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TSE DAO CHUEN 對 CHEUNG WAI YAN formerly known as CHEUNG SUET NGOR

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[2024] HKDC 1150-CH-2024-07-25

TSE DAO CHUEN 對 CHEUNG WAI YAN formerly known as CHEUNG SUET NGOR

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DCCJ 1078/2020

[2024] HKDC 1150

香港特別行政區

區域法院

民事訴訟2020第1078號

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原告人TSE DAO CHUEN 
 及 
被告人CHEUNG WAI YAN formerly known as
CHEUNG SUET NGOR
 
 (根據原傳訴令狀) 

-------------------------

原告人HUANG LIXIAN (黃麗賢),
As executrix of the estate of TSE DAO CHUEN
 
 及 
被告人CHEUNG WAI YAN formerly known as
CHEUNG SUET NGOR
 
 (根據日期為2022年8月4日的繼續進行法律程序命令) 

-------------------------

主審法官:區域法院暫委法官王漓內庭聆訊
聆訊日期:2024年7月4日
判決書日期:2024年7月25日

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判決書

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A.  引言

1.  這是原告人針對翟國怡聆案官2023年9月15日發出的售樓指示的上訴申請。

2.  除了對原告人的上訴表示反對外,被告人還申請要求法庭發出限制提出申請令(或稱Grepe v Loam令)(“限制申請令”),限制原告人在本案中進一步提出申請的權利。

3.  以下是本席就此兩項議題的判決。

B.  案件背景

4.  本案由原告人謝道泉(“謝先生”)提起,爭議主題是對於位於香港新界元朗大棠路99號蝶翠峰第一期3座11樓D單位的物業(“該物業”)的擁有權的判定。謝先生認為他是該物業唯一的實益擁有人。而被告人張惠恩(“張女士”)提出她也是該物業的實益擁有人之一,並且要求法庭根據香港法例第362章《分劃條例》第6(1)條發出命令出售該物業。

5.  案件的正審於2021年3月15、16日在余啟肇法官席前進行。2021年4月1日,余法官頒下判案書(“2021年判案書”),判決謝先生與張女士為該物業的分權共有人,各自擁有一半的權益,並且發出售樓令,但是判決該出售行為只可在謝先生去世6個月之後進行,並且許可與訟人在合適的時機申請法庭指示以實現此出售。

6.  謝先生於2021年8月28日去世。

7.  2022年4月22日,黃麗賢女士(“黃女士”)獲頒遺囑認證,成為謝先生的唯一遺囑執行人。

8.  2022年8月4日,法庭頒佈命令,將黃女士以謝先生遺囑執行人的身份代替謝先生作為原告人繼續程序。

9.  2022年9月6日,被告人根據2021年判案書以傳票申請售樓指示。

10.  2022年10月17日,被告人再次以傳票申請售樓指示,由於傳票内容與2022年9月6日的傳票相似,被告人其後撤回了2022年9月6日的傳票。

11.  2023年7月5日,被告人提出傳票修改其2022年10月17日傳票的部分内容,主要是對於售樓款的處置方式的修改。

12.  2023年9月15日,翟國怡聆案官根據修改後的2022年10月17日傳票發出命令,就余法官2021年判案書頒佈的售樓令的細節作出指示(“該售樓指示”),其中包括要求黃女士14天內清空該物業並交給原告人管有並提供業權契據文件,以及物業以不少於港幣4,900,000元的售價出售等。

13.  2024年5月23日,黃女士提出本次上訴,對該售樓指示逾期提出上訴。

C.  新證據申請

14.  無論是在翟國怡聆案官席前,還是在本席面前,黃女士均未提交任何誓詞或者證據支持其反對理據。

15.  在本次聆訊當日,黃女士提出申請,要求呈堂聲稱為2004年張女士簽署的一份文件(“該新文件”)。她認為該新文件能説明張女士在余法官席前説謊,而2021年判案書在未考慮過該新文件的基礎上頒下,因此判決錯誤。雖然本次上訴並非就2021年判案書上訴,但是此文件能夠説明張女士的道德和誠信有缺陷。

16.  被告人反對黃女士在上訴期間提出新證據,特別是在審訊當日才突然襲擊提出此申請,對被告人不公。

17.  對於呈堂新證據的申請,香港法例第336H章《區域法院規則》第58號命令第1(4)條規則明確規定“除非有特別理由”,上訴時,不得收取進一步證據。

18.  對於“特別理由”,案例也明確,需要滿足經典的Ladd v Marshall條件,即:

(a)  當事人雖然盡了合理努力,仍然未能取得有關的證據在原審時引用;

(b)  如果採納有關證據,對案件的結果會有重要影響,雖然不一定是決定性的影響;及

(c)  有關證據須是表面上可信,雖然不一定是無可置疑的。

見:《香港民事訴訟程序2024年》第一冊,第58/1/3段

19.  本案中,黃女士並無特別理由,其提出的新證據並不滿足Ladd v Marshall條件。

(a)  黃女士起碼2021年已經擁有該新文件,曾經在2021年3月正審期間嘗試呈堂但不獲允許,也未嘗試在2023年9月15日聆案官席前呈堂,甚至直到本上訴聆訊當日才提出申請。她完全沒有盡合理努力及時提交。

