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Criminal Appeal2021

HKSAR v. AGBANYIM EMEKA PRINCE

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[2024] HKCA 583-EN-2024-07-15

HKSAR v. AGBANYIM EMEKA PRINCE

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CACC 261/2021

[2024] HKCA 583

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF APPEAL

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO 261 OF 2021

(ON APPEAL FROM HCCC NO 162 OF 2020)

_______________

 HKSARRespondent
 v 
 Agbanyim Emeka PrinceApplicant

_______________

Before: Hon Zervos, M Poon JJA and Andrew Chan J in Court
Date of Hearing: 28 June 2024
Date of Judgment: 28 June 2024
Date of Reasons for Judgment: 15 July 2024

__________________________________

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

__________________________________

Hon Zervos JA (giving the Reasons for Judgment of the Court):

1.  On 11 November 2021, the applicant was unanimously convicted by a jury before Deputy Judge Derek Chan SC (the judge) of one count of trafficking in a dangerous drug, contrary to section 4(1)(a) and (3) of the Dangerous Drugs Ordinance, Cap 134. He was sentenced to 28 years and 2 months’ imprisonment.

2.  This was a renewal application for leave to appeal against conviction. At the conclusion of the hearing, we refused the application and dismissed the appeal. We also ordered three months loss of time. We said we would hand down our reasons for our decisions in due course and this we now do.

The prosecution case

3.  The present case concerns a seizure of 6.061 kilogrammes of methamphetamine hydrochloride (commonly known as Ice), inside Room A, Flat B, 5/F of Wai Lee Building in Hung Hom (“Room A”), to which the applicant had access with a key.

4.  At the material times, the applicant was a Form 8 recognizance holder who was not permitted to work in Hong Kong.[1] In the afternoon of 19 August 2019, he was intercepted by the police in the vicinity of the Wai Lee Building for an enquiry. In response, he led the police to Room A. With a key in the applicant’s possession, the police gained entry to Room A and conducted a search.

5.  Inside Room A, the police found a Reebok bag lying on the floor next to the bed, which contained two plastic bags of Ice in the quantities stated in the indictment and an electronic scale. The total street value of the Ice at that time was $2,842,987.[2]

6.  The applicant was arrested for the offence of trafficking in a dangerous drug. It was an admitted fact that two tenancy agreements in respect of Room A (for the period between 1 August 2018 and 31 July 2019 (Exhibit P11) and between 1 August 2019 to 31 August 2020 (Exhibit P12) respectively) were seized inside Room A.[3] They were in the applicant’s name and listed his telephone number, 66420253.[4] The landlady testified that the tenancy had been renewed on the same terms by the same tenant upon the expiry of the first term.[5] The tenant produced his Form 8 document as a means of identification. This document was related to the applicant. She checked the photograph on the document to make sure that it was the same person.[6] The tenant put his name on the two tenancy agreements and also signed them in her presence. She said it was the same person each time.[7] She explained that part of the rent was paid by the government directly into her bank account and the remaining part was paid to her by the tenant.[8] It was not in dispute that the tenant was the applicant who had renewed the tenancy 18 days prior to the finding of the drugs in Room A.

7.  It was an admitted fact that the applicant’s DNA were found on the two packets of Ice and the electronic scale.[9]

8.  On the evening of 19 August 2019, the applicant participated in a video recorded interview (VRI) with the assistance of an Igbo/English interpreter. Its admissibility was not in dispute at the trial.[10] In the VRI, the applicant denied knowing about the Reebok bag and the Ice. He did not know why the bag was there or who left it there. He said he lived elsewhere at the time, but an African male called “Jumbo” would sometimes come and stay at Room A. He said that “Jumbo” had stayed in Room A the previous week. He did not have the number of “Jumbo” nor did he know where he was. He claimed that he and “Jumbo” each possessed a key to Room A; he had recently demanded that “Jumbo” return the key to him but was told that it had been lost. The applicant also confirmed that he was the signatory to the two tenancy agreements.[11]

The defence case

9.  The applicant did not give evidence or call any witnesses. He essentially adopted what he said in his VRI and denied knowing about the Reebok bag that contained the drugs.[12]

10.  In presenting the defence case, the applicant’s trial counsel submitted that there was no evidence as to when the applicant last stayed at Room A. It was suggested that there was a possibility of contamination of the applicant’s DNA on the electronic scale and the two packs of Ice by the police in the course of the house search.[13] In particular, trial counsel contended that the applicant’s DNA could have been indirectly transferred onto the exhibits when the police officer used the same pair of gloves to search Room A, handling the exhibits and moving them to the corridor to photograph them.[14]

The case history

11.  On 18 November 2021, the applicant filed an application for leave to appeal against conviction (Form XI). In his home-made grounds of appeal he listed three matters supporting his leave application. First, the prosecution presented a false document to the jury in the form of a Sim card that was relied upon by the prosecution to invite the jury to question “my truthfulness and alleged that I lied in my VRI about the time I started using the Sim card”. Secondly, the judge misdirected the jury when he told them “I said that I never live in the apartment where police claimed that the alleged drugs were found, while I never disputed that the apartment is under my name and I live there as well”. He added that this admission could be confirmed by the Admitted Facts and also in the VRI. Thirdly, he referred to the case report of his trial counsel and solicitor and said that he would be filing more grounds in the future after receiving the Appeal Bundle. Significantly, he maintained that he lived in Room A as confirmed in the Admitted Facts and the VRI, and made no complaint against his legal representatives about the conduct of his case. It was not until considerably later that he made sweeping allegations against his legal representatives at trial, accusing them of not explaining the Admitted Facts and not challenging the VRI, contrary to his instructions, which formed the main focus of his appeal against conviction.

12.  On 9 May 2022, the applicant filed Perfected Grounds of Appeal, in which he complained about the flagrant incompetency of his legal representatives at trial and the insufficiency of evidence for his conviction. He had previously listed a litany of complaints against his legal representatives in a 14 page affidavit dated 19 April 2022. In response, the applicant’s trial counsel, Mr Michael Arthur (Mr Arthur), filed an affirmation dated 7 June 2022 and solicitor, Mr Gerard Morada (Mr Morada), filed an affidavit dated 7 June 2022, both strongly refuting the applicant’s allegations against them. The applicant filed an affidavit in reply dated 11 October 2022. The applicant alleged that his lawyers did not challenge the VRI, contrary to his instructions; failed to explain the Admitted Facts to him properly; and misled him not to testify and decided not to call his girlfriend to give evidence on his behalf. However, the applicant’s allegations were decisively contradicted by the production of several written instructions signed by the applicant.

