that the financial statements showed that the major source of revenue was arrangement fee (a kind of service fee) and that the management fee only contributed less than 10% of revenue and there was no performance fee and that asset management company would also have to invest into the funds they manage but FP did not have this kind of investments. Mr Choy further said he was advised that the performance in 2020 was poor for FP Limited due to the Covid-19 and that to ignore this and using 2019 outdated financial information was over-estimating the value of the FP Equity.

455.  As pointed out by Mr Yeo, there was no supporting evidence that FP was/is an investment advisory firm. Mr Yeo noted that based on announcement on 5 November 2015 when FP Limited acquired a minority stake in a London Gin company, FP was in fact described as a UK-based investment firm and F Capital was said to be a subsidiary of FP[267]. Mr Yeo had also pointed out, FP had invested in F Capital. In fact, according to the financial statements, FP held / holds other investments/ non-operating assets.

456.  Due to the lack of supporting information provided by H, I find whether FP was/is an investment management firm or not, and whether it carries out advisory services or not, it would appear that it is at least also an investments holding firm, as appeared in the above announcement and the non-operating assets held by FP.

Whether the results for the financial period between January and December 2020 should be used

457.  At the time of 1st Sirius Report and 2nd Sirius Report, the audited financial statements of FP Limited available were for the year ended 31 July 2018 and from 1 August 2018 to 31 December 2019. In other words, those financial statements for the year 1 January 2020 to 31 December 2020 were not yet available. Mr Choy adopted a pro-rata 12-month earnings based on the 1 August 2018 to 31 December 2020 results.

458.  As Mr Yeo pointed out, the agreed Valuation Date was 30 September 2020 and the results of the year 2020 would include the period after the Valuation Date and thus, Mr Yeo used only the figures for the financial period from 1 August 2018 to 31 December 2019. As further pointed out by Mr Yeo, the profits for the financial period from 1 August 2018 to 31 December 2019 were from the audited financial statements which showed a net profit of USD 2,654,877. For the period of 1 January to 31 December 2020, there was an estimated loss of USD 750,000, but this was an estimate only.

459.  The estimate appeared to be provided in an email dated 14 January 2021 from the managing partner of F Capital to H in relation to the financial performance of FP (“14.01.21 Email”)[268].

460.  As Mr Choy had himself said in his 2nd Sirius Report, he was advised that no updated financial information could be provided for FP Limited.

461.  The problem, as pointed out by Mr Todd, H’s answers often raised even more questions. If indeed according to H, FP and F Capital are two independent companies after FP’s sale of its 500 class A shares in F Capital in October 2020, why was it the managing director of F Capital who sent the 14.01.21 Email in relation to the financial performance of FP.

462.  Without knowing the details of the operating business in relation to FP, it is not possible to say whether and/or how Covid-19 had affected the company’s performance in 2020. It is also not clear when FP was incorporated but it seems from the public announcement referred to earlier on that in 2015, it was already making investments. Further, H was the one who decided to make the investment in FP, which he seems to have held since prior to 2016. It is not clear why audited financial statements of FP for a longer period, say from 2015, could not have been provided by H.

463.  Again, as H was the one who had failed to provide all detailed information, I am prepared to draw an adverse inference against him and I am not prepared to accept an average figure of net profit based on the results from 1 August 2018 and 31 December 2020 only.

Whether a P/E multiple of 13.8x should be used

464.  As for the P/E multiple of 13.8x, according to Mr Choy, it was the median P/S multiple of selected comparable companieslisted in Hong Kong[269]. On the other hand, Mr Yeo pointed out that the details of the business operations of FP Limited were not provided and he was unable to comment on the multiple used until all relevant details had been provided.

465.  As mentioned earlier, Mr Yeo went on to assume that FP was engaging in a similar business as F Capital and selected a set of comparable companies and came up with a P/E multiple of 18.12x.

466.  Mr Yeo also pointed out that notwithstanding Mr Choy now saying that FP is only a small advisory firm, the comparable companies selected by Mr Choy were also investment holding or investment management companies. Further, they were listed in Hong Kong whereas FP is UK based. Also, Mr Choy had used the multiple of 13.79 of a company which is engaged in investment banking and investment management services in Hong Kong.

467.  Again, as the details of the business operations of FP Limited were not provided by H, I am of the view that an adverse inference should be drawn against H, and I will accept Mr Yeo’s P/E multiple of 18.12x.

The remaining disputed areas (iv), (v) and (vi)

468.  Mr Yeo pointed out that Mr Choy did not assess the fair value of non-operating assets and applied the DLOM after adding the costs of the non-operating assets, whereas Mr Yeo applied the DLOM before adding back the non-operating assets. Mr Yeo referred to the Stout’s Research for his calculations in Appendix 10 of his 1st Report and came up with the median discount of 9.6% for the “finance, insurance and real estate industry”, and that he opined that the adopted DLOM of 40% adopted by Mr Choy was much higher than the median discount of 9.6%.

469.  I agree with Mr Yeo there is no reason why the fair value of the non-operating assets should not be assessed. I will not set out the details of the respective arguments of the experts but again, the experts were clearly hampered by the lack of detailed financial information of the operations of FP Limited. Mr Choy had explained that Mr Yeo’s 9.6% was based on a misapplication of Stout’s Research. However, Mr Yeo’s 9.6% was derived from all sample data from the Stout Research, and there was no clear explanation from Mr Choy as to why he adopted 40% for the DLOM.

470.  Doing the best one can, I am of the view that adopting the average of the two rates, ie adopting 24.8 % for the DLOM is reasonable.

Value of the FP Equity

471.  Based on all above said, I accept Mr Yeo’s updated valuation of HKD 4.49m for FP Equity, adopting the 24.8% for the DLOM.

(v) Intero – JD Investment

472.  JD was said by W to be an investment between H and his brother and as seen earlier, H’s brother was said to be receiving an annual salary of USD 200,000 therefrom. Anyway, Mr Choy adopted a valuation of HKD 0.22m for the loan. In the 1st BDO Report, Mr Yeo had indicated he needed more information to confirm. In the Joint Intero Statement, this valuation was agreed at HKD 0.22m.

(vi) Intero – Equity in Singaporean brokerage firm

473.  Intero holds 2,368 shares, or a 1.38% stake in a small Singaporean brokerage firm and Mr Choy proposed HKD 0.10m for this valuation. Although there was a mistake in exchange rate used by Mr Choy, as he pointed out, the difference of HKD 13,491 was immaterial compared to the overall valuation of Interio. Mr Yeo’s valuation was HKD 0.26m originally, and his updated valuation was HKD 0.21m.

474.  Both experts adopted the average implied enterprise value-to-sales (EV/Sales) approach in their valuation as the investment was loss-making. Mr Choy adopted a EV/Sales ratio of 4.72x and Mr Yeo proposed 8.55x.

475.  Mr Choy used two comparable companies of Singaporean brokerage firms facing the same regulatory environment. Mr Yeo based his on 4 comparable companies, including Hong Kong brokerages, and if the Hong Kong listed companies were removed, there were also only two Singaporean firms which had been covered by Mr Choy.

476.  The experts were again divided over the DLOM, namely 40% adopted by Mr Choy and 9.6% adopted by Mr Yeo. Again, I am of the view that an average of 24.80% for DLOM is reasonable. Based on this, Mr Choy’s valuation would be HKD 136,781 and Mr Yeo’s was HKD 213,924.

477.  The nature of the business of the Singaporean brokerage firm is clear and audited annual reports from 1 July 2017 to 30 September 2019 were produced and there was no dispute that the firm was incurring losses. Due to the small difference between the two valuations, I am prepared to adopt a further average of their valuations, making the valuation of this item, namely about HKD 175,000.

(vii) Intero – IP Loan

478.  According to the loan agreement between IP Limited (IP) and Intero, Intero lent USD 87,500 to IP on 1 June 2018 and the loan would mature on 1 June 2021 with an interest rate payable of 10% per year, and 100% of the equity interest of IP was pledged for this loan. IP also issued a warrant to Intero in connection with this loan, and Intero was entitled to purchase up to 20% fully paid and non-assessable shares of IP at an exercise price of HKD 0.01. Intero could exercise the warrant, in whole or in part, any time until 21 May 2021.

479.  According to IP’s website, IP was founded in 2013 and is a boutique Asia-based venture development firm that focuses on real estate, private equity and early-stage venture.

480.  So far as the loan was concerned, this was agreed in the Joint Intero Statement to be HKD 0.81m.

(viii) Intero – IP Warrant

481.  As said, a warrant was issued by IP Limited to Intero in connection with the loan from Intero to IP.

482.  Mr Choy adopted a valuation of 0.09m for IP Warrant, and Mr Yeo indicated a valuation of HKD 0.57m in his 1st BDO Report. In the Joint Intero Statement, Mr Yeo’s updated figure was HKD 0.47m.

483.  Mr Scott pointed out that the difference in the valuations was due to 3 factors: (1) the P/E ratio of 3.15x for the one-man company in the business development stage while Mr Yeo adopted 12.64% of various listed companies ;(2) Mr Choy deducted the estimated tax owed by IP whereas Mr Yeo to concern only the previous years’ losses and ignored last years’ profit; (3) the experts’ difference on the DLOM.

484.  I will adopt the same approach as for the Singapore Brokerage firm, and adopt an average of the two valuations, ie HKD 0.28m.

(ix) Intero – Project King

485.  Intero through another company of IP, namely I Real Estate 1 Limited (IRE1) made an investment of HKD 400,000 into an Hong Kong Real Estate Fund involved in a real estate project, namely the renovation and reposition of a commercial building (a non-performing hotel) for leasing business.

486.  Mr Choy noted from the email of the founder of IP dated 20 January 2021 to H, the net book value as at the Valuation Date would be negative. Mr Choy considered that any appreciation in the investment in Project King was nominal and did not assess the fair value of Project King.

487.  Mr Choy noted from the emails between the founder of IP and H on 16 July 2020 that Project King had a capital deficit of HKD 20m and was looking for re-financing, and that the hotel’s expenses far exceeded its income, and also that it had only HKD 32,201 in cash as at 30 September 2020. Mr Choy had also pointed out that the project faced a lot of uncertainty due to Covid-19.

488.  Mr Yeo accepted that the status of the corporate lease business operated by Project King would be closely aligned to the overall economy in Hong Kong.

489.  However, Mr Yeo pointed out that the agreed Valuation Date was 30 September 2020 and the pandemic was already here since early 2020. As further pointed out by Mr Yeo, the unaudited third quarter report of Project King as at 30 September 2020 indicated the net asset value of the Real Estate Fund should be considered, which was HKD 811,293,115 as at Valuation Date. Further a report issued by IRE1 indicated the valuation of Intero’s investment in Project King was HKD 514,669 as at 30 June 2020.

490.  In light of the above reports, I find Mr Yeo’s valuation of 0.51m for Project King as at the Valuation Date is reasonable.

(x) Intero – Bremen Intercompany loan

491.  As at Valuation Date, there was an intercompany loan due from Bremen, Intero’s direct shareholder of USD 658,839, or about HKD 5,106,000. Mr Choy had added the full amount to the value of Intero. Mr Yeo indicated in his 1st BDO Report that this was a TBC item. The value was then agreed in the Joint Intero Statement.

(xi) Intero – GP Shares Loan

492.  It was H’s case that in order to purchase the GP Shares, he had borrowed USD 130,000 on 31 October 2019 from two companies and USD 254,000 on 31 December 2019 from one of the Group’s companies. The interest rate of both notes is 2.75% per year and they had not expired as at the Valuation Date. Mr Choy set out in his Table 15 under paragraph 4.12.3 of the 1st Sirius Report the outstanding principal and interest being HKD 4,006,796.

493.  Mr Yeo queried in his 1st BDO Report whether the loans should be included as part of the liabilities o Intero as (i) H was the issuer of the promissory notes and not Intero, and no supporting documents had been provided to indicate that the loans had been transferred to Intero at Valuation Date and thus the liabilities remained that of H and not of Intero; (ii) the maturity dates of the notes were 31 October 2019 and 31 December 2019 which were earlier than the Valuation Date and no supporting document or details on any extension upon maturity were provided.

494.  In his 2nd Sirius Report, Mr Choy indicated that he had been advised by H that those loans would be transferred to Intero.

495.  As no supporting documents were produced by H to show that the loans had been transferred to Intero and if they had been, there should be a corresponding consideration paid to Intero to assume the loan. Further, there was no supporting evidence that the maturity dates of the loans had been extended.

496.  Having considered the above, I agree with Mr Yeo, those loans should not be included or impact Intero’s valuation.

(xii) Conclusion on the Intero valuation

497.  There were 3 items of assets of Intero, the valuation of which were agreed, namely (i) the balance in DBS Bank of HKD 20.26m, (ii) the balance in Deutshce Bank of HKD 33.54m and (iii) the balance in Intero’s account with CI, a securities firm of HKD 6.33m. The 3 items totalled HKD 60.13m.

498.  For the 10 disagreed items, the total value as found by this Court or later agreed came to HKD 62.565m, as follows:

(i) GP Shares – 46.98m

(ii) LP Investments – 3.99m

(iii) FP Equity – 4.49m

(iv) JD Investment – 0.22m

(v) Equity in Singapore brokerage firm – 0.175m

(vi) IP Loan – 0.81m

(vii) IP Warrant – 0.28m

(viii) Project King – 0.51m

(ix) Bremen Intercompany loan – 5.11m

(x) GP Shares Loan – nil

499.  The total of the 13 items will come to about HKD 122.695m, or rounded up to HKD 122.70m.

500.  I will make two observations. First, on H’s own case, the shares in Intero were transferred to Bremen on 1 July 2016, and according to H at arms length, for the value of the Promissory Note of USD 10.5m @ 7.8, HKD81.9[270]. There was however no independent valuation provided by him to support how he arrived at the figure of USD 10.5m. In the list of assets for Intero provided by him in January 2017, he listed only 9 items of underlying assets of Intero’s (8 items of assets + 1 liability) and stated that the total valuation for those items (2) to (9) (ranging from dates from September 2016 to January 2017) was HKD 50,650,393 (of which the cash in bank accounts and securities at CI were about HKD 50.16m) with the value of the GP Shares stated to be “unknown”[271]. It would then seem the GP Shares were estimated by H to be some HKD 31.25m, which would seem more than double Mr Choy’s valuation of HKD 13.24m at 30 September 2020. In H’s Trial Affirmation, he had said the value of the Promissory Note had fully reflected the value of the underlying assets set out by him in paragraph 77 therein and he then referred to Mr Choy’s valuation as at 30 September 2020[272]. It was however not clear how H could use Mr Choy’s valuation of Intero in September 2020 to support the consideration of USD 10.5m in July 2016. In any event, H’s own valuation of USD 10.5m (or HKD 81.9m) for Intero as at 1 July 2016 was higher than Mr Choy’s valuation of USD 79.68m as at 30 September 2020.

501.  Second, H’s transfer on 1 November 2012, was stated to be on the same terms and conditions as the Letter of Employment of 1 August 2009. H’s responsibilities for the Group as stated therein are, amongst other things, in connection with sourcing and analysing investments and has included a particular focus on public and private stressed and distressed investments. H thus had some 10 years’ experience in sourcing and analysing investments and he must be fully aware that there would be illiquidity in the investments he made in those private companies through Intero. In fact, he had himself described those private investments as illiquid. H had not made full disclosure of the reasons of his investments, namely there had been no explanation from H as to why he made those illiquid investments.

502.  In any event, having considered the evidence from the two experts, I have come to the view that HKD 122.42m is a reasonable valuation for Intero as at 30 September 2020.

(3) S____ Land

503.  In light of my earlier findings, the present value of the S____ Land would not be relevant. However, I will consider the two experts’ respective evidence, in the event it should become relevant.

504.  W’s expert, Ms. Morvan, had been in real estate only since January 2016 and had been educated in communications. She is a property agent with ________ in ________. Ms Morvan gave evidence through video link from _______. Ms Morvan accepted that her qualifications and expertise were not close to Mr Robin-Clerc’s on urban planning.

505.  H’s expert, Dr Robin-Clerc, has a doctorate in Planning and Urbanism, and is a court expert on real estate appraisals for the Courts of Appeal of Basse-Terre (Guadeloupe) and Bordeaux (France). She gave oral evidence through video link from France.

506.  Their respective valuations are as follows:

Plot Number and areaW’s expert,
Ms Morvan
 

@ approximately EUR 100/ sq m
H’s expert
Dr Robin-Clerc
In N Zone
(light green colour)
@ approximately EUR 500 /sq m
H’s expert
Dr Robin-Clerc
In UR Zone
(pink colour)
@ approximately EUR 900/sq m
AR 169
(area 3,963 sq m)
EUR 390,000 to  420,000EUR 1,982,000EUR 3,567,000
AR 117
(area 2,040 sq m, average slope of 26%, 15 degrees, a difference in level of 17m between the northern highest point and the southern lowest point)
EUR 200,000 to 220,000EUR 1,020,000EUR1,840,000

507.  The basis of Dr Robin-Clerc’s valuation was based primarily on a transaction in 2010 by which the public authority in ________ acquired 6,000 sq m of land at EUR 500 per sq m. It was however not clear why the public authority bought that sizeable piece of land.

508.  What is clear from the experts’ joint statement[273] is that the major difference between the experts appears to lie in whether the current zoning of the S____ Land is likely to remain for 10 years (per Ms Morvan) or may change in the next 3-5 years (per Dr Robin-Clerc). It is noted that in Dr Robin-Clerc’s 1st report of 21 January 2021, she opined that there was no prospect of the S____ Land being rezoned to the UR Zone in the next 3/5 years[274] but in her 2nd report of 3 May 2021, she amended this and said there was such a prospect[275].

509.  I also note that in the 07.02.13 Email mentioned earlier, H seemed to be saying that it was A___ who “unilaterally decided to put the [S____ Land] into green zone” and as stated therein W wanted to “buy, fund cleanup, get it out of green zone however long that takes…”. Thus, it was anticipated that it would take time to “get it out of green zone”, and it appeared that steps had to be taken before the S____ Land could be taken out of Green Zone.

510.  In light of Ms Morvan’s evidence that the town zoning map she used was one issued by the authority in December 2020, I accept her evidence that that it did not seem likely that there would be a change in the zoning by the authority in the next 3-5 years, but this would not mean any purchaser of the land could not make an application for changing the zone, but there was no evidence as to whether this was possible or how long it would take.

511.  On the other hand, Dr Robin-Clerc has pointed out that the S____ Land is not in “N1a zone”, ie the “dark green zone” and that it is only in “light green zone”. Dr Robin-Clerc agreed that Ms Morvan’s valuation of EUR 100 per sq m would be appropriate if the S____ Land is in the N1a zone, or “dark green zone”. Further, she pointed out that the S____ Land is “located near a beautiful road next to some shopping and convenient facilities, next to some houses being building around, and there is no prospect it will ever be a national park, and that it is in a buildable zone”.

512.  H had said that R5 was helping the Parties in identifying a number of distressed real estate opportunities in ________ and ______ and the S____ Land came up. As the evidence showed, H /the Parties had hoped to make “multiples”, presumably when one day they managed to move the S____ Land out of Green Zone. As found earlier, in 2014/2015, the Parties had only paid about USD 225,000 for the S____ Land. Even if they paid R5 and A___ of about USD 100,000 (as proposed by H in one of the emails) or do a swap with R5 for 1 acre of land in ______ worth about USD 200,000, this would make the total payments by the Parties (in cash and in kind) in the region of some USD 325,000 - USD 425,000.

513.  Prices of land in ________ may have gone up since 2014/2015 but at present, the zoning has not yet been changed. Looking at the progress of the Legal Action and the Demarcation Action, the change of zoning may take time, and generally it may take time to sell in light of the current global pandemic. However, it seems that there may be a purchaser, similar to H, who would buy while the land is still in Green Zone and then moves to change the zone. Having considered this, I find that Ms Morvan’s valuation may be over conservative. On the other hand, although Dr Robin-Clerc is an accredited expert, she is not a property agent in ________, and when it comes to estimating a sale value, one would have to depend on a local agent.

514.  Taking a broad brush approach, I am of the view that the present value would be somewhere between EUR 100 and EUR 500, and I find that the median figure EUR 300 would be a reasonable value per sq m for the S____ Land.

(4) AV 391

515.  Again, in light of my earlier finding, the present value of the plot is not really relevant. Further, where the Parties were planning to build a villa and for which W was applying for a building permit was on only one portion of the land, and there is an existing house on the other portion which, according to W, was then still being used by W’s parents when they were in ________. However, Ms Morvan’s valuation was based on the entire lot of AV 391.

516.  Anyway, both experts agree that AV 391 is 1,939 sq m in UR zone land with a good sea view. Dr Robin-Clerc values AV 391 at EUR 4,317,000 for the land plus the existing house which was built on 1,023 sq m, whereas Ms Morvan values it at EUR 3 to 3.2m, or about EUR 3.1m.

517.  Ms Morvan’s evidence during the trial as to whether her valuation was based only on land or with the existing house was rather confusing. In her report, she did state there was a residential house on the land which was well maintained and in good condition although she had said it was not what one would call a “luxury villa” and did not add much value to the plot[276].

518.  If Ms Morvan’s valuation is only of the land, then this would mean the land is between EUR 1,547 to EUR 1,650 per sq m, or about EUR 1,600 per sq m, which is substantially more than Dr Robin-Clerc’s valuation of the land at EUR 1,100 per sq m. Further, Ms Morvan did not consider the division between the land where the existing house was and the residual land.

519.  According to Dr Robin-Clerc, the residual land is 916 sq m, and the estimated value is EUR 1,007,600. I accept her valuation of the residual land.

520.  For the entire plot with the existing house, I am of the view that the value would be somewhere between the two experts’ valuations, namely about EUR 3.7m.

(5) Other 3 plots of the V___ Land

521.  Dr Robin-Clerc adopts EUR 200 per sq m across the board for N1a zone (dark green zone), EUR 500 per sq m for N zone, and EUR 1200 per sq m for UR zone. On the other hand, Ms Morvan considered each plot individually and came up with a valuation for each plot. Again, I am of the view the average of the two valuations would be reasonable.

(VI) Computation of the assets: the Family Pot

(1) Generally

522.  The Parties have filed an agreed Scott Schedule of Assets and Liabilities (“Scott Schedule”).

523.  First, in relation to the credit card charges, there was no sufficient evidence that those outstanding amounts are capital liabilities and the charges seemed to be the recurring spending or monthly expenses of the Parties under Sections 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3 of their respective Form Es. I am of the view that they should not be treated as liabilities against capital.

524.  Second, the amounts paid for litigation funding will be considered separately.

(2) Assets held by/available for W

525.  In W’s Updated Form E, she gave her interests in her bank accounts to be HKD 77,634.40 and HKD 30,000 for her valuable personal items[277]. In the Scott Schedule, the balance of her bank accounts was reduced to about HKD 17,559, whereas H said should be HKD 66,634.40, which appeared to be the total balances in W’s bank accounts as at 31 March 2021. W closed 3 of her 4 bank accounts in March 2021 and opened a new account with HSBC in April 2021 and HKD 17,559 was her updated balance in her new account.

526.  It was not quite clear as to the whereabouts of the balances in her previous accounts, but she was not really cross examined over this. There was no sufficient evidence that in April/May 2021, W had cash in her bank accounts of HKD 66,634.40.

527.  In the Scott Schedule, H had also alleged that W’s valuable personal items were HKD 400,000, but W had said household furniture and electronics and other household items could not be sold as they were being used and most were between 10 and 15 years old. As for jewellery and 6 Persian carpets, W was not cross examined on it. There was no sufficient evidence that W had valuables of HKD 400,000 and I accept W’s figure of HKD 30,000.

528.  I thus find assets held under W’s personal name to be about HKD 47,559 (being HKD 17,559 + HKD 30,000).

529.  W alleged that H owed her reimbursements for payments under the MPS Order. Those amounts were disagreed by H, and there is no reason why W cannot proceed with enforcement in usual manner, if so advised.

(3) Assets held by H/available for H

530.  Under Part 2.2 of H’s Form E (landed properties in Hong Kong or elsewhere), in light of my earlier finding that the disposition made by H of his interest in M______ Apartment to his father R4 shall be set aside, the value of M______ Apartment should be added back to be assets held by H, namely INR 144,000,000, or HKD 15,840,000. As for rental, according to W, there was rental income for 56 months of INR 325,000 per month, or a total of INR 18,200,000. However there would have to be expenses in connection with the apartment. There was no sufficient evidence as to what the net figure should be. I will disregard the rental. As found earlier, there was no sufficient evidence that H held any interest in K______ M___.

531.  Under Part 2.3 (bank accounts), in light of my finding in relation to the K___ Accounts, the funds transferred out of the K___ Accounts of INR 17,133,000, or HKD 1,796,607.02 should be added back to form part of assets under H’s name. I accept W’s figure for the balance in H’s bank accounts, namely a total of HKD 6,308,908.

532.  Under Part 2.4 (H’s shareholding/beneficial interest in private companies), in light of my earlier finding that H’s dispositions of his shares in Intero and Bremen to the US Trusts should be set aside, the value of H’s shares in those two companies should be added back as assets held by H.

533.  As set out earlier, my finding of the value of H’s share/interest in Intero is around HKD 122.42m. As for Bremen, the value of the land in ______ was agreed at USD 1.29m, or @ 7.75, HKD 9.9975m. As the sum of the intercompany loan of HKD 5.11m was added to Intero, I agree that sum should be regarded as Bremen’s liability and Bremen’s value is about HKD 4.89m (HKD 9.9975m – HKD 5.11m).

534.  Under Part 2.7 (stocks, bonds and other quoted securities/investments), the balance in H’s brokerage accounts/securities was agreed to be HKD 16,955 as at 25 January 2021.

535.  Under Part 2.8 (life insurance etc), I accept the value for ______ Insurance Trust set out by H in the Scott Schedule, namely HKD 2,980,754, being the net of the surrender value at 11 January 2021 less the loan taken out by H secured against the policy to fund the policy premium.

536.  Under Part 2.9 (monies owed to H), there is no reason why the rental deposits paid by H to the Parties’ respective landlords should not be counted as part of H’s assets, as they, or at least part thereof, should be refunded to H upon termination. However, I accept that there may be repair/reinstatement costs charged by the respective landlords. According to H, he had lent HKD 15,458.33 to his father R4 for legal costs for these proceedings. In the Scott Schedule, according to W, the total of monies due to H is about HKD 327,445.33. Allowing some deductions by the respective landlords, I find under this heading, a sum of HKD 300,000 is reasonable.

537.  Under Part 2.10 (valuables), according to H, he no longer owns any cars. There was no sufficient evidence to contradict H’s evidence in this respect. There was no sufficient evidence as to the whereabouts of the 6 silver pieces or W’s alleged figure of HKD 950,000. I accept a value of HKD 100,000 for H’s valuables.

538.  Under Part 2.11 (Other assets), the S____ Land and the V___ Land have been included in the Scott Schedule. In light of my findings earlier, they do not form part of the Family Pot or the Parties’ family resources, or W’s own financial resources.

539.  Under 2.14 (pension/ MPF), there was no sufficient evidence to contradict H’s valuation of MPF to be about HKD 3,716,827 as at 31 December 2020, which I accept.

540.  As for liabilities under Part 2.13 (liabilities), as mentioned earlier, there was no sufficient evidence that the credit card outstanding amounts were capital liabilities. Legal fees should be considered separately under the costs orders. There were no other liabilities set out by H under Part 2.13 of his Updated Form E[278]. In item 71 of the Scott Schedule, W had referred to a loan alleged by H that he borrowed from his friend AW through a company called Cottonwood, and this was in fact referred to in this Court’s decision of 8 June 2020 in relation to H’s then application for downward variation of his payments under the MPS Order[279]. Anyway, H said the loan had been repaid by him, and there was no sufficient evidence to contradict what he said.

541.  The total assets under H’s personal name and/or his financial resources are therefore in the region of HKD 156,163,444:

Part 2.2M______ Apartment:HKD 15,840,000
Part 2.3Bank Accounts:HKD 6, 308,908
Part 2.4Shareholding in private companies, H’s share/interest in the companies at Valuaion Date were: 
 Intero:HKD 122,420,000
 Bremen:HKD 4,480,000
Part 2.7Securities:HKD 16,955
Part 2.8______ Insurance Trust /AIA Policy:HKD 2,980,754
Part 2.9Monies owed to H:HKD 300,000
Part 2.10Valuables:HKD 100,000
Part 2.11Other assets: 
Part 2.12MPF:HKD 3,716,827

542.  Thus, the total of the assets held under by W and H and/or their financial resources amount to approximately HKD156,211,003, as follows:

(A) Assets held by W47,559
(B) Assets held by H156,163,444

(4) Litigation Funding – Issue 8

543.  As seen in various authorities, litigation funding for a spouse may be provided by way of interim periodical payments or maintenance pending suit for the spouse. In the present case, the litigation funding paid to W was paid, not by way of interim periodical payments/maintenance pending suit but by way of various sums from family assets, whether from assets held under H’s personal name and/or from the US Trusts.

544.  According to the Scott Schedule, the total litigation funding distribution from the US Trusts was HKD 14.5m[280]:

To W -Total HKD 6.6m(HKD 1.3m on 7 December 2020 + HKD 5.3m on 1 April 2021)
To H -HKD 5.3m on 1 April 2021: 
To OS -HKD 2.6m( HKD 400,000 on 7 December 2020 + HKD 2.2m on 1 April 2021)

545.  However, it appears from the PwC supplemental report on US tax liability[281], the litigation funding for W, as well as H, had been as follows:

DateAmount received by WAmount received by HRemarks
28.04.17HKD 600,000 Paid by H
28.12.17HKD 600,000 Paid by H
08.05.18HKD 600,000 Paid by H
04.09.18HKD 600,000 Paid by H
11.12.18USD125,000, or
HKD 975,000
USD 125,000, or
HKD 975,000
See Melloy Order of 11.12.18 and paid out of assets held by US Trusts
21.07.20HKD 1,500,000HKD 1,500,000This Court’s Order of 21.05.20 and paid out of assets held by US Trusts
15.12.20HKD 1,300,000HKD1,300,000Paid out of assets held by US Trusts
07.04.21HKD 5,300,000HKD 5,300,000Paid out of assets held by US Trusts

546.  W had thus received a total of HKD 11,475,000 for litigation funding. The initial 4 payments of HKD 600,000 each and totalling HKD 2.4m appeared to be paid by H to W out of assets held in H’s name. However, prior to 11 December 2018, H must have also incurred costs of his own and had paid such costs out of assets held in his name. Since the Melloy Order of 11 December 2018, the rest of the litigation funding was paid out of assets held by the US Trusts on the basis of an equal distribution to H and W.

547.  As the litigation funding was paid by way of capital sums out of the family assets, in my view, they were really advances from the family assets in that had they not been drawn/spent, they would in fact all fall into the Family Pot. On the basis that the costs of H and W being more or less equal[282], I will assume that H had also obtained or spent about HKD 11,475,000 from the family assets for his own costs funding. Such advances to the Parties should be notionally added back to the Family Pot for computation of the total amount for division.

