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Miscellaneous Proceedings2019

LEUNG YUET KEUNG v. HARBOUR FRONT LTD AND ANOTHER

Related cases with same parties

  • HCA241/2016LEUNG YUET KEUNG v. HARBOUR FRONT LTD

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[2025] HKCFI 1009-EN-2025-03-12

LEUNG YUET KEUNG v. HARBOUR FRONT LTD AND ANOTHER

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HCMP 1471/2019

[2025] HKCFI 1009

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS NO 1471 OF 2019

________________

  IN THE MATTER OF ss.722 to 726 of the Companies Ordinance, Cap. 622 of the Laws of Hong Kong
 

and

  IN THE MATTER OF Money Facts Limited

________________

BETWEEN

 LEUNG YUET KEUNGPetitioner

and

 HARBOUR FRONT LIMITED1st Respondent
 MONEY FACTS LIMITED2nd Respondent

________________

Before:Hon Harris J in Chambers
Date of Hearing:23 January 2025
Date of Decision:12 March 2025

_________________

D E C I S I O N

_________________


Introduction

1.  On 11 June 2024 I handed down my judgment on liability after trial in these proceedings and ordered Harbour Front to buy the Petitioner’s (“YK”) 3,950 shares in Money Facts.

2.  On 23 January 2025 I heard an application to determine the following matters:

(1) Minority discount.

(2) Additional expert evidence on valuation.

(3) The valuation date.

(4) Interest.

3.  As matters transpired it was agreed that no discount should be made for a minority discount as the shareholdings are equal. It is not necessary for me to repeat the background to this matter, which is explained in my judgment dated 11 June 2024.

Expert evidence

4.  The Petition was issued on 16 September 2019. Ms Lok argued that as the sole asset of the Company was its indirect interest in the Land[1], which is owned by its subsidiary Money Facts and an offer of HK$888,000,000 has been made by a prospective purchaser for the Land in May 2019 there was no need for a valuation of the shares as the offer price provided a reliable basis for determining the value of the shares, subject to the Court accepting the valuation date. Ms Lok argued, I accept with some justification, that given the history of this matter it is undesirable for directions to be made for the determination of the value involving expert evidence from both parties as this would lead to unnecessary delay and expense. However, having considered the countervailing arguments it seems to me that this is too robust an approach and I will make the directions I explain later. The more complicated issue is the valuation date.

Valuation Date

5.  YK submits that the valuation date should be the date of the offer to which I have referred, alternatively the date of issue of the Petition. Harbour Front submits that it should be the date of the order, alternatively, the date of filing of the Points of Defence in the 2015 proceedings (i.e. HCCW 111 of 2015), namely, 11 November 2015. The commercial reason for the different positions is that the property market has declined since the Autumn of 2019.

6.  It is well established that the choice of the date of valuation is a matter of court’s discretion. In Re Sparkle Consultants (Hong Kong) Ltd[2], Rogers VP said at [33]:

“33. Clearly the choice of an appropriate valuation date is a matter of discretion which has to be exercised in the light of the circumstances of the case and also the other aspects of the order. This would include the basis upon which the valuation should be made…”

7.  The court has a wide discretion to choose a date which is the most appropriate and just in all the circumstances. The authorities in this area have not laid down any rigid rules. Rather, they illustrate how the courts respond flexibly to the particular factors in play and apply different techniques to produce a response which is fair and equitable on the facts of the case before it: Re Dinglis Properties Ltd[3] at [52]; Re AbbingtonHotel Ltd[4] at [123]. As one would expect the principal consideration is that the date of valuation should be one which best remedies the unfair prejudice held to have occurred: Re Dinglis[5] at [85], citing Re Abbington[6] at [123].

8.  Generally, the starting point is that prima facie, an interest in a going concern ought to be valued at the date on which it is ordered to be purchased to reflect the value of what the shareholder is selling. However, this is subject to the overriding requirement that the date achieves fairness: Re New Century Iatrical Inv Management Ltd[7] at [32]; Profinance Trust SA v Gladstone[8] at [33], [60].

9.  As recognised by the English Court of Appeal in Profinance, there are many cases in which fairness requires the court to exercise its discretion to adopt another date. One example would be where a minority shareholder has a petition on foot and there is a general decline in the market, the court may in fairness to the claimant have the shares valued at an early date, especially if it strongly disapproves of the majority shareholders’ prejudicial conduct[9].

10.  This was the case in Re Cumana Ltd[10]. Vinelott J chose the date of the petition as the date of valuation to protect the petitioner against a general fall in the value of shares on the market and to mark the court’s disapproval of the majority shareholder’s “devious and unscrupulous” attempts to “deprive the minority shareholder of the benefit of his shareholding”[11]. On appeal, Lawton LJ considered Vinelott J’s reason for adopting the date of petition as the valuation date was a sound one:

“The date of petition is the date on which the petitioner elects to treat the unfair conduct of the majority as in effect destroying the basis on which he agreed to continue to be a shareholder, and to look to his shares for his proper reward for participation in a joint undertaking.” [12]

See also Re Tai Lap Investment Co Ltd[13] and Re Hing Ming Gondola (HK) Co Ltd (No. 2)[14].

11.  It is clear from my judgments in the present petition, the previous unfair prejudice petition I heard and the judgment of Kwan J (as she then was) in the first of the proceedings in this sorry saga of sibling discord, that the court has found Harbour Front (largely through the agency of YK’s Brother) repeatedly to have behaved improperly and to have ignored the court’s admonitions about its conduct. It seems to me that fairness clearly points in the present case to the valuation date being the date the petition was issued. It seems to me perfectly reasonably for YK’s patience with Harbour Front’s persistent attempts to interfere with the management of Harbour Front and Money Facts, in particular, how the Land at Yau Tong should be dealt with, to have ran-out in mid-2019 and for YK to have decided to issue the petition. There is nothing unfair with this result, in my view quite the opposite. If consequently Harbour Front have to pay more for the indirect interest in the land than it is currently worth that is not unfair; it is the result of the management of Harbour Front’s belligerence and generally unreasonable behaviour. Harbour Front’s argument that it was always open to YK to exit the company earlier using the shootout provision in the Shareholders’ Agreement seems to me irrelevant in assessing the valuation date and certainly cannot justify treating as self-induced any loss that might result from a change of value in the Land between the dates of presentation and determination of the Petition. The judgment determined that YK was unfairly prejudiced by events that had occurred by the time the Petition was issued, and he was entitled to a buy-out order. Harbour Front’s submission tacitly suggests that he was at fault for not giving into Harbour Front’s disruption of the management of Money Facts earlier. Harbour Front’s submission that the fact that he had de iure control of Money Facts is relevant to the determination of the valuation date is similarly misconceived. The complaint was not that YK was excluded from management it was that Harbour Front had interfered with his ability to manage Money Facts to an extent that was unfair and prejudicial.

12.  What seems to me clear is that it would be manifestly unfair for YK to be prejudiced because of any diminution in the value of the assets of Money Facts during the period following presentation of his Petition.

Interest

13.  Harbour Front agreed to the payment of interest at 1% above Hong Kong Interbank Offered Rate (HIBOR) or 1% above prime rate per annum from 23 January 2025 until the date of determination of the price by experts. This was on the basis that the valuation date would be the date of the order for a buyout not the date of the judgment. Even if I had agreed with Harbour Front that the date should be the date a buyout was ordered, I would have proceeded on the basis that it should be the date of the judgment (11 June 2024) not the date of the order containing directions for valuation, which is what Harbour Front has contended.

14.  Harbour Front opposes an order that interest is payable from either of the dates proposed by YK. Mr Smith cited various authorities, which consider the principles by reference to which the Court determines whether to order interest. In a case such as the present in which the petitioner has not been kept out of management and deprived of a salary or director’s fees what is relevant is whether awarding interest for the period sought is justified because the petitioner has not had the use of the value of the shares (i.e. the purchase price).

15.  Ms Lok referred me to the decision of Le Pichon J In Re Tai Lap Investment[15] in which the Judge discusses interest and says this:

“Counsel for the respondents’ submitted that the court has no power to make any order for payment of interest prior to the order for the buy-out. He relied on a dictum of Peter Gibson J in Re DR Chemicals Ltd (1989) 5 BCC 39. But that was a case where the appropriate valuation date was considered to be the date of the order rather than the date of the petition. As explained by the trial Judge in Dynasty Party Ltd & Others v Coombs (1996) 138 ALR 64 cited in the judgment of the Full Court at p.85:

‘To arrive at a fair value to be paid now by valuing the shareholding at some date in the past and by adding to that value an allowance for the fact that the shareholder has been kept out of the enjoyment of that value in the meantime, to borrow the words of Lord Denning, is to give to the oppressed shareholder what is in effect money compensation for the injury done to [the shareholder]: but I see no objection to this. The section gives a large discretion to the court and it is well exercised in making an oppressor make compensation to those who have suffered at his hands.’

The Full Court upheld that approach since the trial judge did not award interest qua interest: rather he used interest as a proxy to measure the increment in the value of the petitioner’s investment in the company appropriate to reflect the fact that the respondent’s interests had the use of the petitioner’s investment since the date of the petition, that being the valuation date.

I agree. As explained by Thomas J in the passage in Rankine v Rankine (1995) 18 ACSR 725, an interest factor should be allowed as the value of the petitioner’s shareholding to arrive at a fair price at which his shares should now be purchased. Accordingly, the petitioner is entitled to interest on the amount to be paid by the respondents at 10 per cent per annum as from the date of the petition.”

16.  What this is describing is a theory of loss, which informs an assessment of the financial consequences of the unfair prejudice for which the petitioner is to be compensated (the “money compensation for the injury done to [the shareholder]” referred to in the quoted passage borrowing the words of Lord Denning). It is not a valuation to arrive at a market price. The distinction is important. The distinction is implicitly recognised in passages from the judgment of Walker LJ (as he then was), on which Mr Smith placed reliance, in Profinance Trust SA v Gladstone[16]:

“31. In our judgment the deputy judge was right in his view that an order for the equivalent of interest is not beyond the powers of the court under s 461(1). The court has repeatedly emphasised the width of the discretion conferred by that subsection, which is not limited to the particular powers enumerated in subs (2). The House of Lords has (in relation to the court’s closely comparable powers under s 210 of the Companies Act 1948) approved the making of adjustments in the valuation process which mean that the court is actually valuing shares, not as they are, but as they would have been if events had followed a different course; and that practice is regularly followed by the court in orders under s 461(1). In these circumstances a denial of the court’s power to award the equivalent of interest would come close to straining at a gnat.

32. It is however a power which should be exercised with great caution. Miss Newman has rightly drawn attention to the need for lawyers to be able to advise their clients as to the likely range of outcomes of s 459 proceedings, in order to encourage compromise in an area in which litigation can be cripplingly expensive. If a petitioner seeking an order for the purchase of his shares contends (either as his only claim or in the alternative) that they should be valued at a relatively early date but then augmented by the equivalent of interest, he must put forward that claim clearly and persuade the court by evidence that it is the only way, or the best way, to a fair result…”

17.  The distinction becomes clearer with an example. If we assume that the value of Money Facts had not changed at all between May 2019 and January 2025 (the preferred valuation dates of YK and Harbour Front respectively) the valuation of the shares to be transferred to Harbour Front by YK would be the same regardless of which valuation date was chosen. The only significance of the date would be whether it justified ordering interest from a date earlier than January 2025 with, if it were so ordered, YK receiving greater compensation. YK is not claiming interest on the basis that he had a right to dispose of his shares at a fair market value in May 2019, and that interest is to compensate him for being held out of that sum. Thus, ordering interest cannot be justified on that ground. To justify an award of interest it is necessary for YK to demonstrate that he suffered some other or additional financial loss as a consequence of Harbour Front’s unfairly prejudicial conduct. As Walker LJ stresses the justification cannot be an afterthought; in the present context something like: but for the unfair prejudice Fonfair would have sold the land, the proceeds of sale would have been distributed, and I would have invested my share in an interest bearing bank account.

18.  In Tai Lap, Le Pichon J took the view that interest should be allowed as part of the valuation of the petitioner’s shareholding to arrive at a fair price. However, if I have understood the judgment correctly, what was ordered was a valuation of the shares as at the date of presentation of the petition and for interest to be payable from that date on the value of the shares determined by the valuation that the Judge directed. Le Pichon J saw this as being part of a “a fair price at which” the shares were to be purchased at the time of the transfer, which was years after the valuation date. There is, however, no explanation of why this was fair. Le Pichon J seems to have assumed that by choosing an earlier valuation date, she was making a finding that the petitioner was entitled to be paid at that date and as he was not, it was fair to order interest. That seems to me to ignore the distinction I have explained earlier and to conflate price and loss.

