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Miscellaneous Proceedings2019

MAN KAI-KWONG, DAVID v. MAK YING-MUI as the administratrix of the estate of the Deceased AND OTHERS

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[2026] HKCFI 2321-EN-2026-04-29

MAN KAI-KWONG, DAVID v. MAK YING-MUI as the Administratrix of the estate of the Deceased AND OTHERS

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HCMP 703/2019

[2026] HKCFI 2321

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS NO. 703 OF 2019

____________

 IN THE MATTER of the Estate of MAN FOR-TAI, WILLIAM (文伙泰), Deceased (“the Deceased”), late of House B3 and carpark, Flamingo Garden, 8 Fei Wan Rd, Sai Kung, New Territories
 and
 IN THE MATTER of Order 85 of the Rules of the High Court (Cap. 4A)
 and
 IN THE MATTER of sections 33 and 36 of the Probate and Administration Ordinance (Cap. 10)

____________

BETWEEN

 MAN KAI-KWONG, DAVIDPlaintiff
 and 
 MAK YING-MUI as the Administratrix of the estate of the Deceased1st Defendant
 MAN KAI-SAU, PETER2nd Defendant
 MAN KAI-FUNG3rd Defendant
 MAN KAI-SUNG, SUSAN4th Defendant

____________

Before: Deputy High Court Judge Grace Chow in Chambers (By Paper Disposal)
Dates of Written Submissions of the Plaintiff: 20 March 2026 and 14 April 2026
Date of Written Submissions of the 2nd Defendant: 8 April 2026
Date of Decision: 29 April 2026

_______________

D E C I S I O N

_______________


Introduction and Procedural Background

1.  By my decision dated 16 March 2026, I dismissed the Plaintiff’s appeal against the Order of Master Jocelyn Leung of 16 October 2025: see [2026] HKCFI 1435 (“the Decision”). For ease of reference and consistency, save as otherwise herein indicated, I shall adopt the same abbreviations and definitions in the Decision.

2.  Essentially, having reconsidered D2’s application to commence proceedings for taxation of the costs order made against P in favour of D2 out of time, for the reasons explained in the Decision, I agreed with the Master that in the exercise of the court’s discretion, time should be extended under O.62, r.16 of RHC for D2 to commence taxation of the Costs Order made absolute by DHCJ MK Liu on 24 February 2023. This decision should be read together with the Decision.

3.  By Summons dated 20 March 2026 (“P’s Summons”), P seeks inter alia:

(1)  Leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal against my Order dated 16 March 2026; and

(2)  A stay of all costs order (including the costs order in the Decision) and the taxation proceedings scheduled for 6 May 2026 (“the Taxation Hearing”), pending appeal or alternatively, until the conclusion of the compulsory liquidation of D2 in the PRC or further order of the court.

4.  On 20 March 2026, an Affirmation of P (“P’s Aff”) and Written Submissions were also filed stated to be in support of P’s applications for leave to appeal and for stay of execution.

5.  By letter dated 23 March 2026, P wrote to this court seeking an urgent application for an interim stay of the deadline for him to file points of objections in respect of the summary assessment of costs as well as an interim stay of the Taxation Hearing pending determination of P’s Summons. This was objected to by letter from D2’s solicitors dated 25 March 2026. I did not entertain P’s application by correspondence which was wholly improper and unjustified[1]. In any event, as subsequently indicated in my summary assessment pursuant to my direction in the Decision (§39) conducted on 15 April 2026, having nonetheless received P’s Points of Objections, I saw no justification for any interim stay of the summary assessment pending determination of P’s Summons. As for a stay of execution of the costs order and a stay of the Taxation Hearing, I indicated that this should be considered together with the application for leave to appeal for which I had already directed the lodging and service of written submissions on 23 March 2026 for my determination on paper which I would do as soon as practicable.

6.  The parties filed their further written submissions as directed. A supplemental Affirmation of P (“P’s Supp Aff”) was also filed in support of P’s Summons on 14 April 2026.

7.  By letter dated 20 April 2026 to my clerk, P stated that he was requesting for “offset” of the prior costs order made by the Master (summarily assessed at HK$40,000) against my summary assessment of the costs  (assessed at HK$60,000) and “an immediate stay of execution” based on the matters state therein.  Any application that is not covered by P’s Summons (or any Summons) or submissions not filed pursuant to my directions plainly should not be considered by me and the writing of letters to the court by litigants without regard to proper procedure should not be condoned.

Applicable Principles

8.  The test for granting leave to appeal against an interlocutory order of the Court of First Instance is trite. Under s.14AA(4) of the High Court Ordinance, Cap. 4, leave to appeal shall not be granted unless the court is satisfied that the appeal has a reasonable prospect of success, or there is some other reason in the interests of justice why the appeal should be heard. Reasonable prospects of success involves the notion that the prospects of succeeding must be “reasonable” and therefore more than “fanciful”, without having to be “probable”. See e.g. Xu Hongbiao v Oasis Investment Group Limited & Ors[2024] HKCA 854per Kwan VP at §41.

9.  Furthermore, insofar as a challenge is made to a judge’s exercise of discretion, it is well-established that the appeal court is not to exercise an independent discretion of its own. Its initial function is one of review only. It is not enough to suggest that the judge assigned inappropriate weight to one (or several) factor(s) in the balancing exercise that led him to exercise his discretion as he did. The appellate court will not interfere simply because it might take a different view from the judge as to the weight assigned to any given factor. However, it may set aside the judge’s exercise of discretion if it can be shown that the judge was plainly wrong in the sense that, for example, he had acted on wrong principles, taken into consideration irrelevant factors, ignored relevant factors or the decision is outside the generous ambit within which reasonable disagreement is possible: see e.g. ibid at §43.

10.  As for a stay of execution, the starting position is that an appeal shall not operate as a stay of execution or of proceedings under the decision of the court below: see O. 59, r.13(1) of RHC. This is because it is not the policy of the court to deprive a successful party of the fruits of his success in litigation. Unless the defendant can justify a stay of execution, one will not be ordered. The practice of the court is that justification can be demonstrated if good reasons exist. Commonly, when considering whether good reasons exist, reference is made to factors such as whether the absence or existence of a stay would render an appeal nugatory and the merits of the appeal. As for merits, merely an arguable appeal cannot by itself be sufficient reason to justify a stay. But if the court is not convinced that there exist arguable grounds of appeal, no stay will be granted. See Star Play Development Ltd v Bess Fashion Management Co Ltd [2007] 5 HKC 84 per Ma J (as he then was) at §§6-10 and Hong Kong Civil Procedure 2026, Vol.1, §59/13/1.

Discussion

11.  In P’s Summons and written submissions, essentially, the following grounds were relied upon in support of his application for leave to appeal and for a stay of execution:

(1)  There is fresh evidence that compulsory liquidation proceedings in Shenzhen against D2 and his associated entities have been commenced. It is said that those proceedings are funded and “state sanctioned” (“Ground 1”);

(2)  P believes that D2 is attempting to use this court as an “ATM” to extract or “cash in” on the costs order (by claiming HK$2.28M in his bill of costs in the taxation proceedings) to fund his legal defence to recovery efforts against him for “siphoning state-linked assets” and it would be an abuse of process to allow him to do so when he is simultaneously subject to liquidation for siphoning the Estate’s assets and currently is a debtor to the Estate in the sum of approximately RMB 260M (“Ground 2”);

(3)  P is currently coordinating with Shenzhen Bus Group (“SBG”), a state-owned enterprise, and the Shenzhen Liquidation Committee on the recovery efforts and any “distribution of funds” to D2 would violate the principles of judicial comity and compromise the global recovery efforts involving state-owned assets (“Ground 3”);

(4)  This court erred in awarding D2 with costs despite his admitted 9-month undue delay and granting D2 a “HK$2.28M windfall” constitutes a palpable error of law (“Ground 4”); and

(5)  P asserts a right of equitable set-off and it is unconscionable to compel payment of costs to D2 when D2 owes RMB32.5M (being P’s 12.5% beneficial interest in the Estate). A stay pending the conclusion of the PRC proceedings would enable the equitable set-off to be calculated upon the conclusion of those proceedings (“Ground 5”).

12.  None of the above grounds demonstrates how my exercise of the discretion to extend time and/or to order costs against P was plainly wrong, in the sense that I had acted on wrong principles, taken into consideration irrelevant factors, ignored relevant factors or my decision is outside the generous ambit within which reasonable disagreement is possible.

13.  In respect of Ground 1, from the evidence before me, it is Shenzhen New Fu Kong Transportation Development Co. Ltd (“NFK”), a corporate vehicle established by SBG and Shenciti Investments Company Limited, the latter which D2 is a director, which is the subject of liquidation filed by SBG[2]. I do not accept that there are any liquidation proceedings against D2 or his associated companies. In any event, I cannot see how the fact that liquidation proceedings are now commenced in Shenzhen against NFK is relevant to demonstrate I erred in the exercise of my discretion to extend time and in particular, my finding of any lack of prejudice to P as a result of the delay.

14.  In respect of Ground 2, as mentioned above, it is not factually correct that D2 is subject to any liquidation proceedings. I also cannot see how there can be any abuse of process when by commencing taxation proceedings, D2 is merely seeking to enforce the costs order of DHCJ MK Liu as a result of P’s unsuccessful litigation against D2 in the OS. Besides, the taxation proceedings concern the quantum of D2’s costs which is disputed by P and have nothing to do with the Estate which is not a party to the taxation proceedings and D2 cannot be said to be extracting anything from the Estate.

15.  In respect of Ground 3, as already mentioned D2 is not subject to any recovery proceedings and even if there are proceedings on foot for recovery against him personally, I cannot see how it has any bearing on P’s personal liability to pay costs ordered against him in Hong Kong proceedings. Leaving aside the lack of any authorities to support the bold assertion that the award of costs to the winner of litigation in Hong Kong would be against judicial comity, I also do not see how this matter is relevant to demonstrate that I erred in the exercise of my discretion.

