HK CourtDB
HomeDirectoryMCP
Hong Kong CourtDB
Back to directory
Matrimonial Causes2020

SG v. GDV

Files (5)

[2024] HKFC 93-EN-2024-04-30

SG v. GDV

HTML content

FCMC 10217/2020

[2024] HKFC 93

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

MATRIMONIAL CAUSES NO. 10217 OF 2020

------------------------

BETWEEN

SGPetitioner
and
GDVRespondent

------------------------

Coram:H.H. Judge C.K. Chan in Chambers (not open to the public)
Date of Hearing:30 April 2024
Date of Decision:30 April 2024 (10:20am)

-----------------------

D E C I S I O N

(Ex-parte Applications for Temporary and Permanent Removal)

------------------------


1.  This hearing concerns with the Respondent Father (“the father”)’s application for:

(1) Temporary removal of both children of family (aged 13 and 11 respectively) to USA from 31 July 2024 to 28 July 2025 for education; and

(2) Permanent removal of both children to USA.

2.  The father filed his both applications on 29 April 2024, but he said his applications were so urgent (he called them “emergency applications”) that he required to see the Duty Judge for an ex-parte hearing, which was fixed to be heard this morning at 9:30am. As this is an ex-parte hearing, the Petitioner mother (“the mother”) was not served and hence did not appear.

3.  According to my understanding, the mother petitioned for divorce in 2020. A decree nisi of divorce was granted on 4 September 2023. By an order dated 23 February 2021, interim care and control of the children were shared by the parties. The trial on custody, care, control and access was heard by HH Judge Thelma Kwan in November 2023 and the parties are waiting for a judgment from the court. There are also disputes on ancillary relief including a s.17 application, the trial of which have been fixed on 2-4, 9 and 11 July 2024 for 5 days before Judge Kwan.

4.  The father has filed 2 lengthy affirmations, containing over 200 pages of narrative and exhibits each. As far as I could understand from the father’s case, he was basically saying that he was due to be relocated to USA in or around July 2024 to start a new employment opportunity. The children may run the risk of being homeless if they remain in Hong Kong without him. He said his main application was for permanent relocation, but if for whatever reason that application could not be processed in time, he would ask for temporary relocation.

5.  First of all, this court has to address a fundamental point and that is whether this court should entertain the father’s ex-parte application. It is well established that ex-parte applications should be regarded as exceptional and the court should not entertain the same unless there are cogent justifications usually in terms of extreme urgency or secrecy: Slik Hong Kong Co Ltd v Gerald Merlyn Rhoslyn E & Ns and Others [2005] HKEC 2368, per Lam J (as Lam PJ then was) at §2.

6.  The issue here is whether the requirement of extreme urgency is satisfied. I stress here that the requirement is not simply urgency, but extreme urgency such that the applications could not be made inter-partes or at least some kind of notice be given to the other party. I fully appreciate that from the perspective of the father, anything that may affect the welfare of his children would somehow be urgent, but I am afraid that the test is much higher than that.

7.  As far as the present case is concerned, there is undoubtedly no justification whatsoever for the application for removal, whether temporary or permanent to be sought by way of an ex-parte application. The mother who is having interim shared care of the children should be given a proper opportunity to state her views. I understand that one of the reasons for the father to come before the Duty Judge to make an ex-parte application because Judge Kwan, being the trial judge who is writing a judgment on custody, is only available next Monday when Her Honour resumes duty. But in my view, this could hardly be regarded as a good justification for the father to make the present ex-parte applications.

8.  Lastly, I must point out that the father is not asking for an ex-parte prohibitory order just to maintain a status quo. Instead, he is asking for a mandatory order for temporary and permanent relocation. According to court’s record, the father had made a similar application for permanent relocation but was dismissed on 9 June 2023. He also made another application for temporary removal but was dismissed by the court on 31 January 2024. The father’s present applications by way of ex-parte applications for both temporary and permanent relocation again is simply an abuse of court process.

9.  Based on the above discussion, the father’s both ex-parte applications are dismissed.

10.  There shall be no order as to costs.

 C. K. Chan
 District Judge

Representation:

The Petitioner was not being served and was not present

The Respondent acting in person

[2023] HKFC 106-EN-2023-06-02

SG v. GDV

HTML content

FCMC 10217/2020

[2023] HKFC 106

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

MATRIMONIAL CAUSES NO. 10217 OF 2020

________________________

BETWEEN

 SGPetitioner
 and 
 GDVRespondent

________________________

Coram: Her Honour Judge Thelma Kwan in Chambers (not open to public)
Date of Hearing: 2 June 2023
Date of Decision: 2 June 2023

________________________

Extempore Decision
(Schooling)

________________________

1.  This is an extempore decision as time is of the essence for parties to confirm schooling arrangement for the upcoming school term for the 2023-2024 school year.

2.  Before me are two applications:

(1)  The Petitioner Mother’s (“M”) Amended Summons dated 29 July 2022 for her to (i) apply for schools in HK and (ii) enrol the children as she sees fit.

(2)  The Respondent Father’s (“F”) “Temporary Removal Summons” dated 11 May 2023 to take the children for schooling in the US. This was filed very last minute but I have decided to consider this Summons at the same time due to the subject matter.

3.  There are two children of the family, namely L aged 13 and P aged 11. L resides with F, and P with M.

Relocation Judgment

4.  There is quite a bit of history to these applications, the most relevant information is contained in my Relocation decision made on 9 January 2023 (“Relocation Judgment”) when I turned down the F’s application to remove the children permanently to the US; and refused his application for leave to appeal in my decision on 24 May 2023. 

5.  This decision to the School Summons should be read in context with my Relocation Judgment, the background to this matter is contained therein.

Discussion

Finances

6.  I started today’s hearing with asking F to confirm who will be paying for the schooling for the children if his application is granted. He says that he will find a lowly job, like selling pizzas, to put the children in that school; and if he is unable, his family will assist with the US tuition.  I also asked that he confirms whether he will be paying for international schools in HK, he says no, as he cannot afford it.

7.  I have then turned to W’s counsel to seek confirmation that should international schools be not viable, whether M is happy to pursue free schooling in HK, and this is confirmed.

8.  I made my observation thereafter that I do not believe the financial situation of the parties is very relevant to these proceedings before me today; and the parties should focus on the schooling arguments instead.

F’s Summons

9.  F has applied to temporarily remove the children for schooling in the US.  He has provided information on the school which he intends to enrol them into, and also said that the full tuition will be supported by his family.  I note here that he says in oral evidence today that he has already enrolled the children into this US school. I am not sure if this was discussed with M, as they have joint custody of the children; but her counsel says not.

10.  In my view, the F’s Summons hard on the heels of my Relocation Judgment and his application for leave to appeal speaks volume on his intention.  To understand this, I should briefly state the reasons for my refusal to the F’s permanent removal application, inter alia:

-  I found that F, with his application, intends to separate M from the two children by moving to the US

-  I found on expert evidence before me at trial, that M will have substantial difficulty in entering US with her Kyrgyzstan passport and background; and her US visa has since expired in December 2022

-  I found that F, in particular, has involved the children into their litigation, and also continues to make denigrating remarks of the M in front of them.  His conduct has caused rifts between L and M, and forces young P to be in defence of M against L when they meet, no doubt creating emotional tension and stress.  In my view, M has been reactively coping with this and needs to deal with her very difficult relationship with L, incited by F.

11.  F intends to go to the US with the children should his application be granted; he therefore asks for interim care and control, and says he will be staying in his Mother’s home in the US.  F takes a substantial time in his oral submission addressing his financial situation (despite my comments), and insist that it is very relevant.  He says that he is facing bankruptcy, will not be able to resume certain employment, his lease is coming up and they will be “out on the streets”.  With these submissions, it further reinforces my serious concern that he will not be returning with the children at all to Hong Kong. He has no ties here, he is facing all these financial issues and High court litigation, he kept calling US a safe haven; my question would be, once he leaves, why should he come back?  And as W’s counsel rightly submits, if that happens, M has no means to pursue an application to bring the children back. 

12.  Reminding myself of the reports I read at the relocation trial, I am also conscious that P has strong emotional ties to M, who has all along been his carer; taking him away from M, even for a short term, will have adverse psychological impact on him in the midst of the loyalty conflicts that are going on with the children.

13.  M’s counsel criticizes F’s case on the following points:

-  F sought to re-argue his permanent removal application, challenging previous findings of facts, and that F is only repeating “old arguments dressed up in new ways” (quoting the case of Re J (Children: Reopening Findings of Fact) [2020] EWCA 1685). 

-  F brought up a Statutory Demand of a debt he owes to a law firm, but counsel argues that this is a debt in existence at time of the relocation trial which he chose not to pay.  F says today it was a disputed amount, be that as it may, it was an old debt.

-  F then cited that he has visited in person to the US consulate in HK and was told by a “Senior US Consulate Officer” that M would have no issue renewing her 5-year visitor visa.  Counsel says this is hearsay and question the likelihood of an official giving such comments.

-  F only offered two return flights to the M and ½ hour per day remote access to the children, Counsel reminds me that this is even less than what he proposed at the permanent relocation trial.

14.  I agree with the above submissions, and find in particular the reference to an unknown US consulate officer mere “say-so” on the issue of visa renewal to be unacceptable hearsay evidence, on which I cannot place any weight.

15.  Counsel argues that H’s case shows no change of circumstances since the trial and I agree.  In fairness to the H, he says there has been instances of abuse by the M to the children, in particular to L; but then he says he still sent L to see her and leave them to it.  These are allegations which have yet to be aired in upcoming hearing, and will not feature into my discussion today. 

16.  M’s counsel in his written submission made relevant references to paragraphs in the Relocation Judgment where some of the above arguments were dealt with by me, including but not limited to expert evidence, F’s proposal for M’s access, children’s dynamics with parents as observed by the SWO and the clinical psychologist.  These references are adopted herein.

17.  I am of the view that this is an application to remove the children permanently from HK dressed up as a temporary removal for Schooling Summons.  As mentioned in my Relocation Judgment, I have serious reservations on F’s credibility; and have no confidence that M will have access to the children if they depart.  F’s oral submission asks for “ironclad” protection Order for M’s access which he claims will be recognized in the US; again, if M will have issues entering the US, it will be an “empty” Order.

18.  M’s counsel submits that the children must remain in HK, for a chance for L to recover his relationship with M, and to ensure that P will feel safe in the continuing care of M.  I agree, best interest of the children considered, and for the reasons mentioned above, and those analysed in the Relocation Judgment, I therefore dismiss the F’s Summons. 

M’s Summons

19.  The children had previously been enrolled in an international school, X Academy.  F’s claim on poverty resulted in him not only failing to pay maintenance to M and tuition for the children as ordered by this Court; he has enrolled L, who is under his sole care and control, into an internet learning course; which is one of the reasons that prompted M’s Summons.

About L

20.  L has since his graduation from Grade 7 at the X Academy in June 2022, been placed on internet schooling called Y Online Academy, because F says the course fee is more affordable.  According to the SIR, L appears to be attending Grade 7 and obtained a certificate of distinction of high standards and excellence during the fall semester of 2022 to 2023.  F says L has online class for about 6 hours per day. 

21.  This is objectionable on several grounds:

(1)  F is in breach of the laws of Hong Kong by placing L on internet learning

The Education Ordinance (Cap 279) requires children before the age of 15 to attend physical school.  F is in breach of Hong Kong law, and may well face criminal sanctions if this persists.  Especially as elaborated below, he has now been informed of the law by an Officer of the Education Department.

(2)  L’s behaviour as recorded by the SIR and Psychologist Report demonstrates the need for interaction with peers

Referring back to previous reports before me at the Relocation trial, L is recorded to idolize his father, has no friends and does not feel he needs any as he has his father, and has difficulty accepting opposing views and negative feedbacks from others. F says in court that L has friends from his extracurricular activities.

I continue to place reliance on these reports and find L’s situation highly irregular, and there is clearly a need for L to be extracted from this enmeshed relationship with his father, and develop his own personality and independence.

(3)  M says L attends this Y class time from 9pm to 2 am and stays up till 5 am HK time and sleeps till 2pm.  M also produced Y class schedule indicating that class is for 8am - 4pm EST.  This is an unhealthy routine for a child.

W’s counsel also made two further points: On F saying that L has “special accommodation to meet with teachers and students before 11pm HK time”, no evidence has been produced before me to support this special accommodation treatment for L.   H also says that Y offers “anytime, anyplace, anywhere” asynchronous learning, which must mean that L is merely watching videos, and not interacting with teachers or other students in real time.  In the absence of evidence to the contrary, I accept these submissions.

(4)  Best interest of the child must dictate that a child of L’s age should be learning in a community setting, and not just sitting at home facing a computer.  F calls it an “amazingly flexible private education schedule, which allows for self-study and self-discipline which [L] greatly enjoys.”  I disagree, a child of L’s age needs to learn discipline in a proper school setting, and in the context of social interaction with peers, practise responsibility and mutual respect.

