Case Detail

HCAL 1353/2020

[2026] HKCFI 165

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO 1353 OF 2020

________________________

BETWEEN
	HUSSAIN MANZAR	Applicant
	and
	NON-REFOULEMENT CLAIMS PETITION OFFICE	Putative Respondent
	and
	DIRECTOR OF IMMIGRATION	Putative
		Interested Party

________________

Before:

Deputy High Court Judge (Non-refoulement Claims) YW Hew in Chambers (Open to Public)

Date of Decision:

9 January 2026

__________________

D E C I S I O N

__________________

1. By a summons issued on 1 December 2025 (“Summons”) supported by an affirmation of the same date (“Affirmation”) the Applicant applied for an extension of time to appeal my order dated 11 November 2025 (“Order”) wherein I had refused his application for leave to apply for judicial review of a decision of the Non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office (“NRCPO”) dated 9 June 2020 (“NRCPO Decision”).

2. In dealing with such I have had regard below to the length of the delay, the reasons for the delay, the prospects of the intended appeal, and the prejudice to the respondent if an extension of time is granted (see Re Gurung Min Bahadur[2018] HKCA 226; Re Saqlain Muhammad[2018] HKCA 346; Nupur Mst[2018] HKCA 524; Nguyen Van Quyen[2025] HKCA 510).

3. In the Summons and the Affirmation, the Applicant says that he has reasonable grounds to bring the proceedings and good reasons for his request to be granted, as follows:

(1)  He says that the reason for the delay is that he “did not receive [his] decision copy in time”;
(2)  He submits that “there are substantive merits to my underlying appeal”; and
(3)  He says that as no hearing date has been fixed for determination of the intended proceedings, there is no impairment or delay if the intended proceedings proceed.

4. Firstly, as the 14-day period for the Applicant to appeal against the Order expired on 25 November 2025 (RHC O. 53 r. 3(4)), the application is late by some 6 days. While the decision was returned to the court undelivered by reason of “No such address”[1], it was and is his duty to give the court an address to which correspondence or notice can come to his attention in a timely manner, such that the consequence of any delay occasioned by the ineffectiveness of such an address falls on his shoulders (Hasmi Rizwan Imran HKCA 439 at §§14-15; Rai Tika Kumari[2025] HKCA 78). Moreover, he has not explained how and when he learnt of the Order and my decision.

5. However, as the delay is relatively minor I will focus on the prospects of success in the intended appeal, which is important as the court will not grant an extension of time to pursue a hopeless appeal (Tran Van Anh[2025] HKCA 408).

6. In that regard, the Applicant’s bare and unparticularised claim that there are “substantive merits to my underlying appeal” fails to identify or amount to a ground of appeal against the decision. Indeed, in the decision I had reviewed the NRCPO Decision with rigorous examination and anxious scrutiny, applying the enhanced Wednesbury standard, and found no reasonably arguable public law grounds to vitiate such. I do not see that there is any proper ground of appeal with any prospect of success, particularly when the Applicant has not identified any basis (in the nature of an error of law, any failure to take account of relevant matters already placed before the court, or that I was plainly wrong) on which the Court of Appeal would reverse my decision (Nupur Mst, supra).

7. In the premises, it would be futile to extend time and would clearly needlessly prejudice the respondent for what appears to be a hopeless appeal. I therefore reject the Applicant’s submissions (insofar as they can be understood) that there is no impairment or delay in relation to the administration of justice.

8. I therefore refuse the application and dismiss the Summons.

(YW Hew)
Deputy High Court Judge
(Non-refoulement Claims)

The Applicant was unrepresented

[1] This was in spite of it having been sent to the address that the Applicant had confirmed to the court at the hearing of his leave application on 15 August 2025, and which is almost identical to the address provided in the Summons and Affirmation which merely adds the words “Ping Yuen Kam Tin” between the words “Shing Mun San Tsuen” and “Yuen Long”.

HCAL 1353/2020

[2025] HKCFI 5229

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No. 1353 of 2020

BETWEEN
	HUSSAIN MANZAR	Applicant
	and
	Non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office	Putative
		Respondent
	and
	Director of Immigration	Putative
		Interested Party

Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review
NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Ord. 53 r. 3)

Following:

consideration of the documents only; or
consideration of the documents and oral submissions by the Applicant in open court;

Order by Deputy High Court Judge (Non-refoulement Claims) YW Hew:

1. The Form 86 is amended on the Court’s own motion, naming only the Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office as the Putative Respondent, naming only the Director of Immigration as the Putative Interested Party, and substituting “Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office” in place of “Adjudicator of TCAB” ; and
2. The application for leave to apply for Judicial Review be dismissed.

Observations for the Applicant:

Introduction

1. The Applicant is a national of Pakistan. By a Form 86 filed on 30 June 2020 (“Form 86”), which was accompanied by a supporting Affirmation also dated and filed on 30 June 2020 (“the Affirmation”), the Applicant sought leave to apply for judicial review of a decision (said by him to be one of the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“TCAB”), but which was actually one of Non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office (“NRCPO”)) made on 9 June 2020 (“the NRCPO Decision”)[1] and which was exhibited to the Affirmation. I will use the abbreviations and definitions from the NRCPO Decision unless otherwise specified herein.