(b)  該新文件主要涉及的議題是2021年判案書的正確與否,與本次上訴的内容無關。這最多涉及寬泛的張女士的可信度問題,對案件結果不會有重要影響。

(c)  該新文件是手寫文件,據稱為20年前書寫,在無其他文件佐證的情況下,無從辨別真偽或其內容的可信度及背景。

20.  此外,鑒於申請的時間,被告人無任何機會當庭對該新文件作出回應。如若放任黃女士呈堂,會對被告人造成不公。

21.  因此,本席當庭拒絕了黃女士呈堂新證據的申請。

22.  類似的,黃女士當庭嘗試在沒有誓詞證據支持的情況下口頭進行一些額外的事實性陳述,比如否認張女士第四份誓詞的内容,提出黃女士曾經有和其他地產中介接洽,有接觸其他買家,甚至有獲得買家對該物業的出價等。對這些不合規的新證據,本席均不予接受。

D.  本上訴相關的法律原則

23.  《區域法院規則》第58號命令第1(3)條規定,上訴需要在被上訴命令發出起14天内提出,除非法庭另有指示。

24.  法庭有權延長此期限,相關考慮因素包括:

(1)  逾期的時長;

(2)  逾期的原因。在針對不利的命令的上訴情況下,法庭不會輕易在沒有合理解釋的情況下同意延期;

(3)  上訴的理據是否充分;

(4)  對另一方造成的損害。

見:《香港民事訴訟程序2024年》第一冊,第58/1/9段

25.  就上訴本身而言,這是一個重審的過程,法庭會對相關證據重新審視,作出判決。(見:《香港民事訴訟程序2024年》第一冊,第58/1/2段)

E.  本上訴

E1.  逾期

26.  本上訴的對象,也即翟聆案官的該售樓指示在2023年9月15日作出。黃女士當時也在場,完全清楚命令内容。法定的上訴時限為14天,即2023年9月29日前。

27.  黃女士直到2024年5月23日,也即是相關命令發出後超過8個月才提出上訴申請,逾期時長為7個月24天,非常嚴重。特別是在與其他相關時限比如法定上訴時限的14天,該售樓指示第2段命令的14天空置交付物業的時限,第3段命令的10個月的出售許可時限等比較後,此拖延的嚴重性更為明顯。

28.  更有甚者,黃女士視此逾期為兒戲,並未在書面提出任何解釋。即使在法庭追問下,也僅僅提出一些模棱兩可的説法,比如她並沒有想到上訴,需要看醫生,以為可以和被告方談判等。這些説法既無證據基礎,也無可信度,更非合理的理由。

29.  該售樓指示明確命令了對黃女士不利的内容,她卻如此拖延,在無任何合理理由的情況下逾期超過法定期限十數倍才提出上訴,逾期情況非常嚴重。

E2.  對被告人造成的損害

30.  如此拖延,以及實質上違反該售樓指示,令被告人無法取得該物業的管有以及時出售,受到了實質的損害。而進一步的拖延,只會令被告人在動蕩的物業市場面臨更大的風險。

E.3  上訴理據

31.  在2024年5月23日傳票中,黃女士對於該售樓指示中第2-5條提出上訴,相關命令如下:

“2. 原告人應在本命令送達予她之日起14天將該物業空置交付予被告人,及為了出售該物業,將關於該物業由原告人管有,保管或控制的所有業權契據和文件交付予被告人;

3. 該物業以私人協約方式在本命令送達予原告人之日起10個月內在公開市場出售,售價不少於港幣4,900,000.00元;

4. 譚潘葉律師行獲委任為負責進行及處理該物業出售事宜的律師;

5. 利嘉閣地產代理有限公司獲委任為出售該物業的地產代理;”

32.  黃女士的書面上訴理據包括:

(1)  對於第2條黃女士稱其現居於該物業,會無處容身;清理物品需時;恐怕會被被告人霸佔拖延賣樓;且即使黃女士居住也可以隨時方便客人看樓。但是黃女士强調她亦希望儘快賣樓;

(2)  對於第3條黃女士稱即使低於市場價也應該可以出售;

(3)  對於第4條,黃女士認為她也應有份處理物業出售事宜,且譚潘葉律師行不應保管售樓金額,應將金額放入法庭;

(4)  對於第5條,黃女士認為不應由利嘉閣獨家代理,應開放代理予其他代理公司如中原美聯等。

33.  黃女士還要求延期執行上述第2、3條命令,亦希望向被告人追討自買樓以來近20年的該物業所牽涉的地租、稅項、差餉及其他應付開支的一半。

34.  被告人對此表示反對,其代表鄺潤雙大律師提出:

(1)  “無處容身”:長達2年的時間足以讓上訴人尋找任何居所,這並非剝奪答辯人執行命令的藉口;

(2)  “霸佔、拖延賣樓”:長達2年的時間是上訴人本人霸佔、故意拖延,從來不回應答辯人、地產經紀以至答辯人律師的電話及所有聯絡,她明顯是無理纏繞、死纏難打一方;