548.  Further, the litigation funding paid to OS of a total of HKD 2,600,000 was also an advance to the OS from the family assets. In my view, this should also be notionally added back to the Family Pot for computation of the total amount for division.

549.  Hence, the total Family Pot should be in the region of HKD 181,761,003, being HKD 156,211,003 (as found earlier on) + HKD 22,950,000 (being approximately the total sums advanced to H and W for their respective litigation funding/costs) + HKD 2,600,000 (being the sum advanced to OS for litigation funding).

550.  As said, the total sum for litigation funding which had been received by W was HKD 11,475,000, and this amount should be deducted from her share of the family assets.

(VII) The Parties’ income and earning capacity – Issue 12

(1) W’s income earning capacity

551.  W is now 50 years old and she holds a Master’s degree in Environment Studies and she had previously worked with a Government Department of Planning and Natural Resources prior to coming to Hong Kong.

552.  Although W has not worked in Hong Kong for some 21 years, and notwithstanding all her alleged medical/dental expenses, there is no sufficient evidence that she has any physical or mental disability or any health issues by reason of which she is not able to work. The Children will need less of their mother’s care as they grow up. The Parties’ son is now 18, and their daughters now 16 and 12.

553.  W is an intelligent and educated woman and in my view, even though she has been out of the work force in Hong Kong for 21 years, she does have some earning capacity, but having said this, there is no sufficient evidence as to what her earning capacity is for the foreseeable future.

(2) H’s income and earning capacity

554.  In his Updated Form E in January 2021, H stated his income to be HKD 313,750 per month (after deduction of MPF contribution)[283] plus a discretionary bonus of an average HKD 65,000 per month (based on HKD 780,000 bonus for 2019/2020), ie a total of HKD 378,750 per month[284].

555.  H’s evidence during the trial that for the last 4 1/2 years, he had not been able to perform at work because of access arrangements with W forced upon him. H also said he had not been able to invest or perform or source transactions largely due to these proceedings and access arrangements, and that it is highly unlikely that he can expect to earn a bonus over the next 3 years.

556.  As found earlier, there was no sufficient evidence that H would leave his present employment or that his employment would be terminated by the Group. Further, if he receives no bonuses or less, his tax liability will be reduced correspondingly. In any event, I am satisfied that he is able to meet his own financial needs and the Children’s financial needs from his income.

557.  As said earlier, with the end of these proceedings hopefully in sight, no doubt both of them can concentrate on rebuilding their lives. There is no reason why H cannot earn a bonus again in the foreseeable future.

G. STEP (2): THE PARTIES’ RESPECTIVE NEEDS – ISSUE 2 AND THE CHILDREN’S NEEDS – ISSUE 3

(I) W’s reasonable needs – Issue 2

558.  I set out hereunder a table of W’s claimed expenses and the amounts of the MPS Order for comparison:

 W’s 1st Form E (16.01.17)W’s 2nd Form E (truncated) (16.10.18)MPS
Order (11.12.18)
W’s Updated Form E (25.01.21)W’s Trial Affirmation (01.04.21)
Rent including carpark100,00070,00070,00074,000 (since April 2019)74,000- amended to 70,000 after April 2021
General56,05043,500
(less car insurance and repairs and club expenses)
105,800, ie 26,450 for each of W and the Children

+H’s Undertakings

of total about 142,320
48,30045,920
Personal22,49027,800
(less medical insurance)
 37,00051,540
Children (school fees and other payments paid by H direct)48,358School fees + school bus + medical insurance covered by H/employer48,358 +
School bus 3,500 +
club 7,500
+ medical and dental insurance +
uncovered medical and dental
  
Children (other expenses)38,07634,50026,450 x 3 = 79,35021,650 

559.  As has been said, the Parties’ needs should be “generously interpreted and accordingly, in trying to ensure that each party and their children have enough to supply their needs set at a level that equates, in so far as resources allow, to the standard of living they enjoyed during the marriage, those needs should not be assessed according to some perceived lowest common denominator, but with flexibility in the light of all the relevant circumstances[285].

560.  There was no dispute as to the Parties’ living standard prior to the breakdown of the marriage. They were living on the south side, and the Children attend international schools. They have the use of a private members’ club and they travel to other parts of the world for holidays. They were leading a comfortable expatriate lifestyle, but it was not an extravagant lifestyle.

561.  With the above in mind, I turn to the main disputed items of W’s reasonable financial needs as set out hereinafter.

(1) W’s housing needs and utilities expenses

562.  Although in paragraph 220 of her Trial Affirmation, W had said she very much hoped someday that she would be able to buy a home, no evidence was provided then as to where she wanted to buy a home or what she had in mind. It was only 4 days before the trial, on 30 April 2021, that her solicitors wrote to H’s solicitors enclosing listing information of properties of net area of about 2,000 sq ft in the neighbourhood of W’s current residence, ranging from HKD 53m to HKD 80m.

563.  The Parties have been living in Hong Kong for some 21 years since 2010 and all those 21 years, they were living in rented accommodation. According to W, the Parties had considered the option of purchasing accommodation during the marriage and had viewed properties in the building of the Parties’ former matrimonial home. However, as mentioned earlier, W had also said that at one stage, they were looking at schools for the Children in ______ when H thought he was losing his job, and that the schools were where the Children had gone to summer camps. The 1st real estate they bought was the M______ Apartment and the 2nd real estate they invested in was land in ______ through Bremen.

564.  I find no sufficient evidence that the Parties had seriously planned to purchase a home in Hong Kong. The Children will most likely be furthering their education abroad upon completing their secondary education in Hong Kong. W’s roots and family members and friends are in ___________ to which she has been returning at least once a year and has done so even during the pandemic. As seen earlier, her good friend who was murdered lived in ___________. She had said during the trial she enjoyed hiking and going to gym in her spare time but she had very little spare time as she had to look after the Children. She had not mentioned any good friends in Hong Kong.

565.  As said earlier, she and H and the Children have been leading an expatriate lifestyle in Hong Kong. When she was asked whether she had boyfriends in ____________, W suddenly said she has a boyfriend in Hong Kong but then quickly added it was not a reasonably stable relationship and that had nothing to do with whether she had to stay in Hong Kong long term. Notwithstanding that she has lived in Hong Kong for 21 years and may continue to do so for the foreseeable future, and whether she has a boyfriend here or not, I do not find that there was sufficient evidence at present that she would want to make Hong Kong her permanent home and/or she would need to purchase a home in Hong Kong.

566.  Having considered the above, I do not find W’s evidence that her housing needs to include purchase of a flat in Hong Kong of about 2,000 sq ft on the south side to be reasonable.

567.  As for rental, W admitted that the lease of her present flat has been renewed on 27 April 2021 at HKD 70,000 per month. H seems to be suggesting that the rent should be divided into 4 shares of HKD 17,500 each, one for W and one for each of the Children. I do not think this is reasonable, as this will mean that when one child becomes independent and self-supporting and H’s maintenance payments for that child will cease, the rental allowance for the rest will be affected, or when all the Children become independent and self-supporting, W’s share is then reduced to only HKD 17,500 per month, if by then she is still living in Hong Kong. On the other hand, when the Children all become independent and self-supporting, W will not need an apartment of the same size as her present one.

568.  By comparison, H’s own current rental is HKD 59,620 per month. In my view, a reasonable sum for W’s own housing needs should be about HKD 60,000 per month. The remaining HKD 10,000 per month will be regarded as the Children’s share of housing costs.

569.  As for her share of the utilities, she seeks a sum of HKD 4,000 per month, same as H’s. I find this reasonable.

(2) Car insurance expense

570.  W’s estimate for car expenses under “General” expenses” was HKD 8,720 per month, namely HKD 4,100 for gas and HKD 4,520 for insurance and repairs. Mr Scott pointed out that the insurance estimate of HKD 4,620 per month was based on W’s old car which had a lot of issues. HKD 4,620 per month would mean HKD 55,440 per annum, which seems quite high. In particular, W had also claimed another amount of HKD2,600 per month for transport under “Personal” expenses.

571.  I find a sum of HKD 5,000 per month for total car expenses under “General” would be reasonable.

(3) Club replacement expense

572.  W claimed HKD 10,000 per month for this item for herself, which included gym, classes, training and meals. The expenses from May to October 2017 was a monthly average of HKD 5,828 most of which was for the Children. Under the MPS Order, H undertook to pay HKD 7,500 per month for W’s and the Children’s expenses at the club. During the trial, W had said that the Children were not using the club due to the pandemic, and that as of late the allowance was mainly used by her.

573.  I am of the view, that the level of club replacement expenses of around HKD 4,000 for W would be reasonable.

(4) Clothing/Shoes expenses

574.  W claimed HKD 2,000 per month in her 1st Form E, HKD 3,000 in her Truncated Form E and HKD 5,500 per month in her Updated Form E and her Trial Affirmation. H complained that she had developed a reckless spending pattern and unhealthy shopping behaviour. W had explained that her weight had fluctuated due to the stress of these proceedings and also nowadays she would shop in more expensive stores rather than “thrift stores” in Stanley. No doubt these proceedings have taken a toll on not just W but also on H, but with completion in sight, the Parties should be able to return to normal life. The amount of HKD 2,000 per month was however in 2017. In my view, a sum of HKD 5,000 per month would be reasonable for this item.

(5) Medical/Dental (uninsured) expense

575.  W has proposed a generous insurance coverage for herself on the basis of continuation with the current insurer Cigna of HKD 7,940 per month. For the uncovered medical/dental expenses, in her 1st Form E it was only HKD 2,000 per month, and in her updated Form E earlier in January this year. W claimed HKD 3,500 per month. Suddenly in her Trial Affirmation, E claimed HKD 10,000 per month. W said she had dental issues for which she had undergone surgeries and she required melisma treatment, psychotherapy, osteopathy, acid reflux hormone replacement therapy and other uninsurable treatments and this item had increased to HKD 10,000 per month, which meant some HKD 120,000 per annum. I find there was no sufficient documentary evidence to support this claim and some of the items may be one off items. In my view, this is on the high side. I find HKD 3,500 per month reasonable for uncovered expenses.

(6) Meals out of home, personal grooming and holiday expenses

576.  For meals out of home and personal grooming, W claimed a total of HKD 5,990 in her 1st Form E and she claimed HKD 8,000 per month in her Updated Form E in January 2021. In her Trial Affirmation, she claimed HKD 4,000 per month for meals out of home and HKD 5,500 per month for personal grooming, totalling HKD 9,500 per month. I find HKD 4,000 per month reasonable for meals out of home and for personal grooming, a monthly sum of HKD 4,000 is reasonable.

577.  As for her holiday expenses, she claimed HKD 6,000 per month in her 1st Form E in January 2017, HKD 10,000 per month in her Truncated Form E in October 2018, HKD 6,000 per month in her Updated Form E in January 2021 and HKD 10,000 in her Trial Affirmation. According to W, her expenses were HKD 10,000 per month in pre-Covid days. I find HKD 10,000 per month reasonable.

(7) W’s reasonable needs

578.  In light of the above, W’s reasonable expenses (including rent) under paragraph 256 of her Trial Affirmation[286] would come to HKD 96,200 per month under “General” expenses and HKD 39,540 per month under “Personal” expenses, totalling HKD 135,740 per month as follows:-

GeneralHKD (pm)PersonalHKD (pm)
Rent60,000Meals out3,500
Utilities4,000Transport2,600
Food5,500Clothing/Shoes4,000
Household5,000Personal grooming3,500
Car expenses5,000Entertainment4,000
Domestic helper10,000Holiday10,000
Other out of pocket expenses400Uninsured medical/dental3,500
Pets1,500Insurance & premium7,940
Club replacement4,000Mobile500
Handyman800  
 96,200 39,540

579.  I will round up to HKD 138,000 per month and this amount I find to be reasonable for W’s financial needs.

(II) H’s reasonable needs – Issue 2

580.  In H’s Updated Form E, under section 4.1 “General”, his expenses were HKD 99,955 per month including rent of HKD 49,620 per month.

581.  As for his expenses under section 4.2 “Personal”, he had included HKD 248,120 for the amounts he had to pay under the MPS Order including the Undertakings, and HKD 100,000 per month for his legal costs. In addition to the MPS Order, under section 4.3 “Children”, his expenses were HKD 10,800 per month.

582.  The total of H’s monthly expenses came to HKD 525,835 per month.

583.  Leaving aside the MPS Order and the legal costs, and the Children’s expenses for the time being, his expenses under “General” and “Personal” were about HKD 166,915 per month, including HKD 55,960 per month for his tax. Excluding tax, his expenses were about HKD 110,955 per month.

584.  H was not really challenged on his monthly expenses, which I find reasonable.

(III) The Children’s reasonable needs – Issue 3

585.  In section 4.3 of her Updated Form E[287], W has set out the Children’s monthly expenses of HKD 21, 650 per month excluding their share of the “General” expenses and other direct payments from H under the MPS Order and with adjusted amounts due to Covid. According to my calculations, without the adjustments due to Covid, the Children’s expenses (ie adding back the decreased amounts due to Covid, in particular travelling, and deducting those increased amounts due to Covid) total about HKD 38,650 per month, less the direct payments by H of school fees school bus and insurance premia[288]. This is without taking into account the Children’s share of the “General” expenses.

586.  Under the MPS Order, H is currently paying HKD 26,450 per month respectively for W and each of the Children, namely a total of HKD 105,800 per month plus the Undertakings. H’s evidence was that he was paying a total of about HKD 248,120 per month for W and the Children under the MPS Order. The apportionment of HKD 26,450 per month each therein was only made or accepted by H on a broad brush interim basis. I am of the view that H should not be regarded as having agreed that each child’s expenses were HKD 26,450 per month.

587.  H has undertaken to continue to pay the Children’s reasonable education expenses until they complete their tertiary education. His proposal was to pay maintenance to W for the Children at HKD 32,500 per month for each child inclusive of their share of the rental (being 1/4 of the monthly rental of HKD 70,000, or HKD 17,500 each) until they reach the age of 18 or complete full time education. This would mean H was proposing to pay a sum of HKD 15,000 per month per child excluding their share of the rental.

588.  H has also set out for this Court’s consideration as to the Children’s prospective financial needs. The son R is now in his penultimate high school year and will be attending university in 2022 and that the Parties’ agreement had been for R to attend university in USA, and that R would need around USD 70,000 to USD 80,000 per annum, which would be over HKD 33,000 per month higher than his current school fees. The older daughter S had also expressed her wishes to attend boarding school in the US and that such may cost HKD 25,425 per month more than her current school fees. In light of this, H had said his expenses for the Children would increase by at least HKD 58, 425 per month starting from 2022.

589.  W on the other hand has proposed HKD 31,650 per month for each of the Children exclusive of their share of rental.

590.  As said earlier, the monthly rental should not be apportioned equally among W and the Children. The Children’s share of the monthly rental should only be HKD 3,333.33 per month (being 1/3 of HKD10,000 per month out of the current monthly rental of HKD70,000 per month). The monthly expenses for the domestic helper and the car have been included in W’s own monthly expenses. However, the Children’s other “General” expenses such as utilities, food, household expenses and any club replacement expenses should be taken into account.

591.  As said, according to W’s Updated Form E, the Children’s expenses under section 4.3 would be a total of about HKD 38,650 per month or about HKD 12,883 per month per child, under normal circumstances, without Covid, and with H paying direct (i) their school fees and transport to school (school bus); (ii) uninsured medical and dental insurance expenses with the insurance premia paid by the Group.

592.  As their lunch expenses have been included in the monthly sum of HKD 38,650, their food expenses at home should be reduced. In the hope of Covid restrictions will be over soon, and having considered the Children’s share of the current rental of about HKD 3,333 per month each, I find a monthly budget of HKD 20,000 per month for each of the Children (including their share of the rental and the “General” expenses) would be reasonable. As a total of HKD 7,000 per month has been included in the Children’s monthly expenses under section 4.3 for their extra tuition (such as mandarin lessons) and for their extra curricular activities, I do not think H needs to undertake to pay any extra save that H should undertake to pay direct R’s SAT classes separately. H should also undertake to pay the Children’s reasonable tuition fees and all related costs which appear on the school invoice until each/them shall leave secondary school in HK and reasonable uninsured medical and dental expenses (excluding over the counter medication). I understand H agrees to continue to pay for the Children’s reasonable education expenses until they reach 18 or cease full time education whichever shall be later. As the Parties have joint custody of the Children, any future education plans have to be agreed by them and there will be change of circumstances and they may need to apply for variation for Children’s periodical payments when the time comes.

(IV) Duxbury Calculations

593.  W’s expert Mr Yeo adopted an annual inflation rate of 3.06% based on the average rate of change of the Hong Kong CPI Composite between 2011 and 2020 (ie 10 years) from his research in Bloomberg on 23 April 2021. He also used the same period of 10 years for calculating the average returns for his proposed investment types. On the assumption that W would invest 50% in bonds, 30% in securities and 10% in time deposits and 10% in savings deposit, he arrived at an annual capital growth of 0.85% and annual investment return was 2.43%[289]. In the Joint Duxbury Statement, He arrived at an average annual portfolio return (comprising both income and capital) of 3.26%. The initial capital sum to provide monthly average expenditure of HKD 167,460 would be HKD 77.05m.

594.  H’s expert Mr Apedaile was instructed to use a figure of monthly expenditure of HKD 49,326, and based on the parameters and assumptions he set out in his report, he arrived at an initial capital sum of HKD 19,043,676. He adopted an inflation rate of 2.299 % per annum based on the average of 5 years between August 2015 and August 2020 for the CPI Composite and an average annual investment return of 3.378 %. Further based on such inflation and investment return, for the sake of comparison, Mr Apedaile also set out his calculations based on W’s case of her monthly expenditure of HKD 167,460, and arrived at a figure HKD 64.65m. In his latest update of 7 May 2021, adopting an annual inflation rate of 1.597 % between March 2016 and March 2021 for the CPI Composite and 3.38 % average portfolio return, he arrived at an initial capital sum of HKD 57.40m for a monthly expenditure of HKD 167,460[290].

595.  The main areas of disagreement between the experts are the inflation rate and the average annual return. In light of the result produced by Mr Apedaile by using his earlier inflation rate and his updated inflation rate in “Scenario B” is that, as pointed out by Mr Todd, W would have received HKD 7.25m in 2020 than in 2021. Anyway, having considered their evidence, I am of the view that that it is more appropriate to adopt an average over a longer period of 10 years rather than 5 years.

596.  As for the annual portfolio return, Mr Yeo’s was 3.276% and Mr Apedaile’s under Scenario A was 3.378% and under Scenario B was 3.38%.

597.  Mr Apedaile had referred to the investment portfolio, he had referred to the one set out by Bharwaney J in the personal injury case Chan Pak Ting v Chan Chi Kuen (No 2) [2013] 2 HKLRD 1 and for needs of over 10 years, the “Bharwaney portfolio” is an “average” portfolio of 10% in time deposits, 70% in high quality bonds of BBB + or better, and 20% in high quality blue-chips that qualify as “widows and orphans” stock. In Hong Kong Family Court Tables 2020, the “Bharwaney portfolio” were used for Duxbury calculations and based on this, an investment return of 2.65% was used.

598.  The deposit interest rate is very low at the moment. For savings deposit, according to Mr Yeo, the annual return was 0.02%. According to Mr Yeo, the 12 month HKD deposit rate was 0.19% per annum as at 23 April 2021. According to Mr Apedaile, it was 0.15% per annum. However, although the savings deposit rate was low, I am inclined to agree with Mr Yeo that in case of any urgent needs, W should maintain some ready cash. In my view, and in light of the capital sum, keeping 5 % of the capital sum which I am going to order in ready cash should be sufficient. Thus, the 10% cash should be divided into 5% on savings deposit and 5% on 12-month time deposit. I am of the view that the rest should be as set out in the “Bharwaney portfolio”.

599.  In any event, I find W’s share of the Family Pot, as decided by this Court, should be sufficient to cover her reasonable financial needs.

H. STEP (3) DECIDING WHETHER TO APPLY THE SHARING PRINCIPLE AND STEP (4) WHETHER DEPARTURE FROM EQUAL DIVISION

600.  H’s reasons for departure from equal division:

(1) The GP Shares were conditional upon H’s continued employment with the Group. The Parties separated in October 2016 and the legal right to obtain a fair value and complete ownership over the GP Shares will only occur when H turns 65 in 2036 and if he is still employed by the Group.

(2) W’s litigation conduct in (i) failing to provide full and frank disclosure in respect of her interests in the S____ Land and V___ Land; (ii) refusing to attend private FDR/mediation as ordered by the Court; unwilling to agree on the appointment of single joint experts and only filed last minutes expert reports shortly before the trial despite the fact that expert reports were ordered on 19 June 2020, and W had received litigation funding; (iii) W’s refusal to seek any disclosure directly from R2 and R3 whom she joined as parties to these proceedings.

601.  As pointed out by Mr Todd, it was only in H’s Closing Submissions that it was asserted that there should be a departure from equal division in respect of H’s GP Shares. In H’s Open Proposals, his own position then was still an equal division of assets. In any event, both Mr Yeo and Mr Choy were instructed to prepare the valuation as at the Valuation Date of 30 September 2020. I do not see that (1) is any reason for departure.

602.  As for (2)(i), there was no finding against W by this Court of her failing to provide full and frank disclosure in respect of the S____ Land and V___ Land. As for (2)(ii) this would be a matter for argument on costs. As for (2)(iii), as set out earlier, according to PBB, H was the only who had all the financial information of the US Trust assets and H was to provide PBB with such financial information. Further, H is the one who is under a duty of full and frank disclosure towards W in these proceedings and not PBB. As set out earlier, I have found that H had failed to provide details and information in particular in relation to his private investments. He had failed to comply with his duty to make full and frank disclosure of his finances and this has led to the Court drawing adverse inferences against him. His disclosure had been piecemeal and as pointed out by Mr Todd, which I agree, very often, his answers or the information provided by him raised even more questions.

603.  In light of the above, H’s reasons for departure from equal division have not been made out.

604.  As for W’s reasons for departure from equal division, namely that she requires a capital sum for purchase of accommodation in Hong Kong, this has been dealt with earlier. Her reasons for departure from equal division have not been made out either.

605.  Other than those set out in the List of Issues, there were no other disputes over the section 7 factors or otherwise. The Parties’ marriage lasted about 15 years. W, although she had not had any earned income during the marriage, she has been a full time homemaker and has contributed towards the family by looking after the home and caring for the family. H on the other hand is the sole breadwinner of the family. They have made equal contribution towards the welfare of the family. Apart from the loss of the use of the club and H’s medical insurance policy (which have been taken into account in considering W’s reasonable needs), there were no other submissions as to what other benefits W would lose the chance of acquiring upon the divorce. Equally, there were no submissions on any loss to H in this respect.

I. STEP (5) DECIDING THE OUTCOME

606.  I have found the Family Pot to be HKD 181,761,000. Having considered all the circumstances of this case and the section 7 factors, I see no reason why there should be any departure from equal division.

607.  On equal division, W should be entitled to HKD 90,880,500. W had already received HKD 11,475,000 as an advance from the Family Pot for her litigation funding, and her own assets were about HKD 47,559. Thus, what she should receive out of the Family Pot is another HKD 79,357,941, or rounded off to HKD 79.4m.

608.  I am of the view this capital sum of HKD 79.4m will cover all W’s reasonable needs and should be paid to her on a clean break basis.

(I) Overpayment of MPS – Issue 9

609.  H seemed to be alleging that there had been overpayment by him under the MPS Order under Issue 9 of the Scott Schedule but in light of my finding of the Parties’ respective needs and the Children’s needs, there was no overpayment which needs to be deducted from W’s share.

(II) US Tax implications – Issue 10

610.  As for US Tax implication under Issue 10, I understand that W will propose a structure for the payment of the capital sum awarded to her to minimize US Tax, if any is payable. It was submitted on behalf of W that H should bear W’s US Tax liability. I do not see why but will hear further submission on this.

J. ORDER

611.  In light of all said above, the effect of my order is:

(1) H shall personally pay to W a lump sum of HKD 79.4m in full and final of all her claims for ancillary relief. Upon full payment, the Parties’ respective claims for ancillary relief against each other shall be dismissed;

(2) H shall pay to W periodical payments for each of the Children HKD 20,000 per month until they complete full time education or further order, subject to H’s undertaking to directly pay their reasonable tuition expenses, including school bus and their reasonable medical and dental expenses not covered by H’s employer’s medical insurance policy (but excluding any over the counter medications).

612.  I understand that the Parties wish to address the Court on payment schedule and the exact structure of the final order. I will direct the Parties to submit agreed directions for lodging their submissions on the outstanding matters and the estimated length of hearing on the outstanding matters.

613.  In the meantime, the MPS Order shall continue to have effect until further order.

K. COSTS

614.  In my view, W is overall the successful party in these proceedings, and I make an order nisi that H shall pay W’s costs, to be taxed on party and party if not agreed, inclusive of all reserved costs and costs of the BVI proceedings, with certificate for two counsel save for costs of W’s 2nd Summons for litigation funding issued on 12 August 2019 and costs of 3 May 2021.

615.  For W’s 2nd Summons for litigation funding, as seen in this Court’s judgment[291], there was no reason as to why W, or H, could not have simply agreed to jointly request the trustee for distribution on the same basis as set out in the Melloy Order of 11 December 2018. I make no order as to costs of that summons. I also make no order as to costs as between the Parties on 3 May 2021 as the parties were not able to comply with this Court’s directions for lodging of agreed trial template and updated timetable for attendance of overseas witnesses.

616.  As for OS’s costs, in my view, the OS was directed to represent the Children due to the setting aside applications. As W is the successful party in the setting aside applications, I make an order nisi that OS’s costs shall be paid by H, to be taxed on party and party basis, if not agreed, with credit by given to H for the HKD 2.6m advanced to OS for litigation funding.

617.  The above orders nisi on costs will be made final after 28 days.

 ( Bebe Pui Ying Chu )
 Judge of the Court of First Instance
 High Court

  

Mr Richard Todd and Ms Bonnie YK Cheng, instructed by Stevenson, Wong & Co., for the Petitioner

Mr John Scott SC JP and Mr Shaphan Marwah, instructed by Oldham, Li & Nie, for the 1st Respondent and 4th Respondent

The 2nd Respondent, absent

The 3rd Respondent, absent

The 5th Respondent, absent

The 6th Respondent, absent

Mr Ken To, instructed by the Official Solicitor, for the Children



[1]   See para 196, C:145

[2]   At D2-468

[3]   Although a “shareholding agreement” referred to in the Letter of Employment as Schedule 1, according to H, the only one signed was the one dated 4 November 2010, at D:686 -706

[4]   See also letter dated 4 November 2010 to Intero at D:707

[5]   At paras 71-132

[6]   See medical certificate dated 11 May 2021

[7]   E:1-16

[8]   E3:547-572

[9]   E3:652-668

[10]   E3: 588- 618, 619-651, 677-701

[11]   E2:309-351, E3:573-586

[12]   E3:710-716

[13]   E1:17-115, 116-209, 210-308

[14]   E2:405-436

[15]   E2:437-473

[16]   E2:365-399

[17]   E3:475-519

[18]   E3:736-776

[19]   E3:717-735

[20]   See medical report dated 11 May 2021

[21]   E2:400-404

[22]   E3:520-531

[23]   E2:352-363

[24]   E3:532-540

[25]   At para 32, C1: 180

[26]   At para 30, C1:180

[27]   In para 33, C1:180

[28]   See para 22, C:94

[29]   At para 31, C1:96

[30]   At paras 33.1 and 33.2, C1:180

[31]   At D9:2155

[32]   At para 25, C2:314

[33]   At para 35, C:97

[34]   See para 27, C314

[35]   D:2144

[36]   In para 25, C2:314

[37]   At para 39, C1:98

[38]   At D:2146

[39]   At D2:2148

[40]   D:2151-2153

[41]   At D:2152

[42]   D:2154-2155

[43]   D:2158

[44]   D:2157

[45]   At para 44, C1:100

[46]   D:2166

[47]   D3:727

[48]   At para 54, C1:189

[49]   See clause 4.16, D:700 and Annex I, D:702

[50]   D14:3257

[51]   D13:3009-3019

[52]   Referred to as the ______ Apartment in the Joinder Decision

[53]   A:10

[54]   D:2512-2550

[55]   See Part 4, D:2547

[56]   D:2534

[57]   D:2539

[58]   D11:2551

[59]   D:2608-2609

[60]   D:2610-2613

[61]   D:2614-2617

[62]   D:2620-2699

[63]   See sections 4.2 and 4.3, D:2630

[64]   D:2780-2785

[65]   D:2560-2599

[66]   D11:2600-2607

[67]   D:2700-2779

[68]   D14:3468- 3546

[69]   Under section 7, from pgs 9-20 of the 2019 Education Trust Deed, and at D:3484-3495

[70]   See para 69, C:195

[71]   See letter dated 16 May 2018 from PBB being copied to Mr B____, at D:1427

[72]   At para 64, C:193

[73]   Under ‘Executive Summary’, E:354

[74]   At D:2652, and at D: 2728

[75]   In para 6, C:76

[76]   At D:1411

[77]   In para 110, Joinder Decision, also Order of Nevada Court at D:1470-1474

[78]   In para 8, C:77

[79]   D:1477-1485

[80]   At para 38

[81]   D:2532

[82]   At pg 556

[83]   At pg 3 thereof

[84]   At para 48, OS Opening Submissions

[85]   D:2548

[86]   D:2744

[87]   Section 10.8, 2017 Family Trust Deed, D:2654

[88]   Clause 15.1 of the 2016 Education Trust Deed, D:2574 and section 9.8, 2017 Education Family Trust Deed, D:2731

[89]   At Part 1.1, 2015 Family Trust Deed, D:2534; at Part 1.1, 2016 Education Trust Deed, D:2583

[90]   See section 7, 2017 Family Trust Deed D:2637-2648; section 7, 2017 Education Trust Deed

[91]   See clauses 3, 5.2 of the 2015 Family Trust Deed, at D:2519

[92]   See clauses 3, 5.2 of the 2016 Family Trust Deed, at D:2567

[93]   Clause 6.2.1 of the 2015 Family Trust Deed, D:2520; clause 6.2.1 of the 2016 Education Trust Deed, D:2568

[94]   See clause 6.4 of the 2016 Education Trust Deed, D:2569

[95]   D:2600, para 4(ii)

