HK CourtDB
HomeDirectoryMCP
Hong Kong CourtDB
Back to directory
Building Management Application2019

NG YUI TONG v. TAIKOO SHING (MANAGEMENT) LTD

Related cases with same parties

  • CACV594/2021NG YUI TONG v. TAIKOO SHING (MANAGEMENT) LTD
  • CAMP133/2024NG YUI TONG v. TAIKOO SHING (MANAGEMENT) LTD
  • CAMP172/2018NG YUI TONG v. TAIKOO SHING (MANAGEMENT) LTD
  • CAMP218/2021NG YUI TONG v. TAIKOO SHING (MANAGEMENT) LTD
  • CAMP354/2022NG YUI TONG v. CHAN CHI KEUNG
  • LDBM116/2018NG YUI TONG v. TAIKOO SHING (MANAGEMENT) LTD
  • LDBM1/2023NG YUI TONG v. TAIKOO SHING (MANAGEMENT) LTD
  • LDBM191/2018NG YUI TONG v. TAIKOO SHING (MANAGEMENT) LTD
  • LDBM196/2018NG YUI TONG v. TAIKOO SHING (MANAGEMENT) LTD
  • LDBM59/2014NG YUI TONG v. TAIKOO SHING (MANAGEMENT) LTD

Files (2)

[2021] HKLdT 34-EN-2021-05-27

NG YUI TONG v. TAIKOO SHING (MANAGEMENT) LTD

HTML content

LDBM 191/2018, LDBM 196/2018 and LDBM 116/2019
(Consolidated)

[2021] HKLdT 34

LDBM 191/2018

IN THE LANDS TRIBUNAL OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

BUILDING MANAGEMENT APPLICATION NO. 191 OF 2018

_________________

BETWEEN

NG YUI TONG
(吳銳堂)
Applicant
and
TAIKOO SHING (MANAGEMENT) LIMITED
(太古城物業管理有限公司)
Respondent

_________________

LDBM 196/2018

IN THE LANDS TRIBUNAL OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

BUILDING MANAGEMENT APPLICATION NO. 196 OF 2018

_________________

BETWEEN

NG YUI TONG
(吳銳堂)
Applicant
and
TAIKOO SHING (MANAGEMENT) LIMITED
(太古城物業管理有限公司)
Respondent

_________________

LDBM 116/2019

IN THE LANDS TRIBUNAL OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

BUILDING MANAGEMENT APPLICATION NO. 116 OF 2019

_________________

BETWEEN

NG YUI TONG
(吳銳堂)
Applicant
and
TAIKOO SHING (MANAGEMENT) LIMITED
(太古城物業管理有限公司)
Respondent

_________________

(Consolidated pursuant to the Order of His Honour Judge Michael Wong dated 23 June 2020)

Before: Deputy District Judge Michelle Soong, Presiding Officer of the Lands Tribunal, in Court

Date of Hearing: 20 April 2021

Date of Decision: 27 May 2021

_________________

D E C I S I O N

_________________


1.  The applicant applies for leave to appeal against my judgment dated 5 March 2021 (“the Judgment”). The Judgment was given after trial of three sets of proceedings (consolidated) brought by the applicant, an owner of Taikoo Shing, against Taikoo Shing (Management) Limited as the respondent.

2.  In LDBM 116/2019, the applicant contends that the respondent has no power to organize recreational activities for the residents under the Deed of Mutual Covenant (“DMC”).

3.  In LDBM 191/2018, the applicant challenges a decision made by the owners of Stage III resolving to do certain repair or renovation works on the planters outside each of their apartments.

4.  In LDBM 196/2018, the applicant challenges certain expenses being included in the budget for the estate in 2018 which the applicant considers objectionable.

5.  The applicant claims that his intended appeal concerns matter of great and general public importance and that he has a reasonable chance of success in his appeal.  His intended grounds of appeal are set out in his affirmation dated 1 April 2021 (“the applicant’s affirmation”) and his written submissions (“the applicant’s submissions”) which was handed up to the tribunal during the leave hearing.

6.  The detailed background of and parties’ arguments in each set of proceedings are set out in the Judgment and shall not be repeated here.

LDBM 116/2019

7.  Subject to one single point below, one cannot deduce from the applicant’s affirmation what is being contended as constituting a ground of appeal. The applicant raised new arguments which were not raised whether properly or at all at trial.

8.  First, he raises in paragraph 3(1) of the applicant’s affirmation that Part VIA of the Building Management Ordinance, Cap.344 (“BMO”) shall prevail in case of inconsistency between it and the DMC. But he has not explained which DMC provision(s) and how such provision(s) is/are inconsistent with Part VIA.

9.  If, as I surmise, the applicant is challenging that the creation or operation of the Management Liaison Council (“MLC”) and the various Sub-committees are inconsistent with Part VIA, this was not pleaded nor argued by the parties at trial[1]. In any event, I do not see why and how the MLC and the Sub-committees are inconsistent with Part VIA or Schedule 7 of the BMO.

10.  The applicant mentions about sections 34C, 34E and 34D of the BMO (which are under Part VIA) but it is far from clear how these provisions constitute ground of appeal.

11.  The applicant only has some more elaboration in relation to section 34I which provides that:-

“Common Parts
(1)No person may—
(a)convert any part of the common parts of a building to his own use unless such conversion is approved by a resolution of the owners’ committee (if any);
(b)use or permit to be used the common parts of a building in such a manner as—
(i)unreasonably to interfere with the use and enjoyment of those parts by any owner or occupier of the building; or
(ii)to cause a nuisance or hazard to any person lawfully in the building.
(2)Any person who contravenes subsection (1) shall be deemed to be in breach of an obligation imposed on him by the deed of mutual covenant in respect of the building.”

12.  It seems that the applicant’s complaint now is that the respondent’s use of the common area for the purpose of holding activities and for putting up decorations etc. are in contravention of section 34I. This is different from the articulation of the issues by the applicant at trial[2]. As this argument was never properly or clearly articulated by the applicant or addressed by the parties, it is natural that the Judgment would not deal with such non-issue but would focus on the essential issue in dispute being whether on the construction of the DMC in particular Clause 7(a) the respondent has the power to organize recreational activities.

13.  In any event, since it is my finding that on a proper construction of the DMC provisions, the respondent shall have the power to organize recreational activities for the residents of Taikoo Shing, I fail to see why the use of the common area for holding activities organized for the common enjoyment of residents would offend section 34C which clearly is to target at unauthorized conversion of common parts for private use and unreasonable use of common parts causing interference, nuisance or hazard. The suggestion that the act of putting some decorations at the common parts of the development for the eye-pleasure and atmospheric enjoyment of the residents during festivals constitutes a conversion of common parts for private use causing nuisance and hence offends section 34C is absurd and cynical if it is what the applicant means.