19.  In the present circumstances I am not satisfied that YK has demonstrated that he has suffered in a relevant way loss caused by Harbour Front’s unfairly prejudicial conduct that justifies ordering interest from the date of the valuation as opposed to the date of the judgment; which it seems to me to be the appropriate alternative, rather than the date of the hearing for directions.

Directions

20.  I will make the directions contained in the appendix to this decision. So far as costs are concerned, given the outcome I consider the appropriate order that there be no order as to costs, and I will make a costs order nisi to that effect.

 (Jonathan Harris)
 Judge of the Court of First Instance
 High Court

Ms Frances Lok SC and Mr Kwan Ping Kan, instructed by Ho & Ip, for the Petitioner

Mr Clifford Smith SC, Ms Sabrina Ho and Mr Arthur Poon, instructed by Yiu & Associates, Solicitors, for the 1st Respondent


Appendix


Directions

1. The 1st Respondent shall purchase the Petitioner's shares in the 2nd Respondent (“Shares” and “Company”) in a sum to be determined in accordance with the directions herein (“Valuation”).

2. The Shares shall be valued as at 16 September 2019 (“Valuation Date”).

3. The Valuation shall be determined by a single valuer appointed by the Court (“Valuer”).

4. Within 28 days of the date of this Order the Petitioner and 1st Respondent shall either inform the Court in writing of the Valuer that they have agreed or in the absence of agreement the Petitioner and the 1st Respondent shall write to the Court with the name and details of their preferred Valuer and the Court will choose the Valuer.

5. With the letter to the Court notifying the Court of the agreed Valuer or each Party’s preferred Valuer, the Party shall include an appendix listing the documents that each Party believes should be provided to the Valuer and any matter that the Party considers relevant to the Valuation. The appendices shall be copied to the other Party.

6. The Court will send a copy of the Order appointing the Valuer to the Valuer and the Petitioner and the 1st Respondent (“Appointment Order”) and the appendices referred to in the previous paragraph herein.

7. The Valuer shall write to the Petitioner and the 1st Respondent within 10 days of the date of the Appointment Order requesting the documents and any information that the Valuer requires in order to carry out the Valuation. The Valuer may ask for additional documents or information. A Party is not to communicate with the Valuer other than in response to a request from the Valuer to the Party or with the leave of the Court.

8. The Valuation shall be determined on such basis as the Valuer in his opinion considers appropriate and without a discount for minority interest.

9. The Valuer shall send to the Court a succinct report stating his Valuation of the Shares and the reasons for arriving at the Valuation (“Valuation Report”) within 56 days of the date of the Appointment Order or such other date as the Court directs. The Valuation Report shall be copied to the Parties.

10. The Court will following receipt of the Valuation Report make an order for the payment of the Valuation and the transfer of the Shares and/or such other directions as it considers appropriate.

11. The fees of the Valuer are to be paid in the first instance equally by the Petitioner and the 1st Respondent. The ultimate liability for payment of the Valuer’s fees shall be determined after the Valuation process has been completed.

12. There be a costs order nisi that there be no order as to the costs of the summons filed on 3 July 2024 and the hearing on 27 August 2024 and 23 January 2025.

13. There be general liberty to apply.



[1]   See [2] of the judgment of 11 June 2024.

[2]   [2002] 3 HKLRD 62.

[3]   [2019] EWHC 3327.

[4]   [2011] EWHC 635 (Ch).

[5]   Supra.

[6]   Supra.

[7]   [2020] 3 HKLRD 464.

[8]   [2002] 1 BCLC 141.

[9]   Supra at [61(iii)].

[10]   Re a Company (No. 002612 of 1984) (1986) 2 BCC 99,453 at Chancery Division (Companies Court). Reported as Re Cumana Ltd [1986] BCLC 430 on appeal.

[11]   (1986) 2 BCC 99,453 at 99,495.

[12]   [1986] BCLC 430 at 436a-b.

[13]   [1999] 1 HKLRD 384 (at CFI) at 399A-G; [1999] 3 HKC 660 (at CA) at 664B-C.

[14]   [2010] 1 HKLRD B1 at [16].

[15]   Supra.

[16]   [2001] EWCA Civ 1031.

[2024] HKCFI 1965-EN-2024-07-22

LEUNG YUET KEUNG v. HARBOUR FRONT LTD AND ANOTHER

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HCMP 1471/2019

[2024] HKCFI 1965

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS NO 1471 OF 2019

________________

 IN THE MATTER OF ss.722 to 726 of the Companies Ordinance, Cap. 622 of the Laws of Hong Kong
 and
 IN THE MATTER OF Money Facts Limited

________________

BETWEEN

 LEUNG YUET KEUNGPetitioner
 and 
 HARBOUR FRONT LIMITED1st Respondent
 MONEY FACTS LTD2nd Respondent

________________

Before: Hon Harris J in Chambers
Date of Hearing: 22 July 2024
Date of Decision: 22 July 2024

_________________

D E C I S I O N

_________________

1.  I have before me a summons dated 15 July 2024 by which the 1st Respondent seeks an order that there be a stay of execution of my judgment handed down on 11 June 2024 pending the outcome of an appeal from the judgment.

2.  The principles by reference to which the court determines an application for a stay of execution pending an appeal are not controversial. They had most recently been set out in [22] of Cheung JA’s judgment in Capital Century Textile Company Limited v Li Dianxiao[1].

3.  I am not satisfied that the 1st Respondent has demonstrated there are strong grounds of appeal in the present case. Neither am I satisfied that the appeal will be rendered nugatory unless a stay is granted. The judgment determined liability in this shareholders dispute. I think given the history of this matter, it is desirable and sensible that the process leading to the valuation of the shares to be purchased by the 1st Respondent proceeds.

4.  I would not anticipate that completion of the purchase take place until after any appeal is determined. In those circumstances I do not think it is correct to categorise the present position as one in which unless a stay is granted, the purpose of the appeal is fundamentally undermined.

5.  I will, therefore, dismiss the application. I assess on a summary basis the Petitioner’s costs at HK$65,000.

  (Jonathan Harris)
Judge of the Court of First Instance
High Court

Mr Kwan Ping Kan, instructed by Ho & Ip, for the Petitioner

Mr Clifford Smith SC and Mr Arthur Poon, instructed by Yiu & Associates, Solicitors, for the 1st Respondent



[1]  [2024] HKCA 651.

[2024] HKCFI 1599-EN-2024-06-11

LEUNG YUET KEUNG v. HARBOUR FRONT LTD AND ANOTHER

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HCMP 1987/2018, HCMP 1988/2018 and HCMP 1471/2019
(HEARD TOGETHER)

[2024] HKCFI 1599

HCMP 1987/2018

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS NO 1987 OF 2018

____________________

 

IN THE MATTER OF Fonfair Company Limited

 

and

 

IN THE MATTER OF Sections 724 and 725 of the Companies Ordinance (Cap 622)

____________________

BETWEEN

 HARBOUR FRONT LIMITEDPetitioner

and

 MONEY FACTS LIMITED1st Respondent
 LEUNG YUET WAH, LEUNG YUET KEUNG2nd Respondent
 and LEUNG YUET HOI 
 LEUNG YUET KEUNG3rd Respondent
 MARCON INVESTMENT LIMITED4th Respondent
 FONFAIR COMPANY LIMITED5th Respondent

____________________

AND

HCMP 1988/2018

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS NO 1988 OF 2018

____________________

 

IN THE MATTER OF Money Facts Limited

 

and

 

IN THE MATTER OF Sections 724 and 725 of the Companies Ordinance (Cap 622)

____________________

BETWEEN

 HARBOUR FRONT LIMITEDPetitioner

and

 LEUNG YUET KEUNG1st Respondent
 MONEY FACTS LIMITED2nd Respondent

____________________

AND

HCMP 1471/2019

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS NO 1471 OF 2019

____________________

 

IN THE MATTER OF ss.722 to 726 of the Companies Ordinance, Cap. 622 of the Laws of Hong Kong

 

and

 

IN THE MATTER OF Money Facts Limited

____________________

BETWEEN

 LEUNG YUET KEUNGPetitioner

and

 HARBOUR FRONT LIMITED1st Respondent
 MONEY FACTS LIMITED2nd Respondent

____________________

(HEARD TOGETHER)

Before:Hon Harris J in Court
Dates of Hearing:4, 6, 11 December 2023
Date of Judgment:11 June 2024

________________

J U D G M E N T

________________

Introduction

1.  I have before me the third series of Petitions issued by Harbour Front Limited (“Harbour Front”), a company controlled by Leung Yat Tung (“YT”) against his elder brother, Leung Yuet Keung (“YK”), in respect of Fonfair Limited (“Fonfair”) and Money Facts Limited (“Money Facts”, collectively the “Companies”). There is also a cross-petition issued by YK seeking an order that Harbour Front purchase YK’s shares in Money Facts. There is no dispute that if YK’s is successful, Harbour Front’s Petitions fail.

2.  Fonfair and Money Facts are used by the Brothers to hold land at Yau Tong (“Land”). The disputes between them relate to the sale or development of the Land. The Companies were originally managed by the Brothers and they had made a written shareholders’ agreement, but after differences between them arose YK took steps to remove YT from their Boards. In the two previous series of Petitions YT sought orders that would have resulted in him being able to participate in management of the Companies. The Petitions were dismissed:

(1) After trial by Kwan J (as she then was) in HCCW 880/2001 and HCCW 246/2022 on 2 February 2004.

(2) After trial by me in 2017 in HCCW 111/2015 and 116/2015. I dismissed both Petitions on 4 October 2017 and my reasons were handed down on 15 February 2018.

3.  Given the extensive judgments after trial and the Parties agreement to the facts contained in the Annex to this judgment, I will not repeat here the background to the dispute or its details.

4.  Kwan J had found in the first set of proceedings that Harbour Front was entitled to participate in the management of the Companies, however, Kwan J further found that YT had caused the breakdown of trust between the brothers and that he had been justly excluded from their management. The Petitions heard by me were founded on the assertion that YT had remedied the matters that Kwan J had found justified his exclusion from management and, thus, Harbour Front had become entitled to participate in management as envisaged by the shareholders’ agreement. I found that YT and his Family members, who had become involved in the dispute had not remedied the matters, which Kwan J had found justified Harbour Front’s exclusion from management. I stated the following concerning Harbour Front’s attempts to remedy its previous conduct:

“22. It should by September 2008 have been quite clear to Harbour Front and YT that if Harbour Front was to have any prospect of returning to a role in the management of Fonfair it would have to make good the losses it had caused to Fonfair and that if Harbour Front continued with its belligerent refusal to respect the decisions of the courts it was likely to find itself permanently excluded from a role in Fonfair’s affairs. Certainly one would have expected Harbour Front’s legal advisers, and it has had the same solicitor since the presentation of the Petitions in 2001, to have made the position clear to Harbour Front and YT.

23. Despite this at no time has YT or Harbour Front made an approach in writing to Fonfair or YK with a view to remedying the misconduct found by Kwan J…

36. On 30 March 2015 Harbour Front petitioned to wind up Money Facts and on 2 April 2015 petitioned to wind up Fonfair. The Petitioners advance the same complaints in both Petitions. I accept Ms Lok’s submission that it is a compelling inference given the history of this matter that the Harbour Front’s offers and proposals in March 2015 were not genuine, but were made with a view to interfering in the sale of the Land to Chung Sing as were the presentation of the Petitions.

…

41. As, in my view, is clear from the history of the disputes between YK and Harbour Front, which I do not think it can sensibly be suggested in practice is anything other than YT’s corporate alter ego, YT has made no sensible effort to try and establish what needs to be done to remedy the breaches of the Shareholders Agreement. The opposite is the position. YT and Harbour Front have made no effort to engage meaningfully to agree what is owed despite being given the interim reports. Instead Harbour Front tried to intimidate Lau & Au Yeung in to stopping compiling them. Harbour Front has made no effort to propose an alternative method for agreeing what is owed and moving on. The guiding mind behind Harbour Front, who as I have said I think it is reasonable to assume is YT, is motivated by an animosity towards YK and a lack of objectivity, which seems to render any prospect of Harbour Front doing what is required to remedy its breaches illusory.