[96]   See paras 74, 75 C:197

[97]   See section 24.2, D:2689

[98]   At D:2784

[99]   D:2780-2785

[100]   See para 1, D:2780

[101]   See para 9, D:2555

[102]   At para 75, C:197

[103]   See para 5, C:171

[104]   At D:2695-2696; and t D:2770-2771

[105]   Paras 56-57, C1:190

[106]   At para 59, C:191

[107]   D:2239-2244, Exhibit KK10-1 of H’s 10th affirmation, 12 August 2020

[108]   D:2506-2509

[109]   At para 59, C1:191

[110]   D: 3865-3866

[111]   See the whats app chats between H and W in December 2015, D:3863-3864

[112]   At D:3865

[113]   D:3865

[114]   At para 57, C1:190

[115]   See para 40, C1:24

[116]   D:2173- 2183

[117]   D:134-207

[118]   D:208-242

[119]   Para 114, C1:212

[120]   At para 79 C1:110

[121]   See clause 6, D1:228

[122]   See para 1 in Schedule IX and Schedule X, D1-240-241

[123]   D:2900-2903

[124]   At para 53, C1:189

[125]   Foreign Bank and Financial Accounts Report

[126]   Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act

[127]   At para 23 C1 20-21

[128]   D:3858

[129]   See paras 16, 17, C:262

[130]   D:2149

[131]   D:2148

[132]   Last paragraph, D:2152

[133]   At para 62, C1:192

[134]   D:2159

[135]   D:2160

[136]   D:2161

[137]   At para 63, C1:192

[138]   See paras 62-63, C1:192-193

[139]   At para 36, C2:317

[140]   At paras 21-23, C2:263-264

[141]   At para 25, C2:264

[142]   See para 7, C1:29, and also para 76, C1:109

[143]   D:3863-3864

[144]   D:2164-2165

[145]   D:2172

[146]   D:2172

[147]   See the letter dated 16 May 2018 from R2, the trustee of the Family Trust to W, D:1426-1427

[148]   See para 37, OS Closing Submissions

[149]   Part 5.1(2), H’s 1st Form E, B:40

[150]   See H’s 1st From E, 01.02.17, B:40 and H’s 1st Answer, 28.07.17, B:101

[151]   At paras 7-8, C1: 17

[152]   At paras 7-8 C1:17, and para 237, B:149

[153]   In para 31 thereof

[154]   At para 105, C1:209

[155]   D:3020

[156]   D:3008

[157]   At para 108, C1:210

[158]   D3:616

[159]   D4:868-870

[160]   At para 110, C1:211

[161]   D:3021 - 3032

[162]   At D:2508

[163]   At D:2901

[164]   D:2510-2511

[165]   At para 41, C1:24

[166]   D:3013

[167]   A:16-18

[168]   See paras 154,160 , C:133,135

[169]   At para 43, W’s Closing Submissions

[170]   See para 24, W’s Opening Submissions

[171]   D:6

[172]   D:103

[173]   D:104-107

[174]   See answers in 8.3, 1st Answers, dated 28 July 2017 B:74

[175]   See answers in 8.1 -8,3, B:74

[176]   D:506,

[177]   D:507-508

[178]   Para 149, C:225

[179]   D:659-660 Annexure II

[180]   At para 149, C1:225

[181]   D:3124

[182]   D:104

[183]   See para 147, C1:225

[184]   D:3125

[185]   D:508

[186]   At para152, C:225

[187]   See H’s instruction letter of instructions to the SC Private Bank on 24 January 2017, D:630; bank statement of H’s SC Private Bank Account, D:576

[188]   D:2320

[189]   At para 178, C1”140

[190]   At para 89, C1:205

[191]   D:2321

[192]   At para 89, C:204

[193]   D:2322-2330

[194]   At para 91, C1:204

[195]   D:2335

[196]   D:3925

[197]   D:3862

[198]   D:3925-3932

[199]   D:2333

[200]   D:2334

[201]   D:2333

[202]   D:3946-4034

[203]   As this Court understands, this refers to any preceding contract/s

[204]   At D:3960

[205]   D:2337-2341

[206]   D:2189

[207]   D:2190-2191

[208]   D:2343-2355

[209]   See “Ownership Origin”, D:2348

[210]   A letter dated 19 December 2014 from Ms D____ reporting on the result of the Demarcation Application was sent to both W’s Yahoo Email Address and A___ at his email address, D:3923

[211]   See recital, D:2323

[212]   At para 91, C1:204

[213]   At para 56, C:103

[214]   D:2904-2905

[215]   D:2904

[216]   See para 89, H’s Trial Affirmation, C:2014

[217]   See email at 2:58, 05.11.15 Emails, D:2904

[218]   D:2194 -2201; repeated D:2906-2913

[219]   D:2906=2907

[220]   Part 2.11, H’s 1st Form E, B:31

[221]   Part 5.1(5), H’s 1st Form E, B:40

[222]   At Part 2.11, B:230

[223]   At B:239

[224]   At para 95, C:206 and paras 97-98, C:207

[225]   See para 196, D:145

[226]   At para 101, D:208

[227]   At para 10, D:208

[228]   At para 103, D:208

[229]   D:497; English translation at D:2360-2362; the plot numbers “AV0744, 743” are according to W sub-division numbers of AV391

[230]   See “Period of Validity”, D:2362

[231]   See para 33, H’s Reply Submissions

[232]   At para 101, C1:208

[233]   D:4195

[234]   D:4203-4208

[235]   See email exchanges between H, W and the architect D, D:4212-14

[236]   D:4210-4211

[237]   D:4209

[238]   D:4215

[239]   D:4039

[240]   D:2195-2201

[241]   Expletives, at 1:23pm, D:2201

[242]   D:2003.3

[243]   E2:402

[244]   At E3:524

[245]   D:618

[246]   D:620

[247]   D:3628

[248]   D:3631

[249]   See Table 1 in para 10, and para 11 of the 1st BDO Report, E:482

[250]   At pg 33

[251]   See table in para 10, E3:482

[252]   D:686 - 705

[253]   At para 19(i) to vii), E:484-486

[254]   The Gordon Growth model, see pg 7 of the Joint Intero Statement

[255]   At para 19(iv), E:485

[256]   E:511

[257]   See para 19 (i), Yeo’s 1st Report, E:484

[258]   At d(ii), pg 8 of the Joint Intero Statement

[259]   See para 183, C:237

[260]   E:509

[261]   At para 2.21, E:747

[262]   See para 19(vi), E:485

[263]   At pg 45

[264]   At D:695

[265]   See Appendix 14, pg 82, Joint Intero Statement

[266]   See para 4.6.2, E:382

[267]   See item 20a, b, pg 21, Joint Intero Statement

[268]   Item 33, E:504

[269]   At para 4.6.6, 1st Sirius Report, E:382

[270]   This seems to be the exchange rate used by H as at January 2017, see D:133.1, although the experts have used USD 1=HKD7.75

[271]   At D:133.1

[272]   At C:198

[273]   E:711-716

[274]   At E:311;E:318

[275]   At E:575

[276]   E3:595

[277]   B:204

[278]   B:232

[279]   In paras 70-76

[280]   At item 109

[281]   At E3:533

[282]   See H’s Form H at G:31-32 of about HKD 13.5m, and W’s Form H at G:38 – 39 of about HKD 14m

[283]   See also D:2119, H’s payslip for December 2020

[284]   B:234

[285]   See para 79, LKW v DD

[286]   C:165

[287]   B:208

[288]   B:208 section 4.3, being HKD 3,000 for extra tuition; HKD 350 for school books and stationery; HKD 1,000 to cover over the counter medication etc.  HKD 4,000 for extra curricular; HKD 4,000 for entertainment; HKD 13,000 for holidays; HKD 5,000 for clothing & shoes; HKD 2,500 for lunches and pocket money; HKD 1,600 for other transport; HKD 200 for uniform; HKD 400 for A’s mobile; HKD 100 for OFW; HKD 1,000 for meals out of home (not including the club); HKD 2500 for grooming etc.

[289]   C3:557

[290]   See table in A5. E3:655

[291]   At para 59

[2021] HKCFI 357-EN-2021-02-23

KCMA v. ABC AND OTHERS

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HCMC 1/2019

[2021] HKCFI 357

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

MATRIMONIAL CAUSES NO. 1 OF 2019

_______________________

BETWEEN  
 KCMAPetitioner
 and 
 ABC1st Respondent
 PBB in his capacity as the Trustee of the Family Trust2nd Respondent
 PBB in his capacity as the Trustee of the Education Trust3rd Respondent
 K4th Respondent

______________________

Before: Hon B Chu J in Chambers (By Paper Disposal)

Dates of Decision: 23 February 2021

_________________

DECISION

(On Costs)

_________________

INTRODUCTION

1.  W issued a summons for litigation funding on 24 August 2020 (“Summons”), essentially seeking a sum of HKD 1,300,000 upon the same basis and in the same manner as in this Court’s order of 21 May 2020 (“21.05.20 Order”). 

EVENTS LEADING TO THE ISSUE OF THE SUMMONS

2.  The 21.05.20 Order was made upon an earlier summons taken out by W on 12 August 2019 for litigation funding.  This Court was then of the view that a sum of HKD 1,500,000 each would be appropriate for their respective costs, up to and including the conclusion of the FDR stage including any mediator’s fees for attendance at the FDR hearing.  The Court then adjourned that summons upon the following undertakings, and the summons was to be dismissed upon each receiving a sum of HKD 1,500,000 from the Trustee:

(1)  Upon the parties undertaking and agreeing to make a joint request to the 2nd Respondent/Trustee of the Family Trust (“Trustee”) within 14 days for a distribution of HKD 1,500,000 each, and

(2)  Upon the parties undertaking and agreeing that the distribution of HKD 1,500,000 each be paid by the Trustee direct to their respective solicitors firm, and

(3)  Upon the parties undertaking and agreeing to their respective solicitors to apply any part of the sum of HKD 1,500,000 towards billed and unpaid costs and/or to meet any costs orders and hold any excess over and above such payment on account of the parties’ respective costs and disbursements, and

(4)  Upon the Trustee agreeing to make a distribution of a total sum of HKD 3,000,000 out of the assets and/or income of the Family Trusts and to pay a sum of HKD 1,500,000 each respectively to H’s solicitors firm and to W’s solicitors firm, and

(5)  Upon the parties agreeing and acknowledging that the distribution of HKD 1,500,000 for each of them from the assets and/or income of the Family Trust is without prejudice to their respective rights and respective positions concerning the US Trusts and/or all and any other matters arising from W’s 1st s17 Application, Injunction Application and/or Disclosure Application.

3.  The parties have since each received a sum of HKD 1,500,000.  It would appear that such was not sufficient to cover the costs up to the FDR, and that led to W issuing the Summons herein, seeking a further HKD 1,300,000.  The Summons was fixed for hearing on 11 September 2020.

4.  It would further appear that the parties were then able to agree to the release by the Trustee of a sum of HKD 1,300,000 to each and a consent summons was lodged, and a consent order was made on 10 September 2020 to this effect (“Consent Order”).  However, subsequent thereto, no funds were received by W, as a result of which on 28 September 2020, she sought leave to restore the Summons. 

5.  Leave was granted and the Summons was then fixed for a 2 hour substantive hearing on 5 January 2021 (“Hearing”).

6.  According to W, she did not receive through her solicitors the funds pursuant to the Consent Order until 15 December 2020.  On 17 December 2020, W then sent a draft consent summons to H, seeking to dismiss the Summons, with the issue of costs to be dealt with at the AR trial, and to vacate the Hearing.

7.  Suffice to say, notwithstanding several rounds of exchange of correspondence, no consent summons was signed, as a result thereof parties attended the Hearing before this Court.

8.  It was not until the day before the Hearing that the parties filed their respective “Notes” for the Hearing.  Neither party even complied with Practice Direction 5.4 in submitting proper skeleton arguments. Even if the only outstanding matter was costs, there was no reason why the practice directions were not complied with, given that parties’ respective solicitors are experienced practitioners in this field. 

9.  W’s solicitors lodged their “Note” the day before the Hearing, ie 4 January 2021 and H’s solicitors only faxed in theirs at 17:42 on 4 January 2021.  The Court was not expected to read “Notes” submitted at last minute when the Hearing was fixed for 2 hours.  As said by this Court at the Hearing, there was no reason why it was necessary for the parties to have to even attend the Hearing physically, which was a waste of parties’ costs and this Court’s time, as the dispute could easily be dealt with on papers.  It was under such circumstances that this Court declined to read those “Notes” submitted late, and adjourned the matter to be dealt with on papers.

THE DISPUTE

H’s case

10.  As seen in H’s Note, after the 21.05.20 Order, the Trustee sent the sum of HKD 1.5m directly to the respective personal bank accounts of H and W, and not the bank accounts of their respective solicitors, as the Trustee took the view that as the parties’ respective solicitors were not beneficiaries, distributions could not be made directly to the solicitors’ firms.

11.  Thus, similarly, the sum of HKD 1.3m was sent by the Trustees through Intero into W’s personal bank account at HSBC on 7 December 2020.  However, it would appear that W then instructed her bank personnel to transfer the sum of HKD 1.3m back to the sender as according to W, “the deposit came from an individual with the surname, “Kim” in Singapore”.

12.  Based on W’s representation, the Trustee then sent a further HKD 1.3m to W’s solicitors’ account on 15 December 2020, which receipt was confirmed by W’s solicitors.

13.  However, by 30 December 2020, the Trustee still had not yet received the return of the 1st sum of HKD 1.3m from W. H’s solicitors then wrote to W’s solicitors to try and resolve the matter by proposing that W to give an undertaking from her that she had received a sum of HKD 1.3m in her personal HSBC account from Intero and that she had returned the sum to Intero.

14.  H’s request for the undertaking was however refused by W who considered that it was not necessary as she had provided a confirmation for a debit transaction of HKD 1.3m from her bank account (“Debit Confirmation”).

15.  The Debit Confirmation showed that the transaction was only made on 24 December 2020 and further the Debit Confirmation did not provide any details as to which bank account the HKD 1.3m was sent.  H thus found the Debit Confirmation unacceptable.

16.  As a result of the above, by 4 January 2021, the Hearing had not yet been vacated.  H said the delay was caused by W and her lack of disclosure.  H thus sought costs of the Summons on a fixed costs basis of HKD 1,040, and for the Hearing to be vacated.

17.  This was not accepted by W, which resulted in the parties’ respective solicitors having to attend the Hearing and further costs were incurred.

W’s case 

18.  W’s case was despite the Consent Order, no funds were received by her leading to her having to seek leave to restore the Summons on 28 September 2020.

19.  Funds were only received by W on 15 December 2020, and as said earlier, her solicitors then sent a consent summons to H’s solicitors on 17 December with a draft consent summons, seeking to dismiss the Summons and for the issue of costs to be dealt with at the AR Trial and for the hearing to be vacated.

20.  It was W’s case that H intended to make use of the Hearing to deal with what he considered to be issues that warranted the Hearing to stand, and that H sought to ensure the funds previously sent to W directly had been returned.  According to W, she had returned the funds and how long it took to reach the sender was not within her control.  In any event, costs could be dealt with at the AR Trial and there was no need to attend the Hearing.

21.  In the above circumstances, it is submitted on behalf of W that H should pay for the costs of the attendance at the Hearing.

DISCUSSION

22.  First, as indicated at the Hearing and earlier, this dispute could have and should been done by way of paper disposal.  The parties’ solicitors should be aware that there have been various announcements from the Judiciary for enhancing social distancing measures in light of the Covid-19 pandemic.  As seen in the announcement on 1 December 2020, for civil proceedings, there will be greater use of alternative means where appropriate including remote hearings and/or paper disposal, in lieu of physical attendance.  Even though there were no directions made by this Court, as this Court was sent letters indicating that that the Hearing could be vacated on undertakings and the Court was anticipating the filing of a consent summons, if the parties were unable to comply with PD 5.4 and there was no settlement, they should have written to the Court to seek a direction for paper disposal.  In any event, there was no reason as to why a 2 hour hearing should continue to remain in the Court’s diary.

23.  Secondly, I find it rather odd that the beneficiaries of a trust could not have authorised the Trustee to pay any distribution to them into an account designated by them, particularly if it were their legal representatives’ account.  Even if this were Trustee’s legal position (presumably upon US legal advice), there was no reason why H and W could not have been advised to provide an undertaking that any distributions paid into their respective personal accounts by the Trustee for the purpose of litigation funding should be paid by them into their respective solicitors’ account forthwith upon receipt.  This, one would have thought, would be a more practical way of dealing with the distributions for litigation funding, rather than incurring further legal costs and time arguing about the matter and/or reversing the funds and incurring further administrative costs and causing delay.

24.  In light of the above said, I find W’s attitude in rejecting the 1st transfer on 7 December 2020 and instructing her bank HSBC to reverse the credit, by reason of it being credited into her personal bank account and, according to her, by reason of it being from source unknown or from an unknown sender “Kim”, did not seem to make sense and showed a rather inflexible attitude of W.  One would have thought, W, who had been waiting for the distribution of a sum of HKD 1.3m, could have asked the Trustee or H to explain and/or to clarify whether the said sum was the distribution from Intero through instructions of the Trustee for the litigation funding, rather than simply to ask HSBC to reverse the credit to the sender.  There had been no evidence that she had sought any clarification from the Trustee and/or H prior to her giving instructions to HSBC for reversing the credit.  There had also been no documentary evidence to show what exactly her instructions to HSBC were.  As she herself had said, HSBC had to investigate the matter.  No doubt an instruction/request to reverse a credit would lead to a bank to investigate and this would certainly have caused delay in the process.  As said, W’s actions did not make any practical sense.

25.  Thirdly, it is clear that H and W have a complete distrust of each other.  It was thus not surprising for H to seek evidence, or as described by his solicitors, “disclosure” as to the receipt of the sum of HKD 1.3m and the transfer out, when by 23 December 2020, two sums of HKD 1.3m had been transferred to W or for her benefit by the Trustee for litigation funding, and the 1st sum had not yet been received back by the Trustee[1].

26.  W’s solicitors however replied only on 29 December 2020[2], stating that the funds were returned to Intero as the sender, and that as HSBC was investigating the matter, the return of funds was delayed.  W’s solicitors further said this matter was irrelevant.

27.  W’s solicitors’ letter of 29 December 2020 seemed to indicate that W did know that the sender was Intero.  Further, since the sum was said to have been reversed upon receipt on 7 December 2020, the fact that by 23 December 2020, Intero had not yet received the sum, while the 2nd sum had been received by W, one would have thought there would be concern and suspicion on H’s part as to what had happened to the 1st sum of HKD 1.3m.

28.  In their reply on 30 December 2020, it was stated that Intero had still not received the funds, and H’s solicitors then pointed out there was no mention or reference on the bank transfer confirmation from Intero to W (“Transfer Confirmation”) of the 1st sum of HKD 1.3m was sent by anyone called “Kim” as alleged by W.  H’s solicitors then requested a copy of W’s bank statement or any documentary evidence which showed the actual receipt of the 1st sum of HKD 1.3m and the subsequent transfer out.  Further, to resolve the matter, H’s solicitors then proposed an undertaking from W in the draft consent summons to vacate the Hearing, as mentioned earlier.

29.  So far as H was concerned, up until 31 December 2020, W had received 2 sums of HKD 1.3m, one in her personal account and one in her solicitors’ clients’ account.

30.  It was not under 31 December 2020 that W’s solicitors finally sent the Debit Confirmation from HSBC regarding the debit of HKD 1.3m on 24 December 2020 from W’s personal account[3]. 

31.  1 January 2021 was a Friday and a public holiday.  H’s solicitors were not able to respond until 4 January 2021 and they pointed out that: (i) notwithstanding W stating earlier that she had already instructed her bank to reverse the credit of the 1st sum of HKD 1.3m, as seen in the Debit Confirmation it was not until 24 December 2020 that the sum was debited from her account; (ii) The transferor’s name on the Transfer Confirmation was clearly stated to be Intero and not “Kim” as alleged by W; (iii) the Debit Confirmation did not state to which account the HKD 1.3m had been re-transferred to.  Thus, H’s solicitors sent a revised consent summons seeking an undertaking from W for her to provide a copy of her bank statement for the period 1 to 31 December 2020 or alternatively a copy of the MT 103 / the wire being sent back to Intero (which was referred to in emails from Intero’s bank, ie Deutsche Bank Singapore, to H).

32.  I do not agree that H was seeking to use the Hearing for other purposes as submitted on behalf of W.  He was simply seeking evidence from W to support what she herself had said. 

CONCLUSION

33.  Having considered the various correspondence and also the parties’ respective submissions, I have come to the conclusion that W has not been reasonable in this matter. 

34.  However, having said this, there was delay in the Trustee paying the sum of HKD 1.3m which had led to W applying for the Summons to be restored, but by 7 December 2020, as she had received the 1st sum of HKD 1.3m, and in my view, the matter should have been resolved at that time.  I am therefore of the view that she should pay H’s costs incurred from 7 December 2020 onwards, save for H’s costs of the attendance at the Hearing.  As I have said earlier, attendance at the Hearing could have been avoided and was not necessary.

35.  H’s costs are to be summarily assessed, if not agreed, and paid within 14 days of assessment.  H to submit a statement of costs within 14 days, and W to submit her list of objections within 7 days thereafter.

36.  Further, the Consent Order has already provided that the Summons shall be dismissed upon W’s solicitors’ receipt of the sum of HKD 1.3m.  As this sum has been received, the Summons should have already been dismissed under the Consent Order.  In my view, there is no need for any further dismissal order.

( Bebe Pui Ying Chu )
Judge of the Court of First Instance
High Court

Mr Karl Wong of Stevenson, Wong & Co., for the Petitioner

Ms Cheng Kit Sum Madelaine of Oldham, Li & Nie, for the 1st Respondent


[1] B:17

[2] B:18

[3] B:23

[2020] HKCFI 1078-EN-2020-06-08

KCMA v. ABC AND OTHERS

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  HCMC 1/2019

[2020] HKCFI 1078

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

MATRIMONIAL CAUSES NO. 1 OF 2019

________________________

BETWEEN  
 KCMAPetitioner
 and 
 ABC1st Respondent
 PBB in his capacity as the Trustee of the Family Trust2nd Respondent
 PBB in his capacity as the Trustee of the Education Trust3rd Respondent
 K4th Respondent

_______________________

Before:  Hon B Chu J in Chambers (Not Open to the Public) (By Paper Disposal)

Date of 1st Respondent’s Submissions: 29 April 2020

Date of Petitioner’s Submissions:  15 May 2020

Date of 1st Respondent’s Reply Submissions:  22 May 2020

Date of Decision: 8 June 2020

___________________________________________

D E C I S I O N

(Variation Application of Maintenance Pending Suit)

  ____________________________________________

1.  This Court has earlier in these proceedings handed down a decision on 21 May 2020 in relation to W’s application for litigation funding (“Litigation Funding Decision”).  I shall continue to use the abbreviations in that decision, save where otherwise indicated herein. 

2.  The AR Trial (for W’s AR Application and her 2nd 17 Application) has been scheduled for a 10 day trial to take place about a year from now, from 3 – 14 May 2021, and there was a direction hearing on 3 June 2020 for the fixing of a FDR hearing.  W’s Disclosure Application has been fixed for a substantive argument on 17 June 2020.

3.  The present application before this Court is H’s Variation Application made by a summons issued on 19 March 2020, and H is seeking a downward variation of the MPS Order on an urgent basis during GAP[1] (“Variation Summons”).

4.  The MPS Order was an order made by consent of H and W[2]. Pursuant thereto, H is to pay W a total sum of HKD 105,800 per month, being maintenance pending suit for W of HKD 26,450 per month and interim maintenance for the Children of HKD 79,350 per month (HKD 26,450 each) with effect from 1 January 2019.  In addition thereto, H has provided the following undertakings to pay direct on monthly basis, expenses totalling about HKD 149,978 at the time (“Undertakings”) :

(i)  Rental (then HKD 70,000);

(ii)  School Fees (then HKD 48,358);

(iii)  Extra Tuition of HKD 6,000 for all the Children;

(iv)  School Bus (then HKD 3,500);

(v)  Car Insurance (then HKD 4,620 if applicable);

(vi)  Cricket Club (HKD 7,500);

(vii)  Medical and Dental Insurance provided by his company;

(viii)  Uninsured Medical and Dental (primarily for the Children’s therapy of HKD 10,000)

5.  As seen above, the monthly payments to W for her and the Children under the MPS Order were HKD 105,800 plus the Undertakings of then estimated amount of HKD 149, 978.  The total of these would be HKD 255,778 per month.

6.  In the Variation Summons[3], H seeks as follows:

(i)  The maintenance pending suit for W be varied from HKD 26,450 per month to HKD 13,600 per month (paragraph 1 of the MPS Order);

(ii)  The interim maintenance for the Children be varied from HKD 13,600 per month totalling HKD 40,800 (paragraph 2 of the MPS Order);

(iii)  The Rental Undertaking be reduced to HKD 60,000 per month (or less subject to the actual amount of rent) upon expiration of the current lease or until May 2020, whichever is the earlier (Recital C(a));

(iv)  School Fees Undertaking (Recital C(b)) – no change;

(v)  The Extra Tuition Undertaking is to be varied for the extra tuition expenses to be paid directly by H and all tuition classes are to be agreed by both parties in writing before it is incurred, with no proposed change on amount (Undertaking in Recital C(c));

(vi)  School Bus Undertaking (Recital C(d)) – no change;

(vii)  Car Insurance Undertaking (Recital C(e)) – no change;

(viii)  The Cricket Club Undertaking to be varied that the expenses are at a maximum of HKD 2,500 per month and any overspending by W to be paid by W within 7 days of receiving the bill, failing which the overspent amount to be deducted from the cash MPS payment on the following month, and for the avoidance of doubt monthly membership dues will be borne equally between both parties (Recital C(f));

(ix)  Medical and Dental insurance provided by H’s employer (Recital C(g)) – no change;

(x)  The Uninsured Medical and Dental expenses Undertaking be varied to HKD 2,500 per month and all medical treatment for the Children to be agreed in writing by both parties before it is incurred (Recital C(h)).

7.  According to Mr Marwah, Counsel for H, what H seeks is to reduce the total amount of monthly maintenance for W and Children, from about HKD 255,778 per month[4] under the MPS Order to a total of HKD 188,975 per month, namely by about 26%.

Ground for variation

8.  Essentially H’s ground for variation is that there has been a material change in H’s income, in that there has been a 40% decrease in his total income.

Legal principles

9.  Section 11 (1) of the Matrimonial Proceedings and Property Ordinance, Cap 192 sets out the Court’s power to vary a periodical payment order and section 11(7) set outs out how this power is to be exercised. 

“(7) In exercising the powers conferred by this section the court shall have regard to all the circumstances of the case, including any change in any of the matters to which the court was required to have regard when making the order to which the application relates and, where the party against whom that order was made has died, the changed circumstances resulting from his or her death.”

10.  As set out by Cheung JA in AEM and VFM [2008] 3 HKLRD 36, CACV 261/2006[5]:

“14 3. The traditional approach to variation was not to re-fix afresh the amount of maintenance but to consider the amount of change in the actual means of the parties so that the new order should merely be increased or decreased roughly in proportion to the change in the means : Foster v. Foster [1964] 3 All ER 541, Jackson’s Matrimonial Finance and Taxation 7th Ed. Ch. 3. 131.

4. The modern approach, as required by section 11(7), is for the Court to consider all the circumstances of the cases. The Court is not required to proceed from the starting point of the original order but look at the matter afresh : Flavell v. Flavell [1997] 1 FLR 353 at 357B following Lewis v. Lewis [1977] 1 WLR 409 and Garner v. Garner [1992] 1 FLR 573.

5. Any change in any of the matters to which the Court was required to consider when making the original order was one of the circumstances to be considered.

6. Almost invariably, an application to vary an earlier periodical payment order will be brought on the basis that there has been some changes in the circumstances since the original order was made, for example, continuing inflation; the increased costs in supporting a growing child and that one party may be more adversely affected than another by the increase in the costs of living : Garner v. Garner.

7. An increase in the wealth of the husband was a relevant factor to be taken into account : Primavera v. Primavera [1991] 1 FLR 16 and Cornick v. Cornick (No. 2)[1995] 2 FLR 490.

8. At the same time the basis and intended effect of the original order are relevant factors to which the Court on variation should pay regard and there should not be a radical departure from the approach taken by the parties themselves when they had entered into an agreement embodied in a consent order : Boylan v. Boylan [1988] FLR 282.”

11.  There is no dispute in relation to the above general principles.  It is not disputed that the above principles similarly apply to a variation of a maintenance pending suit order/interim maintenance order: LL v WMFV [2017] HKFC 135, FCMC 12799/2016, 14.12.17.

The evidence

12.  The Variation Summons was supported by H’s 6th affidavit filed on 18 March 2020, and in reply to W’s 8th affirmation filed in opposition, H filed his 7th affidavit.

13.  Also before the Court were the parties’ respective 1st and 2nd Form Es, the parties’ relevant affirmations/affidavits at the time when the MPS Order was made, and also H’s 5th affidavit and W’s 7th affirmation in respect of the W’s litigation funding application.

H’s disclosure

14.  W has complained over H’s financial disclosure.

15.  First, attached to Mr Marwah’s Submissions is a letter dated 29 April 2020 from H’s solicitors to W’s solicitors enclosing a copy of a HSBC statement and 3 cheques, one dated 28 April 2020 to the Children’s school fees for their school fees, one dated 26 April 2020 to H’s friend (“AW”) of HKD 1,080,000, and a transfer advice to H’s solicitors on 29 April 2020 for HKD 250,000, alleging that after clearance of those payments, H’s bank balance would be reduced to HKD 129,435 (“29.04.20 Letter”). As pointed out on behalf of W, H’s evidence should not be produced by way of a letter attached to counsel’s submissions.

16.  Second, W has produced a chronology of H’s disclosure in relation to his income/bonus, to show that H’s financial disclosure has been piece-meal[6]. According to this chronology, in a letter dated 20 February 2020 from his solicitors (“20.02.20 Letter”), H confirmed that he was expecting that he might receive a cash bonus of around USD 50,000 – 100,000 for 2019.  It was only in H’s 7th affidavit of 23 April 2020 that he produced (i) a letter from his employer dated 22 April 2020 confirming that the bonus for the year ended 31 December was HKD 780,000 or USD 100,000[7], and (ii) a copy of his HSBC account statement of 10 March 2020 showing that the bonus was credited into his HSBC account on 4 March 2020[8].

17.  Third, in the 20.02.20 Letter, H’s solicitors had also enclosed an unsigned letter dated 14 February 2020 from H’s employer as to the deferred shares/fund units (“Fund Units”) awarded to H from 2012 to 2018[9]  but there was no information set out as to what was awarded to H for 2019. Looking at the past, the vesting date is always 28 February of each calendar year, and thus H should know by 28 February 2020 whether there were any Fund Units awarded to him for 2019, ie for the tax year 2020/2021.  The letter dated 14 February 2020 appeared to be the last letter disclosed by H as to the award of the Fund Units.

18.  Fourth, it would appear from the 14 February 2020 Letter that 299,390 units had been sold on unknown date/s for an unknown amount/s.  It was not until H’s 7th affidavit of 23 April 2020 that he explained that he received USD 207,080 on 22 October 2019 for the sale of his Fund Units and produced a copy of the relevant 9 November 2019 HSBC bank statement, and the relevant supporting email.  He disclosed that 84,390 Fund Units were sold some time ago in 2014 without disclosing the amount and the whereabouts of the sale proceeds[10].