13.  The applicant’s leave application was heard on 14 February 2023 before the Single Judge[15]. He appeared in person, having had legal aid refused. The Single Judge addressed the applicant’s eight grounds of appeal, which he summarised as follows:

(1)  The applicant’s trial lawyers failed to act on his instructions to “completely oppose” the production of the VRI, which was “badly polluted”, involuntary and unfairly influenced by the Igbo interpreter present;

(2)  The trial lawyers failed to address the police officers’ improper conduct in the course of the arrest and house search;

(3)  The trial lawyers wrongly advised him not to testify, and “decided” on his behalf that his girlfriend would not testify;

(4)  The trial lawyers failed to explain the contents of the Admitted Facts to him, which he did not understand or admit at all;

(5)  The trial lawyers failed to question the police witnesses about forcing and detaining him inside a “Gogo Van” after his arrest;

(6)  The judge wrongly directed the jury on the evidence of the DNA as being against the applicant;

(7)  The judge acted unfairly by allowing leading questions to be asked in the examination-in-chief of the police witnesses, in particular as to whether there was a valid search warrant, and by failing to direct the jury not to speculate as to the reasons for not answering some of the questions; and

(8)  There was insufficient evidence to convict.

14.  The Single Judge, in his judgment dated 17 February 2023, comprehensively addressed the applicant’s grounds, dismissing them as not reasonably arguable, soundly rejecting the applicant’s allegations against his legal representatives. He put the applicant on notice of the court’s power to order the loss of any time that he had spent in custody pending an unmeritorious renewal of his leave application, particularly if he renewed his allegations of flagrant incompetence against his legal representatives at trial.

15.  On 14 February 2023, the applicant filed a renewal of his leave application (Form XIII). In this document, he was reminded of the court’s power to make a loss of time order. Since the filing of his renewal application, the applicant had submitted numerous letters, requesting additional material and lodging further complaints. Eventually, in a letter dated 26 May 2023, he listed what he described as Amended Perfected Grounds of Appeal, which can be summarised as follows:

(1)  Ground 1 consists of three parts and complains of the ineffective assistance the applicant received from his legal representatives: Ground 1A (the previous Ground (1) in the leave application), alleges that trial counsel failed to challenge the admissibility, voluntariness and fairness of his VRI as there were irregularities that took place during the VRI caused by the wrong interpretation and bad interference of the Igbo interpreter (Mr Harry Donatus Ozuma (Mr Ozuma)); Ground 1B (the previous Ground (3) in the leave application), alleges that trial counsel inadequately advised the applicant as to the strength of the prosecution case, which enticed him not to give evidence and deprived him of calling his defence witness (who attended court but was not allowed to give evidence); Ground 1C (the previous Ground (4) in the leave application), alleges that the legal representatives at trial failed to adequately explain the court procedures and the importance of the Admitted Facts;

(2)  Ground 2 complains that the judge failed to ensure that the case file or the jury bundle be provided to the applicant and the court appointed interpreter to assist him in the conduct of his case; and

(3)  Ground 3 avers that the tenancy agreement (Exhibit P12) is false and fresh evidence in the form of three letters from the International Social Service, Hong Kong (ISS-HK), can prove this to be the case and also disprove the evidence of the landlady (PW1).

16.  In a letter dated 25 September 2023, the applicant requested in respect of Ground 1B that Ms Uhryssa Limos Ubando (Ms Ubando) be called to give evidence concerning his allegations that she was not called to give evidence on his behalf by his legal representatives. He also requested that the trial counsel and solicitor be called to give evidence in the hearing of his renewal application. In a letter dated 13 June 2024, he withdrew a previous complaint concerning his consent for a buccal swab.

The renewal application

17.  At the hearing of the renewal application, the Igbo interpreter assigned to the proceedings was Mr Ozuma, who informed the court that he was the subject of a complaint by the applicant on his grounds of appeal. After a brief discussion, the applicant confirmed that he wished to conduct the hearing in English. It was apparent that he was proficient in English as he was able to formulate his grounds and complaints in his letters, understand questions asked of him and provide detailed answers in the hearing.

Ground 1

18.  In Ground 1, the applicant alleged that his trial counsel, Mr Arthur and his trial solicitor, Mr Morada were flagrantly incompetent.

19.  In Ground 1(A), the applicant complained that Mr Arthur erred in disregarding his instructions and not challenging the VRI, notwithstanding that he was fully aware of the “irregularities” that rendered it involuntary. The “irregularities” mainly referred to the “wrong interpretations and bad interference” by the Igbo interpreter during the course of the VRI, which he argued undermined his right of silence.

20.  The applicant further argued that Mr Arthur’s legal advice that the VRI was exculpatory and could not incriminate him, induced him not to pursue the issue of the voluntariness of the VRI, contrary to his instructions, and eventually agreed not to challenge its admissibility. In the end, both the prosecution and the judge made prejudicial remarks of parts of his VRI to the jury.

21.  In Ground 1(B), the applicant contended that Mr Arthur failed to properly advise him regarding the strength of the prosecution case, which enticed and caused him to refrain from giving evidence. In particular, Mr Arthur advised the applicant not to give evidence, adding that the prosecution evidence was “full of doubts” and the applicant would risk giving contradictory evidence to the defence case. The applicant submitted that Mr Arthur’s advice was plainly wrong, since there was a “virtual certainty to convict” unless he testified: R v Ho Ling and Another[16]. We note that the legal representatives stated that they discussed the case in detail with the applicant and this was confirmed by the signed written instructions.

22.  In addition, the applicant alleged that Mr Arthur and Mr Morada “unfairly deprived” him of the right to call his own defence witness, Ms Ubando, to testify even though she was prepared to do so on 10 November 2021.[17] In the written instructions dated 9 November 2021 that Mr Arthur and Mr Morada stated that he signed and had interpreted to him, his signature appeared alongside the item that he had been advised by his lawyers of his right to call witnesses in his trial and did not want his girlfriend to be his defence witness. He claimed he did not sign the instructions and the signature was not his. He submitted that in the interests of justice, Mr Arthur, Mr Morada and Ms Ubando should be summoned to give evidence on this matter.

23.  In Ground 1(C), the applicant complained that his legal representatives failed to adequately explain to him the court procedures and significance of the Admitted Facts. He said before he signed the Admitted Facts, he was not told that it was conclusive and could be used by the prosecution against his interest. We note that this complaint was contradicted by the statements of the legal representatives and the signed written instructions.

