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Miscellaneous Proceedings2020

LO FONG HUNG v. FUNG YUEN KWAN, VERONICA AND ANOTHER

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[2026] HKCFI 741-EN-2026-01-30

LO FONG HUNG v. FUNG YUEN KWAN, VERONICA AND ANOTHER

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HCMP 2219/2020

[2026] HKCFI 741

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS NO 2219 OF 2020

___________________

 IN THE MATTER of New Bright International Development Limited (the “Company”)
 and
 IN THE MATTER of Sections 723 to 725 of the Companies Ordinance (Cap. 622)

__________________

BETWEEN

 LO FONG HUNGPetitioner
 and 
 FUNG YUEN KWAN, VERONICA1st Respondent
 NEW BRIGHT INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT LIMITED 2nd Respondent
 (創輝國際發展有限公司) 

___________________

Before: Deputy High Court Judge MC Law, SC in Chambers
Dates of Written Submissions: 8 August 2025 and 22 August 2025
Date of Judgment: 30 January 2026

________________________

DECISION ON COSTS

________________________

A.  Introduction

1.  On 9 June 2025, this Court handed down judgment (“Judgment”)[1], holding that the Petitioner (“Madam Lo”) failed to discharge her burden of proof in establishing the Co-operation Agreement that she had concluded with Sam Pa. In the Judgment, it was further held that, even if, contrary to the findings on fact, the parties had entered into the Co-operation Agreement, Madam Lo also failed to establish that it was binding upon the 1st Respondent (“Ms Fung”).

2.  At §191 of the Judgment, this Court made a costs order nisi that the costs of and occasioned by the Preliminary Issue be paid by Madam Lo to Ms Fung, together with a certificate for three counsel, to be taxed if not agreed.

3.  On 23 June 2025, Ms Fung took out a Summons (“Ms Fung’s Summons”) for variation of the costs order nisi to the effect that such costs are to be paid forthwith.

4.  On the same day, Madam Lo also took out a Summons (“Madam Lo’s Summons”) for variation of the costs order nisi. The position of Madam Lo is that:-

(1)  there be no order as to costs of and occasioned by the Preliminary Issue;

(2)  the costs of Madam Lo’s Summons be paid by Ms Fung to Madam Lo, with certificate for two counsel, to be summarily assessed if not agreed; and

(3)  there be no order as to costs of Ms Fung’s Summons.

5.  The parties agreed that the said two Summonses should be disposed of on paper. Written submissions were filed accordingly.

6.  Ms Fung’s Summons is straight-forward. Her position is that costs should be paid forthwith. Very briefly, the arguments for Ms Fung may be summarized as follows:-

(1)  The successful party of a trial of preliminary issue(s) should have its costs and be entitled to have those costs assessed immediately: Greencore (UK) Holdings plc v Elemtis Plc [2005] EWHC 2139 (Comm) at §§5-6, per Aitkens J; Merck KGaA v Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp [2014] EWHC 3920 (Ch) at §6.

(2)  The amount at stake also justifies the expense of separate taxation and costs to be paid forthwith: Steadfast International Ltd v Tuenbo Co Ltd[2022] HKCFI 3578 at §11.

7.  On the other hand, Mr Wong SC,[2] counsel for Madam Lo, submits that the costs order nisi should be varied such that there should be no order as to costs and, on this basis, Ms Fung’s Summons would become academic. Alternatively, should this Court order Madam Lo to pay part or all of the costs of Ms Fung, Madam Lo has no objection to have the costs order varied such that the costs are paid forthwith.

8.  In the circumstances, I shall address Madam Lo’s Summons first.

B.  Madam Lo’s Summons

9.  Madam Lo’s arguments may be summarized as follows.

10.  First, given the parties have respectively lodged appeals[3] from the Judgment, this Court may consider waiting for the Court of Appeal to render its decision and clarify the position on the Co-operation Agreement Issue (as defined below) so as to avoid unnecessary expenses on taxation.