16.  In respect of Ground 4, whether D2 is granted the HK$2.28M windfall is matter for the taxation proceedings. As for awarding costs against P when D2 had delayed without good explanation, I had taken that into account as one of the relevant factors but as I held in the Decision (at §33) that does not automatically debar relief. I also cannot see how any unexplained delay demonstrates that I erred in the exercise of my discretion on costs when ultimately I exercised my discretion in favour of extending time for D2 to commence taxation.

17.  In respect of Ground 5, on P’s case (which is not established by evidence), any debt would be owed by D2 to the Estate but that does not make D2 personally liable to P for there to be a set-off of debts. Besides, equitable set-off only applies to cross-claims that arise out of the same transaction or are closely connected with it: see Federal Commerce & Navigation Co. Ltd v Molena Alpha Inc. [1978] QB 927 at 974-975. I simply cannot see any connection between the costs order against P in the OS (concerning the administration of the Estate) and debts allegedly owed by D2 to the Estate which on P’s case were as a result of misfeasance committed by D2 which led to NFK’s failure (see Decision, §35).

18.  For the avoidance of doubt, I have anxiously considered all the written submissions lodged pursuant to my direction and have not overlooked the various miscellaneous submissions therein such as the serious allegations of concealment of evidence, bad faith, breach of candor/deception etc. against D2, but there is nothing to those complaints (without accepting they are justifiable) particularly when the matters relied upon and the further evidence produced by P are not simply relevant to the present application in that they do now show how I had erred in the exercise of my discretion. In the Written Submissions of P, mandatory disclosure orders are sought from D2’s solicitor. This is clearly misconceived being unsupported by any legal basis and in any event is beyond the scope of P’s Summons.

19.  In all, I am not satisfied that the intended appeal has a reasonable prospect of success, or there is some other reason in the interests of justice why the appeal should be heard by the Court of Appeal.

20.  It follows that there is no basis to grant a stay of the Taxation Hearing or the previous costs order pending appeal as there is no pending appeal upon the dismissal of P’s Summons. There is also no basis for seeking a stay pending the liquidation proceedings in the PRC.

Disposition and Orders

21.  Accordingly, P’s Summons is dismissed. I see no reason why costs should not follow the event. P should pay to D2 forthwith the costs of P’s Summons to be summarily assessed on paper. D2 should lodge and serve a Statement of Costs (limited to 3 pages) within 7 days from the handing down of this Decision and P should lodge and serve any objections (limited to 3 pages) within 7 days thereafter.

  ( Grace Chow )
Deputy High Court Judge

The Plaintiff acted in person

Messrs. J. Chan, Yip, So & Partners, for the 2nd Defendant



[1]  On 22 October 2025, the Master had already informed P that the court will not deal with applications by way of letter. See also AXA China Region Insurance Company Limited v Leong Fong Cheng (unrep) CACV 113/2016, 28 October 2016 where the Court of Appeal has clearly held that communications to the court, whether by fax or letters, should not be encouraged. Furthermore, any application should be made by way of summons supported by affidavits or affirmations and not by correspondence. It is only in very exceptional circumstances that the court will entertain an application by letter. Moreover, it was stated categorically that the rules and procedures of the court applies equally to litigant acting in person. See §§43-55.

[2]  See e.g. Exhibit “DM-1” to P’s Aff and Exhibits “A” and “F” to P’s Supp Aff.

[2026] HKCFI 1435-EN-2026-03-16

MAN KAI KWONG, DAVID v. MAK YING MUI as the administratrix of the estate of the Deceased AND OTHERS

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HCMP 703/2019

[2026] HKCFI 1435

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS NO 703 OF 2019

____________

 IN THE MATTER of the Estate of MAN FOR-TAI, WILLIAM (文伙泰), Deceased ("the Deceased"), late of House B3 and carpark, Flamingo Garden, 8 Fei Wan Rd, Sai Kung, New Territories
 and
 IN THE MATTER of Order 85 of the Rules of the High Court (Cap. 4A)
 and
 IN THE MATTER of sections 33 and 36 of the Probate and Administration Ordinance (Cap. 10)

____________

BETWEEN

 MAN KAI-KWONG, DAVIDPlaintiff
 and 
 MAK YING-MUI as the Administratrix of the estate of the Deceased1st Defendant
 MAN KAI-SAU, PETER2nd Defendant
 MAN KAI-FUNG3rd Defendant
 MAN KAI-SUNG, SUSAN4th Defendant

____________

Before: Deputy High Court Judge Grace Chow in Chambers (Open to Public)
Date of Hearing: 24 February 2026
Date of Decision: 16 March 2026

_______________

D E C I S I O N

_______________

Introduction

1.  I have before me an appeal by the Plaintiff (“P”) against the Order of Master Jocelyn Leung (“Master”) of 16 October 2025 inter alia extending time for the 2nd Defendant (“D2”) to commence proceedings for taxation out of time.

2.  At the hearing of the appeal (“the Hearing”), P appeared in person, unrepresented, and Mr So, solicitors, appeared for D2.

Brief Background and Procedural History

3.  These proceedings, commenced by Originating Summons dated 19 May 2019 (“OS”), concern the administration of the estate of the late Mr Man For Tai William (“the Deceased”) who passed away on 19 June 2014. P is the eldest son of the Deceased and D2 is the son of the Deceased and P’s younger brother.

4.  Under paragraph 1 of the OS, P sought to appoint himself as a co-administrator of the Estate of the Deceased but this was dismissed at the substantive hearing of the OS on 16 December 2020. On 15 July 2021, P obtained leave to amend the OS by inserting paragraph 1A to remove the 1st Defendant (“D1”), P’s mother, the administratrix of the Estate, and replace her by an independent and professional administrator. The amended OS (“AOS”) together with D2’s application to strike out paragraph 2 of the AOS were substantively heard on 1 December 2022.

5.  On 7 December 2022, DHCJ MK Liu handed down judgment dismissing the AOS and struck out paragraph 2 of the AOS (“the Judgment”). A costs order nisi was made against P requiring him to pay the costs of all the Defendants including the costs of D2’s strike out application to be taxed if not agreed (“Costs Order Nisi”).

6.  On 20 December 2022, the Defendants took out their respective Summonses to vary the Costs Order Nisi.

7.  On 21 December 2022, P took out a Summons to vary the Costs Order Nisi.

8.  On 4 January 2023, P served a Notice of Appeal against the Judgment (“P’s Notice of Appeal”).

9.  On 24 February 2023, the Costs Order Nisi was made absolute following the dismissal of the parties’ summonses to vary the Costs Order Nisi.

10.  On 9 May 2023, the parties entered into a Consent Summons for the dismissal of P’s Notice of Appeal which was approved by the court on 16 May 2023.

11.  On 12 May 2023, D2’s solicitors wrote to P’s solicitors making a first without prejudice offer to settle D2’s claim for costs against P. This was rejected by P’s solicitors on 29 June 2023, informing D2 that P had reached settlement on D1’s claims for costs (on 23 June 2023) and counter-offered to settle D2’s costs by the same amount.

12.  On 3 July 2023, D2’s solicitors wrote to P’s solicitors rejecting P’s counter-offer and made a second without prejudice offer to P.

13.  On 10 July 2023, P’s solicitors rejected D2’s second without prejudice offer and made a second counter-offer to D2 valid to 14 July 2023. On the same day, P had reached settlement with the 3rd and 4th Defendants on their costs.

14.  On 24 January 2024, D2’s solicitors rejected the second counter-offer and made a third without prejudice offer to P which was rejected on 31 January 2024.

15.  On 17 April 2024, formal instructions were sent to a law costs draftsman (“Adrian”) by D2 to prepare a formal bill of costs.

16.  On 20 December 2024, a first draft of the bill of costs was sent by Adrian to D2’s solicitors.

17.  On 8 January 2025, D2’s solicitors sent their comments to Adrian.

18.  On 16 April 2025, the final draft of the bill of costs was sent by Adrian.

19.  On 17 April 2025, the final bill of costs was sent to P’s solicitors with an invitation to put forward a reasonable offer to settle the costs by 30 April 2025.

20.  On 30 April 2025, P rejected the invitation on the basis that taxation proceedings were already time-barred under O.62, r.22(7) of the Rules of the High Court, Cap. 4A (“RHC”).

21.  On 7 May 2025, P’s solicitors informed D2’s solicitors that they have no further instructions to act for P.

22.  On 8 May 2025, D2 filed a Summons for extension of time under O.62, r.16 of RHC (“D2’s Summons”).

Applicable Principles

23.  It is trite that an appeal from a master to a judge in chambers is dealt with by way of an actual rehearing of the application which led to the order under appeal, and the judge treats the matter as though it came before him or her for the first time: see Hong Kong Civil Procedure 2026, Vol.1, §58/1/2.

24.  Furthermore, O.62, r.22(1) of RHC requires a person entitled to payment of costs (receiving party) to commence taxation within 3 months after the completion date.

25.  In relation to a costs order made by the Court of First Instance, “completion date” means: (a) the date of the judgment or order of the Court of First Instance which disposes of the action; (b) the date on which the Court of First Instance makes the costs order; or if the order is an order nisi, the date on which the order is made absolute or varied (as the case may be); (c) the date on which the taxing master orders under rule 9D(4) the person entitled to payment of the costs of any interlocutory proceedings in the Court of First Instance to commence taxation proceedings; or (d) where the person entitled to payment of costs is entitled to tax those costs without an order of the Court of First Instance directing the taxation of them, the date on which he becomes entitled to tax those costs, whichever is the later (see O.62, r.22(9) of RHC).

26.  O.62, r.22(7) of RHC further provides that a party is not entitled to commence taxation proceedings under rule 21: (a) after the expiry of 2 years from the completion date; or (b) where the Court has extended the period specified in sub-paragraph (a), after the expiry of the period as extended, whichever is the later.