24.  The respondent submitted that the applicant had failed to establish that his legal representatives were flagrantly incompetent as required in Chong Ching-yuen v HKSAR[18] and HKSAR v Li Xiaoxiang[19]. There was no basis to find that the legal representatives had acted contrary to the applicant’s instructions.

25.  It was submitted that Ground 1(A) could not stand in the face of the applicant’s signed instructions. As explained by Mr Arthur, the applicant gave an exculpatory account in his VRI, and in any event, there was nothing in the circumstances that affected the voluntariness of the VRI. It was noted that the applicant’s claim that he “gave in” against his instructions to challenge the VRI was different from what he said in the leave application that his signatures were “fabricated”. The respondent submitted that such a dramatic change in the applicant’s account demonstrated a lack of credibility on his part. As for Ground 1(B), the jury was directed properly that they could not use the applicant’s silence against him, so his right of silence was safeguarded. It was pointed out that Ms Ubando only arrived after the close of the defence case, and never confirmed that she would be a defence witness. As for the Ground 1(C), it was not supported by the applicant’s signed instructions. They showed that the contents of the Admitted Facts had been explained to him before he signed it. Moreover, the Admitted Facts were read out and interpreted by the Igbo interpreter to the applicant in open court.

26.  As noted by the Single Judge, the applicant by his grounds of appeal was effectively seeking to resile from the signed written instructions he gave to his legal representatives; the formal admissions he made in the Admitted Facts; and the admissibility of the VRI and the admissions he made regarding the tenancy agreements he signed for Room A. In doing so, he cast aspersions on the conduct and competence of his legal representatives and the conduct and fairness of the police and the Igbo interpreter, Mr Ozuma, used during the taking of the VRI. He had even alleged that the signatures on the written instructions dated 9 November 2021 were not his, implying that they were fabricated. This document set out relevant matters as to the conduct of his case and a confirmation of his instructions not to give evidence or call any other witnesses, specifically mentioning that he did not want to call his girlfriend, Ms Ubando, as a witness.

27.  Mr Arthur and Mr Morada, in their respective responses, denied all of the applicant’s allegations and contended that they had acted to his instructions and in his best interest in the trial. In support, they exhibited a set of written instructions interpreted to the applicant and signed by him at the various stages of his trial. It was plain that the contents of these instructions were in direct contradiction to what the applicant contended in seeking to appeal his conviction.

28.  The written instructions dated 23 October 2021 consisted of a copy of the Admitted Facts, which was signed and dated by the applicant, confirming that the Admitted Facts had been read to him in Igbo and that he understood and agreed with the contents. The Igbo interpreter was Mr Ifeanyichukwu C Nduka, who signed the document.

29.  The following written instructions were interpreted to the applicant by a different Igbo interpreter, Mr Benjamin Emeka Udogwu, who signed the documents. The written instructions dated 1 November 2021 confirmed that the applicant’s participation in the VRI was voluntary, having been advised regarding the advantages and disadvantages of challenging the VRI. It was stated that he did not wish to challenge the admissibility of the VRI. The written instructions dated 3 November 2021 reaffirmed that the applicant did not wish to challenge the admissibility of the VRI. The written instructions dated 5 November 2021 confirmed that the applicant was satisfied with the cross-examination of the police witness (PW2) and had no further questions to be asked of him. The written instructions dated 8 November 2021 confirmed that the applicant had provided instructions which he discussed with counsel in respect of the cross-examination of the police witness (PW3). The written instructions dated 9 November 2021, listed a number of matters on which the applicant had been advised. He signed the document and the various amendments. It was stated that the contents of the document had been translated to him in Igbo and he confirmed that what was set out were his instructions. It was signed by him and dated. As we have already noted, it was signed by the interpreter, who confirmed that he had interpreted the document to the applicant in Igbo. It confirmed that at the end of the prosecution case, the applicant was advised of the strengths and weaknesses of the prosecution’s evidence, his right to give evidence and call a witness as well as the advantages and disadvantages. He acknowledged that he did not want to call his girlfriend as a defence witness, and his “own detailed account of the events that transpired during my arrest and the conduct of my VRI would not be known to the members of the jury unless I give evidence.” Having made this acknowledgement, the applicant confirmed that his instructions were that he did not wish to give evidence or call a witness.

30.  In his affidavit, Mr Morada further explained that he took a statement from Ms Ubando on 5 September 2021 and kept her informed as to when she should attend court to give evidence in the defence case but she did not confirm her attendance, repeatedly claiming that she needed permission from her employer. This was explained to the applicant who confirmed his instructions in writing that he did not wish to call Ms Ubando as a witness. It was the day after the applicant had signed his instructions not to call Ms Ubando and when the judge was summing up to the jury that she attended court.

31.  The applicant complained that the Igbo interpreter, Mr Ozuma, during the VRI had misinterpreted the caution inducing him to answer questions, interrupted him causing him to answer questions inappropriately, and answered some of the questions on his behalf. We have already noted that the applicant did not take issue as to the voluntariness of his VRI and the position that he took before us was contrary to his written instructions. He highlighted that during his VRI he was asked to confirm whether the signatures on the tenancy agreement were his, and the interpreter responded “Yes, it’s my signature”, when he did not utter a word. That is not entirely correct for it is recorded that he was shown the two tenancy agreements and when that question was asked he said “Mm”.[20] It may be by his gesture and response he was affirming that the signatures were his. Moreover, when considering the applicant’s answers as a whole, he did not take issue with the fact that he was the tenant of Room A. The attempt by the applicant to distance himself from the renewed tenancy agreement was contrary to his case at trial and an effort to retry his case on an entirely new point unsupported by the evidence. It was highly relevant that no issue was taken by him when evidence was led that the signatures on the two tenancy agreements belonged to him, and the position that he took before us on this matter was completely contradicted by his signed written instructions. Furthermore, when he listed his grounds of appeal in the Form XI dated 18 November 2021, he made no complaint about this matter, but instead complained that the judge misdirected the jury when he told them that he said “I never live in the apartment”, and that “I never disputed that the apartment is under my name and I live there as well”, adding that this admission could be easily confirmed in the Admitted Facts and the VRI.

32.  We did not consider it necessary to call witnesses to give evidence before us because we accepted the statements of Mr Arthur and Mr Morada, which were supported by the circumstances of the case and the written instructions that we accepted were signed by the applicant.

33.  We had no reason to doubt the authenticity of the written instructions and that the applicant signed and agreed with the contents contained in them. This ground of appeal was totally devoid of merit.

