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Personal Injuries Action2021

MOHAMMAD-RIASAT v. WANTON BUSINESS SERVICES LTD

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[2026] HKCFI 567-EN-2026-01-23

MOHAMMAD-RIASAT v. WANTON BUSINESS SERVICES LTD

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HCPI 312/2021

[2026] HKCFI 567

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

PERSONAL INJURIES ACTION NO 312 OF 2021

________________________

BETWEEN

 MOHAMMAD-RIASATPlaintiff
and
 WANTON BUSINESS SERVICES LIMITEDDefendant

________________________

Before:Hon Leung J in Chambers
Date of Hearing:23 October 2025
Date of Decision on Costs:23 January 2026

________________________

DECISION ON COSTS

________________________


1.  On 19 September 2025, this court handed down the judgment after trial (“the Judgment”) in favour of the plaintiff with a nisi costs order (“the Nisi Costs Order”). The defendant now applies to vary the Nisi Costs Order.

BACKGROUND

2.  The background, dispute and findings were set out in the Judgment, which will not be repeated. The same definitions and abbreviations are adopted for the present purpose.

3.  By the Judgment, this court awarded the plaintiff (“MR”) damages in the sum of HK$952,477.44, net of contributory negligence and employees’ compensation received. By the Nisi Costs Order, the defendant (“WBS”) shall pay MR’s costs of the action, including any costs reserved, to be taxed on the District Court scale, while MR’s own costs up to discharge of his legal aid shall be taxed in accordance with legal aid regulations.

4.  On 2 October 2025, WBS filed its summons to vary the Nisi Costs Order (the “Summons”) in the following terms:

(1) WBS do pay MR’s costs of this action (including all costs reserved, if any) up to 15 June 2022 on party and party basis, to be taxed on the District Court scale if not agreed;

(2) WBS shall pay interest on the judgment damages up to 15 June 2022, the total amount of such interest being HK$20,406.18 (“the Judgment Interest”);

(3) No interest shall accrue on the judgment damages after 15 June 2022;

(4) The judgment damages of HK$952,477.44 together with the Judgment Interest of HK$20,406.18 amounting to HK$972,883.62 in total (“the Judgment Sum”) shall remain in Court until further order;

(5) MR shall pay WBS’ costs of this action (including all costs reserved, if any) with certificate for counsel incurred after 15 June 2022 on an indemnity basis, to be taxed on High Court scale if not agreed;

(6) MR shall pay enhanced interest on WBS’ costs (inclusive of counsel’s fees) incurred after 15 June 2022 at 10% per annum above judgment rate (or at any rate as the Court sees fit) from the date of payment of such costs by WBS or its insurer until full payment of the same;

(7) Pursuant to section 18A(4) of the Legal Aid Ordinance (Cap. 91), the Judgment Sum shall be set off against WBS’ costs incurred in this action from 6 July 2023;

(8) Out of the total amount of sanctioned payments of HK$2,400,000.00 paid into Court, the sum of HK$1,427,116.38, representing the balance after deducting the Judgment Sum of HK$972,883.62 together with any accrued interest (if any) shall forthwith be paid out to WBS through its solicitors, Chu & Lau;

(9) Upon agreement or taxation of MR’s costs under paragraph (1) above and WBS’ costs under paragraph (5) above, if WBS’ costs together with interest exceed MR’s costs, the Court shall forthwith pay out to WBS through its solicitors, Chu & Lau, from the Judgment Sum remaining in Court, the net amount of WBS’ costs and interests after deduction of MR’s costs; and

(10) The costs of and occasioned by the Summons be paid by MR to WBS with certificate for counsel, on an indemnity basis to be taxed on High Court scale if not agreed.

5.  MR’s legal aid lasted from 4 November 2020 until 6 July 2023 (the “Legal Aid Period”). Legal Aid Counsel appeared at the hearing of the Summons on behalf of the Director of Legal Aid (“DLA”), and made submission insofar as DLA’s interest in relation to the Legal Aid Period is concerned.

THE PRINCIPLES

6.  O22, r23 of the Rules of the High Court, Cap 4A (“RHC”) provides:

“(1) This rule applies where a plaintiff—

(a) fails to obtain a judgment better than the sanctioned payment; or

(b) fails to obtain a judgment that is more advantageous than a defendant’s sanctioned offer.

(2) The Court may by order disallow all or part of any interest otherwise payable under section 48 of the Ordinance on the whole or part of any sum of money awarded to the plaintiff for some or all of the period after the latest date on which the payment or offer could have been accepted without requiring the leave of the Court.

(3) The Court may order the plaintiff to pay any costs incurred by the defendant after the latest date on which the payment or offer could have been accepted without requiring the leave of the Court.

(4) The Court may also order that the defendant is entitled to—

(a) his costs on the indemnity basis after the latest date on which the plaintiff could have accepted the payment or offer without requiring the leave of the Court; and

(b) interest on the costs referred to in paragraph (3) or sub-paragraph (a) at a rate not exceeding 10% above judgment rate.

(5) Where this rule applies, the Court shall make the orders referred to in paragraphs (2), (3) and (4) unless it considers it unjust to do so.

(6) In considering whether it would be unjust to make the orders referred to in paragraphs (2), (3) and (4), the Court shall take into account all the circumstances of the case including—

(a) the terms of any sanctioned payment or sanctioned offer;

(b) the stage in the proceedings at which any sanctioned payment or sanctioned offer was made;

(c) the information available to the parties at the time when the sanctioned payment or sanctioned offer was made; and

(d) the conduct of the parties with regard to the giving or refusing to give information for the purposes of enabling the payment or offer to be made or evaluated.

(7) The power of the Court under this rule is in addition to any other power it may have to award or disallow interest.”

7.  Pursuant to O22A, r1(2) RHC, upon the satisfaction of the cause or causes of action or to the extent to which the sanctioned payment may be withdrawn or diminished pursuant to O22, and where money in court is a sanctioned payment made in accordance with O22, an order may be made for the money to be paid out. This is the court’s discretion: see MGA Entertainment Inc formerly known as ABC International Traders, Inc doing business as MGA Entertainment v Toy and Trends (Hong Kong) Ltd & Ors [2014] HKCU 1645 at §§15-17.

THE SANCTIONED PAYMENTS

8.  In 2020, MR filed his employees’ compensation claim against WBS. This was settled in January 2021 at the sum of HK$380,000.

9.  On 29 September 2021, MR commenced the present action, claiming against WBS damages in the sum of HK$4,400,000.

10.  On 18 May 2022, WBS made its first sanctioned payment in the sum of HK$1,000,000 (the “1st Sanctioned Payment”). On 25 May 2022, MR’s then solicitors rejected the settlement offer, and demanded a sum of HK$5,050,000. Even higher than the pleaded claim, that was.