(3)  相關490萬為聘請測量師之估價,答辯人從來沒有拘泥於此估價,是上訴人堅拒溝通、交吉或交出樓契,根本連找到買家的可能性都沒有,而這情況是上訴人個人蠻不講理而導致;

(4)  同理,代理人亦不是主要爭議點,上訴人根本從來連合作賣樓的事宜都沒有參與,只一昧牽扯出似是而非的說法,浪費法庭時間、公共資源;

(5)  所有雜項開支於2021年4月一案中已由法庭清楚裁定,拒絕任何指稱因開支衍生的實際權益,並判上訴人敗訴,不能於此刻就已判定的事項(res judicata)重新要求上訴,此正正是終審席抨擊為不可以縱容那些執着固執地在欠缺有效法律依據的情況下企圖重新提起訴訟的無理纏繞上訴人。

35.  對此本席分析如下。

E.3.1  清空物業

36.  此處黃女士的説法完全站不住腳。正如鄺大律師所説,相關的售樓令在2021年4月1日已經由余法官頒下,謝先生已經在2021年8月28日去世,而該售樓指示相關的傳票2022年10月17日已經發出。截至上訴通知發出的2024年5月23日,黃女士已經有超過3年的通知知曉該物業會被出售,以傳票發出之日計算有超過1.5年的時間準備清空物業,即使以該售樓指示發出起算,也有超過8個月的時間供黃女士清理物品,騰空物業。

37.  更重要的,黃女士在聆訊過程中承認,她已經清理了80%的物品,而且大部分時間均已不在該物業居住。如此説法完全與上訴狀下“本人將無處容身”的寫法相悖。

38.  黃女士聲稱她願意配合賣樓,也希望儘快賣樓。但是她同時又要求延期清空物業,延期賣樓,前後矛盾。而且被告人提供的證據明確顯示她拒絕配合,拒絕及拖延回應被告人方就售樓一事的溝通。由於黃女士持續佔有該物業,並令物業處於骯髒、凌亂、且缺乏維護的狀態,導致物業對於買家的吸引力大減,影響出售。

39.  在出售無任何困難的情況下,本席看不到任何延期的理據,特別是黃女士自己也聲稱希望儘快賣樓。

40.  相反,黃女士所謂對被告人可能霸佔拖延賣樓的説法完全沒有任何證據支持。

41.  本席因此判定黃女士此處的理據完全沒有基礎。

E.3.2  售價

42.  黃女士提出售價未必需要該售樓指示下的港幣4,900,000.00元,但是並未提出證據説明此售價有何不合理,以及何為合理售價。

43.  港幣4,900,000.00元乃被告人根據測量師的估價報告提供的市場價。在無任何相反證據的情況下,指示以市場價出售完全合理。

44.  如果由於定價過高,或者其後市場價下跌造成物業出售困難,雙方均可向法庭申請修改價格,甚至修改出售方式。但是在現有證據基礎上,本席看不到此條命令有何問題。

E.3.3  出售事宜負責人及地產代理

45.  以律師行代理出售事宜是較為常見的售樓指令。這樣可以避免當事人的爭議或者不專業造成的延誤或損害。特別是本案中,在黃女士和張女士之間明顯存在齟齬,證據顯示黃女士完全不配合出售,拒絕張女士就此的溝通嘗試,甚至拒接張女士委托的地產經紀總計36次的電話的情況下,以律師行負責出售事宜更為妥當。

46.  在聆訊中,黃女士嘗試否認她有拒絕溝通,稱她沒有接到過地產經紀的電話。如上所述,這些説法並無誓詞支持,也從未在翟聆案官席前提出,本席不予接受。

47.  黃女士對於譚潘葉律師行的不信任,甚至人身攻擊也均無任何證據基礎。本席不接受黃女士所稱的譚潘葉律師行可能以不專業的方式處理售樓事宜的説法。

48.  類似的,在沒有任何證據説明利嘉閣代理有何困難,而現實中出售未果的原因是黃女士的不配合的情況下,本席不認為中介人選有何問題。

49.  因此黃女士此方面上訴理據的也毫無基礎。

E.3.4  雜項開支

50.  對於未支付的地租,稅項,差餉等雜項開支,該售樓指示第6(i)條已經説明了兩位與訟人各一半的分攤方式。

51.  對於已支付的過去20年的雜項開支,在聆訊中仔細研究過余法官的2021年判案書後,鄺大律師同意該判案書並未就此事項作出任何裁決,因為這並非雙方提出的訴求。因此這並非一個已判定事項的問題。

52.  但是在黃女士從未提出相關訴求的情況下,她顯然不能在本上訴提出與該售樓指示無關的新的訴求。因此本席對於此點要求不予考慮。

E.3.5  小結

53.  綜上所述,黃女士有嚴重且毫無理由的逾期,該逾期對被告人造成損害,而黃女士的上訴亦嚴重缺乏理據。本席判決此逾期上訴應予以駁回。

F.限制提出申請令

54.  鄺大律師在陳詞中要求本席進一步發出限制申請令。

55.  吳逸之 對 上潤有限公司及另一人 [2005] 1 HKLRD 473一案確立,法庭面對不斷濫用法律程序的人士,可以發出限制申請令對其行為進行限制。在判案書第48-50段,香港終審法院對該命令的發出條件作出了以下解釋:

“48. 濫用法院程序的形式千變萬化,其背後的動機亦各有不同。濫用法院程序可能是被告人為了企圖延遲一項必然會作出的判決或判決的執行而精心策劃的行動,或可能是針對某名對訟方的惡意騷擾行動。精神狀態不幸地有欠平衡的訴訟人,或會展開難以理解或完全瑣屑無聊的訴訟。若干被判敗訴的訴訟人可能因深深不憤和心情無法平息而作出無理纏擾行為。無理纏擾的訴訟人通常無律師代表,他們的普遍特徵是拒絕接受對其不利的訴訟結果,並固執地在欠缺有效法律依據的情況下企圖重新提起訴訟標的事宜。這種行為可以變成執着的行為,有關訴訟人會毫不畏縮地針對法庭、對訟方的法律代表或他認為犯了某些過失的知名公眾人物作出全無根據的指稱。他們可能展開無數訴訟以及在每宗訴訟中提出無數申請。

49. 在案例Attorney-General v Barker [2000] 1 FLR 759 中, 首席法官Bingham of Cornhill 勳爵指出在英格蘭和威爾斯提起的無理纏擾法律程序的某些特點:

“本席認為, 無理纏擾的法律程序的一大特點是幾乎沒有或完全沒有法律依據(或至少是可識辨的依據);而不管提起有關法律程序的用意為何,其效果是令被告人感到不便、受到騷擾及花費金錢,而上述效果與可能歸於申索人的任何利益是完全不相稱的。此種程序亦涉及濫用法院程序,意即提起此種法律程序的人使用法院程序的目的或方式與一般正確使用法院程序者有着顯著分別。”(見判詞第19段)

50. 在案例Bhamjee v Forsdick (No 1) [2003] EWCA Civ 799中,英國上訴法院法官Brooke對一名無理纏擾的訴訟人作出了耳熟能詳、必能引起共鳴的描述:

“本席覺得他對於規劃督察和高等法院法官作出針對他的決定的依據置諸不理。他一次又一次地重提已於早前被駁回的論點。他是典型的不許別人說“不”的訴訟人,不會考慮法庭向其清楚解釋的關於其申索為何失敗的理由。他除了願意重複又重複地嘗試重新提起訴訟外,還向受對訟方延聘對他的各項上訴和申請提出抗辯的律師提出本席認為是完全基於誤解的疏忽損害賠償申索和其他濟助。”(見判詞第17段)

56.  對此,實務指示11.3條第5段進一步説明:

“根據“吳逸之”一案,法庭祗應在下述情況中,才向訴訟人發出“限制申請令”:訴訟人曾經濫用,並且很可能繼續濫用法庭程序,即訴訟人在若干正在進行的法律程序中,無論是在法庭作出判决之前或之後,經常向法庭提出毫無理據的申請,而法庭在此情況下發出“限制申請令”是相稱的對應措施。”

57.  本案中,鄺大律師認為黃女士符合無理纏繞的訴訟人的標準而應對其發出限制申請令。她依賴的黃女士的纏繞行為如下:

(1)  她逾期提出了毫無理據的本次上訴;

(2)  她違反了該售樓指示;

(3)  她在審理被告人申請售樓指示的傳票的過程中多次造成審訊需要押後,包括:

(a)  2022年9月29日缺席聆訊;

(b)  2022年12月1日缺席聆訊;

(c)  2023年2月3日出庭聲稱沒有收到文件;

(d)  2023年5月12日出庭提出反對意見,引致被告人需要提交進一步證據,比如測量師報告。

58.  如上述案例和實務指示確立,“限制申請令”針對的行為主要是無理纏繞行為,表現形式主要是被限制人“向法庭提出毫無理據的申請”,而且是在“若干”法律程序中,“經常”如此行事,如果不限制,很可能“展開無數訴訟”,“提出無數申請”,“繼續濫用法庭程序”。

59.  而本案中,被告人投訴的黃女士的相關行為多數為被動的拖延行為,除本上訴外並無提出過其他的申請。對於其缺席聆訊的情況,黃女士解釋她並未收到相關文件因此缺席。對此被告人提供的證據無法確立黃女士的解釋為假。更重要的是,是否出席庭審是當事人的權利,法庭不能因當事人不出席而認為其濫用程序,不參與的被動行為與濫用的主動行為有本質上的區別。

60.  而且其中2022年9月29日以及2022年12月1日聆訊針對的是被告人已撤回的2022年9月6日的傳票。在被告人撤回其傳票的情況下,更無法説明黃女士毫無理據,較大可能性是被告人自身程序有問題。2023年5月12日黃女士出庭提出的反對意見促使被告人需要提交包括測量師報告在内的額外證據更説明黃女士當日的反對意見有基礎,有理據。相反,是被告人的申請有瑕疵。