2. The Applicant sought and attended the oral hearing of his application. He made some submissions in relation in relation to his application, which I set out and deal with below.

3. I have amended the Form 86 of my own motion to reflect the nature of the NRCPO Decision, and the identities of the proper Putative Respondent and Putative Interested Party.

Background

4. This is set out in the NRCPO Decision. While I will not repeat the contents thereof, in summary and in relation to the assessment of his claim:

(1)  The Applicant claimed non-refoulement relief on the basis that if he were sent back to Pakistan, he would be harmed or killed by one Ghafar, Ghafar’s relatives, and members of the PML(Q);
(2)  The claim was initially assessed and rejected on the basis of Torture Risk[2] by the Director of Immigration (“Director”) in a decision dated 24 May 2013 (“Director’s Decision”);
(3)  As no appeal was filed against the Director’s Decision, the Torture Risk claim was hence finally determined in accordance with s. 37V(2)(a) Immigration Ordinance (Cap. 115);
(4)  On 30 April 2018 the Applicant submitted an SCF through the Duty Lawyer Service, and subsequently attended an Interview. The claim for non‑refoulement protection was assessed on the grounds of BOR 2 Risk[3], BOR 3 Risk[4], and Persecution Risk[5], and was rejected by the Director in a decision dated 31 May 2018 (“Director’s Further Decision”);
(5)  The Applicant petitioned the NRCPO for relief in relation to the Director’s Further Decision, which held a hearing in relation to the Applicant’s non-refoulement claims on 6 January 2020; and
(6)  The NRCPO issued the NRCPO Decision on 9 June 2020, in which it decided that the Applicant’s claim failed on the three relevant bases, dismissed the petition, and confirmed the Director’s Further Decision.

Legal Principles

5. An applicant, even one acting in person, is required to identify the grounds of judicial review clearly and succinctly in the Form 86, and to fully and frankly disclose all material facts and potential legal answers (Ho Loy & Another v Director of Environmental Protection, unrep. HCAL 21/2015, 22 December 2016, Chow J. (as he was then) at §142; Leung Kwok Hung, unrep., HCAL 83/2012, 28 September 2013, Lam J. (as he was then) at §35; Begum Khadija[2018] HKCA 571; Khan Kamran[2020] HKCA 380).

6. It is trite that the role of the Court in a judicial review is not to provide a further avenue of appeal, and that the Court should not usurp the role of the TCAB/NRCPO which is (and together with the Director are) the primary decision‑makers. The assessment of evidence, COI materials, and credibility, risk of harm, state protection and viability of internal relocation are primarily within the province of the TCAB/NRCPO and the Director, which are entitled to make evaluations based on the evidence available and to decide the weight to be given to them. While the Court will adopt an enhanced standard in scrutinising the decision of the Board due to the seriousness of the issue at hand, the court will not intervene by way of judicial review unless there are errors of law or procedural unfairness or irrationality in the decision of the TCAB/NRCPO. (Re Lakhwinder Singh[2018] HKCA 246; Re Daljit Singh[2018] HKCA 328; Re Mudannayakalage Chaminda Pushpa Kumara[2018] HKCA 400; Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration[2018] HKCA 524; Re Kartini[2019] HKCA 1022; Re Rupinder Singh[2021] HKCA 886).

7. In order for me to give leave for judicial review, I have to be satisfied that there is an intended ground of review which is reasonably arguable, which is one that enjoys a realistic prospect of success (Po Fun Chan v Winnie Cheung (2007) 10 HKCFAR 676). As a leave application of this sort is meant to be a filtering process, I am not expected to give elaborate reasons for my decision (see Re Zunariyah[2018] HKCA 14, at §23).

Discussion

8. The Form 86 does not identify any grounds of judicial review, or advance any allegation of procedural unfairness in relation to, and/or of any error of law in, and/or any irrationality/failure to meet the enhanced Wednesbury test in, the NRCPO Decision.

9. In the Affirmation the Applicant says that he does not agree with the NRCPO Decision and claims that he “did not get free, fair and legaly(sic) decision”. This is entirely inadequate as it merely consists of generic, vague, and unparticularised assertions using selected keywords and phrases without reference to any underlying facts or matters establishing why, how, and where each of those complaints arise in relation to the NRCPO Decision. Such general assertions or propositions of law without particulars are not effective grounds to support a judicial review and cannot assist the Applicant (Re Mizan Sikder[2019] HKCA 20 at §17; Re Aziz Nasir[2019] HKCA 578 at §17; Re Kharsu Numan[2019] HKCA 626 at §24; Re Salim Ahmed[2020] HKCA 244 at §20; Haider Khalil[2021] HKCA 223 at §16; Akhondo Shakhil[2021] HKCA 1616 at §15).

10. Nevertheless, given the seriousness of the issues at hand, I have considered the NRCPO Decision with rigorous examination and anxious scrutiny, applying the enhanced Wednesbury standard and bearing in mind the need for a high standard of fairness.