11.  On 15 July 2022, WBS increased its sanctioned payment by a sum of HK$300,000. On 22 July and 3 August 2022, MR’s solicitors rejected the settlement offer, and demanded a sum of HK$5,030,000. Negligibly less than the sum demanded previously, that was.

12.  On 15 December 2022 and 2 February 2023, WBS further increased its sanctioned payment by a sum of HK$100,000 respectively. There was no response from MR’s solicitors.

13.  On 6 July 2023, MR’s legal aid certificate was discharged.

14.  On 4 October 2023, WBS further increased its sanctioned payment by a sum of HK$900,000 (the “Final Sanctioned Payment”), bringing the sanctioned payments to a total sum of HK$2,400,000. There was no response from MR.

15.  On 21 October 2024, which was 5 days after the pre-trial review (“PTR”) hearing, WBS reiterated the sanctioned payments to MR and that that would be the ultimate, final and non-negotiable offer. On 17 December 2024, MR rejected and counter-offered to settle at the sum of HK$3,200,000, inclusive of the employees’ compensation received. WBS rejected that.

DISCUSSION

16.  Undoubtedly, MR failed to obtain a better result than the sanctioned payments made by WBS, probably not even the 1st Sanctioned Payment as at the time when it was made back in May 2022. The present case falls within the rule so that this court shall make the orders pursuant to §§(2), (3) and (4) of O22, r23 unless it would be unjust to do so. It is the burden of MR to satisfy this court that this would be unjust, considering the circumstances including those set out in §(6) of the rule.

17.  By letters dated 4 October and 20 October 2025, MR made his representations. So did he at the hearing.

18.  In view of the history set out above and the period during which MR was acting on legal advice, I can only consider his repeated rejections of the settlement offers of WBS were conscious and informed decisions on his part. For the purpose of O22, r23(6), it is not about subjective good faith on his part to negotiate for settlement as MR suggests in his submission. His counter-offers through his then solicitors reflect inadequate readiness to compromise, which is the foundation of any settlement.

19.  Contrary to MR’s submission, I do not agree that it was unfair for WBS to reiterate the Final Sanctioned Payment with a view to settlement when MR was acting in person. I see no reason for suspecting that the maintenance of his stance in rejecting such settlement offer, while acting in person, was adopted out of any insufficient understanding, as he did consciously make his counter-offer in reply. It is also unfair for MR to suggest now that WBS’ negotiation for settlement was mere tactic. The fact of the repeated sanctioned payments, so that MR could have put an end to the litigation by walking away with HK$2.4 million with costs, speaks for itself. MR’s argument that making the order would “dismiss the true meaning of justice” lacks substance for the purpose of r23(6), and defies understanding in the circumstances discussed above.

20.  Therefore, the variation of the Nisi Costs Order in terms of §4(1), (2), (3) and (5) above in my view is justified. So is §4(8) above whereby the balance of the sanctioned payments in court after deducting the Judgment Sum should be paid out to WBS.

21.  The following terms of variation sought may deserve further consideration in view of the DLA’s submission:

(1) Insofar as MR should pay enhanced interest on WBS’ costs payable by him (§4(6) above), the appropriate rate of such interest;

(2) the retention of the Judgment Sum in court pending (3) and (4) below (§4(4));

(3) the set-off between the Judgment Sum and WBS’ costs payable by MR (§4(7) above);

(4) in connection with (2) and (3) above, payment out from the Judgment Sum only after the parties’ respective costs have been ascertained and set off (§4(9) above).

22.  Regarding the above issues, DLA made the following submission:

(1) The enhanced interest rate should be 1% or in any event no more than 5% above judgment rate.

(2) The balance of the Judgment Sum after set off against WBS’ costs incurred after the discharge of legal aid should be paid out to DLA forthwith.

23.  DLA also asks that MR’s own costs during the Legal Aid Period to be taxed in accordance with Legal Aid Regulations. On this, this court actually included such order in the Nisi Costs Order, which WBS does not seek to vary by the Summons. In other words, this part of the Nisi Costs Order simply stands.

ENHANCED INTEREST RATE

24.  The enhanced interest and its rate under O22, r23 are matters of the court’s discretion. In Imran v Intrafor Hong Kong Ltd[2024] HKCFI 100, this court had this to say:

“12. Extreme cases involving complete lack of merits, untruthful account, egregious character and manifest exaggeration have attracted award by the court of enhanced interest rate near the top end of the range: see for instance Grupo Pacifica Incorporada v Worldwide Marine Product Ltd & Ors[2018] HKCFI 2584, [17], [19]; Wong Giles v Donowho Simon Christopher & Anor[2020] HKCFI 1053, [27]; Yeung Ho Man v Shum Kin Leung & Anor[2020] HKCFI 2781, [17], [23]; Angbuhhang Netra Jang v Laing O’Rourke Construction Hong Kong Ltd & Anor[2021] HKCFI 232, [11]–[12]; Thapa Hari Bahadur v Paramount Engineering & Manpower & Anor[2022] HKCFI 1305, [11].

13. The court has awarded relatively lower enhanced interest rate despite finding of exaggeration or dishonesty: see instance Ki Tak Yan v The Incorporated Owners of Kam Yuen Building, Boundary Street[2021] HKCFI 1148, [36] (6% above judgment rate); Tse Lai Sing v Tung Wah Group of Hospitals[2021] HKDC 1095, [16] (5% above judgment rate); Carrie Woo v Lui Mo Dock and Wong Miu Yung[2019] HKDC 348 (4% above judgment rate).

14. For less serious cases, the court has awarded further lower enhanced rates: see for instance Maysun Engineering Co Ltd v International Education and Academic Exchanges Foundation Co Ltd [2011] 2 HKLRD 844 (2% above judgment rate); Chan Lap Kwan v Skypy Ltd & Anor (HCPI 258/2012, [2016] HKEC 1944, 7 September 2016) (2% above judgment rate); Union Glory Finance Inc & Ors v Merrill Lynch International Bank Ltd & Anor (HCA 2494/2013, [2016] HKEC 2688, 13 December 2016) (2.5% above judgment rate); Tsang Chiu Yip v Ho Kwok Leung (HCPI 305/2013, [2016] HKEC 1725, 8 August 2016) (3% above judgment rate).”

25.  DLA also refers to this court’s judgment in So Sin Ying v JV Fitness Ltd[2023] HKCFI 3352 as well as the judgments in Yeung Kiu Ying v Fairwood Fast Food Ltd t/a Fairwood[2020] HKDC 293 and Hui Pui Man v Intercontinental Limousine Company Ltd[2025] HKDC 1721 in support of his submission that the rate should be no more than 5%.