Ground 2

34.  The applicant complained that the judge failed to provide him with the case files or jury bundle, and the interpreter was unable to interpret the proceedings to him effectively. He claimed that as a result of being denied the case files or jury bundle from the outset he was kept in the dark as to the progress of the trial and his right to a fair trial was prejudiced: HKSAR v Moala Alipate[21]. However, the applicant acknowledged that on the second day of the trial (2 November 2021) he was provided with a jury bundle upon the interpreter’s request, which he said he shared with the interpreter.

35.  As pointed out by the respondent, the applicant was represented by a legal team of three counsel and one instructing solicitor, who actively assisted the applicant in presenting the defence case. This was evident by the record of the proceedings where counsel on behalf of the applicant agreed to the Admitted Facts, examined witnesses and presented the defence case in his closing address to the jury. It was also evident from the signed written instructions that the applicant was kept informed and consulted about the case alleged against him and how best to present his defence to the jury.

36.  We found no substance in the applicant’s claim that he was kept in the dark regarding the progress of his case as the record of the proceedings and the signed written instructions clearly showed that he was well aware of what was taking place during the trial and giving instructions as to how his case should be presented.

Ground 3

37.  The applicant challenged the authenticity of the tenancy agreement produced at the trial (Exhibit P12) and argued that he was not the tenant of Room A at the material time. He contended that Exhibit P12 was “entirely unknown to me” and he had not executed the renewed tenancy agreement, although he acknowledged that he signed the first tenancy agreement (Exhibit P11).[22]

38.  The applicant took issue with the landlady’s evidence and how it was summed up by the judge to the jury. He argued that the landlady in examination in chief testified that the tenancy agreements were signed by the applicant in her presence and she could not remember or was unsure whether she attended the government offices. He argued that in cross-examination, she testified that the tenancy agreements were signed at the government offices in Kwun Tong in the presence of a government official, and this was how the judge summed up this aspect of her evidence to the jury. As noted in the summing-up, the judge explained that this was what she said in cross-examination, and the jury would have appreciated the totality of her evidence. He complained that there were inconsistencies with her evidence, however the defence case was that he executed the renewed tenancy agreement, but another person called “Jumbo” had stayed at the flat and left the bag of drugs there. Hence, there was no real issue with her evidence.

39.  The applicant also sought to renew his application to file three letters[23] purportedly issued by the International Social Service, Hong Kong, (ISS-HK) as new evidence, pursuant to section 83V of the Criminal Procedure Ordinance (Cap 221). These letters appeared to be issued in response to the applicant’s request for a copy of the tenancy agreements of Room A for the period “2018 to 2019” and “2019 to 2020”. Attached to one of the letters was a tenancy agreement that was purportedly submitted to ISS-HK by the applicant for the period between “2018 to 2019” (the first tenancy agreement). However, it was stated that they were unable to provide the tenancy agreement for the period “2019 to 2020” as there was no record that the document had been kept by the agency.

40.  According to the applicant, the significance of these letters was that the non-existence of a copy of the renewed tenancy agreement in the ISS-HK records could have impacted the credibility of the landlady, and thereby undermined the prosecution case that he had just renewed the tenancy for Room A and was the tenant at the material time of the offence. Furthermore, he complained that there were discrepancies between the two tenancy agreements, his first name had been misspelt in the renewed tenancy agreement (missing “n” in Agbanyim), and the handwriting and signatures were different. It was not in dispute that the applicant had a key to Room A, and the police found the two tenancy agreements inside the room. He said he did not see the Reebok bag in the room as he was not sleeping in his house. He explained that he previously lived with another person called “Jumbo” in Room A for at least three months. He said he did not know where “Jumbo” was living, but he would come and stay with him. “Jumbo” told him that he wanted to live at Room A as the applicant had another room elsewhere. He said there was a recent misunderstanding between them, and he told “Jumbo” to return the key to the room. “Jumbo” could not find the key, so the applicant left it. He said that “Jumbo” would still come to Room A but not as often. The last time he saw “Jumbo” was a week before his arrest.[24]

41.  The applicant repeated his complaint that he did not state in his VRI that he had signed the two tenancy agreements. As we have already stated, this was an attempt by the applicant to distance himself from the renewed tenancy agreement, which was contrary to his case at trial and the evidence.

42.  The respondent submitted that, as the applicant had admitted signing Exhibit P12 in his VRI, which was further accepted as voluntary and admissible in the Admitted Facts, there was no basis on which to adduce the letters as new evidence on appeal. We agreed.

43.  This ground of appeal is without merit.

Loss of time

44.  We had no hesitation in rejecting the applicant’s serious allegations against his legal representatives at trial. The allegations were completely undermined and shown to be untrue by written instructions signed by the applicant and also signed by the trial Igbo interpreter as having been interpreted to him, who was not the interpreter when he was interviewed by the police. When faced with the signed written instructions, the applicant then alleged that he had not signed the documents and that the signatures were false. To persist after his complaints had been completely answered by the legal representatives and soundly rejected by the Single Judge at the leave hearing, was a gross abuse of the court procedures and warranted a loss of time order. The applicant had been informed of the risk of such an order at the outset of the proceedings, and when called upon at the conclusion of the hearing why it should not be made against him, he was unable to provide any plausible explanation, other than to repeat his complaint against his conviction and that he was seeking justice. It was evident that the applicant’s grounds were not only unmeritorious, but also lacked credibility.

Conclusion

45.  For the foregoing reasons, we found no merit or substance whatsoever in the appeal grounds and dismissed the applicant’s appeal against conviction. We also considered that the renewal application centred on an unjustified attack on the applicant’s legal representatives and unmeritorious grounds that warranted a loss of time order of three months.

(Kevin Zervos)
Justice of appeal
(Maggie Poon)
Justice of Appeal
(Andrew Chan)
Judge of the Court of First Instance

Mr Benny Wong, SADPP, of the Department of Justice, for the respondent

The applicant appeared in person



[1]  Admitted Facts, at [2], Appeal Bundle (AB), p 4.

[2]  Admitted Facts, at [7], AB, p 5.

[3]  Admitted Facts, at [8], AB, p 5.

[4]  AB, p 35Q-R.

[5]  AB, pp 67-74.

[6]  AB, p 70A-C.

[7]  AB, pp 72P-73I.

[8]  AB, p 29F-O.

[9]  Admitted Facts, at [14], AB, p 13.

[10]  Admitted Facts, at [9]-[11], AB, pp 5-6.