61.  黃女士有違反該售樓指示,但是違反法庭命令與濫用程序並不等同。對於違反法庭命令的行為,有諸如限時履行指明事項令,訟費懲罰,藐視法庭罪等其他方式進行處理。

62.  本席同意黃女士本次的上訴缺乏理據,而且嚴重逾期。但是總體來看,黃女士的行為並未經常濫用法庭程序,暫時也無“很可能”繼續濫用法庭程序的危險性,未達需要發出限制申請令的程度。因此本席拒絕發出限制申請令。

G.  總結

63.  綜上所述,原告人的逾期上訴予以駁回。但是本席拒絕發出限制申請令。

64.  對於訟費,根據一般的訟費原則,本席作出命令,原告人須支付被告人本上訴的訟費,金額如有爭議,交由聆案官評定。該訟費命令為暫准命令,若於命令作出之日起計14天內沒有一方以傳票向本席申請更改,則會成為永久命令。

  ( 王漓 )
區域法院暫委法官

原告人:沒有律師代表,並親自應訊

被告人:由譚潘葉律師行延聘鄺潤雙大律師代表

[2021] HKDC 399-EN-2021-04-01

TSE DAO CHUEN v. CHEUNG WAI YAN formerly known as CHEUNG SUET NGOR

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DCCJ 1078/2020

[2021] HKDC 399

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

CIVIL ACTION NO. 1078 OF 2020

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BETWEEN

 TSE DAO CHUENPlaintiff

and

 CHEUNG WAI YAN formerlyDefendant
 known as CHEUNG SUET NGOR 

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Before: His Honour Judge Kent Yee in Court

Dates of Hearing: 15 and 16 March 2021

Date of Written Submissions: 19 March 2021 (Plaintiff and Defendant)

Date of Judgment: 1 April 2021

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JUDGMENT

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Introduction

1.  Mr Tse commenced these proceedings against Madam Cheung to claim the entire beneficial interest in a property known as Flat D, 11th Floor, Block 3, Sereno Verde, Phase 1, 99 Tai Tong Road, Yuen Long, New Territories, Hong Kong (“the Property”).

2.  Madam Cheung counterclaims for a declaration that she is a beneficial owner of the Property and further prays for an order that the Property be sold pursuant to section 6(1) of the Partition Ordinance, Cap.352 (“the PO”).

3.  Mr Tse is now a retired pastor and is 93 of age. Mr Tse came to know Madam Cheung in his church in or about June 2002. Madam Cheung then worked as a volunteer there. In the following month, Mr Tse became the godfather of Madam Cheung. Madam Cheung is presently a full-time pastor.  

4.  Before long, by an assignment dated 8 January 2004 (“the Assignment”), Mr Tse acquired the Property at the purchase price of HK$1,071,000 (“the Purchase Price”) and had it registered in the joint names of Mr Tse and Madam Cheung. It is not disputed that the Purchase Price was paid by Mr Tse alone and Madam Cheung made no financial contribution.

5.  By a Notice of Severance dated 10 March 2017 (“the Notice”), Mr Tse gave Madam Cheung notice that pursuant to section 8 of the Conveyancing and Property Ordinance, Cap. 219, he desired to sever the joint tenancy with effect from the date of the Notice and they shall hold the Property as tenants-in-common in equal shares.

6.  Now Mr Tse alleges that he is the sole beneficial owner of the Property and Madam Cheung merely holds her 50% beneficial interest in the Property on trust for him. Madam Cheung insists that she has half of the beneficial interest in the Property.

Issues

7.  The 5 issues identified by Mr Lau, for Madam Cheung, in his opening submissions and Ms Yeung, together with Ms Wong, for Mr Tse, agrees to his formulation.

8.  The 5 issues are as follows:

(1) Whether the Property was purchased subject to any condition or was Madam Cheung’s beneficial interest an absolute gift (“Issue 1”);

(2) If the Property was purchased subject to condition, whether the condition was legally invalid and/or unenforceable because:

(i) It would have been a domestic arrangement between a godfather and a goddaughter with no intention to create any legal relations; and/or

(ii) The condition was uncertain. (“Issue 2”)

(3) If the Property was purchased subject to a condition which was legally valid and enforceable, what were the legal consequences of Madam Cheung’s breach of the condition, in particular:

(i) Whether a common intention constructive trust and/or resulting trust arise over Madam Cheung’s 50% beneficial interest in the Property; and/or

(ii) Whether Madam Cheung was estopped from asserting any interest in the Property. (“Issue 3”)

(4) If the Property was purchased subject to a legally valid and enforceable condition, whether Mr Tse’s claim against Madam Cheung’s breach of the condition is:

(i) time barred by the Limitation Ordinance (Cap. 347); or alternatively,

(ii) barred by equitable principle of laches. (“Issue 4”)

(5) If Mr Tse’s claim fails, whether this court should grant an order for sale of the Property pursuant to section 6 of the PO (“Issue 5”).

9.  Ms Yeung and Mr Lau agree that if on Issue 1, this court finds that the gift of the beneficial interest in the Property was an absolute one subject to no condition, this finding will be dispositive of Issues 2 to 4. Hence, the key issue is whether Mr Tse, at the time of the acquisition the Property, gave Madam Cheung her share of the beneficial interest in the Property as an absolute gift or as a conditional gift. This is a factual issue.