27.  In the present case, it was not disputed that the completion date is 24 February 2023 and the two-year period under O.62, r.22(7) of RHC expired on 23 February 2025.

28.  However, O.62, r.16 of RHC gives the taxing master the power to extend time to commence taxation proceedings. In Wing Ming Garment Factory Ltd v Incorporated Owners of Wing Ming Industrial Centre & Ors [2012] 1 HKC 290, Recorder Jat SC at §34 held that the Court must take into account all relevant circumstances of the case, rather than being bound by a strait jacket. The absence of a good reason is a relevant consideration, maybe even a compelling reason, why indulgence should be refused. The Court must also give effect to the underlying objectives. In that case, the learned Recorder considered as relevant factors: (a) the length of the delay; (b) whether the delay was due to any deliberate conduct or fault on the part of the receiving party; (c) whether the delay has caused substantial prejudice to the paying party; (d) the effect on the receiving party if an extension of time was not granted; (e) the fact that the taxing master may impose whatever “penalty” under O.62, r.22(5) of RHC including to deprive the receiving party a portion of the costs so taxed to achieve a just result; and (f) whether to refuse the extension would be a wholly disproportionate penalty (see §§38-50).

Discussion and Disposition

29.  As already mentioned above, an appeal from a master is a rehearing so I will treat the application as if the matter came before me for the first time. Thus whilst in P’s Skeleton Argument, a number of submissions were made to the effect that the Master’s decision was plainly wrong or the Master had erred or failed to act in accordance with legal principles etc., which were set out as various “grounds”, as I am not bound by the Master’s decision and I will consider the application for extension of time afresh, I do not see the need to deal with those submissions.

30.  I therefore proceed to consider whether I should exercise my discretion to extend time in the circumstances of this case having heard all the submissions and considered the evidence placed before me at the Hearing[1].

31.  Firstly, in the present case, the relevant period of delay should be calculated from 24 May 2023 being three months from the completion date: see Commissioner of Inland Revenue v Li & Fung (Trading) Ltd (No 2) [2014] 4 HKC 61 per Master Levy (as she then was) at §§14-15 and Hung Fung Enterprises Holdings Ltd & Anor v Agricultural Bank of China [2015] 2 HKC 459 per Master Herbert Au-Yeung (as he then was) at §5. As the application to extend time was filed only on 8 May 2025, there was a delay of nearly 24 months. No doubt this was a very substantial delay. I will take into account the length of the delay.

32.  Secondly, there was undue delay. In particular, P complained about D2’s “silence” or inactivity between July 2023 and January 2024 and from January 2024 to 17 April 2024 before sending formal instructions to Adrian totaling 9 months. P rightly did not complain about the period prior to July 2023 when parties were clearly attempting to negotiate for the settlement of cost and there was an outstanding appeal by P so any delay in commencing taxation proceedings was reasonable and excusable.

33.  In the 3rd Affidavit of So Che Wing Rex, he mentioned that prior to the third without prejudice offer in January 2024, D2, as a director of Shenzhen New Fukong Transportation Development Company (“New Fukong”), was preoccupied with handling various urgent matters including negotiation with various parties, bringing proceedings in the Mainland and dealing with arbitration brought by a partner of New Fukong in August 2023. It was also explained in the Affidavit of So Che Wing Rex (paragraphs 14-16) and Adrian’s Affirmation that D2’s solicitors had chased Adrian in November 2024 but as Adrian was recovering from bowel surgery and D2 solicitor’s did not know of the two-year requirement, they did not want to put undue pressure on him and then on 8 April 2025 when D2’s solicitors again chased Adrian for the revised taxation bill, Adrian realized that he had yet to respond to their comments and queries. Adrian only then drew attention to the two-year requirement.  I agree with P that there was undue delay of at least 9 months from July 2023 to April 2024 for which no good explanation was given.  Even taking into account that it has been said on oath that D2’s solicitors did not know of the two-year requirement, and even if D2 is a solicitor, he was not a practising one and cannot be expected to know the procedural rules (but nonetheless he was legally represented), I am of the view that being too busy and ignorant of the rules and procedures of the court are not good excuses for the delay. There was undue delay on the part of D2 for a period of at least 9 months. However, the absence of good explanation for the delay is only one of the relevant consideration (and can be a weighty one) but does not automatically debar relief: see Wing Ming Garment Factory Ltd, §§33-36.

34.  Thirdly, I take into account the inaction also on P’s part since July 2023. Whilst P asked rhetorically why would he as the paying party push the receiving party to commence taxation, I am afraid post-CJR, as a party to court proceedings, he has a duty to do so. As held in Commissioner of Inland Revenue, post-CJR, O.1A, r.3 of RHC imposes a duty on parties and their legal advisers to further the underlying objectives and in the event that negotiation of costs fails, parties should take reasonably practical steps in ensuring that taxation proceedings are to be dealt with expeditiously. Whilst the receiving party bears the ultimate responsibility in commencing taxation without delay, the paying party is also required to further the underlying objectives upon the receiving party’s delay by making an application to compel the receiving party to commence taxation under O.62, r.22(3) (see ibid §§42-52 applied in Hung Fung Enterprises Holdings Ltd, §22 and Hong Kong Civil Procedure 2026, Vol.1, §62/22/5). I have not overlooked what was said was in relation to the exercise of the court’s discretion under O.62, r.22(5), but I cannot see why as a matter of principle, it should not also be relevant to the court’s exercise of the discretion under O.62, r.16 of RHC. As held in Wing Ming Garment Factory Ltd, the court should also have regard to the underlying objectives when considering the exercise of discretion to extend time under O.22, r.16. P also submitted that he had not received the bill of costs and would not have known the amount of costs claimed but I cannot see how that prevents him for compelling P to commence taxation in particular when in his own Affirmation (see §§5, 6 and 8) he professed to have knowledge of the relevant time limits prescribed under O.62, r.22 of RHC. The lack of good explanation for not writing further to D2’s solicitors to discuss costs or resorting to O.62, r.22(3) after July 2023, when P was still legally represented, is a factor which I should also take into account.

35.  Fourthly, I also take into account the lack of prejudice to P as a result of the delay. P asserted that the delay has financially exhausted him and he can no longer afford a solicitor or law costs draftsman to represent him.  However, the fact of the matter is that when the Costs Order Nisi was made absolute in February 2023, he already had incurred a liability to pay the Defendants’ costs and should have made financial provisions for payment of costs even if the quantum has not been agreed or determined. As to the allegation of RMB32.5M loss from the reduction of the value of the BVI Estate, even on P’s own case it was due to D2’s misfeasance over 12 years and thus cannot be caused by the delay. As for the claim that the delay was calculated to obstruct his efforts to appoint independent administrators to preserve the BVI Estate’s value, according to P, in 2016, he initiated inheritance proceedings against D2 in the Mainland which was unsuccessful and the Chinese courts advised him in 2019 to pursue action in the BVI.  There is no reason given for not doing so back in 2019. It is a bare assertion having the unquantified costs proceedings hanging over his head for 26 months “completely paralyzed” his liquidity and froze the required funding of USD200,000 to fund the BVI administrators. In oral submissions, whilst P alluded to the fact that no bank would lend him money with these proceedings which he wished to have finalized by abandoning his appeal against the Judgment and settling with all the Defendants on costs, he accepted that there is no evidence of him having sought to obtain a loan but was rejected because of these proceedings or the unquantified costs claims against him.

36.  Fifthly, I take into account that P’s alleged grievances and prejudice caused by the delay in commencing taxation proceedings can be addressed before the taxing master under the wide powers under O.62, r.22(5) of RHC.

37.  Lastly, I also take into account the loss of the right to commence taxation would be a disproportionate penalty in the circumstances of this case.  To deny D2 an extension of time will mean that D2 will be deprived of all the costs which are substantial even taking into account P’s claim that the bill of costs of around HK$2.28M is inflated or extortionate but that is a matter for taxation. It should be borne in mind that O.1A, r.2(2) of RHC provides that in giving effect to the underlying objectives, the Court should always recognize that the primary aim in exercising the powers of the Court is to secure the just resolution of disputes in accordance with the substantive rights of the parties. Even though D2 may have a claim against D2’s solicitors for negligence, if D2 is not granted an extension of time, it would result in further proceedings and use of judicial resources as well as further time and costs incurred by the parties, which is also contrary to the underlying objectives.

38.  Balancing all the above matters, I would allow D2’s Summons and make the same Order as the Master. Accordingly, I would dismiss P’s appeal.

39.  I see no reason why costs should not follow the event. I will order P to pay to D2 the costs of this appeal to be summarily assessed if not agreed. D2 is to lodge and serve a Statement of Costs within 7 days of the handing down of this decision. P is to lodge and serve any objections to D2’s Statement of Costs within 7 days (limited to 3 pages) and there shall be summary assessment by me on paper.

  ( Grace Chow )
Deputy High Court Judge

The Plaintiff appeared in person

Mr Rex So and Mr Johnathan Lam, of Messrs J. Chan, Yip, So & Partners for the 2nd Defendant



[1]  After the Hearing, by letter dated 2 March 2026 to this court, further submissions were made therein said to provide further clarification and updates as well as requesting that all taxation proceedings be stayed until the determination of this appeal and further orders. By letter dated 6 March 2026, solicitors for D2 opposed the further submissions. As correctly pointed out by D2, P did not apply for nor obtain leave from this court to file further submissions at the Hearing. As held by the Court of Appeal in Keen Lloyd Holdings Ltd v Commissioner of Customs and Excise [2016] 2 HKLRD 1372 at §33, after the close of hearing, unless the leave of court has been given, no further submissions should be advanced whether by counsel, solicitors or litigants in person, whether in writing or otherwise. Even in rare and exceptional circumstances where there is good and cogent reason for drawing the court’s attention to additional matters, the party who wishes to advance further submissions should as a matter of courtesy and proper practice, approach the other parties first to see whether they agree to the lodging of further submissions but even if there is consensus, the parties must apply for leave from the court before such further submissions are lodged. In the present case, I can see no good and cogent reason for allowing a further round of submissions when those matters could have been submitted at the Hearing (the hearing of the appeal was set down as early as 20 October 2025). In the exercise of my discretion, I refuse leave to lodge those further submissions and they have been disregarded by me.

