Case Detail

HCAL 471/2021

[2026] HKCFI 2128

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST

NO 471 OF 2021

_____________

BETWEEN
	Emesiani Ebuka Christopher	Applicant
	and
	Torture Claims Appeal Board/ Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office	Putative Respondent
	and
	Director of Immigration	Putative
		Interested Party

_____________

Before:

Deputy High Court Judge (Non-Refoulement Claims) Jeffrey Chau in Chambers (Open to Public)

Date of Hearing:	4 March 2026
Date of Decision:	24 April 2026

_____________

D E C I S I O N

_____________

Introduction

1. The Applicant has a dual citizenship and is a national in Nigeria and Namibian. On 7 August 2019, he initiated his claim for non-refoulement protection. In gist, he feared that he would be harmed by the people of Boko Haram who killed his father and attempted to force him to convert to Islam. The claim was assessed by the Director of Immigration (the “DOI”) on all applicable grounds. By a decision dated 25 September 2019, the DOI rejected his claim.

2. The Applicant then challenged the decision before the Torture Claims Appeal Board/Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office (the “TCAB”). By the decision dated 3 March 2021 (the “TCAB Decision”), the TCAB dismissed his petition.

3. By a Form 86 filed on 7 April 2021 (the “Form 86”), the Applicant applied for leave to apply for judicial review against the TCAB Decision. By the decision dated 9 February 2026 ([2026] HKCFI 761) (the “Court Decision”), the court dismissed the application on the ground that the intended judicial review against the TCAB Decision was not reasonably arguable. Pursuant to Order 53, rule 3(4) of the Rules of the High Court, the Applicant had 14 days to appeal the Court Decision had he wished to do so. That period had expired.

4. By the Summons filed on 26 February 2026, the Applicant applied for an extension of time to appeal against the Court Decision (the “Application”). The Applicant requested for a hearing and attended the same.

5. The Application was heard before me on 4 March 2026. When asked if he anything to add, he said he had started a new life in Hong Kong, that the US issued a statement about the Christians in Nigeria, that Nigeria was a state of concern because they were killing Christians. He added that he was married and his wife was present in court.

Discussion

6. Under Order 53, rule 3(4) of the Rules of the High Court, where an application for leave to apply for judicial review is refused by a judge, the applicant may appeal against the judge’s order within 14 days after such order.

7. In considering whether to grant an extension of time, the court will take into consideration of: (1) the length of the delay; (2) the reasons for the delay; (3) the prospect of success in the intended appeal; and (4) the prejudice to the putative respondent if the extension of time was granted: Re Mijares Jero Oliveros[2025] HKCA 744 at [12]; Re Adumekwe Rowland Ejike[2019] HKCA 702 at [18]; Re Rahman Wasif[2019] HKCA 299 at [13]. In particular, the prospect of success of the intended appeal is of crucial consideration: Re Kpamou Gbotoi Bernard[2019] HKCA 168 at [15]; Re Irshad Muhammad[2018] HKCA 864 at [16].

8. There was a delay in the Application by a few days.

9. The reason for his delay was set out in his Summons. He states that “The delay was not due to any fault or lack of diligence on the part of the Applicant, but was caused by calculating the deadline. I mistakenly believed that the 14 days period referred only to working or business days. I did not understand that the time limit ran continuously over calender (sic) days, and that general public holidays and court holidays were to be included in the calculation”. I do not consider this a satisfactory explanation for delay. However, given that the delay was relatively short, I am prepared to grant indulgence to extend time if there is merit in the Applicant’s intended appeal.

10. In the Summons and supporting affidavit, the Applicant did not state any grounds for his intended appeal other than an assertion that “I cannot go back to my country because of the threats in my country. Months ago, the President, United States of America label called my Country. A country of particular consign so that means the muslims killing the Christians it’s a threat for a Christian to live in my country and also I have already started a new family here and I have a wife that is why I’m make this application”. I note that these matters have been fully ventilated in the hearings below, and have been considered by the TCAB and this Court: see in particular [9] and [10] of the Court Decision. They do not support any grounds of appeal. It is trite that an appeal is not simply the opportunity for an applicant to re-run the same arguments again without demonstrating where the first instance decision went wrong. I was not satisfied that there were merits in the application for leave to apply for judicial review, and I am still not satisfied that there are merits in the intended appeal.