(5)  Not having funds to put L in school is not an acceptable reason

 W’s counsel in written and oral submission today draw my attention to the basis upon which the H has financial means to put the children into private schools, which the H obviously denies.  I was also reminded that the grandmother has in the relocation trial offers to pay ~HK$45,000 (equivalent) to support the children, although she did say that she would only do this if they are in the US, which I find hard to accept.  These were covered in the Relocation Judgment already, and will not be repeated here. 

    Besides the point that it is not accepted that the H has no financial means, (as I so found in the Relocation Judgment), I am of the view that this is a mere litigation tactic on his part.  Putting L into internet learning class supports his case that he has no money, and also isolate L from his peers and keeps him by his side. 

 As to F continuously saying he has no means to pay for private school, I refer to the contents of the SIR below as to other school options that the children have.

About P

22.  When F failed to pay for tuition fee for P, M was able to continue to put P into his current school by selling her diamond engagement ring to pay for his tuition.  According to the SIR, he is doing well in school.

23.  F told the SWO that he intends to enrol P to the same Y online course as he cannot pay the tuition fee at the current school.

24.  M’s case acknowledges that the children studied at international school prior, and thus preferred, she therefore put down ESF schools on her list; but she also knows that F will continue to plead poverty and not pay for tuition.  It is her case that should he thinks so lowly of the HK local schools, he can find the means to pay for international school tuition here, even finding the support from grandmother if need be.

25.  While F has spoken ill of the local schools and said that it is not “internationally accredited and of low quality”, M believes that putting children into local schools which caters for an English speaking curriculum is a good option, and she is encouraging of the children to integrate with others of different socio-economic background in a local school setting. 

26.  It is unfortunate that F has such low opinion of the local schools in Hong Kong, I agree with the M’s position that as children who spent almost their whole lives here, it should be a good learning experience for them to integrate into the community by experiencing the local schools and meeting people from different background.  I therefore fully support M’s position in enrolling the children into the local schools as an alternative, and that she has the right to make these decisions alone as F is likely to be obstructive.

SIR on this Issue

27.  I directed that a SIR be prepared to look into M’s Summons.  The SWO has referred L’s case to the Education Department on his schooling status.

28.  According to the SWO, a Ms L of the Education Bureau has informed F that children under 15 years of age enjoy free education in Hong Kong.  F was also provided with information on public schools which could provide English syllabus and accept non-Chinese speaking students.  The Education Bureau has also indicated that they would provide support to assist with school placement when needed, but private international school fees are to be borne by the parents themselves.

29.  Ms L has also explained to F that L is required to attend physical school before the age of 15 and that the current school arrangement at the internet course could not be accepted as an alternative school measure and has failed to meet the requirement under the Hong Kong law.  Apparently, F told Ms L that the internet course is an “interim measure before his appealing of the case on relocation to the US”.  Ms L told F that there will be follow up action on L’s school enrolment progress. 

30.  W’s counsel helpfully provided information that contravention to the Education Ordinance is an offence punishable by fine and imprisonment.

31.  Addressing his point on appealing of the case on relocation, I have refused leave to appeal my decision on the issue of relocation.  I am not aware what other actions F seeks to continue on this track, but in the meantime the children must be enrolled in proper schools, and attend classes physically.  This is clearly in line with the laws of Hong Kong and no alternatives could possibly be considered.

32.  Father says the Family Court cannot “simply wave a magic wand” to order what people cannot afford to pay for.  To this I say, the family court can make an order for people to pay, and there will always be people who chose not to, and consequences will ensue with due process.  We are lucky in HK that we have free education to offer to children, and on this, M must make haste to proceed with the necessary applications in the best interests of the children.

33.  These applications have required a delicate balancing exercise on my part.  F’s proposal of quality education in US and my belief that the M will be out of the children’s life if they leave; and on the side of the scale, is that the children can receive quality education in HK, with the M in their lives.  I chose the latter.

34.  As a corollary to her application, the mother also seeks the following, they are sensible Orders to seek in order to enable to M to enrol both children into schools, and I therefore make orders in those terms:

Orders

35.  Orders:

(1) P shall be at liberty to apply and to enrol the children of the family (“the Children”), namely, L, a boy born on XX August 2010 and P, a boy born on XX October 2012, in schools in Hong Kong as she sees fit;

(2) R do provide L’s school reports to the P forthwith;

(3) R do hand over L to the P for any school interview;

(4) P be permitted to provide a copy of this order to schools for the purposes of making applications and enrolling the children in schools.

Costs

36.  This is no reason why costs should not follow the event for both summonses. The costs of the M’s Amended Summons dated 29 July 2022 and the F’s Temporary Removal Summons dated 11 May 2023 be to the Petitioner M.   

37.  The costs for both Summons shall be taxed in accordance with Legal Aid Regulations; there shall be certificate for counsel.

38.  Last but not least, this Court thanks Mr Marwah for his able assistance in these proceedings.

(Thelma Kwan)
District Judge

For Petitioner: Mr Shaphan Marwah instructed by Boase Cohen & Collins assigned by Director of Legal Aid

Respondent: Acting in Person

[2023] HKFC 98-EN-2023-05-24

SG v. GDV

HTML content

FCMC 10217/2020

[2023] HKFC 98

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

MATRIMONIAL CAUSES NO. 10217 OF 2020

________________________

BETWEEN

 SGPetitioner
 and 
 GDVRespondent

________________________

Coram: Her Honour Judge Thelma Kwan in Chambers (not open to public)
Date of Submissions: 15 February and 27 February 2023
Date of Judgment: 24 May 2023

________________________

J U D G M E N T

( Leave to Appeal)

________________________


1.  This is a Summons filed on 15 February 2023 by the Respondent H for leave to appeal against my judgment of 9 January 2023 (the “Judgment”)  wherein I refused his application for permanent removal of the two children of the family to the US. 

2.  The deadline for his leave to appeal application should be 28 days after, which was 6 February 2023; his leave application is therefore late.

3.  Counsel for the Petitioner wife filed his opposition on 27 February 2023.

Background

4.  The background of the case has been set down in the Judgment and will not be repeated here.

5.  I shall refer to the parties as H and W.

The Applicable Legal Principles

6.  The appropriate test when seeking leave to appeal is set out at section 63A of the District Court Ordinance (Cap. 336), which states that either the appeal must have a reasonable prospect of success or that there is some other reason in the interest of justice why the appeal should be heard.

7.  The relevant test of whether an appeal has a reasonable prospect of success is whether the applicant for leave can show that he has an arguable case with reasonable chances of success on appeal.  The case of SMSE v KL [2009] 4 HKLRD 125, elaborated as follows:

“…. Reasonable prospects of success involve the notion that the prospects of succeeding must be “reasonable” and therefore more than “fanciful”, without having to be “probable”.

8.  In challenging an exercise of discretion such as the one I made in the relocation application, it is well known law that it is not enough to establish that the appeal court might have made a different order.   It is only where the decision exceeds the generous ambit within which reasonable disagreement is possible, and is in fact plainly wrong, that an appellate body is entitled to interfere.

9.  The principles are trite that in the challenge of finding of fact by a trial judge, an applicant for leave has to showed that the trial judge is “plainly wrong”.  In this regard I refer to the case of Henderson v Foxworth Investments Limited and another [2014] UKSC 41, where Lord Reed explained this concept at the following paragraphs:

“62. …The adverb “plainly does not refer to the degree of confidence felt by the appellate court that it would not have reached the same conclusion as the trial judge.  It does not matter, with whatever degree of certainty, that the appellate court considers that it would have reached a different conclusion.  What matters is whether the decision under appeal is one that no reasonable judge could have reached.

…

67. … It follows that, in the absence of some other identifiable error, such as (without attempting an exhaustive account)  a material error of law, or the making of a critical finding of fact which has no basis in the evidence, or a demonstrable misunderstanding of relevant evidence, or a demonstrable failure to consider relevant evidence, an appellate court will interfere with the findings of fact made by a trial judge only if it is satisfied that his decision cannot reasonably be explained or justified.”

H’s late Application

10.  H’s explains the reasons for his delay in the affidavit which are summarized as follows:

a.  H says as a litigant in person he is not aware that holidays counted towards the 28 days timeline for appeal;

b.  He says he was busy with his application regarding child abuse by W; and

c.  He says he was researching into his rights to privacy.

11.  Counsel for the W criticized his reasons as “neither reasonable nor credible”.

12.  W’s counsel put forward the authority of Tang chai On v Tang Sing Ki [2016] 5 HKLRD 104 at §9, and states the factors I have to take into regard are (i)  length of the delay; (ii)  reasons for the delay (iii)  the chances of appeal succeeding and (iv)  the degree of prejudice to the W.  I shall adopt these principles.

13.  He says he miscalculated the days for the appeal in not counting  the Chines New Year holidays.  There were three public holidays in January 2023 for Chinese New Year, so even if this is credible, he should have assumed 9 February 2023 as deadline, and he is still late. 

14.  H then says he had to prepare his case for serious child abuse by W in December 2022, January and February 2023, and he had to prepare “a SUBSTANTIAL and URGENT affirmations”.  He filed this latter Summons on 8 February 2023 attaching recordings of the alleged child abuse.  W’s counsel submission states that the recordings do not reveal any abuse by W, and H waited three weeks after the last recording to file his summons despite saying that he puts “SERIOUS Child Safety and Wellbeing Matter ahead of my APPEAL”.

15.  He also says he spent his time researching his rights to “privacy and protection by the HK Family Court”.  He did not elaborate this point in his affidavit.

16.  He also says he needs to give his children positive experiences over the Chinese New Year in the light of M’s abuse, which is why his appeal was late.

17.  None of these grounds for delay have any merits.  Nor do I think there are merits to his appeal which is further elaborated below.  But for completeness’ sake, I will deal with his grounds of appeal as follows.

H’s Grounds of Appeal

Ground 1   Assuming H would not move to the US by himself

18.  “The Judgment firstly wrongly assumed the Father would not move and relocate to the US, which as disclosed in sworn affirmations and testimony the Father will and must do to avoid personal bankruptcy as he is in a disclosed debt spiral.”

19.  W’s counsel refers me to H’s Statement of Proposals for the Relocation hearing, at Page 7 under a paragraph headed “Mother’s access if children to be held in Hong Kong”, following his access proposals to W, it reads at paragraph 4 therein:

“The above enables the children to immediately settle in with their father who can work full time from home and care for both them.”

20.  There is no error in my assumption as this is the H’s case for trial.

Ground 2    Ignoring Welfare Checklist

21.  “This Judgement wrongfully ignored the OBVIOUS children’s welfare check list based on the assumption that the Father will remain in Hong Kong.”

H then proceeds to do his own comparison chart using tangible factors such as size of accommodation, zero cost of living, quality food, two care givers (not the Mother), and access to top schools in the US.

22.  There is no legal requirement that I must refer to the Welfare checklist, it is a tool which assists the Court with factors to consider in exercising its discretion.  W’s counsel helpfully refers me to the case of ZJ v XWN [2018] 3 HKLRD 644 at §25, where the Court of Appeal confirms that “it is not compulsory for our courts to have regard to the “welfare checklist” and that is an aide-memoire.”

23.  I made reference to the Welfare checklist in §44 of the Judgment, and have given due consideration to the relevant factors mentioned therein.

24.  In his comparison he also wrote “Father’s love” and “Mother’s love” on the two sides of his comparison table, as if the two were mutually exclusive. This also shows me that he has not factored in the availability of Mother’s love if the children were to move to the US, which reinforces my concern in the Judgment.

Ground 3   Ignoring Social Investigation Reports

25.  H says that the two Social Investigations Reports have been “wrongly ignored by the HK Family court”.  I beg to differ, I have not ignored the two reports, I have considered them fully.  In §§148 - 156 of the Judgment, I gave reasons why I went against the recommendations of the Social Investigation Reports.

Ground 4   Presuming the company was in good health

26.  “The Judge was misled wrongfully ignored the poor financial situation and wrongfully presumed the company was in good health (which it was not)  again mislead by the mother and legal team leading to false prejudice against the unrepresented father leading to wrongful Judgment.”

I made findings of the H’s financial position based on evidence at trial. For this to be a meritorious ground of appeal, the H has to prove that I was “plainly wrong” in my judgment, I am not of the view that he has come up to proof by merely saying that I was misled.

Ground 5   Support from the grandparents

27.  “The Judge was mislead and wrongfully presumes the father’s grandparents would be never ending source of support to the father being forced to live in Hong Kong which was wrong to assume they would continue to lending to avoid the catastrophic situation all parties know they will face in Hong Kong ….”

“More misrepresentations such as the grandparents support of the grandchildren and paying for their schools were also ignored and restricting the children to see their grandparents on TWO occasions because on the ONE hand the HK Family Court considered the Father a flight risk due to Financial duress when alienating the children from their loving and financially supportive grandparents but on the OTHER HAND the Father is now financial solvent and has money when dismissing the Moving and Relocation Application forcing the children to remain in HK, the HK Family Court CONTRADICTED its OWN basis for this Judgment….”