26.  In Cheung Hon Kin v Chubb Life Insurance Company Ltd (formerly known as New York Life Insurance Worldwide Ltd v Ace Life Insurance Company Ltd. respectively)[2024] HKCFI 3623, the Court explained (at §§19-21) the two approaches in determining the enhanced interest rate. The traditional approach is to calculate the interest on each item of expenditure from the actual date of payment. The modified approach, on the other hand, is to order interest at half the rate which the court would otherwise order for the whole of the relevant period. Both WBS and the DLA left that to this court.

27.  Considering the findings in the Judgment as well as the history and conduct of litigation summarised above, I am not inclined to think this as one of the extreme cases warranting the maximum enhanced interest rate of 10%. WBS has provided the receipts of disbursements made by the insurers of WBS since 15 June 2022, but they have yet to settle its solicitors’ bills. I accede to the variation sought in terms of the traditional approach, and set the rate of the enhanced interest at 3% per annum above judgment rate in respect of the costs and disbursements of WBS from their actual payment.

THE SET-OFF AND PAYMENT OUT

28.  Counsel for WBS acknowledges that it is not the usual practice of the court to allow the judgment sum to remain in court to enable the requesting party to enjoy effective security for his costs, unless he manages to demonstrate good reasons: see Darcy Grant Dmetrichuk v Tung Wah Group of Hospitals Wong Fut Nam College [2006] HKCU 1362 at §18; Ng Chi Kwan, Danny Summer & Anor v Yeung Yiu Kwai & Anor HCPI 633/2011 (28 November 2014) at §§31-34; Sandhu Jatinder Singh v Ma Shiu Ming & Anor DCPI 2647/2022 (11 December 2024) at §66.

29.  In the present case, counsel asks this court to take into account the circumstances of the present case as found, namely that MR has admittedly not worked at all since the accident but been depending on comprehensive social security assistance. It is therefore unlikely that MR would have the means to discharge his liability to pay WBS’ costs. WBS may only look to the prospect of recovering its costs from the Judgment Sum to which he is adjudged to be entitled.

30.  WBS’ application that MR should be entitled to no interest on the Judgment Damages after 15 June 2022 caused this court to raise the concern whether this would be unfair if the Judgment Sum is to be further retained in court pending the set-off. Counsel submits that the root cause of MR’s predicament, notwithstanding judgment in his favour, is the consequence he must bear which triggers the operation of O22, r23 against him. Further, while the Judgment Sum remains in court pending set off and payment out, such sum should still attract interest in the suitors’ funds accounts. Hence no substantial unfairness.

31.  As for the DLA, section 18A(4) of the Legal Aid Ordinance, Cap 91 (“the LAO”) provides that the legal aid first charge on any damages or costs (awarded to the aided person) shall not prevent a court allowing them to be set off against other damages or costs in any case where a solicitor’s lien for costs would not prevent it. The set-off sought under §4(7) above refers to WBS’ costs incurred after the discharge of legal aid on 6 July 2023. DLA observes that other than that, the costs are really those between the DLA and WBS during the Legal Aid Period. This brings about DLA’s following submission.

32.  DLA submits that instead of allowing the balance of the Judgment Sum to be withheld by the court pending set-off of the parties’ respective costs during the Legal Aid Period, such balance should be paid out to the DLA pursuant to section 19A of the LAO. DLA is concerned about the delay due to the uncertain and probably different timing of any agreement or, even more so, the taxation of the parties’ respective costs. This, the DLA argues, is unnecessary and avoidable as the position of DLA to pay WBS’ costs during the Legal Aid Period ought not to be doubted. Hence no real concern referred to above which may otherwise justify the proposed stalling of the payment out. Disposal of the matter this way, it is also submitted, would become relatively neater, and further involvement of this court would be saved as well.

33.  I see the sense in the DLA’s submission. So did counsel for WBS so that she also proposed to revise the terms of the variation to accommodate the DLA.

ORDER

34.  Hence the following order:

(1) Order in terms of §4(1), (2), (3), (5) above;

(2) Order in terms of §4(6) above save that the enhanced interest rate is 3% per annum above judgment rate;

(3) The sanctioned payments in court to the extent of the judgment damages of HK$952,477.44 together with the Judgment Interest of HK$20,406.18, amounting to HK$972,883.62 in total (“the Judgment Sum”), shall be disposed of in the following manner:

(a) Pursuant to section 18A(4) of the LAO, the Judgment Sum shall be set off against WBS’ costs incurred in this action from 6 July 2023;

(b) Unless disposed of at the same time pursuant to (4) below, the balance of the Judgment Sum after the set off pursuant to (a) above shall be paid out of court to the DLA forthwith;

(4) Upon agreement or taxation of their respective costs incurred up to 6 July 2023, MR (through the DLA) or WBS, as the case may be, shall pay the other such costs or upon set off, any net amount of such costs, together with interest;

(5) Order in terms of §4(8) above;

(6) The Nisi Costs Order that MR’s own costs during the Legal Aid Period shall be taxed in accordance with legal aid regulation do stand.

COSTS OF THE SUMMONS

35.  The terms of §4(10) above are appropriate. Therefore the costs of and occasioned by the Summons be paid by MR to WBS with certificate for counsel, on an indemnity basis to be taxed on High Court scale if not agreed.

 (Simon Leung)
 Judge of the Court of First Instance
 High Court

The plaintiff appeared in person

Ms Christina Lee, instructed by Chu & Lau, for the defendant

Ms Cynthia Chan, Legal Aid Counsel, appearing on behalf of the Director of Legal Aid

  

[2025] HKCFI 3753-EN-2025-09-19

MOHAMMAD RIASAT v. WANTON BUSINESS SERVICES LTD

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HCPI 312/2021

[2025] HKCFI 3753

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

PERSONAL INJURIES ACTION NO 312 OF 2021

________________________

BETWEEN

 MOHAMMAD-RIASATPlaintiff

and

 WANTON BUSINESS SERVICES LIMITEDDefendant

________________________

Before:Hon Leung J in Court
Dates of Hearing:14-15 January 2025
Date of the Defendant’s Closing Submission:23 January 2025
Date of the Plaintiff’s Closing Submission:13 February 2025
Date of Judgment:19 September 2025

________________________

JUDGMENT

________________________


1.  The plaintiff (“MR”) claims damages for injuries sustained in the course of his work under the employ of the defendant (“WBS”) in 2018. This case was originally set down for trial on the Running List in 2023, but was subsequently removed from the List and re-fixed. Both liability and quantum are in dispute.

