Case Detail

HCAL 505/2020

[2026] HKCFI 166

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO 505 OF 2020

________________________

BETWEEN
	BUHION AIZA CANOY	Applicant
	and
	TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD / NON-REFOULEMENT CLAIMS PETITION OFFICE	Putative Respondent
	and
	DIRECTOR OF IMMIGRATION	Putative
		Interested Party

________________

Before:

Deputy High Court Judge (Non-refoulement Claims) YW Hew in Chambers (Open to Public)

Date of Decision:

9 January 2026

__________________

D E C I S I O N

__________________

1. By a summons issued on 17 December 2025 (“Summons”) supported by an affidavit of the same date (“Affidavit”) the Applicant applied for an extension of time to appeal my order dated 8 August 2025 (“Order”) wherein I had refused her application for leave to apply for judicial review of a decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“TCAB”)/Non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office (“NRCPO”) dated 9 January 2020 (“TCAB Decision”).

2. In the Summons, the Applicant merely said she did not agree with my judgment, and that it was unreasonable and she wants to appeal. The Affidavit merely acknowledges that she is late to appeal (without explaining why), and requests an extension of time (without explaining why one should be granted).

3. In considering whether to extend for appealing against the refusal of leave, I have had regard to the length of the delay, the reasons for the delay, the prospects of the intended appeal, and the prejudice to the respondent if an extension of time is granted (see Re Gurung Min Bahadur[2018] HKCA 226; Re Saqlain Muhammad[2018] HKCA 346; Nupur Mst[2018] HKCA 524; Nguyen Van Quyen[2025] HKCA 510). The prospect of success is important as the court will not grant an extension of time to pursue a hopeless appeal (Tran Van Anh[2025] HKCA 408).

4. Turning, firstly, to the length of and reasons for the delay, the 14-day period for her to appeal against the Order expired on 15 September 2025 (RHC O. 53 r. 3(4) [1]). The delay of over 3 months in this case is clearly substantial. Yet the Applicant has made no attempt to explain it in her documents. There is hence no good or valid reason for the delay.

5. As to the prospects of success, in the decision I had reviewed the TCAB Decision with rigorous examination and anxious scrutiny, applying the enhanced Wednesbury standard, and saw no reasonably arguable public law grounds to vitiate the TCAB Decision. The Applicant has not identified how and why she says that my decision in relation to such is “unreasonable”. I do not see that such claim constitutes a proper ground of appeal with any prospect of success, particularly when she has not identified any basis (in the nature of an error of law, any failure to take account of relevant matters already placed before the court, or that I was plainly wrong) on which the Court of Appeal would reverse my decision (Nupur Mst, supra).

6. Finally, an extension of time for the Applicant to advance a hopeless appeal would substantially and needlessly prejudice the respondent.

7. Given all of the above, I therefore refuse the application for leave to appeal out of time, and dismiss the Summons.

(YW Hew)
Deputy High Court Judge
(Non-refoulement Claims)

The Applicant was unrepresented

[1] Since I had not directed that time run during the summer vacation, and as 14 September 2025 was a Sunday, the deadline was extended to the next day on which the Court was open: see Do Hung Loi v Torture Claims Appeal Board / Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office[2023] HKCA 1081 at §12; Re Muhammad Ali Pahat[2025] HKCA 657 at §3, RHC O. 3 r. 4.

HCAL 505/2020

[2025] HKCFI 3423

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No. 505 of 2020

BETWEEN
	BUHION AIZA CANOY	Applicant
	and
	Torture Claims Appeal Board / Non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office	Putative Respondent
	and
	Director of Immigration	Putative
		Interested Party

Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review
NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Ord. 53 r. 3)

Following:

consideration of the documents only; or
consideration of the documents and oral submissions by the Applicant in open court;

Order by Deputy High Court Judge (Non-refoulement Claims) YW Hew:

1. The Form 86 is amended on the Court’s own motion, naming only the Torture Claims Appeal Board/Non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office as the Putative Respondent and only the Director of Immigration as the Putative Interested Party, and by adding “/Non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office” before the words “on my non-refoulement case”;
2. Leave to apply for Judicial Review be dismissed.