11.  Second, should the Court decide to resolve the matter now rather than to wait for the decision from the Court of Appeal, an issue-based approach should be adopted in considering costs. As contended for Madam Lo, there are 3 issues in these proceedings, namely (1) whether Ms Fung was at all material times a shareholder / director of the Company merely as Sam Pa’s nominees (“Nominee Issue”); (2) whether Madam Lo and Sam Pa had concluded the Co-operation Agreement (the “Co-operation Agreement Issue”); and (3) whether the Co-operation Agreement binds Ms Fung (the “Bindingness Issue”). The Issue-based approach is also consistent with Order 62, rule 5(1)(e) and (f) and rule 5(2).

12.  Relying on Pfeiffer GmbH v Cheng Hay Kit (unrep) CACV 245/2013, 29 October 2014 at §20 (per Kwan JA, as she then was), Mr Wong SC submits that an issue-based approach is more readily adopted after Civil Justice Reform because it encourages litigants to be selective as to the points they take and to decrease the costs of litigation. It is further argued that Madam Lo and Ms Fung each succeeded on one issue; and that the Bindingness Issue did not add much time; and thus there should be no order as to the costs of the trial of the Preliminary Issue (which reflects a rough and ready estimation). In this regard, Mr Wong SC also relies upon other cases[4] to support his contention that, when each party had succeeded on one issue and the issues are distinct, the Court of Appeal adopted an issue-based approach and made no order as to costs.  

13.  Mr Wong SC also argues that, in running the argument on the Nominee Issue, Ms Fung had significantly increased the length and costs of the proceedings. This is disputed by Ms Fung.

C.  Applicable principles

14.  It is well established that the discretion as to costs is to be exercised in a principled way with a view to reality and justice: YBL v LWC (No 2) [2017] 2 HKLRD 783 at §§9 and 10(c) per Lam VP (as Lam PJ then was), applying Mimi Far Kee Wong Hung v. Raymond Kin Sang Hung (unrep) FACV 10 and 11/2014, 7 July 2015 at [7], per Ma CJ.

15.  Further, under Order 62, rule 5, the court in exercising its discretion shall take into account the matters set out in rule 5(1) as may be appropriate in the circumstances of the case. Rule 5(2) highlights some conduct which the court may take into account, including whether it is reasonable for a party to take an issue, the manner in which the matter was pursued or defended and the extent of success: YBL (No 2) (above) §§10(d)-(e).

16.  The Court will take an overall view of the justice of the case to arrive at a suitable order. The court will not generally go into a minute examination of whether each issue, sub-issue, or arguments therein have been argued successfully by the parties: Cathay Pacific Airways Ltd v. Kwan Siu Wa Becky (unrep) FACV 5/2012, 26 July 2013 at §4.

17.  The Court should examine all the factors and circumstances, taking into account the extent to which a party has succeeded or lost as the case may be, the nature and basis of the case. This is to encourage litigants to be selective as to the points they take and to decrease the costs of litigation: Pfeiffer GmbH v Cheung Hay Kit (unrep) CACV 245/2013, 29 October 2014, at §§8, 19-20, per Kwan JA.

18.  Nonetheless, the discretion to deprive a successful party of his/her costs is to be approached with due circumspection so as not to undermine the utility of the general rule that costs follow the event. Too ready a departure from the general rule encourages unnecessary arguments which will itself increase costs: Pony HK World Ltd v Vand Petro-Chemicals (BVI) (unrep), FACV 4/2013, 18 March 2014 at §4.

19.  Whilst the costs are in the unfettered discretion of the court, costs should normally follow the event. The general rule does not cease to apply just because the successful party raises issues on which he fails. After all, costs are not to be decided according to a score sheet on how many issues have gone one way or another: Yiu Hon Lam v. Chan Yu Chun (unrep) CACV 383/2007, 15 January 2009, §23 per Tang VP (as he then was); Happy Fish Co Ltd v Tang Jeb Ming[2023] HKCFI 600, §3, per DHCJ Jonathan Chang SC.