19.  Fifth, as mentioned earlier, a hearing for W’s Discovery Application has been fixed for argument on 17 June 2020, and that W has complained that H has not accounted for the funds removed by him in breach of the Injunction Order.  The orders sought by W in the Discovery Application regarding the US Trusts are, amongst other things, the following:

(1)  trust accounts from the inception of the US Trusts;

(2)  audited or unaudited financial statements and management accounts of Bremen and Intero from 2014 to 2018;

(3)  a list of assets ever held and/or still held in the US Trusts whether in the names of the US Trusts, Bremen or Intero, and for bank accounts, a list of authorized signatories and power of attorney given under the account;

(4)  details of transactions of over HK$80,000 in or through which any of the US Trusts’ assets were dealt with;

(5)  documentary evidence of certain withdrawals from Intero’s Standard Chartered Bank Private Bank Portfolio and USD savings account and HKD Savings account from April 2017 – 21 December 2017;

(6)  to account for and provide documentary evidence of the HK$1.5m received from the Education Trust;

(7)  to account for and provide documentary evidence of the US$ 250,000 from the Family Trust;

(8)  to provide all communications between H and the Trustees of the US Trusts concerning certain requests by H made to the Trustee of the Family Trust and a meeting, as set out;

(9)  The creation of the Charge Deed on 1 September 2017.

20.  Further, in the Discovery Application, in relation to the Indian Property, the orders sought by W are, amongst other things, the following:

(1)  The trust accounts of the Indian Trust;

(2)  Documentary evidence of the rental income for the Indian Apartment since 1 August 2016 and all outgoings and expenses

21.  Having considered all the above, I agree with W that H’s financial disclosure has been piece meal and has not been satisfactory so far.

H’s income

At the time of the MPS Order (11 December 2018)

22.  In H’s 2nd Form E (Limited) filed on 12 October 2018, ie 2 months prior to the MPS Order, he disclosed his income to be a total average per month of HKD 330,429, being HKD 264,570 being his basic salary + HKD 65,859 for housing allowance + bonus unknown[11], ie HKD 3,965,148 a year.

23.  As seen in the H’s Table in the Litigation Funding Decision[12], according to H’s Employer’s Returns, H’s income for the year 2018/2019, namely 1 April 2018 to 31 March 2019, was HKD 4,833,022 before tax and MPF deductions and HKD 4,189,316 after tax and MPS deductions.

24.  H has now produced a Salaries Tax Demand for Final Tax 2018/2019 and Provisional Tax for 2019/2020[13] (“2018/2019 Final Tax Demand”).  His final tax for 2018/2019 was assessed at a total income of HKD 4,394,964, being his final income of HKD 3,995,422 and the value of residence of HKD 399,542.  The value of residence of HKD 399,542 averaged only about HKD 33,300 per month, and it would appear that, for tax purposes, it was assessed at 10% of his final income. 

H’s current income

25.  As seen in H’s Table in the Litigation Funding Decision, there are 4 components of his income, namely (i) wages; (ii) rental allowance or housing allowance; (iii) bonus (ie cash); and (iv) other rewards (ie awards of the Fund Units)[14] (“4 Components”). 

26.  In H’s 6th affidavit, the supporting affidavit for his Variation Summons, he did not set out any figures for the 4 Components for 2019/2020, save the 2018/2019 Tax Demand, which included the provisional tax for 2019/2020[15]. As seen therein, his provisional tax for 2019/2020 was simply assessed on the same amount of his final income and value of residence for 2018/2019, namely a total of HKD 4,394,964 as mentioned earlier. 

27.  In H’s Table, item (ii) of the 4 Components, namely for rental allowance was HKD 1,180,000 for 2015/2016, HKD 1,247,198 for 2016/2017, HKD 790,316 for 2017/2018 and HKD 837,600 for 2018/2019.   Thus, it would appear that for 2018/2019, he received an average of about HKD 69,809 per month (HKD 837,600÷12), for his housing. 

28.  In his 7th affidavit, in reply to W’s 8th affirmation, H had said he had already explained to W that separate funds for “rental allowance” were not actually received and that a portion of his regular salary happened to be designated as rental allowance for tax reasons[16].

29.  In her 8th affirmation, W had invited H to make disclosure and produce the relevant documentary proof with regard to the total amount of the rental allowance paid and refunded for 2019/20 (ie as seen in his Employer’s Return of 2019/2020)[17].

30.  A table was submitted on W’s behalf and attached to W’s Submissions, setting out H’s total income for 2015/2016 to 2019/2020[18] (“Table A”), and in this Table A, item (ii) rental was stated to be “unknown”.

31.  Thus, at this stage, W has not accepted H’s explanations.  Yet, it did not seem that H has provided any further documentary evidence in support of his allegation in relation to the rental allowance.

32.  H has also provided copies of his pay slips from August 2017 – July 2019[19], and September 2019 to February 2020[20], to show his current net pay to be HKD 313,750 per month (“Pay Slips”). The Pay Slips also showed that he has been voluntarily contributing HKD 9,750 per month towards MPF, in addition to his mandatory contribution of HKD 1,500 per month, from August 2017 to July 2019 and from September 2019 until February 2020.

33.  Based on the Pay Slips, item (i) wages of the 4 Components would be HKD 3,900,000 for 2019/2020, but item (ii) rental, is unknown.  Item (iii) bonus, is now known and is HKD 780,000.  As for item (iv), it appears to be 0, as seen in the unsigned letter dated 14 February 2020 from H’s employer[21].

34.  It thus appears that H’s income for 2019/2020 should be at least HKD 4,680,000 before tax and MPF deductions, but with the exact amount of item (ii) rental being unknown.  

H’s assets and liabilities

At the time of the MPS Order

35.  In his 2nd Form E, H disclosed his interest in his bank accounts to be HKD 1,703,425 and liabilities of HKD 11,731,159[22]. His net assets appeared to be – HKD 10,027,734.

H’s current assets and liabilities

36.  In his 3rd affidavit of 17 September 2019, H had produced a “Net Worth Spreadsheet” as at August 2019 which showed that he had total assets of HKD 11,403,449, of which HKD 1,148,399 was liquid assets and total liabilities of HKD 11,793,157[23].

37.  In his 7th affidavit of 23 April 2020, H disclosed total assets of HKD 8,590,591, of which HKD 2,234,510 was liquid assets, and total liabilities of HKD 10,485,296, with net assets of – HKD 1,894,705[24].

H’s expenses/reasonable needs

38.  As pointed out on behalf of W and set out in a table which I reproduce below, H’s expenses seem to have varied between November 2018 and April 2020:


Period

H’s own expenses

MPS/Direct Payments for W and Child.

Total

Nov 18

300,775 (435,778-135,000) [B1/164]

264,800 (105,800+159,000) [B1/164]

565,575

Sep 19

140,000 [B1:167]

260,050 [B1/167]

400,050

Nov 19

174,350[B1//244]

252,800 (147,000+105,800) [B1/244]

427,150

Mar 20

272,350 [A164]

259,800 [A163/16]

535,650

Apr 20

168,149 (§32)

253,975 (§29 of H’s Submissions)

422,124

39.  In paragraph 4 of Mr Marwah’s Submissions, H’s own expenses were said to have similarly been reduced to HKD 119,939 per month excluding taxes.  This suggests that H’s own reasonable needs can be reduced to around HKD 120,000 per month excluding taxes.

W’s income

40.  As stated in the Litigation Funding Decision, W has always been a homemaker and is financially dependent on H.  There is no sufficient evidence of any income on the part of W other than the maintenance she receives from H.

W’s assets and liabilities

41.  In her 1st Form E, W disclosed her net assets to be HKD 103,537.

42.  As stated in the Litigation Funding Decision, H has alleged that W is expected to receive inheritance from her family and that there is a property held in trust by W’s father for the benefit of W.  As seen in that decision, H has issued a summons for joinder of W’s parents.  Anyway, at this interim stage, there is no sufficient evidence that these alleged assets are financial resources for W.

W’s and Children’s expenses/reasonable needs

43.  The petition was filed by W on 21 November 2016.  W had said in her 10th affirmation filed in September 2018 prior to the MPS Order, after the parties’ separation, H had through his solicitors’ letter of 17 November 2016 proposed to pay W a sum of HKD 229,000 per month to cover her and the Children’s interim needs including Cricket Club expenses of HKD 10,000 per month, but with rental and school expenses separately paid for by H.

44.  In W’s 1st Form E, ie in January 2017, she had set out the expenses/needs of herself and the Children to be about HKD 264,974 per month. 

45.  Later, H had proposed in his solicitors letter of 12 April 2017,  to pay W HKD 101,100 per month and that H was to pay directly rental, the Children’s school fees and school bus fees, Cricket Club expenses and car related costs etc[25].

46.  According to W’s 2nd Form E, W’s and the Children’s expenses/needs were HKD 255,778 per month, and net of the direct payments by H/H’s employer, the amount was a total of HKD 105,800. 

47.  It was under the above circumstances that the parties eventually agreed to the MPS Order.  The MPS Order commenced in January 2019, and it was an order by consent.

48.  In his 7th affidavit, H has alleged that some items of W’s and the Children’s expenses were unreasonable.  H takes the view that the current monthly rent of HKD 74,000 for the residence of W and the Children (2,300 sq ft) in South Bay is too high, and that H had contacted the landlord who refused to reduce the monthly rental despite a 20 – 30% decline generally in rental (of which there is no sufficient evidence).  H had proposed to W to terminate the lease (which expires in April 2021 but contains an early termination clause of two months’ notice), and that H’s proposal was for W and the Children to move into a 1,500 sq ft apartment in Tai Hang at HKD 54,000 per month. 

49.  W and the Children have lived in their current residence for past 3 years since 2017 and the monthly rent of HKD 70,000 was increased to HKD 74,000 in April 2019 which was accepted by H who signed the new lease for 2 more years. 

50.  H’s own rental originally for a serviced apartment in Park View was HKD 69,800 per month, but he said he has now moved to a new apartment in Tai Tam near the Children’s school with rental of HKD 57,329 per month.  As W had said if H wanted to reduce expenses, he could have moved to a flat in Tai Hang at HKD 54,000 per month.

51.  I understand that the former matrimonial home was in Repulse Bay and thus, it would appear that the parties and the Children have always lived in the south side and this would appear to be the living standard they have been used to, and in any event, a flat in South Bay/Tai Tam is much nearer to the Children’s school.  I do not find H’s proposal reasonable, and see no reason for W and the Children to be uprooted to Tai Hang during this interim period.

52.  As for the domestic helper, W had explained that the helper had 15 years of work experience and that her contracted salary was HKD 8,000 per month, and plus other costs, total HKD 10,000 per month and that previously, W and the Children had one full time helper and one part-time helper.  

53.  Now that W and the Children have no car for their use, W suggests that she spends no less than HKD 8,000 per month for transportation, H has put forward HKD 4,800 per month, and H had suggested that as a compromise the middle figure of HKD 5,750 per month.

54.  H has also complained about W’s Cricket Club expenses and other items of her expenses, in particular in relation to “holidays” in that the previous item was based upon 4 trips a year and a total of HKD 276,000 a year for holidays, and due to Covid-19, they would not be travelling in the next year.

55.  As for uninsured medical and dental expenses, it would appear that H’s main complaint is that W had not consulted him over those costs insured for the Children.  In this respect, I agree that W should have discussed with H.

56.  As seen in a table annexed to W’s Submissions (“Table D”), the present reasonable needs of her and the Children, are said to be around HKD 263,975 per month. 

57.  Although Covid-19 has caused a lot of uncertainties in everyone’s life, at this stage, it is too early to tell what the consequences will be, and all this should be clearer by the time of the trial.  At this stage, the Court can only take a broad brush approach, and for W and 3 Children of 16 ½, 14 ½, and 10 ½, I find their reasonable needs should be at more or less the same amounts as at the time of the MPS Order.  

58.  I am of the view that the MPS Order should cover the reasonable interim needs of W and the Children until the determination of W’s AR Application.

Discussion

59.  As quoted earlier, Cheung JA, in his judgment in the VEM v VFM case and citing from Boylan and Boylan, has said that the basis and intended effect of the original order are relevant factors to which the Court on variation should pay regard and there should not be a radical departure from the approach taken by the parties themselves when they had entered into an agreement embodied in a consent order.

60.  H said there has been a 40% decrease in H’s total income, and that due to Covid-19, it is unlikely that H will be receiving a bonus from now until the trial in May 2021, and that he has recently paid about HKD 1.9m from his bank accounts which will result in a bank balance of HKD 129,434 in his HSBC savings account as seen in the 29.04.20 Letter.

61.  If one compares H’s disclosed income at the time of the MPS Order (tax year 2018/2019) and his current income (tax year 2019/2020) as seen in Table A, the gross amount of the first two items of the 4 Components came to the same, ie HKD 3,900,000.  As for the 3rd item bonus of the 4 Components, it was 0 at the time of the MPS Order, namely 2018/2019, and HKD 780,000 for 2019/2020.  In relation to the 4th item Fund Units, in Table A, W adopted a figure of HKD 1,339,284 for 2019/2020.  This is in fact an average taken by W over the past 4 years.  According to the letter of 14 February 2020 from his employer, no award was made for 2018 (the tax year 2019/2020).  As I have mentioned earlier, there was no supporting evidence as to whether any award was made for 2019 (the tax year 2020/2021), which should have vested on 28 February 2020. 

62.  As I have said earlier, H’s financial disclosure has been piecemeal and unsatisfactory.  At this stage, there has been no clear documentary evidence as to item (ii) of the 4 Components, namely the rental allowance or on item (iv), whether any Fund Units were awarded to him for 2019.

63.  In the above circumstances, I do not find that there has been sufficient evidence to support H’s allegation that he has suffered a 40% decrease in his income since the MPS Order.

64.  The evidence indicated that H has always relied on his bonuses and/or other financial resources to meet the family expenses, since it would appear that even at the time of the MPS Order, his basic wages and rental allowances would not be sufficient to cover his own expenses plus the MPS Order[26].

65.  It can be seen in H’s own Net Worth Statement (August 2019)  or the table of his assets and liabilities in his 7th affidavit[27], he has regarded his tax liability as a capital liability to be deducted from his assets.  There was no monthly savings for tax from his income that could be seen in his bank statements, nor were the school fees paid on a monthly basis.  In fact, the Children’s school fees are paid in advance of each semester.

66.  The evidence shows that apart from bonuses, H has since the MPS Order obtained loan/s and also further cash from the sale of the Fund Units.

67.  H has explained that he is not practically able to sell any more Fund Units without risking his career, but there has been no supporting evidence to show this.  In fact, as seen in the email exchanges of 17 – 18 October 2019 between H and his employer[28], it would appear that on 17 October 2019, the original proposal was to sell 342,473.02 of the Fund Units- “ex wine”, and it was H who decided to request a sale of 215,000 Fund Units only, and that he later received net sale proceeds of USD 207,080.29 on about 21 October 2019, after deducting the loan and interest due to his employer, ie about HKD 1,615,226.26.

68.  Thus, there does not appear to be anything to stop H from selling at least another 127,473.02, should such need indeed arise.  It was not clear what “ex wine” referred to.

69.  As mentioned earlier, attached to H’s Submissions was the 29.04.20 Letter setting out 3 payments made by H around that date. 

70.  It was revealed in the 29.04.20 Letter that H had repaid a loan of HKD 1,080,000 from Cottonwood Investments Limited (“Cottonwood”). In H’s 5th affidavit of 27 February 2020 in relation to W’s litigation funding application, H had disclosed a credit line of up to HKD 1,020,000 for funding of his legal costs, which H said he borrowed from his friend AW, a director of Cottonwood, and H had produced a “Memorandum of Understanding” signed by him[29] (“MOU”).

71.  There was no actual loan agreement produced by H, and the “Lender” in the MOU was stated to be Cottonwood, and maturity date of the MOU was the “earlier of 10 days from when a demand for repayment was made by the Lender or 2 years from the date of the first drawdown of the loan”. According to H there were 2 drawdowns, (i) on 12 September 2019 and (ii) on 18 January 2020[30]. H claimed in his 5th affidavit that he owed a total of HKD 1,080,000 including interest to Cottonwood.  This was on 27 February 2020, the date of his 5th affidavit.

72.  In H’s 5th affidavit, he had also produced an email of 17 February 2020 from his friend AW to say that he could not lend H any further amounts.  He had asked H when H thought he would be in a position to pay him back[31].

73.  In my view, the above email was only an enquiry from AW and it was not a “demand for repayment” from Cottonwood.  Further, as the 1st drawdown date was 12 September 2019, according to the MOU, the maturity date should be 12 September 2021 unless there was an earlier demand for repayment.  

74.  In any event, what H then said in his 7th affidavit of 23 April 2020 was very different.  H said the loan was from AW “via Cottonwood” and that the 1st amount of HKD 520,000 was on 12 September 2019 transferred to his solicitors [of which there had been no evidence as to whether it was direct from H or from AW or from Cottonwood], and the 2nd amount of HKD 520,000 was received the next day on 13 September 2019 and credited into his personal account.  It was not clear whether those drawdowns were backed by “valid legal invoices” as stated in the MOU or not.  Clearly the 2nd amount received on 13 September 2019 did not appear to have been used for his legal costs.  Further, not only the 2nd drawdown date was different, the total amount had become HKD 1,040,000, instead of HKD 1,020,000, and also it was not sure what happened to the “Line Fee” of 1% pa, or interest of the 7.5% pa, since according to H, the total interest was about HKD 40,000 to make up the loan to Cottonwood of HKD 1,080,000.  No detailed calculations were provided by H in relation to the HKD 40,000.  

75.  Although H had referred to an email of 20 April 2020 from AW, all this email said was one word “reminder” while forwarding the earlier email of 17 February 2020[32], ie all his friend was doing was to remind H to let him have a reply to the question “when do you think you will be in a position to pay me back”. In other words, it would appear that all AW was doing was to ask H for an indication of the time for repayment.  In my view, this was not a “demand for repayment” from Cottonwood, or AW, as set out in the MOU, as no deadline for repayment had been imposed.

76.  As there was no signed copy of the MOU produced, it was not sure whether it was actually signed by Cottonwood/AW in the end. Suffice to say, it was misleading for H to produce the MOU, when it appeared that at most, he simply borrowed a personal loan from his friend AW and he did not use all of it for litigation costs, but also for his personal expenses.  In any event, I am not satisfied that there was any urgency in repaying his friend on 29 April 2020.

77.  Also, there was no explanation or clarification provided by H as to why he had referred to the 2nd drawdown amount being received by him on 18 January 2020. 

78.  H and his solicitors were fully aware that in relation to W’s 2nd Summons, H’s own position in February 2020 was that both he and W should each be entitled to request a distribution from the Trustee of the Family Trust for the purposes of litigation funding, and that this Court’s decision in relation to that matter was pending.  I again see no sufficient evidence that there was any urgency in H’s payment of HKD 250,000 to his solicitors on 29 April 2020.

79.  In my view, H decided to make the above payments just to reduce the balance in his bank accounts.

80.  As for the cheque for HKD 360,350 for payment of the Children’s school fees, it would appear from the relevant invoices[33] that this amount covers the 1st Semester until 10 January 2021.  This means between now and 10 January 2021, the direct payments pursuant to the Undertakings will be reduced by a monthly sum of HKD 55,000 for the school fees.

81.  W had said that the extra tuition was actually 0, and so was the car insurance[34], and the uninsured medical and dental expenses were only HKD 2,000, and thus until 10 January 2021, H’s payments pursuant to the Undertakings should be less than HKD 90,000 per month, instead of HKD 149,978 per month.  This means that H’s total payments to W and the Children under the MPS Order will actually be only about HKD 195,800 per month until January 2021.

82.  It can also be seen in H’s 2018/2019 Final Tax Demand that H’s salaries taxes would have been paid on 13 January 2020 and 14 April 2020.  Hence, his next tax payments will be in January 2021.

83.  By January 2021, the number of Fund Units awarded to H for the year 2020/2021 should be known by then, as well as whether H will receive any bonus for 2020/2021.

84.  In the meantime, with his net pay of HKD 313,750 per month, H should be able to afford to continue to meet the current payments under the MPS Order.  After payments of about HKD 195,800 per month for W and the Children, H should have at least HKD 117,950 per month to meet his own expenses, and if necessary, the cessation of his voluntary MPF monthly contribution of HKD 9,750 will give him further cash. 

85.  H tried to explain that he did not know or expect the effect of the MPS Order would have lasted as long as it has, and that he thought that the final hearing would be 12 months away.  However, at the time the MPS Order was made, the matter was still in the Family Court, and before the transfer up, and nowhere near to being set down for a final hearing.  Further, as pointed out, the MPS Order was made by consent based on the parties’ agreement and consideration of, amongst other things, H’s average income of at least 3 years, and that there was no evidence that the parties had intended that such agreement was to be re-visited or varied on a year to year basis.

Conclusion and Order

86.  Having considered all the above, I have come to the conclusion that there was no urgency in H’s application and in any event, there is no merit for his application at this stage.

87.  I therefore dismiss H’s Variation Summons and order him to pay the costs W’s costs of and incidental to this application, to be summarily assessed.  W is to lodge her statement of costs within 7 days, H to lodge his list of objections, and H to pay within 14 days of summary assessment.

 (Bebe Pui Ying Chu)
 Judge of the Court of First Instance
 High Court

Messrs Stevenson Wong & Co, for the petitioner

Mr Shaphan Marwah, instructed by Oldham Li & Nie, for the 1st respondent


[1] The generally adjourned period due to the Covid-19

[2] A:1-3

[3] A:14-17

[4] The figure of HKD 225,778 in H’s Submissions is presumed to be a typing error

[5] At para 14

[6] B2:479-482

[7] B3:592

[8] B3:595

[9] B1:237

[10] Para 15.5, A:199

[11] A:87

[12] At para 26

[13] B2:388-390

[14] At para 26

[15] B2:388-390

[16] At para 15.2, A:196

[17] At paras 9 and 9.3, A: 176-177

[18] See Table A annexed to W’s Submissions

[19] B2:329-352

[20] B2:391-396

[21] B1:237

[22] A:79, 85, 86

[23] B1:166-167

[24] A: 196-198

[25] See paras 9, 10, A:66-67

[26] See para 15, A:10

[27] Para 12 A:196-197

[28] B3:637-638

[29] CB3:544-546 in relation to W’s 2nd Summons

[30] In para 4r, A:137

[31] At CB3:548 in relation to W’s 2nd Summons

[32] B3:642

[33] B3: 607-612

[34] There is now no more car and this has generated another issue upon which parties had exchanged a number of correspondences

[2020] HKCFI 848-EN-2020-05-21

KCMA v. ABC AND OTHERS

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HCMC 1/2019

[2020] HKCFI 848

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

MATRIMONIAL CAUSES NO. 1 OF 2019

________________________

BETWEEN  
 KCMAPetitioner
 and
 ABC1st Respondent
 PBB in his capacity as the Trustee of the Family Trust2nd Respondent
 PBB in his capacity as the Trustee of the Education Trust3rd Respondent
 K4th Respondent

_______________________

Before:Hon B Chu J in Chambers (Not Open to the Public) (By Paper Disposal)
Date of Petitioner’s Submissions:23 March 2020
Date of 1st Respondent’s Submissions:30 March 2020
Date of Petitioner’s Reply Submissions:6 April 2020
Date of Petitioner’s Further Submissions:4 May 2020
Date of 1st Respondent’s Further Submissions:4 May 2020
Date of Decision:21 May 2020

____________________

D E C I S I O N
(Litigation Funding)

  _____________________

1.  This Court has previously handed down two decisions in these matrimonial proceedings, the first decision on 21 November 2019 in relation to W’s application for joinder of the Trustee of the US Trusts and for joinder of H’s father (“Joinder Decision”), followed by a 2nd decision on 22 November 2019 on W’s Injunction Application against H (“Injunction Decision”).  As seen in those decisions, there was also the Discovery Application issued by W which was adjourned sine die with liberty to restore.   I shall continue to use the abbreviations in those decisions, save where otherwise indicated herein.  

2.  The present application before the Court is made by W for provision for costs or litigation funding by way of a summons issued on 12 August 2019 (the 2nd Summons as defined later).  Before I consider W’s present application, I will first set out the relevant financial applications which have been made so far by the respective parties in the present proceedings.

The relevant financial applications 

3.  In so far as this Court can gather, there have been the following financial applications issued:

(1)     W’s application for final ancillary relief made in her divorce petition issued on 21 November 2016, and later in her Form A filed under Practice Direction 15.11 on 22 March 2017 (“W’sAR Application”);

(2)     In H’s Form 4, he has indicated that he wishes to be heard on W’s AR Application and that he wishes to make his own applications for ancillary relief, but so far as I can see, no Form A has been filed on his behalf.

(3)     On 27 March 2017, W issued a summons for maintenance pending suit for herself and interim maintenance for the Children, to include a legal cost provision (“W’s1st Summons”);

(4)     On 29 August 2017, W issued a notice of application for avoidance of H’s disposition of assets to the US Trusts and to his father under section 17 of the Matrimonial proceedings and Property Ordinance, Cap 192 (MPPO) and for variation of nuptial settlement under section 6(1) (c) and (d) of MPPO, an invitation to various parties to intervene as respondents, and an injunction (in this judgment collectively referred to as “W’s1st s 17 Application”);

(5)     On 29 November 2018, W issued a summons for the Joinder Application, the Injunction Application and the Discovery Application;

(6)     On 11 December 2018, Judge Melloy ordered that the ancillary relief applications by the parties and W’s 1st s 17 Application be transferred to the High Court (“Transfer Order”);

(7)     After the Transfer Order, on 22 February 2019, W issued a further s 17 application to set aside H’s transfers from his bank accounts to his parents and other third party under section 17 of MPPO (“W’s2nd s 17 Application”);

(8)     On 12 August 2019, W issued the present summons for legal costs provision/litigation funding (“2nd Summons”);

(9)     On 20 September 2019, H issued a summons for joinder of W’s parents and for appointment of single joint expert on French Inheritance Law (“H’s Joinder Application”);

(10)     On 19 March 2020, H issued a summons for downward variation of maintenance pending suit/interim maintenance ordered by Judge Melloy on 11 December 2018 (“H’s Variation Application”).

4.  On same day of the Transfer Order, namely 11 December 2018, Judge Melloy also made the following orders:

(1)     H to pay W a total of HKD 105,800 per month, being maintenance pending suit for W in the sum of HKD 26,450 per month and interim maintenance in the sum of HKD 26,450 per month for each of the 3 Children, plus various undertakings (“MPS Order”);

(2)     W’s application for litigation funding set out in her restored 1st Summons be dismissed upon W receiving a sum of HKD 975,000 on a without prejudice basis as set out in the order (“Melloy Order”);

(3)     W’s summons issued on 29 November 2018 for the Joinder Application, the Injunction Application and the Discovery Application be transferred to the High Court.

5.  At present,

(1)     Pursuant to an order made by this Court on 24 June 2019, W’s AR Application and W’s 2nd 17 Application have been fixed for a 10 day trial, from 3-14 May 2021 (“AR Trial”);

(2)     On 24 September 2019, this Court directed, amongst other things, that a further direction hearing of W’s AR Application, W’s 1st s 17 Application and W’s 2nd s 17 Application be fixed after the substantive hearing of W’s 2nd Summons and that the parties to attend mediation as soon as possible (“24.09.19 Order”);

(3)     W’s Joinder Application and Injunction Application have been decided pursuant to the Joinder Decision and the Injunction Decision respectively on 21 and 22 November 2019;

(4)     W’s 2nd Summons is being dealt with by paper in this decision;

(5)     W’s Disclosure Application which was adjourned sine die has been fixed for a substantive argument on 17 June 2020 (2 hours reserved).

(6)     H’s Joinder Application was fixed for a direction hearing on 28 October 2019 but as service had not yet been properly effected, the proposed joinder has been adjourned sine die with liberty to restore, and the application for a SJE on French inheritance law has been adjourned to a substantive hearing to be fixed (with 2 hours reserved);

(7)     H’s Variation Application has been directed to be dealt with on paper.

6.  W has further indicated that she intends to issue the following applications:

(1)     An application for third party discovery re H’s entitlement from his employer/partnership;

(2)     An application to enforce H’s undertaking in the MPS Order in relation to uninsured medical/dental expenses and housing needs and/or vary upward of the maintenance ordered in the MPS Order;

(3)     An application to seek discovery concerning properties disposed of by H.

W’s applications for litigation funding

7.  According to W’s evidence in her 8th affirmation filed in the FCMC proceedings[1] and a chronology submitted on behalf of W[2]  (“Litigation Funding Chronology”), there have been the following requests and/or applications for litigation funds by W from H :

(i)     On 2 February 2017, W’s solicitors first wrote to seek a monthly sum of HKD 50,000 for litigation funding;

(ii)     As set out earlier, W’s 1st Summons was issued on 27 March 2017, for amongst other things, litigation funding and at a hearing on 19 April 2017, the parties agreed without any condition that H would, amongst other things, make payment of HKD 600,000 for W’s litigation funds and it appears that W’s 1st Summons was then adjourned sine die, and eventually this payment of HKD 600,000 was made on 28 April 2017 by H to W;

(iii)     On 27 October 2017, W’s solicitors wrote to seek further litigation funding in the sum of HKD 600,000 to cover W’s costs from May to December 2017, which was resisted by H, as a result of which, W then sought leave to restore W’s 1st Summons, and at the hearing on 14 December 2017, H agreed to pay HKD600,000 with no condition attached and W’s 1st Summons appeared to be again adjourned sine die;

(iv)     On 9 April 2018, W’s solicitors wrote to seek further litigation funds of HKD 600,000 to cover February to May 2018, which was refused by H, and she again restored W’s 1st Summons on 24 April 2018, and on 8 May 2018, the day before the call over hearing on 9 May 2018, H provided the funds, but W proceeded with the 1st Summons;

(v)     Eventually, as set out earlier, pursuant to the Melloy Order on 11 December 2018, W’s 1st Summons was dismissed by Judge Melloy upon W each receiving a sum of HKD 975,000 of the distribution from the Family Trust and on the without prejudice basis as stated in the order;

(vi)     On 6 June 2019, W sought further litigation funding and this led to various letters between the parties’ respective solicitors, as set out later in this decision;

(vii)     On 12 August 2019, W issued her 2nd Summons.

8.  The without prejudice basis upon which the Melloy Order was made (“WP Basis”) was as follows:

“D. AND UPON [W] receiving the sum of HK$975,000, being half share of the distribution requested to have already been made by [H] from the [Family Trust], for her litigation funding on the basis that is without prejudice to their rights and respective position concerning the [Family Trust] and/or all and any other matters arising from her [1st s17 Application ( as defined later)] and her [Injunction Application and Disclosure Application].”