28.  This ground challenges my consideration of the evidence in my Judgment, which analysis is found in §§71 - 74 therein; I specifically stated that I do not see why the grandparents’ support is conditional only on the children being in the US; and I have already commented on the credibility of the grandmother’s and the H’s sister’s evidence at §55. I do not see how this ground of appeal supports a contention that I have been “plainly wrong” in coming to my decision. 

29.  H has also made a completely different point in the same paragraph about the Court contradicting its own basis.  I was involved with one of the holiday applications when H applied to take the children to visit grandparents in Greece just two months prior to relocation hearing.   I have turned down his application in my extempore decision on 7 July 2022.  In reviewing my notes for that decision, I did not say that he is a flight risk due to financial duress.  H’s point on this is misconceived, there are no contradictions as he alleged.

Ground 6   H can move his residence / office

30.  The judge was misled and wrongfully confuses the ‘office / residence’ as a movable asset. 

H then went on to say that moving equipment and IT will take 90 days and at least $300,000-500,000, and that there is a “high chance to shut the online business down catastrophically bring income to ZERO.” That this move would “take 12 - 18 months to break even and there are NO funds to invest for such a risky move with no ROI.”

31.  All the information in the latter paragraph was never put forward at trial.  In any event, this point was made at §76 of the Judgment and goes to the H’s rental payment of $56,000 for his McDonnell Road residence when he continuously fails to pay the maintenance ordered by the Court; and was only one of the many factor in weighing up the parties’ respective cases.

Ground 7   Children’s wishes

32.  “Due to bias the Judgment wrongfully disregarded and ignored the children’s wishes L age 12, and P’s age 10 along with the Social Well fare reports documenting the children’s wishes and stellar relationship with the Father. Strangely the judge only considered P’s attachment with the M, but disregarded his even more close relationship with the Father with both children.”

Here he says again I have ignored the SIRs, as well as the psychological reports. 

33.  I have heard the oral evidence of the psychologist and the social welfare officer at trial, and also referred to the reports extensively in my Judgment §§125 - 136, 150 - 151.  The weight I attached to the children’s positions to the relocation application was based on my findings from the evidence before me at trial; and in my view, far from “plainly wrong”.

Ground 8   H’s desire to exclude W

34.  “Due to being mislead wrongful bias caused, The Judge wrongfully presumes the father wants to separate the children from the Mother as the basis of this application ignoring the fact that the Mother is not the motivation of this application at all.  The children’s best interests are front and center, the Father’s wishes to move home, and the Mother’s lack of any compelling reasons for the family to suffer in Hong Kong unnecessarily are not compelling reasons to stay.”

He also added that the judge wrongfully ignored the fact that both grandmother and aunt have been a major part of both children’s lives since birth.

35.  I make reference to §§59, 106 - 110 of the Judgment.  These are findings I made after hearing and assessing the evidence at trial.  The analysis speaks for itself, and I am not of the view that I am “plainly wrong”.

36.  The roles of the grandmother and aunt were considered in the Judgment and specific reference can be made to §87.

Ground 9   Best interests of the children

37.  H insists that his plan is well researched, and that the Mother has nothing comparable to offer against what is available in the US.  He complains that I have ignored the best interest of the children.

38.  I have gone through a detailed consideration of the evidence at trial and went through the balancing exercise required of me. I do not see any merit in this ground of appeal.

Ground 10   Misleading testimony

39.  H says that there is “misrepresented, false and misleading testimony of the Mother (supported by her HK legally aided legal team)”.

He then makes reference to the EXHIBIT 1 he filed with his Affidavit, and says that:

“The HK Family Court is now aware of them which makes the grounds of appeal even stronger in light of these facts the HK Family Court should now be awareth of and help the HK Family right this injustice by way of grating this appeal.”

40.  I agree with the W’s counsel’s submission that the first part of this ground lacks specifics.

41.  As for his Exhibit 1, this is in fact his 18 points Summons titled “IMPROPER Conduct of Petitioner” with 116 pages of affidavit; already filed with the Court on 13 February 2023, heard on 16 March 2023 and 18 May 2023, and which points were all dismissed. 

Conclusion

42.  I therefore find that all the grounds of the H’s leave to appeal lack merits and have no reasonable ground of success.  I therefore dismiss his application accordingly.

Costs

43.  I see no reason why costs should not follow the event, I therefore award costs of this leave to appeal application to the W, with legal aid taxation, and certificate for counsel.  This is a cost order nisi which will become absolute 14 days hereof.

(Thelma Kwan)
District Judge

For Petitioner: Mr Shaphan Marwah instructed by Boase Cohen & Collins assigned by Director of Legal Aid

Respondent: Acting in Person

[2023] HKFC 15-EN-2023-01-09

SG v. GDV

HTML content

FCMC 10217/2020

[2023] HKFC 15

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

MATRIMONIAL CAUSES NO. 10217 OF 2020

----------------------------

BETWEEN

 SGPetitioner
 and 
 GDVRespondent

----------------------------

Coram: Her Honour Judge Thelma Kwan in Chambers (not open to public)
Dates of Trial: 6 - 9, 13 – 14 September 2022
Opening Submission for the Petitioner: 5 September 2022
Opening Submission for the Respondent: 2 September 2022
Closing Submission for Petitioner: 12 October 2022
Closing Submission for Respondent: 11 October 2022
Date of Judgment: 9 January 2023

------------------------------------------------------------

J U D G M E N T
(Relocation)

------------------------------------------------------------

1.  This is the Respondent’s (“H”) application to permanently remove the children of the family – “L” born on XX August 2010 and “P” born on XX October 2012, now 12 and 10 respectively (together the “Children”) – to Connecticut, USA (“Relocation Application”); on the premise that the Petitioner (“W”) will have one hour of daily online access; and three round trips tickets to the USA per year, paid for by H.

2.  W opposes the Relocation Application.

3.  I have decided to dismiss H’s Relocation Application.

Background

The parties’ relationship

4.  H and W are both 49 years old. H is a US citizen and was born in the US. He is of Greek heritage. W is from Kyrgyzstan. In 1999, W obtained a student visa to study in the US, thereafter she obtained a US work permit. H and W met in the USA in 2002. They married there on XX May 2004. They moved to Hong Kong shortly thereafter. They have lived in Hong Kong since, and are now both permanent residents here.

5.  After H and W moved to Hong Kong, H founded B (HK) Ltd (“Company”) on XX July 2005. The Company operates a digital platform for real estate agencies, as well as an online portal for real estate listings. H was the sole director and shareholder of the Company until September 2019.

6.  W previously ran a tailoring shop in the US between 2003 and 2006. She sold the shop when she and H moved to Hong Kong. Between 2006 and 2016, she occasionally assisted H with his business. She is also a minority shareholder of the Company, but she says H controls the shares.

7.  L and P were born in Hong Kong and have always lived here. Both Children are Hong Kong permanent residents. They are also US citizens and hold US passports.

8.  After the Children were born, W became a full-time housewife. She had always been the Children’s primary caregiver, until August 2021, when it was ordered that L would be under the H’s interim care and control. Following the order, W and P moved into a separate household. P remains under W’s care and control.

9.  Problems in H and W’s marriage began as early as 2012. It was around this time when H started drinking heavily. W alleges that H would become verbally abusive when intoxicated. H never specifically denied this allegation.

10.  H ceased drinking in around 2015, and it appears that the parties’ relationship improved slightly thereafter.

11.  However, from 2016 onwards, H’s drinking resumed and the parties’ relationship became increasingly frayed. In particular, W’s written evidence details an incident in August 2016, when H got drunk and started yelling at W, causing W and the Children to take refuge in the Children’s bedroom. H denies this allegation.

12.  Divorce was brought up in around 2017. The parties attempted marriage counselling but those attempts were not successful. W alleges that H has since been spending more time with the Children. In her view, H has become competitive with her for the Children’s time, and constantly undermines her parenting.

13.  The parties’ relationship was also violent at times. Both H and W acknowledge that a number of violent altercations between them happened between 2018 and 2019. For present purposes, it is not necessary to go into these allegations.

14.  As to the Children, P has gravitated towards W over the years, whereas L is becoming increasingly influenced by H. W says H has raised L to become rude, brash, arrogant and bullying towards her. H calls P a “wimp” and “mummy’s boy”. P is constantly at the receiving end of H’s mockery.

15.  According to the W, H has been trying to sabotage her relationship with the Children since 2019. W gave the following examples in her written evidence:

(1)  H told the Children that W was “worthless and cannot even pay a single bill”. (H admitted saying this)

(2)  On an occasion in 2019, H told L that W wanted to put him in “retard school” and that “Mom told your teacher that you’re a kid with special needs”, when all W did was make inquiries about possible ADHD diagnoses after H’s cousin told her that this condition runs in H’s family.

(3)  On an occasion in October 2019, H told the Children that they had to stick with him, as he was the provider whilst W had “nothing but bad friends and family”.

(4)  On an occasion in March 2020, H told the Children that “Your Mum kept you hungry. See, I told you, thank God you have a daddy who will feed you” and ask inappropriate question such as “Kids, do you want to go to America with Daddy or stay here with Mom?”

(5)  On an occasion in April 2020, H “followed L into the bathroom and told him he had to make a choice as to who he [wanted] to live with”. At that point, L was nine years old.

16.  H behaviour as aforementioned continued and worsened after the parties’ divorce proceedings started in November 2020. In particular, what H did to P during this period is nothing short of denigration and emotional blackmail. W gave evidence as to the following examples:

(1)  Sometime in 2021, H told P that “You can just go pick garbage out of a beach. This is the kind of shit you are gonna be doing.” The incident was recorded. He also told P “You’re going to have hard little life buddy. It’s alright. There’s plenty of community colleges out there for you. Nice Hong Kong public school.”

(2)  On an occasion in August 2022, when P was having access with H, H made remarks to P, including “Why do I deserve this shit from you?”, “[L’s] got a shot at making something of life. You ain’t got nothing”, “Are you dead to me or not? And maybe you are…”. The incident was also recorded.

17.  H often reminds the Children, especially P, that if they stay in Hong Kong, they will be studying at community college, make “loser friends”, work at “poor job like at 7-11”.

18.  The impact of H’s conduct on P is unfortunately quite predictable. By Orders dated 23 February 2021 and 14 December 2021, HHJ Melloy ordered two government clinical psychologist reports respectively. The latter report observed that P had described H’s conduct as bullying, and that H tended to give P a sense of insecurity and pressure.

19.  In addition to emotionally abusing P, H has also elicited worrying behaviour from L. As noted in the latter report, L would unreasonably blame W for the parties’ marital breakdown on grounds that she told lies, destroyed H’s company, and was lazy for not going to work. It is of particular note therein that L’s descriptions and language were remarkably similar to H’s.

W’s immigration status

20.  W’s current immigration status is an important element in this case. One of the focal points of the Relocation Application has been whether W would be able to immigrate to, or visit the US, such that she can maintain a meaningful relationship with the Children should the Relocation Application be granted.

21.  When W first arrived in the US from Kyrgyzstan, she was able to acquire Political Asylum Residency Status in the US, as Kyrgyzstan was then politically unstable. On that basis, she was also granted a work permit.

22.  W was granted a US Green Card through marriage on 8 December 2005. At that point, she would have become a permanent US citizen if she had returned to the US and completed the necessary procedures. Given H’s assurances that they would return to the US soon, she did not do so. They did not go back in time, and W was forced to abandon her Green Card. H said this is W’s fault.

23.  In December 2017, W obtained a 5-year US visitor visa. The visa has since expired in December 2022.

24.  W sought to make a second Green Card application in October 2019. H told W that he would sponsor her application if she agreed that the family would stay in Connecticut over the upcoming Christmas.

25.  H unilaterally withdrew the second application on 4 February 2020. He says this is because W made a fake report to the police in January 2020, and he says that in around that time, W did not want to work on the marriage, and therefore he did not want to support the marital visa application in the circumstances.

26.  At present, W does not have any immigration or residency status in the US. H instead says W will have no problem obtaining a new visitor visa, and may do so even without an interview.

27.  On 9 June 2022, I ordered that expert opinions be obtained by H for W’s immigration status in the US, and her ability to enter and remain there; W was given leave to reply to the H’s immigration lawyer / consultant’s opinion with her own expert evidence.

28.  H’s expert evidence was not in compliance with Order 38 rule 37. Further directions were given to him on 24 August 2022 to comply with the said rule but he failed to do so. The H’s expert was not called as witness and therefore I am unable to rely on the expert opinion produced by H.

29.  W’s expert was called to give evidence at this hearing via VCF and was cross examined by the H.

Procedural History

W’s petition for divorce and interim orders

30.  W petitioned for divorce in November 2020. On the same date, she also took out an ex parte application to restrain any removal of the Children from Hong Kong. The application was granted by HHJ Melloy by an order dated 12 November 2020. Upon the joint application of H and W, a further order to the same effect was made on 19 November 2020.

31.  On 11 January 2021, W took out an application for maintenance pending suit, as well as interim periodical payments for the Children. Two days later, she took out an application for interim care and control of the Children. A month later, on 20 February 2021, H took out an application for joint interim care and control.

32.  By an order dated 23 February 2021, HHJ Melloy ordered that H and W were to have shared care of the Children, each with exclusive care at specific times.