20.  Whilst one may adopt an issue-approach in an appropriate case, such approach also has its limits. For instance, in Merck KGaA (above) at §9, Nugee J said this:-

“… Mr Hollingworth refers to the fact that the Defendants succeeded on the issue-within-an-issue” of what may be called compendiously the federal law point. I accept that in some cases the Court can take the view that a party that has succeeded overall should not recover all its costs if it has lost on some sub-issues. But there is a limit to which this principle can be taken. I do not regard it as appropriate in this case to drill down below the overall issue of “what is the proper law” to “does the agreement have any connection with New Jersey law or only federal law”? If that were to be done, the Claimant could equally well say that I largely, although not wholly, accepted its position on the various matters addressed by the experts eg whether the District Court was applying State law in any meaningful sense, or would have applied federal choice-of-law rules. Any issue of any complexity is likely to involve sub-issues and sub-sub-issues on which one side or other has the better of the argument: this is not by itself a reason for departing from the general rule. …”

21.  Similarly, in Pigot v The Environment Agency [2020] Costs LR 825 at §6(1), Stephen Jourdan QC (sitting as a Judge of the High Court) said this:-

“The mere fact that the successful party was not successful on every issue does not, of itself, justify an issue-based costs order. In any litigation, there are likely to be issues which involve reviewing the same, or overlapping, sets of facts, and where it is therefore difficult to disentangle the costs of one issue from another. The mere fact that the successful party has lost on one or more issues does not by itself normally make it appropriate to deprive them of their costs.”

D.  Discussion

D1.  Should the question of costs be adjourned?

22.  First, Mr Wong SC’s argument that the matter be adjourned pending the determination of the Court of Appeal’s determination on the appeal and cross-appeal has no merits and should be dismissed straight away. The question here is one of incidence of costs rather than taxation. It is trite that an appeal does not operate as a stay. As such, the fact that the parties had lodged appeal by itself is no justification for this Court to withhold the decision of costs pending the outcome of the appeal.

23.  Further, the fact is that Madam Lo has not taken out any application for stay of taxation pending appeal.

D2.  Reality and justice of the case

24.  The reality and justice do not provide for any justification as to why Madam Lo could avoid the costs consequences.

25.  The hearing is a trial of the Preliminary Issue. Madam Lo as the Petitioner failed to establish the Co-operation Agreement, both on the facts and on the law.

26.  As rightly submitted by Ms Natalie So,[5] counsel for Ms Fung, it is incorrect for Madam Lo to characterize the question of nomineeship as a separate and distinct issue. It is contrary to the position that Madam Lo took at the trial of the Preliminary Issue (i.e. that the question of nomineeship was “part and parcel” of the question as to whether the Co-operation Agreement existed). The substantial facts and evidence adduced by Madam Lo during the hearing of the Preliminary Issue addressed both the questions of whether Ms Fung was merely a nominee of Sam Pa; and whether the Co-operation Agreement was concluded between Madam Lo and Sam Pa.

27.  Similarly, as apparent from the Judgment, I accept the argument advanced for Madam Lo at the hearing of the Preliminary Issue that the question of nominee forms part and parcel of the Preliminary Issue, i.e. whether the Co-operation Agreement was concluded between Madam Lo and Sam Pa. This question cannot be brushed aside when the Court had to consider the factual dispute as to whether the Co-operation Agreement was concluded between Madam Lo and Sam Pa.

28.  Further, Mr Wong SC’s argument cannot stand, when it is unrealistic to dissect the evidence for the purpose of the issues and sub-issues in the present case. The evidence on nomineeship was entangled with the other factual issues and formed part of the big picture for the Court to determine if the oral Co-operation Agreement was concluded between Madam Lo and Sam Pa.

D3.  Whether Ms Fung significantly increased the costs of the trial

29.  Mr Wong SC argues that Ms Fung had significantly increased the length and costs of the proceedings by raising the Nomineeship Issue. A schedule is also placed before this Court setting out the respective amount of evidence, submissions and time spent on the various issues. With respect, this argument has no merits. Madam Lo essentially asks this Court to determine the matter like a score sheet, which is objectionable in the light of Yiu Hon Lam (above) §23 per Tang VP (as he then was) and Happy Fish Co Ltd (above) at §3, per DHCJ Jonathan Chang SC.