11. Given the above, I do not consider it necessary to discuss any potential prejudice caused to the putative respondent.

12. Accordingly, I refuse to extend time and the Application is dismissed.

(Jeffrey Chau)
Deputy High Court Judge (Non-Refoulement Claims)

The applicant was unrepresented and appeared in person

HCAL 471/2021

[2026] HKCFI 761

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO 471 OF 2021

BETWEEN
	Emesiani Ebuka Christopher	Applicant
	and
	Torture Claims Appeal Board/ Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office	Putative Respondent
	and
	Director of Immigration	Putative
		Interested Party

Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review
NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Ord 53 r 3)

Following:

	consideration of the documents only; or
	consideration of the documents and oral submissions by the Applicant in open court;

Order by Deputy High Court Judge (Non-refoulement Claims)Jeffrey Chau:

1. Form 86 be amended, naming only the Director of Immigration as the Putative Interested Party
2. The application for leave to apply for judicial review be dismissed.

Observations for the Applicant:

Introduction

1. By a Form 86 filed on 7 April 2021 (the “Form 86”), the Applicant applied for leave to apply for judicial review against the decision by the Torture Claims Appeal Board (the “TCAB”) dated 3 March 2021 (the “TCAB Decision”), which affirmed the decision of the Director of Immigration (the “DOI”) dated 25 September 2019.

2. I amend on my own volition the Form 86 to name only the DOI as the putative interested party.

3. The Applicant requested for a hearing of this application. When asked whether he had anything to add, he said that there has been development in Nigeria’s political situation, with Christians being slaughtered. Recently, US president was contemplating whether to intervene. He added that he is married here with a family in Hong Kong.

Background

4. The Appellant has dual citizenship and is a national in Nigeria and Namibian. In gist, he fears that he will be harmed by people of Boko Haram who killed his father and attempted to force him to convert to Islam. The Applicant’s personal background, the relevant facts and relevant procedural history have been sufficiently set out in the TCAB Decision, which can be viewed through a hyperlink[1]. I shall therefore not repeat them. Unless otherwise specified, TCAB’s abbreviations and descriptions are adopted herein.

Discussion

5. The leave application operates as a filtering process and there is no requirement or expectation to give elaborate reasons for my decision: Re Zunariyah[2018] HKCA 14 at [23]. It is sufficient to state my observations after considering the TCAB Decision and the materials adduced by the Applicant.

6. I remind myself that in a judicial review, this court does not provide a further avenue of appeal. While I also remind myself that in non-refoulement cases, I would adopt an enhanced standard in scrutinizing the decision of the TCAB given the seriousness of the issue at hand, this court would not usurp the role of the TCAB, which together with the DOI are the primary decision-makers. A finding of fact is exclusively within the realm of the TCAB, and this court will not intervene by way of judicial review unless there are errors of law or procedural unfairness or irrationality in the decision of the TCAB: Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration[2018] HKCA 524 at [14(1)]. There must be a reasonably arguable case with a realistic prospect of success before leave for judicial review will be granted: Peter Po Fun Chan v Winnie Cheung (2007) 10 HKCFAR 676.

7. In a proper Form 86, an applicant is required to identify the grounds of judicial review clearly and succinctly: Ho Loy v Director of Environmental Protection (unreported, HCAL 21/2015, 22 December 2016) at [142], and further to make full and frank disclosure of all material facts to be verified by an affidavit.

8. The Applicant’s affidavit dated 7 April 2021 contains various grounds on which the relief is sought. But they are generic and vague grounds which in truth do not point to any error of law, procedural unfairness or irrationality of the TCAB Decision, notwithstanding the fact that the said grounds are sprinkled with such terminology. They merely boil down to assertions that the TCAB failed to consider or sufficiently considered the serious risk that he faced from his enemies or the psychological effect of the threats his enemies made over him.