33.  However, following W’s application for a non-molestation and ouster order in August 2021, the February 2021 order was varied on 16 August 2021. Consequently, W has interim care and control of P and H has interim care and control of L, both parties will have access to both Children at particular times. W and P moved out of the matrimonial home shortly thereafter.

34.  On 13 August 2021, HHJ Melloy handed down a judgment on the issue on interim maintenance. She ordered that H should pay W HK$44,000 per month (with HK$8,000 as maintenance pending suit and HK$18,000 for each of the Children).

The Relocation Application

35.  Around one month after the MPS judgment on 20 September 2021, H took out the Relocation Application. He says that the Relocation Application is necessary because he is on the verge of bankruptcy and the Company is on the verge of insolvency, whereas his family in the US will be able to provide for the Children if they moved to the US.

36.  H alleges that his dire financial situation is because of proceedings brought against him in relation to the Company. In late August 2019, H caused the Company to issue his mother, father, and sister approximately 31.52% of its shares. The value of the shares issues is around HK$18.31 million. A major shareholder (“S”) says this was done improperly, and has commenced proceedings to have the said transferees removed as shareholders. H has been a defendant in those proceedings since 23 October 2020 (“Shareholder Proceedings”). S also alleges fraud and breach of fiduciary obligations against H. The Shareholder Proceedings consist of two related actions in the High Court. H says W has sided with S against him.

37.  H applied to go for vacation to visit his family in Greece and the US in late 2021 and mid-2022. On both occasions, the applications were turned down by HHJ Melloy and myself respectively. A major reason for both dismissals is the Court’s concern that H might be a flight risk.

38.  There are three outstanding Summons:

(1)  School Summons

W has on 29 July 2022 issued a Summons requesting this Court to order the parties to enrol L into an ESF school. This was taken out because H insists that he has to home school L because he is impoverished. H says he has put L on internet learning courses, which he claims is paid for by his parents. In the meantime, P who lives with W, is still attending another international school. This matter was adjourned sine die by me on 2 August 2022, pending this relocation decision.

(2)  W’s Section 17 Summons and Joinder Summons

W has on 29 August 2022 issued a S. 17 Summons against H. She asks for declaration that H’s parents and sisters’ shares in the Company are in fact held in trust for H and an Order setting aside the transfer; and on 21 September 2022 a Summons for joinder of these parties to the proceedings. On 26 September 2022, I ordered for service of the parties in the US. As H says that issues in this application overlaps with the Shareholder Proceedings, he has been given a chance to provide evidence on those overlapping issues. This matter has been adjourned to February 2023.

The Legal Principles with regard to Relocation

39.  My starting point is found in s.3 of the Guardianship of Minors Ordinance (Cap. 13), which states that the best interest of the minor is the first and paramount consideration.

40.  The applicable principles governing relocation application were based on the English Court of Appeal case of Payne v Payne [2001] Fam 473 and adopted by our Court of Appeal in SMM v TWM [2010] HKFLR 308, [2010] HKLRD 37 CA where Cheung JA summarised them at §21 of his judgment as follows:

“(a) …

(b) …

(c) The application should be approached as follows:

(i) Is the mother’s application genuine in the sense that it is not motivated by some selfish desire to exclude the father from the child’s life? Then ask, is the mother’s application realistic, i.e. founded on practical proposals both well researched and investigated? If the application fails either of these tests, refusal will inevitably follow.

(ii) If, however, the application passes these tests then there must be a careful appraisal of the father’s opposition: is it motivated by genuine concern for the future of the child’s welfare or is it driven by some ulterior motive? What would be the extent of the detriment to him and his future relationship with the child were the application granted? To what extent would that be offset by extension of the child’s relationships with the maternal family and homeland?

(iii) What would be the impact on the mother, either as the single parent or as a new wife, of a refusal of her realistic proposal?

(iv) The outcome of the second and third appraisals must then be brought into an overriding review of the child’s welfare as the paramount consideration, directed by the statutory checklist in so far as appropriate. (per Thorpe LJ at paragraph 40)

(d) In short, the relevant factors are :

(i) The welfare of the child is always paramount.

(ii) There is no presumption created by section 13(1)(b) of the English Children Act 1989 in favour of the applicant parent.

(iii) The reasonable proposals of the parent with a residence order wishing to live abroad carry great weight.

(iv) Consequently the proposals have to be scrutinised with care and the Court needs to be satisfied that there is a genuine motivation for the move and not the intention to bring contact between the child and the other parent to an end.

(v) The effect upon the applicant parent and the new family of the child of a refusal of leave is very important.

(vi) The effect upon the child of the denial of contact with the other parent and in some cases his family is very important.

(vii) The opportunity for continuing contact between the child and the parent left behind may be very significant. (per Butler-Sloss P at paragraph 85)”

41.  In the recent case of BA v BL (Child Relocation) [2019] 4 HKLRD 23 the Court of Appeal per Cheung JA reiterated and further elaborated on the approach to be taken in relocation cases:

“4.12 This led to the more recent decisions of the English Court of Appeal such as K v K where it is stressed that, in the determination of applications for permission to relocate, the welfare of the child was the paramount consideration … The three judges in K v K, Thorpe, Moore‑Bick and Black LJJ were of the same view on this point.

4.13 …

4.14 … Ultimately it is one of the factors to be considered in the overall assessment whether the relocation is in the best interests of the child and the weight to be attached to this factor depends on the facts of the case. The value of Payne is that it "identifies a number of factors which will or may be relevant in a relocation case, explains their importance to the welfare of the child, and suggests helpful disciplines to ensure that the proper matters are considered in reaching a decision but it does not dictate the outcome of a case", per Black LJ at [144] in K v K. In my view Payne is not to be jettisoned. The relevant factors provide a structured framework in which the appraisal is to be made holistically.

4.15...”

42.  I also found the following from Lady Justice Black (as she then was) in the abovementioned case of K v K [2011] EWCA Civ 793 to be of assistance:

141. The first point that is quite clear is that, as I have said already, the principle – the only authentic principle – that runs through the entire line of relocation authorities is that the welfare of the child is the court’s paramount consideration. Everything that is considered by the court in reaching its determination is put into the balance with a view to measuring its impact on the child.

43.  HHJ I Wong has in his recent case of JTMW v NAV FCMC 8504/2017 [2020] HKFC 244 succinctly summarized important points of principles enunciated in the case of ZJ v XWN at paragraphs 53 - 55:

53. The Court of Appeal endorsed what Vos LJ said in Re C (A Child) (Internal Relocation) at [82] and [83],

82. I add a few words in an attempt to summarise the position that has now been reached. As counsel before us agreed, in cases concerning either external or internal relocation the only test that the court applies is the paramount principle as to the welfare of the child. The application of that test involves a holistic balancing exercise undertaken with the assistance, by analogy, of the welfare checklist, even where it is not statutorily applicable. The exercise is not a linear one. It involves balancing all the relevant factors, which may vary hugely from case to case, weighing one against the other, with the objective of determining which of the available options best meets the requirement to afford paramount consideration to the welfare of the child. It is no part of this exercise to regard a decision in favour or against any particular available option as exceptional.

83. ...

54. The Court of Appeal also dealt with the use of the “welfare checklist” in the balancing exercise. The “welfare checklist’ is only an aide-memoire. A judge is not required to mechanically list every factor to demonstrate that he has considered the same.

55. The Court of Appeal emphasized that the guidance in Payne or SMM v TWM or the welfare checklist are simply tools to assist a Family Judge in making the multifactorial assessment to reach a result which is in the best interest of the child after taking account of the potential impact on the parents: at [30].

44.  The consideration of guiding legal principles will be incomplete without citing what has been referred to as the welfare checklist factors, which have been listed in our “Children’s Proceedings (Parental Responsibility) Bill, and has yet to be passed as law in Hong Kong (the “Welfare Checklist”). These are factors that should be taken into account when determining issues relating to children and where their best interest is to be considered:

a. the ascertainable wishes and feelings of the child concerned considered in the light of his age and understanding;

b. the child’s physical, emotional and educational needs;

c. the nature of the relationship of the child with each of the child’s parents and with other persons;

d. The likely effect on the child of any change in the child’s circumstances;

e. The child’s age, maturity sex, social and cultural background and any other characteristics which the court considers relevant;

f. The attitude to the child, and to the responsibilities of parenthood, demonstrated by each of the child’s parents;

g. Any harm which the child has suffered or is at risk of suffering;

h. Any family violence involving the child or a member of the child’s family;

i. How capable each of the child’s parents, and any other person in relation to whom the court considers the question to be relevant, is of meeting his needs;

j. (a broader formulation along the lines of) the practical difficulty and expense of a child having contact with a parent and whether that difficulty or expense will substantially affect the child’s right to maintain personal relations and direct contact with both parents on a regular basis;

k. The range of powers available to the court under this Ordinance in the proceedings in question.

l. Any other fact or circumstance that the court thinks is relevant.”

45.  With these principles in mind, I shall proceed to apply them to the case at hand.

Issues

46.  While the parties have filed extensive evidence and detailed submissions, their cases can be briefly stated.

47.  H says the proposed relocation is in the Children’s best interests because he is in dire financial difficulties, and on the verge of bankruptcy. He can properly provide for the Children in the US with the assistance from his family, but not in Hong Kong. He relies on two Social Welfare Reports, which both state the proposed relocation is in the Children’s best interests, to support his case.

48.  W says the proposed relocation is not in the Children’s best interests. She says:

(1)  The Children can be well provided for in Hong Kong;

(2)  She will cease to have a relationship with the Children if the Proposed Relocation is allowed;

(3)  It is a corollary of the Relocation Application being granted that H will have sole custody, care, and control of the Children, and that is not in the Children’s best interests; and

(4)  I should not attach any weight to the two Social Welfare Reports’ recommendations.

49.  In view of the parties’ cases, the following issues fall for my determination:

(1)  Whether the Children will be well provided for in Hong Kong if I dismiss H’s Relocation Application (it being obvious that he can provide for them in the USA);

(2)  Whether W will cease to have a relationship with the Children if the Relocation Application is granted;

(3)  Whether it is in the Children’s best interests that H has sole custody, care, and control of them; and

(4)  What is my view on the two Social Investigation Reports that H relies on for his application.

(5)  Ultimately, based on the analysis of the above, is the relocation in the best interest of the Children.

I will address each of these issues as I apply the legal principles set out above to the facts of this case.

Reports

50.  There are three Social Investigation Reports (“SIR”) and two Psychological Reports (“PR”). The first SIR and the first PR, both dated 2 August 2021, the second SIR dated 3 December 2021; and the most recent SIR and PR both dated 8 August 2022. The SWO Ms Fong who wrote the December 2021 and August 2022 reports and the Government psychologist Ms LAM who produced the August 2022 Report both gave evidence at this hearing.

51.  The last two SIRs support the Relocation Application, while the two PRs gave useful and relevant information with regard to the dynamics of the parties and the Children for my consideration of this application. The contents of those reports are elaborated below.

Credibility of the Witnesses

52.  This Court heard from 7 live witnesses: (i) W; (ii) H; (iii) H’s sister; (iv) H’s mother; (v) Ms. Roli Khare Rastogi, W’s immigration lawyer; (vi) the social welfare officer; and (vii) the government psychologist. The H’s sister, mother and Ms Rastogi gave evidence via VCF from the US.

53.  W was a credible and impressive witness. Her evidence was clear, concise, and to the point. She was not even slightly shaken by H’s cross-examination. Where her evidence conflicts with H’s, I accept hers without hesitation.

54.  I find the H neither credible nor impressive. Time and again, he would answer the question he hopes was asked, rather than the one actually asked. Almost all of his answers in cross-examination were rambling, evasive, and irrelevant. Some of his answers on critical matters were directly contradicted by contemporaneous evidence. H was repeatedly asked to focus on the question before him; the majority of his evidence was an unfortunate waste of this Court’s time, and was only helpful in that it allowed this Court to realise how little weight it could put on his evidence.

55.  As will be clear below, H’s sister’s and mother’s evidence are not much help in my consideration process. Nonetheless, my assessment of their credibility is as follows:

(1)  While not as bad as H, H’s sister was not an impressive witness either. While she would directly answer the questions asked of her, some of her answers on crucial topics were incoherent, and obviously biased in H’s favour. I do not think it is a coincidence that her incoherent answers were also the ones that are so biased;

(2)  While H’s mother was not asked many questions, she did not offer direct answers to the questions she was asked. What was impressed upon me is that she said she would support the Children if they are in the US but not if they are in HK.

56.  Ms. Khare was an impressive and credible witness. Her evidence was cogent, well-articulated, and accords well with common sense.

57.  While they sometimes struggled to give direct answers, I accept that the government psychologist and the SWO both tried to answer the questions asked of them to the best of their abilities. I find them to be credible witnesses.

Discussion

58.  Drawing the threads together from the abovementioned legal principles, I will approach the following questions accordingly.

Is the application genuine and not motivated by H’s desire to exclude M from the Children’s life

59.  I am of the view that there maybe a few reasons for the H’s Relocation Application, but not the reasons he gives to Court. In my view, his application is motivated by a desire to exclude W from the Children’s lives, and possibly to avoid his financial obligations in Hong Kong as well as the Shareholder Proceedings.