[11]  AB, pp 34F-36I.

[12]  AB, p 23A-D.

[13]  AB, pp 8S-9E.

[14]  AB, p 22D-J.

[15]  [2023] HKCA 217, per Macrae ACJHC.

[16]  R v Ho Ling and Another, unrep., CACC 327/1994, 31 January 1996.

[17]  As pointed out by the Single Judge, according to the clerk’s log, the defence confirmed the applicant would not give evidence nor would he call defence witness at 12 pm on 9 November 2021 – which is consistent with the applicant’s signed instructions dated 9 November 2021; and the prosecution started his closing speech at 10 am on 10 November 2021. Hence, by the time his then girlfriend arrived, the defence case was already closed.

[18]  Chong Ching-yuen v HKSAR (2004) 7 HKCFAR 126.

[19]  HKSAR v Li Xiaoxiang (2018) 21 HKCFAR 272.

[20]  Video Recorded Interview dated 19 August 2019, counters 894-909.

[21]  HKSAR v Moala Alipate [2019] 3 HKLRD 20.

[22]  See the applicant’s Amended Perfected Grounds of Appeal dated 26 May 2023.

[23]  The letters are dated 13 January 2022, 23 March 2022 and 14 June 2022, all addressed to the applicant.

[24]  AB, pp 34H-36I.

[2023] HKCA 217-EN-2023-02-17

HKSAR v. AGBANYIM EMEKA PRINCE

HTML content

CACC 261/2021

[2023] HKCA 217

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF APPEAL

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO 261 OF 2021

(ON APPEAL FROM HCCC NO 162 OF 2020)

________________________

BETWEEN

 HKSARRespondent
 and 
 AGBANYIM Emeka PrinceApplicant

________________________

Before: Hon Macrae Acting CJHC in Court
Date of Hearing: 14 February 2023
Date of Judgment: 14 February 2023
Date of Reasons for Judgment: 17 February 2023

____________________________________

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

____________________________________

(A)  Introduction

1.  This is an application for leave to appeal conviction. At the trial below, the applicant faced an indictment containing a single count of Trafficking in a Dangerous Drug, contrary to section 4(1)(a) and (3) of the Dangerous Drugs Ordinance, Cap 134. The offence arose out of the seizure of 6.061 kg of methamphetamine hydrochloride (commonly known as “Ice”) found inside Room A, Flat B, 5/F of Wai Lee Building in Hung Hom, Kowloon (“Room A”), to which the applicant had access with a key.

2.  The applicant pleaded not guilty to the offence and was tried in the High Court before Deputy Judge Derek Chan SC (“the judge”) and a jury. On 11 November 2021, he was unanimously convicted and subsequently sentenced to 28 years and 2 months’ imprisonment.

3.  By way of a Form XI Notice signed on 18 November 2021, the applicant applied for leave to appeal his conviction only. At the hearing of the application, I refused leave to appeal and said that I would hand down my reasons for doing so in due course. These are my reasons.

(B)  The trial

The prosecution case

4.  At all material times, the applicant was a Form 8 Recognizance Holder, who was accordingly not permitted to work in Hong Kong[1]. In the afternoon of 19 August 2019, he was intercepted by police officers in the vicinity of Wai Lee Building in Hung Hom. Upon enquiry, he led the police to Room A. By means of a key produced by the applicant, the police successfully gained entry to Room A and conducted a search.

5.  Inside the room, the police found a Reebok sports bag lying on the floor next to the bed, which contained two plastic bags of Ice in the quantities set out in the indictment, as well as an electronic scale. The total street value of the Ice at that time was HK$2,842,987[2].

6.  The applicant was arrested for the offence of Trafficking in a Dangerous Drug. It was an admitted fact that two tenancy agreements in respect of Room A (for the period 1 August 2018 to 31 July 2019, and 1 August 2019 to 31 August 2020 respectively) were seized in the premises at the time: they were produced as Exh P11 and Exh P12[3]. The landlady of the premises testified that both agreements had been signed by her and the tenant personally, and the tenancy had been renewed on the same terms by the same tenant, upon the expiry of the first term[4]. If the landlady’s evidence was accepted, this would mean that the tenancy had been renewed by the applicant a mere 18 days before the present offence.

7.  Further, it was an admitted fact that the applicant’s DNA was found on one of the two plastic bags of Ice and the electronic scale[5].

8.  Between 21:34 and 23:08 hours on 19 August 2019, the applicant participated in a video recorded interview (“VRI”), with the assistance of an Igbo interpreter. Its admissibility was not in dispute at the trial below[6]. In the VRI, the applicant denied knowing anything about the Reebok bag or the Ice. Nor did he know why the bag was there, or who had left it there. He said he was living elsewhere at the time, but another African male called “Jumbo” would sometimes come and stay in Room A. As it happened, Jumbo had stayed at Room A the previous week. Nevertheless, the applicant did not have the contact number of Jumbo, nor did he know where he was. He claimed that he and Jumbo each possessed a key to Room A; he had recently demanded that Jumbo return the key to him but was told that it had been lost. The applicant also confirmed in the VRI that he was the signatory to the two tenancy agreements[7].

The defence case

9.  The applicant did not give evidence, nor did he call any witnesses. Essentially, he adopted what he had said in his VRI and denied knowledge of the Reebok bag containing the Ice in question[8].

10.  The applicant’s trial counsel, Mr Michael Arthur, submitted on his behalf that there was no evidence as to when he had last stayed at Room A; and suggested that there was a possibility of contamination of the applicant’s DNA on the electronic scale and the packet of Ice by police officers in the course of their search of the premises[9]. In particular, Mr Arthur suggested that the applicant’s DNA could have been indirectly transferred onto the items when the police officer used the same pair of gloves to search Room A, handle the exhibits and move them to the corridor outside for the purpose of taking photographs[10].

(C)  The grounds of appeal

11.  The applicant is unrepresented. However, by an affirmation filed on 20 April 2022, Perfected Grounds of Appeal filed on 18 May 2022 and Grounds of Appeal filed on 7 June 2022, the applicant has advanced a number of grounds of appeal. The grounds fall into two broad categories. The first alleges flagrant incompetence on the part of his legal representatives at trial; the second complains that he was deprived of a fair trial. The grounds may be summarised as follows:

(1)  The applicant’s trial lawyers failed to act on his instructions to “completely oppose” the production of the VRI, which was “badly polluted”, involuntary and unfairly influenced by the Igbo interpreter present;

(2)  They failed to address the police officers’ improper conduct in the course of the arrest and house search;

(3)  They wrongly advised him not to testify, and “decided” on his behalf that his girlfriend would not testify;

(4)  They failed to explain the contents of the Admitted Facts to him, which he did not understand or admit at all;

(5)  They failed to question the police witnesses about forcing and detaining him inside a “Gogo Van” after his arrest;

(6)  The judge wrongly directed the jury on the evidence of the DNA as being against the applicant;

(7)  The judge acted unfairly by allowing leading questions to be asked in the examination-in-chief of the police witnesses, in particular as to whether there was a valid search warrant, and by failing to direct the jury not to speculate as to the reasons for not answering some of the questions; and

(8)  There was insufficient evidence to convict.