30.  I also do not accept Madam Lo’s argument that Ms Fung had significantly increased the length and costs of the proceedings by raising the Nominees Issue. Instead, it is Madam Fong who put in a lot of materials on matters such as Madam Lo’s involvement in companies (including pictures with various senior political figures) in order to establish the existence of the Co-operation Agreement. Madam Lo also saw fit to adduce expert evidence on the family law in Cambodia. With respect, such evidence was not germane to any issues here and unnecessarily complicates the matter.

D4.  Other matters

31.  The cases that Mr Wong relies upon, such as Kung Kwok Wai David (above) and Cheng Sing Keung (above) are very different from the present one. In Kung Kwok Wai David (above), the question before the court was whether the costs order made was an order nisi or an order absolute; and whether a successful plaintiff should be ordered to pay the costs of an unsuccessful defendant. Such issues do not arise in the present case. Similarly, in Cheng Sing Keung (above), the Court of Appeal held that an issue-based approach could be adopted on the question of costs in that case, when the issues involved were distinct; and the 1st defendant in that case was not even involved in one of the issues litigated between the plaintiffs and the other defendants ; and that the plaintiffs only succeeded on one issue with only nominal damages: see Cheng Sing Keung §§9(1)-(3).  

32.  In any event, ultimately the question of costs is a matter of discretion and essentially turns on how the discretion is to be exercised in the light of the facts of the case. I discern no principles of law from those cases which support Madam Lo’s case.

33.  In the premises, I am not persuaded that the costs order should be varied in the manner as argued for Madam Lo. Her Summons should be dismissed with costs.

E.  Ms. Fung’s Summons

34.  Given my determination on Madam Lo’s Summons as set out above, Ms Fung’s Summons should be allowed such that Madam Lo has to pay the costs in respect of and occasioned by the Preliminary Issue forthwith.

35.  There is no dispute between the parties that there should be no order as to costs on Ms Fung’s Summons; and I so order.

F.  Conclusion

36.  In conclusion, I make the following order:-

(1)  Ms Fung’s Summons be allowed; and the costs order nisi be varied, such that the costs of and occasioned by the Preliminary Issue be paid by the Petitioner to the 1st Respondent forthwith, together with a certificate for three counsel, to be taxed if not agreed.

(2)  There be no order as to costs on Ms Fung’s Summons.

(3)  Madam Lo’s Summons is dismissed.

(4)  Costs of and occasioned by Madam Lo’s Summons be paid by Madam Lo to Ms Fung, summarily assessed at HK$160,000, to be paid forthwith.

  (MC Law, SC)
Deputy High Court Judge

Dr William Wong SC, Mr Christopher Chain SC, Ms Sharon Yuen and Mr Jiang Zixin, instructed by Sit, Fung, Kwong & Shum, for the Petitioner

Ms Natalie So and Mr Alexander Burg, instructed by Dentons Hong Kong LLP, for the 1st Respondent

The 2nd Respondent, New Bright International Development Limited, acting in person and absent



[1]  Unless otherwise stated, the abbreviations used in the Judgment shall be adopted herein.

[2]  Together with Mr Christopher Chain SC, leading Ms Sharon Yuen and Mr Jiang Zixin.

[3]  Mr Wong SC made it plain in his skeleton argument that Madam Lo’s respondent notice was “purely responsive” to Ms Fung’s appeal.

[4]  Kung Kwok Wai David v The Commissioner of Estate Duty [2022] 1 HKLRD 965 and Cheng Sing Keung v Chan Ka Hay[2024] HKCA 288.