10.  Logically, I shall first determine Issue 1. I shall review the respective pleaded cases of the parties and set out the uncontroversial background facts before scrutinizing the evidence to resolve the factual dispute.

Issue 1

11.  In his Amended Statement of Claim, it is pleaded that Mr Tse made the proposal to Madam Cheung (“the Proposal”) that she should promise to take care and look after him when he was unable to do so during his lifetime and arrange a funeral service for him when he passed away and if she did so, Mr Tse would purchase the Property under the joint names of Madam Cheung and him. Madam Cheung made the promise (“the Promise”) and on that basis Mr Tse acquired the Property and became joint-tenants with Madam Cheung in respect of the same.

12.  The Promise, or the alleged breach of Madam Cheung thereof, forms the factual basis of Mr Tse’s claim for the entire beneficial interest in the Property despite Madam Cheung’s holding of its legal title.  His pleaded case is that since his heart operation in June 2015, Mr Tse had difficulty in taking care of himself. However, Madam Cheung failed to honour the Promise and did not look after him.

13.  Mr Tse relies on common intention constructive trust or alternatively, resulting trust, as the legal basis of his claim.

14.  Madam Cheung denies that Mr Tse had ever made the Proposal and that she had ever made the Promise prior to the purchase of the Property.

15.  The following matters are not in dispute and relevant to Issue 1.

16.  Mr Tse and Madam Ng who was his wife used to reside in a flat in public housing estate in Yuen Long. Madam Ng passed away in or about April 2002. They did not have any children.

17.  Two months later, Mr Tse met Madam Cheung and soon developed a close relationship. After Mr Tse had become her godfather, he treated her as his natural daughter.

18.  In 2003, Madam Cheung started her 5-year course in theology. The annual course fee was about HK$60,000. Mr Tse promised to give financial support to Madam Cheung and pay all her course fees together with all the miscellaneous expenses throughout the 5 years. Mr Tse altogether spent no less than HK$330,000 on her studies. Some time after graduation, Madam Cheung became a pastor.

19.  After the acquisition of the Property, Mr Tse gave up his flat in the public housing estate and started residing at the Property alone in April 2004. There are two bedrooms in the Property and Mr Tse told Madam Cheung that she could occupy one of them when she got married.

20.  Up till now, Madam Cheung remains single and has never resided at the Property.   

21.  Mr Tse was very generous financially to Madam Cheung. Over the years, he gave Madam Cheung and her family members a considerable amount of money.

22.  In May 2004, Mr Tse lent a sum of HK$60,000 to one of the younger brothers of Madam Cheung. He never obtained the repayment of the loan and he has not pressed for repayment. Up till now, no repayment has been made.

23.  In July 2004, Mr Tse lent another sum of HK$10,000 to one the sisters-in-law of Madam Cheung.

24.  In 2009, Madam Cheung wanted to set up her own church. Mr Tse provided the set-up cost in the total amount of HK$150,000 and paid Madam Cheung such cost by 3 equal instalments in 2010. The church of Madam Cheung was named after Mr Tse. Mr Tse used to officiate the Holy Communion every Sunday in her church.

25.  Throughout Mr Tse had maintained a close relationship with the family of Madam Cheung. In 2006, Mr Tse had a holiday trip to Singapore and Malaysia with Madam Cheung and her mother (“the Trip”). Mr Tse paid all the travel expenses occasioned by the Trip.

26.  In May 2011, Mr Tse passed the title deeds of the Property (“Title Deeds”) to Madam Cheung for safekeeping purpose.

27.  In June 2015, Mr Tse had a pacemaker implant surgery. In late July 2015, Mr Tse attended his 88th birthday banquet organised by Madam Cheung and one Madam Chan who was the goddaughter of Madam Ng.

28.  In August 2015, Mr Tse came to know Madam Huang and on 10 December 2015, they got married. Since then they have been residing at the Property as their matrimonial home.

29.  In late 2016 and early 2017, Mr Tse issued three letters to Madam Cheung (“the Letters”)[1] and, among other matters, demanded the return of the Title Deeds.

30.  In March 2017, Mr Tse executed the Notice with legal advice. The Notice was registered in the Land Registry.

31.  In October and November 2017, the former solicitors of Mr Tse issued two demand letters to Madam Cheung asking for the return of the Title Deeds and the transfer of her beneficial interest in the Property to him (“the Demand Letters”). Madam Cheung did not reply substantively to these letters before Mr Tse instituted these proceedings.

Analysis of the relevant evidence

32.  Both of the Proposal and the Promise were allegedly made orally and not evidenced by any documents. Mr Tse alleges that they were made just between them and there was no witness. This is therefore a case of one’s words against another and basically an issue of credibility.  

33.  The relationship between Mr Tse and Madam Cheung started almost 20 years ago and inevitably they have a lot of accusations against each other. I shall not attempt to deal with all of them here. I should just focus on those relevant to Issue 1.

34.  Due to the health problem of Mr Tse, Mr Tse’s evidence was taken before Master Raymund Chow on 25 November 2020 pursuant to Order 39 r.1, Rules of the District Court. By consent, the deposition of Mr Tse by way of the transcript of the examination (“the Transcript”) was admitted as evidence in the present trial.