BACKGROUND

2.  At the material times, WBS operated a storage and processing of recycled metal workshop at Yuen Long, New Territories (“the Workshop”). On 6 December 2018, MR began working as a general worker for WBS at the Workshop on daily wage basis. The accident at work happened 6 days later in the afternoon of 12 December 2018.

3.  On the day, as part of his job to separate and trim the resalable metal parts from the stock at the Workshop, MR was instructed to cut metal frames and bars by operating a hydraulic shearing machine there (“the Machine”). He carried out the work alone.

4.  From where MR was standing to operate the Machine, his left was the guillotine counter and his right was the control panel. The guillotine counter had a resting surface where the material to be cut would be placed. Above it was the guillotine consisting of the clamping jaw and the blade. The dimensions of the Machine were 264 cm long, 64 cm wide and 155 cm high. The resting surface of the guillotine counter was 68.5 cm above the ground. The Machine weighed about 5 tons.

5.  In the operation, MR would manually feed the material to be cut onto the resting surface of the guillotine counter to his left, and press the buttons on the control panel to his right. Upon the shearing button being pressed, the guillotine would come down with its clamping jaw side clamping the material while its blade side cutting it. The part of the material on the blade side should be cut loose and fall from that side.

6.  At the time, MR intended to cut an angled, roughly L-shaped, metal frame with one member being 100 cm long and the other being 150 cm long. In other words, either member of the frame would far exceed the height of the resting surface of the guillotine counter (68.5 cm) mentioned above. The frame was round in cross section. The evidence shows that it was solid and rigid. As illustrated above, MR used his left hand to hold a member of the frame and placed it horizontally on the resting surface of the guillotine counter. Imagine pictorially the frame lying like a figure ‘7’ on the resting surface, that is, with the other member of the frame jutting out on the other side of the resting surface. MR then pressed the shearing button on the control panel with his right hand, and the guillotine came down.

7.  The clamping of the L-shaped frame initiated rotation, and thus that of member of the frame being held in MR’s left hand and the member jutting out on the other side of the resting surface to turn down towards the ground. That member of the frame, now turned to point to the ground, effectively became a lever which caused the Machine to jack up or prop up, but the blade side very quickly cut the frame, thus causing the Machine to lose the leverage and drop. The Machine landed on the right foot of MR, trapping and crushing his forefoot foot. He was rescued by other workers and sent to the hospital by ambulance.

8.  The Labour Department conducted investigation into the accident on various dates between December 2018 and March 2019. In its report dated April 2019, the Department concluded that the accident happened in the manner as illustrated above. It pointed out that task-specific risk assessment should have been conducted by a competent person in identifying all associated hazards such as that of the Machine being propped up by the metal bar during the operation. Safe working procedures and measures should have included either trimming the frame to be cut first into straight bars. Alternatively, it should have been ensured that the length of the member of the L-shaped frame jutting out of the guillotine counter would not exceed the height of the resting surface of the guillotine counter. It also recommended sufficient safety information, instruction and training as well as sufficient monitoring and control to ensure that the safety measures were strictly followed.

9.  As a result of the accident investigation, WBS was prosecuted for contravention of sections 6A(1), (2)(a) and (3) of the Factories and Industrial Undertakings Ordinance, Cap 59 (“FIUO”). Specifically, WBS failed to provide and to maintain a system of work for cutting metal bars with the use of hydraulic shearing machine that was, so far as was reasonably practicable, safe and without risk to health of MR at work. It also failed to provide such information, instruction, training and supervision as was necessary to ensure, so far as was reasonably practicable, the health and safety of MR at work. WBS pleaded guilty to both summonses, and was convicted and fined by the Magistrate in June 2019 (Cases FLS 5206 & 5207/2019).

10.  MR filed his application against WBS for employees’ compensation in 2020 (DCEC 1325/2020). This was eventually settled at the sum of HK$380,000 (inclusive of interest and advance payment) plus costs in January 2021.

11.  With legal aid, MR commenced the present action in September 2021.

12.  As mentioned, the trial was at one stage set down for trial on the Running List in 2023. However, legal aid to MR was subsequently discharged, and MR became acting in person since late July 2023. In view of this development, a checklist review was fixed to be heard in August 2023. To accommodate MR, the hearing was vacated and adjourned to September 2023. Upon hearing the parties, the master removed the trial from the Running List. Those acting for WBS then proceeded to set down the case for trial on the Fixture List. Hence the trial before this court.

13.  The above background, I find, cannot be disputed as a matter of fact.

THE PLEADED CASES

14.  MR contends that WBS was negligent as well as in breach of its implied contractual duty of care as the employer and its common duty of care as occupier under the Occupiers’ Liability Ordinance, Cap 314 (“OLO”). As to statutory duties, WBS is said to have been in breach of sections 6(1), 6(2) and 31 of the Occupational Safety and Health Ordinance, Cap 509 as well as sections 24 and 27 of the Occupation Safety and Health Regulation, Cap 509A (collectively “OSH”).

15.  The particulars of breach, albeit elaborate, are essentially based on the alleged failure of WBS to carry out risk assessment as well as to provide and to monitor a system of work which would ensure the safety of MR in operating the Machine in carrying out the metal cutting work.

16.  In defence, WBS denies the alleged breach on its part. It contends that MR should have fed the L-shaped metal frame horizontally to the guillotine counter but with the other member of the frame pointing upwards or vertically. MR should have maintained the frame in such position throughout the cutting process. MR is also said to have stood too close to the Machine when it was in operation. He is said to have operated the Machine in the manner which gave rise to the risk of injury unknown to WBS and without fault on its part. On this basis, MR allegedly failed to exercise reasonable care of himself at work, which caused or contributed to the occurrence of the accident.

17.  No new issue arises out of the reply, save that MR contends that no training was provided to him except for verbal instruction received on what to do when he commenced his employment and work at the Workshop.

18.  Regarding quantum, MR claims damages, net of employees’ compensation received as mentioned above, exceeding HK$4.4 million.

ISSUES

19.  Broadly the issues are:

(1) whether the accident was caused by breach of duties on the part of WBS;

(2) whether the accident was caused by or contributed to by the negligence of MR; and

(3) quantum of damages.

WITNESSES

20.  MR gave evidence.

21.  On behalf of WBS, Mr Law Tak Wing (“Law”), the supervisor of the Workshop at the time, gave evidence.

22.  The principles governing the assessment of the evidence of witnesses are often cited. Essentially, the court will take into account, amongst other things, the inherent and relative consistency and plausibility of a witness with reference to the undisputed and indisputable evidence as well as the evidence of the other witnesses. Demeanour of witnesses is not irrelevant but must be taken into account with abundant caution. See for instance Hui Cheung Fai & Anor v Daiwa Development Ltd & Ors, HCA 1734/2009 (8 April 2014) at §§77-83.

