Case Detail

HCAL 752/2020

[2026] HKCFI 176

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST

NO. 752 OF 2020

_____________

BETWEEN

	EYEVE	Applicant
	and
	Torture Claims Appeal Board / Non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office	Putative Respondent
	and
	Director of Immigration	Putative Interested Party

_____________

Before:

Deputy High Court Judge (Non-refoulement Claims) YW Hew in Chambers (Open to Public)

Date of Hearing:	10 October 2025
Date of Decision:	27 January 2026

_____________

DECISION

_____________

1. By a summons issued on 17 September 2025 (“Summons”) supported by an affirmation of the same date (“Affirmation”) the Applicant sought “leave to appeal out of time” my order dated 31 July 2025 (“Order”), which I had made for reasons given in [2025] HKCFI 3060 (“Leave Decision”), wherein I had refused her application for leave to apply for judicial review of a decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“TCAB”) / Non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office (“NRCPO”) dated 17 April 2020 (“TCAB Decision”).

2. The relevant considerations in relation to such an application are the length of the delay, the reasons for the delay, the prospects of the intended appeal, and the prejudice to the respondent if an extension of time is granted (see Re Gurung Min Bahadur[2018] HKCA 226; Re Saqlain Muhammad[2018] HKCA 346, Nguyen Van Quyen[2025] HKCA 510). However, the prospect of success is important as the court will not grant an extension of time to pursue a hopeless appeal (Tran Van Anh[2025] HKCA 408).

3. The Summons did not explicitly identify any ground of appeal, but merely sought “leave to advance a new sole ground of appeal” which it did not identify. However, in the Affirmation:

(1) The Applicant claimed that the Leave Decision was reached unfairly “without allowing [her] an opportunity to clarify my case and the situation in country”, which she said at the hearing before me was her sole ground of appeal;
(2) She also claimed that she “did not receive any correspondence from the Court regarding the Judicial Review be refused” and that as she was “a litigant in person, illiterate and unrepresented” she was thereby “unaware of the rules regarding the 14-day time limit”; and
(3) She requested the court “to allow my appeal out of time and give a chance to explain”.

4. As I did not direct that time run during the summer vacation, and as 14 September 2025 was a Sunday, I approach the application on the basis that the deadline for the Applicant to file a notice of appeal against my Order was 15 September 2025: see Do Hung Loi v Torture Claims Appeal Board / Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office[2023] HKCA 1081 at §12; Re Muhammad Ali Pahat[2025] HKCA 657 at §3, Qaisar Naeem[2025] HKCFI 3959; RHC O. 3 r. 4. Since the delay is hence relatively minimal, I shall focus on the merits of the appeal.

5. In that regard I see no basis (in the nature of an error of law, a failure to take account of relevant matters already placed before the court, or that I was plainly wrong) on which the Court of Appeal would reverse my decision (Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration[2018] HKCA 524):

(1) As the Applicant did not request an oral hearing (including in her Form 86 and her affirmation in support of her leave application), I was entitled to deal with the application on the papers and was not obliged to hold an oral hearing (RHC O. 53 r. 3(3); Akram Muhammad[2022] HKCA 445 at §§10, 18).
(2) With that said, at the hearing and out of an abundance of caution I asked the Applicant whether she had anything to say in relation to her sole ground of appeal, and whether she wanted to (as claimed in the Affirmation) clarify her case and the situation in her country. All she said in response was that her baby (who she claimed was a Hong Kong citizen) was very small and she needed to breastfeed him, hence she could not go back at present and she needed and asked to be allowed “some more time”. She also expressed her gratitude to Hong Kong and to the court.
(3) I do not see how any of the Applicant’s claims constitute or give rise to any viable grounds of appeal that would justify reversing the Order and my decision. This is so given the nature of judicial review proceedings which, as I pointed out in the Leave Decision are not a further avenue of appeal, and when in the Leave Decision I had reviewed the TCAB Decision with rigorous examination and anxious scrutiny, applying the enhanced Wednesbury standard, and saw no reasonably arguable public law grounds to vitiate such. Moreover, her family circumstances are not valid grounds or a relevant consideration in relation to her own non-refoulment claim (Oguzie Ikechukwu Charles[2022] HKCA 135; BoolLorenza Atienza & ors.[2024] HKCA 1154 at §16).

6. Given the above, an extension of time for the Applicant to advance a hopeless appeal would substantially and needlessly prejudice the respondent.

