Case Detail

HCAL 172/2021

[2026] HKCFI 491

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO 172 OF 2021

________________________

BETWEEN
	Baig Naseem	Applicant
	and
	Torture Claims Appeal Board / Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office	Putative Respondent
	and
	Director of Immigration	Putative Interested Party

________________________

Before:

Deputy High Court Judge (Non-refoulement Claims) Philips Wong in Chambers

Date of Hearing:	12 January 2026
Date of Decision:	30 January 2026

________________________

D E C I S I O N

________________________

Introduction

1. The Applicant is a national of Pakistan. He arrived in Hong Kong illegally on 30 November 2006.

2. The Applicant made a torture claim on 24 March 2007. The claim was rejected on 16 August 2013. The Applicant did not appeal against the decision. On 5 June 2013, the Applicant lodged a claim for non-refoulement under the Unified Screening Mechanism.

3. On 13 November 2018, the Director of Immigration refused the Applicant’s non-refoulement claim. The Applicant’s subsequent appeal to the Torture Claims Appeal Board / Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office (the “Board”) was dismissed on 13 January 2021 (the “Board’s Decision”).

4. By Form 86 filed on 18 February 2021, the Applicant applied for leave to apply for judicial review against the Board’s Decision (the “Leave Application”). The hearing of the Leave Application took place on 20 October 2025 but the Applicant did not attend the hearing.

5. By the decision dated 20 November 2025 ([2025] HKCFI 5621) (the “Court’s Decision”), this Court dismissed the Leave Application on the ground that the Applicant’s intended challenge to the Board’s Decision is not reasonably arguable with any realistic prospects of success.

6. By the Summons filed on 19 December 2025, the Applicant applied for an extension of time to appeal against the Court’s Decision, as the 14‑day period for him to file the appeal under Order 53 rule 3(4) of the Rules of the High Court had expired (the “Application”).

7. The Application was heard on 12 January 2026 and the Applicant attended in person. At the said hearing, when being asked about the delay in making the Application, the Applicant said he has never received the Court’s Decision.

8. The Applicant further contended that there have been further problems after the Board’s Decision. He alleged that his wife and child were killed by the opposite party around 2 to 3 years ago. Apart from that, the Applicant said he had nothing to say in respect of the Application.

Discussion

9. In considering whether to extend the time to appeal, it is trite that the court will take into account: (1) the length of the delay; (2) the reason(s) for the delay; (3) the prospect of the intended appeal; and (4) the degree of prejudice to the other party if an extension of time is granted. The prospect of success of an intended appeal is important. The court will not grant an extension of time to appeal for a hopeless appeal to be pursued. (see Re Mushtaq Imran Ali[2025] HKCA 705, at §§16-17)

10. In the present case, there was delay of about 2 weeks. In the Summons, the Applicant explained that he did not receive the Court’s Decision. The Applicant requested the Court to update his address. The Court’s Decision was issued to the Applicant at the address provided by the Applicant on the Form 86. This was also the address confirmed by the Immigration Department. The Applicant has not filed any Notice of Change of Address until he made the request at the hearing on 12 January 2026. It is the duty of a litigant to give the Court an address to which correspondence or notice can come to his attention in a timely manner. The consequence of any delay or failure occasioned by the ineffectiveness of such an address would fall on the shoulder of the litigant (Re Hasmi Rizwan Imran [2018] HKCA 439, at §15). In the premises, I do not accept that there is valid explanation for the delay.

11. Despite the aforesaid, given the delay was relatively short, I am prepared to grant indulgence if there is merit in the intended appeal. I shall thus proceed to consider the merit of the intended appeal before deciding on the Application.

12. In the Summons and in the supporting Affirmation, the Applicant did not provide any meaningful grounds in support of the intended appeal. The Applicant simply said his life is in danger in his home country and that decisions of the Immigration Department, the Board and the Court were unlawful. The Applicant has failed to provide particulars or explain why such decisions were unlawful.