To these grounds, the applicant has added before me, in oral submissions, that his legal representatives had failed to obtain certain CCTV evidence showing the entrance to the building in question; and failed to put before the jury the fact that the electronic scale had been left behind by the previous tenant, which might also have accounted for his DNA on the article.

(D)  The trial representatives’ response

12.  Pursuant to the directions of Master Chung made on 18 May 2022, Mr Arthur and Mr Gerard Morada, the applicant’s solicitor at trial, have respectively filed evidence in response to the applicant’s allegations. Both have denied those allegations and contend that they had acted fully on the applicant’s instructions, and in his best interests, throughout the trial. They have further exhibited a set of instructions purportedly signed by the applicant (although the applicant disputes his signatures on the document) in respect of the conduct of the trial. It is apparent that the applicant’s instructions, if they are indeed his, confirm, amongst other things, the following matters:

(1)  The Admitted Facts had been read to the applicant in Igbo. He understood the contents and agreed with them[11];

(2)  His participation in the VRI was voluntary, and having been “advised of (the) advantages and disadvantages of challenging the VRI”, he did “not wish to challenge the VRI”[12];

(3)  In respect of the cross-examination of the police witnesses, the applicant had provided his lawyers with a set of instructions, which they had discussed with him. He was “satisfied” with the way Mr Arthur had dealt with the cross-examination of (PW2)[13], and agreed to “leave it to the professional discretion of my lawyers to conduct the cross-examination of PWs and ask questions as he sees fit and advantages to my case”[14]; and

(4)  At the end of the prosecution case, the applicant had been advised of the strengths and weaknesses of the prosecution’s evidence, his right to give evidence and call witnesses and the advantages and disadvantages of doing so. He directed that he did not want his girlfriend to be called as a defence witness, and specifically acknowledged that his “own detailed account of the events that transpired during my arrest and the conduct of my VRI would not be known to the members of the jury unless I give evidence”. He instructed that he did not wish to give evidence or call any other witness[15].

13.  In his affirmation, Mr Arthur further explains how he had advised the applicant not to challenge the VRI as it was voluntary and exculpatory. In the end, the matter was laid to rest as the applicant confirmed his instructions not to challenge it. In respect of those parts of the VRI that were prejudicial, or in the applicant’s words “highly polluted”, they were redacted upon Mr Arthur’s application to the judge. Mr Arthur recalls, having watched the redacted version of the VRI with the applicant, that he received no complaint from him.

14.  In view of the fact that the seizure of the Ice was not disputed, Mr Arthur considers the important issues at trial were essentially “how they got there” and the possibility of secondary transfer of DNA. Accordingly, the alleged improper access and conduct by the police were merely “peripheral” to the issues in the case. In any event, he did cross-examine the prosecution witnesses on those allegations, but they were all denied. As confirmed in the signed instructions dated 5 and 8 November 2021, the applicant was satisfied with the way his defence was conducted and made no complaint regarding the matter.

15.  Mr Arthur further recalls that, at the end of the prosecution case, he had duly advised the applicant about his right to give evidence, and warned that if he chose not to do so, his version of events would not be heard by the jury. Ultimately, the applicant decided not to testify. Mr Arthur also denies having discouraged the applicant’s girlfriend from testifying for the defence; on the contrary, the applicant instructed him that he did not want her to testify.

16.  Mr Arthur also recalls that on 23 October 2021, he explained the contents and the significance of the Admitted Facts to the applicant; and further, on 2 November 2021, the judge explained the same to him in open court with the assistance of the official Igbo interpreter. The Admitted Facts reflected precisely the applicant’s instructions and at no stage had the applicant raised any query about, or objection to, them.

17.  With regards to the issue of the Gogo Van, Mr Arthur avers that ultimately, the applicant accepted that he was kept inside an unmarked police vehicle, and not a Gogo Van. The police witnesses were cross-examined on this issue and they confirmed that the vehicle was in fact an unmarked police vehicle. In any event, the alleged events, which took place inside the unmarked police vehicle, all preceded the VRI and did not have impact on its voluntariness.

18.  Mr Morada, in his affidavit, adopted Mr Arthur’s version of events and added that the applicant’s girlfriend had not indicated at any stage of the trial that she could attend the court to testify. In the end, the applicant’s girlfriend appeared only after the judge had begun his summing-up to the jury.

(E)  The applicant’s further reply and section 83V application

19.  As may be seen by his affidavit filed on 11 October 2022, the applicant entirely disagrees with his trial representatives’ version of events. He disputes that the instructions exhibited to their evidence were the “correct instructions”, and claims that some of the contents were even “unknown” to him. Before me, the applicant disputed the several signatures attributed to him on the signed instructions.

20.  By another affidavit filed on 21 September 2022 and a letter filed 12 October 2022, the applicant also seeks to file new evidence pursuant to section 83V of the Criminal Procedure Ordinance, Cap 221. Attached to the new evidence application are three letters[16] purportedly issued by the International Social Service Hong Kong (“ISS HK”), in response to the applicant’s request for the copy of the tenancy agreements in respect of Room A for the period 2018 to 2019 and 2019 to 2020.

21.  The following matters may be discerned from the replies of ISS HK. Firstly, the tenancy agreement, which the applicant submitted to ISS HK for the period 2018 and 2019 was located in their records and was duly provided to him as requested; however, secondly, they were unable to provide the tenancy agreement for the period 2019 to 2020 because “there was no record of the said document kept in our agency”.

22.  The significance of the new evidence is said to be that the absence, or non-existence, of the said tenancy in the ISS HK records could undermine the prosecution case that he had in fact renewed the tenancy for Room A shortly before the offence and was the tenant at the time of the offence, as alleged by the prosecution.