7. Mainly for the sake of completeness, in relation to the reason for the (relatively minimal) delay the Applicant claimed at the hearing that she had only learnt about my Order from the Sha Tin Court Duty Lawyer on 13 September 2025, which is a Saturday. She also said that she had not updated the Immigration Department or the Court with her address as provided in her Summons and Affirmation[1], even though she had moved to it more than 2 years before the hearing in October 2025, as she was under the impression that once she had (due to other proceedings) updated Sha Tin Police Station with the said address, the same would be circulated everywhere.

8. I do not consider that there is hence a good or valid reason for the delay, as the Applicant had apparently failed to update the Court and the Immigration Department with her new address in circumstances where it is her duty to give the court, and the Immigration Department, an address to which correspondence or notice can come to his attention in a timely manner. The consequence of any delay occasioned by the ineffectiveness of such an address falls on her shoulders (Hasmi Rizwan Imran HKCA 439 at §§14-15; Rai Tika Kumari[2025] HKCA 78).

9. In the circumstances, and notwithstanding the relatively minimal delay in this case, I therefore refuse the application for leave to appeal out of time, and dismiss the Summons.

	(YW Hew)
	Deputy High Court Judge
	(Non-refoulement Claims)

The applicant appeared in person

[1] Being an address at Man Yuen Street in Yau Ma Tei, as opposed to the address of ROOM A, 2/F, 77, WOOSUNG STREET, JORDAN, YAU TSIM MONG, KLN which was the Applicant’s latest reported address provided to the court by staff of the Immigration Department as of 20 May 2025, and to which the address the Order and the Leave Decision had been sent and not returned.

HCAL 752/2020

[2025] HKCFI 3060

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No. 752 of 2020

BETWEEN
	EYEVE	Applicant
	and
	Torture Claims Appeal Board / Non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office	Putative Respondent
	and
	Director of Immigration	Putative Interested Party

Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review
NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Ord. 53 r. 3)

Following:

consideration of the documents only; or
consideration of the documents and oral submissions by the Applicant in open court;

Order by Deputy High Court Judge (Non-refoulement Claims) YW Hew:

1. The Form 86 is amended on the Court’s own motion, naming only the Torture Claims Appeal Board/Non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office as the Putative Respondent, naming only the Director of Immigration as the Putative Interested Party, and inserting “of Torture Claims Appeal Board/Non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office” before the word “DATED”;
2. Leave to apply for Judicial Review be dismissed.

Observations for the Applicant:

Introduction

1. The Applicant is a national of Bangladesh. By a Form 86 dated and filed on 23 April 2020 (“Form 86”), which was accompanied by a supporting Affirmation also dated and filed on 23 April 2020 (“the Affirmation”), the Applicant sought leave to commence a judicial review of a decision dated 17 April 2020, without specifying who had made it.

2. The Applicant did not seek an oral hearing. I have hence dealt with her application on the papers.

3. The only decision dated 17 April 2020 that is relevant to the Applicant is one of the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“TCAB”)/Non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office (“NRCPO”) made on that date (“the TCAB Decision”) which concerned and rejected the Applicant’s claim for non-refoulement relief on the basis of Torture Risk[1], BOR 2 Risk[2], BOR 3 Risk[3], and Persecution Risk[4].

4. Although no documents are exhibited to the Affirmation, it does say that the Applicant wants to judicially review “the refusal decision of the appeal of the [TCAB/NRCPO]. Their decision is unreasonable and unfair.”.

5. Prior to the TCAB Decision, the Director of Immigration (“the Director”) had in a decision dated 28 August 2019 (“Director’s Decision”) rejected the Applicant’s non-refoulement claims on the same bases of risk.

6. The Form 86 does name the Director as the putative Respondent and apparently also as the putative Interested Party. However, in the circumstances I do not see that the Applicant was clearly seeking leave to commence a judicial review of the Director’s Decision.

7. In any event, if and insofar as she apparently seeks such leave, that application would stand only to be rejected and I do so, given both the existence and implications of the two-tier system and the lack of exceptional circumstances justifying such an application (Moshsin Ali[2018] HKCA 549; Yeni Setyawati v Torture Claims Appeal Board[2019] HKCA 1310).

8. I have therefore amended the Form 86 of my own motion to clearly identify the decision in question, the proper putative respondents, and the proper putative interested party.