[2023] HKCFI 591-EN-2023-02-24

MAN KAI-KWONG, DAVID v. MAK YING-MUI as the administratrix of the estate of the Deceased AND OTHERS

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HCMP 703/2019

[2023] HKCFI 591

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS NO 703 OF 2019

________________

 

IN THE MATTER of the Estate of MAN FOR-TAI, WILLIAM (文伙泰) (“the Deceased”), late of House B3 and carpark, Flamingo Garden, 8 Fei Wan Road, Sai Kung, New Territories

  and
 

IN THE MATTER of Order 85 of the Rules of High Court (Cap. 4A)

  and
 

IN THE MATTER of sections 33 and 36 of the Probate and Administration Ordinance (Cap. 10)

________________________

BETWEEN  
 Man Kai-Kwong, DavidPlaintiff

and

 MAK YING-MUI as the administratrix of the1st Defendant
 estate of the Deceased 
 Man Kai-Sau, Peter2nd Defendant
 Man Kai-Fung3rd Defendant
 Man Kai-Sung, Susan4th Defendant

________________________

Before: Deputy High Court Judge MK Liu in Chambers (Paper Disposal)
Dates of written submissions from the Plaintiff: 16 January 2023, 31 January 2023 & 7 February 2023
Dates of written submissions from the 1st Defendant:16 January 2023, 31 January 2023 & 7 February 2023
Dates of written submissions from the 2nd Defendant:16 January 2023, 31 January 2023 & 7 February 2023
Dates of written submissions from the 3rd & 4th Defendants: 16 January 2023, 31 January 2023 & 7 February 2023
Date of Decision: 24 February 2023

_________________

DECISION

__________________

1.  On 7 December 2022, I handed down a judgment (“the Judgment”), in which I ruled against David.  I also made a costs order nisi (“the Costs Order Nisi”) that costs of these proceedings (including costs of D2’s Striking Out Summons and all costs reserved) be paid by David to all the defendants herein, and those costs are to be taxed if not agreed.

2.  Subsequently, all the parties have made applications to vary the Costs Order Nisi.

(1)  On 20 December 2022, the defendants have filed their respective summonses (“Ds’ Summonses”) to seek to vary the Costs Order Nisi.  All the defendants are seeking the same variation, i.e. instead of going through the taxation process, costs payable by David to all the defendants are to be summarily assessed.

(2)  On 21 December 2022, David filed a summons (“David’s Summons”) to seek the following variation of the Costs Order Nisi:

(a)  There be no order as to costs in these proceedings or part of these proceedings; and/or

(b)  Costs of these proceedings or part of the proceedings be paid out of the Estate.

3.  The application(s) made by each side is/are opposed by the other side.

4.  I have directed that the summonses be determined on paper without an oral hearing.  The parties have provided their respective written submissions, and I have duly considered the same.  For ease of reference, unless otherwise indicated, the abbreviations used in the Judgment would be adopted in this decision.

David’s Summons

5.  I would first discuss David’s Summons.

6.  As submitted by Mr Ho for the Mother, the starting point involves the application of the Re Buckton principles[1] as expounded by the Court of Final Appeal in Cheung Pui Yuen v Worldcup Investments Inc.[2] The principles have been succinctly summarised in headnote (4) of the law report as follows:

“Where proceedings had been properly instituted for the benefit of a trust fund, or a deceased's estate, the court might, in an appropriate case, make an order for the costs of the proceedings to be borne by the fund or estate. There were three classes of cases. First, where the trustees asked the court to determine some question. Second, where the question for determination was not raised by the trustees by some of the beneficiaries but was a question that would have justified an application by the trustees. In the first and second classes of cases, the general rule was that the costs of all necessary parties should be paid by the estate. These two classes could be distinguished from the third class, namely where the application was made by a beneficiary but was, in substance although not form, an adverse claim made in hostile litigation. In this third class, the rule applicable to hostile litigation should be applied and the unsuccessful party ordered to pay the costs. Finally, there was a further principle that, if the deceased had been responsible for the creation of the doubts that had necessitated the litigation, it was the estate on which costs should fall. However, these principles did not constitute rules and a discretion as to costs had also to be exercised in light of the particular circumstances of the litigation.”

7.  In considering David’s application for varying the Costs Order Nisi, everything must be based upon my ruling made in the Judgment.  The application is not an opportunity for a party to reargue the matters which have already been determined by me in the Judgment.  I am not prepared and indeed I am not allowed to revisit those matters.[3]

8.  In his written submissions, Mr Chan for David has put forward various grounds in support of David’s application.  With no disrespect, I am not prepared to set out all the points made by Mr Chan in this decision.  Suffice for me to say that I have considered Mr Chan’s submissions, but I am unable to accept the same.

9.  As said in the above, in his application for variation of the Costs Order Nisi, David is bound by the ruling made by me in the Judgment and cannot reargue any issue decided by me. In particular, I have made the following findings in the Judgment:

(1)  “It is not in dispute that the Mother has properly administered the Hong Kong Estate, and the administration of the Hong Kong Estate is nearly completed. In the circumstances, there is no reason and no need to remove the Mother from office.”[4]

(2)  “In my judgment, the Mother cannot be criticized in respect of anything related to the BVI Estate, including the Shareholding Dispute.”[5]

(3)  “As shown by the evidence, after the Hong Kong Grant was made, the Mother has been undertaking the administration of the Hong Kong Estate diligently.”[6]

(4)  “There is no evidence showing that the Mother has done anything improper or has neglected to do anything to discharge her duties in administering the Hong Kong Estate.”[7]

(5)  “There is nothing in the evidence showing that the Mother has not properly administered the Hong Kong Estate, in an independent and impartial manner. There is also no evidence showing that the Mother is being controlled by Peter.”[8]

10.  In his written submissions, Mr Chan has cited Hong Kong Civil Procedure 2023, Volume 1, §85/2/15:

“If an application for the removal of an executor is dismissed, it does not necessarily follow that the cost order would be made in favour of the executor. The court would take into account the executor’s conduct and whether it was not unreasonable for the plaintiff to have made the removal application (Wong Tat Lun Eddie v. Wong Chi Ho Jimmy (HCMP 2391/2013, [2015] HKEC 282))”

11.  Each case depends upon its own facts.  In Wong Tat Lun Eddie v Wong Chi Ho Jimmy, the executor was criticised for lack of progress and lack of transparency, which criticisms were only answered by the executor in the course of the affidavits.  At [23] – [25] of that decision, B Chu J has explained why the beneficiary plaintiff ought to be regarded as the real winner for the period up to the filing of the affidavit evidence (with no order as to costs thereafter), notwithstanding the fact that the removal application made by the plaintiff was unsuccessful:

“23. I accept that there had been delay and deficiencies in that D1 had at least not been forthcoming with providing sufficient information to Ps on the administration and distribution of the Estate and this was only remedied by D1’s 2nd affirmation which was filed shortly before the 1st Hearing.

24. As [counsel] had submitted, and which I accept, Ps had achieved real and substantial success by the time of D1’s 2nd affirmation in that they had successfully compelled D1 to remedy the delay and deficiencies by providing various information about the administration of the Estate and also the Distribution Plan.

25. Having considered D1’s conduct, I am of the view that it was not unreasonable for Ps to have made the Removal Application and that D1 should pay Ps’ costs up to the time of D1’s 2nd affirmation.”

12.  As submitted by Mr Ho, the facts in the Wong Tat Lun Eddie case are entirely different from the facts as found by me in the present case.  David cannot derive any assistance from that case in support of his application for varying the Costs Order Nisi.

13.  In considering the reasonableness of the parties’ actions in these proceedings (which is relevant to the exercise of the court’s general discretion on costs), David is bound by the ruling made by me in the Judgment.  As found by me in the Judgment, there is no unreasonableness on the defendants’ part.  Further, as submitted by the defendants, David’s claim in these proceedings in substance is an adverse claim against the defendants, and these proceedings are nothing but a hostile litigation.  In my view, the rule applicable in a hostile litigation should apply here.

14.  The substantive hearing of the AOS took place before me on 1 December 2022.  At that time, the issue before me was whether David’s claim as per [1A] and [2] of the AOS should be allowed.  After considering the evidence and hearing the submissions, I handed down the Judgment on 7 December 2022, in which I dismissed [1A] and struck out [2] of the AOS. Plainly, David has failed entirely in these proceedings. 

15.  By reason of the above, David should be ordered to bear all the costs in these proceedings.  I would dismiss David’s Summons.

Ds’ Summonses

16.  The grounds put forward by the defendants in support of their applications can be summarised as follows:

(1)  I have presided over the two substantive hearings in these proceedings (i.e. the hearing on 16 December 2020 and the hearing on 1 December 2022) and is fully in a position to conduct a broad-brush assessment of the costs involved.

(2)  In the hearing on 16 December 2020, costs awarded to the defendants were summarily assessed.  Likewise, the costs awarded to the defendants in the Judgment can also be summarily assessed.

(3)  This case is a dispute between close family members.  It would be in the interests of all the parties concerned for the remaining issue of costs to be resolved as expeditiously as possible, so as to allow the family members to put this litigation behind them and move on with their lives.

(4)  Time and costs would be saved if summary assessment is ordered.