9.  In W’s 2nd Summons, she sought periodical payments to be applied towards her litigation funding up to the conclusion of the private FDR (financial dispute resolution) or mediation or before the Pre-Trial Review hearing which was at that time fixed on 24 September 2019.  The total amount sought by W in the 2nd Summons was HKD 1,507,270 as follows :

(i)     for the 1st month, a sum of HKD 233,350;

(ii)     for subsequent months, HKD 106,160 each for 12 months.

10.  W’s 2nd Summons was originally scheduled for a substantive hearing on 3 March 2020 but due to the courts being generally closed with cases generally adjourned, this Court directed the parties to consider disposal of the 2nd Summons on paper, which was subsequently agreed.

11.  W’s Skeleton Submissions were lodged on 23 March 2020 and attached thereto is a draft order[3] (“Draft Order”).  It appears from the Draft Order that the total amount of litigation funds which W is now seeking is in the region of HKD 3,230,000 to be paid :

(i)     HKD 269,208 per month for 12 months; or

(ii)     HKD 179,472 per month for 18 months; or

(iii)     HKD 134,604 per month for 24 months; or

(iv)     alternatively H to cause a distribution of HKD3,230,000 from the Family Trust subject to H’s undertaking and confirmation and payment of costs as set out in the Draft Order.

12.  It further appears in the Draft Order that the costs provision is now to be applied towards W’s legal costs up to the 1st Pre–Trial Review of the final AR Trial.

Legal principles

13.  The Court is empowered to include an element for legal costs provision in an order for maintenance pending suit under s 3 of the Matrimonial Proceedings and Property Ordinance, Cap 192.  As recently set out by the Court of Appeal in WW and LLN[2020] HKCA 178, CACV 524/2019, 25.03.20, following HJFG v KCY [2012] 1 HKLRD 95 and Currey v Currey [2006] EWHC Civ 1338:

“20. The principles for granting litigation funding are well-established:

(1) In order to obtain litigation funding, the burden is on an applicant to demonstrate that she cannot reasonably procure legal representation by any other means. This includes showing that she cannot secure publicly funded legal help at a level of expertise apt to the proceedings. To the extent that she has assets, the applicant has to demonstrate that they cannot reasonably be deployed, either directly or as the means of raising a loan to fund legal services …

(2) The subject matter of the proceedings and the reasonableness of the applicant’s stance in the proceedings will always be relevant.

(3) The period over which costs allowance is to be paid is also relevant. If the application was made before the FDR hearing, it may well be wise to order that the costs allowance should fund the applicant only up to that hearing. If the FDR fails, it would be for the new judge, on the basis of the materials properly before him, to determine whether a new allowance for legal costs should be granted and if so, in what amount: HJFG v KCY [2012] 1 HKLRD 95, §§80-83; Currey v Currey [2006] EWCA Civ 1338.

21. The court should be alert to the risk of injustice arising from irrecoverable and/or unmerited sums paid for litigation funding, which would call for extra caution in the balancing exercise. As stated by Thorpe LJ in Moses-Taiga v Taiga [2005] EWCA Civ 1013, at §20:

‘… the whole purpose of alimony pending suit is to sustain the petitioner pending the court’s determination. There is manifestly a risk of unjustified and irrecoverable payments, but that has to be balanced against the risk of a denial of access to justice for the petitioner, if she has not the means to sustain herself and the litigation pending its determination.’”

14.  There are no disputes in relation to the above principles.

The issues in the present application

15.  It is submitted by Mr Shaphan Marwah on behalf of H that the issues in this application are:

(i)     Whether the Family Trust is a source of funds reasonably available to W;

(ii)     If not, whether H can otherwise afford to pay W’s legal costs;

(iii)     Whether W’s litigation amount needed has been exaggerated.

W’s means

16.  W’s case is that she does not hold any assets of value and that during her 15 year marriage to H, she was and still is a homemaker and financially dependent on H.

17.  In her 1st Form E filed on 16 January 2017, W deposed to having no income.  She had only one bank account at HSBC in her name, which was only opened in November 2016.  She disclosed under “Liabilities” that her then legal costs were HK$76,277.  Her net assets of HK$103,537 as at the date of her 1st Form E.

18.  In her 2nd Form E (truncated) and filed on 16 October 2018, W had again deposed to having no income and expenses of a total of HK$105,800 per month made up of (i) general expenses of HK$43,500; (ii) personal expenses of HK$27,860; and (iii) Children’s expenses of HK$34,500.

19.  H has alleged that W is expected to receive inheritance from her family including but not limited to a property in Vitet, St Barthelemy,  which according to H is valued at approximately USD 6.5m and that further there is another property held in trust by W’s father for the benefit of W , which consisted of land worth approximately USD 2m[4]. W denies these allegations.

20.  Anyway, as seen in Mr Marwah’s submissions on behalf of H, W’s potential inheritance or beneficial interest in land held by her father are not relied on by H for the purposes of this application, and that the one key issue is whether the Family Trust is a source of funds reasonably available to W. 

21.  I will come to the Family Trust later, but so far as W’s assets are concerned, I am satisfied that she has no sufficient assets presently held in her personal name which can reasonably be deployed, whether directly, or as the means of raising a loan in funding legal services for her.  There is no evidence that she has made any application for legal aid, but with the MPS Order and her financial resources from the US Trusts, it does not seem to appear that she will be able to meet the means test.

H’s means

22.  It is H’s case that he cannot afford to pay the sums sought by W for her litigation funds, nor his own costs, without receiving any distribution from the Family Trust. 

23.  In H’s 1st Form E filed on 1 February 2017, he disclosed a base salary of USD 400,000 per year, which was about HKD 260,000 per month. H further disclosed that he had received bonuses for 2015 and 2016 as recorded in his tax returns and said at the time that he was unlikely to receive an annual bonus for 2017.  He disclosed liabilities of HKD529,270 and net assets totalling HKD 46,379,244, which consisted of mainly interests in his bank accounts of about HKD 4,034,555 and assets held by the Family Trust which were estimated to be about HK$40.95m at the time[5].

24.  Then in his 2nd Form E (truncated) filed on 16 October 2018, he disclosed that his income was then HKD 264,570 per month with an unknown discretionary bonus and a housing allowance of HKD 65,859.  He also disclosed interests in his bank accounts being reduced to HKD 1,703,425 and he then disclosed liabilities of HKD 11,731,159.

25.  A summary of H’s income based on his Employer’s Returns was prepared by W’s legal representatives (“W’s Table”)[6] and it is submitted on behalf of W that H’s average income with rent refunded from 2015/2016 to 2018/2019 for those years was HKD 6,984,244 a year or HKD 582,020 per month[7]. In fact the figures in W’s Table also seem to be reflected in H’s Table below.

26.  Mr Marwah has also in his Submissions prepared a table of H’s income which I set out below (“H’s Table”):

 2015/162016/172017/182018/19
WagesHK$1,937,996HK$1,870,798HK$3,174,851HK$3,062,400
RentalHK$1,180,000HK$1,247,198HK$790,316HK$837,600
Bonus (ie cash)HK$5,850,000HK$0HK$2,628,692
HK$0
Any other rewards (ie deferred shares/fund units)HK$2,420,848HK$2,003,265HK$0HK$933,022
Total (pre-tax / MPF)HK$11,388,844HK$5,121,261HK$6,593,859HK$4,833,022
Less Tax payable (net of allowances)[8](HK$1,655,701)(HK$472,821)(HK$998,322)(HK$508,706)
Less MPF[9](HK$111,540)
(HK$111,540)
(HK$136,955)(HK$135,000)
Net TotalHK$9,621,603HK$4,536,900HK$5,458,852HK$4,189,316

27.  It is clear from W’s Table and H’s Table that the total of the 4 items in H’s Table, namely (i) Wages (or salary), (ii) Rental, (iii) Bonus (ie cash) and (iv) Other Rewards, produced the same figures which averaged HKD 6,984,244 a year for those 4 years between 2015/16 to 2018/2019 or a monthly average of HKD 582,020 submitted on behalf of W.

28.  However, W’s figure of the monthly average of HKD 582,020 was the gross income without taking into account deductions for H’s taxes and his MPF contributions, and further averaged over 4 years.  Anyway, on the figures for 2018/2019, according to H’s Table, his net income would be HKD 4,189,316 for the year 2018/2019 or a monthly average of about HKD 349,110. 

29.  H has explained that his income consists of a cash component and a fund unit component which vests in subsequent years, and the vesting of illiquid fund units shows up as deferred cash/fund units in the compensation table for each year of vesting.  On the other hand, W has complained about H’s disclosure and that he never tried to explain properly various documents disclosed by him.

30.  Pursuant to the MPS Order, H is to pay W maintenance pending suit /interim maintenance of HKD 105,800 per month with effect from 1 January 2019 being HKD 26,450 per month for W and HKD 26,450 for each of the 3 Children, and in addition, H has provided undertakings to continue to pay for rent, school fees and school trips, extra tuition and school bus and in so far as it was relevant car insurance and repairs, plus monthly expenses at the Hong Kong Cricket Club, provision of medical insurance through H’s company and uninsured medical and therapy cost[10].  According to H, the total payments he has been making to W every month in cash and/or pursuant to his undertakings total HKD 260,050 per month and that his own expenses (including rent) come to HKD 140,000 per month[11].

31.  At the hearing before Judge Melloy, W was seeking HKD 100,000 per month for litigation funding, and the Judge had said she was not of the view that H had the funds to pay for these costs from any other means other than the Family Trust.  It was her finding at the time that H was receiving a base income of HKD 313,750 net of MPF and that he had received significant bonuses in 2015 and 2017 but they were discretionary, and the Judge had observed that unless H received a bonus of some kind, it was hard to see how he was going to be able to make ends meet including meeting W’s interim expenses[12].

32.  According to a recent letter dated 20 February 2020 produced by H, H said he expected to receive a cash bonus for 2019/2020 of USD 50,000-100,000 although this had not yet been decided                                                           [13].

33.  As set out earlier, H has made an application for downward variation of the MPS Order and H’s Variation Application will be dealt with on paper after the present application.

34.  In any event, a detailed examination of the parties’ means can only be considered at the full ancillary relief trial and at this interim stage, the Court can only adopt a broad brush approach, and having considered the evidence presently before this Court, I have come to the view that there is no sufficient evidence that H will be able to pay his own litigation costs plus W litigation costs without receiving any distribution from the Family Trust.

The Family Trust

35.  As H has pointed out, PBB, the Trustee of the Family Trust and the 2nd Respondent herein has informed W directly in a letter of 16 May 2018 that she is free to request a distribution at any time[14].

36.  That there be distributions of funds from the Family Trust for W’s litigation funding has in fact been proposed in letters between the parties’ respective solicitors.  I will set out below the relevant letters between the parties on their respective proposals.

37.  In the letter dated 6 September 2019 sent by W’s solicitors to H’s solicitors, H was asked to confirm what his position was in relation to W’s 2nd Summons and whether funding could be provided, either in the way that it was done on the last occasion, without prejudice to the parties’ respective positions as stated in the Melloy Order or otherwise[15].

38.  In H’s solicitors’ reply 11 September 2019, they referred to  paragraph 35 of W’s 3rd affirmation, and that as W was willing to agree to her litigation funding to be financed through the Family Trust in the same manner as the Melloy Order, they therefore enclosed a joint letter to the Trustee requesting a distribution of HKD975,000 to each party for the purposes of litigation funding[16] (“Joint Request”).   

39.  Pausing here for the moment, in the above letter, H’s solicitors attached a copy of the letter which was to be sent to the Trustee.  However, notwithstanding what was said by H’s solicitors, the Joint Request was for   a distribution of HKD 950,000 only to each party, and further it was stated to be without prejudice to how W may argue the issue of costs at the final ancillary relief hearing.  Neither the amount nor the basis was consistent with what was stated in the parties’ respective solicitors’ letters, nor was the basis same as the WP Basis in the Melloy Order.

40.  On 18 September 2019, W’s solicitors wrote and raised certain queries on H’s Form H of that date.  Further, on 18 September 2019, with the call over hearing on 24 September 2019 approaching, W’s solicitors wrote to the Court setting out W’s proposed directions for the call over hearing, including amongst other things, directions for W’s 2nd Summons.  In this letter to the Court, W proposed that if agreeable to H, orders be made along those orders sought in paragraphs 1a. and b. of W’s 2nd Summons, or:

“Alternatively, [H] shall cause a distribution from the [Family Trust] to be paid to [W’s solicitors] a lump sum of HKD 1,507,280 (HKD 233,350 +HKD 1,273,930) for her litigation funding up to the conclusion of the private FDR or mediation or before the Pre-Trial Review hearing to be fixed on the following basis:

a. without prejudice to the parties’ rights and respective positions concerning the [Family Trust] and/or all and any other matters arising from her [1st s17 Application] and/or her [Injunction Application and Disclosure Application] (being the same basis upon which the litigation funding was provided by [H] to [W] in December 2018);

b. without prejudice to the parties’ rights and respective positions concerning the treatment of the above lump sum to be received by [W] in the ancillary relief; and

c.     that [H] shall disclose all related documents, including but not limited to the request made to the trustee, the relevant company board and/or member resolutions, the documents showing the flow of funds leading to such distribution and H’s receipt of such funds.”

(“W’s Proposals”)

41.  There was no progress and thus at the call over hearing on 24 September 2019, directions were then given by this Court for a date to be fixed for substantive argument for W’s 2nd Summons.

42.  Subsequently, as mentioned earlier, this Court handed down the Joinder Decision and the Injunction Decision respectively on 21 and 22 November 2019.   This was followed by a further direction hearing on 12 December 2019, during which it would appear that W indicated agreement to receive distribution from the US Trusts for the purposes of her litigation funding on the same basisas ordered by Judge Melloy.  H’s solicitors followed up and  wrote on 13 December 2019 referring to W’s agreement on the litigation funding and enclosed a consent summons for W’s consideration[17].

43.  H’s wording of the relevant recitals in the consent summons were:

“B. AND UPON [W] and [H] acknowledging and agreeing with each other and undertaking to the Court that they both agree that the request for a distribution out of the [Family Trust] and the [Education Trust], their respective underlying corporate vehicles, including but not limited to [Bremen] and [Intero] or with regard to the funds, or of any assets held thereunder for the purpose of litigation funding shall not constitute a breach of Paragraph 1 of the Order dated 22 November 2019 against [H] not to make, cause or permit any distribution, withdrawal, lending , leveraging, provision of collateral, borrowing or any forms of extracts out of the said trusts, directly or indirection and in any capacity.

C.     AND UPON [W] and [H] acknowledging and agreeing that they shall make [Joint Request] to the Trustee of the Family Trust, for litigation funding of HK$ 975,000 each on the basis that it is without prejudice to their rights and respective position concerning the Family Trust and/or in all and any other matters in respect of their position at the ancillary relief trial save for Paragraph B above.”

(“H’s Proposals”)

44.  W responded on 17 December 2019 whilst confirming that her position was for her to receive her litigation funding on the same WP Basis in the Melloy Order, it was her position that it was not part of the Melloy Order that the litigation funding was also to be provided to H.  W’s solicitors then set out in their letter as to W’s proposed wording of the basis for the settlement and withdrawal of her 2nd Summons, namely re-stating W’s Proposals as set out earlier, save to remove the references to W’s Injunction Application and the Disclosure Application as by then this Court had handed down its decisions on those applications.

45.  There was no response from H to W’s solicitors letter of 17 December 2019 until 7 February 2020[18].  H’s solicitors essentially made two comments, namely:

(i)     H is not in a position to “cause a distribution” and suggests that the only way is for the parties to make the Joint Request for a distribution;

(ii)     in respect of disclosure of documents, there is a hearing fixed on 17 June 2020 to deal with W’s Disclosure Application, and that this is not to be linked with litigation funding.

46.  In the above letter, H had further explained that as the parties are merely beneficiaries of the Family Trust, they cannot “cause” any distribution as this is within the discretion of the Trustee who is now joined as a party to these proceedings and that it was unreasonable for W to suggest this.

47.  Although H is the “Investment Director’ of the Family Trust and that all investment matters in relation to the Family Trust are under the control of H, PBB, the Trustee has said in his affidavit filed on 21 August 2019, that his duty is primarily limited to administering the trust in Nevada and to making discretionary distributions of some or all of the trust property to or for the benefit of the beneficiaries which include H, W and their children[19]. Further PBB has stated that he had by the letter of 16 May 2018 reminded W of the right to request periodic distributions from the Family Trust.

48.  Having considered this, I find H’s explanations reasonable and I accept his reasons why there should be the Joint Request rather than W’s proposed wording of H to “cause” any distribution.  Further, I also find that H’s suggestion that the matter of disclosure to be de-linked with the distribution reasonable.

49.  However, on 11 February 2020, W’s solicitors sent over two draft consent summonses, one of which was in relation to W’s 2nd Summons[20].  This draft consent summons essentially maintained the same wording as W’s Proposals.

50.  On 13 February 2020, H’s solicitors replied , enclosing a draft letter for Joint Request to the Trustee of the Family Trust for a sum of HKD 1,507,280 to be distributed to each of them, totalling HKD 3,014,560 and enclosing a draft consent summons essentially maintaining H’s Proposals, adding a paragraph E that H undertakes to W and to the Court that he shall use his best endeavours in respect of the Joint Request[21].  The draft letter for Joint Request has been amended to reflect that the request is made on the same WP Basis in the Melloy Order.

51.  Unfortunately, the matter was not resolved and H then requested for leave to file a supplemental affidavit to update his financial position.

52.  Mr Marwah submitted that H has always accepted the Family Trust is a family asset of which H and W are equal beneficiaries, and that W’s own 1st s 17 Application is premised on the Family Trust being a family asset.  As seen in the Joinder Decision, the assets of the Family Trust comprised of primarily the Promissory Note for USD10.5m issued by Bremen of which the maturity date is 31 December 2026 and Bremen has agreed to pay interest to the Family Trust on the unpaid principal at the rate of 5% compound annually.  Even at simple interest at 5% per annum, USD 10.5m should produce around USD 525,000 per annum.  Mr Marwah submitted that the assets of the Family Trust are estimated around HKD 98m and this is the most sensible source of funds available to the parties to finance their litigation and additionally, the costs of the Injunction Application have been ordered to be paid by H[22].

53.  Having considered the evidence before this Court, I accept Mr Marwah’s submission that the Family Trust is a source of funds available to W for litigation funding, and indeed it is also a source of funds available to H for his own litigation costs.  There is no evidence as to whether W had made any request to the Trustee for a distribution prior to her issuing W’s 2nd Summons and without W have made an actual request, it is not known whether if such a request were made, whether such request would be met. 

54.  Further, although W indicated that she had agreed to there being a distribution upon the same WP Basis in the Melloy Order, W’s Proposals are however not exactly the same basis.  As said earlier, I find H’s explanation as to why there should be the Joint Request for a distribution rather than for him to “cause” a distribution reasonable, and I also accept that his suggestion that the matter of disclosure should not be linked to the distribution a reasonable suggestion.

55.  As to whether H should also be entitled to an equal amount of the distributions, it would appear that at the hearing before Judge Melloy, H had requested for a total distribution of USD 250.000 from the Trustee for the parties’ litigation funding, being 50% or USD 125,000 to each of them and obtained the same.  H had already received his 50% share by the time of the hearing before Judge Melloy, and it was only W who refused to accept her 50% as she took the view that H was in breach of his 1st Undertaking in obtaining the distributions without her knowledge.  When the matter went before Judge Melloy, the question was only whether W should accept her 50% for litigation funding, and as seen in the Melloy Judgment, Judge Melloy clearly took the view that W should and directed her to accept the same without prejudice to her rights and her position at trial.  Judge Melloy had in further said that she had taken aboard the fact that both parties are beneficiaries of the Family Trust and that therefore, prima facie, they are both entitled to receive a distribution from it[23].  I do not see any reasons to hold a different view at this stage.

56.  Although H has not himself made an application for his own litigation costs to be paid out of the assets of the US Trusts, the letters from H’s solicitors and the proposed letter to the Trustee clearly indicated that it is H’s position that he is unable to pay his legal costs without any distribution.  In any event, the distribution to each of the parties is for their litigation funds, which should be paid to their respective solicitors to either apply towards those costs already billed but unpaid, or for them to hold on account for any future legal costs.  Any sums of either party not applied for such purpose by his/her solicitors are in fact held on account for that party and forms part of that party’s assets, and this can be taken into account at the final ancillary relief.

57.  It was submitted on behalf of W that it is wrong for H to now use his previous breach of undertaking as justification for him to receive funds for himself again and by riding on the W's present application.  I do not find it necessary or relevant for W to keep repeating H’s previous breach of undertaking. Suffice to say, in the Injunction Decision, this Court had accepted what W said and found that there was non compliance by H of his 1st Undertaking in relation to the US Trusts and this resulted in this Court in granting injunctive relief against H as set out in that decision, including in particular, H is restrained in making any unilateral request for any distributions, withdrawals etc from the US Trusts.  This only means that H cannot make any request for distributions or withdrawals unilaterally without W’s written consent or without leave from the Court, but it does not mean that H cannot make an application to the Court for leave to request for a distribution, whether it is with or without W’s consent. 

58.  W complained about H’s position being that if he is not allowed to receive funds from the US Trusts, neither can W, and that this points to H’s de facto control over the US Trusts.  However, as I have said earlier, there has been no request made by W to the Trustee in any event and the Trustee’s position is not known.  Further, whether H has de facto control over the US Trusts or not is not a matter this Court will decide at this stage, since H has made known his position regarding the Joint Request, and as I have said, any funds not used by H’s solicitors towards his legal costs will have to be accounted for eventually. 

59.  Having considered all the present evidence, in my view, there is really no reason as to why W, or H, could not have simply agreed to the Joint Request for distribution on the same WP Basis set out in the Melloy Order, and my order will reflect this.  I now turn to consider the appropriate quantum.

The parties’ respective Form H or estimates of costs

60.  As set out earlier, W has changed in the amount sought by her for litigation funding, which in her 2nd Summons was stated to be HKD 1,507,270 and now in the Draft Order, it is HKD 3,230,000. 

61.  W’s 2nd Summons is supported by her 3rd affirmation filed on 12 August 2019.  In paragraph 5 therefore, she had deposed to her having incurred over HKD 4m for her legal costs which were for different purposes set out therein and she had produced a schedule of her estimated legal costs of HKD 1,507,280 (“W’s 12.08.19 Schedule”)[24], which was later updated on 13 March (“W’s 13.03.19 Schedule”)[25].  I set out hereunder her costs, with all figures in HKD:

ItemApplication/sW’s 12.08.19 ScheduleW’s 13.03.19 Schedule
AW’s intended enforcement application re undertakings in the MPS Order and/or to vary upward174,325300,000
BW’s intended application to seek discovery concerning properties disposed by H into the Trusts228,850280.000
CW’s Joinder Application, Injunction Application, Disclosure Application224,913180,000
DW’s AR Trial and 2nd s 17 ApplicationTBC3,000,000
EW’s 1st 17 ApplicationTBC
TBC
New itemsH’s Joinder Application, and SJE re French Inheritance law, H’s summons re substituted service dismissed before issue, W’s application for third party discovery re H’s employment benefits and entitlementNo mentionTotal 500,000 + TBC amounts
FPrivate FDR/Mediation (1 day)216,000200,000
GHandling Children’s passports2,8002,800
Other itemsDisbursements for forensic accounting expenses and property valuation and disbursements for US Trust and Indian Trust experts, H’s intended application to set aside the stop notice in BVI Proceedings, Trustee’s action in Nevada, USA
TBC

TBC
 W’s outstanding billed costs556,3301,567,699
Grand Total 1,507,2808,330, 499

62.  There were two Form H produced by W, one dated 13 September 2019[26] and one dated 13 March 2020[27], which show as follows:

Part 1 (incurred and/or billed)Part 2 (estimated)Form H  dated 13 September 2019Form H dated 13 March 2020
Solicitors’ Costs 3,623,100 + unbilled 50,0004,176,040 + unbilled 80,000
Disbursements 216,967219,738
Counsel Fees 496,000506,000
Sub-total under Part 1 4,385,9774,981,778
 Solicitors’ Costs, Disbursements and all Counsel Fees1,273,899 + estimate costs in W’s 12.08.19 Schedule for current hearing removed3,400,000 for solicitors’ costs + 60,000 for disbursements +3,450,000 for  Counsel Fees , but not including trial for 1st s 17 Application and other potential applications
Sub-total of Part 2  1,273,8996.910,000
Grand Total of Part 1 + Part 2
 
5,659,87611,891,778

63.  As for H, his latest Form H (up to and including the hearing 24 September 2019) and dated 25 September 2019[28] shows his costs incurred up to then was HKD 4,226,075 , and that estimated costs after the hearing on 24 September 2019 up to and including the trial is another HKD 7,050,000, totalling HKD 11,276,075. There has been no further updated Form H filed by him.

64.  As seen above, the parties’ costs incurred/billed to the present are over HKD 4m each.  From now until the conclusion of trial, their estimates is at least another HKD 7m each.  As ordered in the 24.09.19 Order, the parties really should attend mediation as soon as practicable.  Yet, up to now, no mediation had taken place.

65.  There appeared to have been an attempt for mediation, as seen in the parties’ respective correspondence.  In October 2019, there was suggestion for the parties to attend a one day mediation with Mr David Pilbrow SC, and W had indicated that she was prepared to attend such mediation but subject to H’s provision of HKD 200,000 to cover her solicitors costs of the mediation[29]. In H’s solicitors’ letter of 16 October 2019, H replied to confirm his agreement to pay for Mr Pilbrow’s mediation fees in the first instance and that W’s half share should be deducted from her final settlement.  H further suggested Mr Pilbrow’s available dates for W to confirm availability.

66.  However, W’s solicitors replied that she would not agree to the condition and that the appropriate provision was for costs of mediation, including W’s own costs, be initially borne by H without prejudice to either part’s right to seek to argue, at the relevant time, who should ultimately bear the costs.

67.  In response, H’s solicitors indicated that H did not have the funds to provide for W’s costs of mediation and that it was not appropriate for W to delay attending mediation when there was a clear and obvious solution that funding was to come from the Trusts.  Then on 25 October 2019, W’s solicitors wrote indicating the dates that W and her Counsel and solicitors were available for mediation in December 2019 but again sought H’s agreement to pay, in the first instance, the fees of Mr Pilbrow SC and W’s legal costs of HKD 200,000.

68.  By a reply the same day from H’s solicitors, it was pointed out to W that Mr Pilbrow would not be in Hong Kong in December 2019 and there was no reason why the mediation could not take place in October.  On 21 November 2019, W’s solicitors wrote to say, amongst other things, W’s position was that the funding of Mr Pilbrow’s fees as well as W’s legal costs of HKD 200,000 should be paid by H.

69.  It was submitted on behalf of W that when the 2nd Summons was first issued, there did not appear to be any major issues with W’s legal costs for the private FDR or mediation to be funded by H, and there was also no condition imposed by H that half of the mediator’s/FDR judge’s costs be deducted from W’s final settlement which H now seeks.

70.  However, it was clear from H’s solicitors’ letters that H’s position was only that W’s half of the mediator’s fees was to come out of her settlement. So far as W’s legal costs of attending the mediation, H’s position was that he could not afford to pay the same.

71.  Normally, a mediator’s fees are shared equally between the parties as the mediator is independent and jointly instructed by the parties to assist both of them in settling the matter.  I therefore do not see H’s suggestion that he is to pay the entirety of the mediator’s fees first, with W’s half to come out or deducted out of her final award/ settlement unreasonable. As for W’s legal costs for attending mediation, I do not see why such costs cannot be agreed to be paid out of distributions from the Family Trust.  I must say I find W’s attitude in this regard unnecessarily inflexible. 

72.  It is also not clear as to whether Mr Pilbrow is supposed to conduct a private FDR or a mediation (whether facilitative or evaluative).   Pursuant to PD 15.11, the parties should have proceeded to fix a Financial Dispute Resolution hearing.  I understand that parties’ initial attempts to fix a FDR hearing without there being a preliminarily issue hearing first was resisted by Judge Melloy[30]. The parties then seemed to have agreed to jointly appoint Mr Pilbrow to conduct a private FDR.  That was initially in December 2017.  Nothing had been done for almost 2½ years now.  I am of the view that there should be a FDR hearing now and as the trial dates have been fixed in this Court’s diary and I will be the trial judge, I am of the view that the FDR hearing should take place as soon as practicable before another judge, and I propose to fix a short direction hearing for the purpose of giving directions for a FDR hearing.  

73.  As I have previously ordered, the parties should also have attended mediation.  In line with what was said in LLC v LMWA and LELP[2019] HKCA 347, that the effectiveness of the FDR process could be enhanced if a FDR can be held with the assistance of a mediator[31].  It may well be that the parties wish to instruct Mr David Pilbrow to attend the FDR hearing as a mediator, to assist the parties and the FDR Judge, and this can be canvassed during the short direction hearing mentioned above.  As I have indicated, for the mediator’s fees, I am of the view that they should be shared equally.

74.  I am further of the view that any proposed quantum at this stage for litigation funding should be only up to and including the conclusion of the FDR hearing.

75.  As seen earlier, even in W’s own last position on 11 February 2020 when she sent the two consent summonses, in the one in relation to litigation funding, the amount stated was HKD 1,507,280.

76.  Further, as pointed out by Mr Marwah, this Court had ordered H to pay W’s costs of the Injunction Application which was summarily assessed to be a total of HKD 177,620[32], and this should be a source of further funds coming into the hands of W or her solicitors

77.  At the present stage, even though the Trustee of the US Trusts has been joined as a party in these proceedings, realistically it does not appear that the Trustee of the US Trusts will be attending any trial in Hong Kong, whether it be the AR Trial or any preliminary issue trial on W’s 1st s 17 Application, since his position was that he did not wish to be a party in the present proceedings in any form and did not submit to the jurisdiction. In any event, he did not appear at the directions hearing on 12 December 2019.  H’s father K has also been joined as 4th Respondent, but it is not clear whether he intends to attend the trial to give oral evidence.  The Children’s position in relation to the W’s 1st s 17 Application is also not clear.  Subject to further evidence and submissions from parties, I see no reason at this stage as to why W’s 1st s 17 Application cannot be fixed for trial at the same time as W’s AR Application and W’s 2nd s 17 Application.  This also means if H’s Father, K, is to attend trial, he will only need to attend once rather than twice, if there are two trials.

78.  So far as W’s intended application for third party discovery against H’s employer, in H’s solicitors’ letter dated 20 February 2020, a letter from H’s employer dated 14 February 2020 was attached which seems to have set out the shares awarded to H from 2012 to 2018 with the value as at date of award.  I do not understand why this matter cannot be resolved sensibly between the parties.

79.  Having considered all the above, I am of the view that up to and including the conclusion of the FDR stage including any mediator’s fees for attendance at the FDR hearing, an amount of HKD 1.5m each would be appropriate.