[5]  Together with Mr Alexander Burg

[2025] HKCFI 3101-EN-2025-07-17

LO FONG HUNG v. FUNG YUEN KWAN, VERONICA AND ANOTHER

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HCMP 2219/2020

[2025] HKCFI 3101

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS NO 2219 OF 2020

______________________

 IN THE MATTER of New Bright International Development Limited (the “Company”)
 and
 IN THE MATTER of Sections 723 to 725 of the Companies Ordinance

(Cap. 622)

______________________

BETWEEN

 LO FONG HUNGPetitioner
 and 
 FUNG YUEN KWAN, VERONICA1st Respondent
 NEW BRIGHT INTERNATIONAL 2nd Respondent
 DEVELOPMENT LIMITED  
 (創輝國際發展有限公司) 
 and 
 CHIU YEE MUI Intended
 (招綺梅)Intervener

______________________

Before: Deputy High Court Judge MC Law, SC in Chambers
Date of Hearing: 1 November 2023
Dates of Written Submissions: 2, 3 and 6 November 2023
Date of Ruling on Costs: 17 July 2025

______________________

RULING ON COSTS

______________________

A.  Introduction

1.  This is my ruling on costs in respect of the Summons dated 13 October 2023 (“Summons”) taken out by the Intended Intervener (“Madam Chiu”) for leave to intervene in the trial of the preliminary issue in these proceedings (the “Trial”).

2.  The background facts have already been set out in my recent decision on the Preliminary Issue, i.e. [2025] HKCFI 2351. For the present purpose, the salient ones may be stated as follows.

3.  The 2nd Respondent (the “Company”) was at all material times a company incorporated in Hong Kong, with an issued share capital of HK$10,000 divided into 10,000 shares of HK$1.00 each. The Petitioner (“Madam Lo”) has been a shareholder holding 3,000 shares of the Company, whereas the 1st Respondent (“Ms Fung”) has been holding the remaining 7,000 shares of the Company. It is Madam Lo’s case that Ms Fung has been holding the said 7,000 shares as a nominee for one Sam Pa (“Sam Pa”).

4.  On 1 November 2022, Mr. Justice A Chan made an order directing that there be a trial of the preliminary Issue, namely, whether the Co-operation Agreement as pleaded in paragraph 20 of the Petition was entered into between Madam Lo and Sam Pa. The Trial was scheduled to be heard before me from 17 November 2023 (with 8 days reserved).

5.  Madam Chiu is the wife of Sam Pa. She made 2 affirmations for Madam Lo for the purpose of the Trial. On 13 October 2023, Madam Chiu took out the Summons for leave to intervene in these proceedings together with consequential directions. The Summons was returnable before me on 1 November 2023, only about two weeks before the Trial. In the Summons, Madam Chiu applied for, inter alia, the adjournment of the Trial and for further directions including the filing of pleadings, exchange of lists of documents and witness statements on the issue of the ownership of 7,000 shares of the Company (registered under the name of Ms Fung).

6.  The Summons was supported by Madam Chiu’s 3rd Affirmation. Madam Chiu took out the Summons on the following basis:-

(1)  She had commenced divorce proceedings against Sam Pa in September 2023; and that she would seek ancillary relief against the estate of Sam Pa, which would include the 7,000 Shares in question.

(2)  She would testify for Madam Lo at the Trial; and that this Court may have to make findings on whether Ms Fung was holding the 7,000 shares on trust for Sam Pa. As such, Madam Chiu was concerned that she may be prejudiced if there would be some form of estoppel against her when she will be adducing evidence on the issue of the ownership of the 7,000 shares.

7.  At the hearing of the Summons on 1 November 2023:-

(1)  Madam Lo did not oppose Madam Chiu’s Summons.

(2)  Upon the offer of undertakings from Ms Fung not to rely upon any issue estoppel of any findings in these proceedings against Madam Chiu in the matrimonial proceedings, Mr Mok SC, Leading Counsel for Madam Chiu, accepted that this would be sufficient to allay the concern of Madam Chiu. On the basis of the undertakings as agreed between Madam Chiu and Ms Fung, I made an Order dismissing the Summons.

8.  At the hearing, it was agreed between Madam Lo and Madam Chiu that there be no order as to costs. Thus, the only outstanding question is one of costs between Madam Chiu and Ms Fung. Ms Fung seeks costs against Madam Chiu with a certificate for three counsel to be taxed on an indemnity basis. It is contended for Madam Chiu that there should be no order as to costs. I do not intend to rehearse the parties’ arguments here. Suffice it to say that I have considered the parties’ written submissions filed for this purpose.