17.  Having considered the matter, with respect, I decline to order summary assessment.  The costs provided in the Costs Order Nisi should be taxed.  My reasons are as follows:

(1)  Unlike the decision made on 16 December 2020, the Judgment handed down on 7 December 2022 is the final judgment in this case, concluding everything in these proceedings.    Although I have handled some hearings in this case, including the hearings on 16 December 2020 and 1 December 2022, not all the interlocutory hearings in these proceedings are before me.  The costs provided in the Costs Order Nisi may cover costs or part of the costs of the interlocutory hearings which are not before me.  In view of this, for the costs provided in the Costs Order Nisi, it would be better to order taxation instead of having summary assessment.

(2)  It is not uncommon that the costs provided in the final judgment handed down after trial would be taxed and not be summarily assessed.

(3)  Summary assessment is assessing costs in a summary way.  Although summary assessment may save some time and costs, whether summary assessment should be ordered would depend upon the circumstances.  In view of the circumstances as set out above, I would exercise my discretion to order taxation and not summary assessment.

(4)  As to the relationship between the family members, based upon the papers before me, I am of the view that the differences between David on the one hand and the defendants on the other hand are still irreconcilable.  I have been informed that David has in fact lodged an appeal (“the appeal”) against the Judgment.  Realistically, I do not think that ordering summary assessment would assist the reconciliation of the parties in any way.  I also do not think that the parties can put the litigation behind them if summary assessment is ordered.  One must not forget that the appeal is in place, and the parties would have to fight another legal battle in the appeal.

18.  I would dismiss Ds’ Summonses.

Disposition

19.  I dismiss David’s Summons.  I also dismiss Ds’ Summonses.  The Costs Order Nisi is now made absolute.

20.  In view of this outcome, taking a broad-brush approach, in respect of each summons covered by this decision, I make no order as to costs.

21.  I thank all the legal representatives for the assistance provided to the court.

 ( MK Liu )
 Deputy High Court Judge

Written submissions from Mr Maurice J Chan instructed by Fan Wong & Tso, for the Plaintiff

Written submissions from Mr Martin Ho instructed by Kwok, Ng & Chan, for the 1st Defendant

Written submissions from Mr Tommy Cheung instructed by J Chan, Yip, So & Partners, for the 2nd Defendant

Written submissions from Hon & Co., for the 3rd & 4th Defendants


[1]  Re Buckton [1907] 2 Ch 406

[2]  (2009) 12 HKCFAR 31, per Lord Scott NPJ at [56] – [59]

[3]  Hong Kong Civil Procedure 2023, Volume 1,§42/5B/1

[4]  Judgment, [39(1)]

[5]  Judgment, [40]

[6]  Judgment, [41]

[7]  Judgment, [43]

[8]  Judgment. [45]

[2022] HKCFI 3649-EN-2022-12-07

MAN KAI-KWONG, DAVID v. MAK YING-MUI as the administratrix of the estate of the Deceased AND OTHERS

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HCMP 703/2019

[2022] HKCFI 3649

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS NO 703 OF 2019

________________________

 IN THE MATTER of the Estate of MAN FOR-TAI, WILLIAM (文伙泰)  (“the Deceased”), late of House B3 and carpark, Flamingo Garden, 8 Fei Wan Road, Sai Kung, New Territories
 and
 IN THE MATTER of Order 85 of the Rules of High Court (Cap. 4A)
 and
 IN THE MATTER of sections 33 and 36 of the Probate and Administration Ordinance (Cap. 10)

________________________

BETWEEN

 MAN KAI-KWONG, DAVIDPlaintiff
 and 
 MAK YING-MUI as the administratrix of the1st Defendant
 estate of the Deceased 
 MAN KAI-SAU, PETER2nd Defendant
 MAN KAI-FUNG3rd Defendant
 MAN KAI-SUNG, SUSAN4th Defendant

________________________

Before: Deputy High Court Judge MK Liu in Court
Date of Hearing: 1 December 2022
Date of Judgment: 7 December 2022

________________________

J U D G M E N T

________________________

A. INTRODUCTION

1.  These proceedings concern the administration of the estate (“the Estate”)  of the late Mr Man For Tai William (“the Deceased”).  The plaintiff (“David”)  is the eldest son of the Deceased. The 1st defendant (“the Mother”)  is the surviving spouse of the Deceased.  The Deceased and the Mother have 4 children, namely (from the oldest to the youngest), David, the 2nd defendant (“Peter”), the 3rd defendant (“Kai”), and the 4th defendant (“Susan”).

2.  The Deceased passed away intestate on 19 June 2014.  On 30 March 2016, Letters of Administration was granted by the Hong Kong Court to the Mother (“the Hong Kong Grant”), by which the Mother was appointed as the administratrix of the Estate.  A schedule of assets and liabilities of the Deceased in Hong Kong as at the date of death (“the Schedule”)  was annexed to the Hong Kong Grant.

3.  On 19 May 2019, David commenced these proceedings and sought the reliefs set out in the Originating Summons (“OS”).  The reliefs sought in the OS are as follows:

“1.   Whether [David] either singly or together with [Peter], [Kai] and/or [Susan], his siblings, be appointed as co-administrator(s)  (“Co-Administrators”)  of [the Estate] together with [the Mother], the existing administratrix of the Estate;

2.  Further or in the alternative:

(1)  In aid of the determination of the beneficial interests in Super Tycoon Investments Limited (“Super Tycoon”), and in particular, whether the Estate is the sole beneficiary thereof or a beneficiary together with [Peter] in equal shares, a direction that:

(a)  [Peter] do instruct, or otherwise [David] as a Co-Administrator be entitled to instruct, the registered agent of Super Tycoon in the British Virgin Islands, to furnish all records of the composition of, and shares held by, all shareholders of Super Tycoon, from the date of incorporation to the date of the said instruction;

(b)  [David] be entitled to demand Yvonne Pang, Shenciti’s certified accountant and auditor, to furnish him copies of all papers and electronic records in her possession relating to Shenciti Investments Co Ltd (“Shenciti”), the Deceased, and/or [Peter], and in particular, the documents which were prepared for the execution of the Deceased and/or [Peter] on 9 Jun 2007 relating to the transfer of the beneficial interests of Super Tycoon from the Deceased and [Peter] in equal shares to the Deceased holding them absolutely;

(2)  In aid of the determination as to the amount to which [David] and his son Miles MAN are respectively entitled from the proceeds of sale of the properties disposed of by Man Mou Hei Tso [文戊喜祖] prior to the death of the Deceased on 19 Jun 2014, and held by the Deceased in trust for [David] and Miles MAN, an order that:

[Peter] and/or Shenciti do furnish [David] all papers and electronic records in the possession of himself and/or Shenciti relating to the books and electronic records of Man Mou Rei Tso of which [David] is the legal custodian;

(3)  In aid of the determination as to the amount of indebtedness Shenciti owes to the Estate out of its receipts of dividends from Shenzhen New Fukong Transport Development Co Ltd (“New Fukong”)  (a Mainland bus company in which Shenciti has a 65% holding therein), an order that:

[Peter] and/or Shenciti do furnish [David] all papers and electronic records relating to New Fukong, and in particular, all such documents relating to the said receipts;

(4)  In aid of the determination as to the amount of indebtedness Shenciti owes to the Estate out of its receipts of dividends from Shenzhen Fu Kong Commercial Services Co Ltd (“Fukong”)  (a Mainland property development company in which Shenciti has a 100% holding therein), an order that:

[Peter] and/or Shenciti do furnish [David] all papers and electronic records relating to Fukong, and in particular, an such documents relating to the said receipts;

(5)  In aid of the determination as to Shenciti’s indebtedness to the Estate arising from a Mainland judgment of the Weizhou Intermediate People’s Court dated 11 Feb 2014 in favour of Fukong against Jiayin in the sum of RMB 10 million, an order that:

[Peter] and/or Shenciti do furnish [David] all papers and electronic records relating to Fukong, and in particular, all such documents relating to the said receipts;

(6)  A direction that any Co-Administrator be entitled to demand Shenciti a sum of $20,774,806, being the amount of Shenciti’s indebtedness to HSBC (“Indebtedness”)  having been discharged by the Estate on 10 Jun 2014, arising out of the Deceased’s guarantee of an HSBC loan to Shenciti dated 5 Jun 2013, and that any Co-Administrator be entitled to institute legal proceedings against Shenciti to recover such a sum for the Estate;

(7)  A direction that [David] as Co-Administrator be entitled to:

(a)  apply for letters of administration from the Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court or the relevant probate registry of the British Virgin Islands, and

(b)  to conduct a valuation of New Fukong for the purposes of compiling a Schedule of Assets and Liabilities in connection with such an application;

(8)  A direction that [David] as Co-Administrator be at liberty to defend, set off and/or counterclaim Shenciti’s claim against the Estate for the sum of $57,450,462.71 instituted by a writ of summons issued on 20 Sep 2018, being the amount claimed to be outstanding in Shenciti’s director’s account with the Deceased;

(9)  In aid of 2(8)  above, a direction that [David] be entitled to demand Yvonne Pang to furnish him with all papers and electronic records in her possession relating to Shenciti, the Deceased and/or [Peter];

(10)    In aid of the proper management of the Estate’s beneficial interest in Shenciti:

(a)  A declaration that the self-appointment of [Peter] as a director of Shenciti and his removal of the Deceased as a director of Shenciti are unlawful;

(b)  a direction that any of the Co-Administrators who consent to act as Shenciti’s director, be so appointed.”

4.  On 5 September 2019, Peter issued a summons (“D2’s Striking Out Summons”)  for an order to strike out [2(1)] to [2(5)], and [2(9)] and [2(10)] of the OS, on the grounds that these paragraphs (a)  disclose no reasonable cause of action, (b)  are scandalous, frivolous or vexatious, and/or (c)  are otherwise an abuse of the process of the court.

5.  On 17 September 2019, B Chu J directed, inter alia, that [1] of the OS be argued on a date to be fixed, and [2] of the OS and D2’s Striking Out Summons be adjourned sine die with liberty to restore.