BREACH OF DUTY

23.  Reliance on the OLO is misplaced. The accident arose out of the operation of the Machine in cutting the metal frame. This was not an accident caused by any unsafe condition of the premises. The accident did not arise out of MR’s presence at or access to or egress from that part of the Workshop. This was an activity tort. See for instance Leung Kam v Max Wealth Engineering Ltd[2024] HKCFI 3456 (at §65).

24.  The particulars of breach were pleaded with duplication. Further, the particulars founding the alleged breach of OSH substantially overlap with that of FIUO, for which WBS has been prosecuted and convicted as mentioned. Section 19 of the FIUO provides that the Ordinance does not confer a right of action in civil proceedings in respect of breach of section 6A.

25.  That said, the convictions, namely, WBS’ failure to provide a safe system of work as well as to give sufficient instructions, training and supervision to MR in respect of operating the Machine to carry out the metal cutting work at the material time is admissible pursuant to section 62 of the Evidence Ordinance, Cap 8. Short of reversing the legal burden on the part of MR, the factual basis constituting the charges, which WBS admitted and hence its convictions, binds it and is relevant to the issue of liability.

26.  After coming to Hong Kong in 1992, MR has worked as loading and unloading casual worker, general construction site worker as well as security guard. As mentioned, it was his 7th day at work under the employ of WBS. During the whole period, MR has been carrying out metal cutting work by using the Machine. Counsel for WBS accepts in her submission that MR was at the time not a very experienced worker in his job.

27.  According to his declaration to the Labour Department during the accident investigation and his evidence at the trial, MR was verbally told what to do on the first day of his employment by WBS. There was no training or warning as to the risk in operating the Machine at work. Nor was there supervision during the course of his work when the accident happened. He stated the same in his evidence.

28.  The Labour Department’s investigation documents, including the photographs depicting the Machine, cast further light on the circumstances surrounding the occurrence of the accident. There were 6 buttons on the control panel of the Machine. The mode button was switched to manual to enable MR to operate the Machine as mentioned above. Amongst others, there was the shearing button and, under it, the stop and inching return button, which controlled the motion of the guillotine. The function of the shearing button speaks for itself while pressing the stop and inching button would halt the shearing motion. No complaint is made about difficulty to reach these buttons from where MR was standing at the time. Nor is that made about their proper functioning at the time.

29.  Below the control panel on the body of the Machine were affixed 2 print-outs, one in Chinese and one in English, facing MR. They set out 5 safety guidelines for the operation of the Machine. According to Law, he believed that MR read English, and he also instructed MR to pay attention to those guidelines. Whether or not that is true, the guidelines, literally and properly understood, were essentially geared towards addressing the risk of injury arising out of exposure of body parts to the possible guillotine motion when the Machine was power-on or in operation. These guidelines do not readily appeal to a reader as warning against any other risk of accident arising out of the operation of the Machine.

30.  The investigation report of the Labour Department also offered to explain how the Machine dropping from the propped-up state came to land on the foot of MR. The propping up of the Machine was believed to have just slightly shifted its position towards MR. The evidence shows that MR was wearing safety shoes at the time of the accident. However, his shoes could not withhold the weight of the Machine dropping on him. Hence trapping and crushing of his right forefoot.

31.  According to Law, the Machine was very heavy and was not expected to vibrate or shift position during its operation until what happened in the present case. He knew of no similar occurrence prior to the accident. In his evidence in court, MR also expressed that he did not expect that to happen. Counsel therefore argues that the risk of the propping up and shifting of position of the Machine in the course of the metal cutting motion was not reasonably foreseeable. But is this the answer to the question of whether WBS should be liable for the accident?

32.  One must not lose sight of the fact that the accident in the present case was a composition of various factors in sequence, the propping up and shifting of position of the Machine being the concluding factor. That concluding factor was the immediate physical cause of MR’s injury, but remained a constituent part of the manual operation of the metal cutting by the Machine. The duty of WSB was that towards ensuring a safe system of work involving such operation.

33.  The system of work started with the feeding of the metal frame into the Machine. According to Law, the Machine was used to cut metal frames and bars, including H-bars, as well as electric cables of various shapes. In other words, that the material to be cut would come in different shapes, sizes, cross sections and makes was known or reasonably foreseeable. Apparently, so was the possibility that the material being cut could move in the cutting process. Hence Law’s evidence that MR was expected to hold the material to be cut both properly and firmly. MR was adamant, and I accept, that he was holding in his left hand a member of the L-shaped frame after the frame had been placed on the resting surface of the guillotine counter.

34.  As mentioned, Law stated his expectation that one member of the L-shaped frame should have been maintained in a vertical position throughout the cutting process. That, it appears to me, is not difficult to understand in the light of what happened in the present case. Pushing the consideration further, one may even suggest that if the worker had actually held the vertical member in his hand on his side, this might have helped ensuring relatively better grip to resist any movement which might be caused by the clamping or shearing motion in the process. In any event, as illustrated above, that was not the manner in which MR was holding the frame at the time.

35.  Was it reasonable to leave it to the judgment of MR to how to proceed with the cutting process by operating the Machine, including how to feed and hold the material to be cut? Counsel cites what the court said in So Chung Kwong v Ho Kuen & Anor [2000] 3 HKLRD 241 (at 249F-I) about the circumstances relevant to the consideration of breach and contributory negligence. No quarrel is expected as to that. However, the work process in the present case, contrary to counsel’s submission, cannot be categorised as simple and ordinarily risk-free.

36.  As mentioned, the materials to be cut came in various shapes, sizes, cross sections and makes. The risk of accident resulting from movement of the material in the shearing process, if not held properly and tightly, was reasonably foreseeable. In the present case, the risk was compounded by the fact that it was an L-shaped frame round in cross-section as well as hard and rigid weighing some 8 to 10 kg. Further, both members of the frames far exceeded the height of the resting surface of the guillotine counter of the Machine, about which the investigation report of the Labour Department took issue. In these circumstances, it became all the more important for the worker to prepare the metal parts to be cut and, in the case of an L-shaped metal frame, to feed the frame properly as well as to hold it properly and firmly in the cutting process.

37.  Before it was reasonable to leave it to his own judgment at work on the spot, the attention of MR should have been brought to the relevant features of the various materials to be cut which could give rise to safety concern in the course of the work as mentioned above. As fairly accepted by counsel, MR was at the time not very experienced in his job. On the basis of the factual constituents of its convictions on its guilty plea to the industrial summonses, WBS admittedly failed to carry out the specific safety risk assessment at the work in question. On the basis of Law’s evidence, the proper manner of carrying out the work in question was actually known or reasonably perceivable, but the same, I find, was not brought to the attention of MR as part of his instruction or training.