14.  In paragraph 3(1)(h) and (g) of the applicant’s affirmation, he further challenges how the management fee has been collected. He complains that the respondent provided the activities to a small group of residents, but sought contributions from only the residential owners, not all owners, this was an infringement of the prescribed way of collection of management fee and was unfair to the applicant. The exact meaning of this contention is not entirely clear. Anyway, this was not pleaded or argued at trial and no evidence was adduced in this regard. I did not rule on anything about the collection of management fees in the Judgment.

15.  In paragraph 3(2) of the applicant’s affirmation, it is said that I erred in saying that the applicant did not bring legal proceedings against the MLC or the Recreational Sub-committee. I am afraid the applicant misunderstood paragraph 43 of the Judgment as I actually did not suggest that the applicant should commence proceedings against the MLC or the Recreational Sub-committee. What was said in paragraph 43 was that the applicant did not, in the current proceedings, challenge the power of the MLC and the Recreational Sub-Committee to resolve about recreational activities on behalf of the residents.

16.  In paragraph 3(3) of the applicant’s affirmation, it seems that he is reiterating that the respondent could not in the current proceedings contend they have power to organize recreational activities because such a position is contrary to the legal advice they previously obtained.

17.  As stated in paragraphs 68 and 24 of the Judgment, I agree with the respondent that the two letters of advice from the respondent’s legal advisers are no more than opinions which cannot oust or override the tribunal’s jurisdiction to construe the DMC and to rule the case. The applicant’s contention that the respondent shall be estopped from, in these proceedings, taking a position that is inconsistent with the legal advice they previously obtained is without legal basis.

18.  To conclude, no point appears to have been advanced in the applicant’s affirmation as to why the Judgment is erroneous in law in respect of the true construction of the DMC or the organization of the activities.

19.  I will now deal with the applicant’s written submissions which was handed up during the leave hearing.

20.  Paragraphs 1 to 4 of the applicant’s submissions relate to the construction of Clause 7(a) of the DMC which have already been dealt with in paragraphs 52 to 63 of the Judgment.  The applicant did not explain why the Judgment is erroneous.

21.  Paragraphs 5 to 7 of the applicant’s submissions relate to Clause 7(c) of the DMC which is an exemption of liability clause. The applicant seeks to demonstrate the legal threshold for establishing “dishonesty” by reference to the case Great Source Enterprise Ltd v Sino Estates Management Ltd[3]. In my view, this case is not relevant to our present concern as we have not even come to the stage of considering the relevant test. As mentioned in paragraph 75 of the judgment, the applicant has not particularized or adduced any evidence to show criminal liability, dishonesty or willful negligence on the part of the respondent.

22.  The applicant also quotes extracts from Great Source Enterprise Ltd v Sino Estates Management Ltd on the issue of whether the Control of Exemption Clauses Ordinance (Cap.71) (“CECO”) applies to a DMC. This is again irrelevant as I already explained in paragraph 73 of the Judgment that the CECO does not apply to the DMC in question because the DMC had been made before the CECO came into force.

23.  In paragraph 7 of the applicant’s submissions, he contends that the various decisions of the MLC and the Recreational Sub-committee infringed his rights as he did not have the opportunity to raise objections in relation to the proposed activities. Again, this was not a pleaded issue. No argument was made and no evidence was adduced on the decision-making process of each and every decision of the MLC and the Recreational Sub-Committee concerning social or recreational activities.

LDBM 191/2018

24.  The applicant contends that I was wrong in placing focus on the mosaic tiles on face of the planters and completely ignored the fact that the planter was a fixture. Paragraph 3(4) of the applicant’s affirmation asserts that planters are fixtures and cannot form part of the common parts of the building. I do not see the basis of such a contention as well as the suggestion that the planter is a fixture of the applicant’s property.

25.  In paragraph 8 of the applicant’s submissions, he raised that since the entire planter is not a load bearing part of the building and since it is not within the common parts set out in Schedule 1 of the BMO, it is not common parts but should be in his private ownership. Such argument has been dealt with in paragraphs 82 to 88 of the Judgment.

26.  In paragraph 3(4) and (5) of the applicant’s affirmation, he contends that the planters are not common parts under the DMC in reliance of the case Incorporated Owners of No.27A Chatham Road Kowloon v Mr Lee or Unlawful Occupier (Lee Kai Kong) & Another (九龍漆咸道 27A 號業主立案法團 訴 李啟剛及另一人) [4] wherein Woo JA (as he then was) said that when an owner owns certain undivided shares and at the same time owns certain part of the building which has not been assigned with any undivided shares, then this owner should be entitled to the exclusive use of such area even though it is without undivided shares. The applicant says that as the planter has not been assigned with any undivided shares and since it is connected with his unit, it should be regarded as owned by the applicant.

27.  In my view, the applicant’s reliance on this case is misconceived. The distinguishing feature of that case is that, the part without undivided share in that case (which was the roof) was clearly assigned to certain owners who also own undivided shares of certain units whereas in the present case, the planter was not assigned to the applicant by express wording nor does it form part of the pink area on the assignment plan showing the demised area upon the applicant’s acquiring his unit.

28.  In paragraph 3(6) to (8) of the applicant’s affirmation, he challenges that the contribution towards the planters was not calculation in accordance with the DMC. This argument lacks particulars and, again, was not properly raised or substantively argued by both parties. Paragraph 3(7) of the applicant’s affirmation is particularly incomprehensible.

29.  Paragraph 3(9) and (10) of the applicant’s affirmation is about exemption clause but the applicant’s exact contention is far from clear. Paragraphs 75 of the Judgment simply concluded that even if the holding of activities were not permitted on a true construction of the DMC, no claim for damages against the respondent would lie. The applicant has not explained why I erred in law in paragraph 75 of the Judgment.

LDBM 196/2018

30.  Paragraphs 3(11) to (14) of the applicant’s affirmation fail to identify any finding in the Judgment that is erroneous in law.

CONCLUSION

31.  Section 11(2) of the LTO provides that:-

“Subject to section 11AA and the provisions of any Ordinance relating to appeals from the Tribunal, any party to proceedings before the Tribunal may appeal to the Court of Appeal against a judgment, order or decision of the Tribunal on the ground that such judgment, order or decision is erroneous in point of law.”