6.  On 16 December 2020, the substantive hearing on [1] of the OS took place before me.  At the end of the hearing, I dismissed [1] of the OS with costs to the defendants.  Given the irreconcilable differences between David on the one hand and the defendants on the other hand, the Co-Administrators proposal as set out in [1] of the OS (“the Co-Administrators Proposal”)  is simply unworkable.  For this reason, I dismissed [1] of the OS.

7.  On 15 July 2021, David amended the OS and inserted [1A] into the OS.  [1A] of the Amended Originated Summons (“AOS”)  is as follows:

“1A. [The Mother] should be removed and replaced by an independent and professional administrator regarding [the Estate].”

8.  This is the substantive hearing of [1A] (“Relief 1A”)  and [2] of the AOS, and D2’s Striking Out Summons.

9.  At the beginning of the hearing, I asked Mr Maurice Chan for David to clarify David’ position on the parts of [2] of the AOS concerning Co-administration.  Since the Co-Administrators Proposal has been dismissed, these parts do not appear to be relevant in these proceedings. Initially, Mr Chan said that he would seek leave to amend [2] of the AOS, and Mr Chan had asked for a break to enable him to have time to prepare the proposed amendments.  After the break, Mr Chan handed up a draft containing the proposed amendments.  The amendment application made by David was opposed by all the defendants.  After taking further instructions, Mr Chan told me that he would withdraw the amendment application, and he would not pursue [2] of the AOS.  Mr Chan agreed that in these circumstances, Peter’s striking out application should be allowed.

10.  In view of the latest development, the only issue in the substantive hearing is whether Relief 1A should be granted.  David’s application for Relief 1A is opposed by all the defendants.

B.   THE PARTIES’ RESPECTIVE CASES

11.  I would first set out the parties’ respective stances.

B1.   David

12.  Mr Chan submits that “the live key issue” relating to Relief 1A is as follows:[1]

Whether the Mother should be removed as an administratrix and that an independent administrator should be appointed in her stead; and if so, whether his administration be limited to “Super Tycoon Related Properties” (“STRP”), ie properties held by Super Tycoon, which includes:

(1)   Shenciti, Border Shuttle (“BS”), New Harbourway (“NHW”), and Wardon (“the HK companies”); and

(2)   New Fukong and Fukong (“the Mainland companies”).

13.  Mr Chan submits that the Mother should be removed because so far she has failed to give the draft BVI Schedule of Assets and Liabilities to David so as to enable David to ascertain the extent of the Estate’s interest in Super Tycoon, a holding company which holds a string of valuable subsidiaries.

14.  Mr Chan suggests that the Mother should be replaced by an independent and professional administrator.  Mr Chan submits that David has grievance towards Peter and the Mother.  Mr Chan submits that David’s grievance is mainly towards Peter, but also towards the Mother, for the Mother has tolerated Peter’s misfeasance, escapades and ruinous abuse of the HK companies and the Mainland companies.

15.  Mr Chan also submits that while there should be an independent and professional administrator looking after the administration of the STRP in the Estate, the new administrator should also be authorized to deal with the non-STRP in the Estate as well.  Mr Chan submits that there should not be two different administrators looking after different parts of the Estate, for this would lead to conflicts between the two administrators and hinder the administration of the Estate.

B2.   The Mother

16.  Regarding Relief 1A, Mr Martin Ho for the Mother submits that:

(1) As a matter of law, the Hong Kong Grant is only confined to the assets of the Estate which are situated in Hong Kong (“the Hong Kong Estate”), ie the assets set out in the Schedule annexed to the Hong Kong Grant.  The STRP are not covered by the Hong Kong Grant.

(2) The Mother has been diligently administering the Hong Kong Estate since being appointed as the administratrix by the Hong Kong Court, with the assistance of her lawyers.  There is no basis to question the competence and performance of the Mother in her diligent administration of the Hong Kong Estate.

(3) David’s motive in perusing [1A] of the AOS is highly questionable. At the beginning of these proceedings, P did not say that the Mother is unfit to remain as an administratrix of the Estate. At that time, David was in fact saying that he himself, and perhaps the other siblings, be appointed as co-administrators in addition to the Mother. However, after the dismissal of [1] of the OS, David changed his stance and lodged his complaint against the Mother.

(4) The view of the Mother (being the single majority beneficiary of the Estate)  and the views of Peter, Kai and Susan (collectively with the Mother being the majority beneficiaries of the Estate)  should be given weight.  All of them prefer the Mother to remain as the sole administratrix of the Hong Kong Estate.

(5) Regarding the STRP, since Super Tycoon is a company limited incorporated in BVI, the STRP in fact are assets situated in BVI (“the BVI Estate”).  The Mother is open to the possibility that an independent administrator be brought in to collect and administer the BVI Estate.

(6) The fact that Mother remains as the administratrix of the Hong Kong Estate does not prevent the BVI Court from appointing some other suitable person (including independent professional administrator)  for the BVI Estate.  The investigation of the affairs of Super Tycoon is hence not a proper basis to remove the Mother as the Hong Kong administratrix, in respect of the Hong Kong-based assets of the Hong Kong Estate.

B3.   Peter

17.  Mr Tommy Cheung for Peter submits that Relief 1A should be refused.  Mr Cheung submits that:

(1) The Mother obtained the Hong Kong Grant on 30 March 2016.  Since then, she has administered the Hong Kong Estate dutifully with the assistance of lawyers and other professionals.  The Mother has made substantial progress in the administration of the Hong Kong Estate, and such administration has already entered a mature stage and the Mother is also willing and able to complete the remaining parts of the administration. Peter, Kai and Susan all support that the Mother should continue to be the administratrix of the Hong Kong Estate and do not agree to the proposal as set out in [1A] of the AOS.

(2) David is a minority beneficiary of the Estate.  He is only entitled to 12.5% of the Estate.  No or no sufficient ground has been put forward by David justifying removing the Mother and replacing her by a professional administrator.

(3) Professional administrators are expensive.  It is not justified to have a professional administrator in the circumstances of this case.

B4.   Kai and Susan

18.  Mr Victor C.I. Lui for Kai and Susan submits that [1A] of the AOS should be refused, and the Mother should continue to be the administratrix of the Hong Kong Estate.  Mr Lui submits that the Mother has all along been conscientiously discharging her duties as the administratrix of the Hong Kong Estate.  David’s criticisms of the Mother’s administration are not supported by objective evidence and are unfounded.  It would be beneficial to the proper administration of the Estate that the Mother continues her role as administratrix.

C.   THE PRINCIPLES

C1.   Principles concerning removal and appointment of personal representative(s)

19.  Probate and Administration Ordinance (“PAO”), s.33(3)  provides:

“The court may, if satisfied that the due and proper administration of the estate and the interests of the persons beneficially entitled thereto so require, suspend or remove an executor or administrator (other than the Official Administrator)  and provide for the succession of another person in place of such executor or administrator and for the vesting in that other person of any property belonging to the estate.”

20.  Recently, the principles concerning the exercise of the powers under s.33(3)  of the PAO have been summarized by Wilson Chan J in Chu Wing Chuen Paul v Chu Oi Yan Irene[2]. Those principles are as follows:

(1) The discretion to remove an executor or an administrator under section 33 of the PAO involves an assessment and a value judgement in all the relevant circumstances of whether removal is required for the due and proper administration of the estate and the interests of the beneficiaries.

(2) Not every mistake or neglect of duty, or inaccuracy of conduct of trustees would induce the court to remove the executor or the administrator.

(3) The acts or omissions must be such as to endanger the trust property or to show a want of honesty, or want of proper capacity to execute the duties, or a want of reasonable fidelity.

(4) Hostility between the executor/administrator and the beneficiary is not a ground for removal, unless the breakdown of the relations between them is such as to lead to the administration coming to a standstill, or makes it difficult or impossible for the administration to be completed by an existing personal representative.

(5) In exercising its discretion, the court should have regard to the size of the estate, the nature of the assets that need to be administered, the background and education, training and experience of the remaining and substituted personal representatives and the interests of the beneficiaries.  The view of the majority beneficiaries is a relevant factor.

(6) The discretion to remove an executor or an administrator is to be exercised with great caution and sparingly. In general, removal is not to be preferred unless the administration is still far from completion. The courts are reluctant to exercise the discretion where the incumbent executor or administrator wishes to carry on, without allowing that incumbent an opportunity to repair or remedy any defects and progress promptly with due administration. The fact that administration of the estate could have been done better is not of itself sufficient ground.

21.  Any proposed removal of an administrator from office would need to be justified by evidence, showing that his or her continuation in office is likely to be detrimental to the interests of the beneficiaries.  As said by Patten LJ in Re Savile’s Estate[3]:

“83. … direct intervention by the Court in the administration of a trust or an estate by the removal of the trustee or personal representative has, for the most part, to be justified by evidence that their continuation in office is likely to prove detrimental to the interests of the beneficiaries. A lack of confidence or feelings of mistrust are not therefore sufficient in themselves to justify removal unless the breakdown in relations is likely to jeopardise the proper administration of the trust or estate. This is something which requires to be objectively demonstrated and considered on a case-to-case basis having regard to the particular circumstances.” (Emphasis added)

C2.   Scope of the Grant made by the Hong Kong Court

22.  An important issue in this case is that the scope of the Hong Kong Grant made by this court is in fact only concerned with the assets and liabilities in Hong Kong.

23.  As stipulated in s.24A(1)  of the PAO, the affidavit in support of an application for a grant shall set out “assets” and “liabilities” of the deceased in Hong Kong.  In this case, the Schedule annexed to the Grant has expressly shown that the schedule relates only to the assets and the liabilities “of the Deceased in Hong Kong as at the date of death”.