Order

80.  In light of all above said, the order I make will be subject to the following undertakings, agreement and/or acknowledgment by the parties :

(i)     Upon the parties undertaking and agreeing to make a joint request to the 2nd Respondent/Trustee of the Family Trust (“Trustees”) within 14 days for a distribution of HKD 1,500,000 each; and

(ii)     Upon the parties undertaking and agreeing that the distribution of HKD 1,500,000 each be paid by the Trustee direct to their respective solicitors firm; and

(iii)     Upon the parties undertaking and agreeing to their respective solicitors to apply any part of the sum of HKD 1,500,000 towards billed and unpaid costs and/or to meet any costs orders and hold any excess over and above such payment on account of the parties’ respective costs and disbursements; and

(iv)     Upon the Trustee agreeing to make a distribution of a total sum of HKD 3,000,000 out of the assets and/or income of the Family Trusts and to pay a sum of HKD 1,500,000 each respectively to H’s solicitors firm and to W’s solicitors firm; and

(v)     Upon the parties agreeing and acknowledging that the distribution of HKD 1,500,000 for each of them from the assets   and/or income of the Family Trust is without prejudice to their respective rights and respective positions concerning the US Trusts and/or all and any other matters arising from W’s 1st s17 Application, Injunction Application and/or Disclosure Application.

81.  The order I make is thus as follows:

(i)     A 30 minutes direction hearing be fixed on 3 June 2020 at 9:30 am, for directions to be given for FDR hearing to be fixed for 1 day before another Judge of the Court of First Instance;

(ii)     There is no need for Counsel to attend the direction hearing on 3 June 2020 at 9:30 am; 

(iii)     W’s 2nd Summons will be adjourned sine die with liberty to restore, and the 2nd Summons shall be dismissed upon the parties’ respective solicitors each receiving a sum of HKD 1.5m from the Trustee;

(iv)     There be liberty to apply.

82.  As for costs, I am of the view that costs of this application should be reserved and be determination at the AR Trial.

(Bebe Pui Ying Chu)
Judge of the Court of First Instance
High Court

  

Messrs Stevenson Wong & Co, for the petitioner

Messrs Oldham Li & Nie, for the 1st respondent


[1] Paras 9-25, CB1:13-19

[2] CB2:768-770

[3] CB1:1

[4] See para 5.5(3), CB1:155

[5] See CB1: 145, 148

[6] CB4:766

[7] See para 43, pg 12, W’s Skeleton Submissions

[8] See the tax payable for 2015/16 [CB1:223], 2016/17 [CB1:238], 2017/18 [CB1:251], and 2018/19 [CB3:539].

[9] Now at HK$11,250 per month.

[10] See paras 12, 13, CB3:691-692

[11] CB1:205

[12] At para 15, CB3: 693

[13] At para 4, CB2:472

[14] CB3:606

[15] CB2:276

[16] CB2 :277

[17] CB2:424-428

[18] CB2:444

[19] See para 9, CB3:492

[20] CB2:445-451

[21] CB2:452-459

[22] See para 13, pg 2, H’s Submissions

[23] At para 16, Melloy Judgment, CB3: 693

[24] CB1:201-202

[25] CB4:772-773

[26] CB2:280-281

[27] CB4:752-753

[28] CB4 :750-751

[29] At CB2: 286

[30] See para 10, Melloy Judgment CB3:690

[31] At para 68, pg 26

[32] HKD 39,044 for the Pre-Transfer Costs, and HKD 138,576 for the Post-Transfer Costs

[2019] HKCFI 2873-EN-2019-11-22

KCMA v. ABC AND OTHERS

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HCMC 1/2019

[2019] HKCFI 2873

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

MATRIMONIAL CAUSES NO. 1 OF 2019

________________________

BETWEEN

 KCMAPetitioner
 and 
 ABC1st Respondent
 PBB in his capacity as the Trustee of the Family Trust2nd Respondent
 PBB in his capacity as the Trustee of the Education Trust3rd Respondent
 K4th Respondent

________________________

Before: Hon B Chu J in Chambers (Not Open to the Public)
Date of Hearing: 24 September 2019
Date of Decision: 22 November 2019

________________________

D E C I S I O N
(Injunction and Discovery)

________________________

1.  This Court has handed down a decision on W’s Joinder Application on 21 November 2019 (“JoinderDecision”). The present decision is in relation to W’s other remaining two applications in the Summons, namely the Injunction Application and the Discovery Application.  Save as indicated herein, I shall follow the abbreviations in the Joinder Decision.

2.  The brief background of these matrimonial proceedings has been set out in the Joinder Decision and I will not repeat here. For reasons stated in the Joinder Decision, I have ordered that PBB in his capacity as the Trustee of the two US Trusts be joined as 2nd and 3rd respondents, and H’s father, K, be joined as the 4th respondent.

3.  After the submissions in the Joinder Application, legal representative for PBB in his capacity of the Trustee of the Family Trust were released as they had no instructions to participate further in the Injunction Application or in the Discovery Application.

The Injunction Application

Orders sought by W

4.  The orders sought by W in the Summons include the following :

(i)  Restraining H and the Trusteeof the US Trusts from making or causing to be made any distribution or withdrawal etc from the US Trusts, Intero, Bremen or any assets held thereunder (“NoWithdrawal Order”);

(ii)  Restraining H and K from parting with possession with the Indian Apartment (“No Parting With Possession Order”);

(iii)  Restraining H, the Trustee of the US Trusts, and theIndian Trust, from causing or permitting the addition or exclusion of any beneficiaries to the US Trusts and the Indian Trust (“No Change of BeneficiariesOrder”);

(iv)  Restraining H, the Trustee of the US Trusts, and the Indian Trust from varying respectively the governing jurisdiction or place of administration of the trusts (“No Change of JurisdictionOrder”);

(v)  Restraining H, the Trustee of the US Trusts and the Indian Trust from decanting the trusts to any other settlements (“No Decanting Order”);

(vi)  Issuing any further letter of wishes or giving any instructions affecting the present entitlements or expectations of the beneficiaries and disposition of any of the assets under the trusts (“No Letter of WishesOrder”).

Matters leading to the issue of the Injunction Application 

5.  W first sought an injunction in the Notice, which was only against H.  As mentioned in the Joinder Decision, H gave his 1st Undertaking on 29 August 2017 in writing that he would not personally take steps to change the then status of the US Trusts, save with the agreement of W or with leave of the Court.

6.  W and H appeared to have a different understanding as to what the words “then status” meant.   

7.  W had produced a so called chronology of H’s alleged breaches of the 1st Undertaking in her 13th affirmation at the time of her issuing the Summons (“Chronology”)[1], which was later updated and produced in W’s 4th affirmation filed on 3 September 2019[2] (“Updated Chronology”). 

8.  The Chronology (and in fact also the Updated Chronology) essentially sets out chronologically the various letters between W’s solicitors and H’s solicitors and/or the Trustee.  It would appear that W’s complaint of those matters set out in the Chronology/Updated Chronology was mainly that H had, in breach of the 1st Undertaking, made unilateral requests to the Trustee for distributions/reimbursement.  As appeared in the Chronology :

(i)  There were mainly two written requests made by H to the Trustee without Ws knowledge or agreement, namely one for reimbursement and one for distribution both on 11 October 2018; 

(ii)  The request made by H on 11 October 2018 for reimbursement was said by H for reimbursement of HKD 1.5m from the Education Trust;

(iii)  As for H’s request for distribution from the Family Trust of USD 250,000 on 11 October 2018, a sum of US$250,000 was sent to H by the Trustee on the basis that H and W were each to receive USD 125,000 for litigation funding.

9.  It was W’s case that it was only at the hearing on 26 October 2018 before Judge Melloy in relation to her application for litigation funding and interim maintenance that she found out H had unilaterally requested for and received a distribution of USD 250,000 from the Trustee for litigation funding (USD125,000 for respectively H and W), notwithstanding she had not agreed to it.  According to W, this led to her issuing the Summons.

10.  W had refused to accept her share of the distribution by the Trustee of USD 125,000 (or HK$975,000) for her litigation funding, but later, as seen in the Melloy Judgment, she was directed by Judge Melloy to accept the same without prejudice to her rights and her position at trial.  

11.  In so far as the Summons was concerned, and the Injunction Application therein, W had attempted to obtain an interim injunction at the resumed hearing before Judge Melloy on 3 December 2018 for interim maintenance based on her complaints in the Chronology. 

12.  As seen in the Melloy Judgment, Judge Melloy referred to a letter from H’s solicitors of 30 November 2018 (“30.11.08 Letter”)[3] and quoted paragraph 13 of that letter in which H’s solicitors had pointed out that, amongst other things (i) there was no evidence from W concerning the change in the status of the beneficiaries or to the trust assets; (ii) the only matter W relied on was the distribution of HK$975,000 each which was made from the accumulated income and not capital and made for the purpose of meeting both parties’ financial needs including litigation funding; (iii) W’s action of filing the BVI Proceedings and the injunction were entirely disproportionate.

13.  Judge Melloy said on the face of it, she tended to agree with the above observations in paragraph 13 of the letter.  She had said she was conscious of the fact that it was W’s case that H had breached the 1st Undertaking but, she was of the view that W had not made out a prima facie case for an interim injunction of the nature sought[4] which Judge Melloy had described to be very wide terms.  The Judge then accepted the terms of the 2nd Undertaking from H upon which she discharged the 1st Undertaking, and the Summons was then transferred up to the High Court and Judge Melloy had also said if W wished to pursue the injunction, she would need to do so in the High Court.

14.  Pursuant to the 2nd Undertaking, H has undertaken that he will not make or cause to make any distribution from the USD Trusts in his personal capacity (but not in his capacity as director of Bremen and Intero to make follow on investment as may be required or interest distributions pursuant to the directions of the Trustee).

15.  Since the Melloy Judgment and after the transfer up, various affirmations were filed.  The relevant ones placed in the Core Bundle before this Court were (i) H’s 1st affidavit (ii) W’s 1st affirmation (iii) H’s 2nd affidavit (iv) PBB’s affidavit of 21 August 2019 (v) W’s 4th affirmation and (v) K’s unsworn affidavit.

The basis of W’s Injunction Application

16.  Section 21L of the High Court Ordinance provides that the Court of First Instance may by order whether interlocutory or final grant an injunction in all cases in which it appears to the Court of First Instance to be just or convenient to do.   

17.  An application for injunction may be made under Order 29 rule 1 of RHC and this was the applicable rule stated in the margin of the Summons. 

18.  In W’s 13th affirmation, she had set out her evidence under the headings “good and arguable case”, “real risk of dissipation” and “balance of convenience”, namely the requirements for a Mareva Injunction.  It thus appeared that she was seeking a Mareva injunction, at least in so far as the No Withdrawal Order and the No Parting With Possession Order (in respect of the Indian Apartment) respectively under paragraphs 2a and 2b of the Summons.  However, in her 4th affirmation, W then referred to there being all “serious issues to be tried” in relation to the s17 Application and referring to “our assets” and she then seemed to be seeking a proprietary injunction. 

19.  It thus seems what W was seeking was both a proprietary injunction and a Mareva injunction.  As she pointed out, since the transfers of family assets to the US Trust and the transfer of the Indian Property fell within the period of the statutory presumption in section 17(3) of MPPO, the transfers were presumed to have been carried out by H with the intention to defeat W’s claim for ancillary relief and those assets were family assets to which she is entitled to share or have an interest.  Further, W relied on the updated Chronology regarding H’s breaches of his 1st Undertaking.

Paragraph 2a of the Summons – No Withdrawal Order

20.  Mr Egerton submitted that at the time of the issue of the Injunction Application, W had in fact already issued the BVI Proceedings and she did not disclose those proceedings to Judge Melloy at the hearing on 26 October 2018. 

21.  The BVI Proceedings were commenced by W on 23 October 2018 , ie 3 days prior to the hearing before Judge Melloy, when W issued a Stop Notice in BVI against Intero[5].  Intero was required under the Stop Notice to refrain from taking any of the following steps in relation to the “Stock” (ie the share or shares of Intero registered in the name of H and/or the Family Trust and/or Bremen) without notice to W’s lawyers: (i) the transfer, sale or other dealing with the Stock or the payment out of the income thereof; (ii) the making of any payment by way of a dividend, interest or otherwise in respect of the  Stock, and (iii) registration of any transfer of the Stock[6].  The BVI Proceedings were received by H by way of service upon Intero and Bremen on 8 and 9 November 2018[7].

22.  Although there was no disclosure of the BVI Proceedings at the hearing on 26 October 2018 by W, by the time of the resumed hearing on 3 December 2018 before Judge Melloy, H had notice of the BVI Proceedings as well as the Summons. 

23.  As seen in the Melloy Judgment, and as mentioned earlier, the Judge had quoted paragraph 13 of the 30.11.18 Letter which had in fact referred to the BVI Proceedings, and the Judge was aware that there were BVI Proceedings filed by W although it was not clear whether she was aware of the details.    

24.  In the present case, as said earlier, H had already received by way of service upon Intero and Bremen the BVI Proceedings on 8 or 9 November 2018.  This was before the resumed hearing on 3 December 2018.  There was no sufficient evidence that there was any prejudice suffered by him due to the alleged non-disclosure by W of the same in her supporting affirmation (13th affirmation) for the Injunction Application.  In fact, H had never issued any summons to discharge his 2nd Undertaking due to W’s non-disclosure.   

25.  In any event, the present evidence shows that W has a good arguable case in respect of her s17 Application and there is a serious issue to be tried in respect of her claim that those assets transferred by H into the US Trusts are family assets of which she has a share.  There were no submissions made on behalf to H to the contrary in Mr Egerton’s “Note”.

26.  H’s Form Es would appear to indicate that there were insufficient assets within the jurisdiction to satisfy W’s claims in that the majority of the underlying assets held by the US Trusts and the Indian Trust are outside jurisdiction.  In particular, the Promissory Note held by the Family Trust is governed by the law of Nevada, and the 3 pieces of land held by Bremen are in USVI.  It is not clear where the rest of the underlying assets of Intero are sited but both Intero and Bremen are BVI companies.

27.  As for real risk of dissipation, which would be applicable in an application for a Mareva Injunction, Mr Egerton relied on Judge Melloy’s reasons in declining to grant an interim injunction and that a further 10 months had elapsed since the issue of the Summons and the 2nd Undertaking was in place for some 9 months.  

28.  It was made clear in W’s 4th affirmation that her complaints of H’s breach of the 1st Undertaking were:

(i)  the Indian Apartment was transferred by K to the Indian Trust the day after the 1st Undertaking;

(ii)  As noted in her Updated Chronology, there was never any joint request made to the Trustee for distribution pursuant to the 1st Undertaking, and that she had not given anyone permission to request for distribution on her behalf;

(iii)  H’s conduct in unilaterally requesting for a distribution and/or reimbursement from the US Trusts was a breach of the 1st Undertaking and that H’s explanations for his action indicated that he would continue to repeat the same behaviour in future if not restrained;

(iv)  H’s conduct after the 1st Undertaking in borrowing against assets held in the US Trusts by executing a deed of charge on 1 September 2017 (“Charge Deed”) over his indirect beneficial interest in a fund in exchange of a promissory note of the same date for a loan of US$200,000[8];   

(v)  During the period between the 1st Undertaking and end of December 2017, there were 3 withdrawals from the Intero’s bank account between October 2017 to December 2017 as set out further below (“3 Withdrawals”);

(vi)  H had a complete free hand, as the Investment Director of the US Trusts, to deal with any and all of the underlying assets of the US Trusts.

29.  In so far as the Indian Apartment was concerned, this was actually not mentioned in the 1st Undertaking.  W complained that the documents in relation to the Indian Apartment were produced by H on a piece-meal basis[9].

30.  K had produced in his affirmation (which was unsigned and unfiled at the time of the hearing) (i) a transfer deed executed on 12 September 2016 by H in favour of K transferring to K all H’s full share of the Indian Apartment out of natural love and affection (“Transfer Deed”)[10]; and (ii) a trust deed executed by K was settlor and the Indian Trustee as trustee pursuant to which the Indian Apartment was settled into the Indian Trust (“Indian Trust Deed”)[11]. 

31.  Both the Transfer Deed and the Indian Trust Deed had been produced by H but only in his 2nd Answers of 9 April 2018, which was after the 1st Undertaking, and it was upon receipt of these documents that W learnt of the exact date when the Indian Apartment was transferred by H into K’s name, and that it was on 30 August 2017, the day after the 1st Undertaking, that the Indian Apartment was settled by K into the Indian Trust.  

32.  The 3 Withdrawals were also made after the 1st Undertaking, and were withdrawn by H from Intero’s bank account held at the Standard Chartered Bank.  They were respectively (i) US$208,195 (HK$1,623,921) on 27 October 2017, (ii) US$14,171 (HK$110,533) on 29 November 2017 and (iii) US$354,025 (HK$2,761,395) on 21 December 2017.  It was W’s case that she was only provided by H Intero’s bank statements between January 2016 and December 2017, from which she noted the 3 Withdrawals.  Whether there were other withdrawals after December 2017 was unknown to her.  

33.  H’s explanation was that the 3 Withdrawals were made during the ordinary course of business by Intero.  The amount in (i) was said by H to be for a prior investment commitment which would be of indirect benefit to W and the amount in (iii) was said to be made as an interest payment to the Family Trust from Bremen[12].

34.  W complained it was not clear what investment commitment for the withdrawal of (i) was but said it could be the investment in “Jura Developments” which had been mentioned by H and that he was required to transfer funds of USD1m and an annual salary of USD200,000 to his own brother (the same brother named Protector Committee for the US Trusts”).   However, in response, H said there had not been any investment of USD1m to Jura Developments and that the money was a loan on a commercial basis and that most of that investment had already been recouped by Intero. 

35.  As for withdrawal in (iii), H’s explanation was that it was the interest payable under the Promissory Note by Bremen to the Family Trust.

36.  H had explained in his 1st affidavit[13] in opposition to W’s supporting 13th affirmation, that the requests to the Trustee was to make a distribution out of “income” and not “assets” and was thus not a breach of the 1st Undertaking, and he did not take any steps to change the status of the US Trusts. This was also what was set out in paragraph 13 of the 30.11.18 Letter quoted in the Melloy Judgment.

37.  However, as pointed out by Mr Todd, the so called “income” was the alleged interest payment under the Promissory Note, but such interest payment was premature and in fact reduced the amount of interest capable of being compounded as accrued until the maturity date, and thus reduced the potential value of the Promissory Note, or the asset value of the Family Trust.   

38.  It was also pointed out by Mr Todd that if the amount was not from the asset of the Family Trust, then it must have been from assets of the Education Trust, but the 1st Undertaking applied to both US Trusts.  Further, the withdrawal of US$ 354,025 mentioned earlier in (iii) was made on 21 December 2017 whereas the distribution of US$125,000 each was according to the Trustee, requested by H in October 2018 and paid in October 2018.  

39.  What W sought for interim injunctive relief in the Notice was essentially 5 out of the 6 orders sought in the Injunction Application in the Summons.  In short, the relief sought in the Notice in connection with the US Trusts were (i) the No Withdrawal Order; (ii) No Change of Jurisdiction Order; (iii) No Change of Jurisdiction Order; (iv) No Decanting Order; and (v) No Letter of Wishes Order.  As said earlier, at the time of the Notice, W did not have a copy of the Transfer Deed of the Indian Property between H and K or the Indian Trust Deed which were only produced by H in his 2nd Answers of 9 April 2018.  There was thus no injunctive relief claimed in the Notice in respect of the Indian Property.

40.  The purpose of W seeking the interim injunctive relief at the time of the Notice was clearly to try to maintain the then status quo of the trust assets of the US Trusts, and I am of the view that this would also include any accumulations of the assets by way of interest and/or income and/or otherwise.  Further, the proper construction of the 1st Undertaking must be that the status quo of the trust assets in the US Trusts together with any accumulations including any interest or income would be maintained, and this would include no distributions or no withdrawals in any form without W’s agreement or Court’s leave.  This must have also been H’s own understanding since in his solicitors’ letters to W’s letters, he had sought W’s agreement in requesting for the distribution from the Trustee.  

41.  Even if the 1st Undertaking was only confined to “assets”, I accept Mr Todd’s argument that that the withdrawals and/or distributions made from the so called “income” to Family Trust in fact came from the assets of Bremen and would still be a breach of the 1st Undertaking concerning the assets of the Education Trusts.

42.  What the Updated Chronology showed was that there had been unilateral requests by H for distributions resulting in one distribution being made by the Trustee in October 2018 of US$250,000 to H and W as mentioned earlier.  There was also another unilateral request made by H to the Trustee of the Education Trust for reimbursement of HK$1.5m for maintenance for the Children already incurred and paid for by H and that request was being considered by the Trustee when the Summons was issued.  Although it would seem that H did not eventually receive the reimbursement, the fact remained that H did not seek W’s agreement to make that request.  

43.  Having considered all the evidence, and notwithstanding H’s explanations, I am of the view that there had been non-compliance with the 1st Undertaking on the part of H in relation of the US Trusts, whether in actual terms of the 1st Undertaking or in spirit, in that after the 1st Undertaking:

(i)  There had been unilateral requests by H to the Trustee for distributions and/or reimbursements contrary to the 1st Undertaking;

(ii)  There had been at least 3 Withdrawals from Intero’s bank account;

(iii)  There had been borrowing by H by charging the assets of the US Trusts pursuant to the Charge Deed.

44.  Further, after the 1st Undertaking, the Indian Apartment was settled into the Indian Trust.  It is also not clear how the Trustee’s legal costs of both the Nevada proceedings and these proceedings are being met, and whether the equivalent of any “Beddoe Order” has been sought.

45.  The present evidence indicated that H has been dealing with the funds of the US Trusts freely and as he likes being the sole “Investment Director”.  Having considered this, and bearing in mind that there has not been full and frank disclosure by H of his finances, notwithstanding that 10 months have elapsed since the issue of the Injunction Application in the Summons, I am satisfied that there remains a real risk of dissipation by H, of the assets and funds of the US Trusts and also the assets and funds of the Indian Trust and/or the Indian Apartment, if not restrained. 

46.  As said earlier, Mr Egerton had referred to the BVI Proceedings.  In H’s 2nd affidavit in August 2019, his BVI solicitors were however threatening to strike out W’s Stop Notice[14].

47.  The order now sought by W in paragraph 2a of the Summons, namely the injunction in respect of the US Trusts is in fact wider than the orders sought in the Stop Notice in the BVI Proceedings.

48.  As found earlier by this Court, there had been non-compliance of the 1st Undertaking, and that there had been the settlement of the Indian Property after the 1st Undertaking, I do not find the 2nd Undertaking, which only concerned distributions from the US Trusts, to be sufficient.

49.  H works as a “Partner” of an investment management firm.  According to H’s 2nd Form E of 12 October 2018, his basic monthly income was HK$264,570 plus a housing allowance of HK$65,859 and a discretionary bonus.  On his own case, he was at that time earning at least a monthly income sum of HK$330,429.  As seen in a letter from H to PBB on 15 February 2018, his bonus was over HK$2m for the 2017 calendar year. According to W’s calculations, he was earning on average HK$549,488.

50.  The injunctions sought will not affect H’s income or his other personal assets.

51.  If H were allowed to continue to make unilateral requests for distributions, make withdrawals or borrowings against the funds of the US Trusts and if H succeeded in doing so, such funds would be diminished without W’s knowledge causing prejudice to W’s case.  In any event, if there is any need for H to make any request for distributions or withdrawals from the US Trusts and if W’s consent is unreasonably withheld, he can always seek leave from the Court.

52.  Having considered the circumstances of this case, I am of the view that the balance of convenience lies in favour of granting an injunction, whether Mareva or proprietary, as sought by W against H in respect of the US Trusts.  In any event, it is just and convenient to grant the injunction sought.  I am therefore prepared to grant an order against H in terms of paragraph 2a in the Summons, restraining H in making or causing to be made distributions and/or withdrawals etc save adding after that paragraph the following :

“save for the ordinary and proper expenses which would ordinarily be incurred in the maintenance of the trust assets, and/or save as agreed by [W] or ordered by the Court”.

53.  For the avoidance of doubt, the injunction will include H being restrained from making any unilateral request for any distributions, withdrawals, lending, provision of collateral, borrowing or any forms of extractions from the US Trusts.

54.  Even though the Trustee of the US Trusts are now joined as parties, there are no sufficient grounds as to why an injunction will need to be issued directly against the Trustee.  In particular: -

(1)  W did not seek any injunction originally in the Notice against the Trustee.  It is not clear whether the Trustee was aware of the 1st Undertaking or the Injunction Application prior to him being properly served on 29 March 2019 and/or 18 April 2019. 

(2)  Save one distribution in October 2018 of USD 125,000 each mentioned earlier, which according to the Trustee was upon a joint request by H and W[15], so far there had been no sufficient evidence that the Trustee had made and would make any distributions without any written requests from H.  In a letter dated 16 May 2018[16], PBB has stated that pursuant to the Trust Agreement, he is authorised to consider “distribution requests” and to make distribution.  There seems no sufficient evidence that the Trustee is likely to make any distributions or withdrawals or extractions of any form from the funds held by the US Trusts, without any written request from H and/or W, save for ordinary proper expenses for the maintenance of the “Trust Property”.

(3)  The Family Trust is a “directed trust” where all investment matters are under the control of the Investment Director, ie H.  The Family Trust only has one bank account (with no investments and nominal cash only) and the shareholding of a limited liability company under the control of the Investment Director. 

(4)  The evidence shows that the Trustee has no independent knowledge of investment activity at the level of the limited liability company or lower-tier companies and that access to investment details is subject to the discretion and control of the Investment Director.

(5)  As said earlier, it is not clear whether the Trustee has obtained any equivalent of a “Beddoe Order” for his legal costs of the Nevada proceedings and these proceedings.  Notwithstanding this, there is at present no sufficient evidence of there being any risk of dissipation by the Trustee of the funds of the US Trusts.

55.  Having considered all the above, I am not prepared to grant an injunction directly against the Trustee at this stage.  Further, in my view, the Trustee, now being a party in the s17 Application will be bound upon due service of the present order upon him. 

Paragraph 2b of the Summons – No Parting with Possession Order

56.  As for paragraph 2b of the Summons in relation to the Indian Apartment, H’s latest proposed undertaking is acceptable to W save that the full address and description should be stated as set out by W.  I will accept this undertaking from H.

57.  As for K, there is no sufficient evidence that K was aware of H’s 1st Undertaking at the time when K settled the Indian Apartment into the Indian Trust.  In any event, the 1st Undertaking did not include the Indian Apartment. 

58.  K is one of the 5 beneficiaries of the Indian Trust.  K is not part of the “Protector Committee” under the Indian Trust Deed.  The “Trust Advisor” is K.  Pursuant to clause 15.5, the Protector Committee shall have the right to nominate additional Trust Advisor(s) who shall act along with the Trust Advisor(s) together as Advisory Committee.  Although pursuant to Clause 15.1, the Indian Trustee has to give prior written notice to the Trust Advisor in relation to the sale, assignment or other disposition of any property or any interest in any property forming part of the “Trust Fund”[17], it does not appear under Clause 15.2 that K has any final decision making power in respect of any activities in relation to any investment of the Indian Trust Fund.  

59.  In any event, as K, now a party in there proceedings, will be bound by this Court’s order upon due service of the order (together with H’s undertaking in relation to Indian Apartment) on him, I do not find it necessary at this stage for an injunction to be issued directly against him.

Paragraphs 2c, 2d, 2e and 2f of the Summons

60.  As for paragraphs 2c, 2d, 2e, and 2f of the Summons, there is no evidence whether before or after the 1st Undertaking, that there has been any change in the class of “Beneficiaries” in the US Trusts, or in the governing jurisdiction or place of administration of the US Trusts after being transferred to Nevada, or any decanting of the US Trusts to any other settlements, or has there been there any sufficient evidence of any further letter of wishes after the 1st Undertaking.  

61.  I am prepared to accept H’s undertakings in terms of paragraphs 2c, 2d, 2e and 2f of the Summons in lieu of an order made in those terms.  However, there were no particular submissions in Mr Egerton’s “Note” or “Supplemental Note” on these paragraphs and it is not clear whether H is prepared to offer undertakings.  I will give him 21 days to consider, failing which the orders sought by W will be made against H.  I do not see it necessary to make those orders against the Trustee.  In so far as the Indian Trustee or Indian Trust are concerned, they have not been joined nor heard.  I am not prepared to make any orders against them.

The Discovery Application

62.  In relation to the Discovery Application, the orders sought by W against H and the Trustee in the Summons regarding the US Trusts are, amongst other things, the following:

(1)  trust accounts from the inception of the US Trusts;

(2)  audited or unaudited financial statements and management accounts of Bremen and Intero from 2014 to 2018;

(3)  a list of assets ever held and/or still held in the US Trusts whether in the names of the US Trusts, Bremen or Intero, and for bank accounts, a list of authorized signatories and power of attorney given under the account;

(4)  details of transactions of over HK$80,000 in or through which any of the US Trusts’ assets were dealt with;

(5)  documentary evidence of certain withdrawals from Intero’s Standard Chartered Bank Private Bank Portfolio and USD savings account and HKD Savings account from April 2017 – 21 December 2017;

(6)  to account for and provide documentary evidence of the HK$1.5m received from the Education Trust;

(7)  to account for and provide documentary evidence of the US$ 250,000 from the Family Trust;

(8)  to provide all communications between H and the Trustees of the US Trusts concerning certain requests by H made to the Trustee of the Family Trust and a meeting, as set out;

(9)  The creation of the Charge Deed on 1 September 2017.

63.  In relation to the Indian Property, the orders sought by W against H and K in the Discovery Application are, amongst other things, the following:

(1)  the trust accounts of the Indian Trust;

(2)  Documentary evidence of the rental income for the Indian Apartment since 1 August 2016 and all outgoings and expenses.

64.  W’s 13th affirmation was filed in support of the Injunction Application and the Discovery Application, and she had described the discovery she sought as an “ancillary disclosure order”[18].  There was only one paragraph in her 13th affirmation in which she said she sought specific discovery with the view to ascertaining the assets which will be covered by the injunction[19]. H had complained that W did not provide any reason for specific discovery.

65.  Subsequently, W filed her 4th affirmation and she had said therein that there was a questionnaire issued on her behalf about the assets, transactions and accounting of the US Trusts, and that H, as the “Investment Director, should be able to make the disclosure but instead he directed her to the Trustee. 

66.  W had complained that H had refused to provide any straightforward and comprehensive disclosure on Intero and Bremen, and that he had only provided information and documents on a piece meal fashion[20].

67.  Under Order 24 rule 3(1) of RHC, which is applicable to matrimonial proceedings pursuant to rule 3 of MCR, the Court may order specific discovery by any party to a matter to any other party of documents which are or have been in his possession, custody or power relating to any matter in question in the cause or matter.

68.  Mr Todd submitted in his Skeleton Arguments that W “needed” the disclosure set out in the Summons.  There were however no submissions as to why those information/documents sought were said to be in H’s and/or the Trustee’s and/or K’s “possession, custody, or power”, or indeed whether the information/documents had ever existed.