11. The NRCPO began by setting out the Applicant’s background, immigration, and procedural history, a summary of his claim, and the materials before it (Paragraphs 1 to 9). It then detailed the facts alleged by the Applicant, including his supplementary testimony at the hearing (Paragraphs 10 to 50), and the principles relevant to each of the three grounds at hand as well as to assessment of the Applicant’s claim (including as to standard and burden of proof, and internal relocation) (Paragraphs 51 to 71), and relevant COI that it had considered (Paragraphs 72 to 89).

12. The decision-maker then turned to assess the Applicant’s evidence and make her findings of fact. She gave salient reasons as to why she found the Petitioner’s account to be unreliable, and did not accept that he had been threatened with being harmed or killed by Ghafar, or even that he had been assaulted by Ghafar’s family and his men. She also found that it was implausible that he remained a target of the Ghafar family. Indeed, it was only accepted that he was a national of Pakistan (Paragraphs 90 to 103).

13. Given such findings, the NRCPO unsurprisingly did not accept that there was any evidence that he would be exposed to BOR 2 Risk, BOR 3 Risk, or Persecution Risk if refouled. It also found, from the COI, that state protection was available. The Applicant’s claims for non-refoulement protection on the three relevant grounds therefore failed, the petition was dismissed, and the Director’s Further Decision was confirmed (Paragraphs 104 to 115).

14. I do not, from my examination and scrutiny, see that the Applicant has any reasonably arguable case that there was procedural unfairness (bearing in mind the need for a high standard of fairness), an error of law, and/or irrationality/failure to meet the enhanced Wednesbury test that is sufficient to vitiate the NRCPO Decision and justify the grant of leave. This is especially so as to the assessment, reasoning, and findings regarding the Applicant’s evidence, credibility, the risk of harm, and state protection, which are all matters primarily within the province of the decision-making body. Nor do I see any reasonably arguable public law basis to vitiate the decision-maker’s conclusions regarding Persecution Risk, BOR 3 Risk, and BOR 2 Risk.

15. At the hearing before me, the Applicant initially said he had nothing to say in relation to his leave application. However, he then claimed that since 2017 he had no contact with his family back home, that his parents had passed away and that he did not know the whereabouts of his siblings. He said that he had only been in touch with an unnamed friend of his father who had said that his “problem” had not been resolved, that the friend was “doing his best to to get it solved” and that such would take 6 months to a year. He therefore requested to be allowed to stay for a year and said after his “problem” was solved he would go back himself.

16. I do not see that such bare and unsubstantiated allegations are relevant to the issues before me or assist the application for leave, given the aforesaid findings in and analysis of the NRCPO Decision, and as judicial review is not a further avenue of appeal or for revisiting the assessment in the hope that the court may consider the matter afresh absent any legal error (Lakhwinder Singh, supra).

17. There is hence no basis for the court to intervene by way of judicial review, and I am not satisfied that there are any reasonably arguable grounds for judicial review which enjoy a realistic prospect of success.

Conclusion

18. In the circumstances, I have ordered that the application for leave to apply for judicial review be dismissed.

Dated the 11^th day of November 2025

(Teresa Ng)
for Registrar, High Court

Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence

Notes for the Applicant: If leave has been granted, the Applicant or his solicitors must:
a) serve on the respondent and such interested parties as may be directed by the Court the order granting leave and any directions given within 14 days after the leave was granted (Order 53, rule 4A); b) issue the originating summons within 14 days after the grant of leave and serve it in accordance with Order 53, rule 5; and c) supply to every other party copies of every affidavit which the Applicant proposes to use at the hearing, including the affidavit in support of the application for leave (Order 53, rule 6(5)).		Sent to the Applicant on the 11^th day of November 2025 HUSSAIN MANZAR Applicant’s ref. no: Nil.		Sent to the Putative Respondent / the Putative Respondent’s solicitors / such Putative Interested Parties as may be directed by the Court / the Putative Interested Parties’ solicitors on the 11^th day of November 2025 Torture Claims Appeal Board / Non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office Putative Respondent’s ref. no.: USM 12009/18/6/188/P2328 Director of Immigration Putative Interested Party’s ref. no.: QA T/C 199/10 (formerly RBCZ/383/07) QA T/C 1278/18 (formerly RBCZ 2001177/14) Department of Justice, Senior Assistant Law Officer (Civil Law) (Civil Litigation Unit 2)

Form CALL-1

[1] https://legalref.judiciary.hk/doc/judg/html/vetted/other/en/2020/HCAL001353_2020_files/the_Board's_Decision.pdf

[2] The risk of torture under Part VIIC of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap 115.

[3] The risk of violation of the right to life under article 2 of section 8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap 383.

[4] The risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment under article 3 of section 8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap 383.

[5] The risk of persecution with reference to the non-refoulement principle under article 33 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol.

HUSSAIN MANZAR v. NON-REFOULEMENT CLAIMS PETITION OFFICE [Decision on Leave Application]

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	consideration of the documents only; or
	consideration of the documents and oral submissions by the Applicant in open court;