13. At the hearing on 12 January 2026, the Applicant contended that there were further problems after the Board’s Decision (see §8 above). In so far as there is change of circumstances as alleged, the proper course for the Applicant to take is to file a subsequent claim under section 37ZO of the Immigration Ordinance (Cap 115) based on any alleged change of circumstances, rather than applying for judicial review against the Board’s Decision. The challenge to the Board’s Decision based on any “new” circumstances is misconceived. In any event, the allegations made by the Applicant at the hearing on 12 January 2026 are not supported by any evidence. Such contentions were not even made on oath.

14. I have reviewed the Board’s Decision and the Court’s Decision carefully. The Board had considered and assessed the Applicant’s situation comprehensively and had provided reasons in support of its decision. The Court had reviewed the Board’s Decision and addressed all the grounds relied upon by the Applicant in the Leave Application (§§8-15 of the Court’s Decision). I do not see any errors in the Court’s analysis and reasoning. The Court came to the correct decision that there is no realistic prospect of success in the intended challenge to the Board’s Decision. I do not see any errors of law, procedural unfairness or irrationality in the Court’s Decision. Neither has the Applicant made any such allegations. Accordingly, I fail to see any prospect of success in the intended appeal.

Conclusion

15. As there is no valid explanation for the delay, and more importantly no prospect of success in the intended appeal, I refuse to extend the time for the appeal. The Application is hereby dismissed.

	(Philips Wong)
	Deputy High Court Judge
	(Non-refoulement Claims)

The applicant was unrepresented and appeared in person.

HCAL 172/2021

[2025] HKCFI 5621

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No. 172 of 2021

BETWEEN
	Baig Naseem	Applicant
	and
	Torture Claims Appeal Board/ Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office	Putative Respondent
	and
	Director of Immigration	Putative
		Interested Party

Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review
NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Ord 53 r 3)

Following;

consideration of documents only; or
consideration of documents and the Applicant being absent in open court;

Order by Deputy High Court Judge (Non-refoulement Claims) Philips Wong:

1. Form 86 be amended as follows:- (1) the Torture Claims Appeal Board / Non‑refoulement Claims Petition Office be named as the only Putative Respondent; and (2) the Director of Immigration be named as the only Putative Interested Party.
2. The application for leave to apply for judicial review be dismissed.

Observations for the Applicant:

Introduction

1. By Form 86 filed on 18 February 2021 (the “Form”), the Applicant applied for leave to apply for judicial review (the “Leave Application”) against (1) the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board / Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office (the “Board”) dated 13 January 2021 (the “Board’s Decision”); and (2) the decision of the Director of Immigration (the “Director”) dated 13 November 2018 (the “Director’s Decision”).

2. The Director’s Decision had already been superseded by the Board’s Decision. The Director’s Decision is not susceptible to judicial review once appeal to the Board had been pursued (see Re: Moshsin Ali[2018] HKCA 549, at §§31-45). Accordingly, in so far as the Applicant seeks leave to apply for judicial review in relation to the Director’s Decision, the application fails in limine and is dismissed.

3. In the Form, the Applicant named the Director and the Board as both the proposed respondents and the proposed interested parties. As it is trite that the Board should be the proposed respondent whereas the Director should be the proposed interested party in an application of this sort, I make an order to amend the Form on the Court’s own motion.

4. The Applicant requested an oral hearing for the Leave Application. The hearing took place on 20 October 2025 but the Applicant did not attend the hearing. Notice of Hearing was issued to the Applicant on 2 October 2025 at the address provided by the Applicant on the Form. The Immigration Department has also subsequently confirmed the address to be the Applicant’s latest address on record. On 16 and 17 October 2025, attempts were made to contact and remind the Applicant of the hearing by phone at the number provided by the Applicant on the Administrative Form and on Form No. 8 but it was found out that there was no such number registered.

5. As proper notice of the hearing had been given to the Applicant at the address provided by the Applicant, I consider it appropriate to proceed to determine the Leave Application in the absence of the Applicant.