Observations for the Applicant:

Introduction

1. The Applicant is a national of the Philippines. By a Form 86 filed on 6 April 2020 (“Form 86”), which was accompanied by a supporting Affirmation also filed on 6 April 2020 (“the Affirmation”), the Applicant sought leave to commence a judicial review of a decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“TCAB”)/Non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office (“NRCPO”) made on 9 January 2020 (“the TCAB Decision”)[1]. The TCAB Decision is exhibited to the Affirmation.

2. The Applicant did not seek an oral hearing of her application. I have dealt with her application on the papers.

3. I have amended the Form 86 of my own motion to properly identify the relevant putative respondent and interested party.

Background

4. The Applicant’s background and factual case underlying her claim for non-refoulement relief, and the immigration and procedural history leading up to the TCAB Decision, are set out in the TCAB Decision, and in the Director’s Decision (defined below, and which was also before the TCAB/NRCPO). For the sake of concision I will not repeat them, but in essence:

a.  The Applicant’s claim for non-refoulement relief stems from a fear that she will be harmed or killed by her ex-boyfriend (“Ex-Boyfriend”);
b.  Her claim for non-refoulement relief was made with the benefit of legal assistance, and was assessed by the Director of Immigration (“the Director”) on the basis of Torture Risk[2], BOR 2 Risk[3], BOR 3 Risk[4], and Persecution Risk[5], who rejected it as not being substantiated in a decision dated 8 October 2018 (“Director’s Decision”);
c.  The Applicant on 19 December 2018 filed a Notice of Appeal/Petition; and
d.  An oral hearing of the appeal/petition took place before TCAB/NRCPO on 4 April 2019, with the benefit of interpretation. This was attended by the Applicant, who adopted all the information contained in her Non-refoulement Claim Form, the Interview Record, and her Notice of Appeal/Petition as evidence in support of her claim, and was questioned by the TCAB/NRCPO.

5. The TCAB/NRCPO subsequently handed down the TCAB Decision.

Legal Principles

6. An applicant, even one acting in person, is required to identify the grounds of judicial review clearly and succinctly in the Form 86, and to fully and frankly disclose all material facts and potential legal answers (Ho Loy & Another v Director of Environmental Protection, unrep. HCAL 21/2015, 22 December 2016, Chow J. (as he was then) at §142; Leung Kwok Hung, unrep., HCAL 83/2012, 28 September 2013, Lam J. (as he was then) at §35; Begum Khadija[2018] HKCA 571; Khan Kamran[2020] HKCA 380).

7. It is trite that judicial review is not a further avenue of appeal, and that the Court should not usurp the role of the TCAB/NRCPO which is (and together with the Director are) the primary decision‑makers. The assessment of evidence, COI materials, and credibility, risk of harm, state protection and viability of internal relocation are primarily within the province of the TCAB/NRCPO and the Director, which are entitled to make evaluations based on the evidence available and to decide the weight to be given to them. While the Court will adopt an enhanced standard in scrutinising the decision of the Board due to the seriousness of the issue at hand, the court will not intervene by way of judicial review unless there are errors of law or procedural unfairness or irrationality in the decision of the TCAB/NRCPO: see Re Lakhwinder Singh[2018] HKCA 246; Re Daljit Singh[2018] HKCA 328; Re Mudannayakalage Chaminda Pushpa Kumara[2018] HKCA 400; Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration[2018] HKCA 524; Re Kartini[2019] HKCA 1022; Re Rupinder Singh[2021] HKCA 886.

8. In order for me to give leave for judicial review, I have to be satisfied that there is an intended ground of review which is reasonably arguable, which is one that enjoys a realistic prospect of success (Po Fun Chan v Winnie Cheung (2007) 10 HKCFAR 676). As a leave application of this sort is meant to be a filtering process, I am not expected to give elaborate reasons for my decision (see Re Zunariyah[2018] HKCA 14, at §23).