38.  Law stated that MR was every now and then reminded to pay attention to work safety. However, that, even if true, would have been general and non-specific. That MR managed to carry out his work by operating the Machine for 6 consecutive days before the accident is neither here nor there. The case of Lam Ka Lok Louis v Swire Properties Management Ltd HCPI 914/2003 (30 April 2005) (at §39) cited by counsel is distinguishable.

39.  Where it was reasonably foreseeable that personal injury of some kind could result from the absence of a safe system of work involving the manual operation of the Machine, the employer is not absolved from liability for fault causing the accident just because the injury came about in some unforeseeable manner or the particular form of injury was unexpected. See for instance the relevant case law discussed in Charlesworth & Percy on Negligence (16th ed) at §§5-146 to 5-158.

40.  All things considered, I find that WBS should still be liable for the accident in the present case.

CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE

41.  In the light of the above discussion, I find that the extent to which MR could be said to have contributed to the occurrence of the accident was at most his failure to stay sufficiently alert to the movement of the metal frame in his hand so as to enable him to react by pressing the stop and inching return button to halt the cutting process.

42.  Counsel refers to numerous decided cases. As acknowledged, the comparison is fact-sensitive. In my view, the case of MR falls below the degree of blameworthiness warranted by the circumstances of those cases cited. Therefore, I decline from adopting the 25% contributory negligence as submitted. 10%, I find, should be top rate in the circumstances of this case.

QUANTUM

43.  MR advances a claim for a total sum, net of employees’ compensation received, in excess of HK$4.4 million.

Injuries and treatment

44.  The following account of the injuries and treatment received by MR as given by counsel is evidenced by the documents.

45.  Due to the accident, MR sustained multiple open fractures to the toes of his right foot. An emergency operation was performed on 13 December 2018. The 1st to 4th toes were temporarily fixed with K-wire, and the 5th toe was given revision amputation. The wounds were heavily contaminated with metal dust, and debridement was necessary. The forefoot became infected and gangrenous changes took place at all the remaining toes. Amputation of all the toes at metatarsal level was performed on 20 December 2018. The wound did not heal, and wound coverage was done on 29 December 2018. His condition became stable and he was discharged on 15 January 2019. He was followed up by physiotherapist, occupational therapist, prosthetist and orthopaedic surgeons.

46.  MR attended the Prosthetic and Orthotic Department of the Tuen Mun Hospital 8 times between mid-January 2019 and early October 2020. He was prescribed a toe filler which he uses daily by fitting the filler into a sports shoe as well as a cosmetic foot which he uses when he needs to expose his feet such as during religious and social activities.

47.  MR has received 40 sessions of physiotherapy at the Pok Oi Hospital, which concluded in January 2020 when his progress became static. He was able to walk indoors independently for 30 minutes with one elbow crutch and prosthesis. The therapist reported that he needed supervision at outdoor walking.

48.  MR has received occupational therapy, at the Pok Oi Hospital for 11 sessions for desensitisation training and at the Tuen Mun Hospital for 14 sessions for work conditioning. During the last of these sessions in September 2019, MR was found to be unable to match the demands of his pre-accident job as a general worker in metal recycling.

49.  At the initial stage after the amputation, MR was also reported to have suffered from phantom pain at the injured site, and was referred to the Department of Anaesthesia and Operating Theatre Services at the Tin Shui Wai Hospital. Pain interventions were performed on 2 occasions, which MR claimed to have been effective in reducing his pain by half. The medical report suggests that by the time of his discharge from the department in January 2021, he had complete pain relief, entailing pain medication treatment daily for a week. His last appointment was in late March 2022.

Present complaints

50.  At the time when he was jointly examined by the orthopaedic experts engaged by the parties respectively in early August 2021, MR still complained about, amongst others, the following problems:

(1) continuous right foot pain with numbness over stump and sole, requiring painkiller daily;

(2) feeling burning sensation with walking or standing for about 30 minutes;

(3) need to use walking stick for outdoor activities while holding furniture indoors;

(4) pain increase when foot hit on something;

(5) swelling and tenderness over scar;

(6) right lower limb weakness; feeling pins and needles during cold weather or in room with air-conditioning on;

(7) inability to run or squat; great difficulty in using stairs with tolerance of up to 10 steps and that in climbing slope;

(8) difficulty in sleeping;

(9) need to sit down for taking shower or changing clothes;

(10) need to be accompanied if using public transport;

(11) inability to do help wife with housework.

Medical expert opinion

51.  Dr Lam Yan Kit and Dr Ko Put Shui Peter were instructed on behalf of MR and WBS respectively, who produced their joint expert report dated 5 November 2021 after the joint medical examination mentioned above.

52.  Apart from noting down his background information, the experts set out their observation about MR’s ambulation during the examination. They also agreed on the nature of injuries, their complications and the residual symptoms based on the medical records, reports and their examination. They agreed that the treatment, investigation and rehabilitation in the present case were adequate. They too noted that MR’s condition had reached more or less stable and static by late 2019 to early 2020. As mentioned, MR was considered stable enough for referral to medical assessment board for assessment. The experts agreed that no further treatment would be necessary except for the replacement of worn out prosthesis.

53.  The experts agreed that MR should be able to cope with his daily activities and social activities, though unable to play cricket or ball game which he claimed to have used to do. The experts did not differ significantly in their assessment of the degree of impairment of the whole person resulting from MR’s injuries. However they differed in respect of the degree of loss of earning capacity suffered by MR.

54.  In practical terms, Dr Lam opined that MR should be unable to resume his pre-accident job, but suitable instead for sedentary type of jobs such as cashier or salesman. Dr Ko opined that MR should be able to return to his pre-accident job as a warehouse general worker with mild decrease in work efficiency and effectiveness. The caveat was that MR would have to be accommodated for modified duty, regular short break of about 15-20 minutes after continuous standing for an hour or 2 and relieved from heavy manual labour involving over 10 kg. Alternative jobs not requiring heavy exertion and prolonged standing and walking, such as car-park attendant, security guard, storekeeper, telephone operator, toll collector or cashier, would also be suitable.

55.  On 7 June 2022, the medical experts rendered their second joint report whereby they agreed that the cost of replacement of prosthesis quoted by the public hospital is reasonable, which MR has paid HK$28,218.66. This prosthesis is advised to be used only for occasions when he has to expose his feet during social activities. It is expected to last about 3.5 years before replacement on the assumption that he has to attend such activities twice a week.

56.  Surveillance on MR was carried out on divers dates between July 2020 and January 2021 as well as in March 2023. The medical experts were given the opportunity of viewing the video recording and perusing the surveillance reports. That led to their third joint report dated 13 April 2023. The experts observed that MR on the occasion in January 2021 used one stick and walked with mild limping gait in sports shoes. He held his stick with his right and left hand interchangeably. The video did not show obvious inconsistency when compared with the findings during the experts’ joint examination.