24.  In respect of foreign assets in the Estate, a separate grant of letters of administration under the foreign jurisdiction would need to be applied for.  See Wong Tat Lun Eddie v Wong Chi Ho Jimmy[4], in which B Chu J said:

“114. The Rialto Property did not appear in the Schedules. It is an asset of the Deceased outside Hong Kong. As pointed out by [counsel], the Probate granted by the Hong Kong Court would not give D1 any authority to collect foreign assets. D1 would have to apply for an ancillary grant or a separate grant in the US…” (Emphasis added)

25.  See also Williams, Mortimer and Sunnucks on Executors, Administrators and Probate (21st edn)  §§43-30, 43-32, 49-02, 49-03.

26.  The legal position has been clearly set out in Dicey, Morris & Collins on the Conflict of Laws (16th edn)  at §27-026:

“Usually he or she will be unable to recover any assets situate in a foreign country unless he or she first obtains a grant of representation from the foreign court. If he or she attempts to deal with foreign assets without a grant he or she may find himself or herself liable as an executor de son tort under the foreign law…”

D.   RELIEF 1A

D1.   STRP – Assets not in Hong Kong

27.  Super Tycoon is a company limited incorporated in BVI.  Before the death of the Deceased, the Deceased was a 50% registered shareholder of Super Tycoon.  Peter was and is the other registered shareholder of Super Tycoon, with 50% of the shares registered under his name. There is a dispute between David and Peter as to whether the 50% shares registered under Peter’s name were in fact beneficially owned by the Deceased during the Deceased’s lifetime (“the Shareholding Dispute”).  David says that the answer is in the affirmative, and the Estate is now the beneficial owner of all the shares of Super Tycoon.  Peter’s position is that the 50% shares registered under his name are beneficially owned by him.  Be that as it may, it is clear that:

(1) The Estate beneficially owns either 50% or 100% of the shares of Super Tycoon.

(2) Since Super Tycoon is a company limited incorporated in BVI, the shares in Super Tycoon are foreign assets, and are not assets in Hong Kong.

28.  It is not in dispute that Super Tycoon is the company holding various valuable assets:

(1) Super Tycoon wholly-owns Shenciti, and Shenciti in turn wholly-owns Fu Kong.  Shenciti also owns 65% shares in New Fu Kong.

(2) New Fu Kong owns almost all the shares in NHW, and NHW owns almost all the shares in Wardon.

(3) Shenciti also owns almost all the shares in BS.

29.  By virtue of the shares beneficially owned by the Estate in Super Tycoon (no matter 50% or 100%), the Estate indirectly has interests in the companies set out in the aforesaid paragraph.  However, one cannot forget that as a matter of law, the assets directly owned by the Estate are the shares in Super Tycoon.  Since Super Tycoon is a company limited incorporated in BVI, those shares are not assets in Hong Kong, but are foreign assets.  In accordance with the principles set out in [24] to [26] above, the Hong Kong Court cannot make any grant in respect of these shares.

30.  The Mother has produced expert evidence on BVI law.  The expert evidence is unchallenged and I accept the same.  The expert evidence shows that:

(1) The BVI Court enjoys a wide discretion to appoint a person who is not the personal representative in the home jurisdiction to take up the BVI Grant, and the BVI Grant can be tailor made to cover, for instance, the Deceased’s shareholding in Super Tycoon specifically.

(2) The BVI Court can confer powers on the BVI administrator to exercise the shareholding rights enjoyed by the Deceased in Super Tycoon.

31.  It is plain and obvious that any grant made by this court cannot confer powers on the administrator to exercise the rights stemmed from the shares owned by the Deceased in Super Tycoon.  For the sake of discussion, even if this court accedes to David’s request and grants Relief 1A to him, the new administrator appointed by the Hong Kong Court would still have no authority to deal with the shares in Super Tycoon, and the new administrator would still not be able to exercise the powers conferred by those shareholding.  Without those powers, it would not be possible for the new administrator to deal with the STRP matters.  The STRP matters cannot be addressed by Relief 1A at all.

32.  According to the Mother, the Mother is unable to obtain a grant from the BVI Court due to the caveats entered by David in the BVI.  The Mother is open to the option of an independent third party be brought in for the BVI Grant to deal with the BVI Estate.  As to who should be appointed as the administrator taking care of the BVI Estate, this is a matter to be considered and determined by the BVI Court. This is not a matter to be determined by me.  I make no comment on this issue. Suffice for me to say that the STRP matters (ie the matters in the BVI Estate)  would not be a reason in support of Relief 1A sought by David.

33.  For the sake of completeness, in relation to the BVI Estate, I would also mention the following.

34.  In respect of the Shareholding Dispute raised by David, the Mother has tried to investigate the matter.  The Mother has obtained an affirmation (“Ding’s Affirmation”)  from the restructuring lawyer retained by the Deceased (ie Mr Ding Zhenyu (“Ding”), then of Messrs Simmons & Simmons), who testified that the Deceased and Peter were intended by the Deceased to be equal beneficial shareholders of Super Tycoon.  The Mother is unable to go any further, for without a BVI Grant, the Mother simply does not have any locus to commence any proceedings in the BVI Court to try to resolve the issue(s)  in relation to the legal and beneficial ownership of the shareholding in Super Tycoon.

35.  Mr Chan criticizes the Mother in relation to 2 emails mentioned by David in [24.3(4)] of his 1st Affirmation dated 20 May 2019.  According to David, there are 2 emails from Ms Yvonne Pang (“Pang”, Shenciti’s certified accountant and auditor)  dated 8 June 2007 to Peter and Ding.  The emails could show that the Deceased had issued express instructions to Pang and Ding to re-restructure Super Tycoon so that the Deceased would be its sole shareholder.  The Deceased was prepared to attend the office of Ding to sign the papers on 9 June 2007.  Mr Chan submits that the Mother has never intended to make enquiries with Pang in respect of these 2 emails.

36.  As stated in the above, in fact the Mother has made enquiries regarding the Shareholding Dispute.  The Mother has contacted Ding and obtained Ding’s Affirmation.  It cannot be said that the Mother has done nothing to investigate the matter.  The Mother is unable to obtain a grant from the BVI Court due to the caveats entered by David in the BVI. The Mother is open to the option of an independent third party be brought in for the BVI Grant to deal with the matters in the BVI Estate, including investigating the legal and beneficial shareholding of Super Tycoon.

37.  Mr Chan also submits that the Mother should be removed because she has failed to give a draft BVI schedule of assets and liabilities to David so as to enable David to ascertain the extent of the Estate’s interest in Super Tycoon.  With respect, this is not a valid criticism.

(1) Regarding the BVI assets, the Mother has invited David to have discussion on these a long time ago.  However, David has refused to discuss these matters with the Mother.  In 2015, the Mother’s solicitors already indicated that the Mother “is not in a position to be involved in [the Super Tycoon related companies] until she has obtained the grant from the relevant authority in BVI” and that “[g]iven the shares of Super Tycoon (i.e. shares of a BVI company)  are foreign assets, they are not allowed to be included in the Schedule of Assets and Liabilities of the Deceased in Hong Kong.”[5]

(2) The Mother has been trying to address David’s concerns by inviting him to have face-to-face meetings, but was refused by David.  After David entered the caveats in BVI, the Mother repeatedly invited David for a meeting to address any concern he may have. However, David has refused to engage in any talks.

(3) In any event, as a matter of law, a personal representative appointed by the Hong Kong Court does not have the obligation to prepare a draft schedule of assets and liabilities not situated in Hong Kong to the beneficiaries of the estate.

38.  Mr Chan has also made the following points:

(1) It would not be desirable to have two administrators, one taking care of the Hong Kong Estate and the other dealing with the BVI Estate.  It would be more desirable to have one administrator to deal with everything in the entire Estate.

(2) If it is necessary to have two administrators, the Mother should make an application to the BVI Court, asking the BVI Court to appoint an administrator to take care of the BVI Estate. However, the Mother has failed to do so.

(3) If an independent administrator of the Hong Kong Estate is appointed, that administrator can make an application to the BVI Court, asking the BVI Court to appoint an administrator dealing with the BVI Estate.

39.  With respect, I am not persuaded by these submissions.

(1) It is not in dispute that the Mother has properly administered the Hong Kong Estate, and the administration of the Hong Kong Estate is nearly completed.  In the circumstances, there is no reason and no need to remove the Mother from office.

(2) While the administration of the Hong Kong Estate is almost finished, I do not see any reason why having another administrator to administer the BVI Estate would be undesirable at this stage. I also do not see any reason why there would be conflict between the Mother and the BVI administrator.

(3) The Mother has already said that she could not obtain the BVI Grant because of the caveats entered by David in BVI.

(4) There is no evidence showing that an application for the BVI Grant must be made by the administrator appointed by the Hong Kong Court.  David has not explained by evidence why he himself, as a family member of the Deceased, has not taken any step to try to make an application for a BVI Grant conferring authorities on an independent professional to deal with the BVI Estate.

40.  In my judgment, the Mother cannot be criticized in respect of anything related to the BVI Estate, including the Shareholding Dispute.

D2.   Hong Kong Estate

41.  As shown by the evidence, after the Hong Kong Grant was made, the Mother has been undertaking the administration of the Hong Kong Estate diligently.  The steps taken by the Mother in administering the Hong Kong Estate include the following:

(1) The Mother had paid off the various costs and expenses associated with the Deceased.

(2) The Mother has arranged interim partial distributions to the beneficiaries on 11 August 2016, 13 March 2017, 23 July 2020, 21 June 2021, 28 June 2021, 20 December 2021 and 4 July 2022 for a total amount in excess of HK$40m.

(3) The Mother has defended a legal action issued by a third party (including successfully defending a summary judgment application with costs obtained)  for loans purportedly advanced to the Deceased prior to his passing away.  In light of David’s refusal to consent to an order of indemnification, the Mother was forced to take out a Beddoe application, which Beddoe Order was granted to her in May 2018.

(4) The Mother has instructed valuers to formally value the various pieces of land which the Deceased owned or had interest in.