35.  I have studied the Transcript. I could not discern that Mr Tse had any problem with giving relevant testimony at all. He was responsive and able to testify coherently. He attended the trial in his wheelchair and made outbursts in the public gallery occasionally when Madam Cheung testified in the witness box.

36.  I now turn to the evidence and assess the parties’ credibility taking into account inherent improbabilities, the relevant factual matrix and the contemporaneous documents.

37.  It is plain to me that at the time of the acquisition of the Property, Mr Tse had intense feelings for Madam Cheung. I need not determine the exact nature of these feelings though I am not sure whether it was purely for religious reasons as contended by Mr Tse. Mr Tse adopted Madam Cheung as her goddaughter shortly after they became acquainted. In his witness statement, Mr Tse explained that the purpose of the adoption was to ensure that Madam Cheung would take care of him when he was unable to do so. And Madam Cheung expressly agreed to this.

38.  In both his witness statement and his oral testimony, Mr Tse stated that he treated Madam Cheung as his natural daughter after the adoption. He was willing to give Madam Cheung unreserved financial support though he was already in his seventies with little earning capacity and financial resources. He offered to commit himself financially to pay for Madam Cheung’s 5-year course in 2003 and the total course fees were sizable, amounting to more or less one-third of the Purchase Price.  There is no allegation that the payment of the course fees and the incidental charges over five years was subject to any condition.

39.  For the acquisition of the Property, there is no allegation that Madam Cheung had asked for any beneficial interest. The idea solely came from Mr Tse. I do not find it probable that Mr Tse found it necessary and appropriate to expressly require Madam Cheung to agree to take care of him when he was unable to do so before he agreed to make her a joint tenant of the Property in view of their relationship. This is particularly so given Madam Cheung had already agreed to do so at the time of the adoption according to his own evidence.  

40.  Under cross-examination, Mr Tse recounted what he told Madam Cheung before his purchase of the Property. The account markedly differed from the pleaded case in that he merely told Madam Cheung that he treated her as his daughter and wished that Madam Cheung could take care of him and help him when he could not do so. Madam Cheung agreed and assured him that she would take care of him. Mr Tse was sure that he told Madam Cheung in those terms.[2]

41.  Furthermore, under cross-examination, Mr Tse was adamant that the foregoing exchange between Madam Cheung and him took place twice. The first one was when she went to inspect the Property with him and the second one was when he was required to make payment for the acquisition.[3] The latter was mentioned for the first time and I believe Mr Tse merely made it up to make his account sound more credible.

42.  The difference between the pleaded case of Mr Tse and his evidence is not insignificant given the oral nature of the Proposal and the Promise. I require cogent evidence to find the existence of the Proposal and the Promise. Mr Tse’s evidence is unable to support his pleaded case and cannot meet the requirement. On his evidence, he did not really raise the Proposal and make it an express condition upon which the beneficial interest in the Property was to be vested in Madam Cheung. 

43.  I turn to the evidence of Madam Cheung. She said that prior to the purchase of the Property, Mr Tse told her that he wished her to dedicate her life and time in missionary works without the need to worry about having a place to live. He also told her that he had always treated her as his own daughter and since his wife had already passed away and he had no children of his own, he would want her to have beneficial interest in the Property.

44.  Her testimony by and large supports her pleaded case. I do not find the additional details given and some minor inconsistencies under cross-examination could cast doubt on her credibility. She appeared to be forthcoming and truthful.  Her account is far more probable. I do not think she should be required to explain the purported reasons given by Mr Tse for the gift. Even if they did not make perfect sense, the nature of the gift cannot be altered.

45.  On this crucial issue, I prefer the evidence of Madam Cheung. I accept that she did not make the Promise and that the Proposal did not exist at all. I find that Mr Tse did have strong affinity for Madam Cheung at the material time and he intended to gift her with the beneficial interest in the Property unconditionally.

46.  The following matters further reinforce my belief that Mr Tse indeed intended that the beneficial interest in the Property was an absolute gift to Madam Cheung free of conditions. 

47.  First, as shown in the undisputed facts above, after the acquisition of the Property, Mr Tse continued to make unconditional monetary gifts to Madam Cheung and her family including the set-up cost of her church and the expenses of the Trip.

48.  Secondly, I cannot accept that Mr Tse became unable to take care of himself after the operation in June 2015. In my view, it is a fiction to build his case of the common intention constructive trust. He did attend the birthday banquet in the following month and it is not disputed that there were about 90 guests. In his witness statement, Mr Tse said he was too weak and could not eat anything during the banquet. He said he was reluctant to take part but Madam Cheung insisted on his attendance because the invitations to the guests had been sent.

49.  I do not accept the evidence of Mr Tse. He looked smart and jovial in the group photo taken in the banquet. He could also manage to get married with Madam Huang a few months later. The invitation card of his wedding ceremony shows that there would also be a wedding banquet held at a local seafood restaurant on 10 December 2015 and Madam Cheung would lead the prayer at the ceremony. Mr Tse was physically fit to deal with those big events and he was apparently still on good terms with Madam Cheung despite her alleged breach of the Promise.