57.  On the first occasion in March 2023, MR was seen using an umbrella, walking with slight limp. He was seen able to climb about 10 steps of stairs slowly with his umbrella as support without holding onto the handrail of the staircase. On the second occasion in March 2023, MR was seen sitting on a bench exercising his right ankle and foot. There was a brief moment when he was able to walk unaided without noticeable limping. Counsel rightly points out that MR actually walked faster than his wife at the time. MR was also able to cope with gentle slopes without problem. The video showed improvement in his ambulatory status. Dr Ko added that MR had obvious further improvement especially in terms of his likelihood of walking independent of aid and his gait stability.

58.  Both medical experts maintained their respective assessments on the degree of impairment of the whole person and loss of earning capacity of MR.

59.  MR was given sick leave from the date of the accident (12 December 2018) to 17 June 2020. Dr Lam considered that that being endorsed by the MAB was reasonable. On the contrary, referring to, amongst others, the physiotherapy and occupational therapy reports and his referral to medical board assessment by early 2020, Dr Ko opined that MR has reached maximum medical improvement by late 2019 to February 2020 when reasonable sick leave should have ended. Record of his good recovery was confirmed by the Yuen Long outpatient clinic in early March 2020. The record also shows that he defaulted his follow up treatment for hypertension as he decided to take the trip to Pakistan.

60.  According to MR, his current orthopaedic follow-up attendance is at annual intervals. The experts are agreed that MR does not need any further treatment apart from replacement of the worn out prosthesis.

61.  For the toe filler, the experts agreed that replacement would be needed every 5 years with costs in the private sector at HK$8,000 and minimally if done in the public sector.

Pain, suffering and loss of amenities (PSLA)

62.  MR claims general damages in the sum of HK$800,000. Counsel cites the following cases as comparables:

Hung Sau Fung v Lai Ping Wai [2016] HKLRD 106

Lo Ping Kin v Yuen Tsz Shing trading as Wing Tao Professional Recycle DCPI 2474/2013 (27 April 2016)

Ho Yuk Yin v Lau Ah Lung & Anor HCA 2141/1984 (12 November 1985)

Ho For Sang v Lau Sun Choi & Anor [2003] 1 HKLRD A15

63.  MR underwent partial amputation of his forefoot, which counsel accepts was serious injury. However, the evidence objectively reveals satisfactory recovery, including noticeable improvement since 2021 and by early 2023. Besides managing his daily activities without assistance, albeit with inconvenience, MR’s need to rely on walking aid outdoors, I find, was exaggerated. To a certain extent, he also manages climbing slope and stairs. He did manage to travel to Pakistan between March 2020 and now.

64.  All the circumstances considered, I find the reasonable award should be in the region of HK$700,000.

Loss of earnings

65.  In court, MR agreed that, as depicted in the surveillance video recording taken in early 2023, he could walk without support of his umbrella if this was level ground. He added that he used to manage walking even faster before the accident than the speed at which he walked without aid now. However, the fact that MR has been improving to the state as depicted in the surveillance video recording taken in early 2023, in my judgment, is undeniable.

66.  Counsel submit that factoring in an additional period of absence from work after the end of reasonable sick leave, MR should be expected to have been capable of resuming work of the appropriate kind by mid-May 2020. I am prepared to allow reasonable period of post-accident absence from work until mid-June 2020. That was a period of 18 months. That brings the period of absence from work to effectively coincide with the end of the reasonable sick leave according to Dr Lam.

67.  As mentioned, amongst the conditions of MR is hypertension, which he somehow attributes to the accident. According to him, he was fit before the accident, but became unable to exercise after that. Hence his obesity (nearly 88 kg) and hypertension. Objectively the medical records suggest the state of hypertension after the accident, but there is no prior record of MR’s such state for comparison. No definite finding could be made in this respect. That said, MR himself did not categorise his hypertension as the reason preventing him physically from re-entering the job market at all. This in my judgment must be the case as a matter of common sense.

68.  As mentioned, the medical experts expressed different opinion in respect of MR’s capacity to return to his pre-accident job as a general warehouse worker. Dr Lam opined in the negative. Dr Ko’s opinion, though different, was apparently not without qualification as mentioned. The likelihood of MR being accommodated in terms of what Dr Ko recommended in order to enable him to return to his pre-accident job, in my judgment, is unrealistic. Counsel fairly accepts that, so that the accident has effectively rendered MR incapable of returning to his pre-accident work. Realistically MR has become suitable for less physically demanding work such as car park attendant, security guard, store keeper, toll collector or cashier as recommended by both experts.

69.  The Plaintiff was born on 27 February 1974 and aged 44 at the time of the accident. He is now about 51.5 years old. Counsel does not argue about the normal retirement age of 65 for manual workers like MR. According to the Personal Injury Tables Hong Kong 2019 Table 9, at 2.5% discount rate the multiplier for age 51 is 11.53 and the multiplier for age 52 is 10.83. Counsel proposes the median of 11.18 as the appropriate multiplier for MR’s working life. I accept that.

70.  MR claims monthly earning in the sum of HK$15,600 per month of 26 working days. WBS disputes that. The fact was that MR met his accident on the 7th working day since the commencement of his employment. According to the earnings records of 2 similar workers employed in the Workshop for the year 2018, they worked on average 24.33 days and 24.28 days in a month. Hence basis for believing that MR would have worked and earned as such but for the accident. Objectively that would appear to be reasonable, if one factors in statutory holidays and days when MR might have taken for trips to Pakistan. On this basis, MR would have earned from working for WBS HK$(600 x 24 days) = HK$14,400 per month at the time of the accident.

71.  By pleading, MR contends that he would have secured a job as a general worker entitling him to earnings similar to those of construction site general worker, which would exceed $1,000 per day. He testified that he would have asked his friends if they might introduce him to jobs with such higher pay. The factual basis for such contention is unknown, perhaps apart from his own assertion. The fact was that MR met a prior accident in March 1999, which rendered him unable to work for about 5 to 6 years. When he subsequently worked in constructions sites, he had to avoid heavy manual labour. That caused him to change to work as a security guard. It was after changes of jobs, mainly part-time, when he finally joined WBS as a general worker. He was on comprehensive social assistance. For the purpose of the present assessment, I am not convinced about his asserted prospect of taking on or moving to some other jobs giving him higher pays. That I find was sheer self-serving speculation.