Background

9. The Applicant’s background and case as to the incidents underlying her claim for non-refoulement relief, and the immigration and procedural history (including the documents by which she raised her claim and which were before the TCAB/NRCPO) leading up to the TCAB Decision, are set out in the TCAB Decision (Paragraphs 1 to 20). For the sake of concision, I will not repeat them, but in essence, and in addition to the portions already summarised above:

a.  The Applicant’s claim for non-refoulement relief stems from a fear that she will be harmed or killed by unknown men whom she suspects are linked to Mr. Shamim Osman (“Osman”) an Awami League (“AL”) Member of Parliament (“MP”) in Bangladesh. She also believes she may face problems from the family of her former employer, one Mr Kodu (“Kodu”) as she is too scared to testify against Osman’s men regarding their assault on Kodu.;
b.  Her claim for non-refoulement relief on the basis of Torture Risk, BOR 3 Risk, BOR2 Risk, and Persecution Risk was first raised on 16 June 2019, and was rejected as not being substantiated by the Director in the Director’s Decision, against which the Applicant filed a Notice of Appeal/Petition on 4 September 2019; and
c.  The TCAB/NRCPO held an oral hearing on 15 January 2020 at which the Applicant gave evidence, and which was conducted with the assistance of a Bengali-English interpreter.

10. The TCAB/NRCPO found and set out in the TCAB Decision (as set out therein and for reasons which I have analysed in more detail below) that the Applicant was not entitled to non-refoulement protection on the relevant grounds, refused her appeal/petition, and confirmed the Director’s Decision.

Legal Principles

11. An applicant, even one acting in person, is required to identify the grounds of judicial review clearly and succinctly in the Form 86, and to fully and frankly disclose all material facts and potential legal answers (Ho Loy & Another v Director of Environmental Protection, HCAL 21/2015, 22 December 2016, at §142).

12. It is trite that judicial review is not a further avenue of appeal, and that the Court should not usurp the role of the TCAB which is (and together with the Director are) the primary decision‑makers. The assessment of evidence, COI materials, and credibility, risk of harm, state protection and viability of internal relocation are primarily within the province of the TCAB and the Director, which are entitled to make evaluations based on the evidence available and to decide the weight to be given to them. While the Court will adopt an enhanced standard in scrutinising the decision of the Board due to the seriousness of the issue at hand, the court will not intervene by way of judicial review unless there are errors of law or procedural unfairness or irrationality in the decision of the TCAB: see Re Lakhwinder Singh[2018] HKCA 246; Re Daljit Singh[2018] HKCA 328; Re Mudannayakalage Chaminda Pushpa Kumara[2018] HKCA 400; Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration[2018] HKCA 524; Re Kartini[2019] HKCA 1022; Re Rupinder Singh[2021] HKCA 886.

13. In order for me to give leave for judicial review, I have to be satisfied that there is an intended ground of review which is reasonably arguable, which is one that enjoys a realistic prospect of success (Peter Po Fun Chan v Winnie Cheung & Anr (2007) 10 HKCFAR 676). As a leave application of this sort is meant to be a filtering process, I am not expected to give elaborate reasons for my decision (see Re Zunariyah [2018] HKCA 14, at §23).

Discussion

14. The Applicant has merely complained in the Affirmation that the TCAB Decision is “unreasonable and unfair”, but has not attempted to explain or identify the details in support of such of allegations, let alone (given the nature of judicial review proceedings, which are not an appeal) whether and how such amount or relate to procedural unfairness in relation to, any error of law in, and/or any irrationality/failure to meet the enhanced Wednesbury test in, the TCAB Decision.

15. Nevertheless, and given the seriousness of the issues at hand, I have considered the TCAB Decision with rigorous examination and anxious scrutiny, applying the enhanced Wednesbury standard, and bearing in mind the need for a high standard of fairness, to see if there was any procedural unfairness, error of law, and/or any irrationality/failure to meet the enhanced Wednesbury test, which vitiates the TCAB Decision. In the process, I have borne in mind the aforesaid allegations of the Applicant.

16. After outlining the the relevant procedural and immigration history, including the relevant grounds and the Applicant’s overall case (Paragraphs 1 to 20) the TCAB/NRCPO set out the facts which it accepted, its approach to making findings on relevant factual matters and credibility (Paragraph 21), how it had assessed credibility (including on giving the benefit of the doubt), but also that on all of the evidence before it, the TCAB/NRCPO had “cumulatively significant concerns regarding the truth of central aspects of the claims and evidence advanced”, and that it would below set out its “concerns, considerations, assessment, reasons, and findings regarding the Applicant’s circumstances” below (Paragraphs 22 to 23).