42. I find that Harbour Front has fairly been excluded from management. In my view this will remain the case until such time as Harbour front takes genuine and substantial steps to remedy its misconduct. Mr Fung has cited no authority for the proposition that a finding that a shareholder has been fairly excluded from management becomes spent simply by effluxion of time even if the shareholder has made no substantive effort to remedy his wrong as I have found to be the position in the present case. This is entirely unsurprising as the proposition seems to me to be as meritless as it is unattractive. If a shareholder acts in such a way as to destroy the mutual trust which was central to any agreement that he could take part in management, it seems to me clear that until such time as he remedies the misconduct, if it is possible to do so and it might not, he loses the right to argue that his exclusion alone justifies the court making a winding-up order on the just and equitable ground or granting relief for unfair prejudice. The reason is simple: it would not be just and equitable to wind up in these circumstances and the exclusion from management is not unfair.”

5.  I note in passing that other litigation was brought unsuccessfully by Harbour Front following the February 2004 decision in which Kwan J, Recorder Kwok and the Court of Appeal found that Harbour Front had not remedied the matters, which Kwan J found had justified Harbour Front’s exclusion from management and did so in clear and firm terms.

6.  It seems to me quite clear that if YK had brought a cross-petition seeking a buyout order pursuant to sections 724 and 725 of the Companies Ordinance, Cap. 622 (“Ordinance”), certainly if he had done so before me, he would have been successful. Ms Lok argued that the correct analytical framework in which to determine the Petitions was to ask if there had been any change of circumstances since 2017, which adversely affects YK’s right to a buyout order. This is the converse of Harbour Front’s case in its Petitions, which I think can summarised as this: Harbour Front has corrected the wrongs it has been found to have committed in the previous proceedings to which I have referred and is entitled to participate in the management of the Companies as envisaged in the shareholders’ agreement.

The Legal Issues

7.  In the present Petition Harbour Front argues that as evidenced by [42] of my judgment, the findings of Kwan J and myself do not necessarily mean that Harbour Front is permanently excluded from relying on the shareholders’ agreement. If Harbour Front “takes genuine and substantial steps to remedy its misconduct …… if it is possible to do so and it might not be”, its exclusion will cease to be fair. What steps are adequate to remedy misconduct will depend on the nature of the misconduct and the circumstances. The greater the seriousness of the misconduct, the number of instances, the period of time over which it has taken place, and the general behaviour of the recalcitrant shareholder will all be material. It is obviously possible for breach of trust to be so serious that the trust and confidence of a shareholder has been irreversibly breached. It might reasonably be thought that this is a matter of common sense, but at the level of principle it derives from the characteristics of the equitable rights that may justify a shareholder objecting to another shareholder exercising their strict legal rights in a way inconsistent with the understandings between shareholders.

8.  At least since Ebrahimi v Westbourne Galleries[1] if not earlier, it is clear that shareholders are not, by the mere fact of shareholding, entitled to participate in management. Lord Wilberforce (at 370E-G) set out the elements typically required for there to be superimposition of equitable considerations:

(1) An association formed or continued on the basis of a personal relationship, involving mutual confidence; and

(2) an agreement, or understanding, that all, or some, of the shareholders shall participate in the conduct of the business.

9.  Such mutual understandings and agreements are not immutable and can change over time. “Relationships may obviously change significantly over time, and a company can become a quasi-partnership, with understandings between shareholders, and equally cease to be one as time passes and circumstances change, with those understandings changing accordingly.”[2]

10.  This is not surprising. The essence of what is commonly referred to as a “quasi-partnership” is that the company has not just corporate personality and a constitution, but also scope for personal obligations and rights binding the shareholders in equity based on (i) a relationship of mutual trust and confidence and (ii) an agreement or understanding that each (or some) shall have the right to participate in the management of the company. Accordingly, if the personal obligation and rights, or their substratum of mutual trust and confidence and equal participation, are deliberately or permanently renounced by a member, he cannot thereafter expect that equity will allow him to hold the other members to their equitable obligations: see Re Edwardian Group Limited[3].

11.  The agreement or expectation of equal participation is, therefore, not indefinite and is likely to be limited to a point in time at which “for some other reason the change in management and control became necessary”: R&H Electric v Haden Bill Electrical[4], citing Lord Templeman’s decision in Tay Bok Choon v Tahanson.

12.  These principles are illustrated by the Australian case of Fexuto v Bosnjak[5], where the majority shareholders excluded Mr Bosnjak from involvement in the management of the company. The trial judge held that, even if an expectation of participation in the management had existed, it had ceased to exist because of the emergence of a conflict over a long period of time between Mr Bosnjak and another controller ([84]). The trial judge held that the relations between them had “became strained to the degree that they could not work together” and concluded that “…the point has been reached where the brothers cannot work together and any legitimate expectation has ceased”. This observation was endorsed on appeal, where Spigelman CJ said (at [90]) that:

“There will be circumstances in which the emergence of irreconcilable differences will cause the court to conclude that an understanding or expectation as to participation in management should be taken to have ceased, in a manner not entitling the person excluded from such participation to relief under the statutory provisions. That would be so where the court decides that it is the person excluded who is responsible for the breakdown in the relationship.”

13.  This approach was endorsed in Nasser v Innovative Precasters[6]. Three venturers were parties to a “quasi-partnership” characterised by mutual cooperation and trust ([78]). However, there was a subsequent change in the individuals’ relationship due to a fight ([113]). Following the fight, the parties held grudges against each other, and the relationship changed fundamentally. This led the court to conclude that the expectation as to participation in the management came to an end by reason of the emergence of irreconcilable differences ([115]–[117]): “At that point, the pre-existing expectations about participation in day-to-day management were overtaken by mutual acceptance of the reality that Mr. Nassar would no longer participate”. As a result, although the petitioner had been excluded, it was not exclusion of the kind which would warrant a finding of oppression or unfair prejudice ([119]).

14.  This is also the law in Singapore. In Over & Over v Bonvests Holdings[7], the company in question started as a “quasi-partnership” during the formative years of its inception ([88]). However, as a result of events engendered mostly by the majority shareholders’ camp, a fundamental change in the character of the parties’ relationship was precipitated (“…This relationship was to be characterised by curt and eventually confrontational communications …”), and what began as a closely knit partnership underpinned by private share ownership was eventually replaced by a going concern that was effectively a listed subsidiary of the respondent ([96]–[97]).

15.  In Ng Yat Chi v Max Shares (No. 2)[8], the petitioner petitioned to wind up the company on the basis that it was just and equitable to do so. The petitioner contended that the company was intended to be a joint venture formed on the basis of a personal relationship involving mutual trust and confidence but there had been a breakdown in their relationship (568G). Rogers VP concluded that the company was not formed on the basis of a personal relationship. In obiter (572A-C), his Lordship held that even if there was a special relationship between the parties, such a relationship would have come to an end when the petitioner left the management of the company and gave up his position as managing director for reasons of his own. The misconduct had negatived the original agreement of mutual trust and confidence. Roger VP went on at 572D-I, to hold that the petitioner could not pray in aid a “special relationship” given his conduct in defrauding the company of its profits: “…it is reading Lord Wilberforce’s speech too literally to hold that simply because at the formation of the Company there was a personal relationship which involved mutual trust and confidence which may have been intended to be faithfully carried out, that relationship survived a blatant abuse of confidence on the part of the person seeking to found his case of justice and equity upon it. In short, by abusing his position and siphoning off profits, Mr. Ng had destroyed the basis of the mutual trust and confidence”.

16.  Harbour Front has not cited any authority in which a shareholder, who has been found to have caused a breakdown in trust has acted in a way, which a court has been satisfied remedies the misconduct sufficiently to restore the equitable rights the shareholder originally had. The authorities Harbour Front relies on concern a narrower proposition, namely, that a claimant who has found to have come to court with “unclean hands” and consequently is not entitled to equitable relief, can purge his mistake and renew an application for relief: Royal Bank of Scotland v Highland Financial Partners LP[9][10]; The Pui Ying Middle School of Hong Kong v So Shing Yit[11]. Although there are similarities between a case in which an equitable remedy is sought to right a legal wrong and a case in which relief is sought in a unfair prejudice petition, there are likely to be material differences. The latter is much more likely to involve a long term and close business relationship. Curing a breakdown in a business relationship is likely to be considerably more difficult than “purging” an isolated wrong, which the court considers deprives a party of a right such as specific performance in the case of Pui Ying Middle School. It is likely to require action, which rebuilds a damaged relationship. As I observe in [42] of my 2018 reasons this may not be possible. In other words, it is not just a matter of correcting individual mistakes, but restoring trust, or at least taking action, which the court takes the view goes sufficiently far to justify the other shareholder being required to act in accordance with the shareholders’ original understandings and agreements.

17.  It should have been quite clear to YT’s advisers, and YT or his Children if they read the judgments, that in order to remedy the misconduct they would need to need to show a recognition of the seriousness of their misconduct and demonstrate a bona fide desire to restore the status quo ante. It is necessary at the very least not only to correct the wrongs YT and his alter ego Harbour Front have committed, but to do so in a way that demonstrates a genuine attempt to restore trust. Self-evidently, it would not be sufficient to, for example, repay money which had been misappropriated, but to do so in a grudging and offensive manner.

18.  Harbour Front has also argued that in relation to YK’s petition a breakdown in trust and confidence does not necessarily justify ending the relationship by, in the present context, ordering a buyout. Ms Ho relied in particular on Lord Hoffmann’s statement in O’Neill v Phillips[12] “... even in partnership law a dissolution would be granted on the [grounds of breakdown in trust and confidence] in a case in which it was still possible under the articles for the business of the partnership to be continued”. Ms Ho referred to similar statements in Re Neath Rugby Ltd[13]and Grace v Biagioli, which suggest something more than a breakdown in trust is required. In the case of an unfair prejudice petition brought under sections 724 and 725 of the Ordinance for a buyout order, “something more” is likely to be an action that has prejudiced the shareholder in a manner, which so prejudices him as a shareholder that it is fair for him to be allowed to exit the company. What I understand Lord Hoffmann and the courts in Neath Rugby and Grace v Biagioli[14] to be saying is that even if trust between shareholders has broken down if it is possible for the commercial venture to be carried on in accordance with the company’s constitution a buyout order will probably not be justified. In other words as a matter of fact the relationship between shareholders may have been destroyed and it is genuinely difficult for them to work together, but that does not mean it is impossible for the shareholders to conduct the business of the company on the basis originally agreed[15]. However, this plainly is not such a case. It is obvious from the judgments that I have referred to earlier that YT has committed serious wrongs in relation to the Companies. Although, I accept that it does not necessarily follow that because a shareholders’ conduct has deprived him of the right he otherwise had to be involved in the management of the company it will be impossible for a company to be managed on the basis originally contemplated, in practice it is likely to be so. In the present case Ms Ho argued that as Harbour Front was a corporate shareholder the difficulties in operating the shareholders’ agreement could be resolved by Gillian and her brother representing Harbour Front. Theoretically this might be the case, but it would be naive not to recognise that this would only be so if they could effectively distance themselves from both their Father’s misconduct and the atmosphere of mistrust he had created, which was always likely to be very difficult particularly as Gillian was implicated in it. As I will demonstrate later, in practice Gillian continued with the confrontational approach I describe in my earlier decision.

19.  As I have already noted Harbour Front accepts that if YK’s Petition is successful its two Petitions inevitably fail. However, Harbour Front argues that there had been no irrevocable breakdown in trust in the mutual trust and confidence between Harbour Front and YK as of October 2018 by which time Harbour Front had remedied its previous wrongdoings. In my view this is analytically erroneous. Plainly YT (and as found by Kwan J Harbour Front is plainly his alter ego) had caused a serious breakdown in the trust and confidence in his relationship with YK at the time I dismissed Harbour Front’s Petitions in October 2017. The issue is whether Harbour Front subsequently remedied the causes of the breakdown. Ms Ho’s argument that, because YK continued to refer to the shareholders’ agreement in correspondence and has not purported to terminate it, he accepted that it was possible to implement it and he cannot, therefore, believe that the relationship has irretrievably broken down, is specious. The fact that he had until issue of his petition in September 2019 tried to operate the Companies in a manner consistent with the shareholders’ agreement does not mean that the relationship with YT and his children had not irretrievably broken down; it simply indicates how YK tried to manage the situation up until the point at which he thought that the best course was to take action to exit the Companies. In my view, if YK can demonstrate that Harbour Front continued after October 2018 to behave in a way, that damaged the relationship between the shareholders that is sufficient. Given the seriousness of Harbour Front and YT’s misconduct prior to 2017, it would not require much in order to demonstrate that trust and confidence has been permanently destroyed as a consequence of wrongdoings by Harbour Front that justifies the court finding unfair and prejudicial conduct and ordering a buyout. To look at the matter from the perspective of Harbour Front’s Petitions, unless Harbour Front can demonstrate that it has remedied the previous wrongs YK’s case will be made out.