(1)  H is always denigrating of W and appear to have already successfully create a divide between L and her;

(2)  The SWO and government psychologist’s evidence makes it abundantly clear to me that H has no intention of engendering a good relationship between W and the Children;

(3)  The Relocation Application was taken out around 5 weeks after HHJ Melloy handed down the MPS judgment in August 2021. Ever since then, H has not been in full compliance with the MPS Order and payment has been haphazard, to the extent that Judgment Summons proceedings has been taken out by W. Up to August 2022, outstanding payment from H amounts to HK$162,500;

(4)  As mentioned, H is facing the Shareholder Proceedings which is clearly taking a toll in many aspects of his life.

60.  In considering this limb for the Relocation Application, I need to look at the H’s financial position.

61.  H says the Children can be provided for in the US, but not Hong Kong. In particular, he says:

(1)  He cannot provide for the Children in Hong Kong because he is in dire financial straits. He points to the Form E he filed to support his case;

(2)  H’s family can provide for the Children in the US. H and the Children can live in H’s family home rent free; and H’s family will pay for the Children’s expenses, allowing them to (among other things) attend top private schools, and partake in a wealth of extracurricular activities while H tries to get back on his feet;

(3)  H’s family cannot provide for the Children in Hong Kong, because Hong Kong’s living expenses (rent, in particular) is too expensive, and would bankrupt H’s family members.

62.  There is no evidence to suggest that the Children will not be well provided for in the US if the Relocation Application is granted. It is clear from H’s case and from his family members’ evidence that his family is a financial resource to him.

Can H personally provide for the Children in Hong Kong?

63.  Despite what H says in his Form E, I find that H has not come up to proof that his financial situation is as catastrophic as he says it is.

64.  H has had ample opportunity to prove that he and the Company (which he is CEO of, and has significant shareholding in) are on the verge of insolvency. To do so, he need only have filed evidence to that effect, which (if they exist) he should have ready access to. Tellingly, he did not file any such evidence.

65.  That the Company is financially healthy is especially clear from information arising from its Annual General Meeting held on 19 August 2022 (“AGM”).

(1)  There is a video clip of the AGM which was attended by the W, which shows H telling his shareholders that the Company is cashflow positive with HK$300,000 revenue per month; and will (if all goes according to plan) soon be listed through the back door, causing the Company to be worth between EUR4-9 million;

(2)  H prepared a slide deck for the AGM. It shows that the Company has CAD1 million in annual revenue, and CAD10-22 million revenue in the pipeline.

66.  In cross-examination, H said the Company was far less financially healthy than he had suggested at the AGM. In particular, he said he gave a rosy picture at the AGM to get S to drop the Shareholder Proceedings, and that it is in fact unlikely that the Company would get listed through the back door.

67.  I reject H’s evidence. Quite apart from the fact that H’s evidence is completely unsupported by documentary evidence; it is also inherently incredible, because:

(1)  It suggests he is lying to his shareholders at the AGM, which, bearing in mind the likely consequence, is inherently unlikely per se; and

(2)  It does not make sense. S brought proceedings against the Company because (in his view) H wrongfully caused the Company to issue his family members shares. It is unclear why S would drop this litigation simply because the Company is doing well financially.

68.  As I disbelieve the H’s depiction of the Company’s finances, it follows that H is also financially healthy, because:

(1)  On H’s own admission, he holds significant shareholding in the Company: while H initially stated in his Form E that he holds all of the Company’s shares on trust for his mother, he admitted in cross-examination that he, in fact, beneficially owns all those shares;

(2)  H admitted in cross-examination that he is in fact entitled to a lot more shares under the Employee Stock Ownership Plan in his employment contract, this was not declared in his Form E;

(3)  H’s employment contract shows he is entitled to HK$2.34 million annually from the Company. H also claims that he has been drawing less income from the Company as it is not doing well and therefore the Company owes him outstanding salary, amounting to HK$2.8M over the period from September 2019 to 30 June 2022. Since the Company is financially healthy, it is able to pay H what it owes him.

69.  I find H and the Company to be both financially healthy, H clearly has more than enough resources to provide for himself and the Children in Hong Kong.

Can H’s family provide for the Children in Hong Kong?

70.  Having concluded that H has more than enough resources to provide for himself and the Children in Hong Kong, it is unnecessary for me to additionally address whether H’s family members can provide for the Children in Hong Kong if H cannot. I will nonetheless do so briefly.

71.  H, his mother, and his sister have all given evidence to the effect that whereas H’s family can provide for the Children in the US, they cannot provide for the Children if they remain in Hong Kong.

72.  I reject their evidence; it is unequivocally clear to me that they are saying what they need to say to back up the Relocation Application.

73.  None of them have given any good reasons why they would only be able to provide for the Children in the US, but not if they are in Hong Kong. Quite the contrary, one would have thought instead that, cash being as good in Hong Kong as it is in the US, if H’s family can provide for the Children in the USA, they must also be able to provide for them in Hong Kong. Looking at the H’s mother’s affidavit, she has provided a table showing her intended financial support, which adds up to US$5770/month (Food, private school and insurance for the two Children), equivalent to HK$44,717. There is no reason why this amount cannot be made available to W and Children support in Hong Kong. Coincidentally, this accords with what HHJ Melloy ordered for their interim maintenance.

74.  In fairness to H and his family members, H and his sister have made some attempt at explaining why H’s family would only pay for the Children if they were in the USA, but not if they are in Hong Kong. However, their explanations are incomprehensible, and I do not accept them.

75.  H says the Children’s current living costs in Hong Kong are much higher than what they would be in the US. However, his assertion is without any supporting evidence, and I have no reason to take his word at face value.

76.  Even if what H says is true, it appears that this is in large part because H has decided that the Children (and himself) should have a high standard of living in Hong Kong. For instance, H decided to sign a new lease in August 2021 for an apartment in Mid-Levels at Macdonnell Road that is currently paid by the Company at HK$56,500 per month. (H explains that this is paid by the company as he is currently working from home). This is after having said to W when she was looking for alternative accommodation that he cannot afford to pay for two households. As such, especially if one bears in mind that H’s family intends to provide for the Children comfortably in the US, it appears that H’s family is able more than able to provide for the Children if the Children live a more modest (but by no means frugal) life.

77.  As for H’s sister, she says H’s family would not be willing to pay for the Children’s expenses in Hong Kong because she is not willing to “throw good money after bad” into H’s failing Company.

78.  This is plainly a bad point. Quite apart from the fact that I have already found that the Company is, in fact, beyond solvent; H’s family can pay the Children’s expenses directly, instead of injecting money into the Company.

79.  In the premises, I also find that H’s family is an available resource to provide for the Children in Hong Kong.

80.  I therefore do not accept the basis of the Father’s Relocation Application.

Is the application realistic and found on proposals well researched and investigated

81.  H calls it a “No Cost” stable “Safe Haven”.

82.  H’s plan is to return home to Connecticut where he is from. He says his mother and sister can provide a place to live, access to elite school and care for the children:

1)  The house is 2,700 square feet with 4 bedrooms in a prime neighbourhood

2)  There be “warrantied” elite private schooling paid for by the grandparents for as long as needed until the father is able to do so again

3)  Large supportive and loving extended family

4)  Children will enjoy a vibrant Greek Orthodox Church community and a vibrant community which knows the H and family for 50 years as they own a pizza business beloved by the entire community

5)  Enjoy a “A” Alumni network and community (H was a “A” graduate)

83.  H’s mother and unmarried sister will provide the back-up care for the Children.

84.  He therefore said that the Children can be homed without costs on his part while he “re-establishes” himself. He provides the name of two possible private schools but no supporting evidence that any application has been made or if the Children will have a place.

85.  H offers to make available daily online access for one hour per day for W at pre-determined time, and his sister will also assist to ensure that daily online access runs smoothly.

86.  He also offers US$3,000 to the W to pay any US immigration lawyer of her choice to establish permanent residency in the US.

87.  W says that H’s mother is in her mid-80s and not very mobile. She states that H’s previous holiday application was premised on his mother’s old age and maybe her last Christmas (2021) and now he proposes that his mother can be a backup carer for the Children. W also says H’s sister does not have a very close relationship with the Children, having only spent 4 holidays with them; that she is not married, has no childcare experience and should be busy with the family pizza business. She further says that neither of them will promote the relationship between her and the Children.

88.  I am not of the view that the H has a well-researched and investigated plan. All he is doing is describing his mother’s home and the neighbourhood. From what he said, he is going to be living off his family, and has no plans on how he is going to “re-establish” himself and how long he intends to take. And as explained hereunder, I find his offer of three round trips tickets to the W disingenuous.

Will the relocation Application be detrimental to her and her future relationship with the Children

89.  W says she will cease to have a relationship with the Children if the proposed relocation is allowed because: (i) realistically speaking, W cannot immigrate to the USA; and (ii) H will not try to help W and the Children maintain a relationship if the Relocation Application is granted.

90.  I will address W’s claims in turn.

Can W immigrate to or visit the USA?

91.  In my view, realistically speaking, W cannot immigrate to the USA; and there are serious doubts on whether she can visit the USA. The W’s prior visitor visa has come to an end in around 7 December 2022.

92.  This Court has the benefit of reading Ms. Khare’s expert evidence on these two matters, as well as hearing her oral evidence on the same.

93.  First, on the question of whether W will have difficulty obtaining a visitor visa renewal: To get a visitor’s visa, W will have to show lack of immigration intent and strong ties to Hong Kong. However, she will have difficulty showing both those things.

94.  Apparently, the US immigration looks at visitor’s visa application with a presumption of immigrant intent which puts the burden on the applicants to show that they will leave US once the stated purpose of the trip is over. Her previous visitor visa does not guarantee a visa re-issuance. If this Relocation Application is granted, W will have difficulty showing her lack of immigration intent because both Children have US Citizenship and would be residing in the US, which will cause US immigration to suspect that W intends to immigrate to the US to be with the Children. Further, W has previously been issued a marriage-based Green Card, which suggests W at least once upon a time intended to immigrate to the US. Therefore, even if W can get a visa in Hong Kong (which Ms Khare seriously doubts), she will likely be stopped at the US port of entry and be asked to turn around by a US Customs and Border Protection officer who will likely conclude that once she arrives, she will be inclined to stay behind.

95.  She will also have difficulty showing that she has strong ties to Hong Kong, because she does not currently have a job or stable income in Hong Kong, and has extremely limited savings in her Hong Kong bank account. If H and the Children leave Hong Kong for the US, her ties with Hong Kong will be even more tenuous.

96.  Secondly, W is clearly no longer entitled to a marriage based green card. While there are other ways a person can obtain Permanent Residency in the US (e.g. employment related visas for extraordinary ability or special skills; through the Diversity Visa lottery or wait for the Children to sponsor her when they turn 21); none of those ways are realistically available to W.

97.  H asks me not to accept Ms. Khare’s evidence for two reasons.

98.  First, he says Ms. Khare is “clearly biased”, because she admitted in cross examination that she is Mr. Marwah’s (W’s counsel) “College friend and known to him for many years”.

99.  I reject this reason. The following exchange extracted from H’s cross-examination of Ms. Khare makes it clear that while Mr. Marwah and Ms. Khare have known of each other for many years, there is nothing about their relationship that would compromise Ms. Khare’s impartiality:

Q:How did you come in touch with Boase, Cohen & Collins for this engagement?
A:I was in touch with Mr. Marwah and he knows that I specialise in US immigration law, and then he put me in touch with the law firm that’s handling this case.
Q:So you did have a pre-existing business relationship, this wasn’t just a random found you on the internet like my opinion.
A:This is – I mean as we practice immigration law, I think I do know Mr. Marwah, we had studied together many, many years ago, but he does know that I practice immigration law.
Q:so you studied together, so you have a close relationship and that’s how you…
A:I don’t think it’s a close relationship, but we do have – we are both graduates of the same school for undergraduate.

(emphasis added)

100.  Secondly, H says W has once successfully acquired Political Asylum US Residency status and (based on that) a US work permit; and Ms. Khare’s opinion does not mention that. On that basis, he says Ms. Khare’s expert opinion is defective, and should be accorded little weight.

101.  I agree that Ms. Khare’s opinion does not address W’s previous Political Asylum US Residency status. In my view, it was right not to, as it is irrelevant to whether W can obtain Permanent Residency in the USA going forward.

102.  Insofar as H thinks that piece of information is relevant to Ms. Khare’s opinion because it suggests W can obtain Political Asylum US Residency status again, he is plainly wrong. W previously obtained that status because she was facing persecution in Kyrgyzstan. This could not possibly assist W if she tries to apply for Political Asylum US Residency afresh now, when she is living in Hong Kong as a Permanent Resident.

103.  Furthermore, since I cannot rely on H’s expert opinion, there is nothing to contradict Ms Khare’s evidence. In the premises, I accept Ms. Khare’s evidence, and find that W cannot immigrate to the US or be granted visitor status to enter the US.