17. The TCAB/NRCPO then proceeded to set out such matters. In doing so, it went into some detail on various salient issues with reference to evidence (including documents, COI, and oral evidence at the hearing) before it. Pursuant to such the TCAB/NRCPO found that the concerns were cumulatively significant and were not overcome by the Applicant’s responses or evidence overall, did not accept the evidence or truth of various central aspects of the claims made[5], and held that it was not satisfied that on the totality of the evidence before it that the Applicant faced a real risk of being harmed in Bangladesh in the reasonably foreseeable future for any of the reasons claimed or arising on the evidence (Paragraphs 24 to 53).

18. The TCAB/NRCPO then went on to consider Persecution Risk, BOR 3 Risk, BOR 2 Risk, and Torture Risk. It concluded (as it was entitled to and given its previous findings) that none of them were established. It then further concluded (again as it was entitled to) that the Applicant was not entitled to non-refoulement protection on the relevant grounds, refused her appeal/petition, and confirmed the Director’s Decision (Paragraphs 54 to 75).

19. Despite my aforesaid examination and scrutiny, I do not see that it is reasonably arguable that there is procedural unfairness (bearing in mind the need for a high standard of fairness), error of law, and/or irrationality/failure to meet the enhanced Wednesbury test which vitiates the TCAB Decision. This is particularly so as to the assessment, reasoning, and findings rejecting the Applicant’s evidence and facts underlying her claim, the risk of harm, and consequently Persecution Risk, BOR 3 Risk, and BOR 2 Risk, all of which are primarily within the province of the decision-making body.

20. In light of the above, I see no reasonably arguable grounds for judicial review which enjoy a realistic prospect of success, including any which could be premised on or related to the Applicant’s vague and unparticularised claim that the TCAB Decision was “unreasonable and unfair”.

Conclusion

21. In the circumstances, I have ordered that the Form 86 be amended as described above, and that the application for leave to apply for judicial review be dismissed.

Dated the 31^st day of July 2025

(Teresa Ng)
for Registrar, High Court

Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence

Notesfor the Applicant: If leave has been granted, the Applicant or his solicitors must:
a) serve on the respondent and such interested parties as may be directed by the Court the order granting leave and any directions given within 14 days after the leave was granted (Order 53, rule 4A); b) issue the originating summons within 14 days after the grant of leave and serve it in accordance with Order 53, rule 5; and c) supply to every other party copies of every affidavit which the Applicant proposes to use at the hearing, including the affidavit in support of the application for leave (Order 53, rule 6(5)).		Sent to the Applicant on the 31^st day of July 2025 EYEVE Applicant’s ref. no: Nil.		Sent to the Putative Respondent / the Putative Respondent’s solicitors / such Putative Interested Parties as may be directed by the Court / the Putative Interested Parties’ solicitors on the 31^st day of July 2025 Torture Claims Appeal Board / Non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office Putative Respondent’s ref. no.: USM 16257/19/9/13/B2080 Director of Immigration Putative Interested Party’s ref. no.: QA T/C 623/19 (formerly RBCZ 158/19) Department of Justice, Senior Assistant Law Officer (Civil Law) (Civil Litigation Unit 2)

Form CALL-1

[1] The risk of torture under Part VIIC of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap 115.

[2] The risk of violation of the right to life under article 2 of section 8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap 383.

[3] The risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment under article 3 of section 8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap 383.

[4] The risk of persecution with reference to the non-refoulement principle under article 33 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol

[5] Namely that the Applicant’s scars evidence the truth of any aspect of the claims made, that the Applicant witnessed a fatal attack on Kodu as she had claimed, that she had ever been an actual or perceived witness to such incident (or had been asked to be a witness in respect of such), that she had been abducted or raped, that she was the victim of a targeted assault on her return to Bangladesh in 2014, and that she was ever threatened, targeted for harm or actually harmed in Bangladesh for any of the reasons claimed.

EYEVE v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD / NON-REFOULEMENT CLAIMS PETITION OFFICE

Related cases with same parties

Files (2)

	consideration of the documents only; or
	consideration of the documents and oral submissions by the Applicant in open court;