Factual Matters

20.  Harbour Front’s initial reaction to my February 2018 decision was to issue notices of appeal. The appeals were withdrawn in November 2018. Correspondence between the Parties had stopped in August 2017. The correspondence between the Parties starts again with Harbour Front’s letter to YK of 17 July 2018. This letter starts by referring to an offer to purchase Money Facts and Fonfair to which Harbour Front would appear to be receptive. It is signed by Gillian. The third paragraph reads:

“We understand that both Harbour Front and you are minded to realise both our respective interests in the Land and to terminate our existing shareholders relationship so that we can move on, particularly in light of the long history of disputes. We observe that pursuant to the Shareholders Agreement, we are both under an obligation, inter alia, to ensure that:-

(1) Money Facts should be operated so as to ensure as majority shareholder in Fonfair that Fonfair should pursue and negotiate any future development plan and other business to safeguard and maximize the interests of the shareholders of Fonfair; and

(2) Money Facts should be operated as a company to safeguard and maximize the interest of Harbour Front and Leung Yuet Keung in Fonfair.”

Gillian continues in a similar vein the pre-penultimate paragraph:

“For the above reasons and pursuant to the Shareholders Agreement, we demand Leung Yuet Keung to jointly procure Money Facts to:-

(1) Procure Fonfair to conduct a public tender for sale of the Land in accordance to the Parallel Public Tender Arrangement;

(2) Procure Fonfair to give the Undertaking (as described above) in accordance to the Parallel Public Tender Arrangement; and

(3) Write to all Fonfair shareholders to agree to join in a public tender of sale for shares in accordance to the Parallel Public Tender Arrangement within the stipulated time in the July 2018 Letter.”

The letter makes no reference to YT repaying the sums that are owed or contains no acknowledgement of the findings of the courts that effectively YK was justified in excluding Harbour Front from management of the Companies. It seems to me a remarkably unempathetic letter to have sent in the circumstances. It suggests that Gillian had no grasp of the import of the court’s concerns about the way in which YT and Harbour Front had conducted themselves. It plainly indicates an assumption that despite the judgments Harbour Front is entitled to involve itself in the management of the Companies even though at that time no effort had been made to pay the sums owed to Fonfair despite the February 2018 decision.

21.  One might have thought that given the content and tenor of the judgments that if Gillian genuinely wanted to rectify the situation Harbour Front would either simply have agreed the sum owing. This is not what happened. As explained by Ms Ho in [27(1)] of Harbour Front’s written closing, its position was as follows: “As explained by Gillian Leungduring cross-examination, while Harbour Front initially had reservations to the accuracy of the interim reports because they were carried out by an accountant firm selected by YK, and none of the liabilities has been adjudicated upon in any form …… This is the reason Harbour Front initially requested for the quantum of Harbour Front’s liability to be formally adjudicated.” In other words, rather than try and agree the sum, she wanted more proceedings. This did not suggest a genuine attempt to establish a constructive working relationship. Whether this was because she was acting at the direction of her Father, whose judgment was blurred by his animosity to his brother, her own animosity or an inability to understand the gravity of the situation, it is difficult to assess.

22.  On 24 July 2018 Harbour Front wrote to Fonfair. The letter runs to 5 pages and again is signed by Gillian. It also does not start of with any kind of apology. It is a turgid repetition of the history of Fonfair’s attempts to resolve the dispute over the misappropriations by YT. It makes two proposals. The first was a payment of HK$12,762,695.14 to be made in full and final payment within 7 days of acceptance of the offer. The second was that the sum payable be referred to arbitration and HK$12,762,695.14 paid by way of security. On 25 July 2018 Harbour Front wrote to YK personally. The letter was signed by Gillian.

23.  On 27 July 2018 YK issued notices to convene extraordinary general meetings of Fonfair and Money Facts to consider Harbour Front’s proposal and give an update on the current status of the sale of the Land.

24.  On 3 August 2018 Fonfair replied to the 24 July 2018 letter. The letter was signed by YK. It suggests that Harbour Front’s letter is unhelpfully tendentious and that rather than rearguing what has taken place it should admit liability and cooperate in the reconciliation process. It suggests that the proposals are an attempt to create a paper trail to argue in future court proceedings that Harbour Front has remedied its past breaches of the shareholders’ agreement.

25.  The correspondence continues in a similar vein until 30 November 2018 when Harbour Front’s new solicitors write “unequivocally” accepting the reconciliation in the 2016 Interim Report. This was 18 days after Harbour Front had issued (12 November 2018) Petitions HCMP 1987/2018 and HCMP 1988/2018. There followed correspondence in December and January 2019 between the Parties solicitors discussing the terms of the written confirmation concluding the agreement of the reconciliation. Harbour Front wanted to include a provision that by agreeing the reconciliation it had purged its breaches of the shareholders’ agreement. Understandably, Fonfair’s solicitors objected on the grounds that this was unnecessary and clearly was included to bolster Harbour Front’s case in the Petitions.

26.  It seems to me clear that the initial offer in July 2018 to pay HK$12 million was caused by Harbour Front’s wish to involve itself in the possible sale of the Land rather than a genuine recognition that the past wrongdoings should be remedied. The same is true of the November 2018 offer, which was clearly made with a view to improving Harbour Front’s position in the new proceedings.

27.  Ms Ho invited me in her closing to make findings in relation to matters predating the Petitions I heard in 2017, in particular:

(1) That Harbour Front did not sabotage the prospective sale of the Yau Tong property in 2008.

(2) That in relation to the Chung Sing offer in 2015, first, it was not acting mala fides in putting forward its offer to purchase the Land and YK’s shares. Secondly, there was no evidence that the winding up petitions in HCCW 111/2015 and HCCW 116/2015 had sabotaged the Chung Sing offer.

28.  It seems to me that this is unnecessary. As I have already stated it seems to me clear that by the time of the trial in 2017 Harbour Front’s conduct as found by Kwan J and subsequently by myself was sufficient to support a finding that Harbour Front’s conduct was unfairly prejudicial and justified making a buyout order at the end of 2017 had YK sought one.

29.  In August 2018 the shareholders of Fonfair had discussed at the annual general meeting the sale of the Land. YK took the view that it should be put up for sale by an invitation to purchase the Land and that although if the Fonfair’s shares were sold it would attract lower stamp duty the additional complications of the sale would likely not result in any financial benefit. Harbour Front’s correspondence suggests that it wanted to keep open the possibility of selling the Land or shares. On 2 October 2018 Harbour Front wrote to YK (this time a letter sent by Jerry Leung). The letter complains that Savills’ had published an advertisement for the “Sale by Public Tender” of the Land. The letter complains that Harbour Front were entitled to be kept informed of all the details of any proposed tender and, effectively, approve it. The advertisement is in general terms. It states that the “Basis of Sale: The property is to be sold on “as-is” basis with existing tenancy”. In subsequent correspondence Harbour Front complains that Fonfair has not adequately considered and obtained advice on a sale by selling shares. YK answered the complaints in detail, and in my view convincingly, in a letter dated 23 October 2018. Harbour Front replied on 31 October 2018 repeating is complaints and evincing an assumption that it was entitled to be actively involved in the management of the Companies. This was followed by issue of the Petitions and issue in November of an application for an injunction to stop the public tender in HCMP 1987/2018. Clearly, by this time what hope there was of re-establishing any trust and confidence had been destroyed, and destroyed by the time the “unequivocal” acceptance of the reconciliation report was communicated.

30.  The injunction was in my view an abuse. Most of the relief sought was rejected by DHCJ Kenneth Wong on 23 November 2018. He declined to grant any relief to allow Harbour Front’s participation in the management of Fonfair. The DHCJ did order that the Land could not be sold without Harbour Front’s consent prior to the determination of the Petitions. Plainly this interfered with the management of the affairs of Fonfair and prevented it operating in accordance with its articles of incorporation and prejudiced YK qua shareholder and given the history of this matter, clearly did so unfairly. Harbour Front argues that as the shareholders’ agreement had not been terminated it was entitled to rely on its terms and it gave it a right to participate in the management of the Companies’ affairs and the question of prejudice and fairness has to be considered in that light. I accept that if what had happened was that the board of Fonfair had decided to sell its major asset without consulting a major shareholder, who the other shareholders had, pursuant to a shareholders’ agreement, agreed needed to be consulted and agree the sale, this would be relevant in assessing whether interference by the shareholder with the lawful exercise of the board’s power was unfairly prejudicial to the major shareholder, because its rights under the articles were on the face of the matter infringed. However, the position in this case was far more complex. Harbour Front chose to sabotage the sale of the Land by interfering in the operation of Fonfair in circumstances in which the courts had twice found that Harbour Front had lost the right to complain that the Companies were not being run in accordance with the shareholders’ agreement. As I have said, it seems to me that Harbour Front’s conduct was unfairly prejudicial to YK.

31.  In 2019 YK wrote a letter to YT, which certainly on its face expressed in emollient language a desire to resolve their differences amicably. He suggested that an offer that had been received for the Land should be accepted. YK observes towards the end of the letter “It is in the best interests of Fonfair and us all to accept the offer, reap the profit and think of better things to do.” The clear implication being that it was best to sell the land and divide up the proceeds and for the Brothers to get on with their lives, which might be thought to be a sensible way of bringing the disputes to an end. YT did not reply. Instead, Gillian replied to “Mr. Leung”; not her “Uncle”. There is nothing in the letter, which acknowledges her Father’s wrongdoings, nothing in the language she uses, which attempts to introduce a more friendly tone or reciprocate the spirit in which YK’s letter appears to be written. The letter does not suggest an agreement in principle to selling the land and moving on. On the contrary we read this: “The obsolete past events you referred to, most of which were decades ago, shed little, if at all, light on the potentials of the Land. Without repeating what Harbour Front has already said in its previous letters, I would urge a proper and independent professional analysis be conducted to enable parties to decide what is best pursuant to the Shareholders Agreement.” In other words, nothing has changed in the views of those who run Harbour Front. It has been Harbour Front’s case for some time that YT is no longer interested in the Land and its associated disputes. Indeed, in her letter Gillian says this “Whether you choose to believe or not, my father is disinterested in the captioned matter and the series of litigations attached thereto.” This is not credible, however, if it was true it follows that Gillian was the person, who had to remedy the wrongs done in the past. Her letter does nothing to suggest that she recognised this. The tone and content were confrontational.

Disposition

32.  I will make an order in HCMP 1471/2019 that Harbour Front purchases YK’s shares in Money Facts. The precise terms of the order require further consideration as I have not received submissions on questions such as valuation. The Petition should be listed for a 30 minute case management hearing unless the Parties can agree directions.

33.  I dismiss HCMP 1987 and 1988 of 2018.

34.  I make a costs order nisi in each Petition. In HCMP 1471 that the 1st Respondent pay the Petitioner’s costs, such costs to be taxed if not agreed. In HCMP 1987 and 1988 the Petitioners pay all the Respondents’ costs, such costs to be taxed if not agreed.

 (Jonathan Harris)
 Judge of the Court of First Instance
 High Court

Ms Sabrina Ho and Mr Arthur Poon, instructed by Yiu & Associates, for the Petitioner (in HCMP 1987/2018 and HCMP 1988/2018), and the 1st Respondent (in HCMP 1471/2019)

Ms Frances Lok and Mr Kwan Ping Kan, instructed by Ho & Ip, for the 1st and 3rd Respondents (in HCMP 1987/2018), and the 1st Respondent (in HCMP 1988/2018), and the Petitioner (in HCMP 1471/2019)

The 2nd Respondent was not represented and did not appear (in HCMP 1987/2018)

The 2nd Respondent was not represented and did not appear (in HCMP 1988/2018 and HCMP 1471/2019)

The 4th Respondent was not represented and did not appear (in HCMP 1987/2018)

The 5th Respondent was not represented and did not appear (in HCMP 1987/2018)


Annex

1.  In this Schedule of Agreed Facts, where appropriate, the following judgments are referred to:

(a) 2002 Judgment: Fonfair v Universal Dockyard (HCA 1886/2001, 25 January 2002) per DHCJ To.

(b) 2004 Judgment: Re Money Facts Limited (HCCW 880/2001, 2 February 2004), per Kwan J (as she then was).