32.  Section 11AA(1) LTO provides that no appeal may be made under section 11(2) unless leave to appeal has been granted by either the Tribunal or the Court of Appeal.

33.  Section 11AA(6) LTO provides that such leave shall not be granted unless either the appeal has a reasonable prospect of success or there is some other reason in the interests of justice why the appeal should be heard.

34.  The applicant’s application for leave to appeal must fail as he fails to show any basis on which the Judgment is erroneous in law and I see no reasonable prospect of success in his intended appeal.

35.  Both parties agree that costs of the leave application should follow the result of the leave application, I therefore order the applicant to pay the respondent’s costs of this application, to be taxed on the District Court scale if not agreed.

 (Michelle Soong)
 Deputy District Judge
 Presiding Officer
 Lands Tribunal

Mr. Ng Yui Tong, the applicant of LDBM 191/2018, LDBM 196/2018 and LDBM 116/2019 (Consolidated), appeared in person

Mr. Arian Law of Mayer Brown, for the respondent of LDBM 191/2018, LDBM 196/2018 and LDBM 116/2019 (Consolidated)



[1]   In fact, the applicant himself substantively mentioned about the MLC and the Sub-committees as well as the various DMC provisions relating to these bodies in his Reply which means he all along was well aware of the existence of these bodies and the relevant DMC clauses. But the applicant has never challenged or taken issue about these bodies being inconsistent with the BMO. As a matter of fact, the applicant himself has been a member of the MLC for quite a number of years.

[2]   Bundle D, Tab 2, p.32, applicant’s opening submissions.

[3]   [2004] 4 HKC 49, LDBM 167/2001.

[4]   CACV 2238/2001, unreported, 25 October 2002.

[2021] HKLdT 10-EN-2021-03-05

NG YUI TONG v. TAIKOO SHING (MANAGEMENT) LTD

HTML content

LDBM 191/2018, LDBM 196/2018 and LDBM 116/2019
(Consolidated)

[2021] HKLdT 10

LDBM 191/2018

IN THE LANDS TRIBUNAL OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

BUILDING MANAGEMENT APPLICATION NO. 191 OF 2018

_________________

BETWEEN

NG YUI TONG
(吳銳堂)
Applicant
and
TAIKOO SHING (MANAGEMENT) LIMITED
(太古城物業管理有限公司)
Respondent

_________________

LDBM 196/2018

IN THE LANDS TRIBUNAL OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

BUILDING MANAGEMENT APPLICATION NO. 196 OF 2018

_________________

BETWEEN

NG YUI TONG
(吳銳堂)
Applicant
and
TAIKOO SHING (MANAGEMENT) LIMITED
(太古城物業管理有限公司)
Respondent

_________________

LDBM 116/2019

IN THE LANDS TRIBUNAL OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

BUILDING MANAGEMENT APPLICATION NO. 116 OF 2019

_________________

BETWEEN

NG YUI TONG
(吳銳堂)
Applicant
and
TAIKOO SHING (MANAGEMENT) LIMITED
(太古城物業管理有限公司)
Respondent

_________________

(Consolidated pursuant to the Order of His Honour Judge Michael Wong dated 23 June 2020)

Before: Deputy District Judge Michelle Soong, Presiding Officer of the Lands Tribunal, in Court

Date of Trial: 1 February 2021

Date of Judgment: 5 March 2021

_________________

J U D G M E N T

_________________


BACKGROUND

1.  This application concerns a residential and commercial development known as Taikoo Shing.

2.  Taikoo Shing was developed by 12 stages, each stage consists of a number of tower blocks and has its own Deed of Mutual Covenant and management agreement in similar terms, similar forms and the same material clauses.

3.  The Applicant has been a registered owner of Flat H, 10th Floor, Fu Shan Mansion, Stage III since 1997. Stage III comprises 8 blocks of buildings[1]. The DMC for Stage III is dated 9 January 1978 and is registered at the Land Registry by memorial number 1488926 (“DMC”).

4.  The Respondent[2] was and is the appointed Manager of Taikoo Shing under the DMC.

5.  LDBM 116/2019 originates from HCA 1383/2013[3] under which the Applicant questions the Respondent’s power to organise activities of a social or recreational nature for the residents of Taikoo Shing.

6.  LDBM 191/2018 relates to a decision made by the owners of Stage III resolving to do certain renovation works on the planters outside each of their apartments as part of an overall renovation project of the exterior of the buildings.

7.  The Applicant contends that the resolution is void because the planter is owned by him and is not a common part hence the Respondent has no power to repair the same or to collect contributions for that purpose.

8.  LDBM 196/2018 relates to certain expenses (festive decorations, meal subsidy to the Respondent’s staff, etc.) included in the budget for the estate in 2018 which the Applicant considers objectionable.

9.  At trial, the Applicant appears in person and testifies himself. The Respondent is represented by Mr Hunsworth, solicitor-advocate of Messrs. Mayer Brown with Mr Cheung Lap Ting, the Chief Estate Manager, as their witness.

10.  These proceedings mainly involve dispute of law and the interpretation of the DMC rather than factual dispute between the factual witnesses.

LDBM 191/2018 (POWER TO HOLD ACTIVITIES)

APPLICANT’S CASE

11.  It is the Applicant’s case that since or about 2006, various activities purportedly of a social or recreational nature unrelated to nor requisite for the management of the estate have been organized by the Respondent. Those activities include:

(a)dragon boat race;
(b)anniversary dinners;
(c)activities for senior residents, including but not limited to elderly health check programme;
(d)special coach to Wo Hop Shek Cemetery at Fanling during Ching Ming Festival;
(e)tower festive decorations and Mid-Autumn variety shows;
(f)Chinese New Year tour and Easter tour; and
(g)summer activities for 2013 and various interest workshops.
 (hereinafter collectively referred to as “the Activities”)

12.  The Applicant contends that:

(a)the Activities are not necessary or requisite for or in connection with or reasonably incidental to the management of the land and the buildings, hence in breach of Clause 7(a) of the DMC;
(b)the expenses on the Activities exceeded the scope of the annual budget as prescribed under Clause 8(a) of the DMC, hence in breach of the said provision;
(c)the Activities do not serve the common interest or benefit of all the owners of the estate, hence the Respondent does not have lawful authority to hold the same;
(d)by reason of the foregoing, the Respondent is not entitled to withdraw, use or seek reimbursement of monies or expenditures incurred in the Activities out of the management fund of the estate;
(e)the Respondent stands to unjustifiable gain and profit by receiving remuneration and management supervision fee at 5% of all expenses and expenditure attributable to organizing the Activities under Clause 8(a)A(iv) of the DMC;
(f)the Respondent shall be estopped from denying that they have no authority to hold the Activities because that was the conclusion made by their own legal advisors,[4];
(g)the Respondent stands in the position of a trustee with regard to the management fund and therefore owes a fiduciary duty and/or duty of utmost good faith to properly apply the management fund; and
(h)if the Respondent purports to exonerate its obligations or breaches by reliance upon the DMC provisions, such provisions are unconscionable, oppressive and unreasonable and should not be applied in the Respondent’s favour.

