HK CourtDB
HomeDirectoryMCP
Hong Kong CourtDB
Back to directory
2020

RE MANJINDER SINGH

Files (2)

[2021] HKCA 1433-EN-2021-09-28

RE MANJINDER SINGH

HTML content

CACV 393/2020

[2021] HKCA 1433

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF APPEAL

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 393 OF 2020

(ON APPEAL FROM HCAL NO. 574 OF 2017)

____________________

RE:MANJINDER SINGHApplicant

____________________

Before :Hon Cheung, G Lam JJA and S T Poon J in Court
Date of Decision :28 September 2021

____________________

D E C I S I O N

____________________

Hon Cheung JA (giving the Decision of the Court) :

I. Leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal

1.  On 23 April 2021, this Court handed down a judgment dismissing the applicant’s appeal against the decision of Campbell-Moffat J of 12 August 2020 in which she refused to grant leave to him to apply for judicial review.

2.  The facts and issues in the appeal before the Court of Appeal, as well as the Court’s reasons for dismissing it, are set out in our judgment.  We will not repeat them here.

3.  The applicant now applies, by a notice of motion dated 6 May 2021 (‘Notice of Motion’), for leave to appeal against our judgment to the Court of Final Appeal.

4.  No discernible grounds were stated in his notice of motion.

5.  In his written submissions, the applicant (again) referred to general legal principles and authorities on non‑refoulement claim, but did not point to any error in our judgment or to any matter of great general or public importance.

II.      Legal principles

6.  Under section 22(1)(b) of the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal Ordinance, Cap. 484 (‘HKCFAO’), leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal will only be granted if the question to be determined involves great general or public importance or otherwise ought to be determined by the Court of Final Appeal.

III.     Our view

7.  The matters stated by the applicant in his notice of motion and written submissions do not constitute grounds for granting leave to the Court of Final Appeal. 

8.  The applicant has failed to identify any question of great general or public importance for the Court of Final Appeal to determine in accordance with section 22(1)(b) of the HKCFAO.

9.  We also do not see any basis for granting leave on the ‘or otherwise’ limb under section 22(1)(b) of the HKCFAO.

IV.     Disposition

10.  For these reasons, the Notice of Motion dated 6 May 2021 is dismissed.

(Peter Cheung)(Godfrey Lam)(S T Poon)
Justice of AppealJustice of AppealJudge of the Court of
  First Instance

  

Applicant, unrepresented, acting in person

  

[2021] HKCA 551-EN-2021-04-23

RE MANJINDER SINGH

HTML content

CACV 393/2020

[2021] HKCA 551

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF APPEAL

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 393 OF 2020

(ON APPEAL FROM HCAL NO. 574 OF 2017)

________________________

RE:MANJINDER SINGH Applicant

________________________

Before :  Hon Cheung JA, G Lam and S T Poon JJ in Court

Date of Hearing :  20 April 2021

Date of Judgment :  23 April 2021

____________________

J U D G M E N T

____________________

Hon Cheung JA (giving the Judgment of the Court) :

1)  The appeal

1.  This is an appeal by the applicant against the decision of Campbell-Moffat J of 12 August 2020 in which she refused to grant leave to him to apply for judicial review.

2)  Factual background

2.1.  The applicant is a national of India.  He arrived in Hong Kong on 19 May 2012 but he overstayed and was arrested.  He raised a non-refoulement claim on 13 October 2013.

2.2.  The basis of the applicant’s claim is that he would be harmed or killed by the family members of a boy, who the applicant happened to have ran over with his car.

2.3.  The background facts have been summarized in the decision of the Judge at [4].

3)  The Director’s Decisions

3.1.  The Director of Immigration (‘the Director’) decided against the applicant’s torture claim on 7 January 2016.  The decision covered Bill of Rights Article 3 (torture/inhuman treatment) risk, as well as other statutory and convention rights against torture and persecution (‘the Director’s Decision’).

3.2.  The Director decided against the applicant’s right to life claim on 15 November 2016 (‘the Director’s Further Decision’).  The Director’s Further Decision covered Article 2 (right to life) of the Bill of Rights.

4)  The Board’s Decision

4.1.  The applicant appealed against the Director’s Decision to the Torture Claims Appeal Board (‘the Board’).  After a hearing held on 20 October 2016, the Board dismissed the applicant’s appeal on 3 April 2017 (‘the Board’s Decision’).

4.2.  The Board found that the applicant did not suffer any serious injury from the alleged attack.  It was an isolated incident.  There was no real intention from the family members of the boy to harm or kill the applicant.  There was no evidence of public official involvement.  There was no report to the local police.  There was no real chance that the applicant would be harmed.  The applicant failed on all applicable grounds.

5)  Decision of the Judge

5.1.  The applicant made a number of complaints before the Judge.  They include that the Board was wrong in holding that the level of risk of harm was low, that the applicant did not receive any letter for submitting further evidence, that the Board ignored overwhelming evidence of violence against him, or that the Board relied on country of origin information to his disfavour.  

5.2.  The Judge held that the Board correctly applied the relevant law and the relevant tests.  As to the applicant’s complaint that he ‘did not receive any invitation letter by which Immigration asked [him] for additional facts and grounds’, she held that the applicant was given the opportunity to give evidence before the Board but he elected not to.  He informed the Board that he had no further information to submit.  It was for the applicant to prove his case before the Board.  The applicant needed to show before the Board how it was the case that the country of origin information was wrong.  There was no evidence of overwhelming violence against the applicant.  The applicant failed to show where the bias alleged was.   

6)  Grounds of appeal

6.1.  The applicant in the notice of appeal requested that his grounds of appeal be referred to in his supporting affirmation.  In his supporting affirmation, he stated that the Judge was wrong in holding there was no state acquiescence and the Judge failed to provide detailed reasons.

6.2.  In his written submissions, the applicant referred to general legal principles and authorities on non-refoulement claim without specifying how they related to his case.

7)  Our view

7.1.  We are of the view that the applicant’s appeal is without merits.  The applicant provided no reasonably arguable grounds for judicial review.  An appeal against refusal of leave for judicial review is not an occasion for the applicant to regurgitate arguments already advanced.  The Court of Appeal would only reverse the decision of the Judge if it could be demonstrated that there were errors in law, that the Judge failed to take into account relevant matters, or the decision was otherwise plainly wrong: see United Muslim Association of Hong Kong v Yusuf Yu[2018] HKCA 451 at [38] and [39]. 

7.2.  It is thus incumbent on the applicant to point out with sufficient particularity the errors allegedly committed by the Judge in assessing the Board’s Decision.

7.3.  We see no basis to disturb the Judge’s decision.  Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.

(Peter Cheung)(Godfrey Lam)(S T Poon)
Justice of AppealJudge of the Court Judge of the Court
 of First nstanceof First Instance

Applicant, unrepresented, appearing in person