(c) 2006 Judgment: Fonfair v UDL Management (HCA 2002/2001, 24 November 2006) per Poon J (as he then was).

(d) 2018 Judgment: Re Money Facts Limited [2018] HKCFRI 358 per Harris J.

(e) 2019 Judgment: Harbour Front v Money Facts & Ors[2019] HKCA 916.

A. BACKGROUND

2.  In the late 1950s, Mr. Leung Senior founded Universal Dockyard Limited (“Universal Dockyard”) and acquired the Yau Tong Property.

3.  The Yau Tong Property was subsequently sold in 1980 to Fonfair, the then subsidiary of Universal Dockyard. Universal Dockyard had occupied the Yau Tong Property for over 40 years, notably known by the shipbuilding market to be the home of Universal Dockyard.

4.  In 1966, Mr. Leung Senior passed away and his six (6) children, including YK Leung and YT Leung, received shares in Universal Dockyard as part of their inheritance.

5.  The Yau Tong Property is the only material asset of Fonfair Company Limited (“Fonfair”). The Yau Tong Property is the last piece of land inherited from the estate of the late Mr. Leung Man Kwong, the founder of Universal Dockyard and the father of YT Leung and YK Leung.

B. RELEVANT PARTIES

B1.Fonfair

6.  On 3 July 1980, Fonfair was incorporated in Hong Kong as a subsidiary of Universal Dockyard.

7.  In October 1980, Fonfair acquired the Yau Tong Property from the administrator of Mr Leung Senior’s estate.

8.  In September 1991, Fonfair was spun off from Universal Dockyard to keep the Yau Tong Property in the hands of the Leung family, when Universal Dockyard became listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange.

9.  On 13 February 1998, YT Leung’s 3958 shares in Fonfair were transferred to Harbour Front with the consent of YK Leung.

10.  Since March 2001, YT Leung resigned as director of Fonfair.

11.  At the 2006 AGM of Fonfair, YK Leung vote against the re-election of Fire Full Investment Limited (“Fire Full”). From 17 October 2006 up to present day, YK Leung and Marcon, a company owned and controlled by YK Leung, remain as the only directors of Fonfair.

12.  As at the date of the Petitions, the share capital of Fonfair has been held as follows:-

ShareholderNo. of SharesPercentage (%)
Harbour Front3,95832.96
Money Facts7,90065.79
Leung Yuet Wah,
Leung Yeut Keung and Leung Yuet Hoi
750.63
YK Leung250.21
Marcon500.42

B2. Money Facts Limited (“Money Facts”)

13.  On 5 June 1990, YT Leung and YK Leung entered into the Shareholders Agreement. (“the Shareholders Agreement”) and the Share Sale Agreement.

14.  On 21 May 1991, Money Facts was incorporated in Hong Kong. The purpose of forming Money Facts was to hold an equal amount of YT Leung’s and YK Leung’s shareholdings in Fonfair to form a majority block of shares in Fonfair pursuant to the Shareholders Agreement.

15.  On 3 September 1991, YK Leung and YT Leung entered into the Deed of Agreement and Release whereby it was provided that they should jointly acquire Money Facts and each was to take up 3,950 shares in Money Facts, that they should be the first directors of Money Facts and should cause the articles of association of Money Facts to be amended in the manner pursuant to the provisions of the Shareholders Agreement.

16.  On 13 February 1998, YT Leung’s 3,950 shares in Money Facts were transferred to Harbour Front with the consent of YK Leung.

17.  As at the date of the Petitions, the share capital of Money Facts has been held as follows:-

ShareholderNo. of SharesPercentage (%)
Harbour Front3,95050
YK Leung3,95050

18.  After YT Leung resigned as a director of Money Facts in March 2001, YK Leung appointed his nominee Wong Sum Yuen to be a director of Money Facts.

19.  On 16 June 2016, Marcon, a company owned and controlled by YK Leung, was appointed as a director, and replaced Wong Sum Yuen who resigned on 17 June 2016.

C. AGREED FACTS RELEVANT TO THE SHAREHOLDERS AGREEMENT

20.  Money Facts was formed on the basis of a personal relationship between YK Leung and YT Leung involving mutual confidence. Fonfair was continued or operated on a similar basis to Money Facts, as the shareholding in Fonfair held by the estate of the Leung Man Kwong is so small as to be almost insignificant.

21.  The provisions in the Shareholders Agreement, which provide that (1) YK Leung and YT Leung had agreed not to cause Money Facts to issue further shares without their mutual consent, and (2) they should cause themselves to be elected as the only two directors in Money Facts, must have been designed to ensure that there was to be equality of control in Money Facts of the two shareholders.

22.  The Shareholders Agreement set out the three objectives of Money Facts in its role as the majority shareholder of Fonfair, including the important objective of pursuing and negotiating any future development plan of the Yau Tong Property. In view of these objectives, it must have been intended that YK Leung and YT Leung should have a right to participate equally in the business of Money Facts and through Money Facts in the business of Fonfair.

23.  There was an implicit agreement or understanding that both shareholders of Money Facts should participate in the conduct of its business and that through Money Facts, both should participate in the business of Fonfair, and that neither was to be excluded from management and control unless for good reason such change should become necessary.

24.  There was a quasi-partnership between YK Leung and Harbour Front in respect of their association in Money Facts and Fonfair giving rise to equitable considerations.

D. AGREED FACTS RELEVANT TO THE FINDINGS IN THE 2002 AND 2004 JUDGMENT

25.  The rental income of the Yau Tong Property was applied towards mortgage repayments of the loan taken out by Fonfair from Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation Limited for payments to Universal Dockyard to facilitate the spin-off of Fonfair.

26.  This arrangement continued until November 1996 when a loan of $30 million was obtained from the Standard Chartered Bank against the Fonfair’s assets to discharge the HSBC loan (“SCB Loan”). The proceeds were then distributed between YK Leung and YT Leung in accordance with the ratio of their shareholding in Fonfair. YK Leung and YT Leung became responsible for the monthly repayment of the SCB loan. From then on, with Fonfair having been freed from the burden of making mortgage repayments, the rental income net of incidentals became available for distribution to the Fonfair’s shareholders, i.e. effectively to YT Leung and YK Leung in the approximate ratio of 2 to 1.

27.  YTL, who had the management of Fonfair, overdrew in favour of himself. This led to the appointment of an independent accountant firm, Messrs Lau & Au Yeung Certified Public Accountants Limited (hereinafter called “Messrs Lau & Au Yeung”) to review the accounts of Fonfair. As a result, it was revealed that YT Leung had overdrawn from Fonfair’s account $2,652,363, while YK Leung had been underpaid $1,988,432. The reconciliation account prepared by Messrs Lau & Au Yeung was accepted by both YT Leung and YK Leung. On 27 November 1997, Fonfair duly paid YK Leung the amount which he had been underpaid, while YT Leung was required to refund the amount overdrawn.

28.  In view of YT Leung’s misappropriation, it was agreed by YK Leung and YT Leung that Messrs Lau & Au Yeung be engaged to administer the accounts of Fonfair, and YK Leung to manage the lease of the Yau Tong Property to avoid further conflict of interest with YT Leung representing both Fonfair (as landlord) and Universal Dockyard (as tenant) at the same time (“1997 Agreement”). The 1997 Agreement was never implemented due to the lack of cooperation from YT Leung.

29.  From September 1998 to December 1999, almost all the rental income received by Fonfair from Universal Dockyard was misappropriated by YT Leung into the account of YT Leung Trading (a company controlled by YT Leung).

30.  Subsequent to December 1999, Universal Dockyard was allowed by YT Leung to remain in possession of the Yau Tong Property without payment of rent.

31.  YT Leung was adjudged bankrupt on 1 March 2001, which YK Leung admitted to be a “windfall” brought about by the bankruptcy of YT Leung.

32.  YK Leung obtained control of the board afterwards. The 2004 Judgment found that it had only become possible for Fonfair to bring HCA 1886/2001 against Universal Dockyard to enforce the tenancy agreement, after YK had secured control of the board upon YT’s bankruptcy. YT Leung assisted Universal Dockyard to resist Fonfair’s claim by producing documents purportedly made by Fonfair. These documents have been found by To. J. in the 2002 Judgment to be lacking in credence.

33.  After Fonfair obtained judgment against Universal Dockyard on 11 December 2001, the latter failed to pay the judgment debt or deliver up vacant possession. Irene Leung (wife of YT Leung), in her capacity as a director of Universal Dockyard, filed an affirmation in support of its application for a stay of execution for six months of Fonfair's writ of possession issued on 23 April 2002.

34.  On 7 May 2001, Fonfair commenced HCA 2002/2001 to recover its books and records from UDL Management Limited (“UDLM”). In December 2001, summary judgment was entered against UDLM requiring it to deliver Fonfair’s books and records to Fonfair’s auditors. UDLM did not comply with the order. This led to committal proceedings initiated by Fonfair against Irene Leung and Bobby Chan in HCA 2002/2001 which failed.

35.  On 21 June 2002, Fonfair presented a petition to wind up Universal Dockyard in HCCW 663/2002. Fire Full (nominee of Harbour Front) and Harbour Front objected to Fonfair’s petition to wind up Universal Dockyard, and actively assisted Universal Dockyard to resist the petition and to thwart Fonfair’s attempts to recover the judgment debt for arrears of rent (HK$8.5 million with interest as at March 2003).

36.  Kwan J (as she then was) found that, in siding with Universal, Harbour Front had acted against the interest of Fonfair and had defeated the first of the three purposes for setting up Money Facts. Kwan J also rejected Harbour Front’s submissions that its opposition to wind up Universal Dockyard was justified for “sentimental” or commercial reasons.

37.  Due to the misconduct of Harbour Front, there was a breakdown of the relationship of mutual trust and confidence between the parties. As a result, Harbour Front cannot assert its right of equal participation in the management of Money Facts and Fonfair, and has failed to make out a case of wrongful exclusion from management.

E. AGREED FACTS RELEVANT TO THE 2008 RECONCILIATION EXERCISE

38.  By 2008, Fonfair was expected to accumulate a surplus out of rental income. On 1 August 2008, Fonfair’s board resolved that the proportion of the surplus which represented Harbour Front’s interest in Fonfair be set-off against the sums owed by Harbour Front. Neither Harbour Front nor its solicitors objected to the Fonfair’s proposed course of action.

39.  At the 2010 AGM of Fonfair (held on 23 November 2010), an interim report was prepared by Messrs. Lau & Au Yeung.

40.  On 23 November 2016, Fonfair issued the 2015 Interim Report.

41.  On 23 November 2016, Fonfair issued the 2016 Interim Report.

F. AGREED FACTS RELEVANT TO HARBOUR FRONT’S SERIOUS ATTEMPT TO REMEDY OR HAS REMEDIED ITS BREACHES OF THE SHAREHOLDER’S AGREEMENT

42.  On 30 March & 2 April 2015, Harbour Front petitioned for the winding up of Money Facts and Fonfair in HCCW 111 & 116/2015 respectively (the “2015 Petitions”).

43.  The 2015 Petitions were heard on 5-9, 13 June 2017.

44.  By a letter dated 7 June 2017 (halfway through the trial of the 2015 Petitions), Harbour Front through its then solicitors informed YK Leung that it was prepared to pay to Fonfair within 2 working days of notification:-

(1) An amount inclusive of the principal and interest which YK Leung alleged Harbour Front should pay to rectify the breaches identified under the 2004 Judgment; and

(2) A further amount to cover the estimated legal and other costs which Fonfair may have to incur for the determination or adjudication of the total liability of Harbour Front.

45.  By letter dated 5 July 2017, Harbour Front made a further offer to Fonfair (“without any admission or affecting our rights”) to make reparations, and amongst other things tendered to Fonfair a cheque of HK$3,022,000. By letter dated 19 July 2017 and 10 August 2017, Harbour Front repeated its offer dated 5 July 2017 and requested for confirmation of the amount due by Harbour Front to Fonfair. Fonfair responded to and rejected the offers and requests on 15 August 2017.

46.  On 5 October 2017, this Court dismissed the 2015 Petitions. Reasons for judgment was delivered on 15 February 2018.

47.  On 15 March 2018, Harbour Front filed Notices of Appeal in CACV 68 & 69/2018 to appeal against this Court’s order dismissing the 2015 Petitions.

48.  By letter dated 24 July 2018, Harbour Front proposed to pay Fonfair HK$12,762,695.14 or alternatively, the same sum as interim payment for the question of quantum to be adjudicated. Fonfair rejected Harbour Front’s proposal in its letter on 3 August 2018.