13.  The Applicant seeks the following reliefs:

(a)an injunction to restrain the Respondent from organizing the Activities or such activities as are not necessary, requisite or reasonably incidental to the management of the estate;
(b)a declaration that the Activities are not necessary, requisite or reasonably incidental to the management of the estate and that the Respondent shall not pay for the Activities out of the management fund of the estate;
(c)damages;
(d)an order that an independent auditor be appointed to examine the books and accounts of the Respondent relating to the Activities and application of the management fund, and submit to the Court income and expenditure report and assessed profits by the Respondent out of the Activities;
(e)an order for discovery of the profits and gains by the Respondent out of the Activities, and an account thereof be taken and a refund by the Respondent of all profits obtained out of the Activities to the owners of the estate;
(f)an order for the Respondent to account for, pay and refund all expenditures incurred for the Activities to the owners;
(g)interest; and
(h)costs.

RESPONDENT’S CASE

14.  The Respondent admits having organised the Activities.  They consider that such activities were for the benefits of the residents of the estate and were necessary or requisite for the management of the estate, falling within the ambit of what they could do under Clause 7(a) of the DMC.

15.  Disagreeing with the Applicant’s narrow construction of Clause 7(a), the Respondent contends that the management power thereunder shall not be confined to those matters that are “necessary or requisite” but should also cover matters that are “in connection with” the management of the buildings.

16.  The Respondent highlights that since Taikoo Shing opened its first stage in 1976 there has been a history of community activities being undertaken. This was traditionally regarded as being a way of fostering community spirit and promoting harmonious neighbourhood in the estate.

17.  Under the DMC, the Respondent has the overall management responsibility over the entire estate hand in hand with a body called the Management Liaison Council (“MLC”) constituted by the representative owners of the estate. Clause 6C empowers the MLC to monitor and control the budgets of the estate.

18.  Historically, a budget for all the said activities was prepared and included in the overall operating budget for Taikoo Shing for each year.

19.  For year 2013 in particular, the amount spent on community services expenses comprised only approximately 0.5% of the overall management expenditure. In the material years, the MLC approved the organisation of the Activities and also the budget earmarked therefor.

20.  The Respondent considers it impossible to manage a large scale estate such as Taikoo Shing if regard has to be had for individual preferences or choices of each individual owner and, for this reason, the system established in the DMC is a form of “representative democracy”. Individual owners can lobby or speak to the representatives of their block who sit on the Representative Committee. In turn, the members of the Representative Committee who sit on the MLC could raise matters and issues at meetings of the MLC which provides a forum for debate and resolution, and for the Respondent to know and receive the views of their owners as expressed by their representatives.

21.  As a matter of fact, the number of community activities has significantly decreased not least because of the Applicant’s commencement of legal proceedings. Of the various activities mentioned in paragraph 11 above, most of them have been abandoned due to the present litigation, the situation is set out in the table below:

Dragon Boat RaceNo Dragon Boat Team has competed since 2013.
Anniversary DinnersApart from a dinner in 2017 to celebrate the 40th anniversary of Taikoo Shing, anniversary dinners have been suspended since 2013.
Senior Residents’ ActivitiesApart from limited interest classes for senior residents (e.g. pop song classes or Chinese opera classes), all activities have been suspended since 2013. These include the important Health Talks and Health Checks and Anniversary and Christmas celebrations for elderlies.
Coach to Wo Hop Shek CemeterySuspended since 2013.
Tower Festive Decorations and Mid-Autumn Variety ShowsBoth remain as annual events, save the Mid-Autumn Variety Show was not held in 2014 when District Council funding was not granted.
Chinese New Year and Easter TourSuspended since 2013.
Summer ActivitiesAll suspended since 2013.

22.  Whilst the Respondent accepts that there is a contractual obligation upon it to carry out its functions in accordance with the DMC, they consider the Applicant’s assertion of some sort of fiduciary relationship owed to him is legally misconceived.

23.  The Respondent considers the plea in paragraph 12(h) above (i.e. about unconscionable DMC provisions) meaningless as the Applicant fails to identify which DMC provisions are “unconscionable, oppressive and unreasonable”.

24.  As regards the letters of advice from two law firms mentioned in paragraph 12(f) above, the Respondent say that they are no more than opinions which cannot oust or override the Tribunal’s jurisdiction to construe the words of the DMC and to rule the case. The Applicant’s contention that the legal opinions somehow created an estoppel is legal nonsense.

25.  The relief for damages is not supported by particulars. The Applicant claims that he suffered monetary loss of $527.80 presumably being his calculation of his contribution over all those years to the costs of the Activities. Given the triviality of the amount, the Respondent elected not to waste time and costs on auditing this figure.

DISCUSSION

Overview of DMC and Observations

26.  I shall begin by giving an overview of the DMC provisions governing the role of the Respondent vis-à-vis the role of the owners in the management of the estate. This exercise is essential to understanding the Respondent’s power under the DMC.

27.  Preamble (5) of the DMC stipulates that the Respondent:-

“… undertake the management, operation, servicing, maintenance, repair, renovation, replacement, security, and insurance of the said Land and the buildings thereon and their equipment services and apparatus (all or any of which activities are hereinafter included under the word “management”)”.

28.  Clause 6A of the DMC provides that the Respondent shall be the Manager of the entire Taikoo Shing. A similar clause is contained in the DMC for each and every stages. Pursuant to all the DMCs, the Respondent has managed all matters pertaining to the whole Taikoo Shing development since 1976.

29.  Clause 6B provides for the establishment of a “Representative Committee” which is a body having the function of, inter alia, representing all the owners in all dealings with the Manager through a body called “Management Liaison Council” (i.e. the MLC). This provision requires owners to elect two representatives from each block and two representatives from the owners of the shops to serve on the Representative Committee[5]. Clause 12 sets out the membership and meetings of the Representative Committee.