B.  Submissions and ruling

9.  On question of costs, it is not disputed that question of costs is a matter of the discretion of the Court. It is also trite that the Court can take into account the parties’ conduct. In the present case:-

(1)  I see no justification for Madam Chiu to intervene in the Trial. To accede to the application would have the serious effect of derailing the Trial.

(2)  If Madam Chiu’s concern is one that she would give evidence at the Trial and that any ruling on the question of the beneficial ownership of the 7,000 shares may prejudice her position in the divorce proceedings, I do not see why she had to seek leave to intervene and to adjourn the Trial, especially when Madam Lo has already been represented by a team of four counsel (with two Senior Counsel).

(3)  I agree with the submissions of Mr Dawes SC that there was inexplicable and undue delay on the part of Madam Chiu in taking out the Summons. This inevitably caused significant disruption to the parties’ preparation for the Trial.

(4)  Further, as submitted by Mr Dawes SC, which I agree, there is the much more cost-effective route of simply writing to Ms Fung’s solicitors to seek the relevant confirmations or undertakings. Even after the Summons had been taken out, there was still ample time for Madam Chiu to raise her concern through correspondence and see if any appropriate undertakings can be provided by Ms Fung in that regard. Yet it is not clear why Madam Chiu and her legal team never saw fit not to pursue this much cheaper and much more cost-effective alternative.

10.  In these circumstances, Ms Fung also seeks certificate for three counsel and costs to be taxed on an indemnity basis. I agree. Whilst Mr Mok SC argues that there should be no order as to costs, as no undertakings were ever offered by Ms Fung to Madam Chiu until the hearing of the Summons, the fact remains that Madam Chiu and her legal team had never asked for such undertakings through correspondence, whether before or after the issue of the Summons. Given the vast volume of documents (including numerous legal authorities) produced by Madam Chiu’s legal team at this eleventh hour application, Madam Chiu has no basis to resist the application for certificate for three counsel, when she herself also instructed a team of three counsel at the hearing.

11.  In the circumstances, Madam Chiu should pay Ms Fung the costs of and occasioned by the Summons on indemnity basis together with a certificate for three counsel. A statement of costs was provided for Ms Fung, seeking in total a sum of HK$992,764 (representing counsel fees of HK$423,000 and solicitors’ fees of HK$562,970 for a team of 4 fee earners, one trainee solicitor and one litigation clerk). Mr Mok SC contends that the sum is excessive and an appropriate sum should be HK$400,000.

12.  Taking into account all the circumstances and adopting a broad-brush approach, I tax the costs down to a sum of HK$680,000 and I so order. Such costs are to be paid by Madam Chiu to Ms Fung forthwith.

  (MC Law, SC)
Deputy High Court Judge

Ms Sharon Yuen and Mr. Jiang Zixin, instructed by Sit, Fung, Kwong & Shum, for the Petitioner

Mr Victor Dawes SC, leading Ms Natalie So and Mr Alexander Burg, instructed by Dentons Hong Kong LLP, for the 1st Respondent

The 2nd Respondent, New Bright International Development Limited, acting in person and absent

Mr Johnny Mok SC, leading Ms Theresa Chow and Ms Jennifer Fan, instructed by KCL & Partners, for the Intended Intervener

[2025] HKCFI 2351-EN-2025-06-09

LO FONG HUNG v. FUNG YUEN KWAN, VERONICA AND ANOTHER

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[2022] HKCFI 3788-EN-2022-11-01

LO FONG HUNG v. FUNG YUEN KWAN, VERONICA AND ANOTHER

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HCMP 1668/2020 & HCMP 2219/2020
(Heard together)

[2022] HKCFI 3788

HCMP 1668/2020

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS NO 1668 OF 2020

_______________________

 IN THE MATTER of New Bright International Development Limited (the “Company”)
 and
 IN THE MATTER of sections 431, 570 and 610 of the Companies Ordinance, Cap 622

_______________________

BETWEEN

 FUNG YUEN KWAN, VERONICAPlaintiff
 and 
 NEW BRIGHT INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT LIMITEDDefendant
 and 
 LO FONG HUNG1st Intervener
 WANG XIANGFEI2nd Intervener