23.  The applicant also disputes the authenticity of Exh P12. He contends that the tenancy agreement produced at trial in respect of the period 2019 to 2020 was “entirely unknown to him” and was “not signed by him”. By comparing it with Exh P11, he alleges one can readily see the obvious differences in content, handwriting and signatures.

24.  The applicant maintains that he only discovered the issue concerning Exh P12 after he had “carefully reviewed and scrutinised all the relevant documents” following his conviction.

(F)  The response of the respondent

25.  Mr Dominic Ngai, on behalf of the respondent, opposes the present application. He submits that the applicant has failed to discharge the heavy burden involved in establishing the flagrant incompetence of his trial representatives, or to show that he has been deprived of a fair trial. In particular, he invites the court to accept the accounts given by Mr Arthur and Mr Morada, and reject the applicant’s version in its entirety. He argues that the accounts of his trial representatives are supported by the clear, contemporaneous and signed instructions of the applicant. With the assistance rendered by the defence Igbo interpreter throughout the trial, it is inconceivable that the applicant could have been kept in the dark about developments in the trial as he now claims. Mr Ngai submits that none of the applicant’s grounds of appeal has any merit.

Ground 1

26.  As is apparent from the signed instructions, the applicant’s allegation that he had opposed the production of the VRI is simply untrue. As pointed out by Mr Arthur, the account of events contained in the VRI was exculpatory, and the applicant had himself seen the redacted version in open court and raised no complaint. Further, the judge had properly reminded the jury that the VRI, apart from any incriminating parts, also contained explanations.

Ground 2

27.  Mr Ngai submits that Mr Arthur was clearly aware of the allegations of improper access and conduct by the police, and had cross-examined the prosecution witnesses on those matters. In any event, he argues that those allegations were peripheral to the main issue in the case, which was how the applicant’s DNA came to be deposited on the electronic scale and one of the packets of Ice.

Ground 3

28.  It is the respondent’s position, as confirmed by the applicant’s signed instructions, that the applicant had been given full and proper legal advice following the close of the prosecution case. Mr Arthur then conducted the defence case pursuant to his instructions not to testify or to call his girlfriend as a witness. Further, in his summing-up, the judge had properly directed the jury that they must not assume anything from the applicant’s decision not to give evidence, and invited them to consider the explanations contained in his VRI. There is simply no merit in this ground.

Ground 4

29.  Mr Ngai argues that the applicant’s allegations regarding the Admitted Facts are simply untrue in the wake of his clear, signed instructions. The trial representatives had advised and explained the effect of the Admitted Facts to the applicant; furthermore, the document in its final form was read and interpreted to him in open court, and then admitted to by him personally before the judge.

Ground 5

30.  Mr Ngai contends that Mr Arthur had discharged his duty properly in cross-examining the police witnesses regarding the applicant’s alleged detention in a Gogo Van, which was in fact an unmarked police vehicle. Besides, whatever the applicant’s instructions were regarding those events, they all preceded his voluntary participation in the VRI, which was accepted as voluntary in the Admitted Facts.

Ground 6

31.  It is the respondent’s argument that Mr Arthur had already done his best in cross-examination of the police witnesses and government chemists by suggesting several possible ways that there might have been secondary transfer of DNA to the electronic scale and drugs. In his summing-up, the judge had set out the evidence in this regard, and fairly reminded the jury that the DNA evidence did “not in itself prove that the defendant committed the offence”[17].

Ground 7

32.  It is submitted that Mr Arthur conducted the applicant’s defence according to his instructions and in his best interests. Furthermore, as confirmed by his signed instructions, he had entrusted the matter of the cross-examination of the important exhibits officer to the professional judgment of his counsel.

33.  Mr Ngai further argues that leading questions are not prohibited in criminal trials. For instance, the questions now complained about only had the effect of confirming the applicant’s acknowledgment of the seizure, as opposed to his knowledge of the Ice, which would clearly have been objectionable. Besides, the judge reminded the jury that the applicant claimed to have no knowledge of the Ice in his VRI[18]; while, of the police officers’ credibility, he said, “the fact that they are officers does not mean that their evidence is more credible or less credible than other witnesses”[19]. It is submitted that the applicant could not have been prejudiced in any way.

Ground 8

34.  Mr Ngai submits that the sufficiency of the evidence was an issue for the jury. In his summing-up, the judge gave a detailed summary of the evidence and the points made in the closing speeches of counsel. The judge correctly used the absence of fingerprint evidence, and of CCTV footage and telephone records as examples to illustrate the point that it was not open to the jury to speculate as to what this absent evidence might be, or to fill in any gaps in the evidence. Above all, the jury were properly reminded that they were to decide, on the whole of the evidence, whether the prosecution had made them sure of the applicant’s guilt.

35.  Finally, Mr Ngai draws to my attention the decision of the Court of Final Appeal in Chong Ching Yuen v HKSAR[20] and submits that the crucial question before any appellate court will be whether the applicant had a fair trial. He argues that the directions to the jury were fair, accurate and comprehensive. Further, as supported by their evidence on appeal, the trial representatives had discharged their duties diligently and conducted the defence in accordance with their instructions. Besides, there was nothing in the circumstances to suggest that the applicant, who had the benefit of experienced legal representation and interpretation, did not fully understand the trial proceedings. The applicant has, therefore, failed to show that he was deprived of a fair trial.

(G)  Consideration

36.  The applicant is, by his grounds of appeal, now effectively seeking to resile from: (i) the signed instructions he gave to his trial representatives; (ii) the formal admissions he made in the Admitted Facts; and (iii) the admissibility of the VRI and the admissions he made therein (for example, as to the signing of the tenancy agreements). In so doing, he has sought to cast aspersions on the conduct and competence of his legal representatives, and the conduct and fairness of the police and Igbo interpreter used during the taking of the VRI, in an effort to undermine the Admitted Facts and the admissibility of the VRI. He has even gone so far as to suggest that the signatures on his instructions on 9 November 2021 have somehow been fabricated. It can be seen that his position has changed dramatically since the trial and his conviction.

37.  In the Admitted Facts, which were agreed to and read out at trial, the applicant had admitted the following matters relevant to the present application:

(1)  His identity and Form 8 status;

(2)  The seizure of drugs (there was no admission as to where they had been seized) by the exhibits officer, and its associated chain of evidence;

(3)  The narcotic weight and the street value of the Ice in question;

(4)  The seizure of two tenancy agreements inside Room A for the relevant periods, and their formal production at the trial as Exh P11 and Exh P12;

(5)  The formal production of the VRI at trial, which was accepted as voluntary and made with the assistance by an Igbo interpreter; and

(6)  The findings of the applicant’s DNA on the electronic scale and one of the packets of Ice.