30.  Clause 6C provides for the establishment of the MLC and requires that each Representative Committee shall elect from their number not more than three persons to serve on such MLC which shall have meetings not less than 8 times a year. It further stipulates the powers and functions of the MLC which include, among other things, (a) to liaise with the Respondent in respect of all matters dealing with the management of the Taikoo Shing; and (b) to review the annual budget.

31.  Clause 7(a) of the DMC sets out the powers and functions of the Respondent both in broad term and specific term.

32.  The broad term is contained in Clause 7(a)’s introductory preamble which states that the Respondent:

“… shall have full and unrestricted authority to do all such acts and things as may be necessary or requisite for or in connection with the said Land and any of the buildings thereon and the management thereof including in particular but without in any way limiting the generality of the foregoing…”

33.  Clause 7(a) then sets out the specific powers in its sub-paragraphs (1) to (28). Sub-paragraph (24) provides that the Respondent shall have the power:-

“… to do all such other things as are reasonably incidental to the management of the said Land and the said buildings…”

34.  Clause 7(b) provides that all acts and decisions of the Respondent arrived at in accordance with the provisions of the DMC shall be binding on all owners.

35.  Clause 8 stipulates the preparation of budgets for the estate, to be divided into four parts. The first part covers expenditures on common areas and facilities; the second part concerns non-residential parts expenditures; the third part is about residential parts; and the forth part covers car-parking spaces expenditures.

36.  In my view, it is clear that the DMC envisages the Respondent to have the overall management responsibility over the entire Taikoo Shing. It shall manage the estate in consultation with the MLC which is a body substantially composed of owners’ representatives to represent the interests of all the owners and to exercise budgetary control.

37.  This management style of Taikoo Shing is echoed by what are said in the 65-page[6] celebratory booklet prepared for the Silver Jubilee of Taikoo Shing (“Jubilee Booklet”) in 2001. This booklet gives an overview on how Taikoo Shing had been managed and on the respective roles of the residents’ representatives and the Respondent over the management of the estate including the organization of the Activities. The Jubilee Booklet has some referential values.

38.  Page 7 of the Jubilee Booklet states, inter alia:

“… In offering these services to the residents, the particular style of management that has made Taikoo Shing so special through these years has been the emphasis placed on participation of the residents in the running of their common housing affairs. This participation started at the outset, 25 years ago, with the election of the first Tower Representative for Stage I. Today Taikoo Shing has a Representative Committee for each of its 12 Stages and a Management Liaison Council composed of 33 elected Councillors, representing the entire estate.”

39.  Pages 17 to 19 of the Jubilee Booklet is a summary of the residents’ participation in the management of Taikoo Shing:

Page 17

“Taikoo Shing residents’ representation and participation in estate management can be divided into two groups: the Representative Committees (“RC”) and the Management Liaison Council (“MLC”). According to the Deed of Mutual Covenant (DMC), two representatives will be elected from each tower. The Representative Committee in each stage (there are 12 stages in Taikoo Shing) will elect not more than three Councillors to form the Management Liaison Council. Under the supervision of the Management Company, all representatives and councillors are elected by the residents by secret ballots.

In accordance with the Deed of Mutual Covenant, the Management Company and the MLC have regular meetings at least eight times a year … Under the Management Liaison Council, there are six Sub-Committees. The Management Company encourages participation of the Representative Committees and the Management Liaison Council in these sub-committees.

• Security Sub-Committee…

• Finance Sub-Committee…

• Environmental & General Sub-Committee…

• Recreation Sub-Committee: To organise social, cultural and recreational activities for the residents of the estate

• Scout Sub-Committee: To cater for the children in the estate who cannot join the scout groups in their schools. This Scout Group is the 206th Hong Kong Group of the Scout Association of Hong Kong.

(emphasis added)

Page 19

“Apart from the Representative Committees and the Management Liaison Council, the residents of Taikoo Shing can also have other channels to voice their opinions. In accordance with the Deed of Mutual Covenant, there is provision for an Annual General Meeting for each of the 12 stages. During these annual meetings, residents of each tower get together and freely discuss items of common interest: from finance to cleansing, from security to maintenance, from recreation to environment, etc. Their opinions are collected, recorded and acted upon to ensure that the management of the estate is carried out both for the well being and in the best interests of the residents themselves.”

40.  As could be seen from the above undisputed evidence, the MLC has 6 sub-committees to specialise and focus on different aspects of affairs of the estate. Of particular relevance to the present case is the “Recreational Sub-committee”.

41.  On page 63 of the Jubilee Booklet is an article written by the then chairman of the Recreational Sub-committee:-

“… I have been here for twenty years. In these years, I have participated in picnics, carnivals, parental talks, various competitions, Mid-Autumn Festival Variety Shows, dinner parties and lots of other activities which cannot be fully listed.

My relationship with Taikoo Shing became closer after I was elected as a Tower Representative a few years ago. Hand in hand, I worked with another lower representative on occasions like Christmas & Lunar New Year Tower Decorations. The results of these decorations were not bad. …

The above-mentioned activities were all organized by the Recreation Sub-Committee with help from the staff of the Community Relations Department[7]. I learned the details of the operation only after I was elected as Chairman of the Recreation Sub-Committee. Generally speaking, the Committee will convene four to five meetings every year. The Community Relations Department will gather relevant information and execute suggestions from members after the meetings. I would like to take this opportunity to express my heartfelt gratitude to every staff member of the Department. It is my hope that we can organise more meaningful activities with greater variety for the residents, so that life in Taikoo Shing will become even more dynamic. (emphasis added)

42.  From the above contents of the Jubilee Booklet, it appears that the Respondent actually was not the decision-making body that decided whether to hold or not to hold certain activities for the residents. The owners’ representatives in the MLC, or more specifically the Recreation Sub-committee, seem to be the one that made the decision whilst the Respondent was more a facilitator to provide administrative support in the execution of the MLC’s decision.

43.  It should be noted that in the present proceedings, the Applicant has never challenged the power of the MLC or the Recreational Sub-committee to consider, discuss and resolve about recreational activities on behalf of the residents.

44.  But even if such challenge was raised, in my opinion, by reason of Clause 6B[8] and Clause 6C[9] it falls within the power and function of the duly elected residents’ representatives (to be collectively exercised through the MLC and/or the Recreational Sub-committee) to decide whether and what recreational activities shall be held and to recommend the same for the Respondent’s execution.

45.  Although the holding of recreational activities is not acts and things strictly “necessary or requisite for” the management of the land, Clause 7(a)(24) clearly empowers the Respondent to “do all such other things as are reasonably incidental to the management of the said Land and the said buildings”.