104.  It is opportune to now look at what the H proposes in this context. He promises 3 sets of round-trip tickets. This offer is limited to just the travel costs, it is completely silent on where she can stay or other costs of the trip; I find this offer disingenuous. W is clearly not in funds to travel for an extensive period to spend time with the Children. Coupled with the above analysis on the W’s inability to enter US, I cannot see how these visits can possibly take place.

105.  In H’s written closing submission, he has now additionally offered to send the Children to go see W three times a year in Hong Kong. This offer was not made before or during the hearing, and comes out of nowhere. Due to the following analysis, I am not confident that this will actually happen.

Will H try to help W and the Children maintain a relationship?

106.  W rests her case quite substantively on parental alienation. As I do not have independent assessment on this issue, I shall refrain from drawing any conclusion in that regard. However, in my judgment, H will not help W and the Children maintain a relationship if the Relocation Application is granted. I say so for two reasons.

107.  First, I find that at least one of the reasons why H took out the Relocation Application is to separate W from the Children. He repeatedly said W initiated an “unannounced” divorce, suggesting to me that he was oblivious to the level of discord between the parties, and generally lacking in empathy. He clearly thinks little of W and made no attempt to hide that fact from the Children; he consistently speaks ill of W in front of them. L is openly rude and challenging to W and I have no doubt that the behaviour is instilled and encouraged by the H.

108.  On W’s evidence, on 11 March 2021, H threatened to take the Children back to the USA, mocked W by saying she would not be able to step foot in the USA, and told W that she would only get supervised access if he allows it. While H denied in cross-examination that he ever said those things, I believe that he did. W made the allegation as early on as 28 July 2021, well before this trial commenced. If the allegations are false or in any way unfair, H would have denied them in writing on the earliest possible occasion. Tellingly, he did not do so.

109.  Secondly, it is beyond peradventure that H has made consistent efforts to separate the Children from W since 2019. This was already mentioned in paragraphs 15 and 16 above.

110.  Again, I accept these allegations to be true, as aforesaid, H did not make any efforts to deny these allegations while he had ample time to do so. Also given what I have said about W and H’s credibility, I have no hesitation in taking W’s word over H’s.

Holistic assessment of what is in the best interest of the Children

Is H having sole custody, care, and control of the Children in the Children’s best interests?

111.  H asks that should the Relocation Application be allowed, that he be granted sole custody as this will be required in the US for enrolment into private school and medical emergencies.

112.  In my judgment, H having sole custody, care, and control of the Children is not in the Children’s best interests.

113.  First, as aforesaid, H has made consistent efforts to undermine W’s relationship with the Children since 2019, and those efforts have yielded troubling effects on both Children. Those efforts may well intensify if H has sole custody, care, and control of the Children, and especially if he relocates with them to the US. That is plainly not in the Children’s best interests, as it is important that they maintain a meaningful and on-going relationship with W.

114.  Secondly, without any intention of criticizing H’s personality, values, and beliefs, it appears that H has a tendency of exposing the Children to concepts that are inappropriate for children their age. According to W, H had kept the Children up to watch “Games of Throne” and “Zombieland” with him. H had actively encouraged use of force. He encouraged the Children to throw stones at animals. W produced evidence (a video clip which was shown in court) showing how H encouraged the Children to destroy and smash up the office premises H was moving out of. H saw nothing wrong with this behaviour.

115.  Furthermore, H has on at least two occasions made misogynistic comments about women in front of the Children:

(1)  W has produced a recording dated 31 August 2022 showing H referring to W’s female friends as “whores”; and

(2)  H has told the Children that W is worthless because she does not generate income. This is something that L repeats at the W.

116.  H having sole custody, care, and control of the Children is especially not in P’s best interests, as H’s treatment of P has been nothing short of appalling.

117.  First, it appears that H has on at least one occasion made sexually inappropriate comments about P to P. On 3 August 2021, H had a conversation with P. The conversation was recorded. It is worth quoting “…P you 're a real prize buddy. I'm sure you'll get a lot of old men who will want to spend some private time with your ass. And your mother will accommodate that. Just like her mom did for her…” (emphasis added).

118.  Quite regardless of whether H meant what he said, the mere fact that H thinks it was appropriate for him to make such comments to a child aged 9 tells strongly against H’s parenting abilities.

119.  Secondly, H has proven to be a particularly abrasive parent to P. It is clear that H is not above using verbally abusive language to address P when he is upset, to cite just some examples:

(1)  On 1 November 2020, when P told H that he loved W, H called P a “fxxking moron” and told him “I am at the end of my rope with you”

(2)  On 31 August 2021, H had a conversation with P. The conversation was recorded. In it, H says: “You’re making have [sic] a choice you fxxking asshole” and “If you want to fxxking stab me in the back worse than [S], fine”.

120.  This is the kind of language that he uses consistently with P. He would also tell P that if he stays behind in HK, he will be living off the streets; and then justify saying by saying that he needs to be the “boogeyman” to make sure that P sees the reality. I am therefore of the view that leaving the Children in H’s sole custody care and control will not just sever W’s relation with the Children; it will also adversely affect P emotionally and mentally.

121.  I seek further support from the two PRs, and have quoted extensively to support the basis of my belief.

The Two Clinical Psychologist Reports

122.  The two PRs give me abundant insights into the relationship and dynamics between the parties and with the children.

123.  Briefly, H is said to take on a polite attitude on interview but is seen to be focused on speaking ill of W and blaming her for the destruction of the Company. He can find no strength in the W, except to say she is the Children’s mother. The first psychologist makes initial summary as follows:

“… In Summary, the father was so pre-occupied with attacking the mother and to present himself as a capable father that it was difficult for the discussion to focus on the children’s’ needs. It is questionable as to whether the father’s preoccupation with adults’ issues affected his parenting capacity. The father also appeared to hold strong parental value of excellent achievement and staying in control by using physical force. It is worth exploring as to how such value affected the children’s behaviours.”

124.  M is seen to be polite and co-operative with well-regulated mood. She is able to identify the strengths of the children as well as the H. However, she is assessed to be on the defensive and in fear of losing the younger son.

“In summary the mother appeared to have the potential to understand the children's feelings and be a good parent. However, she appeared to be preoccupied with attacking the father and with defending herself. It is questionable as to whether this affects her parenting capacity negatively. She was also in so much fear of losing her children that it is questionable as to whether she would choose to engage in parenting behaviors that are not in P's best interest.”

125.  It is clear that L is under H’s influence, and taking “explicit or implicit” cues from him to abuse the W. The psychologist found him to be less sensitive and lacks empathy, with an “all or nothing” attitude. He has no friends in school (when he was attending school which is not the case now) but he idolizes his father and emulates his attitude and conduct. One can only imagine how much hurt this has caused W.

126.  The following excerpts are from the first PR:

“When I asked [L] if there was anything that his mother wanted him to tell me, he said no because he did not talk to his mother. When I asked him if there was anything that his father wanted him to tell me he said that his father made sure that he told me about his mother hitting him. L said he wants to take revenge of his mother by hitting her back.”

“He said he would like to get into an elite school, which is consistent with his father’s wishes for the boys. He said that his father is his idol and his inspiration. He said he would like to go to A college because he will become rich. … He said that if he has to stay in Hong Kong with his mother, he will have no money hence he will live on the street. He said that if he moved to USA then his father will fund her to live there so he will get to see his mother frequently. …”

“L spontaneously told me that his father did not get his mother a green card so that she cannot get welfare in USA. When I asked him how did he know, he said his father told him. L also told me that his mother destroyed his father’s company. When I asked him how did he know, he said his father told him.”

127.  And from the second PR:

“L’s comments on his mother were negative. He depicted that his mom created arguments over nothing. And his dad did not contact her was to avoid arguments with her. He blamed the mother for the marital problem such as she always told lies, her destroy to father’s company and she was lazy for not going to work. These descriptions were largely in the same line with the expressions of the father.”

128.  The first psychologist finds P to be a more sensitive child, he has a good grasp of the parents’ situation and offers a more balanced view of what is happening at home. While P says he loves both parents, he is protective of his mother and feels that his father is being unfair to her. P told the first psychologist this:

“It started when mom wanted to devour (divorce?) dad started lying to mom and turned L against mom and L is falsely saying that mom beat him up but that is not true. P said that dad is lying and instigating and that mom is reacting and reacting.”

“When I asked P to tell me more about why he said his father was lying, he said that his father told a lie about his company because his father gave all his money to his family and would not give his mother any. He thinks his mother should get half of his father’s money. He said that he feels sorry for his mother as [s]he only gets HKD14000 per month.”

“In the post observation interview, P said that he often felt that his father was bullying him, saying that he is stupid and calling him a fxxking idiot. He said that he did not like his father calling him names.”

“He said he felt that his father was trying to make him agreed with him, forcing him to say yes, his father will keep on asking questions or lecturing him. He said that he nodded because he was afraid of his father taking away his computer or his phone. He said he was afraid to freely express his ideas to his father because his father would not give him basketball classes or would not allow him to play games with his computer. He said that he felt that he had to lie because he is afraid of his father being mean to him.”

129.  The second psychologist echoes similar findings and says that P is better able to describe his emotions.

“P said his mom wanted to be friend with dad but dad did not want so. He converted L to not to like mom. It started when dad was always rude to mom then mom wanted to divorce with him. Then father cancelled mom’s green card. Then now, dad wanted to bring L and him to USA and to leave mom behind.”

Regarding the relocation plan:

“He sensed that father seemed to be nicer to him than before as to convince him to go to USA. However, he did not want to go because mom cannot go. The father may keep them there forever without mom and he cannot see his mom forever. He is afraid that father will bully him because there is no one to help him.”

“P described the father bullied him. Father told him that if they were going to stay in Hong Kong, the two boys would have to study in local public Chinese school or to live in the street as the father no longer have money to support the living expenses in Hong Kong. … He told he did not dare to tell his father about his own thought … It seemed to me that P’s description reflected that father’s saying tended to give him a sense of insecurity and pressure and he did not feel secure enough to express his need or fear to his dad.”

130.  Both psychologists made the following observations about L, it is apparent to them that L’s abusive reaction to his mother belies his need for her attention and care. From the first PR:

“L said he will build his own house in USA. He said there will be a room for the father, P and grandparent, but not for the mother. L eventually built a structure that is outside of the house, giving her mother a crib to sleep in.”

“When the mother is alone with L, L did not show any signs of rejection. He began to relax as he started drinking. He also answered his mother’s questions freely. It appeared that when L is able to spend time with his mother alone, L initiated contact with his mother and responded to her questions. There was no sign of resistance.”

“It appeared that L’s negative comments about his mother were somehow disproportional to his experience in the observation.”

“As noted, L’s expressions reflected that he really wanted to get mother’s attention and love despite that he was trying hard to convey a message that he did not need the mom or what she did was totally bad.”

(emphasis added)

And from the second PR:

“L impressed me an intelligent enthusiastic to learn, self confident, keen to share what he knows and also caring to his younger brother P. … He loves P, his father and still cares about the mother’s attention to him though he denied of it.… he nearly had an all-or nothing perception on his mother. Some were related to his unfulfilled care and love from the mother, while large of his comments and his negative feelings towards the mother were disproportionate to the events he experienced which was biased by his strong preference and loyalty towards his father. Obviously, L still needs mother’s attention and particularly needs father’s facilitation to promote a more balance boundary and view in relating to the mother.”

131.  The first psychologist has this to say about the family dynamics:

“L and P are both currently exposed to destructive interparental conflicts. L expressed a strong preference for the father and he was preoccupied with showing me that his mother is a bad parent (to the extent where he was unable to focus on his own needs). His negative comments on the mother was disproportionate to his experience in my observation. He also actively rebel against his mother during the observation. P preferred equal time with both parents but his answers changed depending on who he was with. Both children’s preference appeared to be under the influence of their parents: L received from his father explicit and implicit messages to resist his mother and P is under the pressure of his mother father and brother to offer answer that favour them. The mother tended to be more open allowing the children to express freely their wishes; yet this has changed as she felt increasing insecure.”

“Both parents’ parenting capacity was hindered by their preoccupation in attacking the other parent and defending oneself. Both of them showed that they have potential to be good parent, yet neither of them are putting the children’s psychological well-being as the first priority.”

132.  I also find the following observations about the H illuminating from the two reports.

“Father was not aware that he has trapped his children in loyalty conflict, which is affecting their psychological health negatively.”

“It seemed that the father does not really concern the children’s psychological issues in the parental conflicts as noted in the past reports. Regarding to L’s relationship with the mother, …. He will not intervene the mother-son relationship and will not ask L to change his attitude towards the mother as it is the mother’s problem.”

“The father tended to adopt a quite all or none perspective on seeing the mother and minimized her strengths to parent the children”

133.  And in the observation of the father-P interaction, the second psychologist reports the following when P was asked about his choice for the relocation in the father’s presence:

“Father looked a bit uptight and serious, saying that there would be no money for them to stay in Hong Kong and their life and career would be over and horrible that they would end up living in poverty and studying in local public school. … Father then asked P whether he would miss him or L if he was left in Hong Kong. P said yes but he did not want to go to the USA without mom. Father became more pushy and said to P that if he stayed with his mother, he could not meet him and L and would it that ok to him. P kept silent and looked at me …. As noted in the above conversation, father became tense, pushy and gave pressure to P when P clearly indicated his wish and need for the mother.”