9. As can be seen from the TCAB Decision, the TCAB took into account all the evidence available and found that on the basis of the same, applying the correct legal principles in respect of all the applicable grounds under the Unified Screening Mechanism, the Applicant’s allegations were insufficient to make out any of the applicable grounds [50-53]. In particular, the TCAB adopted a nuanced approach, and accepted some of his evidence (e.g. [47]). The conclusion that he had not adduced credible evidence to show that he was being targeted and pursued by Boko Haram in Nigeria was well founded, fully taking into account the inherent probabilities of the Applicant’s version of events, including the interactions and violent actions of the Boko Haram [48]. It is incorrect to assert that the TCAB has failed to take into account the matters stated in the grounds. Further, the grounds did not sufficiently challenge the TCAB’s conclusion that relocation is viable, other than asserting that “[his enemies] could easily trace me wherever I hide in my country” ([8] of the grounds), bearing in mind in particular that he could also relocate to Namibia [49, 50(d), 53]. I also see nothing wrong in the TCAB’s consideration of the country of origin information.

10. I have also carefully considered the Applicant’s oral submissions. His oral assertion in Court, even if true, does not assist his case.

a.   The development in Nigeria, even if true, does not affect the TCAB’s conclusion. In particular, there was simply insufficient evidence to show that Boko Haram was targeting the Applicant, and he could be relocated to Namibia;
b.   If and insofar as the Applicant seeks to claim that there has in fact been a significant change of circumstances or new information relevant to his non‑refoulement claim, that may be relevant to the potential procedure in ss. 37ZO and 37ZP Immigration Ordinance (Cap115), but it is not relevant to the present application (Amandeep Kumar v Torture Claims Appeal Board[2019] HKCA 1369 at §13; Poinem v Torture Claims Appeal Board[2020] HKCA 911 at §15);
c.   The Applicant’s family circumstances in Hong Kong are not valid grounds or relevant consideration in relation to his own non-refoulement claim: Oguzie Ikechukwu Charles v Torture Claims Appeal Board, unreported, CACV 469/2021, 21 January 2022, [2022] HKCA 135, at [20].

11. All in all, I do not see any errors of law, procedural unfairness or irrationality in the TCAB Decision, despite rigorous examination and anxious scrutiny. The Applicant’s intended challenge to the TCAB Decision is not reasonably arguable, and accordingly the application for leave to apply for judicial review is dismissed.

Dated the 9^th day of February 2026

(Annson CHEUNG)(Ms)
for Registrar, High Court

Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence

Notes for the Applicant: If leave has been granted, the Applicant or the Applicant’s solicitors must:
a) serve on the respondent and such interested parties as may be directed by the Court the order granting leave and any directions given within 14 days after the leave was granted (Order 53, rule 4A); b) issue the originating summons within 14 days after the grant of leave and serve it in accordance with Order 53, rule 5; and c) supply to every other party copies of every affidavit which the Applicant proposes to use at the hearing, including the affidavit in support of the application for leave (Order 53, rule 6(5)).		Sent to the Applicant on 09/02/2026 Emesiani Ebuka Christopher Applicant’s ref. no.: Nil.		Sent to the Putative Respondent / the Putative Respondent’s solicitors / such Putative Interested Parties as may be directed by the Court / the Putative Interested Parties’ solicitors on 09/02/2026 Torture Claims Appeal Board Putative Respondent’s ref. no.: USM 16375/19/10/24/NI/NAM1 Director of Immigration Putative Interested Party’s ref. no.: QA T/C 567/19 (Formerly RBCZ 10397/19) Department of Justice, Senior Assistant Law Officer (Civil Law) (Civil Litigation Unit 2)

Form CALL-1

[1] https://legalref.judiciary.hk/doc/judg/html/vetted/other/en/2021/HCAL000471_2021_files/the_Board's_Decision.pdf

EMESIANI EBUKA CHRISTOPHER v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD / NON-REFOULEMENT CLAIMS PETITION OFFICE

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