46.  I pause to point out that this case does not concern a situation where the manager in the purported exercise of their power carried out or imposed certain things on the owners against their wish. The reality is there has been a long history[10] of community activities being undertaken upon the decision and approval of the MLC with a view to fostering community spirit in the estate.

47.  Bearing that in mind, when the body of duly elected owners’ representatives (i.e. the MLC) having discussed, deliberated and resolved[11] that a modest fraction of the owners’ money shall be spent on providing community activities for the benefits of the residents as a whole, and if such expenditure has been properly approved through the budget approval procedure laid down in the DMC, I just do not see why the Respondent’s offering managerial support to execute such decision should not fall within “the things reasonably incidental to the management” in Clause 7(a)(24) of the DMC.

48.  With that being said, I am not suggesting that the Respondent should blindly carry out whatever decision reached by the MLC without any discretion. Clause 7(a)(24) by the phrase “reasonably incidental to the management” requires some degree of reasonableness and relevance in the exercise of such power. The question of reasonableness are facts sensitive but there is no need for me to embark on this topic because the Applicant’s case is not about the reasonableness of the decisions to hold the Activities. The Applicant’s case is – the Respondent has the power to hold recreational or community activities at all.

Recital (5)

49.  The Applicant contends that the management power under Clauses 7(a) and 7(a)(24) shall be restricted by Recital (5) and cannot be expanded to include recreational activities. The Respondent’s management power shall be limited to that of repair and keeping the main structure of buildings’ common areas in good condition and when necessary replacing the equipment[12] only.

50.  Recital (5) stipulates that the Respondent:-

“…undertake the management, operation, servicing, maintenance, repair, renovation, replacement, security, and insurance of the said Land and the buildings thereon and their equipment services and apparatus (all or any of which activities are hereinafter included under the word “management”)”.

51.  I do not see how on the natural and ordinary meaning of the words used in Recital (5), it could be contended that the management power shall be confined to that of repairing and maintaining the building structures, common area and equipment only.

Clause 7(a)

52.  The Applicant contends that the Activities are not necessary or requisite for or in connection with or reasonably incidental to the management of the land and the buildings, hence in breach of Clause 7(a) of the DMC

53.  Clause 7(a) provides that:

“Except as otherwise expressly provided by these presents, the Management Company shall be responsible for and shall have full and unrestricted authority to do all such acts and thingsas may be necessary or requisite for or in connectionwith the said Land and any of the buildings thereon and the management thereof including in particular but without in any way limiting the generality of the foregoing:

(24) To do all such other things as are reasonably incidental to the management of the said Land and the said buildings.”

(emphasis added)

54.  Mr Hunsworth for the Respondent submitted that in the phrase underlined in the quote above, the disjunctive “or” was used. The words “necessary”, “requisite” and “in connection with” are not conjunctive in the sense that they are joined together. Therefore, the Respondent shall have the power to do not only “all such acts and things as may be necessary or requisite for… the said Land” but also “all such acts and things … in connection with the said Land … and the management thereof”, which is broad enough to include the power to organise social and recreational activities.

55.  I agree with Mr Hunsworth’s textual analysis of Clause 7(a).

56.  In addition to such analysis, I also seek to interpret the relevant clauses having regard to the overall context of the deed, which is an approach endorsed by Ma CJ in Fully Profit (Asia) LtdvSecretary for Justice, as well as the intention of the contracting parties to the deed. In Jumbo King LtdvFaithful Properties Ltd & Others, Lord Hoffmann NPJ has this to say:-

“The construction of a document is not a game with words. It is an attempt to discover what a reasonable person would have understood the parties to mean. And this involves having regard, not merely to the individual words they have used, but to the agreement as a whole, the factual and legal background against which it was concluded and the practical objects which it was intended to achieve. Quite often this exercise will lead to the conclusion that although there is no reasonable doubt about what the parties meant, they have not expressed themselves very well. Their language may sometimes be careless and they may have said things which, if taken literally, mean something different from what they obviously intended. In ordinary life people often express themselves infelicitously without leaving any doubt about what they meant. Of course in serious utterances such as legal documents, in which people may be supposed to have chosen their words with care, one does not readily accept that they have used the wrong words. If the ordinary meaning of the words makes sense in relation to the rest of the document and the factual background, then the court will give effect to that language, even though the consequences may appear hard for one side or the other. The court is not privy to the negotiation of the agreement – evidence of such negotiations is inadmissible – and has no way of knowing whether a clause which appears to have an onerous effect was a quid pro quo for some other concession. Or one of the parties may simply have made a bad bargain. The only escape from the language is an action for rectification, in which the previous negotiations can be examined. But the overriding objective in construction is to give effect to what a reasonable person rather than a pedantic lawyer would have understood the parties to mean. Therefore, if in spite of linguistic problems the meaning is clear, it is that meaning which must prevail.”

57.  It is stated in the Jubilee Booklet that Taikoo Shing was Swire Properties Limited’s first major development in the early seventies, begun when they took over the former Taikoo Dockyard and obtained permission from the government to transform it into a residential estate. The completion of the first tower block, in December 1976, marked the beginnings of a complex that spreads to 53 acres, and is home to over 12,000 families, living in 61 residential towers. Taikoo Shing was and remains to be the largest private residential development in the Hong Kong Island.

58.  With such scale of development, it is unlikely that the developer and the draftsman of the DMC intended the deed be drawn up in such a way to give the Respondent a very restricted power to do things that are “necessary” or “requisite” for management only (such as structural repair and maintenance as suggested by the Applicant) so as just to meet the basic management needs of the residents but not anything else beyond that primary level.

59.  From the following “message”[13] by the then Managing Director of Swire Properties Limited published in the Jubilee Booklet, one can see the developer’s aspiration to provide an integrated environment for working, living and leisure to the residents:-

“… In Taikoo Shing we set out to create a new landmark in private urban development. We created a model of a comprehensive, self-contained city within the greater city that Hong Kong had become – one that offered its own rationale and set its own standards. We established an integrated environment for working, living and leisure, elevating the art of property management to the point where residents were invited to serve on committees through which they participated in the management process, long before our Government ever legislated for it. As a result, Taikoo Shing has reaped honours, earned awards and attracted envious imitation. …”

60.  To create such a living environment, the provision of some community activities to the residents should be within the scope of what could be done by the Respondent. Although the Jubilee Booklet was not prepared around the time when the DMC was executed, it had been published in 2001, more than 15 years before the present proceedings, and was unlikely a document made for a self-serving and defensive purpose in litigation. I see no reason not to believe in the truthfulness of what are stated therein by the developer with regard to their intended way and style of managing the estate.