134.  I draw a few important points from the concluding paragraphs in the second PR. The psychologist says she “tended to believe that the father’s motive is not totally out of cutting the mother son relationship”. (emphasis added)

135.  The next point being this, and I flag this now as a similar point is made by the SWO in her last report (quoted below):

“In this case, if both L and P go to the USA, the moving parent’s motivating factor for keeping the sibling bonding by keep the mother-sons relationship would be likely weaken. The moving parent (the father in this case) has to demonstrate his willingness and commitment for co-parenting and mother-sons access should be clearly defined. However the father’s commitment for the co-parenting is in doubt give his negative evaluation on the mother’s parenting and his reservation for communicating with the mother.”(emphasis added)

136.  Last but not the least, I am very conscious of the impact of relocation on P. P is close to the W, and he has repeatedly said he needs her to be nearby. P also seems to be under the impression that if Relocation Application is granted, he will not be able to see his mother “forever”. In looking at his relationship with H, it will take some time before P can gather the courage to speak freely to him. It would therefore not be in P’s best interest to leave him in the sole care of his father without his mother’s balancing forces. Quoting from the second PR:

“P seems to gain emotional security from mother and given his age, he still needs mother to fulfil his physical care.”

“P did not feel secure enough to express his need or fear to his dad’s demand and forcing attitude.”

137.  The legal principles remind me to look at the effect upon the child of the denial of contact with the “staying” parent, and the opportunity for continuing contact between the child and the parent left behind. The welfare checklist reminds me of various factors: a child’s emotional needs, likely effect on a child of any change in circumstances, and any harm that a child is at risk of suffering. I am therefore well supported in taking the above considerations to conclude that the relocation cannot be for the benefit of the Children.

Mother’s view on the Children’s future in HK

138.  I was concerned as to how W can cope with the situation where H will continue to cry poverty and make her life difficult. She was asked this at the close of her oral evidence. It is clear that she has thought these issues through.

139.  She said that she is a designer and had a tailoring business in the US with a small team of employees. She said she intends to re-start a similar business or take up work for a fashion company. She has apparently also researched on more economical English medium schools, which are free or subsidized, and she is ready to move to the school catchment areas to enable the Children to take up studies in these schools.

140.  She comes across as resolute and determined, and as already mentioned, I have no hesitation in accepting her words.

Impact on the Applicant F if Relocation Application is dismissed

141.  Given that I disbelieve H’s basis of this Relocation Application, I am of the view that H will not be severely impacted if I dismiss his application. However, it is clear that he will at least be facing the following litigation ahead:

(1)  Outstanding MPS payment arrears and associated judgment summons proceedings;

(2)  W’s School summons;

(3)  W’s S.17 Application; and

(4)  H’s Shareholders Proceedings.

Balancing exercise on my part

142.  I make reference to the abovementioned welfare checklist when balancing the pros and cons of allowing H’s application, against the pros and cons of dismissing it.

143.  Simply put, I am looking at a situation where I am convinced that the Children’s relationship with their mother will be negatively impacted, if not severed if they were to be allowed to relocate; versus a promise of free housing in a bigger house, elite school, large community and church life, and a care plan supported by H’s aging mother and sister.

144.  H has not said that if the relocation is disallowed that he will go to the US by himself.

145.  I agree with the W’s counsel: Relocation will destroy the relationship between W and the Children.

146.  I am of the view that keeping the Children together in Hong Kong will at least allow a chance for L to salvage his relationship with W, and to that end I would like to see L spending some personal time with W going forward and this needs to be built into the access arrangement. It is also important for P to gradually find more independence from the stress that W is experiencing. In my view, the amount of “tangible” benefits allegedly available in the US cannot outweigh the risk of and impact on these Children growing up without their mother.

147.  It is apparent that both parents have inappropriately involved the Children in the divorce and financial matters. This is clearly wrong, and have thrown the children into the throes of the parties’ conflict. But like every family “broken” by divorce, children will adjust if the parents are truly caring of them and put their needs ahead of their own strife. This latter point is clearly a work in progress.

What should I do about the two Social Welfare Reports that support H’s Relocation Application?

148.  As mentioned, the last two SIRs state that the Proposed Relocation is in the Children’s best interests. H says his Relocation Application should succeed on that basis.

149.  I reject this argument.

150.  The two said reports have similar concluding paragraphs save the highlighted part below. This emphasis was actually added by the SWO in her last report.

“I observed that both P and L loved their parents but presented in different ways since they were all along “trapped” in the middle of their parental disputes. L’s preference to the father was clear but yet, he did not resist the care and concern by her mother during the parental observation. P presented his preference with his mother but yet, he related intimately and played hard with his father at my parent-child observation. … when considering the childrens’ wish, L’s preference remained firm to relocate to the US, with strong desire to study and live in the US especially together with his younger brother. P presented a shifted mind to stay in HK while it might reflected his uncertainty over further chance to maintain contact with his mother after relocation to the US.

Putting the childrens’ interests and welfare as paramount consideration, I still tend to support them to relocate to the US together where they could secure more familial support from the father’s family and the education / child care plan is assesses feasible. However, the effect upon the children’s reduction with the mother AND the opportunity of continuing contact between the children and their mother left behind are more significant in this case while further addressing the separation anxiety and uncertainty of the young son P. When further considering the parents’ communication block under their prolonged conflict with deep mistrust, I strongly suggested the children’s access to their mother should be clearly defined, including daily access through electronic means and the father’s commitment to arrange physical access between the mother and sons during their long school holidays. (emphasis added by the SWO)

151.  What is apparent is that the SWO is concerned about W’s contact with the Children going forward; I note that relevantly, the clinical psychologist shares the same concern.

152.  Having view of the whole case, I have decided to go against the recommendation of the SWO. Here I am guided by the principles cited by Cheung JA in the case of WSM v FSY, CACV352/2004, unreported, 27 July 2005:

“22. As we understand the position, the social welfare report, is, like all other material information, one of matters that the court should pay due regard in determining what is in the best interest of the child. No doubt because the social workers have carried out the background investigation, they are able to provide details of the family situation which are not otherwise available to the court. And to that extent the courts have said in the past that if the recommendation of the welfare officers are not followed then it is highly desirable that the judge should say why he has not done so : see W v W (A minor : custody appeal) [1988] 2 FLR 505.

23. This is a matter of commonsense but as more recent cases show, the judge’s reasons for reaching his own decision instead of relying on the recommendation are normally the very reasons for his declining to follow the recommendation. Unless his reasons are manifestly wrong he is not under any further duty to spell out the reasons for departing from the recommendation : see Re V (residence : review) [1996] 3 FCL 101 and Naziya Aslam v Rafagat Ali (CACV 144/2003). This is an approach we will also adopt. Otherwise the matter will be enmeshed in technicalities.

24. We will further add that a social welfare report is not a special category of material information, nor should the recommendation assume a status somewhat akin to a legal presumption which needs to be rebutted. Ultimately the decision making lies with the judge based on the available evidence and guided by the relevant principles. See also Z and Y [2001] 1 HKLRD 261.”

153.  It is plain from both SIRs that they have accepted the H’s version of events and made their recommendations on the basis (and without having seen all the evidence available to this Court) that H cannot provide for the Children in Hong Kong; and that he would at least try to foster a good relationship between W and the Children if H’s application is granted.

154.  W’s counsel also correctly points out that the SWO did not compare the situation between relocation and staying in Hong Kong. SWO acknowledged as much in cross examination.

155.  However, I have found that H can provide for the Children in Hong Kong, and I am convinced that H will not try to help W and the Children maintain a relationship if this Relocation Application is granted. Furthermore, the recommendation of the SWO is made without the benefit of the immigration expert opinion which points to the realistic possibility of W not being able to live in or visit the US.

156.  In the circumstances, I attach no weight to the concluding recommendations in the two referenced Social Welfare Reports.

Conclusion

157.  In view of the matters stated above, I have no hesitation in concluding that H’s proposed relocation is not in the Children’s best interests. H’s Relocation Application is therefore dismissed accordingly.

Costs

158.  As this is a Children’s matter, I shall follow the usual practice and make no Order as to Cost. The Petitioner’s own costs is to be taxed in accordance with legal aid taxation, with certificate for counsel. This is a cost order nisi which will become absolute 14 days hereof.

  (Thelma Kwan)
District Judge

For Petitioner: Mr Shaphan Marwah instructed Boase Cohen & Collins assigned by Director of Legal Aid

For Respondent: Acting in Person

 

[2021] HKFC 163-EN-2021-08-13

SG v. GDV

HTML content

FCMC 10217/2020

[2021] HKFC 163

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

MATRIMONIAL CAUSES

NO. 10217 OF 2020

----------------------------

BETWEEN  
 SGPetitioner

and

 GDVRespondent

----------------------------

Coram:  Her Honour Judge Sharon D. Melloy in Chambers (Not open to public) Paper Disposal

Date of Direction: 23 February 2021

Date of written submissions:  4 and 18 May 2021

Date of Judgment: 13 August 2021

------------------------------------------------------------

J U D G M E N T

(Maintenance pending suit/Interim maintenance)

------------------------------------------------------------

Introduction

1.  This is an application by a Petitioner wife for maintenance pending suit for herself pursuant to section 3 of the Matrimonial Proceedings and Property Ordinance Cap 192 (MPPO) and for interim maintenance for the two children of the family, two boys who are now aged 11 and 8 years of age respectively, under section 5 of the same ordinance. The wife seeks the sum of HK$52,000 per month (i.e. HK$32,000 per month for rental and HK$20,000 per month as direct maintenance for both herself and the boys), plus a continuation of the husband’s agreement to pay for the children’s school fees. The husband for his part offers HK$36,600 per month (including rental of HK$22,600 per month) plus HK$45,200 for a rental deposit. He says that the school fees have been paid for up to date, but clearly provision will need to be made for the school fees going forward in addition. The husband estimates these at a further HK$20,383 to HK$24,460 per month. Thus it appears that on the face of it the parties are only HK$15,400 per month apart (i.e. HK$52,000 – HK$36,600 = HK$15,400).

The main issues

2.  The only issue to be determined, at this stage then, is how much should the husband pay to the wife for her interim support and that of the children?

Background

3.  This is a very high conflict case between a Petitioner wife who was originally from Kyrgyzstan and a Respondent husband who is a US citizen but of Greek heritage. They met in 2002 in the United States and on the XX May 2004 they married in Washington State, USA. In 2006 they relocated to Hong Kong, where the husband set up his own business called AIS, which is a real estate media and software company. They and the children are both Hong Kong permanent residents, but the wife does not have any immigration status in the US. The boys, however, are both US citizens.

4.  There have been many allegations and counter allegations made by one party against the other, which I do not intend to go into here. In so far as the living arrangements are concerned, it appears to be sensibly acknowledged by both sides that it is now imperative that they live apart. To that end it is also of note that an order was made on the 19 November 2020 that the children be not be removed out of the jurisdiction of Hong Kong, save with the leave of the court. This was followed on the 23 February by an interim interim order that the husband do pay the wife interim maintenance pending suit for herself in the sum of HK$8,000 per month and interim interim maintenance for the two boys in the sum of HK$3,000 per child per month. This was premised on the parties continuing to live under the same roof in the immediate to short term. A further order of the same date sets out the interim care arrangements for the two boys. I am told however that this arrangement has not worked well. There is currently a Children’s Dispute resolution hearing scheduled for the 1 September 2021.

5.  In addition to the matrimonial litigation, there is also litigation pending in the High Court with respect to the husband’s company. As at the 18 January 2021 it was the husband’s position that this action was likely to be determined shortly, within weeks or months. The current status of that litigation is unknown. According to the husband’s Form E he has drawn the sum of HK$87,800 per month on average from the company by way of a director’s loan and he has received no formal salary as such. It is the wife’s position that historically the husband received an income and/or other financial resources from the company in the sum of approximately HK$300,000 per month.        

6.  It does not appear to be disputed that the husband has always been the main breadwinner in the family and that he was responsible for the most of the outgoings during the marriage, including the rental, domestic helper’s costs and school fees.

The law

Maintenance pending suit

7.  The law is well known and not in dispute. Section 3 MPPO Cap192 states that the only governing principle is that the court shall make such order as it considers reasonable in all of the circumstances of the case. Consequently, applications such as these are approached on a broad-brush basis. A detailed examination of the parties’ means may be examined at a later date at a full ancillary relief hearing if there is no agreement in the meantime, when there is then every opportunity to achieve fairness by means of set off. In other words, if there is any overpayment or underpayment that can normally be rectified at a final ancillary relief hearing. As Rayden points out

…what really matters is the immediate and reasonable requirements of the wife balanced against the ability of the husband to pay for them, assessed using a broad-brush approach. (See paragraph 16.17 of Rayden, 18th edition).