49.  On 9 August 2018, Harbour Front offered to pay Fonfair HK$15,616,705.23 (i.e. the full sum under Appendix I to IV of 2016 Interim Report) as security and HK$1,000,000 as security for legal costs, pending adjudication of quantum owed by Harbour Front. Fonfair rejected Harbour Front’s revised proposal on 16 August 2018.

50.  On 29 September 2018, Harbour Front through its solicitors tendered a cheque of HK$11,467,293.47, being the full sum under Appendix I to III of 2016 Interim Report, to Fonfair.

51.  On 8 October 2018, Fonfair rejected Harbour Front’s proposal.

52.  On 13 October 2018, Harbour Front through its solicitors, indicated its acceptance of the reconciliation exercise based on figures stated in the 2016 Interim Report.

53.  By letter dated 16 October 2018, Fonfair did not accept Harbour Front’s proposal.

54.  By letter dated 22 October 2018, Harbour Front through its solicitors Messrs. Yiu & Associates (“Yiu & Associates”) provided that:

“purely for the purpose of settlement without farther delay, we hereby re-confirm on behalf of Harbour Front its acceptance of the execution of the one off "reconciliation exercise" based on the figures contained in the 2016 Interim Report ("Settlement by Reconciliation Exercise"), which is Fonfair's/ YKL's own proposed and insisted form of settlement to fully and finally settle and to purge Harbour Front's past breaches including those of the Shareholders Agreement.”

55.  On 20 November 2018, Harbour Front filed a request for the dismissal of the appeal in CACV 68 & 69/2018. On 28 November 2018, the CA ordered the dismissal of the appeal.

G. AGREED FACTS RELEVANT TO THE LITTLEWOODS OFFER

56.  By Notices for annual general meeting (“2008 AGM”) dated 12 August 2008, the directors of Money Facts and Fonfair informed the shareholders of an offer from Messrs. Littlewoods Solicitors on behalf of their client (i.e. the “Littlewoods Offer”) to purchase the Yau Tong Property and Yau Tong Marine Lot No. 1.

57.  This Court found that Harbour Front did not comission a valuation of the Yau Tong Property and did not form a view as to whether the Littlewoods Offer was high or low or commercially advantageous to Fonfair.

58.  On 26 August 2008, Harbour Front commenced HCA 1598/2008 against directors of Money Facts (including YK Leung) for (inter alia) a declaration that YK Leung was in breach of the Shareholders Agreement and an injunction restraining YK Leung from voting in the 2008 AGM.

59.  On the next day, 27 August 2008, Harbour Front took out an urgent application for interim injunction against the Money Facts directors (including YK Leung) to restrain them from voting on the Littlewoods Offer at the 2008 AGM.

60.  On 29 August 2008, Recorder Kwok SC dismissed Harbour Front’s application as an abuse of process and held that the application was “frivolous and vexatious”. The learned Recorder ordered indemnity costs be paid by Harbour Front forthwith.

61.  On 2 September 2008, Harbour Front wrote a letter to Littlewoods Solicitors.

62.  On 3 September 2008, Harbour Front appealed and applied for interim injunction pending appeal. This was dismissed by Kwan J (as she then was) (“2008 Judgment”). Kwan J dismissed Harbour Front’s application because Harbour Front remains in breach of the Shareholders Agreement, and has thwarted the first of the 3 purposes for which Money Facts was set up. It has (up until then) made no reparation of the losses suffered by Fonfair as a result of its misconduct in the misappropriation of rental income and the thwarting of Fonfair’s attempts to recover the judgment debt of $8.5 million for arrears of rent owed by Universal Dockyard, which has been wound up in 2003.

63.  Subsequently, Harbour Front’s appeal was heard and dismissed by the CA, who found Harbour Front’s application an “abuse of process”.

64.  On 5 September 2008, Fonfair’s solicitors (Messrs. Ho & Ip) wrote to Littlewoods to clarify that Harbour Front’s various court applications have been dismissed by the Court.

H. AGREED FACTS RELEVANT TO THE CHUNG SING OFFER

65.  By Notices dated 20 March 2015, the board of Money Facts and Fonfair proposed EGMs for the two companies to be convened on 8 April 2015 for their shareholders to consider an offer received on 16 March 2015 from Chung Sing Real Estate Company Limited to purchase the Yau Tong Property at the price of HK$365,000,000.00.

66.  On 24 March 2015, Harbour Front made two offers:

(1) An offer to YK Leung to purchase all the shares owned by YK Leung in Money Facts and Fonfair at the price of HK$30,400 per share; and

(2) An offer to Fonfair for the purchase of the Yau Tong Property at the price of HK$379,600,000.00.

67.  By letter dated 26 March 2015, Harbour Front requisitioned EGMs to be convened by Money Facts and Fonfair for resolutions to be passed to mandate Fonfair’s acceptance of Harbour Front’s purported offer to purchase the Yau Tong Property and the rejection of the Chung Sing Offer.

68.  This Court found that Harbour Front had not commissioned a valuation of the Yau Tong Property before deciding to make its proposals.

69.  By letter dated 27 March 2015, Harbour Front requisitioned EGMs to be convened by Money Facts and Fonfair on 8 April 2015 for resolutions to be passed to mandate Fonfair, in the event that Fonfair did not accept Harbour Front’s offer, to take all such steps necessary to sell the Yau Tong Property by way of public auction and/or public tender for the best obtainable price (“Public Auction / Tender Proposal”).

70.  On 30 March 2015 Harbour Front petitioned to wind up Money Facts and on 2 April 2015 petitioned to wind up Fonfair (the “2015 Petitions”). This Court found that there is a compelling inference given the history of this matter that the Harbour Front’s offers and proposals in March 2015 were not genuine but were made with a view to interfering in the sale of the Land to Chung Sing as were the presentation of the Petitions.

71.  On 8 July 2016, Fonfair applies for validation order to (inter alia) renew the lease of the Yau Tong Property. Harbour Front opposes the application for validation. On 14 February 2017, this Court grants validation to Fonfair.

I. AGREED FACTS RELEVANT TO THE 2018 LAND PUBLIC TENDER

72.  On 9 October 2018, advertisements of the 2018 Land Public Tender were published in various newspaper.

73.  On 30 November 2018, the 2018 Land Public Tender closed.

J. AGREED FACTS RELEVANT TO THE HCMP 1987/2018 &HCMP 1988/2018 PROCEEDINGS

74.  On 12 November 2018, Harbour Front issued HCMP 1987/2018 and HCMP 1988/2018.

75.  On 23 November 2018, the Court granted an interim injunction in HCMP 1987/2017 restraining sale or disposal of the Yau Tong Property (unless with Harbour Front’s prior approval or consent)pending determination of the Petition or further order of the Court. The decision was upheld on appeal by the Court of Appeal on 23 August2019.

K. AGREED FACTS RELEVANT TO THE IDL OFFER

76.  By letters dated 21 and 24 May 2019 from Savills (Hong Kong)Limited, acting for a prospective purchaser with an offer to purchasethe Yau Tong Property at the price of HK$888 million. The name ofthe prospective purchase was partially redacted and is referred to inthese Petitions as “Investment Development Limited” (or “IDL”).

77.  By a Notice of Extraordinary Meeting dated 29 May 2019, an EGM ofFonfair was scheduled to be held on 17 June 2019 for shareholders toconsider the offer from IDL and to express their views as to what theyconsider to be appropriate in response. Money Facts had accordinglycalled an EGM to be held on 17 June 2019 by a Notice ofExtraordinary Meeting dated 29 May 2019.

78.  By a letter on 5 June 2019, Harbour Front, through Yiu & Associates, invited YK Leung to a without prejudice meeting on 17 June 2019,before the Money Facts’ and Fonfair’s EGMs.

79.  The aforesaid 3 meetings were convened on 17 June 2019.

80.  On 31 July 2019, Fonfair passed a written resolution which recited therelevant background and consideration in respect of the offer from IDL (revised on 29 July 2019 to the increased consideration ofHK$910,000,000 (the “IDL Offer”) and resolved to accept it.

81.  The IDL Offer lapsed on 16 August 2019.

82.  On 16 September 2019, YK Leung presented the Cross-Petition seeking buy-out of its shares in Money Facts.

83.  By Summons dated 3 October 2019, Harbour Front applies to strikeout and dismiss the Cross-Petition on the ground that it discloses noreasonable cause of action and/or is otherwise an abuse of process.

84.  On 7 August 2020, DHCJ Jat SC dismissed Harbour Front’sSummons, but reasoned that “as presently advised, I am scepticalthat YK’s pleaded case does fall within s.724(1)”.



[1]   [1973] AC 360, 379B-G.

[2]   Hollington on Shareholders’ Rights, 8th ed, [7.47].

[3]   [2018] EWHC 1715 (Ch), [232] per Fancourt J.

[4]   [1995] 2 BCLC 280, 293d-h, 295d-g per Robert Walker J (as he then was).

[5]   (2001) 37 ACSR 672.

[6]   [2009] NSWSC 342.

[7]   [2010] 2 SLR 776.

[8]   [2001] 1 HKLRD 561.

[9]   [2013] 1 CLC 596.

[10]   [2012] 2 CLC 109.

[11]   [2021] HKCI 692.

[12]   [1999] 1 WLR 1092, 1104F-G.

[13]   [2010] BCC 597, Stanley Burnton LJ [108].

[14]   [2005] EWCA Civ 1222, [61(6)].

[15]   Lau v Chu [2020] 1 WLR 4656, Lord Briggs [15].

[2020] HKCFI 1912-EN-2020-08-07

LEUNG YUET KEUNG v. HARBOUR FRONT LTD AND ANOTHER

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HCMP 1471/2019

[2020] HKCFI 1912

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS NO 1471 OF 2019

______________________________

 

IN THE MATTER OF ss.722 to 726 of the Companies Ordinance, Cap 622 of the Laws of Hong Kong

 

and

 

IN THE MATTER OF MONEY FACTS LIMITED

BETWEEN  
 LEUNG YUET KEUNGPetitioner

and

 HARBOUR FRONT LIMITED1st Respondent
 MONEY FACTS LIMITED2nd Respondent

______________________________

Before:Deputy High Court Judge Jat SC in Chambers
Date of Hearing:23 July 2020
Date of Decision:7 August 2020

__________________

DECISION

__________________

1.  By Summons dated 3 October 2019, the 1st Respondent (“Harbour Front”) applies to strike out and dismiss the Petition filed herein on 16 September 2019, on the ground that it discloses no reasonable cause of action and/or is otherwise an abuse of process.

Brief background

2.  This is the latest episode in a long history of litigation between the Petitioner Mr Leung Yuet Keung (“YK”) on the one hand, and his brother Mr Leung Yat Tung (“YT”) and companies controlled by or related to him on the other, concerning the 2nd Respondent (“Money Facts”) and its subsidiary Fonfair Company Limited (“Fonfair”).

3.  Money Facts owns 67.5% of Fonfair, the only substantial asset of which is a piece of land known as Yau Tong Marine Lots 2, 3 & 4 (“Property”).  YK and Harbour Front (controlled by YT) each holds 50% of the shares in Money Facts, while Harbour Front further owns 32.96% of Fonfair.  A small number of Fonfair’s shares are held by other members of the Leung family.

4.  YT and YK entered into a Shareholders Agreement dated 5 June 1990 (“SHA”) for the establishment of a new company, which eventually was Money Facts, to hold their interests in Fonfair.  This was the original agreement between them in respect of Money Facts which gave rise to a relationship of mutual trust and confidence.

5.  There is no dispute that Money Facts and Fonfair were a “quasi-partnership” between YK and YT, and upon YT’s transfer of his shares in the companies to Harbour Front in February 1998, between YK and Harbour Front.  For present purposes, it is unnecessary to draw any distinction between YT and Harbour Front.

6.  YT and YK used to be directors of both Money Facts and Fonfair. YT ceased to be a director of both companies when he was adjudged bankrupt in 2001.  Since around March 2001, YK has been in sole control and management of both companies.

7.  Since 2001, the brothers have been engaged in a number of litigations, including non-exclusively the following proceedings.

8.  HCA 1886/2001 – After YT ceased to be a director of Fonfair, Fonfair under YK’s control commenced proceedings against a company controlled by YT (“Universal”) which used to lease the Property from Fonfair.  Without going into the details, YT misappropriated some of the rent payable to Fonfair and later allowed Universal to occupy the Property without paying rent. Fonfair obtained judgment against Universal (“2002 Judgment”) but Universal failed to comply with it, and YT actively took steps to thwart Fonfair’s attempts to pursue Universal to recover the judgement debt.