(5) The Mother has issued legal proceedings against a company limited, ie Manbro Investments Ltd, for sums owed to the Deceased.

(6) The Mother has issued proceedings against the squatters occupying the land owned by the Deceased.

(7) The Mother has also issued legal proceedings against Shenciti in respect of certain debts owed by Shenciti to the Deceased.

(8) The Mother has arranged for the sale and leasing out of certain pieces of land owned by the Estate.

(9) The Mother has also directly distributed certain pieces of land owned by the Estate to the beneficiaries.

42.  Substantial and significant works have been done by the Mother in administering the Hong Kong Estate.  There is no dispute that the administration of the Hong Kong Estate has been almost completed.

43.  There is no evidence showing that the Mother has done anything improper or has neglected to do anything to discharge her duties in administering the Hong Kong Estate.  In fact, Mr Chan has acknowledged that “[David] does not have any serious grievance about how [the Mother] administered the non STRPs.”[6]

D3.   Other allegations against the Mother

44.  David has made some other allegations against the Mother.  I agree with Mr Ho that these allegations are unsubstantiated.

45.  There is a general theme put forward by David that the Mother has colluded with Peter, Kai and Susan, and they are all in Peter’s camp.  David also alleges that the Mother has been controlled by Peter.  In my view, these allegations are unsupported by the evidence.  There is nothing in the evidence showing that the Mother has not properly administered the Hong Kong Estate, in an independent and impartial manner.  There is also no evidence showing that the Mother is being controlled by Peter.

46.  According to David, there was a disagreement between him on the one hand and the Mother, Peter, Kai and Susan on the other hand as to what medical treatment should be given to the Deceased after the Deceased fell into coma on 12 August 2013.  David was of the view that the Deceased should be kept alive by the machine so long as there was a faint hope that he might regain consciousness.  The Mother and the siblings took the view that it would be too costly to maintain the life of the Deceased by the life supporting machine.[7] In my view, this episode is something happened before the death of the Deceased, and is completely irrelevant as to whether the Mother has administered the Hong Kong Estate independently and impartially.

47.  David also alleges that the Mother has made a false allegation against him, and that is “indicative of her lack of the intellectual honesty that befits a proper administrator”[8].  However, the Mother simply said that it would be misleading for David to characterise the Super Tycoon-related companies as being the Estate’s properties, as the Estate only enjoys an interest in those companies through Super Tycoon, the BVI entity, and that no BVI Grant could be obtained due to the caveats entered by David.[9] The response was to David’s factual contention that the Estate’s properties comprise the various underlying operating companies for the Mainland businesses[10], and hence the Mother could or should have directly intervened in those businesses.  In my view, the Mother’s response is a fair description and cannot be said as bearing any intellectual dishonesty.

48.  In the latest affirmation in reply filed by David (ie David’s 11th Affirmation), David made a serious allegation against the Mother, ie the Mother had previously tried to “bribe” the staff of New Fukong in a banquet held some time in or after October 2013.  Mr Ho submits that no weight should be given to this part of David’s evidence.  I agree with Mr Ho.

(1) No satisfactory reason has been given as to why this serious allegation is only raised for the first time in David’s 11th Affirmation (which is an affirmation in reply)  filed in November 2022, while the matters in this episode occurred in 2013 or 2014.  Mr Chan has tried to explain that this episode is based upon the statement made by one Mr Shi Xin (the board secretary of New Fukong)  signed on 25 October 2022, and David only obtained this statement a few days before the filing of his 11th Affirmation.  However, there is no evidence showing that David had made reasonable effort to try to obtain this statement, and he could not obtain the statement at an earlier time notwithstanding the reasonable effort made by him.

(2) The raising of such a serious allegation in the reply evidence shortly before the substantive hearing is grossly unfair to the Mother and constitutes an abuse of process.  Ambushing the Mother in this way is impermissible.[11]

(3) Even taking David’s allegation at face value, David is in fact only relying on hearsay evidence based on a short statement made by one Mr Shi Xin (the board secretary of New Fukong)  signed on 25 October 2022.  However, the statement of Mr Shi only says that in the Lunar New Year of 2014, after the Deceased was comatose, the Mother and Peter chaired a lunar new year celebration event of New Fukong, and distributed red packets contain RMB 1,000 to each of the staff member present (more than 100 staff members participated in that celebration event).  Mr Shi himself does not say that Mother did or intended to “bribe” any staff.  With the lunar new year context of the episode in mind (which David has omitted in his affirmation), this episode can hardly be cogent and sufficient evidence showing that the Mother did or intended to “bribe” any staff of New Fukong.

(4) Allegations of fraud or dishonesty have to be supported by cogent evidence, and a legal representative should only allow such allegations to be advanced when there is sufficient evidence to do so.[12] For the reason stated in the above, the allegation that the Mother had tried to “bribe” the staff of New Fukong in fact should not be put forward at all.

(5) Further, the allegation has no relevance in these proceedings.  The relevant event took place in 2013 or 2014, before the Deceased passed away in June 2014, and before the Mother obtained the Hong Kong Grant in March 2016.  The allegation is not relevant to the performance of the Mother’s administration of the Hong Kong Estate.

(6) For all these reasons, no weight is attached to this allegation.

49.  David criticizes the Mother, Peter and Kai for “straining Shenciti’s income”.[13]  However, the basis for saying so is that, according to David, the Deceased at one time told him that the Mother, Peter and Kai had extravagant lifestyles and the Deceased had to make provisions to them from time to time, and as a result Shenciti’s income had been strained.[14] As submitted by Mr Ho, even assuming that this episode is true, this matter is irrelevant as to whether the Mother has properly discharged her duties as the administratrix of the Hong Kong Estate.

50.  In [19.4] of his 1st Affirmation, David has also said that the Mother’s solicitors have used “all sorts of excuse to delay, deflect, evade and frustrate … legitimate enquiries for information”.  The subject matter in that part of his affirmation is an alleged indebtedness of HK$6 million owed by the Estate to him as a result a promise made by the Deceased to him in relation to the distributions from Man Mou Hei Tso.  Facing a claim against the Estate, there is nothing wrong for the Mother’s solicitors to adopt a stance to safeguard the Estate’s interest, and not to accede to David’s claim unless satisfactory proof is provided by David.

D4.   Refusing Relief 1A

51.  With all the aforesaid in mind, there is no valid reason for removing the Mother from the administratrix’s office.

52.  There are further reasons in support of keeping the Mother as the administratrix of the Hong Kong Estate.

(1) The Mother intends to continue to be the administratrix of the Hong Kong Estate and to complete the administration.

(2) The majority of the beneficiaries (ie the Mother, Peter, Kai and Susan)  supports the Mother to continue to be the administratrix of the Hong Kong Estate.

(3) There has already been significant progress in the administration of the Hong Kong Estate.  In fact, the administration of the Hong Kong Estate is on its way to completion.  Even David does not have serious grievance against the Mother in relation to her administration of the Hong Kong Estate.

(4) Costs would be incurred and borne by the Estate if a professional is appointed to replace the Mother as the administrator of the Hong Kong Estate.  In the absence of a valid reason for removing the Mother as the administratrix, there is no justification to require the Estate to pay costs to retain a professional administrator for the Hong Kong Estate.

(5) The Deceased was a well-known and respected businessman and village head.  Removing the Mother (being the lawful widow of the Deceased)  as the administratrix and replacing her with an outsider would cause irreparable damage to the Mother’s reputation and cause her to suffer stigma among the relatives.  In the absence of any reliable evidence showing a compelling reason for removing the Mother from the office, the court should not adopt this course.

53.  For all these reasons, in my judgment, the court’s discretion should be exercise against granting Relief 1A.

E.   DISPOSITION

54.  I dismiss [1A] and strike out [2] of the AOS.

55.  As a result of this judgment, all the claims made by David in these proceedings have been either dismissed or struck out.  Costs should follow the event.  There be a costs order nisi that costs of these proceedings (including costs of D2’s Striking Out Summons and all costs reserved)  by paid by David to all the defendants herein.  Those costs are to be taxed if not agreed.

56.  Lastly, it remains for me to thank all counsel for the assistance rendered to the court.

(MK Liu)
Deputy High Court Judge

Mr Maurice J Chan instructed by Fan Wong & Tso, for the Plaintiff

Mr Martin Ho instructed by Kwok, Ng & Chan, for the 1st Defendant

Mr Tommy Cheung instructed by J Chan, Yip, So & Partners, for the 2nd Defendant

Mr Victor Lui instructed by Hon & Co., for the 3rd & 4th Defendants



[1]  David’s written submissions dated 17 November 2022, [2.1]

[2]  [2022] HKCFI 804, [21] – [22]

[3]  [2014] EWCA Civ 1632

[4]  HCMP 2391/2013, 21 October 2014

[5]  See the Mother’s solicitors’ letters dated 18 September 2015 and 15 December 2015 respectively.

[6]  David’s written reply submissions dated 24 November 2022, [2.4]

[7]  David’s 1st Affirmation dated 20 May 2019, [9]

[8]  David’s 6th Affirmation dated 11 April 2022, [5.1] 

[9]  The Mother’s 4th Affirmation dated 27 January 2022, [38]

[10]  David’s 5th Affirmation dated 29 September 2021, [2.1]

[11]  Szeto Chak Mei v Chan Lam Shan (HCMP 836/2012, 3 November 2015)  per G Lam J (as G Lam JA then was)  at [9] – [11]; Sze Ching Lok v China Resources Power Holdings Co Ltd (HCMP 1655/2013, 31 December 2013)  per Poon J (as Poon CJHC then was)  at [29]

[12]  Multifor Enterprise Development Ltd v Ho Chow Ping Danny[2022] HKCFI 737, per Recorder Rachel Lam SC at [15]

[13]  David’s Reply Submissions dated 24 November 2022, [2.1(1)]

[14]  David’s 1st Affirmation dated 20 May 2019, [4.3(1)]