_______________________

HCMP 2219/2020

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS NO 2219 OF 2020

_______________________

 IN THE MATTER of the New Bright International Development Limited (the “Company”)
 and
 IN THE MATTER of Sections 723 to 725 of the Companies Ordinance (Cap 622)

_______________________

BETWEEN

 LO FONG HUNGPetitioner
 and 
 FUNG YUEN KWAN, VERONICA1st Respondent
 NEW BRIGHT INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT LIMITED
(創輝國際發展有限公司)
2nd Respondent

_______________________

(Heard Together)

Before:  Anthony Chan J in Chambers

Date of Hearing:  1 November 2022

Date of Decision:  1 November 2022

________________

D E C I S I O N

________________

1.  These are my short reasons for acceding to the application of Mr Dawes SC (appearing with Ms So for Ms Veronica Fung) to have the interim injunction application, which is to be heard tomorrow, adjourned. With the benefit of hearing counsel, the proposition that there should be a trial of primary issue, with the rest of the proceedings be stayed, is agreeable to the parties. I think that the stay should also apply to the interim injunction summons. That summons was filed on 1st December 2022. On 4th December 2020, directions were given by the court for substantive argument and filing of evidence.

2.  There was considerable delay in the filing of evidence, but it has to be said that the delay, which I will elaborate a little further, cannot be blamed solely upon Ms Fung because the fact that Ms Fung might have delayed in filing her evidence would not have inhibited Madam Lo to have a hearing fixed for the argument of the summons.

3.  As the events unfolded, Madam Lo only sought to fix a date for the argument on 26 July 2022, which was more than one and a half years after taking out the summons. In the meantime, there were two directors appointed by Ms Fung. They are her brothers by the name of Baton and Harry, and they were appointed respectively in December 2021 and January 2022. Prima facie, there is no reason why Ms Fung should not have done so when she is the majority owner of the company in question, and there was no prosecution of the injunction application.

4.  However, Baton’s appointment had resulted in the issue of another set of proceedings by Madam Lo to challenge the same. With respect, I take the view that this was indiscriminate use of the court’s scarce resources. It should not be countenanced by the court, and it reflects rather poorly on the need for the interim injunction.

5.  It is an important backdrop to this dispute between Ms Fung and Madam Lo that they had generated no less than 8 sets of proceedings in this court. Madam Lo’s case is fundamentally premised upon an oral cooperation agreement based on which she is said to be entitled to equal participation in the management of the company despite being only a minority shareholder. This has become the central dispute which applies to almost all of the 8 sets of proceedings between the parties. Given the agreement of the parties, and I shall order in a moment, that there should be a preliminary trial as to whether or not such a cooperation agreement existed, I do not see in the circumstances before the court that the injunction summons calls to be resolved in parallel. Such resolution would engage a good deal of the court’s resources.

6.  There are two points that I should add to what I have already said. Firstly, I agree with Mr Dawes that it is evident from the terms of injunction sought that they have been overtaken by events, namely, the appointment of Baton and Harry. Hence, in order to be effective it is imperative for Madam Lo to seek additional relief in her summons. Secondly, I think it is quite clear from the chronology of events that Ms Fung’s evidence did not cover the appointment of her brothers as additional directors, and therefore the evidence in that regard is lacking. I think this deficiency in the evidence would likely impact upon the feasibility of deciding the summons tomorrow.

  ( Anthony Chan )
Judge of the Court of First Instance
High Court

Mr Victor Dawes SC and Ms Natalie So, instructed by Dentons Hong Kong LLP, for the Plaintiff in HCMP 1668/2020 and the 1st Respondent in HCMP 2219/2020

Mr William Wong SC, Mr Christopher Chain, Ms Sharon Yuen and Mr Jiang Zixin, instructed by Sit, Fung, Kwong & Shum for the 1st - 2nd Interveners in HCMP 1668/2020 and the Petitioner in HCMP 2219/2020

The Defendant in HCMP 1668/2020 and the 2nd Respondent in HCMP 2219/2020 were not represented and did not appear