It adds:

In practice, as oral evidence is rarely given, it will be unusual for the court on an application for maintenance pending suit to be in a position to make findings of fact on issues in dispute sufficient, for example, to deal with conduct or allegations of non-disclosure.  However, if it is demonstrated that the paying party has not performed his duty to make full and frank disclosure of his financial resources, then the court can take a broad and robust view of his means, and it does not have to accept and proceed on the basis of the assertions of the paying party as to his means and an inability to pay.  The court can look at the reality of the situation and take into account voluntary funding from third parties. Any under provision or over provision in the order for maintenance pending suit can always be corrected when the account comes to be taken at the substantive hearing when there are every opportunity to do fairness by set off ……”

(Ref paragraphs 16.18 of Rayden, 18th edition).

8.  Reference may also be made to the Court of Appeal decision in HJFG v KCY (CACV 127/2011, 28 October 2011, where the following principles were reiterated with respect to maintenance pending suit/interim maintenance applications:

a.  The sole criteria to be applied in determining the application is “reasonable” which is synonymous with “fairness”.

b.  A very important factor in determining fairness is the marital standard of living.

c.  In every maintenance pending suit application there should be a specific maintenance pending suit budget which excludes capital or long term expenditure, more aptly to be considered on a final hearing.

d.  Where the affidavit or form E disclosure by the payer is obviously deficient, the Court should not hesitate to make robust assumptions about his ability to pay.  The Court is not confined to the mere say-so of the payer as to the extent of his income or resources.  In such situation, the Court should err in favour of the payee.

How much maintenance should the husband pay to the wife as maintenance pending suit for herself and interim maintenance for the children?

An overview

9.  Counsel for both sides have put forward different proposals based on a totally different analysis of the current financial situation of the parties. Counsel for the wife suggests as follows:

4.  The total W is seeking (at this stage) as an interim measure is:

Rent: $32,000 (modest 2-bedroom apartment near the former matrimonial home and the Children's school)
Living Expenses: $20,000(for W & the Children)
Total: $52,000

This sum would represent just 17.33% of the H’s $300,000 monthly salary. In addition, the H would undertake to pay or have paid the school fees.

10.  It is also suggested, inter alia that the husband has refused to make full and frank disclosure of his means

Lack of Full and Frank Financial Disclosure

21.  As set out earlier, the Respondent has failed in his duty to provide full and frank disclosure.

22.  The Petitioner's Solicitor's letter 12th April 2021, highlighted the ‘information deficit’ in his Form E, as he has yet to disclose various directly relevant documents; the outstanding documents are inter alia:

(1)  the 2019, 2020 and 2021 financial statements (whether audited or unaudited, monthly and annual) of AIS Hong Kong Limited and its parent company AI Corporation USA (the “Companies”), both of which the Respondent has a significant direct or indirect shareholding in and moreover is the CEO of both Companies;

…

(3)  the Respondent’s personal bank Statements (Citibank and / or any other personal accounts);

(4)  tax returns filed for the Companies since 2019;

(5)  the Respondent’s personal Hong Kong and U.S. tax returns;

(6)  any shareholders’ agreements for the Companies including any amendments;

(7)  the Companies’ monthly and annual profit and loss statements;

(8)  documents in relation to the Respondent’s employment terms and remuneration (including any periodic drawings, bonuses, health care benefits, dividends, housing benefits, reimbursements to the Respondent from the Companies); and

(9)  documentary evidence of any offers made to the Respondent in the proceedings of HCMP 1847/2020 and any relevant without prejudice and open offer correspondence.

23.  The lack of financial disclosure intentionally deprives the Court of any picture (let alone any vaguely accurate picture) of his financial situation.

24.  The Respondent alone controls all the finances for both the Companies’ and the parties’ personal finances. The Petitioner is rendered helpless without any reasonable interim maintenance from the Respondent; she and the children are held hostage by the Respondent’s approach.

25.  The case law is clear; in AD (aka AT v RT[2020] HKFC 188, this Court set out as quoted above (see §7 above), that if the payee has to borrow from resources available to him to subsist then he must also borrow for his/ her spouse’s needs. Thus, if (which is denied), on the Respondent’s own case he is impecunious as a result of the ongoing civil proceedings against him, and that he therefore has to make company loans to himself from AIS HK to subsist, he can borrow to fund the basic needs of the Petitioner and his children: a safe, calm home for the children and their mother and their basic expenses. Nothing more, nothing less.

This analysis of the law is accepted.

11.  In answer to this the husband’s counsel puts forward three different scenarios as follows:

G. ANALYSIS: H’S OFFER MORE THAN FAIR

G 1. First analysis: dividing available resources after Children’s needs

33. One analysis would involve deducting the sum of those three essential Children’s needs (homes, school, DE) from the parties’ monthly resources, and splitting the balance of the remaining monthly resources in half between the parties.

34. That would be ‘fair’ in the interim because (1) children come before parents (2) care is presently shared equally and (3) 50/50 is the starting point of fairness.

35. Thus: two homes ($45,200) + school ($22,422) + DE ($7,000) = $74,622 per month. Deducting $74,622 from the $101,502 generated each month, leaves a balance of $26,880 available to the parties each month, or $13,440 each.

36.H’s offer exceeds this. H currently pays $8,000 to W and $3,000 per child, totaling $14,000 per month: H#4 §10. He further offers to pay rent in cash and $45,200 by way of rental deposit.[1] This is ‘more than fair’, calculated by reference to everything available to the family.

G2. Second analysis, incorporating W’s earning capacity at its lowest point

37.  Moreover, this analysis omits W’s earning capacity of $15,000 to $50,000. Even incorporated at its lowest, this makes H’s offer very generous. Parties’ total monthly resources would increase to $101,502 + $15,000 = $116,502. Deducting the Children’s needs in the sum of $74,622 would leave $41,880.

38.  W would receive $15,000 in earnings plus $14,000 per month, or $29,000.

39.  Whereas H would be left with $116,502 - $74,622 - $15,000 - $14,000 = $12,880, being (1) less than half of what W would receive and (2) a mere 31% of the $41,880 of parties’ available monthly resources after children’s needs.

G3. Third analysis, incorporating W’s reasonable needs

40.  W claims utilities ($4,500) + food ($12,000) + household expenses ($2,000) + unspecified ‘insurance premia’ ($9,000) + personal expenses ($25,000) = $52,500.

41.  This is nearly double the $26,880 that is available to the parties after Children’s essential needs (Section G1 above) and is, with respect, hopelessly wishful thinking. Note eg that W’s further claim of $32,000 for rent would itself use 40%+ of the parties’ resources (and further, is not supported by evidence).

42.  Realistic (and ‘mirror’) discounts are suggested at H#4 §63, and bring sums within the $14,000 that W would receive even without utilizing her earning capacity.

The reasonable needs of the wife

12.  Originally the wife said that her monthly expenses were in the region of between HK$172,420 – HK$174,420 per month. This is set out in her Form E dated the 4 January 2021. Later, in her 3rd affirmation dated the 8 January 2021, she sought HK$22,200 per month whilst living in the former matrimonial home and anticipated seeking further financial assistance to cover rent, food and utilities in due course. As indicated above the court initially ordered that HK$14,000 per month be paid on an interim interim basis.

13.  It is of note that the wife currently has very little income of her own. She previously ran her own tailoring business in the US. However, since relocating to Hong Kong she has only worked on a very part time basis in the same field, although it is also her case that she helped set up the husband’s office and that she originally assisted him in the business. In any event it does not appear to be seriously disputed that the wife’s earning capacity is somewhat limited at present. I do not therefore accept that at present she has an immediate earning capacity of between HK$15,000 – HK$50,000 per month It is though accepted that the wife will need to do what she can to generate some more sustainable sources of income in due course.

14.  In the short term I accept that the wife needs additional funds in order to move into her own apartment. She asks for HK$32,000 per month. The husband offers HK$22,600 per month. I will allow HK$28,000 per month in this regard. This is slightly more than the husband is willing to pay and slightly less than the wife is seeking. I am of the view that the wife should be able to afford a reasonable but small apartment in that price range for both herself and the boys.   

15.  In addition I shall increase the wife’s maintenance slightly, as it is clear that she will need more resources at her disposal once she is living separately from the husband. Thus the husband shall pay an additional HK$16,000 per month to be divided between the parties as set out below.

The children’s school fees

16.  The husband has not formally undertaken to pay for the children’s school fees going forward. He has though stated that the fees are paid up to date. Clearly this will need to be a priority going forward and in the absence of an undertaking an indication will be given to this effect at the end of the judgment.

The husband’s ability to pay and the other financial resources available to the wife

17.  It is the husband’s case that although the parties enjoyed a good standard of living in the past that this is now threatened by the litigation that is currently ongoing with respect to his company. His counsel puts it thus:

D. HISTORICAL ARRANGEMENTS / STANDARD OF LIVING

…

14.  Up to 2020, the family’s expenses were met by the Company, in monthly sums of $56,500 for the rental cost of the former matrimonial home, the Children’s school fees and $24,600 to $30,000 to meet the Children’s and W’s expenses (including a domestic employee’s salary): W#3 §14; H#4 §8.

15.  In 2020, the Company made a net loss of $2.3 million.

16.  On 20 September 2020, the Company mandated by board resolution that H be ‘prohibited from directly or indirectly withdrawing any monies from the Company’.

17.  On 23 October 2020, a shareholder (Mr S) issued HCMP 1847 of 2020 (Company Action) against H and others for relief (1) returning two directors to office and (2) divesting F and his family of shares: H#1§8. Mr S contends that provision by the Company for the family’s expenses was improper: Exhibit GDV-1 pp. 26, 32; Letter from Reed Smith (LFRS) [LA14].

18.  Mr S now threatens a further claim against H for $1.6m + brought by the Company or as a derivative action if necessary: LFRS. H’s position in the Company and his legal liability is precarious and liable to change at short notice, on any view.

18.  Time will tell whether or not this is an accurate portrayal of the husband’s current financial circumstances and if he is able to come up to proof in this respect. In any event his proposals are put forward on the premise that he has historically drawn about HK$78,700 per month from the company. According to his Form E this figure is slightly higher at HK$87,800 per month. At the same time, he says he had outgoings of approximately HK$146,000 per month. It is of note that these figures do not match up in any event and it is not clear what the husband’s financial situation was previously and what his true financial position is now.

19.  All in all though I am satisfied that the husband should have the resources at his disposal to pay slightly more than he has offered (i.e. HK$44,000 per month plus the school fees and the rental deposit) as opposed to HK$36,600 plus the school fees and rental deposit. I also accept, as suggested by Mr. Surman for the wife that the husband has clearly had the ability to borrow historically. Further I also note the concerns about the husband’s disclosure and I accept what has been said in that respect. 

Conclusion

20.  Consequently, I shall make an order that the husband do continue to pay HK$8,000 per month as maintenance pending suit for the wife and HK$36,000 per month towards the children’s expenses or say HK$18,000 per month per child.

Costs

21.  Neither party has been wholly successful here and the amount in dispute was in reality quite small. This is a matter that can and should have settled. However, it seems, that given the husband’s stated position that the wife really had no option but to issue the application that she did. In such circumstances I shall exercise my discretion and make an order nisi to be made absolute in 14 days’ time that the husband shall contribute towards 50% of the wife’s costs of and arising out of her summons dated the 11 January 2021, such costs to be taxed on a party and party basis if not agreed. There shall be Legal Aid taxation of the wife’s own costs. In addition, there shall be certificate for counsel.

Order

22.  Consequently, I shall make an order as follows:

1)    Orders 2 and 3 contained in the court order dated the 23 February 2021 shall be varied to the effect that the Respondent shall continue to pay maintenance pending suit to the Petitioner for herself in the sum of HK$8,000 per month and interim maintenance to the Petitioner for the two children of the family in the sum of HK$18,000 per month per child, such payment to be backdated to the 1 August 2021 and allowance to be made for any payments made to date and thereafter to be paid on the 1st day of each succeeding month until further order.

2)    The First Appointment hearing shall be adjourned to the 1 September 2021 at 11:00 am.

3)    There shall be an order nisi to be made absolute in 14 day’s time that the Respondent shall contribute towards 50% of the Petitioner’s costs of and arising out of her summons dated the 11 January 2021, such costs to be taxed on a party and party basis if not agreed. There shall be Legal Aid taxation of the Petitioner’s own costs. There shall also be certificate for counsel.

IT IS FURTHER DIRECTED THAT:

4)    The Respondent shall pay a rental deposit for the Petitioner and the two children of the family in the sum of HK$56,000, such sum to be provided within the next 7 days.

5)    The Respondent shall continue to pay for the children’s school fees. 

 ( Sharon D. MELLOY )
 District Judge

Mr. Giles Surman was instructed by Messrs Boase Cohen & Collins to appear on behalf of the Petitioner

Mr. Josh Baker was instructed by Messrs Tanner De Witt to appear on behalf of the Respondent



[1] To be clear, H envisages moving out.  See Letter from TDW 12.05.2021 [LA4].  W is incorrect (at W#5 §43) to say that H intends to continue to live at the former matrimonial home.  Both parties will have to downsize.