69.  On the other hand, H seemed only to rely on the order of the Nevada Court, in that Mr Egerton in his “Note” submitted that the disclosure by W is subject to the Trustee’s willingness to participate in the proceedings and that due to the order made by the Nevada Court, any request for discovery should be made to the Nevada Court.   

70.  If those information and documents sought by W are relevant to W’s claims for ancillary relief and are in the possession, custody or power of H, I see no reason why W has to go to the Nevada Court to obtain a discovery order against him, since this Court has the jurisdiction in personam against H and to order him to produce the same.

71.  In so far as the US Trusts were concerned, there is however no sufficient evidence that the Trustee had/has in his possession, custody or power the documents sought by W save the “annual report” if and when such has been provided to him by H.  This was referred to in the “footnote” in the “Trust Petition” dated 14 May 2019 presented by the Trustee of the Family Trust to the Nevada Court[21] (“Footnote”).  

72.  According to the Footnote, and according to the Trustee of the Family Trust, the Family Trust owns its own bank account (with no investments and nominal cash only) and the units of a limited liability company under the control of the Investment Director and that the Trustee has no independent knowledge of investment activity at the level of Bremen or lower-ties companies.

73.  Further, according to the Trustee, consistent with the laws creating and governing the directed trusts, the access to investment details is subject to the discretion and control of the Investment Director; and notwithstanding that he is informed and believes that he will receive an annual report from the manager of the limited liability company that provides a beginning and ending value for the units, because the Family Trust is not a US taxpayer, the Trustee does not file a US (or state) tax return and thus does not receive – or need any details of investment.

74.  There was no reference in the Trustee Petition of the Promissory Note but it would appear that the “units in the limited liability company” referred to in the Footnote should be the shareholding of Bremen and/or Intero.

75.  The above evidence shows the Trustee of the US Trusts in fact has very little information, if any on the investment details of the two BVI companies save whatever the Investment Director or H will send him, in an “annual report”.  As mentioned in PBB’s affidavit filed on 21 August 2019, the Trustee’s US lawyers had responded to W’s questionnaire by a letter dated 28 August 2017[22] sending her the limited information the Trustee had in his possession at that time. 

76.  In relation to the Family Trust, the Trustee had replied that for most of the information and documents requested, those were not part of the Trustee’s records.  In relation to the Education Trust, the Trustee had stated that the questions or requests were not to the Trustee and could not be answered by the Trustee.  Even though by now, the Trustee should have received the “annual report” from the two BVI companies provided to him by H, but this could equally be produced by H.

77.  There was no sufficient evidence from W as to why the information/documents she sought in the Disclosure Application against the Trustee were in existence and/or in the Trustee’s possession, custody and power to produce or why it was necessary to make a disclosure order directly against the Trustee.  Having considered the above, I am not prepared to make any disclosure order as sought by W directly against the Trustee of the US Trusts at this stage.

78.  As for H, he was the sole shareholder and director of Intero and Bremen prior to the transfers.  It appears that he has remained the sole director of the two BVI companies even after the relevant dispositions/transfers, at least as at 1 July 2016[23], and there has been no sufficient evidence to say he has since been replaced as the sole director.  It would appear that according to PBB, the two BVI companies would still be under the control of H.  On this basis, and as seen in the Footnote, the accounting and/or financial documents/records if any, all bank account statements or portfolio or fund statements of any assets/investments of those two BVI companies should be in H’s possession, custody and power to produce.  This would include the so called “annual report”.  Further, as H is the “Settlor” of the shares of the two companies into the US Trusts, he must have in his possession, custody and power the details of all injections into the US Trusts and the dates of such injections.

79.  As for the Indian Apartment, K is not the trustee of the Indian Trust and there was no sufficient evidence from W as to why the information/documents she sought in the Disclosure Application were in K’s possession, custody and power to produce. I am not prepared to make any disclosure order directly against K at this stage.  As for H, it seems his position is that he is not aware of there being any trust accounts and he has provided some information on rental and management fees.     

80.  Having regard to the above, I am not prepared to dismiss W’s Discovery Application against H whether in respect of the US Trusts or of the Indian Property.  I propose to adjourn it sine die as after the hearing, H has indicated that he is prepared to provide confirmation in relation to which information/documents are in his possession, custody and power, and W has made some comments on what has been proposed by H.

81.  I will give the parties 21 days to work out an agreed order as to which of the information/documents sought are in H’s possession, custody or power to produce and/or for H to file an affidavit confirming which of the information/documents sought are not in his possession, custody and power to produce and the reasons thereof, failing which or if there is any further dispute, I will direct the Discovery Application to be restored for a 2 hour hearing before this Court. 

Orders

82.  As for the Injunction Application, my order is to the following effect:

(1)  an order in terms of paragraph 2a of the Summons against H, as amended as stated earlier;

(2)  H’s undertaking in respect of paragraph 2b of the Summons accepted;

(3)  H’s undertaking in terms of paragraphs 2c, 2d, 2e and 2f if offered within 21 days will be accepted, failing which, there will be an order in terms of paragraphs 2c, 2d, 2e and 2f after 21 days;

(4)  all orders sought in paragraph 2 of the Summons as against the Trustee and K be dismissed;

(5)  H is to pay W’s costs of and incidental to the Injunction Application to be summarily assessed.  W to submit a Statement of Costs within 14 days and H to lodge his List of Objections within 14 days thereafter. Costs to be paid by H to W within 14 days after summary assessment;

(6)  There be no order as to costs between W and the Trustee and between W and K in respect of the Injunction Application.

83.  I make no costs orders against W in (6) above even though W has failed to obtain an injunction against the Trustee or K.  This is because no substantive submissions were put forward on behalf of the Trustee or on behalf of K in relation to the Injunction Application. 

84.  As for the Discovery Application, this is adjourned sine die with liberty to restore after 21 days and to be fixed for argument for a 2 hour hearing before this Court, if no agreed order is submitted within 21 days from today.  Costs of the Discovery Application be reserved.

 (Bebe Pui Ying Chu)
 Judge of the Court of First Instance
 High Court

Mr Richard Todd, instructed by Stevenson Wong & Co, for the petitioner

Mr Robin Egerton, instructed by Oldham Li & Nie, for the 1st and the 4th respondents

The 2nd respondent, absent

The 3rd respondent, absent



[1] S1:146-149

[2] S4:1058

[3] See para 18, S2:342

[4] At para 18

[5] S1: 153-286

[6] S1: 155-286

[7] See S1: 151-153

[8] S2:310-330

[9] S4:1056

[10] S4:1067-1071

[11] S4:1074- 1110

[12] See S1:34

[13] At para 18, S1:32

[14] Para 23, S1:62

[15] See para 15, S1:68

[16] S2:486, S2:404 (para 5.2, Trust Agreement)

[17] S4:1089

[18] See para 2

[19] See para 32

[20] See para 17-18, S1:78

[21] S2:495

[22] S2:482-484

[23] S1:212-213

[2019] HKCFI 2822-EN-2019-11-21

KCMA v. ABC

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HCMC 1/2019

[2019] HKCFI 2822

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

MATRIMONIAL CAUSES NO. 1 OF 2019

________________________

BETWEEN

 KCMAPetitioner
 and 
 ABCRespondent

________________________

Before: Hon B Chu J in Chambers (Not Open to the Public)
Date of Hearing: 24 September 2019
Date of Decision: 21 November 2019

________________________

D E C I S I O N
(on Joinder)

________________________

1.  These are matrimonial proceedings and presently before this Court is a summons issued by the petitioner wife (“W”) for joinder, interlocutory injunction and disclosure against the husband (“H”) and other non-parties as set out below (“Summons”).

2.  The application for joinder (“Joinder Application”) is to join :

(1)  Mr Paras B Barnett (“PBB”), in his capacity as trustee (“Trustee”) of two trusts which I shall refer to as (i) the Family Trust and (ii) the Education Trust (collectively “US Trusts”);

(2)  The father (“K”) of H, to whom H had transferred an apartment in India (“Indian Apartment”) in September 2016, which was later settled by K in a trust in India (“Indian Trust”);

3.  The application for injunctions (“Injunction Application”) is sought by W respectively against H, the Trustee and K restraining, amongst other things, each of them in dealing with the disputed assets under the US Trusts and/or the Indian Apartment.

4.  The application for specific discovery (“Discovery Application”) is sought by W against (i) H and the Trustee for various information/documents including the trust accounts of the US Trusts, and (ii) H and K to account for and to provide information including trust accounts of the Indian Trust now holding the Indian Property.

5.  This decision is on the Joinder Application only.

6.  Counsel Mr Richard Todd appeared at the hearing for W and Mr Robin Egerton appeared for H and his father K.  Mr Leon Ho appeared for PBB in his capacity as the Trustee of the Family Trust only.  PBB in his capacity as the Trustee of the Education Trust had no legal representation and was absent at the hearing. 

Brief Background

7.  H and W met in August 1999 and were married in October 2001.  They separated in late 2016.  There are three children of the family, the eldest being a boy now aged 15, and the two younger children being girls, now aged 13 and 9 respectively (collectively “Children”).

8.  W is a full time housewife and has not worked since 2000.  The Children now live with W in a property at South Bay Close, Hong Kong.  

9.  It was W’s case that in about 2006, the parties bought the Indian Apartment with their family funds and that the Indian Apartment was purchased in H’s sole name by reason of him being an Indian national.  Subsequently, on 12 September 2016, H transferred the Indian Apartment into his father K’s name, and later on 30 August 2017, K settled the apartment into the Indian Trust.  The Indian Apartment is said to be worth about US$2.3m.

10.  On the other hand, it was H’s case that the Indian Property was a co-investment by him and his father K and that it was initially purchased in H’s name as they could take advantage of his non-resident Indian status and to obtain preferential mortgage lending rates from local Indian banks.  It is further H’s case that K had contributed towards the expenses and that the apartment would be made available for the use of H’s parents.  According to H, there was considerable delay in construction and handover of the Indian Apartment and eventually it was on 12 September 2016 that the title was conveyed into H’s name and on the same day it was further conveyed by H to K.  As said earlier, K later transferred the Indian Property to the Indian Trust.  The Children, K and K’s wife (H’s mother) are named among the 5 beneficiaries.  Both H and W have been excluded.   

11.  It was not disputed that H had set up two BVI companies which shall simply be referred to as (i) Intero and (ii) Bremen respectively on 2 July 2009 and on 3 July 2012[1].  At the time, H was the sole shareholder holding one share in each company and he was the sole director of each company.  Intero was said to have been set up to facilitate a capital injunction into an investment management company of which H works as a “Partner” and H is said to hold an interest in the holding and/or related companies through Intero.  Bremen was set up to hold 3 pieces of land in St Thomas in the US Virgin Islands. 

12.  According to a “Trust Structure” produced by H, there was also a trust set up by him in 2013, with W and the Children as beneficiaries, which I shall simply call “Insurance Trust”[2].  There is not a subject matter of the Summons.  

13.  In 2015, the marriage went into difficulties.  According to W, on 6 July 2015, H transferred a total of HK$7.5m from his personal account to Intero[3]. 

14.  The parties underwent marriage counselling between September 2015 until March 2016 and it was during this period that H set up the two US Trusts, according to W, without her knowledge and/or consent.

15.  The Family Trust was set up by H on 1 November 2015, initially as a New Hampshire trust.

16.  Upon setting up the Family Trust on 1 November 2015, H transferred his one share (100% shareholding) in Intero to the then New Hampshire trustee of the Family Trust[4].  This was followed by H transferring HK$2.2m from his personal bank account to Intero[5].

17.  It would appear on 1 November 2015 that H also transferred his one share (100% shareholding) in Bremen to then new Hampshire trustee of the Family Trust[6]. On 1 July 2016, H formally set up the Education Trust, also initially as a New Hampshire trust.  On the same day, the one share in Bremen was transferred to the Education Trust[7].

18.  Further, on 1 July 2016, the Family Trust entered into a sale and purchase agreement to “sell” the 100% shareholding in Intero to Bremen.  Bremen then borrowed a sum of US$10.5m from the Family Trust for the “purchase” and Bremen issued a promissory note dated 1 July 2016 for US$10.5m to the Family Trust (“Promissory Note”).  The maturity date of the Promissory Note is 31 December 2026 and Bremen agreed, amongst other things, to pay interest to the Family Trust on the unpaid principal amount at the rate of 5% compound annually until the date such accrued interest is repaid in full.  

19.  In short, as a result of the above transactions on 1 July 2016, the assets of the Family Trust comprised of primarily the Promissory Note, whereas 100% of the shareholding in Intero is now owned by Bremen, and in turn 100% of the shareholding in Bremen is owned by the Education Trust of which H and W are not beneficiaries.  Bremen’s assets are said to be worth about HK$93m, consisting of[8]:

(i)  3 pieces of land in US Virgin Islands worth net of about HK$42,381,300

(ii)  100% shareholding in Intero worth about HK$50,650,393

20.  W issued the divorce petition in November 2016.

21.  According to W, it was only when she received H’s Form E filed on 1 February 2017 that she discovered H’s setting up of the US Trusts and the transfers into the US Trusts and also the Indian Apartment being transferred into K’s name.  She had pointed out that Intero and Bremen had been held by H in his personal name for over 6 years until the respective transfers into the US Trusts which were effected as said earlier, after the parties attended marriage counselling in September 2015.

22.  Shortly before H filed his Form E, the Family Trust and the Education Trust were relocated by H from New Hampshire to Nevada USA in January 2017. 

23.  In so far as the Family Trust is concerned, a trust deed was executed on 1 January 2017 under the Nevada law, with H as the initial “Settlor” and PBB as the Trustee (“Trust Agreement”)[9].  The Trustee acknowledged receipt of property received from the prior trustee and agreed to administer that property and all other property received in accordance with the provisions of the Trust Agreement.  The Family Trust is said to be irrevocable.

24.  H is named as the sole “Investment Director” as well as the “Trust Protector” in the Trust Agreement.  Section 4.3 sets out that the successor Trust Protector shall be a committee comprising of H’s father K, H’s brother, H’s “Spouse”, and two of H’s friends. 

25.  “Beneficiary” is defined in Section 5.1 to be (i) H, (ii) W, (iii) the descendants of H and W, (iv) certain charitable organizations as contingent beneficiaries, and (v) any person whom the Trustee adds as a “Beneficiary” under the Trust Agreement.  Section 5.2 provides for the distributions of the “Trust Property” by the Trustee.  Further, under section 5.4, the Trustee has the power to add or exclude “Beneficiaries” and the Trustee has the power to exclude irrevocably any person (other than H or W) as a “Beneficiary”.  The spouses of the “Beneficiaries”, save H and W, are “Excluded Persons”

26.  As for the Education Trust, according to a summary produced by W[10], the “Investment Director” is H and the “Protector” is also H with power to appoint, failing which, a committee comprising of (i) H’s father K, H’s brother, and a friend.  The “Beneficiaries” of the Education Trust are (i) H’s descendants, (ii) W’s descendants (by name) including those born after divorce.  Thus, the Children are “Beneficiaries” and both H and W are “Excluded Persons”.   

27.  On 29 August 2017, W issued a Notice of Application (“Notice”) for, amongst other things, (i) an avoidance of dispositions order under section 17 of the Matrimonial Proceedings and Property Ordinance, Cap 192 (MPPO) (“s17 Application”); (ii) a variation of nuptial settlement under sections 6(1)(c) and (d) of the MPPO (collectively “s6(1)(c)Application”).

28.  By the s17 Application, W is seeking to set aside, amongst other things, the following dispositions made by H[11]:

In relation to the US Trusts –

(1)  the disposition of the shares in Intero into the Family Trust on 1 November 2015;

(2)  the disposition of the shares in Bremen to the Education Trust on 1 November 2015 or in about July 2016;

(3)  the disposition of the shares in Intero from the Family Trust to Bremen on 1 July 2016;

(4)  the transfer of the Family Trust from the jurisdiction of New Hampshire to that of the jurisdiction of Nevada in about January 2017;

In relation of the Indian Apartment –

(1)  the disposition of the Indian Apartment to his father K in August 2016 and all transfers thereafter;

29.  By the s6(1)(c) Application, W is seeking, amongst other things:

(1)  the US Trusts and the Indian Trust be dissolved and assets held by the trusts be distributed to W and/or H; or alternatively,

(2)  The US Trusts and the Indian Trust be varied to enable W and/or H to benefit from one or all of the trusts.

30.  In the Notice, W has invited the Children, Bremen, Intero, PPB as the Trustee and H’s parents to intervene, and the Notice also includes an application for an injunction against H.

31.  It was H’s case that he first contemplated estate protection and financial planning as early as 2009 with regard to the set up of efficient financial structures for the family, and that he had discussed with W the setting up of trusts.  It was further H’s case that the US Trusts were primarily set up for succession planning, tax mitigation and asset protection and that W was aware of the setting up of the US Trusts, but this was denied by W. 

32.  W had referred to a letter from the Trustee to W dated 16 May 2018 referring to the Trust Agreement being forwarded to her “last year”, which meant that the Trust Agreement was only first provided to W in 2017[12].

33.  H has denied that his transfer of the shares in Intero and Bremen to the US Trusts was made to defeat W’s claims for ancillary relief, pointing out that in respect of the Family Trust, W is one of the two beneficiaries.

34.  However, it is not really disputed that the legal effect of the H’s transfers of his shareholdings in Intero and Bremen into the US Trusts is that whatever rights and entitlement that W had in sharing the family assets held by Intero and Bremen are now being subject to the discretion of the Trustee of the Family Trust and the Promissory Note, and further that H, as the sole Investment Director, has the exclusive duty and power to invest and otherwise manage all of the “Trust Property”.  As pointed out by W, in effect, about HKD93 million worth of family’s assets held by Intero and Bremen were injected into the Education Trust of which she is not a “Beneficiary”. 

35.  Further, as pointed out on behalf of W, the “Borrower” stated in the Promissory Note, ie Bremen, is not required to pay interest or principal before the “Maturity Date”, ie 31 December 2026[13].  W has in fact raised a number of issues in relation to the Promissory Note.

36.  PPB had filed an affidavit in his capacity as the Trustee of the Family Trust to oppose the joinder.  He has explained that the Family Trust is a “directed trust” meaning he does not make investment decisions and H, as the Investment Director, is conferred the exclusive duty and power to invest and otherwise manage all of the “Trust Property”.  He has further pointed out that it is stated in the Trust Agreement that H, as Investment Director, has the duty to provide information of investment of the “Trust Property” to the Trustee[14].

37.  Thus, it would seem that the role of the Trustee for the Family Trust is very limited, only making discretionary distributions. The Trustee does not appear to have any knowledge, much less control, over any of the Trust Assets.

38.  As mentioned earlier, PBB as the Trustee of the Education Trust was not represented at the hearing and there was no affidavit filed by PBB on behalf of the Education Trust and thus there was no information provided by PBB in his affidavit relation to the Education Trust.  For the present application, W’s case is that the same information provided by PBB for the Family Trust should also apply to the Education Foundation, of which H is also the sole Investment Director.

39.  As H is the sole Investment Director of both the US Trusts, it is W’s case that H has retained complete control over all the assets held by Bremen and Intero notwithstanding the transfers into the US Trusts.

40.  The Notice was fixed for hearing before Judge Melloy on 29 August 2017, and as the Notice contains an injunction, at the hearing, H offered a signed written undertaking that he would not personally take steps to change the then status of the Family Trust and the Education Trust, save with the agreement of W or with leave of the Court (“1stUndertaking”)[15].

41.  On 21 November 2018, W issued the Summons.  Subsequently as seen in a judgment handed down by Judge Melloy on 11 December 2018 (“Melloy Judgment”)[16], she accepted in substitution for and upon the discharge of the 1st Undertaking and without prejudice to H’s position and the position of the other parties, a further undertaking from H that he will not make or cause to make any distribution from the US Trusts in his personal capacity (but not in his capacity as director of Bremen and Infero to make follow on investment as may be required or interest distributions pursuant to the directions of the Trustee) (“2nd Undertaking”)[17].  It was also on 11 December 2018 that, Judge Melloy made the order transferring the Notice, the Summons, and W’s application for ancillary relief to the Court of First Instance.

42.  W’s ancillary relief application including the Notice, the Summons and relevant orders and W’s relevant affirmations were duly served on the Trustee on 18 April 2019 by a licensed process server in Las Vegas, Nevada, USA.  Further, the Notice, the Summons and relevant documents were duly served on K in India on 15 July 2019.

43.  There were no issues raised by the Trustee or K in relation to the mode of service.

Proper procedure for service and joinder of non-parties in a variation of settlement application or an avoidance of disposition application

44.  In the present case, I find some of the rules and practice directions did not seem to have been followed and for future reference, I will set out what in my view should be the proper procedures for service and joinder of non-parties in variation of settlement/avoidance of disposition applications.  There are two aspects, firstly in relation to service and secondly in relation to joinder.

The notice of application form

45.  Previously, pursuant to rules 68, 68A, 70, 74 of the Matrimonial Causes Rules (MCR), the notice of an application for a variation of settlement order or for an avoidance of disposition order should be made in Form 8 or Form 8B, which are specified forms in the MCR.

46.  It is further provided by rule 74(3) of MCR that the notice of the application (whether Form or Form 8B) together with a copy of the supporting affidavit shall be served on the following persons as well as the respondent to the application:

(1)  in the case of an application for a variation of settlement order (ie under section 6(1)(c) of MPPO), the trustees of the settlement and the settlor if living;

(2)  in the case of an application for an avoidance of disposition order (ie under section 17 of MPPO), the person in whose favour the disposition is alleged to have been made, and such other persons, if any, as the registrar may direct.

47.  As seen above, it is mandatory under rule 74(3) for the trustees and the settlor in (1) and for the disponee of the disposition in (2) to be served with the notice of application and the supporting affidavit.

48.  With the introduction of PD 15.11 on the Financial Dispute Resolution Pilot Scheme, rule 84A of MCR came into effect on 29 December 2003, pursuant to which the entire rule 74 has been dis-applied in divorce proceedings issued after that date.  Further, the notice of application form, ie Form 8 or 8B referred to in rule 74 has been replaced by a Form 25 in the MCR (or Form A in PD 15.11) (“Form 25”).

Service

49.  As rule 74 is no longer applicable to proceedings issued after 29 December 2003, pursuant to paragraph 5a (iv) of PD 15.11, the Family Court Judge, upon the filing of Form 25 for a variation of settlement order or an avoidance of disposition order shall have to give directions at the First Appointment Hearing, as to service of all relevant persons to be served under section 6A(5) and s 17 of MPPO and the issue and service of Form F.

50.  For some reasons, there is no mention in paragraph 5a(iv) of PD 15.11 of persons to be served under section 6(1)(c) of MPPO, ie in a variation of settlement case.  Assuming that this was an inadvertent omission, the clear intention of paragraph 5a(iv) PD 15.11 is for directions to be given in relation to service on all relevant persons, at the First Appointment Hearing or the first available direction hearing.  In the present case, there did not appear to have been such directions sought or given although in the Notice, W appeared to seek “leave to invite the persons named to intervene”.  It is not clear to the Court as to what “leave to invite” W was seeking, but in any event, the Court was not informed whether such leave was given.  At the hearing on 29 August 2017 when the 1st Undertaking was given, the parties acknowledged that W was to be released from her implied undertaking, to “contact the companies and, the trustees named in the Notice”[18].  However, “contact” does not mean “service”.   

51.  Further, rule 72 of MCR has never been dis-applied.  Under rule 72(1), in an application for a variation of settlement, the court, shall, unless it is satisfied that the proposed variation does not adversely affect the rights or interest of any children concerned, direct that the children be separately represented on the application.  Rule 72(2) then provides that on any other application for ancillary relief the court may give such a direction as it is empowered to give by paragraph (1).  In my view, these rules should equally apply in any application for an avoidance of disposition order which may affect the rights or interests of any children. 

52.  Again, directions did not seem to have been sought or given under rule 72 of MCR in the present case.   

53.  As set out above, (i)directions on service of all relevant persons,and (ii) directions for the issue and service of a Form Fand (iii) directions under rule 72 of MCR should have been sought by the applicant in a variation of settlement case or an avoidance of disposition case at either the First Appointment Hearing, or at the first available directions hearing.  I am also of the view that “all relevant persons” in paragraph 5a(iv) of PD 15.11 should include the trustee and the settlor if living in a variation of settlement application, or a disponee in an avoidance of disposition case and any other persons the Judge may direct, as previously provided under rule 74(3) of MCR.

54.  Under rule 109 of the MCR, any document in the matrimonial proceedings may be served outside jurisdictionwithout leave in accordance with Order 11 rules 5 and 6 of the Rules of the High Court (RHC).  Even though no leave is required, the mode of service abroad should follow that set out in Order 11 rules 5 and 6 of RHC.  Although Order 11 rules 5 and 6 refer to the service of a writ, ie an originating process, pursuant to rule 3 of MCR, they should apply to service of Form 25 for a variation of settlement/avoidance of disposition order, subject to necessary modifications.  Further, after Order 11 rule 5A of RHC has been introduced in 1999, any service in Mainland China should be in accordance with that rule.  

55.  Order 11 rule 5 has referred to service being accompanied with an acknowledgment of service of the writ form.

56.  There is no rule in MCR or in the Practice Directions requiring that Form 25 is to be served on a non-party with an acknowledgment of service, nor has this been the practice of the family practitioners in Hong Kong, in so far as this Court is aware.  It is however interesting to note that in the case Wyler v Lyons [1963] P 274, referred to this Court by Mr Ho for the Trustees, the notice for an avoidance of disposition order was served and endorsed with the usual direction to complete the form of acknowledgment of service together with the usual explanation as to what to do[19].

57.  As mentioned earlier, paragraph 5a(iv) of PD15.11 provides for directions in relation to the issue and service of Form F. If Form 25 is to be served on a non-party, it should in my view at least be served accompanied by a Form F, so that the non-party has clear notice of what is being alleged by the applicant against the non-party.  There should also be directions given on service of any supporting affidavit.

58.  As matters now stand, for service out of jurisdiction under Order 11 rule 5 :

(i)  the service effected in the foreign country/place has to comply with the law of the foreign country/place (rule 5(2));

(ii)  The document needs not be served personally or by the applicant or an agent if served by a method in accordance with Order 11 rule 6 (rule 5(3));

(iii)  If served through the foreign government, judicial authorities and British Consul under Order 11 rule 6, there has to be an official certificate that the application has been served with rule (5A) or rule (6) and the official certificate shall be evidence of the facts stated therein rule 5(5).

59.  Order 11 rule 6 provides for service through foreign governments, judicial authorities and British Consul.

60.  Form F reads as follows:

“Notice of allegation in proceedings for ancillary relief

Take Notice that

This statement has been filed in proceedings for ancillary relief which are as follows:

(to be completed)

If you wish to be heard on any matter affecting you in these proceedings you may intervene by applying to the Court for directions regarding:

•  the filing and service of pleadings.

•  the conduct of further proceedings.

You must apply for directions within eight days after you receive this Notice.

The period of eight days includes the day you receive it.”

61.  Although rule 74(4) of MCR provides that any person served with the notice of application may within 14 days after service file an affidavit in answer, due to the rule having been dis-applied, it seems that there is no such provision as rule 74(4) in Form F any more.

62.  Since the non-party, if served abroad, may need more than 8 days to respond, directions should also be sought from the Judge, at the same time as directions are being sought on service, as to the time given to the non-party served with the Form 25 and Form F to respond.

Effect of service

63.  Order 15 rule 13A of our Rules of the High Court (RHC) has set out the service of a notice of action to non- parties in an action relating (i) estate of a deceased person; or (b) property subject to a trust, as follows:

“13A. Notice of action to non-parties

(1) At any stage in an action to which this rule applies, the Court may, on the application of any party or of its own motion, direct that notice of the action be served on any person who is not a party thereto but who will or may be affected by any judgment given therein.

(2) An application under this rule may be made ex parte and shall be supported by an affidavit stating the grounds of the application.

(3) Every notice of an action under this rule shall be in Form No. 52 in Appendix A and the copy to be served shall be a sealed copy and accompanied by a copy of the originating summons or writ and of all other pleadings served in the action, and by a form of acknowledgment of service in Form No. 14 or 15 in Appendix A with such modifications as may be appropriate.

(4) A person may, within 14 days of service on him of a notice under this rule, acknowledge service of the writ or originating summons and shall thereupon become a party to the action, but in default of such acknowledgment and subject to paragraph (5) he shall be bound by any judgment given in the action as if he was a party thereto.

(5) If at any time after service of such notice on any person the writ or originating summons is amended so as substantially to alter the relief claimed, the Court may direct that the judgment shall not bind such person unless a further notice together with a copy of the amended writ or originating summons is issued and served upon him under this rule

(6) This rule applies to any action relating to—

(a) the estate of a deceased person; or

(b) property subject to a trust

(7)   Order 6, rule 7(3) and (5) shall apply in relation to a notice of an action under this rule as if the notice were a writ and the person by whom the notice is issued were the plaintiff.”

64.  Order 15 rule 13A (4) clearly states that if the person served with the requisite notice acknowledge service within the time stipulated, then that person shall become a party to the action/proceedings, and that in default of such acknowledgement and subject to paragraph (5) therein, the person shall be bound by any judgment given as if he/she was a party thereto.

65.  There is no reason why the rule cannot apply subject to necessary modifications to the service of the Form 25 accompanied with Form F in an application for a variation of settlement or an application for avoidance of disposition order which relates to property subject to a trust.    In fact, the Court of Appeal at paragraph 25 of its judgment in LLC v LLWA and anor [2019] 2 HKLRD 529, CAMP 143/2018 has referred to Order 15 rule 13A(4) of RHC when discussing preliminary issues hearings in matrimonial proceedings involving third party interests.

66.  As has also been pointed out by Mostyn J in DR v GR and Others (Financial Remedy; Variation of Overseas Trust) [2013]1196 (Fam), (an authority which is not on any Counsel’s “list of authorities”), once served, the non-party can file evidence in answer, or they can decide whether to participate only as witnesses or to seek to intervene (ie to be joined) and to be represented, and it is up to them.  Mostyn J then went on to say: “But if they have been served in accordance with the rules, and do nothing, then it is clear beyond a shadow of a doubt that any order will be valid and binding on them”[20].

67.  In my view, when directions are being given under paragraph 5a(iv) of PD15.11 in relation to service, such directions may also incorporate, whether in Form F or not, a notice that any non-party properly served shall be bound by any judgment in default of any acknowledgment of service and/or response.

Joinder

68.  There is no rule that the trustees and/or settlor in a variation of settlement case or the disponee in an avoidance of disposition case or any non-party served with a Form 25 is to be automatically joined.  If the applicant in Form 25 wishes to apply to join the non-party who has been duly served, or the non-party duly served wishes to make an application to intervene/join as a party in the application, an application for joinder should be made by issuing an inter-partes summons accompanied by a supporting affidavit.