9.  HCCW 880/2001 and HCCW 246/2002 – Harbour Front petitioned for the winding up of Money Facts and Fonfair on the just and equitable ground, on the basis that it had been unfairly excluded from participating in the two companies’ management and affairs.  Kwan J (as Kwan VP then was) heard the petitions in November-December 2003, and in a detailed and closely reasoned judgment her Ladyship dismissed both petitions in February 2004 essentially on the ground that Harbour Front’s exclusion was not unfair: it was due to the misconduct of Harbour Front that there was a breakdown in the relationship of mutual trust and confidence, hence Harbour Front cannot assert its right of equal participation in the management of Money Facts and Fonfair (“2004 Judgment”). The misconduct included the misappropriation of Fonfair’s properties and related matters canvassed in the 2002 Judgment.

10.  In this Petition, YK relies upon a number of findings in the 2004 Judgment.  In particular, Her Ladyship found that Money Facts was set up to:

“1. ensure as the majority shareholder in [Fonfair], that the rental and other incomes received by Fonfair are properly administered and that after reasonable provisions for expenses such incomes are distributed to the shareholders of Fonfair; 2. ensure as the majority shareholder in [Fonfair], that Fonfair shall pursue and negotiate any future development plan and other business to safeguard and maximize the interest of Fonfair shareholders; 3. safeguard and maximize the interest of [YK] and [YT] in [Fonfair]; (I shall refer to the above as “the three purposes”).”

11.  Another provision of the SHA which YK relies on is what is called the “Cooperation Provision”:

“YK and YT agreed to negotiate and execute such further and other documents and instruments and to do such and further things as might be necessary to implement and carry out the intent of the [SHA].”

12.  HCCW 111/2015 and HCCW 116/2015 (“2015 Petitions”) – In 2015, Harbour Front again petitioned for the just and equitable winding up of Money Fact and Fonfair respectively, again based on YT/Harbour Front’s exclusion from management. These petitions were tried before Harris J who dismissed both petitions on 4 October 2017, with Written Reasons for Judgment handed down on 15 February 2018 (“2018 Judgment”).  In substance, his Lordship found that Harbour Front had fairly been excluded from management and had failed to remedy the losses it had caused by its misconduct. Harbour Front appealed against the 2018 Judgment, but abandoned the appeal in November 2018.

13.  The above judgments contained detailed findings of the background and history of the disputes between the two sides, to which I respectfully refer.

14.  HCMP 1987/2018 and HCMP 1988/2018 (“2018 Petitions”) – These are the latest rounds of proceedings prior to the presentation of the present Petition.  In these petitions, Harbour Front seeks (for the third time) to be allowed to reassert its rights under the SHA to participate in the management of the two companies’ affairs, on the ground that it had remedied or taken “active, serious and diligent steps” to remedy its misconduct.  It is pertinent to note here that the misconduct relied on by YK in this Petition are substantially the same as those pleaded in his Points of Defence filed in the 2018 Petitions. The 2018 Petitions are substantially ready to be set down for trial.

15.  In November 2018, in HCMP 1987/2018, Harbour Front successfully obtained from Deputy High Court Judge Kenneth Wong an interlocutory injunction against YK enjoining him (or through Money Facts) from causing or procuring Fonfair to dispose of or sell the Property without the prior approval or consent of Harbour Front (“Injunction”).  The Court of Appeal dismissed YK’s application for leave to appeal against that decision on 23 August 2019.

This Petition

16.  The Petition was presented by YK on 16 September 2019, ie. shortly after the Court of Appeal dismissed his application for leave to appeal against the Injunction. 

17.  In substance, YK complains that “YT (and since February 1998, Harbour Front) conducted Money Facts’ affairs in a manner unfairly prejudicial to the interests of its members including YK and caused an irrevocable breakdown in the relationship of trust and confidence”: Petition §12. In other words, YK invokes s.724(1)(a) of the Companies Ordinance, Cap. 622 (“Ordinance”).

18.  Petition §13 broadly summarises YK’s complaints in this way:

“YT and/or Harbour Front flagrantly breach [sic] the [SHA] by:

(1) misappropriating from and causing loss to Fonfair and (together with other entities or corporate vehicles controlled by YT) obstructing Fonfair’s efforts to recoup its losses (counteracting the 1st and 3rd Purposes of Money Facts and the Cooperation Provision) (see Section D below);

(2) persistently sabotaging or otherwise interfering with arm’s length sale of the [Property] by Fonfair in circumstances where Harbour Front was (as found by the courts) for good reason not entitled to participate in the management of Money Facts or Fonfair (counteracting the 2nd and 3rd Purposes of Money Facts and the Cooperation Provision) (see Section E below);

(3) refusing to properly consider and/or accept an arm’s length offer by a third party, [IDL] to purchase the [Property] from Fonfair at the consideration of HK$910,000,000 in August 2019 (“IDL Offer”) (counteracting the 2nd and 3rd Purposes of Money Facts and the Cooperation Provision) (see Section F below).”

19.  Section D, E and F of the Petition set out at length the alleged unfair prejudicial conduct relied upon. These sections refer to the dispute between the two sides over the years which have led to the many visits to the courts mentioned above. 

20.  More specifically:

(1) Section D refers to the disputes considered in the 2002 Judgment and the 2004 Judgment.  The section also refers to the events leading to the 2015 Petitions and the commencement of the 2015 Petitions to interfere with the proposed sale of the Property.

(2) Section E refers to two incidents in 2008 and 2015 when offers had been made by third parties to purchase the Property. These were referred to as the “Littlewoods Offer” (in 2008) and the “Chung Sing Offer” (in 2015).  It is unnecessary to go into details here, suffice to say that the events related to these two matters had been considered by Harris J in the 2018 Judgment.  His Lordship found that YT’s conduct relating to the Chung Sing Offer were done with a view to interfering in the sale of the Property to Chung Sing as were the presentation of the 2015 Petitions.

(3) Section F concerns the Injunction.  The gist of the complaint is that after delivery of the 2018 Judgment, when Harbour Front was in correspondence with the management of Money Facts and Fonfair with regard to a proposed public tender of the Property, Harbour Front suddenly commenced the 2018 Petitions and obtained the Injunction to stop the sale of the Property.  The Petition pleads that the application for interlocutory injunction was made in bad faith.  Further, the Petition complains that in 2019 an offer was received from a third party (ie. the IDL Offer) to purchase the Property for HK$888 million, subsequently increased to HK$910 million, but Harbour Front refused to engage in any meaningful consideration of the offer and rejected it outright.  This is said to be in breach of the SHA.   The IDL Offer has since lapsed.

21.  The Petition concludes in §59 in these terms: “In the circumstances, YK submits that Money Facts’ affairs are being or have been conducted in a manner unfairly prejudicial to the interests of the members including YK.”  Again, this is a clear reference to s.724(1)(a) of the Ordinance.

22.  The primary relief prayed for is an order that Harbour Front buys-out YK’s shares in Money Facts at fair value to be assessed by the court, after taking into account of and making allowances for the unfairly prejudicial conduct complained of. 

23.  Neither YK, nor Harbour Front in the 2018 Petitions, invokes the court’s jurisdiction to wind-up the companies on the just and equitable ground under s.177(1)(f) of the Companies (Winding Up and Miscellaneous Provisions) Ordinance, Cap. 32.

Grounds for striking out

24.  In support of the application to strike out the Petition, counsel for YK (Ms Sabrina Ho and Mr Justin Lam) relied on three main grounds in their Skeleton Submissions.

25.  First, it is said that the Petition discloses no reasonable cause of action because YK has been in full and sole control of the boards of Money Facts and Fonfair, so that it is within his power to cause and he did cause the companies to take action to remedy the alleged wrongful conduct committed by Harbour Front (“Control Point”).

26.  Secondly, it is said that the allegations against Harbour Front do not concern the conduct of Money Facts’ affairs or any act/ omission on behalf of Money Facts.  The court has no jurisdiction to grant relief under ss.724 and 725 of the Ordinance (“Jurisdiction Point”).

27.  Thirdly, the Petition is a collateral attack on the correctness of the Injunction.  It is not open to YK to claim that it is unfairly prejudicial for Harbour Front to act upon the interim injunction and withhold consent for a proposed sale of the Property (“Injunction Point”).

Strike out: applicable principles

28.  There is no dispute between counsel for both sides that the burden is on the applicant to show that it is plain and obvious that the petition is bound to fail, assuming that the allegations pleaded in the petition will be established: Re Hitachi Shin Din Cable Limited, HCMP 2979/2004 (unrep, 2 February 2005) at [2] per Kwan J.

Central question is Jurisdiction

29.  Despite the multiple ways in which the application is advanced on behalf of Harbour Front, Ms Ho realistically accepted that the determinative question is the Jurisdiction Point.  She accepted, in my view rightly, that if the complaints pleaded in the Petition arguably fall within the jurisdictional ambit of s.724(1), neither the Control Point nor the Injunction Point, separately or cumulatively, would be dispositive of the Petition.  The converse is also true: if the complaints do not fall within the jurisdiction conferred by s.724(1), the other points would not save the Petition.

30.  Further, as I have observed, the complaints pleaded in the Petition are substantially the same as the facts and matters pleaded in YK’s Points of Defence in the 2018 Petitions.  These events will have to be canvassed at the trial of the 2018 Petitions, so there will be no significant increase in terms of time, or costs, if the Petition is to be heard together with the 2018 Petitions.

31.  That being the case, I turn to consider the central question in this application, namely whether the misconduct complained of arguably fall within the statutory jurisdiction.

Jurisdiction under s.724(1)

32.  Section 724(1) provides that:

“The Court may exercise the power under section 725(1)(a) and (2) if, on a petition by a member of a company, it considers that–

(a) the company’s affairs are being or have been conducted in a manner unfairly prejudicial to the interests of the members generally or of one or more members (including the member); or

(b) an actual or proposed act or omission of the company (including one done or made on behalf of the company) is or would be so prejudicial.”

33.  Counsel for both sides cited a number of authorities on the ambit of s.724 (and its equivalents under the previous s.168A of the Companies Ordinance, Cap. 32, and the corresponding English legislations).  The following principles can be derived from the authorities cited.

34.  The conduct complained of must be (or, in this context, capable of constituting) the act or conduct of the company, as opposed to act or conduct of the shareholder in his private capacity:  Re Ka Ka Realty Ltd [2004] 1 HKLRD 832 at [13] to [24] per Kwan J; Re CY Foundation Group Ltd (unrep. HCMP 702/2010, 25 April 2012)at [65] - [69] per Barma J (as Barma JA then was).

35.  The “affairs of the company” is to be construed widely: Mandarin Resources Corp Ltd (unrep. HCCW 348/1986) at [14] per Burrell J.  In Luck Continent Ltd v Cheng Chee Tock Theodore [2013] 4 HKLRD 181 (which was the appeal from Barma J’s decision in Re CY Foundation) at [30], Lam JA (as Lam VP then was, with whom Stock VP and Lunn LJ agreed) said:

“… the acts or conduct in question must be in respect of the company’s affairs. It has been said that the court will construe the words ‘affairs of a company’ liberally and will not adopt a technical or legalistic approach but will look at the business realities: see Re Neath Rugby Ltd [2009] 2 BCLC 427, [50]; McKillen v Misland (Cyprus) Investments Ltd [2012] EWHC 2343 (Ch), [628]-[629].”

36.  Paragraphs [628]–[629] of Re Coroin (No 2), McKillen v Misland (Cyprus) Investments Ltd [2013] 2 BCLC 583 (the first instance decision David Richards J) are in these terms:

“[628] The court will not adopt a technical or legalistic approach to what constitutes the affairs of the company but will look at the business realities. It was held by the Court of Appeal in Re Citybranch Group Ltd [2004] EWCA Civ 815, [2004] 4 All ER 735, [2005] 1 WLR 3505 that the affairs of a company could include the affairs of a wholly-owned subsidiary which had common directors. If the affairs of the subsidiary are being conducted in a manner which damages the subsidiary and hence the value of the holding company's interest in the subsidiary, then the omission of the directors of the holding company to take steps to rectify the situation seems to me plainly capable of falling within s 994(1). Likewise, where the directors of a partly owned subsidiary nominated by the holding company permitted the holding company to build up a business at the expense of the subsidiary's business, which was allowed to wither, without taking any steps to protect the subsidiary's position, they were engaged in the conduct of the affairs of the subsidiary: Scottish Co-operative Wholesale Society Ltd v Meyer [1958] 3 All ER 66, [1959] AC 324; see also the decision of Court of Session (Outer House) in Whillock v Henderson [2009] BCG 314, 2007 SLT 1222.