Discussion

9. The Form 86 does not identify any grounds of judicial review. The closest the Applicant gets to doing so in the papers is the vague and amorphous allegation in her Affirmation that the TCAB had “disregard[ed] [her] dangerous situation”. It is unclear whether, how, and why the Applicant alleges any procedural unfairness in relation to, any error of law in, and/or any irrationality/failure to meet the enhanced Wednesbury test in, the TCAB Decision.

10. Nevertheless, and given the seriousness of the issues at hand, I have considered the TCAB Decision with rigorous examination and anxious scrutiny, applying the enhanced Wednesbury standard.

11. The TCAB Decision sets out the Applicant’s procedural background, immigration history, and an outline of what happened at the hearing (Paragraphs 1 to 7). It then outlines the relevant principles relating to each of the four types of risk (Paragraphs 1 to 21), and summarises the Applicant’s case (Paragraphs 22 to 27).

12. This is followed by an assessment of the evidence in which the decision-maker, while accepting that her account of events was credible, found that there was no genuine and substantial risk that she would be harmed or killed by her Ex-Boyfriend, and that the Applicant could avail herself of both state protection and internal relocation. The TCAB/NRCPO gave adequate reasons for doing so, referring to the evidence before it and COI referred to within the Director’s Decision (Paragraphs 28 to 37). Accordingly, the TCAB/NRCPO found that the Applicant did not have a valid claim for non-refoulement based on BOR 2 Risk, BOR 3 Risk, Persecution Risk, and Torture Risk, in each case giving relevant and adequate reasons, that she was hence not entitled to non-refoulement protection, and confirmed the Director’s Decision (Paragraphs 38 to 42).

13. Despite my examination and scrutiny I do not see that it is reasonably arguable that there is procedural unfairness (bearing in mind the need for a high standard of fairness), an error of law, and/or irrationality/failure to meet the enhanced Wednesbury test which vitiates the TCAB Decision. This is particularly so when the assessment of evidence, COI materials, credibility, risk of harm, state protection and viability of internal relocation are primarily within the province of the TCAB/NRCPO.

14. I am hence not satisfied that there are any reasonably arguable grounds for judicial review which enjoy a realistic prospect of success.

Conclusion

15. In the circumstances, I have ordered that the application for leave to apply for judicial review be dismissed.

Dated the 8^th day of August 2025

(Teresa Ng)
for Registrar, High Court

Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence

Notes for the Applicant: If leave has been granted, the Applicant or his solicitors must:
a) serve on the respondent and such interested parties as may be directed by the Court the order granting leave and any directions given within 14 days after the leave was granted (Order 53, rule 4A); b) issue the originating summons within 14 days after the grant of leave and serve it in accordance with Order 53, rule 5; and c) supply to every other party copies of every affidavit which the Applicant proposes to use at the hearing, including the affidavit in support of the application for leave (Order 53, rule 6(5)).		Sent to the Applicant on the 8^th day of August 2025 BUHION AIZA CANOY Applicant’s ref. no: Nil.		Sent to the Putative Respondent / the Putative Respondent’s solicitors / such Putative Interested Parties as may be directed by the Court / the Putative Interested Parties’ solicitors on the 8^th day of August 2025 Torture Claims Appeal Board / Non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office Putative Respondent’s ref. no.: USM 13995/18/10/337/F910 Director of Immigration Putative Interested Party’s ref. no.: QA T/C 4268/18 (formerly RBCZ 10171/18) (T8S21) Department of Justice, Senior Assistant Law Officer (Civil Law) (Civil Litigation Unit 2)

Form CALL-1

[1] https://legalref.judiciary.hk/doc/judg/html/vetted/other/en/2020/HCAL000505_2020_files/the_Board's_Decision.pdf

[2] The risk of torture under Part VIIC of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap 115.

[3] The risk of violation of the right to life under article 2 of section 8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap 383.

[4] The risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment under article 3 of section 8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap 383.

[5] The risk of persecution with reference to the non-refoulement principle under article 33 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol

BUHION AIZA CANOY v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD / NON-REFOULEMENT CLAIMS PETITION OFFICE

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	consideration of the documents only; or
	consideration of the documents and oral submissions by the Applicant in open court;