Background

6. The Applicant’s background, the basis of his claim and the arguments he advanced had been set out in detail in the Board’s Decision, and it is not necessary for me to repeat the same here. The hyperlink to the Board’s Decision[1] is included below for reference.

Discussion

7. The applicable legal principles relating to application of this sort are well established. The role of the Court in a judicial review is not to provide a further avenue of appeal. The primary decision makers are the Director and the Board. Though in non-refoulement cases, the Court will adopt an enhanced standard in scrutinizing the decision of the Board due to the seriousness of the issue at hand, the Court should not usurp the role of the Board. Assessment of evidence, country of origin information (COI) materials, risk of harm, state protection and viability of internal relocation are primarily within the province of the Board (and the Director). The Court will not intervene by way of judicial review unless there are errors of law or procedural unfairness or irrationality in the decision of the Board. (See Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration[2018] HKCA 524, at §14)

8. In the Form and in the supporting Affirmation, the Applicant provided a number of grounds which can generally be summarized as follows:-

(1)  The Director and the Board had failed to take into account many things and issues.
(2)  The Director and the Board made assumptions in the Applicant’s case. They did not know the real situation and condition of Pakistani culture. The Director never visited Pakistan, especially the Applicant’s area.
(3)  The Director had failed to appreciate or give proper importance or weight to the presence of state acquiescence in the Applicant’s case. This had led to an unfair outcome of the case. The Applicant claimed that he was tortured at the behest of and in full collusion with the police and the state law enforcement agencies as well as those in the high ups of the political circles. The Applicant claimed that the whole saga of misfortune was a direct result of misconduct of police officials. The Applicant further submitted that the state should be rendered liable to the Applicant for the acts of the state and its public officials for failing to provide reasonable protection for its citizens under the duty of due diligence.
(4)  The Director had failed to take into account or give enough weight to the Applicant’s argument.
(5)  The Director had failed to consider or give enough weight to the evidence which supports the fact that the police in his country would not be able to protect.
(6)  The Director showed an unfair attitude towards the Applicant or the Applicant’s claims by interpreting COIs which suited his pre-conceived conclusion. There was corruption and incompetence of the administration in the Applicant’s country. Various human rights organizations had complied reports on the matter which support the Applicant’s assertions.
(7)  The Director had failed to attain the high standard of fairness required by the Wednesbury test. As such, the Director’s Decision is unreasonable.
(8)  The Board had failed to make sufficient enquiries before finalizing the determination. The Board had failed to appreciate that the Applicant is in Hong Kong under custody and had limited options to gather evidence. The Board had failed to give sufficient chance to the Applicant to arrange relevant evidence.
(9)  The Director had violated the laws in considering the non-refoulement claim.
(10)  The Board’s Decision and the Director’s Decision were unlawful.

9. I do not consider any of the above Applicant’s contention meritorious. I shall briefly set out my reasons below. In so far as the Applicant’s complaints are made against the Director, I refer to my observation and ruling in §2 above. I shall further consider such complaints as if the complaints were made against the Board as well.

10. In relation to points (1), (4), (5), (7), (9) and (10), the complaints are bare assertions and lack particulars and elaboration. The Applicant has failed to identify precisely what evidence or arguments the Board was alleged to have overlooked, failed to take into account, or failed to give sufficient weight. The Applicant has also failed to explain precisely how the Board had allegedly “violated” the laws. Specifically in relation to point (5), the Board was entitled to reject the Applicant’s claim that the police in Pakistan would not be able to help him (§§56-59 of the Board’s Decision). I see no errors committed by the Board.

11. In relation to Point (2) above, the Applicant has failed to identify what assumption(s) the Board had allegedly made which the Applicant considers to be wrong. Further, there is no legal basis to require the Director or the Board to actually visit the Applicant’s home country to conduct any investigation of a non-refoulement claim. Whilst the inquiry is one of joint endeavor, the burden is on the Applicant to prove his claims. In the present case, the Director and the Board had plainly considered the evidence adduced before deciding on the claims. Again, I see no errors committed by the Board.