50.  It is absurd for him to allege that he could not take care of himself despite the birthday banquet and the wedding. He was in fact very socially active. Furthermore, I cannot understand how Mr Tse could expect Madam Cheung could fulfill the Promise even if it had existed given his marriage with Madam Huang. There is also no suggestion let alone evidence that Mr Tse ever indicated to Madam Cheung that he had become unable to take care of himself and required her fulfillment of the Promise. Nor is there any evidence that Madam Cheung was aware of his allegedly dire physical condition.

51.  Thirdly, Mr Tse did not mention the Proposal and the Promise in any of the Letters. Nor did he start to deny the beneficial interest of Madam Cheung in the Property in those lengthy documents.

52.  Fourthly, the Notice is the most telling document. By the Notice, Mr Tse unequivocally acknowledged Madam Cheung’s beneficial interest in the Property. There is no reason why Mr Tse would still accept her beneficial interest if she had allegedly breached the Promise, even on legal advice. The Notice is cogent evidence contrary to the pleaded case of Mr Tse.

53.  Lastly, in the Demand Letters, there was no allegation of the Proposal or the Promise and the assertion of the sole beneficial ownership of Mr Tse was made on the basis of his financial contribution to the Purchase Price and the related costs only.

54.  For the foregoing reasons, I am of the firm view that the beneficial interest in the Property was an absolute gift to Madam Cheung. It was an advancement made by Mr Tse to Madam Cheung as his goddaughter. Neither the Proposal nor the Promise was ever in existence.  I cannot accept the pleaded case of Mr Tse.

55.  In light of this conclusion, Issues 2 to 4 become academic and need no consideration. What remains to be determined is the counterclaim of Madam Cheung and, in particular, Issue 5.

Issue 5

56.  As it now stands, Mr Tse and Madam Cheung are the equal beneficial owners of the Property. The parties agree that it is a basic right of a co-owner to rid himself of the shackles of co-ownership.

57.  The parties also agree that it is impractical to partition the Property. The only remedy available appears to be an order for sale.

58.  To argue against the grant of an order for sale, the burden is on the opposing co-owner to show that such an order will not be beneficial to all the co-owners or that it will result in very great hardship to him. This court has to determine whether such an order is beneficial to all the co-owners objectively: Wong Chun Kei v Poon Vai Chung [2007] 1 HKLRD 825 at §§18-19 per Recorder Fok SC (as he then was).

59.  The evidence of Mr Tse does not cover this issue. Ms Yeung asks this court to consider his advanced age and poor health. She further submits that it can be inferred that Madam Huang and Mr Tse have no alternative residence given his financial difficulties.

60.  There is no evidence of Madam Huang’s financial condition. In any event, Mr Tse would be entitled to his share of the proceeds of sale of the Property with which he could pay for his accommodation elsewhere.

61.  It is not fair for Madam Cheung to be locked in the unhappy co-ownership of the Property though it is a gift. Nevertheless, I accept that Mr Tse may suffer certain hardship if he is ordered to leave his long-term residence and stay at a new home in his twilight years.   

62.  Madam Cheung in the witness box indicated that she would agree that she would wait until the passing of Mr Tse to sell the Property and in the meantime Mr Tse could continue to use it as his matrimonial home. Based on this indication, Mr Lau invites this court to make an order for the sale of the Property until after the passing of Mr Tse.

63.  I welcome this invitation but I also accept Ms Yeung’s submission that it is reasonable to allow some time for the vacant possession of the Property to be delivered after the passing of Mr Tse. She asks for 6 months. Mr Lau agrees.   

64.  In view of these special circumstances, I agree to grant an order for sale of the Property not less than 6 months after the passing of Mr Tse. I should give parties liberty to apply.

Conclusion and Order

65.  For the reasons given, I reject the evidence of Mr Tse regarding his case of common intention constructive trust and resulting trust. I dismiss his claim accordingly.

66.  I conclude that Mr Tse and Madam Cheung have equal beneficial interest in the Property as tenants-in-common and I allow the counterclaim of Madam Cheung and grant the declaration sought.  I further make an order for sale of the Property pursuant to section 6 of the PO but the sale could only take place not less than 6 months after the passing of Mr Tse. The parties are given liberty to apply for directions to materialize the sale in due course.

67.  Costs should follow the event. I make an order nisi that Mr Tse do pay Madam Cheung her costs of the action including any reserved costs with certificate for counsel, to be taxed if not agreed. His own costs are to be taxed in accordance with the Legal Aid Regulations.

68.  Lastly, I thank all counsel for their assistance.

 (Kent Yee)
 District Judge

Ms. Wendy W.Y. Yeung and Ms. Karen Wong, instructed by T.C. Lau & Co., assigned by the Director of Legal Aid, for the plaintiff

Mr. Andrew Lau, instructed by Tam, Pun & Yipp, for the defendant



[1]  Respectively dated 22 December 2016, 4 January 2017 and 3 February 2017.

[2]  p.13S – p.14A of the Transcript.

[3]  p.14S of the Transcript.