38.  It is to be remembered that Section 65C(3) of the Criminal Procedure Ordinance stipulates that:

“An admission under this section for the purpose of proceedings relating to any matter shall be treated as an admission for the purpose of any subsequent criminal proceedings relating to that matter (including any appeal or retrial)”. (Emphasis supplied)

The Court in HKSAR v Tam Ho Nam[21] at [91] has recently emphasised that admissions, which have been formally and solemnly made under section 65C, are rightly made very difficult to withdraw; and only then, with the leave of the court. I cannot on the material before me see any reasonable argument that the applicant might successfully withdraw such admissions.

39.  The carefully chronicled instructions signed by the applicant, and meticulously kept by the legal representatives, suggest that he was kept well informed of the progress and development of his trial as it progressed, with the assistance of an interpreter. Moreover, in accordance with standard court procedure, the Admitted Facts were read out in the applicant’s presence in open court without demur[22]. At no stage did the applicant raise any concern or complaint about the accuracy (or inaccuracy) of the Admitted Facts, until after he had lodged his leave application following conviction. Accordingly, an appellate court would normally continue to regard the matters recorded therein as conclusively proved: this point is particularly relevant to his present challenge to the admissibility of the VRI and Exh P12.

40.  Furthermore, the above admissions are consonant with the applicant’s signed instructions; and Mr Arthur’s tactics and conduct of the defence at trial were also consistent with those instructions. Given that the applicant had never raised any complaint about the conduct of his case or his legal representatives as the trial progressed, an appellate court might have great difficulty in concluding that the signed instructions were not an accurate record of the applicant’s instructions at trial. The allegations of flagrant incompetence are not reasonably arguable, given the very careful and diligent steps taken by the applicant’s legal representatives to ensure not only that the applicant gave them appropriate instructions but that they faithfully followed those instructions.

41.  In view of the matters set out in the Admitted Facts and the prosecution case, issues such as the Gogo Van allegations, the damage to the door of the premises and the demeanour of the Igbo interpreter were not significant issues in the case. Mr Arthur cannot realistically be criticised for taking the view that they did not advance the defence case. Indeed, arguably, such issues undermined the case he was trying to present to the jury. Mr Arthur’s tactic of not concentrating on peripheral matters but focussing on the possible secondary transfer of DNA, was arguably a wise one and properly within his discretion given the applicant’s written instructions.

42.  As for the complaint about the VRI, the fact is that it contained the gist of the applicant’s defence in the absence of his evidence; accordingly, it is difficult to fault Mr Arthur’s tactic in not challenging it, especially given the applicant’s clear instructions that it was voluntary. In any event, it remains a matter of speculation as to what the applicant and his girlfriend might have said (on top of what was contained in the VRI), had they testified. For present purposes, given that his VRI was admitted into evidence, alongside counsel’s cross-examination and submissions on the possibility of secondary transfer of DNA, the important aspects of his defence would have been properly considered by the jury.

43.  As for the new suggestion made to me in oral argument that the electronic scale was left behind by the previous tenant, as a result of which the applicant may have touched it, I cannot see how counsel could have advanced such an explanation without the applicant giving evidence or, at least without the suggestion appearing in the VRI, which it did not.

44.  The applicant has failed to make out a reasonably arguable case of incompetence, let alone flagrant incompetence, on the part of his trial representatives. On the contrary, an appellate court might be particularly struck by the care and conscientiousness with which his legal representatives obtained, confirmed and carried out their clear instructions.

45.  Nor can I see any reasonably arguable ground that the applicant did not get a fair trial.

46.  The applicant’s challenges to the fact of leading questions, and the judge’s failure to direct on certain matters in the summing-up, are not reasonably arguable. It appears that leading questions were only asked regarding matters that were not in dispute. At trial, the applicant had the benefit of having a defence team of three counsel, a solicitor and a defence interpreter. Yet none of them reacted to the alleged unfairness and prejudice which is said to have arisen in the course of the trial. In any event, the time to make complaints about leading questions is at the trial, not at the appeal.

47.  Finally, the judge’s summing-up on the evidence was accurate and his directions on the applicable principles were correct. In its overall effect, the summing-up seems comprehensive, fair and balanced.

48.  As for the applicant’s wish to adduce fresh evidence as to the tenancy of the premises, I cannot see an appellate court acceding to such an application, even assuming it fulfilled the other requirements under section 83V of the Criminal Procedure Ordinance, when the applicant has already admitted signing the tenancy agreements in his VRI, which was accepted as voluntary and admissible in the Admitted Facts.

(H)  Conclusion

49.  Accordingly, I refused leave to appeal on any of the grounds advanced before me. I further advised the applicant at the hearing that he has the right to renew his application for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal, but he is also warned that the Court has the power to order the loss of any time which the applicant has spent in custody pending his appeal, if it were to come to the conclusion that there was no justification for the renewal of the application. I should also add, in the context of this particular case, that where allegations of flagrant incompetence against legal representatives at trial are renewed at the appeal and found by the Court to be wholly unjustified, the Court will normally consider an order for loss of time.

  (Andrew Macrae)
Acting Chief Judge of the
High Court

Mr Dominic Ngai SPP, of the Department of Justice, for the Respondent

The Applicant appeared in person



[1]   Admitted Facts [2] at AB, p 4.

[2]   Admitted Facts [7] at AB, p 5.

[3]   Admitted Facts [8] at AB, p 5.

[4]   AB, pp 67-74.

[5]   Admitted Facts at [13], at AB, p 6.

[6]   Admitted Facts at [9]-[11], at AB, pp 5-6.

[7]   AB, pp 34F-36I.

[8]   AB, p 23A-I.

[9]   AB, pp 8S-9E.

[10]  AB, p 22D-J.

[11]  The applicant’s signed instructions dated 23 October 2021.

[12]  The applicant’s signed instructions dated 1 November 2021 and 3 November 2021.

[13]  The applicant’s signed instructions dated 5 November 2021.

[14]  The applicant’s signed instructions dated 8 November 2021.

[15]  The applicant’s signed instructions dated 9 November 2021.

[16]  Respectively dated 13 January 2022, 23 March 2022 and 14 June 2022, all addressed to the applicant.

[17]  AB, p 22K-U.

[18]  AB, p 23E-K.

[19]  AB, p 20Q-U.

[20]  (2004) 7 HKCFAR 126.

[21]  [2021] 5 HKLRD 367.

[22]  2 November 2021.