[629] By way of conclusion on this aspect, guidance was given by the Court of Appeal in Re Neath Rugby Ltd (No 2), Hawkes v Cuddy (No 2) [2009] EWCA Civ 291, [2009] 2 BCLC 427 at [50] where, in a judgment with which the other members of the court agreed, Stanley Burnton LJ said:

‘The judge cited the observations of Powell J in Re Dernacourt Investments Pty Ltd (1990) 2 ACSR 553 at 556: "The words 'affairs of a company' are extremely wide and should be construed liberally: (a) in determining the ambit of the 'affairs' of a parent company for the purposes of s 320, the court looks at the business realities of a situation and does not confine them to a narrow legalistic view; (b) 'affairs' of a company encompass all matters which may come before its board for consideration; (c) conduct of the 'affairs' of a parent company includes refraining from procuring a subsidiary to do something or condoning by inaction an act of a subsidiary, particularly when the directors of the parent and the subsidiary are the same ... " I would accept these propositions, but with some qualification. Proposition (b) may extend to matters which are capable of coming before the board for its consideration, and may not be limited to those that actually come before the board: I do not accept that matters that are not considered by the board are not capable of being part of its affairs. Nonetheless, like the judge, I am unable to see how it can be said that the affairs of Neath and of Osprey were so intermingled that all of the affairs of the latter were the affairs of the former. It would, for example, be quite irrational to suggest that Mr Blyth, when acting as a director of Osprey, was conducting the affairs of Neath.’

It no doubt goes without saying that the affairs of the company will also encompass matters which must go to the company in general meeting, rather than the board, for consideration.”

37.  There is no dispute between counsel for the parties on these principles. The arguments of counsel focused on the application of these principles to the facts of this case.

Parties’ contentions

38.  I have already mentioned that the Petition at §12 alleges that:

“YT (and since about February 1998, Harbour Front) conducted Money Facts’ affairs in a manner unfairly prejudicial to the interests of the members including YK.” (emphasis added)

39.  Ms Ho, on behalf of Harbour Front, argued that the Petition  is fundamentally flawed.  She emphasised the special feature in this case, ie. that YK has been in control of Money Facts since 2001 and it was YK, not Harbour Front, who has been conducting the affairs of Money Facts. The facts pleaded in the Petition are conduct of Harbour Front, not affairs of Money Facts.   For example, Ms Ho referred to Petition §41 where it is pleaded that the acts by Harbour Front in relation to the Chung Sing Offer were done:

“in bad faith to sabotage any arm’s length negotiation of sale of the [Property] by Fonfair to third parties, stifle any genuine offers made by third parties to purchase the same, and in breach of the 2nd and 3rd Purposes of Money Facts”;

and Petition §41(6) where it is pleaded that:

“By commencing the 2015 Petitions (which were dismissed after trial), Harbour Front improperly hijacked the management of Money Facts and Fonfair which it was not entitled to.”

40.  Ms Ho submitted that these paragraphs demonstrate that the substance of what YK complains of is that YT/Harbour Front were wrongfully interfering with or sabotaging the proposed sale of the Property, rather than Harbour Front conducting any affairs of Money Facts.

41.  Ms Frances Lok, counsel for YK, submitted that s.724 is engaged (or, in the present context, arguably so).  Ms Lok’s primary contention is that the conduct of YT/Harbour Front pleaded in the Petition constituted the affairs of Money Facts despite the fact that YT/Harbour Front had no management role or control over Money Facts since 2001. 

42.  More specifically, she argued that s.724(1)(a) does not mention who was conducting the affairs of the company, and it is possible that a person who has no management role in the company could depending on the facts be said to be conducting the affairs of the company. Ms Lok placed emphasis on the wider context and the past history of the two brothers’ dispute. It is important to bear in mind, so Ms Lok submitted, the unique circumstances of this case: Money Facts was set up to hold the Property (via Fonfair), with the two brothers each holding equal number of shares; the SHA goes to the core of Money Facts’ existence and spells out the requirement that the Property would be managed in such a way so as to achieve the “three purposes”; and the past history over the past 30 years was all about the two brothers wrestling over the control of Money Facts and the Property.  The wrongful conduct of YT/Harbour Front undermined the very reason of Money Facts’ existence.  Viewed in this light, it is arguable (so Ms Lok submitted) that although YT/Harbour Front has no management role or control of the companies, the conduct complained of, all of which had to do with leasing the Property, receiving rent, taking possession of or sale of the Property, are “affairs of the company”.

43.  In support of that contention, Ms Lok referred to Re Coroin (No 2); McKillen v Misland (Cyprus) Investments Ltd, supra at [626] and Re CY Foundation Group Ltd, supra at [67]-[69] for the proposition that “private acts” of a shareholder may be covered by s.724 if those acts translate into acts or omissions of the company or the conduct of its affairs.  

44.  What David Richards J said in [626] in the former decision is this:

“[626] The purpose of the jurisdiction is to provide remedies in respect of the way in which the affairs of the company are conducted. It was perceived prior to the enactment of s 75 of the Companies Act 1980 that there was insufficient protection to shareholders in that respect. The section is not directed to the activities of shareholders amongst themselves, unless those activities translate into acts or omissions of the company or the conduct of its affairs. Relations between shareholders inter se are adequately governed by the law of contract and tort, including where appropriate the ability to enforce personal rights conferred by a company's articles of association. This important distinction has been emphasised in many of the authorities. In Re Legal Costs Negotiators Ltd [1999] 2 BCLC 171 the Court of Appeal upheld the decision of Peter Goldsmith QC, sitting as a deputy judge of the Chancery Division, to strike out a petition under s 459 of the Companies Act 1985 as unsustainable. Peter Gibson LJ (at 195) summarised the judgment below, with which he said he completely agreed. He said that the judge –

“reviewed the authorities from which he drew two points of significance for the case before him. The first was that the starting point was to consider what the parties had agreed between themselves as their commercial relationship, though he recognised that this need not always be contained in the articles of association. The second was that the essence of the powers under s 459 is to give a remedy where there is complaint about the way the company's affairs are being conducted through the use (or failure to use) powers in relation to the conduct of the company's affairs provided by its constitution. He regarded the section as concerned with the company's affairs rather than the affairs of individuals and to be concerned with acts done by the company or those authorised to act as its organs.”

Peter Gibson LJ said (at 196):

“Thus like the judge I too would lay emphasis on the need to show that it is the affairs of the company which are being or have been conducted in an unfairly prejudicial manner or that it is an act or omission of the company that is or would be so prejudicial. The conduct of a member of his own affairs, for example by requesting a general meeting of the company or seeking answers to an excessive number of questions, is irrelevant.”

I would only add that the refusal by a company to convene a general meeting would be an act of the company, although whether it was either unfair or prejudicial would of course depend on the circumstances. Other authorities in which the same distinction had been drawn include Re Unisoft Group Ltd (No 3) [1994]1 BCLC 609, Re Estate Acquisition and Development Ltd [1995] BCC 338 and Re Leeds United Holdings plc [1996] 2 BCLC 545.”

45.  It seems to me that Ms Lok was taking what David Richards J said in [626] out of context.  That paragraph has to be read together with [628] and [629] which have been adopted by our Court of Appeal in Luck Continent v Cheng: see [35]-[36] above.  David Richards J was addressing what might constitute the company’s affairs within the meaning of the section.  I do not read the learned judge to be saying, or intending to say, that simply because the conduct of a shareholder has a causal effect on what the company does or does not do, the shareholder’s conduct would amount to the affairs of the company.  A creditor could by serving a statutory demand against a company cause the company to take certain responsive actions.  It would be difficult, one may perhaps even say absurd, to suggest that the creditor is thereby “conducting” the affairs of the company simply because what he does leads the company to react in a certain way.

46.  Likewise, Barma J in Re CY Foundation Group Ltd [67]-[69] was addressing the distinction between acts or lack of action on the part of a company and acts of a shareholder in exercising his own private right.  The decision, properly understood, does not support the wide proposition advanced by Ms Lok.

47.  Ms Lok also submitted that private acts of a shareholder destroying trust and confidence in a quasi-partnership company can amount to unfairly prejudicial conduct in the affairs of the company, citing Re Home & Office Fire Extinguishers Ltd [2012] EWHC 917 (Ch) [92]; Re Abbington Hotel Ltd [2012] 1 BCLC 410 [105]; and Rackind v Gross [2005] 1 WLR 3505 [16] – [18].

48.  It is unnecessary to go into those authorities in detail.  Re Home & Office Fire Extinguishers Ltd and Re Abbington Hotel Ltd are cases where the respondent was in a management role of a quasi-partnership company and the conduct in question took place either in the course of his conduct of the company’s affairs or against the background of disputes between the shareholders over the management and affairs of the company.  Properly understood in context, the passages in these cases relied upon do not support Ms Lok’s wide proposition.  Rackind v Gloss concerned the conduct of a subsidiary’s affairs and does not assist.

49.  Ms Lok in her oral submissions said that YK also relies on s.724(1)(b), despite no reference to that effect in the Petition. Moreover, she advanced no submissions as to how that limb applies here.  In response, Ms Ho submitted that it would be wrong to allow such an argument to be raised when s.724(1)(b) has not been expressly pleaded, citing Graham v Every [2014] EWCA Civ 191 at [37] per Arden LJ and [77] per Vos LJ (as Lady Arden and the Chancellor then were).

50.  Given that this a strike out application, if any deficiency in the Petition could be remedied by an appropriate amendment, the court may decline to strike out.  The difficulty here, however, is that Ms Lok has not explained how s.724(1)(b) may be relevant.  Nor has she suggested that YK might apply to amend the Petition.  I am therefore not inclined to accept Ms Lok’s argument.

Exercise of discretion

51.  I have carefully considered the submissions made by counsel.  As presently advised, I am sceptical that YK’s pleaded case does fall within s.724(1).  Nevertheless, I have come to the conclusion that this is not an appropriate case to strike out, for two reasons.

52.  First, I am mindful that the circumstances of this case are unusual.  Although at the moment the case advanced by Ms Lok appears somewhat shadowy, I am not prepared to go as far as to hold that the Petition could not arguably fall within s.724(1).  At the end of the day, as Ms Lok frankly accepted, her case would involve a novel construction of s.724(1)(a).  I am persuaded, albeit only just, that YK’s contention should be given an opportunity for more matured consideration at trial.

53.  Secondly, I also bear in mind that substantially the same complaints are being relied upon in YK’s defence to the 2018 Petitions.  Counsel for both sides accept that if the Petition is allowed to proceed, it should be heard together with the 2018 Petitions. Realistically, therefore, to allow YK to pursue the Petition would not add significantly to time or costs.

54.  Whether to strike out the Petition is a matter of discretion.  Taking into account these two reasons, I am prepared to exercise my discretion not to strike out the Petition so that YK would be able to have his case fully argued in the light of the facts found by the trial judge.

Disposal

55.  For these reasons, the Summons is dismissed. 

56.  I order that the Petition shall be heard together with the trial of the 2018 Petitions.  I will give the following directions:

(1) The Petition shall stand as Points of Claim;

(2) The 1st Respondent shall file and serve Points of Defence within 14 days from the date of handing down of this judgment;

(3) The Petitioner shall file and serve Points of Reply within 14 days thereafter;

(4) The Petitioner and the 1st Respondent do file and exchange their List of Documents within 21 days thereafter. The List of Documents shall only contain documents which have not been disclosed in the disclosures in HCMP 1987/2018 and HCMP 1988/2018;

(5) There be inspection of documents within 14 days thereafter;

(6) The Petitioner and the 1st Respondent do file and exchange their witness statements within 21 days after inspection. The witness statements shall only cover matters which have not been covered in the witness statements and the witness statements in reply filed in HCMP 1987/2018 and HCMP 1988/2018.

57.  As to costs, it seems to me that a fair order would be for the costs of the application to be in the cause.  I make an order nisi to that effect. Either party who wishes to vary that costs order nisi should apply in writing within 7 days of handing down this judgment.

58.  Lastly, I thank counsel for their assistance.

(Jat Sew-tong SC)
Deputy High Court Judge

  

Ms Frances Lok, instructed by Ho & Ip, for the Petitioner

Ms Sabrina Ho and Mr Justin Lam, instructed by Yiu & Associates, Solicitors for the 1st Respondent

The 2nd Respondent was not represented and did not appear