61.  In my view, the Applicant’s narrow construction of the relevant clauses in the DMC to give the Respondent only very restricted management powers could hardly achieve the particular style of property management as intended by the developer and the draftsman of the DMC. That narrow construction may even bring about nonsensical result by forestalling activities (such as basic health checkup for elderlies, refuse recycling project or exchange of second-hand items etc.) simply because they are not “necessary” or “requisite” to the management of the estate despite these activities may be non-costly and beneficial to the residents. That does not make sense.

62.  In taking the above view, I am not laying down any general rule that manager of every building or estate must provide community activities or services for the benefits of the residents. Every case must be decided on their own facts with the particular terms of the DMC, the features of and any uniqueness in the subject estate taken into account. There may be situations where the estate or building is small with limited funds and resources and under such circumstance, the provision of recreational activities may not be well justified.

63.  What we concern here is a large urban development housing over 12,000 residential units and the amount spend on community services represents approximately 0.5% of the management of the estate. These may be relevant if one is to assess whether the extent of community activities provided and the expenditure thereon are excessive or just in moderation. But I have no intention to explore this area further as these proceedings are not about the reasonableness of the quantum of expenditures having been spent on community activities but are about whether the Respondent has the power to provide such activities as a matter of principle.

Clause 7(a)(24)

64.  In any event, I consider that the power to hold the Activities shall fall within the “the things reasonably incidental to the management” in Clause 7(a)(24) of the DMC. Paragraphs 26 to 48 are the analysis thereon which shall not be repeated here.

Clause 8

65.  The Applicant contends that the Activities were not within the items of expenditures allowed in the first, second, third and fourth parts of the annual budget prescribed in Clause 8(a).

66.  The short answer to this challenge is, Clause 8(a) is not the provision that governs the powers and functions of the Respondent, the Representative Committee or MLC, nor is it the charging provision in respect of the financial contributions payable by the owners towards the management of the estate.

67.  Clause 8 serves to lay down a four-part[14] framework for the drawing up of the annual budget and to identify the essential items of expenditure that must be covered therein. Clause 8(a)A, in particular, shall not be taken as creating an exhaustive list of expenditure beyond which no financial contribution thereto could be asked of the owners because the items thereunder are obviously narrower in scope than the things that could or should be done by the Respondent under Clause 7(a). I find the Applicant’s argument in relation to Clause 8 unconvincing.

68.  The above discussion should be sufficient to deal with the Applicant’s various contentions as set out in paragraph 12 above. Concerning the Applicant’s contentions in paragraph 12(f), (g) and (h) in particular, I agree with the Respondent’s analysis.

Disposition

69.  The Applicant seeks a declaration that the Activities were not necessary, requisite or reasonably incidental to the management of the estate and an injunction to restrain the Respondent from holding the same. He also asks for independent auditor be appointed to examine the books and accounts relating to the Activities, for discovery of the Respondent’s gain out of the Activities, for a refund of such gain by the Respondent to the owners of the estate and also for damages.

70.  As I fundamentally disagree with the Applicant’s reasoning behind the seeking of such relief, such relief are not granted.

71.  For the relief of damages in particular, the Applicant contends that his monetary loss is about $527[15], presumably being his calculation of his financial contributions to the costs of the Activities over several years.

72.  Clause 7(c) of the DMC is an exemption of liability clause. It provides that the Respondent shall not be liable to the owners or any of them in respect of any act done or omitted in pursuance or purported pursuance of the DMC if the act or omission does not involve criminal liability, dishonesty or wilful negligence.

73.  The Control of Exemption Clauses Ordinance (Cap.71) does not apply to DMCs made before 1 December 1990[16] hence should not apply to the DMC at suit which was executed in January 1978.

74.  At common law, the content of exemption clause is a matter for the parties. The first purchaser is bound by the exemption clause because he signed the DMC and subsequent purchasers including the Applicant are also bound because they buy “subject to and with the benefit of the DMC” or because they “step into the shoes” of someone who was bound.[17]

75.  The Applicant has not particularized or adduced evidence about criminal liability, dishonesty or wilful negligence on the part the Respondent in arranging the community activities. Pursuant to Clause 7(c), no damages shall be awarded even if my ruling on the Respondent’s power to hold the Activities is incorrect.

76.  To conclude, by reason of the above analysis the Applicant’s application in LDBM 191/2018 must be dismissed.

LDBM 191/2018 (PLANTERS)

77.  The Applicant contends that the planter outside his flat is not a common part of the building he lives. He claims that the planter (including its exterior surface and top surface) forms part of his unit because the planter has been exclusively used by him and is only accessible through his unit. Therefore, the Respondent has no right to repair the exterior of his planter or any other planter of the building and it follows that the resolution passed in November 2017 by the owners resolving to replace the mosaic tiles on the top of the planters was void. By this application, the Applicant seeks to recover the contribution which he already paid in December 2017.

78.  The Respondent contends that the tops of the planters form part of the common parts of the building firstly because they are part of the exterior wall and it makes perfect sense for the them to be in uniformed outlook which has been the historical position since the estate was first developed. Secondly, the plan attached to the assignment of the Applicant’s flat actually excludes the planter from being part of the demised area.

79.  It is also the Respondent’s case that by a notice of meeting dated 31 July 2017, the Respondent convened a meeting of owners to be held in November 2017, agenda item 4(iii) thereof proposed the acceptance of “Additional Works B” (which is about the replacement of the mosaic tiles on the top of the planters for each flat) to become part of the renovation project for the buildings.

80.  At the meeting in November 2017, the owners duly passed by a huge majority a resolution to undertake Additional Works B. Pursuant to Clause 13(j) of the DMC, resolutions passed by owners at a duly convened meeting shall be binding on all owners including the Applicant.

81.  I agree with the Respondent’s analysis.

82.  I also note that in the assignment[18] under which the Applicant acquired his property, the assigned property is described as:-

“… ALL THAT FLAT “H” on the “TENTH FLOOR of FU SHAN MANSION, KAO SHAN TERRANCE as shown and coloured Pink on the Floor Plan annexed to an Assignment registered in the Land Registry by Memorial No.1590262 …”

83.  There is no textual description in the assignment to the effect planter was assigned to the assignee thereunder.

84.  In the floor plan annexed to the assignment registered by Memorial No.1590262, the Applicant’s unit (i.e. Flat H on 10th Floor of Fu Shan Mansion) was coloured pink but the planter outside his unit was not coloured pink.