69.  Unlike England, where some of their Civil Procedures Rules have been incorporated into their Family Procedure Rules 2010, there are no specific provisions in the MCR in relation to the procedure on joinder of non-parties in a variation of settlement/an avoidance of disposition case.  The relevant provisions are to be found in Order 15 of the RHC.

70.  Order 15 rule 4 of RHC is not applicable unless the trustee and/or settlor in an application for variation of settlement or a disponee in an application for an avoidance of disposition is already a plaintiff or a defendant in a separate action/proceedings brought by him or brought against him.  

71.  The proper procedure for an application for the joinder of a trustee and settlor in a variation of settlement application or a disponee and other non-parties directed to be served in an avoidance of disposition application should be Order 15 rule 6(2)(b) of RHC.

72.  Order 15 rule 6(2)(b) provides that:

“(2) Subject to the provision of this rule, at any stage of the proceedings in any cause or matter the Court may on such terms as it thinks just and either of its own motion or on application—

(a) …

(b) order any of the following persons to be added as a party, namely—

(i) any person who ought to have been joined as a party or whose presence before the Court is necessary to ensure that all matters in dispute in the cause or matter may be effectually and completely determined and adjudicated upon, or

(ii) any person between whom and any party to the cause or matter there may exist a question or issue arising out of or relating to or connected with any relief or remedy claimed in the cause or matter which in the opinion of the Court it would be just and convenient to determine as between him and that party as well as between the parties to the cause or matter.

(3)  An application by any person for an order under paragraph (2) adding him as a party must, except with the leave of the Court, be supported by an affidavit showing his interest in the matters in dispute in the cause or matter or, as the case may be, the question or issue to be determined as between him and any party to the cause or matter.”

(emphasis added)

73.  As seen above, there are two limbs in Order 15 rule 6(2)(b), namely (i) and (ii).  The supporting affidavit for the joinder should set out whether it is under (i) or (ii), or under both, that the joinder is being sought against the non-party.

74.  For Order 15 rule 6(2)(b)(i), the supporting evidence should identify clearly (1) the matter in dispute between a party and the proposed new party and (2) the connection to the main matter in dispute between the parties.

75.  For Order 15 rule 6(2)(b)(ii), the supporting evidence should identify clearly (1) the existing question or issue between the proposed new party and any party in the matter and (2) the relief or remedy claimed in the matter out of which the existing question or issue is said to be related to or connected with.

76.  The supporting affidavit for the joinder should be concise and in my view it is not appropriate to include lengthy and detailed allegations between the parties themselves, since the non-party may not be related to the parties at all and indeed may be innocent third parties or strangers caught up in the parties’ dispute in the matrimonial proceedings.

To join or not to join – the legal principles

77.  As said above, upon being served with the Form 25 and the Form F, the non-party may decide to intervene or to join as a party in the application, or the applicant in in the application may decide to apply to join that non-party as a party.

78.  Paragraph 15/6/1 of the Hong Kong Civil Procedure Volume 1 2020 sets out the effect of Order 15 rule 6.  Paragraph 15/6/6 is in relation to adding or substituting defendants and paragraphs 15/6/7 – 15/6/11 are in relation to interveners.  Suffice to say, it can be seen, amongst other things, as follows:

(i)  On whether a new party should be joined, the test is whether there is a bona fide claim and a proper question to be tried between the plaintiff and the intended defendant that is necessary or just and convenient for resolution between them as well as between plaintiff and the defendant in the proceedings[21];

(ii)  The court retains a discretionary power to refuse the order or to impose terms[22];

(iii)  A court could review the position of joinder at any stage of the proceedings[23];

(iv)  Prima facie, the plaintiff is entitled to choose the person against whom to proceed, and to leave out any person against whom he does not desire to proceed.  Under this rule, the court has power on the application to add or substitute a defendant, and the object is to ensure that (a) all issues in dispute be effectively adjudicated upon by the court and (b) all relevant parties are before the court.  The court can on such terms as it thinks just give leave for a person to be joined as a defendant and allow him to participate in the proceedings to the extent permitted by the court[24].

79.  Mr Ho on behalf of the Trustee had referred this Court to three “old authorities”, the earliest one in time was the case of Goff v Goff [1934] P 107 in which the New York trustees were seeking to set aside the service on them of the wife’s petition to vary a marriage settlement after decree absolute on the grounds that (i) the service was defective and (ii) that the English Court could not make any effective order against the trustees as although the service was good under the English rules, it was not served in accordance with the requirement of the New York Law and the service should be set aside on the general ground that no effective order could result against the party served.  However, although service was set aside on the general ground that no effective order could result against the party served, it was set aside without prejudice to the petitioner’s rights to apply for leave to dispense with service on the trustees.

80.  The second case in terms of time referred to by Mr Ho was Brandt v Brandt (No 2) [1960] HKLR 395.  The Brandt case was an appeal on whether by reason of section 48(6) of the then Divorce Ordinance or otherwise it was necessary to obtain leave of the court to present a divorce petition intended to be served on the respondent out of the jurisdiction pursuant to the then Order 2 of the then Code of Civil Procedure, and the Full Court held that the issue of jurisdiction was one to be determined in each suit as it arose and that prior leave was not required in that case.  It is not clear how this case would help the Trustee, and in any event, the law has gone through some substantial changes since.

81.  Mr Ho also referred to Wyler v Lyons, supra, which concerned an application by the plaintiff, who was the sole member of the board of a Liechtenstein foundation (ie a trust set up by the husband) administering the trust, to set aside the service on him by the wife of her notice to set aside the dispositions made by the husband to the trust. 

82.  It was held that as the court could make no order which would be effective against the plaintiff, the plaintiff was prima facie not subject to the court’s jurisdiction and was entitled not to be subjected to its process; further, that as the dispositions sought to be set aside were not made in his favour and, in so far as the property concerned, was not in his personal ownership or possession, he ought not have been served personally and that, therefore the service would be set aside.

83.  Sir Jocelyn Simon, President of the division, had pointed out according to Liechtenstein law the foundation was itself a legal entity and that it was the recipient and was itself the owner of the property comprised in the various dispositions which the wife was seeking to set aside, and the foundation could be served with process at the office of an advocate who was appointed as representative of the foundation in accordance with the law of Liechtenstein.  Further, the evidence showed that the Liechtenstein courts would not recognize or execute any order of the court in relation to the foundation and there was no reciprocal enforcement of judgments between England and Liechtenstein[25].

84.  Mr Ho relied on the above case to argue that as no order made by this Court would be effective as against the Trustee, therefore, the Trustee should not be joined.  However, Liechtenstein is a civil law country where enforcement of a foreign order will depend on its legislation and in my view what the President said had to be seen in that context.

85.  Mr Ho had also referred this Court to Hamlin v Hamlin [1986] Fam 11 and this Court’s own decision in LCYP v JEK[2019] HKCFI 237.  The Hamlin case concerned an injunction under the English section 37 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 (which is equivalent to our section 17 of the MPPO) obtained by the wife against a villa of the husband in Spain.  The judge had refused to continue an ex parte injunction on the ground he had no jurisdiction over a foreign realty.  The Court of Appeal (Kerr LJ and Bush J) allowed the appeal and held that there was jurisdiction under section 37 to make an order concerning foreign property although the court would not exercise its discretion to make an order concerning foreign property which could not be enforced.  The matter was then remitted to the judge below for the wife’s application to be heard on its merits.  I note that Spain is also a civil law country.

86.  The LCYP and JEK case concerned the joinder of the trustee company of the Delaware trust set up by the husband in that case and certain funds were injected into the trust by the husband.  The trustee did not appear nor had they filed any evidence to oppose the joinder save that the trustee sent a later to the Court stating that the Court had no jurisdiction over the trustee.  Although the husband’s legal representative had referred to the case of Hamlin v Hamlin, counsel for the wife in that case had referred this court to T v T and Others (Joinder of Third Parties) [1996] 2 FLR 357.  This Court followed what was said by Wilson J (as he then was) in T v T and allowed the joinder application by the wife, as I came to the view that if the husband in that case were to fail to comply with any orders made by the Hong Kong Court, joining the trust company could facilitate the enforcement proceedings which the wife might have to take in the United States. 

87.  For some reasons, none of the Counsel appearing at the present hearing had referred this Court to T v T.  In that case, the trustees of a Jersey settlement applied to set aside an order joining them made by Wilson J at a hearing when a Mareva injunction was continued against Mr T and Mr T alleged that he had no control over the trust assets.  

88.  Wilson J refused the trustees’ application to set aside the joinder.  He had considered Order 15 rule 6(2)(b) of the then English Rules of the Supreme Court and (i) and (ii) thereunder, namely the two limbs which are similar to our Order 15 rule 6(2)(b)(i) and (ii).  As said by Wilson J, the reference to ‘justice’ and ‘convenience’ in the second limb (ii) seemed to him to be less stringent than the reference in the first limb (i)[26], but he came to the view in that case, both limbs would be applicable as a crucial matter for his determination would be to evaluate the real control over the assets of the trust and that this matter would be directly relevant to the duty of inquiry the court had under s 25(a) of the Act (ie the equivalent of s 7 of our MPPO).

89.  Wilson J had further said that quite apart from the fulfilment of his duty under s 25, he had come to the view that the enforcement of any orders that he might make would likely to be facilitated by the trustees remaining as parties to the proceedings.

90.  Wilson J went on to say that he would have had some doubt about whether to have added this consideration (ie of enforcement) into his conclusion about the applicability of Order 15 rule 6(2)(b)(i) and/or (ii) had he not been referred to a decision of Mummery J in TSB Private Bank International SA v Chabra [1992] 1 WLR 231 where a very wide construction was placed upon the ‘justice’ and ‘convenience’ referred to in rule 6(2)(b)(ii)[27].  

91.  Wilson J had also referred to the Wylerv Lyons case as being an “old authority” and pointed out that at that time, ie in 1963, there was no inquisitorial duty cast upon the court in ancillary relief proceedings at all: it simply had a discretion to make limited forms of ancillary relief and that the duty has been imposed upon the court since 1971.

92.  In fact, on the question of enforcement, what Wilson J had further said was he would also expect and believe that, notwithstanding that there might be difficulties about the automatic enforcement in Jersey of any order that he made in the event that the trustees failed to take an active part in the proceedings, nevertheless their having been made parties to the proceedings would be likely to assist the wife in, if not direct enforcement, the obtaining of an analogous or supplementary judgment in Jersey, and indeed might assist her in putting before the Jersey court, as facts which had been found and from which there should be no escape, facts found by the court at a hearing in which, whether the trustees actively participated or not, the trustees were parties[28]. 

93.  In DR v GR, supra, the wife applied for a variation of settlement.  The post-nuptial settlement was a discretionary Jersey trust which owned a Liberian company which in turn owned a UK company which in turn owned two further UK companies, which owned two retirement villages and other assets in the UK.  The trustees of the Jersey trust were joined as parties and then later all the companies in the trust were joined also.  In neither case was an application made for joinder and further at the time of the joinders, neither the husband nor the trustees nor the companies had any notice of any application for joinder.  The trustees had not participated in the proceedings, but the companies made their own application to be dis-joined.

94.  Suffice to say, Mostyn J found the procedure adopted in that case “bedevilled him” and he then reviewed various authorities concerning applications for variation of settlement cases, one aspect of which was whether the interposition of companies between the trust at the top of the tree and the assets at its bottom acted as any kind of impediment to making a variation which disposed of the actual assets at the bottom.  Mostyn J had considered the procedure aspect and laid down certain guidelines, and he was of the view that a joinder was not an essential pre-condition for the validity of a variation of settlement order.

95.  In DR v GR, Mostyn J allowed the companies joined to be dis-joined as he said he saw no good reason why either the trustees or the companies were joined.  Mostyn J had referred to the decision of Birt DB in Mubarak v Mubarak [2008] JRC 136, [2009] 1 FLR 664 and Article 9(4) of the Trusts (Jersey) Law 1984 and had said that there was only a very limited extent to which enforcement of the UK court’s order could be achieved in Jersey and that did not depend on whether the trustees were joined to the proceedings or even if they submitted to the jurisdiction. Further, if the assets were sited in UK then a successful applicant would likely seek to enforce a variation directly in UK and would not involve the Jersey courts at all.  However, this part of Mostyn J’s judgment may now have to be looked at in light of the subsequent decision of the Supreme Court in Petrodel Resources Ltd & Prest & Ors [2013]UKSC 34, [2013] 2 AC 415.

96.  In DR v GR, Mostyn J had referred to T v T and it seems clear that he did not agree with what was held by Wilson J.  Mostyn J said he had difficulty in understanding why the factual inquiry referred to by Wilson J would be assisted by the formal joinder of the trustees.  In so far as assisting enforcement was concerned, Mostyn J had said the views of Wilson J must, at least as far as Jersey was concerned, be seen in the light of the direction of Birt DB in Mubarak v Mubarak, supra.

97.  The only authority Mr Todd had referred the Court to was TM and AH [2016] EWHC 572 (Fam).  The issue in that case was whether trustees respectively of a BVI trust and of a Swiss trust should be joined in a variation of settlement application by the wife.  Those trustees were not submitting to the jurisdiction and it had also been indicated that they needed to apply to the BVI court and the Swiss court for guidance or direction as to what they should do in relation to the litigation between the husband and the wife, and Moor J had said that was something that was very familiar to the court in such cases.

98.  Moor J further said he was not making any comment whatsoever on the effect that joinder might have in either the BVI or Switzerland and he had said it seemed to him that it was irrelevant, but as the wife was applying to make very substantial changes to those trusts, the trustees should be joined so that they could have their say, if they wish to do so, on those very serious applications[29].  Moor J held there was an existing matter in dispute in that case which required for its resolution the joinder of the trustees. 

99.  Moor J clearly disagreed with the conclusions of Mostyn J in DR v GR.  He had said :

“I have to say that it is not my experience that the court regularly deals with such matters without joining the trustees. Indeed, my experience is to the contrary, namely that the trustees are joined when there is an application to vary the trusts of which they are the trustees. In A and Aand St George’s Trustees, a decision of Mr Justice Munby … he made it very clear in argument, if not in his published judgment, that trustees had to be joined for orders to be binding upon them. I consider it a tenet of article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights that requires a fair trial that trustees should be joined before a court varies the trusts of which they are trustees. It is hard to see how a court can make such an order without them being parties to that litigation, let alone to say that such a variation is binding on them in such circumstances[30].” (emphasis added)

100.  Thus, one of Moor J’s reasons for joinder of the trustees was for the orders to be binding upon them.  There does not appear to be a similar provision in the FPR 2010 as our Order 15 rule 13A of RHC. Although in the English Civil Procedure Rules, there is rule 19.8A which is in fact broader than our Order 15 rule 13A, that rule has not found its way into the FPR 2010.   

101.  It is noted that both TM v AH and DR v GR are variation of settlement cases and at present there seems to be different views in England on joinder of trustees in such cases.  I was informed by Mr Todd that TM v AH was the most recent case on joinder of trustees in a variation of settlement case in England.  No recent cases on joinder of a disponee in an avoidance of disposition case had been produced to this Court by counsel.  I had mentioned the case Goldstone v Goldstone [2011] EWCA Civ 39 during the hearing, in which joinder of a foreign transferee in s37 proceedings was upheld by Court of Appeal although the main issue in that case was what should be the applicable rules for the joinder.    

102.  The transferee in the Goldstone case was not a trust or trustee.  However, it was accepted by both sides therein that the court could only order the transfer of assets in name of the transferee if satisfied that in reality they were owned by the husband in that case[31].  The Court of Appeal decision would be an indication of the approach of the court towards joinder in s37 proceedings in England[32].

103.  To join or not to join a non-party served with the notice of an application for variation of settlement/avoidance of disposition will depend on the circumstances of each case.  I now turn to the present case.

Whether the Trustee should be joined in the present case  

W’s reasons for joinder of the Trustee

104.  Mr Todd submitted in his Skeleton Submissions that “Plainly the trusts(sic) and H’s father are properly to be joined to this ancillary relief” and he then referred the Court to TM v AH.  In reply to submissions made by Mr Ho for the Trustee during the hearing, Mr Todd submitted on behalf of W that she was seeking orders against the Trustees in order to get back H’s money and that it must be plainly just and convenient to join the Trustee in order to get back H’s money.

The Trustee’s grounds for opposition

105.  PBB’s objection in relation to his joinder as the Trustee of the Family Trust can be summarized as follows:

(i)  He has obtained an order that the Nevada Court (as defined below) assumes exclusive jurisdiction over the Family Trust as a proceeding in rem, including exclusive jurisdiction over all of the Family Trust’s administration and internal affairs[33];

(ii)  He has obtained an opinion from an expert in the law of Nevada, Mr Layne T Rushforth (“Mr Rushforth”), an attorney admitted into the practice of law in the State of Utah and in the State of Nevada in USA[34], that the Nevada Court should not recognize any judgment, order or decree from the Hong Kong Court in the present proceedings concerning the Family Trust and its administration[35].

106.  There were no submissions made on behalf of PBB in his capacity as Trustee of the Education Trust, but Mr Ho submitted that although no order from the Nevada Court had been obtained by PBB over the Education Trust, there was nothing to prevent PBB from making a similar application and to obtain a similar order from the Nevada Court.

H’s position on joinder of the Trustee

107.  Mr Egerton informed this Court that he had nothing further to say on behalf of H or to assist, other than his “Note”.  There was nothing in the Note to indicate whether H himself was opposing the joinder of the Trustee or not, save that the application to join K should be dismissed as K was not the appropriate person to be joined.

Whether the Trustee should be joined

108.  PBB had made it clear that he did not wish to be a party in the present proceedings in any form[36] and had not submitted to the jurisdiction of the Hong Kong Court.

109.  PBB had produced in his affirmation a copy of the order made on 5 July 2019 by the District Court of Clark County in Nevada[37] (“Nevada Court”) and a copy of the opinion of Mr Rushforth mentioned earlier.

110.  In essence, the Nevada Court ordered that:

(1)  The Nevada Court takes in rem jurisdiction over the Family Trust to the exclusion of all other courts and tribunals, including exclusive jurisdiction over all of the Family Trust’s administration and internal affairs;

(2)  Mr Barnett is confirmed as the Trustee of the Family Trust;

(3)  Any requests for information and discovery in the Hong Kong Divorce Proceedings concerning the Family Trust, including, but not limited to, its administration, accountings, inventories, and investments, shall be made in the proceedings before the Nevada Court and are subject to the Nevada Court’s exclusive jurisdiction;

(4)  Any requests for court instructions, injunctive, declaratory, or any other legal or equitable relief concerning the Family Trust shall be made in the proceedings before the Nevada Court and are subject to the Nevada Court’s exclusive jurisdiction.

111.  As explained by Mr Rushforth, the Family Trust is a valid Nevada self-settled spendthrift trust settled by H in accordance with the Spendthrift Trust Act of Nevada and that the Family Trust has been administered and domiciled in the State of Nevada from its inception.

112.  W had initially responded in the Nevada proceedings with a “Motion to Dismiss” which was only on the ground that she was not properly served.  The Nevada Court later determined that she and the Children were properly served and although W was given further time to file a substantive response, she did not do so, and she did not submit to the jurisdiction of the Nevada Court.

113.  In so far as this Court can see, W has never challenged that the Family Trust is a spendthrift trust duly set up in accordance with the laws of Nevada, nor has she ever challenged that the Nevada Court has the exclusive in rem jurisdiction over the administration and internal affairs of the Family Trust, nor has she ever challenged that PBB was duly appointed as the Trustee of the Family Trust.  It is thus not clear why the Trustee felt it necessary to seek those orders from the Nevada Court.

114.  Having said this, I accept W’s case in her 13th affidavit and her 1st affirmation was rather confusing as to her reasons for joinder.  The Summons was stated to be under Order 15 rule 4, but as set out earlier, this rule is not applicable since there had not been any separate action brought by or against the Trustee at the time of issue. 

115.  The Summons was supported by W’s 13th affirmation filed in the Family Court action prior to the proceedings being transferred to the High Court.  However, W’s 13th affirmation seemed to have been made in support of the Injunction Application and the Discovery Application[38].  There was no indication as to whether she was seeking a joinder of the Trustee for the s17 Application or the s6(1)(c) Application.  In fact, it was only in W’s 4th affirmation filed on 3 September 2019, ie 3 weeks prior to the present hearing and 10 months after the Summons, that she set out clearly her evidence and reasons in relation to the Joinder Application.   

116.  Further, it was only in W’s 4th affirmation that she made clear that the primary relief sought in the Notice by her is the s17 Application and that if such an order is granted, she does not intend to seek substantive reliefs for the s6(1)(c) Application[39].  Thus, it would seem that the joinder of the Trustee was being sought by W in respect of the s 17 Application.

117.  It was however not made clear from W’s 4th affirmation whether she was proposing that the Trustee be joined under rule 6(2)(b)(i) or (ii) of Order 15.   She had said that in the event of the disposition of Intero and Bremen being set aside, the companies would need to be returned to H for the parties to share and that it was necessary for her to join the two trusts as the recipients, so that they would be bound by the outcome of her s17 Application[40].  

118.  During the hearing, Mr Todd further submitted that once the Trustee is joined then he can elect how he is going to deal with the matter and/or whether to participate, and that W hopes that the Trustee will take the sensible view which is he will accept the order made by this court eventually but if not, then W will have to proceed in Nevada by way of a common law action.  Mr Todd has further referred to Order 15 rule 6(2)(b)(ii) and submitted that the Trustee has been involved in a transaction which is going to be subject to this Court’s investigation and that it is just and convenient to have the Trustee joined to deal with that particular issue.  The issue between W and the Trustee is whether the assets of the US Trusts are subject to the discretionary disposition of the Trustee.

119.  To summarise, the issue is whether it is necessary, or just and convenient to join the Trustee, to allow the Trustee an opportunity to participate in the Court’s investigation of the transactions, to assist the Court’s investigation into the issue whether the assets of the US Trusts remain family assets and/or H’s assets available for W to share and to assist in carrying out any order/s this Court may make in recovering those assets transferred to the US Trusts.  Thus, it is also to facilitate her enforcement of any orders made by this Court.

120.  As seen from the parties’ Form Es, the assets transferred to the US Trusts formed a substantial part of the H’s assets or the family assets.

121.  As mentioned earlier and as seen in the respective “Summary” of the US Trusts prepared by W[41], the primary asset of the Family Trust is now the Promissory Note and the primary asset of the Education Trust is now the shareholding in Bremen. The underlying assets of Bremen are 3 pieces of land in USVI and the shareholding of Intero, which holds various investments and accounts, including, amongst other things, H’s investments in the holding/related companies of the investment management company for which he works as a “Partner”, a Standard Chartered Private Bank account and a Deutsche Bank portfolio account. 

122.  If the s17 Application were allowed, consequential orders may include an order that the Trustee to effect the transfer of the shares in Intero and Bremen back to H, and joining the Trustee will allow this Court to make an order directly against the Trustee.  It may be possible for W to rely on Order 45 rule 8 of RHC if the Trustee fails to comply with such an order, to seek an order that the signing of the necessary documents to effect the transfer by some other person appointed by the Court.  Whether such an order will be recognised will in fact depend on the BVI law as Bremen and Intero are BVI companies.

123.  The consequential orders may also include a declaration that the transfers of the shareholding of Intero and Bremen to the Trustee were invalid and of no effect and H to remain the sole shareholder of Intero and of Bremen.  Again whether such a declaration will be recognised will depend on the BVI law.  Further as part of the W’s claim for ancillary relief, there may be a “money judgment” made against H out of the trust assets and a “money judgment”, according to Mr Rushforth, may be recognised by the Nevada Court[42]. It seems that it may also be enforceable under common law[43]. 

124.  Notwithstanding Mostyn J’s views on what Wilson J had held in T v T, as pointed out by Wilson J, Order 15 rule 6(2)(b)(ii) is less stringent than Order 15 rule 6(2)(b)(i).  I share the views of Wilson J that enforcement of any orders that this Court may make is likely to be facilitated by the Trustee being joined as a party to the proceedings, and that the Trustee having been made a party would be likely to assist W in, if not direct enforcement, the obtaining of an analogous or supplementary judgment in either BVI or Nevada and may assist her in putting before those courts as facts which have been found by this Court at the ancillary relief trial in which the Trustee is a party, whether the Trustee will actively participate or not[44]. I am also of the view that there exists between the Trustee and W an issue as to whether the assets of the US Trusts are subject to the discretionary disposition of the Trustee or family assets or assets in reality owned by H, which issue is connected with W’s claim for ancillary relief.

125.  Having considered the above, I am satisfied that W has brought herself within both limbs of Order 15 rule 6(2)(b) and that it would be necessary and also just and convenient for PBB to be joined both in his capacity as Trustee of the Family Trust and also as Trustee of the Education Trust.  

126.  The effect of an order setting aside the transfers of the shares via Intero and Bremen to the US Trusts may mean that the assets of the US Trusts may be diminished or distinguished. Without the primary assets, this means that the US Trusts may have to be dissolved.  The Children are “Beneficiaries” of the Family Trust and of the Education Trust. As mentioned earlier, directions should have been sought as to whether the Children ought to be separately represented in the s17 Application and/or the s6(1)(c) Application and whether they ought to be served with the Notice and be separately represented.  Further, there is also the question of whether Intero or Bremen should be served with the Notice notwithstanding W has issued a “Stop Notice” in respect of the shares of Intero and/or Bremen in the Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court in BVI (“BVI Proceedings”).

127.  I am of the view that W should seek directions on the above as soon as practicable. 

Whether K should be joined

128.  What was submitted in Mr Todd’s Skeleton Arguments for reasons for joinder were the same for the Trustee and H’s father K.

129.  Mr Egerton’s “Note” and “Supplemental Note” stated that they were lodged on behalf of H only, although this Court was informed at the commencement of the hearing that Mr Egerton in fact appeared for both H and his father K. 

130.  Anyway, Mr Egerton had referred to K’s position as set out in K’s affidavit, namely K opposed being joined as a party and that the trustee of the Indian Trust (“Indian Trustee”) had made an application to the Indian Court for a declaratory order in respect of the jurisdiction.  Mr Egerton had also submitted there was no basis for joining of K, who was not the trustee of the Indian Trust[45] and that the appropriate person to be joined should be the Indian Trustee, as pointed out in a letter dated 30 November 2018 from H’s solicitors to W’s solicitors[46].

131.  However, the disponee of the s17 Application relating to the Indian Property was K, and not the Indian Trustee, since it was K to whom H transferred or caused to be transferred the Indian Apartment. 

132.  W’s allegation was that H was the one who had paid for the purchase of the Indian Apartment out of family funds and that H had been paying the mortgage of the Indian Apartment.  The justification given by H for such payments is that he has a liability to maintain his parents under the Indian Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act.

133.  It is also H’s and K’s case that the Indian Apartment was a co-investment by H and K, and that it is K’s case that he has contributed something in the order of HK$880,000 towards the finishing of the interiors of the Indian Apartment. 

134.  There is clearly a matter of dispute as to whether H was in fact the sole beneficial owner of the Indian Apartment or it was a co-investment between H and K and that K also had beneficial interest therein before the transfer to the Indian Trustee, and in my view K’s presence before the Court is necessary to ensure that all matters in dispute in relation to whether K had any beneficial interest in the Indian Apartment may be effectually and completely determined and adjudicated upon.  There is clearly also a question or issue arising out of W’s claims which in my view it would be just and convenient to determine as between W and K as to whether the entirety of the Indian Apartment would be available for sharing by W in her application for ancillary relief against H.  Even though K is now about 86 years old, he is able to make an affirmation in these proceedings which indicates he is capable of understanding what the allegations are against him.

135.  Having considered the above, I am of the view under both limbs of Order 15 rule 6(2)(b), H’s father K should be joined.

Conclusion

136.  In light of above, I order that the following persons be joined in these proceedings for the purpose of W’s Notice, with H re-named as 1st Respondent:

(i)  PBB in his capacity as the Trustee of the Family Trust as the 2nd Respondent herein;

(ii)  PBB in his capacity as the Trustee of the Education Trust as the 3rd Respondent herein;

(iii)  H’s father, K, as the 4th Respondent herein.

137.  Paragraph 6 of the Order of 24 September 2019 shall be varied.  The parties are to fix a directions hearing before this court on the first available date (estimated length of hearing: 60 minutes) for directions as to the filing of evidence by the 2nd to 4th Respondents in response to the Notice and directions as to whether there should be service of the Notice on the Children and/or whether the Children should be separately represented), and also whether there should be service of the Notice on the two BVI companies.  There is a 2nd notice of application issued by W on 22 February 2019 under s17 of MPPO and directions for service on non-parties of this 2nd notice should be sought at the directions hearing. 

138.  As for costs of the Joinder Application, this should be costs in the cause of the respective s17 Application against each of the new respondents.

139.  I will hand down my decision on the Injunction Application and the Discovery Application separately.

 (Bebe Pui Ying Chu)
 Judge of the Court of First Instance
 High Court

Mr Richard Todd, instructed by Stevenson Wong & Co, for the petitioner

Mr Robin Egerton, instructed by Oldham Li & Nie, for the respondent and intended 4th respondent

Mr Leon Ho instructed by Robertsons for the intended 2nd respondent

The intended 3rd respondent, absent



[1]  S1:169 (Intero) and S1:208 (Bremen)

[2]  S2:345

[3]  See W’s Chronology at S4:1020

[4]  See para 12, S1:59

[5]  S4:1020

[6]  S1:211

[7]  S1:212-213

[8]  S4:1022

[9]  S2:394-471, S2

[10]  S4:1022

[11]  S1:7.1-7.6

[12]  S2:485

[13]  S1:76

[14]  See paras 8-9, S1:66

[15]  S1:7.8

[16]  S2:335-343

[17]  S1:8-10

[18]  S1:7.1-7.8

[19]  At pg 278

[20]  At para 22

[21]  Para 15/6/1, pg 364

[22]  Para 15/6/1, pg 365

[23]  Para 15/6/1, pg 365

[24]  Para 15/6/6, pg 369

[25]  At pg 279

[26]  At E, pg 365

[27]  At H, pg 365

[28]  At B-D, pg 366

[29]  At para 11

[30]  At para 10

[31]  At paragraph 30(a)

[32]  See paragraphs 69 and 70

[33]  S2:533, at para 33

[34]  S3:534-784

[35]  S3: 541-543

[36]  Para 27, S2:482

[37]  S2:530-533

[38]  See para 2, S1: 15, and para 32, S1:24

[39]  See para 19, S1:78

[40]  See para 22, S1:79

[41]  S4:1021-1022

[42]  At para 10 S3:540

[43]  There have in fact also been developments as to whether enforcement under common law in a foreign jurisdiction is confined to a “money judgment”. See the Canadian Supreme Court decision in Pro Swing Inc v Elta Golf Inc [2006] 2 SCR 612, [2007] 3 LRC 338

[44]  A-C, at pg 366

[45]  See para 25, pg 6 of the “Note”

[46]  S2:332-334