72.  Counsel proposes to calculate MR’s loss of earnings on the basis of his pre-accident level of earning from WBS, though WBS has apparently closed down the Workshop by now due to business environment. As such, counsel borrows reference from government statistics. The December 2018 edition of the quarterly report of wage and payroll statistics suggested that the earnings of a general worker were HK$12,885. The June 2020 edition suggests that the earnings have increased to HK$14,248. Hence an increase during the period between the accident and the end of reasonable sick leave mentioned above by about 10.6%. Applying this to the average monthly earnings of HK$14,400, one gets the increased level of HK$15,926. The median during the period was therefore HK$15,163. On this basis, loss of earnings plus 5% MPF benefits suffered by MR since the date of the accident until mid-June 2020 should be: HK$15,163 x 18 months x 105% = HK$286,580.70.

73.  Counsel proposes to adopt the monthly rate of HK$15,163 for the calculation of further loss of earnings. The reason is that the September 2024 Edition of the statistics actually suggests a minimal drop of about 1% in monthly income level (presumably factoring in the aftermath of COVID-19 pandemic). On this basis, the loss of earnings of MR at HK$15,163 per month plus 5% MPF benefits since the end of reasonable sick leave until now would be HK$15,163 x 63 months x 105% = HK$1,003,032.45.

74.  MR should have been capable of taking up alternative job, albeit at lower wages, since mid-June 2020 as mentioned above. His evidence in respect of alleged unsuccessful attempts to find a job after the expiry of sick leave is both unconvincing and actually contradicted by his pleaded stance. By pleading, MR claims on the basis that he would have worked as a security guard earning HK$10,800 a month 3 months after the end of his sick leave. MR must abide by such pleaded stance.

75.  That said, the rate of monthly income as a security guard is not substantiated by any documentary evidence. Again borrowing the government statistics, counsel points out that the June 2020 edition suggests such job on shift system should earn about HK$12,912 a month while the September 2024 edition suggested that monthly income has increased to HK$14,936. Hence a median of HK$13,924. I accept such proposition for the calculation.

76.  In the premises, had MR resumed working by taking up the alternative job as security guard after mid-June 2020, he would have earned, inclusive of 5% MPF benefits, HK$13,924 x 63 months x 105% = HK$921,072.60. His partial loss of earnings for the period was HK$1,003,032.45 – 921,072.60 = HK$81,959.85.

77.  MR’s total loss of earnings and MPF benefits since the accident until now was therefore: HK$286,580.70 + 81,959.85 = HK$368,540.55.

Loss of future earnings & earning capacity

78.  On the basis as mentioned above, MR’s loss of earnings, inclusive of MPF benefits, from today until normal retirement will be HK$(15,926 - 14,936) x 12 x 11.18 x 105% = HK$139,459.32.

79.  MR claims for loss of earning capacity in the sum of HK$200,000. This would have been to compensate for a person’s handicap in the labour market manifested in the risk of inability, due to disadvantage caused by his disabilities, to remain gainfully employed in his post-accident job: see Moeliker v A Reyrolle & Co Ltd [1977] 1 WLR 132; Chan Wai Tong & Anor v Li Ping Sum [1985] HKLR 176. The usual practice is to award a sum roughly representing the income for a nominal period of unemployment or underemployment as a result.

80.  In the present case, MR never returned to work since the end of his sick leave. The above assessment of his loss of earnings is based on his partial loss due to the relatively lower income from his alternative sedentary job which he should have been capable of securing. There is no basis for suggesting the risk of inability to remain so employed due to his conditions attributable to the accident. Hence no further award in respect this head.

Future medical expenses

81.  MR claims toe filler prosthesis as advised by the medical experts at HK$8,000 per unit from the private sector for 7 units, ie a total sum of $56,000. As for the cosmetic foot, this is agreed to cost HK$28,218.66 per unit with expected durability of 3.5 years. MR claims 10 replacements at HK$282,186.60.

82.  Counsel does not dispute MR’s life expectancy of 83 years. From age 51.5 to age 83, the remaining life expectancy is 31.5. Table 28 shows that for a term certain of 31 years, the multiplier is 21.66 and for 32 years the multiplier is 22.12. Counsel proposes the median of 21.89 as the appropriate life multiplier for the future expenses on prostheses. I accept that.

83.  Factoring in the multiplier mentioned above, counsel proposes that for the prosthesis with a life of 5 years, the cost of 5 units should be allowed, ie HK$8,000 x 5 = $40,000 while the cost of 7 replacements of the cosmetic foot should be allowed, ie HK$28,218.66 x 7 = HK$197,530.62. Hence the total future medical expenses of HK$40,000 + 197,530.62.60 = HK$237,530.62. I accept the quantification.

Miscellaneous special damages

84.  Medical expenses are claimed at HK$31,018.66, travelling expense at HK$2,000 and tonic food at HK$5,000. Only 2 receipts have been produced, namely that for the cosmetic prosthesis at HK$28,218.66 mentioned above and that for manual wheelchair at HK$1,500. Hence a total amount of HK$29,718.66.

85.  Counsel rightly points out that MR was on comprehensive social allowance, and received free medical treatment from the public hospitals. The tonic food, according to MR, was mutton and chicken soup, which would not be expensive. Accepting the readiness of the court to allow nominal sum even in the absence of cogent evidence in support, counsel proposes a total sum of HK$35,000 for all these items of special damages. I find that to be reasonable and allow such sum.

Summary

86.  In summary, the quantum is arrived at as follows:

Pain, suffering and loss of amenitiesHK$700,000.00
Pre-trial loss of earnings & MPFHK$368,540.55
Future loss of earnings & MPFHK$139,459.32
Future medical expensesHK$237,530.62
Miscellaneous special damagesHK$ 35,000.00
Total:HK$1,480,530.49

87.  Discounted by 10% on account of contributory negligence, the quantum becomes HK$1,332,477.44. Net of employees’ compensation received, the quantum becomes HK$1,332,477.44 – 380,000 = HK$952,477.44.

88.  Interest on general damages (PSLA) accrues from the date of writ to today at 2% per annum while interest on pre-trial special damages (loss of earnings and miscellaneous special damages) accrues from the date of accident until today at half judgment rate.

ORDER

89.  Judgment is entered in favour of MR against WBS in the sum of HK$952,477.44 with the aforesaid interest. Judgment interest runs at the judgment rate from today until full payment.

90.  Following this event, I make a nisi order that WBS shall pay MR’s costs of this action, including any costs reserved, to be taxed on the District Court scale if not agreed. MR’s own costs up to the discharge of his legal aid shall be taxed in accordance with legal aid regulation. In the absence of application within 14 days to vary, the nisi order shall become absolute without further order.

 (Simon Leung)
 Judge of the Court of First Instance
 High Court

The plaintiff appeared in person

Ms Christina Lee, instructed by Chu & Lau, for the defendant