85.  Section 3 of the Building Management Ordinance, Cap.344 defines “common parts” to mean:-

“… the whole of a building, except such parts as have been specified or designated in an instrument registered in the Land Registry as being for the exclusive use, occupation or enjoyment of an owner…”

86.  As neither the planter itself nor its outer and upper sides has been specified or designated in any registered instrument for the exclusive use, occupation or enjoyment of the Applicant, it should form the common parts which the Respondent has powers and obligation to repair and maintain under the DMC.

87.  The fact that owners are generally allowed to use the planters constructed outside their premises is neither here nor there because such use was not designated or specified by any registered instrument.

88.  In any event, the owners have not been permitted to use the upper or outer side or surface of the planters. Their de facto use of the void inside the planters should not turn the external surface of the planters into the owners’ property.

89.  By reason of the above analysis, the Applicant’s application in LDBM 191 of 2018 is dismissed.

LDBM 196/2018 (DECORATIONS & OTHER EXPENSE)

90.  The Applicant complained that the following items of expenses should not have been included in the 2018 budget of the estate:-

(a)festive decorations in the lobbies of the buildings during Chinese New Year and Christmas;
(b)Mid-autumn festival variety show;
(c)6% pay-rise of management staff (because such pay-rise allegedly has not been formally “endorsed” by the Swire Properties[19]);
(d)meal subsidy of $40 to certain staff of the Respondent (because such expenditure had allegedly been objected to in the Representative Committee meeting in 2016 and the owners’ meeting in 2016 and, therefore, should be borne by their employer rather than the owners); and
(e)upgrading the accounting and management system as well as engagement of a project manager because these expenditures are outside the “management” provision of the DMC.

91.  The analysis in LDBM 116/2019 above could aptly deal with the Applicant’s complaints about the expenses on festival decorations and the Mid-Autumn Festival activity.

92.  As a remark, I simply do not see what benefits or what sensible result could be achieved by the Applicant’s attempt to prohibit the residents from contributing a fractional per capita costs towards festive decorations in Lunar New Year and Christmas to satisfy their humble wish to experience a warm and pleasant festive ambience within their living environment on some special occasions in a year.

93.  As for the other expenses, they are related to the employment of the Respondent’s staff and should fall within Clause 8(a)(A)(iv) of the DMC. It is Mr Cheung’s evidence and the Respondent’s case that these expenses were included in the operating budget for 2018 and that operating budget was, as in every year, the subject of consultation and subsequent approval by the MLC in accordance with the prescribed procedures.

94.  The Applicant’s allegation that certain expenses had been subject to challenge by some owners or their representatives during some stages of budget discussion in 2016 is a non-starter because what matters is the due approval of the 2018 operating budget. There is no suggestion by the Applicant, nor any objective evidence from him, that the 2018 operating budget was not properly passed and approved.

95.  For the above reasons, the Applicant’s application in LDBM 196/2018 is dismissed.

COSTS

96.  At the end of the trial, the Applicant and the Respondent agreed that costs should follow the event and they further agreed to adopt the District Court scale for taxation.

97.  As the three sets of applications are all dismissed, I order the Applicant to pay the Respondent’s costs in these proceedings, to be taxed on the District Court scale if not agreed.

 (Michelle Soong)
 Deputy District Judge
 Presiding Officer
 Lands Tribunal

Mr. Ng Yui Tong, the applicant of LDBM 191/2018, LDBM 196/2018 and LDBM 116/2019 (Consolidated), appeared in person

Mr. Nick Hunsworth of Mayer Brown, for the respondent of LDBM 191/2018, LDBM 196/2018 and LDBM 116/2019 (Consolidated)



[1]   Namely, Po Shan Mansion, Heng Shan Mansion, Wah Shan Mansion, Loong Shan Mansion, Foong Shan Mansion, Yee Shan Mansion, Kam Shan Mansion and Fu Shan Mansion, car parks and school playground.

[2]   A subsidiary of the Swire Properties Limited, the developer of the estate.

[3]   The High Court action was transferred to the Lands Tribunal by the order of Master Lai dated 5 June 2019.

[4]   Pursuant to the Applicant’s inquiry as to whether the Respondent had the authority or power to organize the Activities, the Respondent obtain two legal opinions one from Messrs. Li, Kwok & Law dated 3 December 2012 and the other from Mayer Brown JSM dated 15 March 2013, both casted doubts over the Respondent’s authority.

[5]   A similar clause is contained in the DMC for each stage.

[6]   Exclusive of advertisement section inside the Jubilee Booklet.

[7]   It is one of the various departments within the Respondent Company.

[8]   Clause 6B states that the Representative Committee shall represent all the owners in all dealings with the Respondent.

[9]   Clause 6C states that the MLC has the power to represent the owners to liaise with the Respondent in respect of all matters concerning the management of Taikoo Shing and to review budgets.

[10]   Since Taikoo Shing opened its first stage in 1976.

[11]   In the very lengthy affirmation of the Applicant (which stands as his witness statement at trial) which consists of 207 paragraphs, there is one paragraph 44 stating that “After the Recreation Sub-committee / Community Relations Sub-Committee have discussed the activities covered in Paragraphs 40 to 42 above in each of the sub-committee meetings, the sub-committee chairman would report such discussions in the following MLC meeting. However, the chairman of the MLC only makes a note of this in the Minutes of the MLC meeting, and did not allow MLC members preset in the meeting to vote and decide whether such activities should be held.”. These proceedings are not about the procedural fairness of the MLC meeting and the same has never been raised as an issue in the Form 29 of the Applicant. The Applicant has not pointed out which rules concerning the MLC meeting was in breach and no evidence about how MLC meetings had been conducted and no house/meeting rules is adduced by the parties. Therefore, whether the proper rules for the holding of MLC meetings had been adhered to at the material times is beyond the scope of these proceedings.

[12]   Paragraph 18 of the Applicant’s Affirmation (stands as witness statement), trial bundle p.70.

[13]   On page 5 of the Jubilee Booklet, trial bundle p.90.

[14]   First part concerns expenditures on common area and facilities; second part concerns expenditures on non-residential portion; third part concerns expenditures on residential portion; and fourth part concerns expenditures on car-parking portion.

[15]   Paragraph 149 of the Applicant’s Affirmation which stands as his witness statement at trial.

[16]   Section 19 of Cap.71.

[17]   Malcolm Merry, Building Management in Hong Kong, 3rd Edition, p.191.

[18]   Registered in the Land Registry by Memorial No.7134016 on 26 June 1997, see trial bundle, pp. 184 -191.

[19]   The developer of the estate.