12. In relation to Point (3), the Applicant’s claim is based on the alleged threat from his cousin because of a dispute on a piece of land (§§7-9 of the Board’s Decision). There was no allegation or evidence to suggest that the state, the police or any public officials were involved, or that the alleged acts or threats of his cousin were committed on behalf of the state. Accordingly, this ground has no relevance in the context of the case.

13. In relation to point (6), the Applicant has completely failed to demonstrate how the Board had allegedly demonstrated an unfair attitude towards him. The alleged corruption and incompetence of the administration in Pakistan was considered by the Board but the Board was entitled to conclude that there is insufficient evidence showing that the police in Pakistan was not able to help (§§56-59 of the Board’s Decision).

14. Lastly, point (8) above is unmeritorious. The Applicant had been given sufficient time and opportunity to present his case and adduce evidence in support. In fact, at the hearing before the Board on 9 October 2020, the Applicant was specifically asked whether he had new information to provide to the Board. The Applicant responded by indicating that he had no further information to add (§31 of the Board’s Decision).

15. Having fully considered the Board’s Decision. I do not find any error of law, procedural unfairness or irrationality. Neither has the Applicant been able to demonstrate any of the same. There is nothing to indicate that the Board had failed to take into account any relevant matters. The Board’s Decision was comprehensive with adequate reasons provided. The Board was entitled to reject the Applicant’s claims based on its evaluation of the evidence (§§31-61 of the Board’s Decision). I see no errors in the Board’s reasoning. The Board’s Decision satisfies the enhanced Wednesbury test and is not Wednesbury unreasonable or irrational. There is plainly no basis to say that the Board had failed to assess the Applicant’s claims properly.

16. In the premises, I am not satisfied that the Applicant’s intended challenge of the Board’s Decision is reasonably arguable with any realistic prospects of success. Accordingly, I refuse to grant leave for judicial review.

17. Leave application of this sort is meant to be a filtering process and I am not expected to give elaborated reasons for my decision (see Re Zunariyah[2018] HKCA 14, at §23). Suffice for me to state that in reaching the decision, I have considered all the relevant documents before me, as well as the grounds advanced by the Applicant.

Conclusion

18. In the premises, I make an order that the Form be amended as described above and the Leave Application be dismissed.

Dated the 20^th day of November 2025.

(Allen Lee)
for Registrar, High Court

Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence

Notes for the Applicant: If leave has been granted, the Applicant or the Applicant’s solicitors must:
a) serve on the respondent and such interested parties as may be directed by the Court the order granting leave and any directions given within 14 days after the leave was granted (Order 53, rule 4A); b) issue the originating summons within 14 days after the grant of leave and serve it in accordance with Order 53, rule 5; and c) supply to every other party copies of every affidavit which the Applicant proposes to use at the hearing, including the affidavit in support of the application for leave (Order 53, rule 6(5)).		Sent to the Applicant on 20/11/2025 Baig Naseem Applicant’s ref. no.: Nil.		Sent to the Putative Respondent / the Putative Respondent’s solicitors / such Putative Interested Parties as may be directed by the Court / the Putative Interested Parties’ solicitors on 20/11/2025 Torture Claims Appeal Board/ Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office Putative Respondent’s ref. no.: USM 14584/18/11/427/P2907 Director of Immigration Putative Interested Party’s ref. no.: QA T/C 4074/18 (formerly: RBCZ/2001687/14) (T8S21) Department of Justice, Senior Assistant Law Officer (Civil Law) (Civil Litigation Unit 2)

Form CALL-1

[1] https://legalref.judiciary.hk/doc/judg/html/vetted/other/en/2021/HCAL000172_2021_files/the_Board's_Decision.pdf

BAIG NASEEM v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD / NON-REFOULEMENT CLAIMS PETITION OFFICE

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	consideration of documents only; or
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